Some of the minimally manipulable Pareto optimal and anonymous social choice functions can be interpreted as status quo voting. 1 Introduction. The well-known ...
Oct 11, 2006 · This paper is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous social choice function for three alternatives ...
This paper is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous social choice function is manipulable.
This paper is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous social choice function is manipulable.
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Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity. METEOR, Maastricht University School of Business and Economics. METEOR Research Memorandum. No. 026 https ...
Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability - ScienceDirect.com
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We compare the manipulability of different choice rules by considering the number of manipulable profiles. We establish the minimal number of such profiles.
This paper is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous social choice function is manipulable.
Abstract This paper is concerned with the minimal number of proles at which a unanimous and anonymous social choice function for three alternatives is ...
This paper is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous social choice function for three alternatives is manipulable.
The main result of this paper is that unanimity rules with status quo are the minimally manipulable rules among all anonymous surjective rules, provided n>m ≥ 3 ...