We investigate the mechanism design problem when the agents and the mechanism have computational restrictions.
We investigate the mechanism design problem when the agents and the mechanism have computational restrictions.
Abstract: We investigate the mechanism design problem when the agents and the mechanism have computational restrictions. In particular, we examine how results ...
We investigate the mechanism design problem when the agents and the mechanism have computational restrictions.
Our problem is to design a mechanism that will induce the participants to truthfully reveal their private information. The Generalized Vickrey Auction. 1. Each ...
A mechanism specifies the actions available to each agent and the outcomes of each action profile. We assume that agents have utilities over outcomes. There are ...
Using limited information provided by the mechanism, we design strategies for software agents to make bids intelligently. In particular, we derive ...
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Furthermore, among software agents, it might be more desirable to construct mechanisms that do not rely on the ability to make payments. In this paper, we ...
Oct 13, 2015 · This paper studies mechanism design when agents are maxmin expected utility maximizers. A first result gives a general necessary condition ...
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Researchers and developers are creating a variety of autonomous economically motivated software agents endowed with algorithms for maximizing profit or utility.