ABSTRACT. We study the complexity of finding pure Nash equilibria in voting games over well-known restricted preference domains,.

[15], consider three popular tie-breaking rules (lexicographic, random-candidate, and random-voter) and two types of voters' attitude: lazy voters, who prefer ...

It is demonstrated that in almost all cases the complexity of finding pure Nash equilibria in voting games over well-known restricted preference domains, ...

We study the complexity of finding pure Nash equilibria in voting games over well-known restricted preference domains, such as the domains of single-peaked ...

This paper considers the setting where all voters are strategic, and provides a complete analysis of the setting with two candidates, and shows that for ...

ABSTRACT. In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is as- sumed that a group of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a ...

Trembling hand (TH) equilibria were introduced by. Selten in 1975. Intuitively, these are Nash equi- libria that remain stable when players assume that.

Jun 28, 2022 · Abstract. We formalize a voting model for plurality elections that com- bines Iterative Voting and Calculus of Voting. Each iteration,.

Abstract. We present a systematic study of Plurality elections with strategic voters who, in addition to having preferences over election winners, ...

This paper investigates the nature of multicandidate electoral equilibria under three different classes of single-ballot-single-winner voting systems: (1) ...