We compare the manipulability of different choice rules by considering the number of manipulable profiles. We establish the minimal number of such profiles.

In choosing new parliamentary representatives most democracies apply voting procedures that select among the top-ranked candidates reported by the voters.

We compare the manipulability of different choice rules by considering the number of manipulable profiles. We establish the minimal number of such profiles for ...

We establish the minimal number of such profiles for tops-only, anonymous, and surjective choice rules, and show that this number is attained by unanimity rules ...

We establish the minimal number of such profiles for tops-only, anonymous, and surjective choice rules, and show that this number is attained by unanimity rules ...

Maus et al. [2007] characterized the least manipulable rule by a single manipulator among tops-only, anonymous, and surjective choice rules, to be the unanimity ...

We compare the manipulability of different choice rules by considering the number of manipulable profiles. We establish the minimal number of such profiles ...

Some of the minimally manipulable Pareto optimal and anonymous social choice functions can be interpreted as status quo voting. 1 Introduction. The well-known ...

Oct 11, 2006 · This paper is concerned with the minimal number of profiles at which a unanimous and anonymous social choice function for three alternatives ...

We introduce new measures of manipulability of anonymous voting rules and argue for their superiority over some commonly used measures.