Jun 13, 2012 · We present a polynomial-time algorithm that always finds an (approximate) Nash equilibrium for repeated two-player stochastic games.

This paper is a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium for repeated two-player (bimatrix) games, under the average-payoff criterion.

This paper treats a closely related problem, that of finding a Nash equilibrium for an average-payoff repeated bimatrix game, and presents a polynomial-time ...

This paper treats a closely related problem, that of finding a Nash equilibrium for an average-payoff phrepeated bimatrix game, and presents a polynomial-time ...

This paper treats a related but distinct problem, that of finding a Nash equilibrium for an average-payoff repeated bimatrix game, and presents a polynomial- ...

May 6, 2004 · The central result of this paper is a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium for repeated 2-player (bimatrix) games, under ...

We present a polynomial-time algorithm that always finds an (approximate) Nash equi- librium for repeated two-player stochastic games.

Our approach draws on the well known ``folk theorem'' from game theory and shows how finite-state equilibrium strategies can be found efficiently and expressed ...

We present a polynomial-time algorithm that always finds an (approximate) Nash equilibrium for repeated two-player stochastic games. The algorithm exploits ...

A polynomial-time algorithm that always finds an (approximate) Nash equilibrium for repeated two-player stochastic games is presented, resulting in ...