Policy Recommendations

Over the past 18 years, attacks by authoritarian forces have contributed to a global decline in political rights and civil liberties. Yet those facing relentless oppression on the front lines have not given up, and they remain crucial to sustaining the fight for freedom around the world. In every country and territory, there are human rights defenders, democracy activists, journalists, and ordinary voters working to defend and expand freedom for their compatriots. Their individual victories are tied directly to the success of the larger democratic struggle against authoritarian rule.

We can and must meet this moment with unwavering political will. Democratic governments, donors, and the private sector must deepen their solidarity with front-line allies, hold dictators accountable for rights abuses and corruption, and invest in democratic institutions at home and abroad. They must also reject any weakening of their core principles for the sake of illusory short-term interests. Only a global order in which democratic norms prevail can deliver liberty, prosperity, and security—for those living now and for future generations.

To achieve their goals, democratic societies should prioritize the following actions. (Click on the boxes below to read the full recommendations.)

Provide steady support and flexible funding to those on the front lines of the struggle against tyranny.

Democratic governments and donors must increase and sustain support for those working to defend and promote fundamental freedoms around the world. Failure to do so emboldens autocrats and can result in the loss of hard-won progress.

• Democratic governments and donors must be alert to setbacks that could precipitate further declines in fundamental freedoms. Freedom House research has shown that once a country tips into the Partly Free or Not Free category, it often struggles to recover. Over the last 50 years, freedom of expression has declined more than any other civil liberty. In 2023, four types of repression were notably common: attacks against LGBT+ people’s rights, violence against migrants, rising rates of organized crime that threatened democratic institutions, and attacks on religious freedom, including acts of antisemitism and Islamophobia. Each of these trends should be met with strong international condemnation, financial assistance to support victims and activists, and sanctions as appropriate.
• Donors should provide rapid and flexible support to countries at critical junctures. Amid a panoply of competing needs, the democratic community and donors should be prepared to surge assistance to countries at critical junctures. These are places where recent democratic gains require reinforcement, or where freedom is threatened by authoritarian aggression, conflict, or illiberal leaders. In 2024, such settings include Colombia, Liberia, Thailand, Nigeria, Ukraine, Myanmar, Sudan, and Tunisia. The US Agency for International Development’s “Democracy Delivers Initiative” and the US Department of State’s “Fundamental Freedoms Fund” are examples of projects that focus support on countries at critical junctures. Donors should build on the lessons learned from these existing frameworks to further systematize rapid-response funding mechanisms that will allow the democratic community to address emerging developments.
• Democracies should uphold their commitment to a Ukrainian victory. Ukraine is unique among other countries at critical junctures, both in the extent to which the fate of its democracy could affect the security of other democracies around the world, and in the decisive role to be played by continued military support from the United States and other foreign partners. Democratic governments should not delay or hesitate in providing Ukraine with the resources it needs to defend and reclaim its territory from Russian forces, and to proceed further down the democratic path. For more detailed recommendations on the war in Ukraine, visit freedomhouse.org.

Uphold the rights of people living in disputed territories.

The events of the past year in places such as Nagorno-Karabakh and the Gaza Strip provided stark evidence that populations without self-determination are at greater risk of extreme human rights abuses or atrocities.

• Donors should provide resources to support human rights defenders (HRDs) and civil society organizations from these territories. Technical assistance and training on issues like coalition and constituency building, advocacy, organizational development, and physical and digital security are particularly helpful. Because locally elected leaders, even in disputed territories, can help safeguard civil liberties and provide an accountable and constructive channel for addressing residents’ interests, election-related programming should be considered. Protection for HRDs should be of paramount importance, and donors should be ready to offer medical, legal, psychosocial, and relocation support as needed. Democratic governments should also be prepared to help HRDs evacuate when necessary. (See also the recommendations below on support for HRDs in exile.)
• Democratic governments should leverage existing international mechanisms to shine a spotlight on repression in disputed territories. These mechanisms, such as regional and international special rapporteur mandates, can provide people living in disputed territories with an international platform to raise awareness of any human rights concerns, facilitate the documentation of injustices, and drive collective responses. Support and training must be given to the local human rights and democracy activists who are central to collecting evidence of human rights violations, war crimes, and other international crimes, which can then be shared with international investigators.
• Democratic governments must be champions of international laws and norms. When international law, peace agreements, or established borders are violated, democratic governments should publicly condemn the breaches and use international and regional normative frameworks and standards as a basis for responses. In the event of widespread state or nonstate violence, the democratic community should be vociferous advocates for resolving conflicts in accordance with international law, ensuring that humanitarian assistance flows unhindered, securing safe passage for those seeking to flee or return to their homes, and holding perpetrators of violence accountable by imposing sanctions and pursuing charges in the appropriate national and international venues.

Protect free and fair elections in 2024.

From the United States to India, Russia, and Mexico, at least 40 countries—representing more than two-fifths of the world’s population—are holding national-level elections in 2024, and many more will conduct other types of balloting. Free and fair elections are a cornerstone of any democracy, and independent and transparent electoral processes are necessary to foster genuine competition and public trust.

• Democratic governments should immediately and publicly condemn electoral manipulation or the refusal to honor electoral outcomes. Efforts to rig elections, including through the abuse of state resources or media to unfairly benefit the incumbent, or by changing election rules on short notice to put the opposition at a disadvantage, should be met with diplomatic pressure or sanctions. Democracies should not recognize the legitimacy of leaders who come to power through systematic electoral manipulation.
• Democratic governments should protect elections from the threat of foreign interference. Democratic governments should share with one another any information pertaining to electoral threats. Prior to an election, they should review their physical and digital voting infrastructure for malign intrusions and ensure that electoral management bodies are impartial and independent.
• Democratic governments should bolster public trust in electoral processes and address voter apathy. The administration of any election should be transparent and allow observation by all stakeholders and political parties, and existing electoral laws should be impartially enforced. Neutral election observers from internationally accredited organizations and reputable domestic groups should be invited to monitor the totality of election processes—from preelection developments to postelection dispute resolution—without any undue restrictions and regardless of whether a country is rated Free, Partly Free, or Not Free.
• Democratic governments, civil society, and technology companies should defend against the harms of artificial intelligence during election periods. As noted in Freedom on the Net 2023, artificial intelligence (AI) has increased the scale, speed, and efficiency of online harms and digital repression during electoral periods, and the affordability and accessibility of generative AI technology has lowered the barrier of entry to the disinformation market. Against this backdrop, political parties, committees, and campaigns should refrain from intentionally misrepresenting candidates in advertising that features AI-generated or AI-manipulated imagery. Tech companies should increase efforts to defend election integrity. Specifically, companies should support the accessibility of circumvention technology and resist government orders to shut down internet connectivity or ban digital services during an election period. They should work closely with independent researchers who can study the effects that their services have on information integrity and free expression. Finally, companies should invest in staff dedicated to working on human rights issues, including regional and country specialists, to better understand the local impact of their products.

Respond consistently to attempts to overthrow duly elected governments.

When the international community fails to address coups and coup attempts in a firm and principled manner, it normalizes these illegitimate actions and encourages their proliferation.

• Democratic governments should review existing laws to clarify the scenarios that warrant a reevaluation of bilateral relations and foreign assistance. The Lomé Declaration enumerated four scenarios for unconstitutional changes in government that could provide a model definition: (1) a military coup d’etat against a democratically elected government, (2) an intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected government, (3) replacement of a democratically elected government by an armed dissident group or rebel movement, and (4) refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party after free, fair, and regular elections. Some experts have suggested that violations of term limits should also be included as an action-forcing event. In the United States, the conditions outlined in Section 7008 of the annual State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations legislation—that is, whether a country’s military has overthrown, or played a decisive role in overthrowing, the government, and whether the deposed leader was “duly elected”—could be expanded to mirror those of the Lomé Declaration or to otherwise account for takeovers by nonmilitary actors.
• Democratic governments’ responses should be public, swift, and coordinated with one another. Government decisions to enforce provisions like Section 7008 should be both timebound and public. In the US context, the State Department should have a set period of time to determine the applicability of Section 7008, in consultation with Congress, and publicly announce its decision. As is the case with Section 7008, democratic policymakers should scrutinize the elements of assistance that particularly benefit the chief executive and upper echelons of the government, such as access to preferential trade arrangements, investment in infrastructure, or sales of arms and other forms of military cooperation. Any suspension of assistance should be publicly explained in detail to serve as a deterrent.
• Democratic governments should impose targeted sanctions on those seeking to prevent a peaceful transfer of power or overthrow a duly elected government. Immediate cuts to foreign assistance should not be the only recourse. Existing laws should be modified—or new laws added—to concurrently mandate immediate, targeted sanctions against individual perpetrators responsible for the overthrow of duly elected governments.
• Democratic governments and donors should give long-term priority to assistance for governance and security-sector reform. When resuming aid to a country where the United States’ Section 7008—or a comparable law in another country—has been applied, donors should consider mandating needs assessments to ramp up existing portfolios related to democratic, human rights, governance, and security-sector reform.

Hold autocrats accountable for human rights abuses and corruption, and limit their ability to evade the rule of law and undermine democratic institutions.

As authoritarian leaders increasingly work together to avoid accountability and bolster their regimes, it is vital for democracies to operate in a coordinated fashion to robustly defend free institutions and impose meaningful penalties on those who violate fundamental rights.

• Democratic governments should impose targeted sanctions on rights abusers and corrupt officials in a way that maximizes their impact. Targeted sanctions, which include visa bans and asset freezes, can be a powerful tool for deterrence and accountability, particularly in countries where the local legal system is unlikely to provide justice. However, selective application, failure to combine it with other tactics, and challenges in addressing unintended negative effects have made this tool less powerful than it could be. Targeted sanctions are most effective when they are clearly and narrowly defined; when they are multilateral; when they are applied as part of a comprehensive strategy in combination with other foreign policy instruments, such as diplomatic pressure and suspension of foreign assistance; and when the names of those sanctioned and the reasons for sanctioning them are made clear publicly. Public naming and shaming can deter repeat abuses by perpetrators and similar abuses by others, and can encourage victims and activists to continue their work. Democratic governments should impose sanctions consistently and not overlook egregious violations simply because the perpetrator is a partner or ally. In the United States, the Immigration and Nationality Act should be updated to allow officials to publicly name those receiving visa bans.
• Democratic governments should limit the ability of authoritarian regimes to evade sanctions. Sanctions alone are not a sufficient mechanism for ensuring full accountability, in part because ill-intentioned leaders and governments are often able evade sanctions by creating networks of shell corporations, stashing money in accounts belonging to associates, and collaborating with other authoritarians. Regimes in countries like Russia and Iran, for example, continued to export oil and acquire arms in 2023 despite facing broad sectoral and targeted sanctions. Democratic governments and the private sector should work with civil society to identify and close legal loopholes and improve compliance. Democracies should pass transparency laws that require the submission and collection of identifying information about shell companies’ owners and beneficiaries. The private sector should consult with anticorruption and human rights organizations as part of their “know your customer” efforts. These expert groups will be able to provide detailed context on corruption and human rights abuses, how perpetrators may be networked, and how they may seek to avoid detection. Individuals and entities found to be enabling, facilitating, or otherwise supporting sanctions evasion should themselves face sanctions.
• Democratic governments should work together to reform and better protect international democratic institutions. Democratic member states should closely monitor upcoming elections at international bodies to ensure that there is a robust slate of democratic candidates running for open seats. Democracies should push back when authoritarian rulers seek to invoke and redefine the language of democracy to obfuscate their abuses of power, denouncing these efforts publicly and explaining why and how they mislead the intended audiences. At the United Nations, serious reform is needed. Rules and practices should be changed to prohibit egregious and consistent human rights abusers from holding seats on the Human Rights Council. Democratic governments should work within the UN system to limit state reprisals against participating activists—by maintaining their confidentiality, providing transparency regarding state requests for accredited activists’ information, and responding swiftly and vocally when states attempt to thwart their participation.

Protect human rights activists in exile and facilitate their work.

While studies indicate that HRDs overwhelmingly prefer to work from within their home countries, authoritarians are increasingly targeting them through judicial harassment, violent political persecution, torture, and arrests. As a result, many HRDs have been forced to flee abroad.

• Donors should continue to support HRDs in exile so that they may continue their work. Flexible financing and innovative technological solutions are essential to empower HRDs in exile and allow them to safely communicate with people in the countries they were forced to flee.
• Democratic governments that shelter HRDs should adjust their laws to address the threat of transnational repression. Because many exiled HRDs remain outspoken critics of their repressive home governments, authoritarian regimes routinely engage in transnational repression to silence and intimidate them. Governments that shelter such individuals should ensure that they have in place a clear definition of transnational repression and the laws necessary to address the threat. Government officials who may encounter perpetrators or victims of transnational repression—including those at the national, subnational, and local levels who work in law enforcement and with immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers—should receive training to respond appropriately. Additional recommendations for responding to transnational repression are available on the Freedom House website.
• Governments that shelter HRDs should provide visas for those facing imminent danger. Countries where such visas do not exist should create a new category for democratic activists that allows multiple entries and long stays, providing individuals in need with the option of a swift temporary relocation. Democratic states with existing categories of this kind could increase the transparency and consistency of their procedures for issuing humanitarian visas to civic activists. For those who must flee permanently, host countries should review their asylum processes to ensure that exiled HRDs are not being denied legal status as a result of illegitimate criminal charges leveled against them by origin-country governments. Permanent legal status offers a better safeguard against transnational repression and reduces HRDs’ reliance on identification documents from their home countries, which can be canceled or put holders at risk when they seek renewal at the issuing country’s consulates and embassies. Permanent residency status can also enable family reunification, which reduces the origin-country government’s ability to pressure exiles through their loved ones—a practice known as coercion by proxy.
• Democratic governments should address the apparent proliferation of spyware attacks against HRDs in exile. Governments in at least 49 of the 70 countries studied in the 2023 Freedom on the Net report were suspected of having access to sophisticated spyware or data extraction technologies. Some reports have indicated that even democracies may have misused commercial spyware against HRDs. Democracies should ensure that any surveillance they undertake is legal, necessary, and proportionate. They should consider joining the Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative and uphold the principles of the Joint Statement on Efforts to Combat the Proliferation and Misuse of Spyware.
• Governments, the private sector, and civil society should work together to limit the unintended impact on activists of sanctions against their home countries. HRDs should not be denied access to commercial services as a result of overcompliance with sanctions or derisking practices. For example, following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a number of Russian activists noted an increase in denials of service by banking institutions due to their nationality. Companies should meet with exiled HRDs to better understand how their current efforts to mitigate risk—whether reputational, regulatory, or sanctions-related—may adversely impact exiled dissidents.

Support the liberation and resilience of political prisoners.

Many current and former political prisoners have stated that the worst fear of those in detention is to be forgotten. Democratic governments and human rights organizations must keep a spotlight on the staggering number of HRDs who are imprisoned worldwide.

• Democratic governments should advocate for the immediate and unconditional release of political prisoners. One way to draw attention to the issue is to recognize October 30 as the International Day of Political Prisoners. Governments should regularly and proactively raise cases of political prisoners during bilateral engagements with perpetrator governments, and ensure that political prisoners and the abuses they suffer remain a point of discussion at multilateral forums. Governments should collectively increase their requests for information or for specific actions related to prisoners’ medical care.
• Donors should increase targeted assistance to political prisoners, their families, and their lawyers. The legal needs of detained HRDs vary, but they can include attorney fees, funds to support the preparation and submission of appeals to higher courts following an unjust ruling, and funds to prepare legal inquiries as to detention conditions and official complaints. In cases where political prisoners are transferred deliberately to remote locations, donors should consider covering the costs incurred by family members or lawyers as they visit relocated prisoners or attend distant court hearings. If and when released from prison, HRDs often require support to address the psychological and physical toll of imprisonment and any ongoing stigma and ostracization in their countries. Additional recommendations on how to support the release of political prisoners can be found at freedomhouse.org.