Walter Model

Walter Model
Walter Model
Nickname(s)	Hitler's fireman
Allegiance	Nazi Germany
Years of service	1910 - 1945
Rank	Field Marshal
Commands	3rd Panzer Division (November 1940) XLI Panzer Corps (October 1941) Ninth Army (January 1942) Army Group North (January 1944) Army Group North Ukraine (March 1944) Army Group Centre (June 1944) Army Group B (August 1944) OB West (August-September 1944)
Battles / wars	Eastern Front Operation Barbarossa Battle of Moscow Battles of Rzhev Battle of Kursk Baltic Offensive Operation Bagration Western Front Battle of Normandy Operation Market Garden Battle of Hurtgen Forest Battle of the Bulge Ruhr Pocket
Awards	Knight's Cross with Oakleaves, Swords and Diamonds

Otto Moritz Walter Model (IPA: ['mo:dəl]) (24 January 1891 – 21 April 1945) was a German General and later Field Marshal during World War II. He is noted for his defensive battles in the latter half of the war, mostly on the Eastern Front but also in the west, and for his close association with Adolf Hitler and Nazism. He has been called the Wehrmacht's best defensive tactician.

Although he was a hard-driving, aggressive panzer commander early in the war, Model became best known as a practitioner of attrition warfare—his associate, General Erhard Raus, called it "zone defense". It emphasised strong fortifications, a reluctance to give ground (although not an absolute refusal to withdraw), and the importance of not allowing major enemy breakthroughs. This approach brought him much success, but his death in 1945 meant he would later be overshadowed by his rivals who advocated maneuver warfare.

Model first came to Hitler's attention before World War II, but their relationship did not become especially close until 1942. His tenacious style of fighting and aggressive personality won him plaudits from Hitler, who considered him his best commander and repeatedly tasked him with retrieving desperate situations. However, the relationship had broken down by the end of the war, after Model was defeated at the Battle of the Bulge.

In personal terms, Model was a leader of great vigour and energy, who led from the front and accepted no excuses for failure. By all accounts an unpleasant man, he was bad-tempered, foul-mouthed, bullied and abused his subordinates, and generally made life miserable for those around him. On the other hand, he was held in high regard by his rank-and-file troops, who appreciated his constant visits to the front line and his down-to-earth, straight-talking demeanour.

Early life and career

Model's decision to burn his papers at the end of World War II means relatively little is known about his early years. Born in Genthin, Saxony-Anhalt, he was the son of a music teacher and belonged to a lower-middle class, non-military family. He entered the army officer cadet school (Kriegsschule) in Neisse in 1908, where he was an unexceptional student, and was commissioned as a Lieutenant (Leutnant) into the 52nd Infantry Regiment von Alvensleben in 1910. He made few friends among his fellow officers, and soon became known for his ambition, drive and blunt outspokenness. These were characteristics that would mark his entire career.

World War I

In World War I, the 52nd Infantry formed part of the 5th Division, fighting on the Western Front. Model served as the adjutant of his regiment's 1st Battalion. In May 1915 he was severely wounded near Arras, and in October he won the Iron Cross, First Class. His deeds brought him to the attention of his divisional commander, who despite misgivings about his "uncomfortable subordinate", recommended him for a posting to the General Staff. Among other things, this meant that Model took part in only the initial stages of the Battle of Verdun, and escaped the carnage of the Somme, to which his division was committed in his absence.

No man's land, World War I.

Model sailed through the abbreviated staff officers' course and returned to the 5th Division as adjutant of the 10th Infantry Brigade, followed by postings as a company commander in both the 52nd Infantry and the 8th Life Grenadiers. He was promoted to Captain (Hauptmann) in November 1917, and in 1918 was assigned to the staff of the Guard Ersatz Division, which fought in the German Spring Offensive of that year. He ended the war with the 36th Reserve Division.

Inter-war years

By the end of the war, Model had gained a reputation as a capable officer with great potential. In addition, he was already known to Hans von Seeckt, head of the slimmed-down Reichswehr, from his staff postings during the war; and he was equipped with an excellent reference from Major-General Franz von Rantau, commander of the 36th Reserve Division. It was thus no surprise that he was one of the 4,000 officers retained in the Reichswehr. Model generally kept away from politics in the chaotic period that marked the birth of the Weimar Republic, although as an army officer he was involved in the bloody suppression of the 1920 communist uprising in the Ruhr. The next year he married Herta Huyssen, and they would eventually have three children: Christa, Hella and Hansgeorg.

In 1925 Model was posted to the 3rd Infantry Division, an elite formation of the Reichswehr, and one which was heavily involved in testing the new technical innovations of that era. From 1928 he lectured in tactics and war studies for the basic General Staff training course, and in 1930 was transferred to the Training Branch of the Truppenamt. He became known both for his enthusiastic support for modernising the army, and his complete lack of tact. In 1938, the year he became a Major General (Generalmajor), he gave a demonstration of an assault on mocked-up Czech fortifications that impressed Hitler and annoyed the army chief of staff Ludwig Beck (who was trying to dissuade Hitler from occupying the Sudetenland). Like many other army officers at the time he was a supporter of the Nazi party; his time in Berlin also brought him into contact with senior members of the Nazi regime, and in particular he was friends with Joseph Goebbels and Hermann Göring.

World War II

Model spent the first year of World War II as a chief of staff, first of IV Corps during the invasion of Poland, and then of Sixteenth Army during the Battle of France. He was promoted to Lieutenant General (Generalleutnant) in April 1940, and earned his first senior command posting in November that year, when he was assigned to lead the 3rd Panzer Division. He immediately proceeded to ignore all formalities of organisation and command, which endeared him to his men and exasperated his staff—who often had to clean up the mess he left behind. He also instituted a combined arms training program where his men were thrown together in various ad-hoc groupings regardless of their parent unit: tankers would train with infantry, engineers with recon units, and so on. Model thus anticipated by some months the regular German use of kampfgruppen in World War II; while this would become routine later on, it was still not a universal practice in the Wehrmacht in late 1940 and early 1941.

The German advance during Operation Barbarossa, June to December 1941.

Invasion of the Soviet Union

Main article: Operation Barbarossa

For Operation Barbarossa, the 3rd Panzer Division was assigned to the XXIV Panzer Corps, itself part of the Second Panzer Group, commanded by Heinz Guderian. The campaign opened on 22 June 1941, with Guderian urging his divisions forward at breakneck speed. This suited Model just fine, and by 4 July, his advance elements leading the panzer group's charge had reached the Dnieper, an exploit that earned him the Knight's Cross. Crossing it in strength was another matter, however, as the Red Army was prepared to defend the river line. 3rd Panzer's vanguard was thrown back by the Soviet 21st Army, and it was not until 10 July that the Germans were in a position to force a crossing. For this operation, Model, now reinforced with additional troops, reorganised his command into three groups: an infantry-heavy force that would cross the river and establish a bridgehead, a mobile armoured group that would pass through the bridgehead and continue the advance, and a fire support group containing nearly all his artillery. The plan worked so successfully that the river crossing cost scarcely any casualties. There followed two weeks of hard fighting to defend the panzer group's flank, during which he was assigned the 1st Cavalry Division in addition to 3rd Panzer as Gruppe Model, and then an attack to break up Soviet forces massing near Roslavl.

After the fall of Smolensk, Hitler ordered a change of direction, and Guderian's panzer group turned south into the Ukraine. Its objective was to trap the Soviet forces defending Kiev, an unsupported advance of 275 km (172 mi), and again 3rd Panzer would form the spearhead. From 24 August to 14 September Model conducted a lightning thrust into the rear of the Soviet Southwestern Front, in which he impressed on his men that speed was everything. The maneuver reached its conclusion when 3rd Panzer made contact with the 16th Panzer Division from Army Group South at Lokhvitsa. While it would take several more days to eliminate all resistance, the trap around Kiev had been closed.

Throughout the opening stages of Barbarossa, Model had driven his men hard, achieving the rapid pace of advance that Guderian called for. He had taken great risks—at one point 3rd Panzer had only 10 tanks operational—but his audacity and improvisational skills (and the tactical ineptness of his foes) had brought him rich rewards.

Before Moscow

Main article: Battle of Moscow

File:Battle of moscow03.jpg

Anti-tank fortifications on Moscow streets, 1941.

Shortly thereafter Model was promoted to General of Panzer Troops and placed in command of XLI Panzer Corps, which was embroiled in Operation Typhoon, the assault on Moscow. The attack had begun on 2 October, 1941, and Model arrived at his new command on 14 November in the midst of the battle, which did not help to endear him to his staff.

The corps, part of Georg-Hans Reinhardt's Third Panzer Group, was located at Kalinin, 160 km (100 mi) northwest of Moscow. It was worn out, at the end of a long and tenuous supply line (Model had been promoted on 28 October, and needed two weeks just to get to Kalinin), and the cold weather was starting to hamper the Germans. Nevertheless morale remained high, and the final push towards Moscow began shortly after his arrival. Model was a whirlwind of energy, touring the front and exhorting his troops to greater efforts; he also ran roughshod over the niceties of protocol and chains of command, and in general left his staff trailing in his wake. By 5 December, XLI Panzer Corps' 6th Panzer Division had reached Iohnca, just 35 km (22 mi) from the Kremlin. There, the advance stopped, as the winter—thus far comparatively mild by Russian standards—took hold. Temperatures dropped to 20 to 40°C below zero, weapons and vehicles froze solid, and the Germans were forced to call a halt to offensive operations.

Just as the Germans had made that decision, the Soviet Kalinin, Western and Southwestern Fronts launched a massive counteroffensive, aimed at driving Army Group Centre back from Moscow. The attacks were especially strong against Third Panzer Group, which had made some of the closest penetrations to the city. In three weeks of confused, savage fighting, Reinhardt extricated his troops from potential encirclement and fell back to the Lama River line. Placed in charge of covering the retreat, Model's harsh, almost brutal style of leadership now paid dividends as panic threatened to infect the German columns. On several occasions he restored order at a congested crossroads with a drawn pistol, but the retreat never became a rout.

During this period, Model noticed that the Soviet attacks—made en masse and with poor tactical coordination—tended to be most successful when the Germans employed a strongpoint defense instead of a continuous line. Moreover, Soviet logistics were still inadequate to support a fast-moving battle; thus even if a gap was made, it did not automatically mean a crisis. Therefore he ordered his men to spread themselves out, which exploited his corps' advantage in artillery over the Soviets, while he created small mechanised kampfgruppen to deal with any breakthrough. His tactics were successful, if costly (by the end of 1941, 6th Panzer Division mustered 1,000 men, including all frontline, support and staff personnel). He would continue to advocate similar tactics throughout his career.

Rzhev

Main article: Battles of Rzhev

File:Soviet Offensive Moscow December 1941.jpg

Soviet ski troops on the attack supported by armour, December 1941.

Model's success in holding his front had not gone unnoticed, and in January 1942 he was placed in charge of the Ninth Army occupying the Rzhev salient, leapfrogging at least 15 more senior commanders in Army Group Centre alone. When Model took over, his sector was in a shambles: the Kalinin Front had broken through the line and was threatening the Moscow-Smolensk railway, the main supply route for Army Group Centre. Despite the danger, he realised the precarious position the attackers themselves were in and immediately counterattacked, cutting off the Soviet 39th Army. In the ferocious battles that followed, he repelled multiple Soviet attempts to relieve their trapped soldiers, the last being in February. He then squeezed out the pocket at his leisure, in a series of operations culminating in mid-July. For this, he was awarded the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross and promoted to Colonel General (Generaloberst).

Having restored Ninth Army's front, Model set about holding it. His defensive doctrine, which combined conventional thinking with his own tactical innovations, was based on the following principles:

• Up-to-date intelligence, based on frontline sources and reconnaisance instead of relying on reports from rear-area analysts.
• A continuous front line, no matter how thinly held. This was counter to standard German doctrine, which called for a screen of outposts and the main body held further back.
• Tactical reserves to halt any imminent breakthrough. In practice, this meant dispersing his armour into individual platoons and companies along the front to support the infantry, instead of concentrating it into a sizable striking force.
• Centralised artillery command and control. Since the end of World War I, German divisions had had their artillery spread out amongst their component regiments, which made it difficult to bring the maximum weight of fire to bear on any one point. Model reorganised his artillery into special battalions under the direct control of the divisional and corps commanders.
• Multiple static lines of defense, to delay the enemy's advance. Hitler had in fact forbidden the construction of multiple lines, saying that soldiers would be tempted to abandon their current line in favour of falling back to the next; Model simply ignored this inconvenient order.

Using these tactics, he would successfully defend his front throughout 1942 and into 1943, despite giving up troops and vehicles for the battles further south. In this time he fought off several major Soviet offensives; one of these, codenamed Operation Mars by the Soviets, has been described as Marshal Georgy Zhukov's worst defeat of the war. It all added to his reputation as a "lion of defense".

Ninth Army eventually evacuated the salient in Operation Buffalo (Büffel) in March 1943, as part of a general shortening of the line. Large-scale anti-partisan sweeps were carried out in the weeks prior to the operation (the army's sector was a hotbed for partisan activity), in which an estimated 3,000 Russians were killed, the great majority of whom were unarmed. The withdrawal itself took two weeks, with minimal casualties or disruption: no mean feat when the army numbered about 300,000 men including civilian hangers-on, 100 tanks and 400 guns. In its wake, Model personally ordered the deportation of all male civilians, wells to be poisoned, and at least two dozen villages razed. In the same month, he received the Swords to his Knight's Cross, and Ninth Army received orders to move into Orel.

Kursk and Orel

Main articles: Battle of Kursk and Operation Kutuzov

On 5 July, 1943 Model led the northern assault on Kursk during Operation Citadel, a plan which had caused great controversy within the German high command. Günther von Kluge and Erich von Manstein, commanding Army Groups Centre and South respectively, had originally urged that the salient be attacked in May, before the Soviets could prepare their defenses. Others, including Heinz Guderian, felt that attacking was unnecessary, and the Germans should instead wait for the Soviets to launch their own offensive before defeating it. Model was also dubious about attacking, pointing out that Konstantin Rokossovsky's Central Front was strongly dug in and outnumbered him two to one in men, tanks and artillery. Rather than conclude that the offensive be called off, however, he said it should be postponed until he could receive further reinforcements, in particular the new Panther tanks and Ferdinand tank destroyers.

File:Model-4.jpg

Model prior to Operation Citadel, looking unusually relaxed.

Model's true opinion on the value of the offensive remains unclear. Von Manstein took his recommendation at face value, while Guderian said that he was categorically against attacking. Army Group Centre's operations officer, Peter von der Groeben, also stated his belief after the war that Model had hoped to scuttle the operation, by causing it to be delayed until the Soviets launched their own attack.

Model's assault was a failure, as Ninth Army quickly became enmeshed in the elaborate Soviet fortifications. If he had hoped to gain an advantage by waiting for reinforcements, he had made a critical error: the Red Army's strength in the salient was in fact growing much faster than that of the attacking force. Nor did his tactical plan of attack meet with great success. Having less armour and more artillery than von Manstein in the south, and fearing that the deep Soviet defenses would stall an armour-heavy attack (the hallmark of the German Blitzkrieg), he decided to use his infantry to breach Rokossovsky's line before unleashing his armour. It did not work. The Germans took heavy losses to advance less than 12 km (8 mi) in seven days, and were unable to break through to open ground. Model threw his armour into the fray, but with little effect beyond incurring more casualties. (As mitigating factors, the Soviets had concentrated more of their strength facing Model in the north; and Rokossovsky had correctly anticipated where the attack would come, defending that sector heavily. Model's use of infantry assaults also meant his losses in armour were lower than von Manstein's.)

Prior to Kursk, Model had anticipated the possibility of a Soviet attack into the Orel salient, and had (without OKH's knowledge) constructed extensive defensive works to meet such an attack. Following the stalling of his advance, the Soviet counteroffensive, Operation Kutuzov, duly opened on 12 July. It involved not just Rokossovsky's Central Front, but also the Bryansk and Western Fronts, a greater concentration of forces than Model had assaulted in Operation Citadel. For the battle, von Kluge placed him in command of Second Panzer Army in addition to Ninth Army—again, a larger total force than he had commanded in Citadel. The Soviet preponderance of strength was such that Stavka expected it to take only 48 hours to reach Orel, splitting the German forces into three parts; instead, the battle ended three weeks later with Model's orderly withdrawal from the salient. An idea of the scale of the fighting compared to Citadel can be gained from the combined casualty lists for Second Panzer and Ninth Armies: from 1 to 10 July, the Germans took 21,000 casualties, and from 11 to 31 July, 62,000. Despite these losses he had inflicted similarly heavy casualties on the three Red Army Fronts, shortened the line, and avoided annihilation. His reputation thus survived the failure of Citadel.

The Baltic

Main article: Baltic Offensive

Soviet advances on the Eastern Front, August 1943 to December 1944.

On 29 January 1944 Model was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Army Group North, which two weeks earlier had seen its stranglehold on Leningrad broken by the Volkhov, Leningrad and 2nd Baltic Fronts. The situation was dire (a circumstance that Model would come to be familiar with): two of the three corps of the German Eighteenth Army had been shattered, and contact lost with the III SS Panzer Corps defending Narva.

The army group's previous commander, Georg von Küchler, had pleaded for permission to withdraw to the Panther Line in Estonia, which was still only half-completed at that stage. Model immediately cracked down on such talk, instituting a new policy he called Shield and Sword (Schild und Schwert). Under this doctrine, ground would only temporarily be ceded, to gather reserves for an immediate counterattack that would drive the Soviets back and relieve pressure on other areas of the front. These statements of aggressive intent won over Hitler and OKH, who had no substantial reserves to send him but were still unwilling to lose territory. Their significance has since been debated by historians, with some claiming that Shield and Sword was Hitler's invention, while others say they were a calculated ploy by Model to disguise his true intent—to pull back to the Panther Line.

Regardless, the "temporary" loss of ground usually became permanent, as Model conducted a fighting withdrawal to the Panther Line. He delegated responsibility for the Narva front to Otto Sponheimer commanding Army Detachment Narva, while he concentrated on extricating Eighteenth Army from its predicament. Without OKH's notice or approval, he constructed a series of interim defensive lines to cover its retreat, slowing down and inflicting heavy losses on the Soviets in the process.

By March, the withdrawal was complete. His forces were mostly intact, but the fighting had been fierce: his Shield and Sword counterattacks alone had cost him some 10,000-12,000 men. These counterattacks usually failed to recover ground, but they kept the Soviets off-balance and won Model time to pull his units back. They also allowed him to say to Hitler that he was pursuing an aggressive approach, even as the front moved steadily to the west.

On 1 March Model was promoted to Field Marshal (Generalfeldmarschall), the youngest in the Wehrmacht. His meteoric rise from Colonel to Field Marshal had taken just six years.

Ukraine and Poland

Main articles: Operation Bagration, Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive, and Lublin-Brest Offensive

On 30 March Model was made Commander-in-Chief of Army Group North Ukraine in Galicia, which was withdrawing under heavy pressure from Zhukov's 1st Ukrainian Front. He replaced von Manstein, who had fallen out of favour with Hitler; despite von Manstein's previous victories, the Führer wanted someone who could be unyielding in defense, and Model fit the bill. There, he came into conflict with von Manstein's associates, in particular Hermann Balck and Friedrich von Mellenthin at the XLVIII Panzer Corps. Like their previous commander, they favoured the concept of "elastic defense", which called for a thinly-held front line and strong armoured reserves to counterattack Soviet breakthroughs; they now refused to implement Model's preferred tactics. Model solved the problem by transferring XLVIII Panzer Corps' tanks to Hermann Breith's III Panzer Corps, leaving Balck and von Mellenthin in charge of four weak infantry divisions in the front line.

By mid-April Zhukov's advance had come to a halt, before the argument over which defensive doctrine was superior could be decided. On 28 June Model was sent to rescue Army Group Centre, which had been torn apart by Operation Bagration, the Soviet offensive in Belorussia. The Ninth Army (Model's old command) and Fourth Army were trapped, and the Soviets were about to liberate Minsk. Despite the catastrophic situation, Model believed that he could still hold Minsk, but this would require Fourth Army to break out of its pocket, and reinforcements to counterattack the Soviet advance. The reinforcements in turn could only be obtained by pulling back, thus shortening the line and freeing up troops. The consensus is that the German position was doomed regardless of what Model could have done, but Hitler rendered the issue moot by refusing to sanction either Fourth Army's escape or a general withdrawal until it was too late.

Minsk was liberated by the Soviet 1st and 3rd Belorussian Fronts on 3 July, but Model still hoped to re-establish the front to the west of the city, with the aid of divisions from Army Groups North and North Ukraine. However, German strength was unequal to the task, and he had been driven out of Vilnius and Baranovichi by 12 July. At the same time, the 1st Ukrainian Front (now commanded by Ivan Konev) and the 1st Belorussian Front's left wing (which had been uncommitted thus far) opened up a fresh offensive against Army Group North Ukraine. In this battle the First Panzer Army managed to hold the line east of Lvov using Model's defensive tactics, but was forced to retreat when the Fourth Panzer Army, weakened by the steady flow of units to Army Group Centre, was unable to stem the Soviet penetrations of its front. Model stopped the Red Army's advance just short of Warsaw, after Hitler finally consented to release four experienced and fresh panzer divisions to him (3rd SS Panzer, 5th SS Panzer, Hermann Göring and Grossdeutschland). It should be noted that he was assisted in this by the Soviets themselves, who paused their offensive to regroup and resupply, and allow the Germans to crush the non-communist Warsaw uprising.

At various times in 1944, Model commanded each of the three major Army Groups on the Eastern Front, and for a short period in the middle of the year was commanding both Army Groups Centre and North Ukraine simultaneously. He therefore came closer than anyone else in the Wehrmacht to effective command of the entire theater.

Remains of a German convoy destroyed near Falaise.

Normandy

Main article: Battle of Normandy

On 17 August 1944, Model received from a grateful Hitler the Diamonds to go with his Knight's Cross with Oakleaves and Swords, a reward for patching up the Eastern Front. Simultaneously, he was transferred to the west, replacing von Kluge as commander-in-chief of Army Group B and OB West. The front in Normandy had collapsed after nearly two months of severe fighting, the U.S. Third Army was driving for the Seine, and the army group was in danger of being completely annihilated in the Falaise pocket.

Model's first order was that Falaise be defended, which did not impress his staff. However he quickly changed his mind, convincing Hitler to authorise the immediate escape of the German Seventh Army and Panzer Group Eberbach—something that von Kluge, with his limited political clout, had not been able to do. He was thus able to salvage a remarkable proportion of his units, albeit at the cost of nearly all his armour and heavy materiel. When Hitler demanded that Paris be held, Model replied that he could do so, but only if given an extra 200,000 men and several panzer divisions—an act that has been described as naivety by some, and canny bargaining by others. The reinforcements were not forthcoming, and the city's liberation took place on 25 August. Meanwhile, Model fell back to the German border.

By early September, Model was finding the task of juggling his responsibilities at Army Group B and OB West increasingly difficult, in the face of Allied air superiority and his own predilection for roaming the front lines. Thus he was happy to relinquish OB West in that month to Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt. He retained command of Army Group B, a post he would keep until the army group's final dissolution in April 1945.

The borders of Germany

Main articles: Operation Market Garden and Battle of Hurtgen Forest

After the debacle of Normandy, Model established his headquarters at Oosterbeek, near Arnhem in the Netherlands, where he set about the massive task of rebuilding Army Group B. On 17 September, his lunch was rudely interrupted when the British 1st Airborne Division dropped into the town: Operation Market Garden, the Allied attempt to capture the bridges on the lower Rhine, Maas and Waal, was under way. Model initially thought they were trying to capture him and his staff, but the size of the assault quickly disabused him of that notion.

When Model perceived what the Allies' real objective was, he ordered the II SS Panzer Corps into action. The corps, containing the 9th SS Panzer and 10th SS Panzer Divisions refitting after Normandy, had been overlooked by Allied intelligence: while still seriously understrength, it was composed of veteran troops and a deadly threat to lightly-equipped paratroopers. 9th SS Panzer took on the British at Arnhem, while the 10th moved south to defend the bridge at Nijmegen.

Dragon's teeth near Aachen, part of the Siegfried Line.

Model believed that the situation represented not just a threat, but also an opportunity to counterattack and possibly clear the Allies out of the southern Netherlands. Towards this end, he forbade SS General Willi Bittrich and SS Lieutenant General Heinz Harmel, commanding II SS Panzer Corps and 10th SS Panzer respectively, from destroying the Nijmegen bridge. With the exception of this tactical error, Model is considered to have fought an outstanding battle and handed the Allies a sharp defeat. The bridge at Arnhem was held and the 1st Airborne Division destroyed, dashing the Allies' hopes for a foothold over the Rhine before the end of the year.

Arnhem restored much of Model's self-confidence, which had been shaken by the experience of Normandy. From September to December he fought another Allied thrust to a standstill, this time by Omar Bradley's U.S. 12th Army Group into the Hürtgen Forest and Aachen. While he interfered less in the day-to-day movements of his units than at Arnhem, he still kept himself fully informed on the situation, slowing the Allies' progress, inflicting heavy casualties and taking full advantage of the fortifications of the Siegfried Line.

The Hürtgen Forest cost the U.S. First Army at least 33,000 killed and incapacitated, including both combat and noncombat losses; Germans casualties were between 12,000 and 16,000. Aachen eventually fell on 22 October, again at high cost to the U.S. Ninth Army. The Ninth Army's push to the Roer River fared no better, and did not manage to cross the river or wrest control of its dams from the Germans. Hürtgen was so costly that it has been called an Allied "defeat of the first magnitude", with specific credit being assigned to Model.

Wacht am Rhein

Main article: Battle of the Bulge

File:Model-5.jpg

With a German soldier during the Battle of the Bulge.

Following the end of Market Garden, Hitler decided that the Germans should launch an offensive in the west, which would catch the Western Allies by surprise. The objective he had in mind was to split the Allied front and capture Antwerp. This operation, codenamed Wacht am Rhein (Watch on the Rhine), would force the British and Americans to sue for peace, leaving Germany free to concentrate on fighting the Soviet Union.

Model, along with all the other commanders involved, believed the idea was unachievable given the scarce resources available in 1944. At the same time, both he and von Rundstedt felt that a purely defensive posture—as had been adopted since retreating from Normandy—could only delay Germany's defeat, not prevent it. Thus he prepared Operation Herbstnebel, a less ambitious attack that did not attempt to cross the Meuse, but would still have inflicted a severe setback on the Allies. A similar plan had been developed by von Rundstedt at OB West, and the two Field Marshals combined their plans to present a joint "small solution" to Hitler. It was rejected, and the "big solution" of aiming for Antwerp went ahead.

For this operation, Model had at his disposal Sixth SS Panzer Army, Fifth Panzer Army and Seventh Army, including a dozen panzer and panzergrenadier divisions, representing the last strategic reserve of the Third Reich. Despite his misgivings, Model threw himself into the task with his usual energy, cracking down on any defeatism he might find. A staff officer complained about shortages, causing him to snap: "If you need anything, take it from the Americans". He remained acutely aware of both the operation's significance, and its most likely outcome. When Colonel Friedrich August von der Heydte, ordered to lead a parachute drop as part of the operation, said that the jump had no more than a 10 per cent chance of success, he replied: "Well, then it is necessary to make the attempt, since the entire offensive has no more than a 10 per cent chance of success. It must be done, since this offensive is the last remaining chance to conclude the war favourably."

The operation was launched on 16 December 1944 and enjoyed initial success, but it lacked air cover and infantry, and most critically, fuel. Sixth SS Panzer Army ran into stiff resistance, and while Fifth Panzer Army managed to make a deep thrust into Allied lines, Model was unable to exploit the breakthrough. The Germans had failed to capture the vital road junction at Bastogne; combined with the poor weather and impassable terrain, this caused the German columns to bank up into huge traffic jams on the roads behind the front. Starved of fuel and ammunition, the attack had ground to a halt by 25 December, and was called off on 8 January.

Defeat at the Ruhr

Main article: Ruhr Pocket

The failure of Wacht am Rhein marked the end of Model's special relationship with Hitler, who on 21 January 1945, issued an order that all the divisions of Army Group B would thenceforth be personally responsible to him. Withdrawing to the Rhine was forbidden, and the army group was directed to conduct its defense without giving up an inch of ground.

The Allied capture of the bridge at Remagen was the beginning of the end for Model.

It was an impossible task, and by mid-March Model had been forced back to the Ruhr. On 1 April, Army Group B was encircled there by the U.S. First and Ninth Armies. Hitler's response was to declare the Ruhr a fortress, from which surrender or escape were denied (much like Stalingrad had been); he further ordered its industries to be destroyed to prevent them falling into Allied hands. Model ignored these orders.

On 15 April, after the Allies had split the pocket in two, Major General Matthew Ridgway, commanding the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps, urged Model to surrender rather than throw the lives of his soldiers away. The reply was that Model, still bound by his oath to Hitler and his sense of honour as a Field Marshal, considered surrender out of the question. Rather than continue fighting, however, he ordered the army group dissolved. The oldest and youngest soldiers were discharged, and the remainder given the option of surrendering or attempting to break out on their own. In fact, he could do little else: the Fifth Panzer Army had already laid down its arms, and German command and communications in the pocket had all but disintegrated. On 20 April, Joseph Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry denounced Army Group B as traitors, marking the final break between Model and the collapsing Nazi regime.

Model's decision ended the war for his men, but he himself had little desire to witness the aftermath of defeat. He said to his staffers before dissolving his command: "Has everything been done to justify our actions in the light of history? What can there be left for a commander in defeat? In antiquity they took poison". His decision to commit suicide was sealed when he learned that the Soviets had indicted him for war crimes, specifically the deaths of 577,000 people in concentration camps in Latvia and the deportation of 175,000 others as slave labour. After his attempts to seek death on the front line came to nothing, he shot himself in the head in a wooded area on 21 April 1945. The location, between Duisburg and the village of Lintorf, is today part of the city of Ratingen.

Postscript

Model was buried where he fell. In 1955 his son, Hansgeorg Model, guided by his father's former officers, recovered his father's body. Walter Model was reinterred in the Soldatenfriedhof Vossenack, a German military cemetery near the town of Vossenack in the Hürtgen Forest. Hansgeorg himself served as an officer cadet with the Grossdeutschland Division in late 1944 and 1945; after the war he joined the Bundeswehr, rising to the rank of Brigadier General.

Generalship

Limitations

Unlike Erwin Rommel, another Field Marshal who preferred to lead from the front, Walter Model was almost universally disliked by those who had to work with him. For example, when he was made commander of the XLI Panzer Corps in 1941, the entire corps staff asked to be transferred. Not only was he foul-mouthed and abusive, but he made a habit of bypassing his staff and subordinate commanders, changing plans without consultation, and issuing orders directly to units further down the chain of command. He was oblivious to the niceties of etiquette, often reprimanding or castigating his officers in public. When he departed Army Group North in March 1944 after being sent to the Ukraine, the Army Group's Chief of Staff, Major-General Eberhard Kinzel, remarked: "Schweinfuhrt" (the swine has flown). It was a reference to Model's nickname among his staffers, that he had earned during his time at XLI Panzer Corps: "Frontschwein" (the frontline pig).

He was not an operational genius in the mould of von Manstein, who had masterminded the plan that defeated France in 1940. Model had led the spectacular advance of 3rd Panzer Division during Operation Barbarossa, and come excruciatingly close to the heart of Moscow in 1941, but his record with offensive operations at army level and above was mediocre. As Ninth Army commander he encircled and destroyed large enemy formations that had penetrated his front, but at Kursk he miscalculated the effect of delaying the offensive, and his plan of attack was uninspired at best, flawed at worst. In the Ardennes, he was unable to overcome the problems of supply and coordination that hobbled the operation. His command style had worked when he was leading a division or corps, but once promoted to command of an army, it opened him to criticism over whether the advantages gained were enough to offset the loss of efficiency that followed.

Nor did Model show any outstanding ability at strategy. On both the Eastern and Western Fronts, he had held commands that included control of multiple army groups; on both occasions, his stints were marked by the lack of any coherent plan. His decision during Operation Bagration to reinforce Army Group Centre with divisions from Army Group North Ukraine only had the effect of weakening the latter. It has been observed that he showed little ability or inclination to contemplate those stretches of the front he did not command.

The lion of defense

File:Model-nehring.jpg

Model conferring with General Walther Nehring (right), commanding Fourth Panzer Army, 1944.

What Model possessed was an excellent tactical mind, especially on the defensive, and an "outstanding talent for improvisation". At 3rd Panzer Division he was a pioneer in the use of kampfgruppen, which would soon become standard practice for the Germans. He had a formidable memory and eye for detail which allowed him to dominate his staff officers, especially those in charge of specialist areas such as artillery, transport and communications. His operational doctrine was very unlike that of his colleagues who dominated postwar evaluations of German operations: men like Guderian, von Manstein, von Mellenthin and Balck, who emphasised maneuver warfare as the key to winning battles. To some extent, this was a product of their respective experiences. Model fought nearly all his battles in the northern and central parts of the Eastern Front; he was never tested on the steppes of southern Russia, where the open terrain would have made mobile warfare a more attractive proposition. Nevertheless, his defensive record indicated the value of his approach. At Rzhev, Orel, in Galicia and in Estonia he stymied opponents who expected to overwhelm him, and as late as November 1944, he gave the U.S. 12th Army Group a bloodied nose in the Hürtgen Forest.

His approach was not pretty. Model was a notoriously ruthless commander, willing to take casualties to stabilise his front. In addition to the instances noted above, he would send theater or operational reserves into the line where the fighting was toughest, thus preserving the units he saw as organic to his own command. For example, he was given the elite Grossdeutschland Division in September 1942, when his Ninth Army was under heavy attack during Operation Mars. Told that the division was not to be broken up, Model nonetheless split it into battalions and companies which he used to plug any gaps that appeared. Grossdeutschland took nearly 10,000 casualties out of a strength of 18,000 men, and at one point was reportedly close to mutiny; but from Model's viewpoint, these losses were acceptable because they meant that Ninth Army's own troops did not have to suffer them. That said, he did not simply treat these units as disposable either. In early 1942, the Der Führer Regiment of the 2nd SS Division Das Reich was infamously reduced to a handful of men in three weeks of bitter fighting—but in that time it also received at least 1,500 reinforcements, including 88 mm guns, artillery pieces, and StuG III assault guns, and Model himself visited the sector daily, calculating the minimum support that would be needed to hold off the Soviet attacks.

Allied to this were his boundless determination and vigour, and stubborn refusal to countenance defeat. He held himself to the same high standard as he held those around him, saying: "He who leads troops has no right to think about himself". His visits to the front may not have helped operational efficiency, but they energised his men, who consistently held him in much higher regard than did his officers. As commanding general of Ninth Army he was once recorded as personally leading a battalion attack against a Soviet position, pistol in hand. Even his peers respected his ability and iron will, detest his personality though they might. Guderian thought him the best choice to command Army Group Centre during the crisis of Operation Bagration, and the Ninth Army's War Diary recorded, after he arrived at Army Group headquarters in Minsk: "The news of Field Marshal Model's arrival is noted with satisfaction and confidence."

Assessment

Relationship with Hitler

Before the war, Model had been content to leave politics to the politicians, preferring instead to concentrate on military affairs. Despite this, he became one of the Wehrmacht's Field Marshals most closely identified with Hitler. Postwar opinions on him have varied. Some historians have have called him "blindly loyal" or a "zealous disciple" of Hitler; others take a more nuanced view, seeing in Model a coldly calculating opportunist who used the Führer to his advantage, whether or not he was committed to him or the ideals of Nazism. The contradictions between his Lutheran upbringing and his later association with the Nazis have similarly been the subject of comment.

As one of the few German generals of middle class upbringing, Model's background appealed to Hitler, who distrusted the old Prussian aristocratic order that still dominated the Wehrmacht's officer corps. His defensive tactics were a much better fit to Hitler's instincts never to give ground, than airy talk of "elastic defense"—even if Model did not entirely share those instincts. His stubbornness, energy and ruthlessness were more qualities that Hitler found admirable, and Model's blunt and direct manner of speaking also made an impression. In a famous incident, the two of them clashed over the disposition of reinforcements to the Ninth Army at Rzhev. When the argument became heated, Model demanded: "Who commands the Ninth Army, my Führer, you or I?" Hitler backed down, indicating that if he might not see reason, he could be bullied into submission. Importantly, however, he never challenged Hitler on political issues: a point that has been identified as the secret to their successful relationship.

Helped by his defensive successes, he thus gained Hitler's full trust and confidence, with the Führer calling him "my best Field Marshal" and (after Operation Bagration) "the saviour of the Eastern Front". In turn, this granted Model a degree of flexibility available to no other German general. He frequently disputed, ignored or bypassed orders that he felt unsupportable: at Rzhev and Orel he had constructed defensive fortifications in defiance of a ban, and his use of Shield and Sword tactics while at Army Group North proved to be simply a cover for a staged withdrawal. His relationships with his superiors were marked by dissembling, where what he wrote in his reports could bear little resemblance to what was actually happening. While other generals who clashed with Hitler were fated to be dismissed, Model's standing remained undiminished—so long as he produced results. After he failed at the Ardennes and the Ruhr, he was discarded.

Model and Nazism

Many of Model's fellow officers considered him a Nazi. He had voiced pro-Nazi sentiments before and during the war, and he frequently harangued his troops to have faith in the Führer and uphold the virtues of National Socialism. Furthermore, he appointed a Waffen-SS officer as his adjutant at Army Group North in 1944, made repeated requests to have SS officers assigned to his staff at each of his army group commands, and filled the National Sozialistischer Führungs Offizier (NSFO, essentially a Nazi political commissar) post at Army Group B that had been vacant before his arrival. His habit of parroting the Führer's orders caused him to be viewed as a sycophant, even if he often undermined or ignored those orders in practice.

Following the July 20 Plot, Model was the first senior commander to reaffirm his loyalty to Hitler. However, he also refused to give up General Hans Speidel, his Chief of Staff at Army Group B who was heavily implicated in the plot, to the Gestapo. Model was well aware of Speidel's political leanings, as were his predecessors at Army Group B, Rommel and von Kluge. Like them, he shielded Speidel for as long as possible, while ignoring such treasonous talk as might take place.

While on the Eastern Front, Model showed no objection to the treatment of civilians by the SS in the areas under his command, and oversaw several anti-partisan operations, mostly while commanding Ninth Army. These operations, conducted by Wehrmacht troops as well as SS, were bloody, although not unusual by German Eastern Front standards. In conjunction with the ruthless scorched earth policies he followed during his retreats, they would lead to his being declared a war criminal by the Soviet Union.

Despite this, while commanding Army Group Centre, he refused to dispatch troops to put down the Warsaw uprising (a task that ultimately was carried out by the SS), viewing it as a rear-area matter. He stated at the time that the revolt was the product of the corrupt and incompetent Nazi administration in Poland, which the regular army should have nothing to do with. On the other hand, he showed no hesitation in clearing the Warsaw suburbs of Praga and Saska Kępa, through which vital supply lines ran, and he stood by when the Germans razed the city afterward.

It has been argued that the best explanation for Model's behaviour and suicide is that he was not necessarily a Nazi, but an authoritarian militarist who saw in Hitler the strong leader that Germany needed. This characterised many in the German officer corps, but in Model's case it was accompanied by a cynical willingness to placate the Nazi regime to expedite his own goals, and a complete internalisation of the image of the professional, apolitical soldier. He had dedicated his life to the army, whether the Reichswehr or the Wehrmacht, and in his final days in the Ruhr, more than one observer had detected in him a struggle to cope with the fact that its destruction was imminent. In this view, Model's decision to take his own life was less to do with matters of honour or Soviet retribution, as with an inability to come to terms with utter defeat.

Summary of career

Dates of rank

• 22 August 1910: 2nd Lieutenant, Infantry
• 25 February 1915: 1st Lieutenant
• March 1918: Captain
• 1929: Major
• 1932: Lieutenant Colonel
• 1 October 1934: Colonel
• 1 March 1939: Major General
• 1 April 1940: Lieutenant General
• 1 October 1941: General of Panzer Troops
• 28 February 1942: Colonel General
• 1 March 1944: Field Marshal

Service history

• 1909: Officer cadet training
• 1910: 52nd Infantry Regiment von Alvensleben
• 1917: Staff assignments
• 1925: Commanding officer, 9th Company, 8th Infantry Regiment
• 1928: Staff officer, 3rd Division, Berlin
• 1930: Staff officer, Section 4 (Training), Truppenamt, Berlin
• 1932: Chief of Staff, Reich Kuratorium for Youth Fitness
• 1933: Battalion commander, 2nd Infantry Regiment
• 1935: Head of Section 8, General Staff, Berlin
• 1938: Chief of Staff, IV Corps
• 1939: Chief of Staff, Sixteenth Army
• 1940: Commander, 3rd Panzer Division
• 1941: Commander, XLI Panzer Corps
• 1942: Commander, Ninth Army
• January-March 1944: Commander, Army Group North
• March-June 1944: Commander, Army Group North Ukraine
• June-August 1944: Commander, Army Group Centre
• August-September 1944: Commander-in-Chief, OB West
• August 1944-April 1945: Commander, Army Group B

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