Talk:Operation Barbarossa

Three Soviet Directives from 22 June 1941:

I tried to put this into the article, however my edition was deleted:

Failure to aim directly for Moscow a strategic mistake?

This is what German generals believed both during and after the war, but do historians generally agree? Alan Clark seems not to (but his book is quite old), nor does Bevin Alexander IIRC. Also the comment that Hitler was more interested in destroying the Red Army than in specific territorial gains seems off. I believe that was standard German army doctrine, whereas Hitler was more interested in economic objectives. Martijn Meijering (talk) 10:26, 16 November 2016 (UTC)

Many military historians agree that it was a strategic error to delay the attack on Moscow.--Obenritter (talk) 23:28, 16 November 2016 (UTC)

Really? I was not getting this impression from various sources. If the Wehrmacht pushed onto Moscow, they would have an undefeated South Western Front on their flank / rear. Moscow was being fortified since July and it's not a certainty that the German forces could have taken it, or effectively encircled it. K.e.coffman (talk) 23:38, 16 November 2016 (UTC)

This fact does not suggest they would have won the war as a result, it was simply a strategic mistake because it gave Stalin time to refortify. Hitler made a fatal error by delaying the drive towards Moscow by diverting needed Panzers to the southern front towards Kiev, which was stalled. What many people fail to realize is that Moscow was THE railway transportation hub of the entire Russian rail system. If the German generals had been allowed to press for Moscow sooner, they could have cut off the city and its rail connections which would have severely hampered the Russians ability to move materials and caused serious logistical problems. Glantz argues of course (like you contend), that had the Russians troops not been occupied at Kiev, this may have changed the situation as well on the German south-western flank. Still, the Russian forces and equipment were qualitatively inferior at this stage, so the Germans very well could have taken Moscow otherwise (siding with German historians here since the facts speak for themselves -- the German forces captured over 665,000 troops near the Kiev cauldron). What makes you think these forces (who were categorically defeated) would have repulsed a more concentrated assault? Anyway, it is all opinion at this point but many agree that while it was likely a strategic mistake to delay the attack on Moscow by redirecting forces, the overall outcome remains the same. Logistical obstacles kept the German under-supplied, they would have still been dealing with severe weather for which they were not equipped and had Moscow been taken, the Russians would have just retreated deeper inland and attacked from the South and East. The Germans could not match the Soviet industrial capacity nor could they overcome the supply stretch deep into the Soviet interior. What we end up with in the end is a prolonged war and not some counterfactual reality where the Nazis outright defeat the Soviets. --Obenritter (talk) 01:45, 17 November 2016 (UTC)

Do you have a citation that shows most military historians believe it was a strategic mistake? If not, then we should present the various opinions instead. As an aside, I believe Heinrici wrote after the war that an immediate drive on Moscow was the only chance Germany had, but it would have been much more of a gamble than the generals had realised at the time. Martijn Meijering (talk) 16:23, 17 November 2016 (UTC)

Of course we should present the various opinions. Having read hundreds of books on the Third Reich, a considerable number in German - my understanding and recollection is that many historians view the delay on Moscow as a strategic error. Heinrici's comment even supports that notion to a degree; when he asserts "an immediate drive on Moscow was the only chance Germany had" but they failed to do it -- doesn't that constitute a strategic error? By the way, Stalin even later claimed that he sacrificed three-quarters of a million men on the southwest front with the intention to delay the German assault on Moscow. That supports the historians who see the delay as a pretty significant error. Anyway - perhaps "most" historians is too strong; many would be more appropriate. Many disagree as well. As you'll note from my commentary above, that did not change the fact that the Russians would have regrouped anyway and Germany was doomed. This is especially the case when Germany declared war on America just a few months later. Nonetheless, the mistake at Moscow notwithstanding, the greatest error made by the Germans was their failure to co-opt the assistance of the Ukrainians and other peoples who were otherwise disillusioned with the Soviet system under Stalin.--Obenritter (talk) 18:18, 17 November 2016 (UTC)

Much of what the German generals wrote post-1945 was of the "blame Hitler" school of thought. Very convenient for them to blame the hated dead guy, who could not of course respond. That doesn't mean that everything they wrote was nonsense, it's simply a word of caution.

The Soviet economy was quite a bit smaller than the German, so it is not correct to say the "Germans could not match the Soviet industrial capacity"; actually it was the other way round. But the Soviets' military/industrial system management was much better at converting raw materials and labor into combat power than the Germans were.

Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 17:27, 17 November 2016 (UTC)

I'm in the process of checking the books I have on this subject. Mercatante argues that the correct course of action would have been to focus on Leningrad, Ukraine and the Caucasus, just as Hitler had wanted from the beginning. I don't know how serious a scholar Mercatante is however. Martijn Meijering (talk) 20:55, 17 November 2016 (UTC)

No need to beat this horse much longer Martijm. A very strong case on how the Germans "could have won" is made by Russell H. S. Stolfi (1992) Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted. Nonetheless, I read plenty of earlier studies which were likely tainted by the German general's view (Liddel-Hart comes to mind) of the situation, pro-German authors writing about their own countrymen in the sixties and seventies, and of course, the whole era of the Invincible Wehrmacht which tainted what would have been otherwise objective studies. More and more modern scholars are shedding doubt on the soundness and feasibility of the attack on Moscow. Robert Citino makes a great case that the efforts around Kiev were remarkable and a stunning success, which in his opinion validated the approach Hitler took. Still - I am not entirely sold that they could not have captured Moscow - the question for me is "at what cost and to what end?" given their supply and weather problems. I'd rather see scholarly editors like yourself improving the article (like replacing all the TV documentary citations) in lieu of debating "what ifs."Obenritter (talk) 00:34, 18 November 2016 (UTC)

Just to keep notice: the IHR is a negationist institution and any paper that gives even 0.1% credibility to the pre-emptive strike hypothesis should be take as serious as one claiming the Moon is made of cheese. Bertdrunk (talk) 01:51, 19 November 2016 (UTC)

Indeed. DMorpheus2 (talk) 01:19, 20 November 2016 (UTC)

@Bertdrunk: -- great point, I should have made that disclaimer immediately so thanks for that. I just stumbled across this and found its content worth mentioning since we were debating "what ifs". Nonetheless -- given the often controversial nature and offensive content the journal publishes -- I have removed that link accordingly.--Obenritter (talk) 04:40, 20 November 2016 (UTC)

Twenty years ago (and earlier) this issue would be a completely worthy point. But thanks to the opening of Soviet archives in the 1990s, and the info they held subsequently making their way into English military history literature over the past 10–15 years, the assessment above becomes problematic. There are several piece of information that undermines the entire notion that an attack on Moscow in July/August would have produced a different outcome. The Germans may have captured Moscow, but they would be just as exhausted as they were in the real battle, and they will have to winter in a ruined city and still be forced to face fresh reserves from Siberia. Historians who have wider access to Soviet archives (and conversant with the language), like Glantz, over the past decade have hammered the untenability of the argument (that the diversion to Kiev was the cause of failure) from almost every angle imaginable. EyeTruth (talk) 01:57, 22 November 2016 (UTC)

And @EyeTruth: drops the mic !--Obenritter (talk) 01:37, 23 November 2016 (UTC)

I share EyeTruth's understanding here. Glantz and the other major recent authors on this topic tend to argue that the Axis forces simply weren't capable of achieving the goals of Barbarossa in light of the capabilities of the Soviet Union, and there wasn't an alternate set of German decisions which could have delivered victory. Nick-D (talk) 02:18, 23 November 2016 (UTC)

After rereading some of the books I have on the subject, I get the impression that there is less debate on the merits of an attack on Moscow than I thought. The discussion appears to be more about whether Hitler's diversion was the cause of Germany's defeat, which is not the same thing. It's possible to believe the diversion was a mistake, but that Germany would still have lost the war even if they had aimed straight for Moscow. This appears to be what Glantz believes. I'll keep reading and see if I can find a summary of the debate somewhere. Martijn Meijering (talk) 09:11, 23 November 2016 (UTC)

Thanks for that input @Mmeijeri:. That's been my stance for a long time even though I must confess as a student of history, older than many of you perhaps, my traditional education about this battle was tainted by the German (and British I might add) authors of many years ago. It's always interesting to see progress and deeper comprehension of historical events thanks to enduring research. Ideology and its philosophical influence on history was my focus area so I was not surprised when the Wehrmacht exhibit first appeared in Germany (which wiped away its "clean" myth), with its now permanent, Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Dimensionen des Vernichtungskrieges 1941–1944 (Crimes of the German Wehrmacht: Dimensions of a War of Annihilation 1941-1944) manifestation in Berlin. Much of their worst was perpetrated during the course of Barbarossa as we all know now. Nonetheless, I appreciate the respectful debate and research that many of you have put into this article.--Obenritter (talk) 23:10, 23 November 2016 (UTC)

The Barbarossa invasion was planned for one or two months earlier than it subsequently occurred, the delay being due to the Battle for Greece, and the delay meant that the then-late attack on Russia dragged on into the Russian winter, which the German attackers had originally planned to avoid, as they did not wish to make the same mistake as Napoleon. As a result, the Wehrmacht troops had no winter clothing, nor low temperature oils and greases for their vehicles or aircraft which froze up and became immobile, leaving them only their horse-drawn transport. In addition, some men froze to death or became unfit due to frost bite. This onset of the Russian winter stopped Barbarossa stone dead in its tracks, giving the Soviets time to withdraw to the east and re-organise their industry, much of which had been over-run. While this was taking place Stalin appealed to the British and Americans for aid, which was sent via the Arctic convoys to tide them over until the factories could be re-setup in the east.

Barbarossa was originally planned mostly to take place during the Russian summer, which is why the Germans did not see fit to provide any winter clothing for the troops involved, as they would not need any. The Soviet's industry was almost all contained in areas subsequently captured by the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS, and if the operation had taken place as planned, the Soviets would have lost most, if not all of their war-fighting capability with no way of replacing it, all while facing a still-advancing German army. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.173.13 (talk) 17:24, 9 February 2017 (UTC)

Rape and sexual assault

Mass rape and sexual assault by German forces during the invasion are well-documented, though it seems that there isn't even a mention of this under 'war crimes' - perhaps there should be something written about this. Mellk (talk) 16:02, 10 April 2017 (UTC)

Why not put your proposal here, i talk, and we can all discuss? DMorpheus2 (talk) 17:05, 10 April 2017 (UTC)

@ Mellk, If you have sources, go ahead and edit the article.EyeTruth (talk) 02:00, 21 April 2017 (UTC)

Bulgaria

Closing discussion initiated by banned HarveyCarter. Binksternet (talk) 20:32, 12 April 2017 (UTC)
The following discussion has been closed. Please do not modify it.
Bulgaria assisted with Barbarossa by keeping parts of Greece and Yugoslavia occupied from 1941-44. (2A00:23C4:6393:E500:80CC:BAB3:726B:DD1D (talk) 19:10, 12 April 2017 (UTC)) Bulgaria was not engaged in Barbarossa. They should not be flagged as a participant. Anything after Dec 1941 is irrelevant to this point. Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 19:15, 12 April 2017 (UTC) Bulgaria also kept Axis pressure on Turkey and - for its own sake - kept an eye on Romania, as Bulgaria had occupied part of Romania in 1940. Spain should certainly be listed as Franco sent thousands of soldiers to fight against the USSR in 1941. (2A00:23C4:6393:E500:80CC:BAB3:726B:DD1D (talk) 19:26, 12 April 2017 (UTC)) The case against including Bulgaria is simply not in question. They neither declared war nor invaded the USSR in 1941. Therefore they were not participants in Op Barbarossa, regardless of what other favors they may have done for the Nazis. It's an open-and-shut case. I admit Spain is far less clear-cut, since they did send one Infantry Division into the campaign. Still: they neither declared war nor committed large forces, and few RSes will list Spain as a true combatant. Spain's contribution was trivial both in terms of overall forces engaged and in terms of Spain's capability. Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 19:52, 12 April 2017 (UTC)

Spain

Spain should not be listed as a combatant. Spain never declared war on the USSR, and no Spanish military unit fought against the USSR. Spanish citizens were permitted to join the German Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS as volunteers. They wore German uniform and conformed to German, not Spanish, organization. Obviously all this was done with the active support of the Spanish government. It is worth noting, however, that the Spanish government's support was veiled precisely to avoid the entanglement of actually being at war. DMorpheus2 (talk) 20:04, 12 April 2017 (UTC)

Please ignore the trolling by banned User:HarveyCarter. Binksternet (talk) 20:32, 12 April 2017 (UTC)

Error correction request in "Northwest Russia" section

Since the article is protected, i wish to change "negation" to "negotiations", — Preceding unsigned comment added by Dost17 (talk • contribs) 17:36, 28 April 2017 (UTC)

Please ignore the talk. I was able to fix it. Dost17 (talk) 17:42, 28 April 2017 (UTC)

My Edit on "War Crimes" section mentioning "Wansee Conference" was reverted

Yes, I agree that "Wansee Conference" is not part of Operation Barbarossa. Exactly so is the discussion between Himmler and Hitler on 18 December 1941 which is mentioned on the same section and is part of the article. I can not understand how a "note" taken in a private discussion can be more important than "THE" pivotal event of Wansee Conference in which the fate of the JEWS was discussed ? But still, you are the boss...

I think the 'aftermath' section should probably confine itself to events that were clearly determined or very, very heavily influenced by how Barbarossa turned out. Obviously the holocaust itself falls into that category because, had the Germans not invaded the USSR, many fewer jews would have been exposed/vulnerable to the nazis. A link to the holocaust thus should be there. Was the conference itself prompted somehow by the campaign of invasion or would it have happened anyway? I honestly have no idea. DMorpheus2 (talk) 15:14, 5 May 2017 (UTC)

Mark Roseman (2003) asserts on pages 31–32 of The Wannsee Conference and the Final Solution that, "...on the eve of Operation Barbarossa...the Nazis were still committed to finding a territory to which to deport Europe's Jews." However Roseman adds that although Operation Barbarossa added an imperative for murder and altered the tone of the war, it is unclear if the systematic plan to eliminate the Jews was part of the original plan which "later widened into something more comprehensive?"(p. 43). Given the uncertainty here and the existence of the Madagascar Plan in this picture, I think we should support Eye Truth's revert.--Obenritter (talk) 22:17, 5 May 2017 (UTC)

Anders?

Currently we have the following content: In particular, relations between Soviets and Poles, whose country was earlier invaded by the former, changed, allowing for the formation of Polish army units within the Soviet Union, such as that of General Anders, to support the Soviet war-effort.

This is mixed up. The Anders-led units were virtually POWs and *left* the USSR to fight alongside the western Allies. The later Polish LWP forces under Berling that fought on the eastern front were loyal to a different government and, organizationally, were completely separate. Polish-Soviet relations were much more complex than this sentence implies and indeed I think it obscures more than it explains. Thoughts? DMorpheus2 (talk) 11:40, 11 May 2017 (UTC)

@DMorpheus2: This unregistered editor's contribution added nothing worthwhile to the Historical Significance section anyway (not surprising given the errors introduced) so I reverted it.--Obenritter (talk) 23:32, 11 May 2017 (UTC)

@Obenritter: Thanks, that's helpful. DMorpheus2 (talk) 14:52, 12 May 2017 (UTC)

Not a turning point

Closing discussion initiated by banned HarveyCarter.
The following discussion has been closed. Please do not modify it.
Germany never had any chance of winning World War II as it did not have the resources like oil and grain to fight a long war against the British Empire. (2A00:23C4:638A:5000:789B:3661:8D12:B380 (talk) 19:31, 30 May 2017 (UTC)) Paradoxically, Germany was better off for vital resources, such as oil and grain, under the export arrangements of the August 39 pact, than it got through it's failed expansion in the east. After June 41 it certainly was not strong enough. I would disagree with your point that the BoB 'forced' Hitler to invade the U.S.S.R. Hitler wanted to invade the East, as part of Nazism's core ideology. That Hitler was a rubbish strategist does not take away the rather compelling 'what if' that had Hitler followed the Navy General Staff advice, the Nazis may well have dealt a crippling blow to Great Britain by concentrating on the Middle East and the Med, the taking of Malta and severing the Suez Canal lifeline. This could have been done with the resources Hitler had to hand prior to June 41. Barbarossa sucked the Germans into an unwinnable campaign of attrition while losing the million tons of oil a year plus the precious grain, rubber, strategic rare metals, etc that they were getting from the pact. Irondome (talk) 19:48, 30 May 2017 (UTC) The oil crisis in early 1941 meant Hitler either had to surrender or obtain more oil from the Soviet Union. Stalin would have either resisted the demands, or at least made any increase in oil dependent on increased deliveries of goods that Germany would have been incapable of meeting. Focusing on the Mediterranean in 1941-2 would have allowed Stalin time to rebuild the Red Army, making the Soviet Union a major threat to Germany. The point about Malta and the Suez Canal is irrelevant as Britain had already agreed to give up its empire. (2A00:23C4:638A:5000:684C:239A:B1F1:3E0 (talk) 12:51, 31 May 2017 (UTC)) This is not a forum for your (nutty) ideas. Do you have some edit you wish to suggest? DMorpheus2 (talk) 15:16, 31 May 2017 (UTC)

Missing information

Why is there no mention of the fact that Stalin was going to attack Germany? (2A00:23C4:638A:5000:2DA4:4D39:8AD:91F5 (talk) 11:48, 3 June 2017 (UTC))