Israeli–Palestinian peace process

The peace process in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict refers to intermittent discussions held during the ongoing violence which has prevailed since the beginning of the conflict. Since the 1970s, there has been a parallel effort made to find terms upon which peace can be agreed to in both the Arab–Israeli conflict and in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Some countries have signed peace treaties, such as the Egypt–Israel (1979) and Jordan–Israel (1994) treaties, whereas some have not yet found a mutual basis to do so.

William B. Quandt, in the introduction of his book Peace Process, says:

"Sometime in the mid-1970s the term peace process became widely used to describe the American-led efforts to bring about a negotiated peace between Israel and its neighbors. The phrase stuck, and ever since it has been synonymous with the gradual, step-by-step approach to resolving one of the world's most difficult conflicts. In the years since 1967 the emphasis in Washington has shifted from the spelling out of the ingredients of 'peace' to the 'process' of getting there. … Much of US constitutional theory focuses on how issues should be resolved – the process – rather than on substance – what should be done. … The United States has provided both a sense of direction and a mechanism. That, at its best, is what the peace process has been about. At worst, it has been little more than a slogan used to mask the marking of time."

Since the 2003 road map for peace, the current outline for a Palestinian–Israeli peace agreement has been a two-state solution.

Views of the peace process

Palestinian views on the peace process

Main article: Palestinian views on the peace process

Palestinians have held diverse views and perceptions of the peace process. A key starting point for understanding these views is an awareness of the differing objectives sought by advocates of the Palestinian cause. 'New Historian' Israeli academic Ilan Pappe says the cause of the conflict from a Palestinian point of view dates back to 1948 with the creation of Israel (rather than Israel’s views of 1967 being the crucial point and the return of occupied territories being central to peace negotiations), and that the conflict has been a fight to bring home refugees to a Palestinian state. Therefore, this for some was the ultimate aim of the peace process, and for groups such as Hamas still is. However Slater says that this ‘maximalist’ view of a destruction of Israel in order to regain Palestinian lands, a view held by Arafat and the PLO initially, has steadily moderated from the late 1960s onwards to a preparedness to negotiate and instead seek a two-state solution. The Oslo Accords demonstrated the recognition of this acceptance by the then Palestinian leadership of the state of Israel’s right to exist in return for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and West Bank. However, there are recurrent themes prevalent throughout peace process negotiations including a feeling that Israel offers too little and a mistrust of its actions and motives. Yet, the demand for the right of return by the Palestinian refugees to Israel has remained a cornerstone of the Palestinian view and has been repeatedly enunciated by Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas who is leading the Palestinian peace effort.

Israeli views on the peace process

Main article: Israeli views on the peace process

There are several Israeli views of the peace process. The official position of the State of Israel is that peace ought to be negotiated on the basis of giving up some control of the occupied territories in return for a stop to the conflict and violence. Israel's position is that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas be the negotiating partner in the peace talks, and not Hamas, which has at times engaged with Israel in escalations of the conflict. The Oslo Accords and the Camp David 2000 summit negotiations revealed the possibility of a two state system being accepted by Israeli leadership as a possible peace solution.

However, the violence of the second intifada and the political success of Hamas (a group dedicated to Israel's destruction) have convinced many Israelis that peace and negotiation are not possible and a two state system is not the answer. Hardliners believe that Israel should annex all Palestinian territory, or at least all minus the Gaza Strip. Israelis view the peace process as hindered and near impossible due to terrorism on the part of Palestinians and do not trust Palestinian leadership to maintain control. In fact, Pedahzur goes as far as to say that suicide terrorism succeeded where peace negotiations failed in encouraging withdrawal by Israelis from cities in the West Bank. A common theme throughout the peace process has been a feeling that the Palestinians give too little in their peace offers.

US views on the peace process

There are divergent views on the peace process held by US officials, citizens and lobbying groups. All recent US Presidents have maintained a policy that Israel must give up some of the land that it conquered in the 1967 war in order to achieve peace; that the Palestinians must actively prevent terrorism; and that Israel has an unconditional right to exist. Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush publicly supported the creation of a new Palestinian state out of most of the current Palestinian territories, based on the idea of self-determination for the Palestinian people, and President Obama has continued that policy. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton thought that peace can only be achieved through direct, bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Obama outlined the pursuit of the two-state solution as American policy for achieving Palestinian aspirations, Israeli security, and a measure of stability in the Middle East.

American Jewish views on the peace process

According to the sociologist Mervin Verbit, American Jews are "more right than left" on peace process issues. Verbit found that surveys of American Jews often reflect the view of the poll's sponsors. Often it is the wording of the survey questions that bias the outcome (a headline illustrating this point reads "ADL poll shows higher support for Israel than did survey by dovish J Street"). Using survey data from the American Jewish Committee where findings could not be attributed to wording biases, Verbit found American Jews took a rightward shift following the collapse of the Camp David talks in 2000, and the 9/11 attacks in 2001.

Major current issues between the two sides

See also: History of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

There are numerous issues to resolve before a lasting peace can be reached, including the following:

• Borders and division of the land;
• Strong emotions relating to the conflict on both sides;
• Palestinian concerns over Israeli settlements in the West Bank;
• Status of Jerusalem;
• Security concerns over terrorism, safe borders, incitements, violence;
• Right of return of Palestinian refugees living in the Palestinian diaspora.

From the Israeli perspective, a key concern is security, and whether the major Palestinian figures and institutions are in fact trying to fight terrorism and promote tolerance and co-existence with Israel. Israeli concerns are based on abundant documentary and empirical evidence of many Palestinian leaders having in fact promoted and supported terrorist groups and activities. Furthermore, there is much concrete evidence of Palestinians having supported and expressed incitment against Israel, its motives, actions, and basic rights as a state. The election of Hamas has provided evidence for this view, with the Hamas charter stating unequivocally that it does not recognize Israel's right to exist. However, there remain some activists on the Palestinian side who claim that there are still some positive signs on the Palestinian side, and that Israel should use these to cultivate some positive interactions with the Palestinians, even in spite of Hamas's basic opposition to the existence of the Jewish State. Since mid-June 2007, Israel has cooperated with Palestinian security forces in the West Bank at unprecedented levels, thanks in part to United States-sponsored training, equipping, and funding of the Palestinian National Security Forces and Presidential Guard.

A further concern is whether, as a result of this security argument, Israel will in fact allow the Palestinian community to emerge as a viable and sovereign political unit, a viable and contiguous state. There are also various economic and political restrictions placed on Palestinian people, activities, and institutions which have had a detrimental effect on the Palestinian economy and quality of life. Israel has said repeatedly that these restrictions are necessary due to security concerns, and in order to counteract ongoing efforts which promote terrorism which incite opposition to Israel's existence and rights as a country. The key obstacle therefore remains the Israeli demand for security versus Palestinian claims for rights and statehood.

Furthermore, the identification of 'Palestinian' with 'terrorist' can be construed as problematic, and Sayigh argues that this association is used as a rationale for maintaining the status quo, and that only by recognising the status of Jewish immigrants as 'settlers' can we conceptually move forwards However, it is the case that the Palestinian resort to militancy has made such conceptual clarity difficult to achieve.

Nevertheless, there is a range of ulterior motives for Israel's denial of Palestinian statehood. If Palestine were declared a state, then immediately, Israel, by its present occupation of the West Bank will be in breach of the United Nations Charter. Palestine, as a state, could legitimately call upon the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter to remove Israel from the occupied territories. Palestine, as a state, would be able to accede to international conventions and bring legal action against Israel on various matters. Palestine could accede to various international human rights instruments, such as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It could even join the International Criminal Court and file cases against Israel for war crimes. It would be a tinderbox of a situation that is highly likely to precipitate conflict in the Middle East.

There is a lively debate around the shape that a lasting peace settlement would take (see for example the One-state solution and Two-state solution). Authors like Cook have argued that the one-state solution is opposed by Israel because the very nature of Zionism and Jewish nationalism calls for a Jewish majority state, whilst the two-state solution would require the difficult relocation of half a million Jewish settlers living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The Palestinian leaders such as Salam Fayyad have rejected calls for a binational state or unilateral declaration of statehood. As of 2010, only a minority of Palestinians and Israelis support the one-state solution. Interest in a one-state solution is growing, however, as the two-state approach fails to accomplish a final agreement.

Attempts to make peace

See also: List of Middle East peace proposals

For other uses, see Two-state solution (disambiguation).

Not to be confused with Two-nation theory.

A peace movement poster: Israeli and Palestinian flags and the words peace in Arabic and Hebrew. Similar images have been used by several groups supporting a two-state solution to the conflict.

Map of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 2011. Agreeing on acceptable borders is a major difficulty with the two-state solution.

Area C of the West Bank, controlled by Israel, in blue and red, December 2011

The two-state solution is a proposed approach to resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, by creating two states on the territory of the former Mandatory Palestine. It is often contrasted with the one-state solution, which is the establishment a single state in former Mandatory Palestine with equal rights for all its inhabitants. The two-state solution is supported by many countries, and the Palestinian Authority. Israel currently does not support the idea, though it has in the past.

The first proposal for separate Jewish and Arab states in the territory was made by the British Peel Commission report in 1937. In 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a partition plan for Palestine, leading to the 1948 Palestine war. As a result, Israel was established on the area the UN had proposed for the Jewish state, as well as almost 60% of the area proposed for the Arab state. Israel took control of West Jerusalem, which was meant to be part of an international zone. Transjordan took control of East Jerusalem and what became known as the West Bank, annexing it the following year. The territory which became the Gaza Strip was occupied by Egypt but never annexed. Since the 1967 Six-Day War, both the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip have been militarily occupied by Israel, becoming known as the Palestinian territories.

The Palestine Liberation Organization has accepted the concept of a two-state solution since the 1982 Arab Summit. In 2017, Hamas announced their revised charter, which claims to accept the idea of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, but without recognising the statehood of Israel. Diplomatic efforts have centred around realizing a two-state solution, starting from the failed 2000 Camp David Summit and the Clinton Parameters, followed by the Taba Summit in 2001. The failure of the Camp David summit to reach an agreed two-state solution formed the backdrop to the commencement of the Second Intifada, the violent consequences of which marked a turning point among both peoples’ attitudes. A two-state solution also formed the basis of the Arab Peace Initiative, the 2006–2008 peace offer, and the 2013–14 peace talks.

Currently there is no two-state solution proposal being negotiated between Israel and Palestinians. The Palestinian Authority supports the idea of a two-state solution; Israel at times has also supported the idea, but nowadays rejects the creation of a Palestinian state. Long-serving Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in 2015 rejected a Palestinian state. He again rejected a Palestinian state in June 2023. Former Israeli PMs Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert in late 2023 expressed support for a two-state solution. Public support among Israelis and among Palestinians (measured separately) for “the concept of the two-state solution” etc. have varied between far above and far below 50%, depending partly on how the question was phrased.

The major points of contention include the specific boundaries of the two states (though most proposals are based on the 1967 lines), the status of Jerusalem, the Israeli settlements and the right of return of Palestinian refugees. Observers have described the current situation in the whole territory, with the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and blockade of the Gaza Strip, as one of de facto Israeli sovereignty. The two-state solution is an alternative to the one-state solution and what observers consider a de facto one-state reality.

Following the 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel and the subsequent Israel–Hamas war, multiple governments renewed the long-dormant idea of a two-state solution. This received serious pushback from Israel's government, especially from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. On 26 September 2024, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud and Norway's Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide co-chaired a meeting of representatives of about 90 countries, held on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, to launch a global alliance to strive for a two-state solution.

History

Main article: Israeli–Palestinian conflict

Mandatory Palestine in 1946.

In the wake of Jewish migration from Europe in the context of Zionism and intercommunal conflict in Mandatory Palestine, the first proposal for the creation of Jewish and Arab states in the British Mandate of Palestine was made by the British Peel Commission report of 1937 led by William Peel, 1st Earl Peel. The plan maintained a mandate covering a small area containing Jerusalem and allotted the poorest lands of Palestine, including the Negev Desert, and areas that are known today as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to the Arabs; while most of the coastline and some of Palestine's most fertile agricultural land in the Galilee were allotted to the Jews. Consequently, the recommended partition proposal was rejected by the Arab community of Palestine, and was accepted by most of the Jewish leadership.

Partition was again proposed by the 1947 UN Partition Plan for the division of Palestine. It proposed a three-way division, again with Jerusalem held separately, under international control. The partition plan was accepted by Jewish Agency for Palestine and most Zionist factions who viewed it as a stepping stone to territorial expansion at an opportune time. The Arab Higher Committee, the Arab League and other Arab leaders and governments rejected it on the basis that Arabs formed a two-thirds majority and owned a majority of the lands. They also indicated an unwillingness to accept any form of territorial division, arguing that it violated the principles of national self-determination in the UN Charter. They announced their intention to take all necessary measures to prevent the implementation of the resolution. Subsequently, the Intercommunal conflict in Palestine gave way to civil war and the plan was not implemented.

1955 United Nations map showing the borders of Israel according to the Green Line of the 1949 Armistice Agreements.

At the end of the British Mandate, with the establishment of the State of Israel and entry of Arab regular armies into what had been Mandatory Palestine, the 1948 war became an international conflict. At the end of the war, the Green Line established by the 1949 Armistice Agreements became the de facto borders of the State of Israel. The war resulted in the fleeing or expulsion of 711,000 Palestinians, which the Palestinians call Nakba, from the territories which became the state of Israel.

UN resolution 242 and the recognition of Palestinian rights

After the 1967 Arab–Israeli war, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed resolution 242 calling for Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied during the war, in exchange for "termination of all claims or states of belligerency" and "acknowledgement of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area". The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which had been formed in 1964, strongly criticized the resolution, saying that it reduced the question of Palestine to a refugee problem.

In September 1974, 56 member states proposed that "the question of Palestine" be included as an item in the General Assembly's agenda. In a resolution adopted on 22 November 1974, the General Assembly affirmed Palestinian rights, which included the "right to self-determination without external interference", "the right to national independence and sovereignty", and the "right to return to their homes and property". These rights have been affirmed every year since.

Early Palestinian articulations of two-state solution

The first indication that the PLO would be willing to accept a two-state solution, on at least an interim basis, was articulated by Said Hammami in the mid-1970s.

Likud party's insistence on only Israeli sovereignty

The Israeli Likud party, in its manifesto for the 1977 elections which it won in a landslide, declared: "Between the sea and the Jordan there will only be Israeli sovereignty." Similar statements have been made by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as late as 18 January 2024.

On 18 July 2024, the Israeli parliament passed a resolution that rejected the establishment of a Palestinian state. The resolution passed in the Knesset with 68 votes in favour and nine against it. Netanyahu’s coalition with far-right parties co-sponsored the resolution, while the opposition left the session to avoid supporting the statement.

Palestinian Declaration of Independence

The Palestinian Declaration of Independence of 15 November 1988, which referenced the UN Partition Plan of 1947 and "UN resolutions since 1947" in general, was interpreted as an indirect recognition of the State of Israel, and support for a two-state solution. The Partition Plan was invoked to provide legitimacy to Palestinian statehood. Subsequent clarifications were taken to amount to the first explicit Palestinian recognition of Israel.

2017 Hamas Charter

Main article: 2017 Hamas charter

The 2017 Hamas charter presented the Palestinian state being based on the 1967 borders. The text says "Hamas considers the establishment of a Palestinian state, sovereign and complete, on the basis of the June 4, 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital and the provision for all the refugees to return to their homeland." This is in contrast to Hamas' 1988 charter, which previously called for a Palestinian state on all of Mandatory Palestine. Nevertheless, even in the 2017 charter, Hamas did not recognize Israel.

6th Netanyahu cabinet

In December 2022, Benjamin Netanyahu returned as Prime Minister of Israel, forming the most right-wing government in Israel's history. Netanyahu's coalition partners rejected the two-state solution. In February 2023, Netanyahu said he would be willing to grant Palestinians autonomy but not sovereignty, and in any future deal Israel would maintain full security control of the West Bank. In June 2023, Netanyahu told members of the Knesset that Israel must block the creation of a Palestinian state.

Later in 2023, despite Israeli PM Netanyahu's statement denying the creation of a Palestinian state as a condition for a normalization with Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabian crown prince Mohammed bin Salman said normalization with Israel was "for the first time real". This was an apparent reversal of Saudi policy, articulated in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, when Saudi Arabia had offered Israel normalization with the whole Arab world if Israel allows the creation of a Palestinian state. Israeli and other officials involved in the negotiations confirmed that the Saudis were considering normalization with Israel without the creation of a Palestinian state. Many Palestinians worried that Israeli-Saudi normalization would cost them their last significant leverage for Palestinian statehood.

In October 2023, Hamas launched an attack on Israel. Numerous sources identified the lack of a Palestinian state as a cause of the war. The Associated Press wrote that Palestinians are "in despair over a never-ending occupation in the West Bank and suffocating blockade of Gaza". After Netanyahu invaded Gaza, he once again reiterated his opposition to the existence of a Palestinian state.

Diplomatic efforts

Main article: Israeli–Palestinian peace process

Security Council resolutions dating back to June 1976 supporting the two-state solution based on the pre-1967 lines were vetoed by the United States, which supports a two-state solution but argued that the borders must be negotiated directly by the parties.

After the First Intifada began in 1987, considerable diplomatic work went into negotiations between the parties, beginning with the Madrid Conference in 1991. The most significant of these negotiations was the Oslo Accords, which officially divided Palestinian land into three administrative divisions and created the framework for how much of Israel's political borders with the Palestinian territories function today. The Accords culminated in the Camp David 2000 Summit, and follow-up negotiations at Taba in January 2001, which built explicitly on a two-state framework, but no final agreement was ever reached. The violent outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000 had demonstrated the Palestinian public's disillusionment with the Oslo Accords and convinced many Israelis that the negotiations were in vain.

  Recognition of Israel only

  Recognition of both Israel and Palestinian State

  Recognition of Palestinian State only

  Israel and Palestinian State

In 2002, Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (who would go on to be King from 2005 to 2015) proposed the Arab Peace Initiative, which garnered the unanimous support of the Arab League while Israeli leaders continually refuse to discuss the initiative. President Bush announced his support for a Palestinian state, opening the way for United Nations Security Council Resolution 1397, supporting a two-state solution.

At the Annapolis Conference in November 2007, three major parties—The PLO, Israel, and the US—agreed on a two-state solution as the outline for negotiations. However, the summit failed to achieve an agreement.

Following the conflict that erupted between the two main Palestinian parties, Fatah and Hamas, Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip, splintering the Palestinian Authority into two polities, each claiming to be the true representatives of the Palestinian people. Fatah controlled the Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank and Hamas Governed in Gaza.

The latest initiatives were the 2013–14 Israeli–Palestinian peace talks under the guidance of John Kerry, the United States Secretary of State. These talks also failed to reach an agreement.

Viability

By 2010, when direct talks were scheduled to be restarted, continued growth of settlements on the West Bank and continued strong support of settlements by the Israeli government had greatly reduced the land and resources that would be available to a Palestinian state creating doubt among Palestinians and left-wing Israelis that a two-state solution continued to be viable.

In January 2012 the European Union Heads of Mission report on East Jerusalem found that Israel's continuing settlement activities and the fragile situation of the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem, as well in area C, was making a two-state solution less likely. The Israeli Foreign Ministry rejected this EU report, claiming it was "based on a partial, biased and one sided depiction of realities on the ground." In May 2012, the EU council stressed its "deep concern about developments on the ground which threaten to make a two-state solution impossible'.

On 29 November 2012, the UN General Assembly voted by 138 to 9, with 46 abstentions to recognize Palestine as a "non-member observer state". On the following day, Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu announced the building of 3,000 new homes on land to the east of East Jerusalem, in an area referred to as "E-1". The move was immediately criticized by several countries, including the United States, with Israeli ambassadors being personally called for meetings with government representatives in the United Kingdom, France and Germany, among others. Israel's decision to build the homes was described by the Obama administration as "counterproductive", while Australia said that the building plans "threaten the viability of a two-state solution". This is because they claim the proposed E-1 settlement would physically split the lands under the control of the Palestinian National Authority in two, as the extent of the PNA's authority does not extend all the way to the River Jordan and the Dead Sea. Israel's Labor party has voiced support for the two-state solution, with Isaac Herzog stating it would be "in Israel's interests".

in March 2015, Netanyahu declared that a Palestinian state would not be established during his administration, while he also stated that he disapproved the one-state solution for the ongoing conflict between two people.

After the Trump administration's controversial decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital in December 2017, Palestinian officials said the policy change "destroys the peace process" and the decision indirectly meant the United States was "abdicating its role as a peace mediator" that could no longer act as a mediator in the peace process because the United States had become a party to the dispute instead of neutral intercessor for negotiations.

A 2021 survey among 521 scholars who have dedicated their professional lives to the study of this region and its politics, found that 52 percent of respondents believed the two-state solution is no longer possible. If a two-state solution is not achieved, 77 percent predict "a one-state reality akin to apartheid" and 17 percent "one-state reality with increasing inequality, but not akin to apartheid"; one percent think a binational state with equal rights for all inhabitants is likely.

Settlements in the West Bank

UN resolutions affirm the illegality of settlements in West Bank, including East Jerusalem, including United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334 passed in December 2016. As of November 2023, there are at least 700,000 Israeli settlers in the Occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem across 150 settlements and 128 outposts. More than three-quarters of the existing settlements have been constructed since the Oslo Accords.

The establishment and expansion of the illegal settlements in the Occupied West Bank constitute a major challenge to the possibility of a two-state solution by "violating Palestinian sovereignty, threatening civil peace and security, jeopardizing water resources, and blocking agricultural development." This has progressively reduced Area A and B of the West Bank territory to a "shrinking archipelago of enclaves".

Proposals have been offered for over 50 post-evacuation compensation of settlers for abandoned property, as occurred following Israel's withdrawal of settlements from Gaza in 2005 and from the Sinai Peninsula in 1982. Some settlers in those previous withdrawals were forcibly removed by the IDF.

Public opinion in Israel and Palestine

Israeli demonstration against annexation of the West Bank, Rabin Square, Tel Aviv-Yafo, June 6, 2020

In a 2002 poll conducted by PIPA, 72% of both Palestinians and Israelis supported at that time a peace settlement based on the 1967 borders so long as each group could be reassured that the other side would be cooperative in making the necessary concessions for such a settlement. A 2013 Gallup poll found 70% of Palestinians in the West Bank and 48% of Palestinians in Gaza Strip, together with 52% of Israelis supporting "an independent Palestinian state together with the state of Israel".

Support for a two-state solution varies according to the way the question is phrased. Some Israeli journalists suggest that the Palestinians are unprepared to accept a Jewish State on any terms. According to one poll, "fewer than 2 in 10 Arabs, both Palestinian and all others, believe in Israel's right to exist as a nation with a Jewish majority." Another poll, however, cited by the US State Department, suggests that "78 percent of Palestinians and 74 percent of Israelis believe a peace agreement that leads to both states living side by side as good neighbors" is "essential or desirable".

In 2021, a poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research revealed that 39% of Palestinians supported "the concept of the two-state solution", while 59% said they rejected it. Support is even lower among younger Palestinians; in 2008, then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice noted: "Increasingly, the Palestinians who talk about a two-state solution are my age." A survey taken before the outbreak of fighting in 2014 by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) found that 60 percent of Palestinians say the goal of their national movement should be "to work toward reclaiming all of historic Palestine from the river to the sea" compared to just 27 percent who endorse the idea that they should work "to end the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and achieve a two-state solution." WINEP says that "this is a new finding compared to similar (but not identical) questions asked in the past, when support for a two-state solution typically ranged between 40–55 percent". By 2020, 40% in Gaza and 26% in the West Bank believe that a negotiated two-state solution should solve the conflict. Another report, published also in 2021 by the RAND Corporation, found that also 60% of Israelis across the political spectrum were opposed to a two-state solution.

The two-state solution enjoyed majority support in Israeli polls although there has been some erosion to its prospects over time. A 2014 Haaretz poll asking "Consider that in the framework of an agreement, most settlers are annexed to Israel, Jerusalem will be divided, refugees won't return to Israel and there will be a strict security arrangement, would you support this agreement?", only 35% of Israelis said yes.

According to a 2021 PCPSR poll, support for a two-state solution among Palestinians and Israeli Jews, as of 2021, had declined to 43 percent and 42 percent, respectively. According to Middle East experts David Pollock and Catherine Cleveland, as of 2021, the majority of Palestinians said they wanted to reclaim all of historic Palestine, including pre-1967 Israel. A one-state solution with equal rights for Arabs and Jews was ranked second.

Some researchers argue that the two-state solution has already been implemented because Jordan, which makes up 78% of the former Mandatory Palestine, was originally created as a state for the Arabs.

In December 2022, support for a two-state solution was 33% among Palestinians, 34% among Israeli Jews, and 60% among Israeli Arabs. 82% of Israeli Jews and 75% of Palestinians believed that the other side would never accept the existence of their independent state.

At the end of October 2023, the two-state solution had the support of 71.9% of Israeli Arabs and 28.6% of Israeli Jews. Prior to the October 7 attack, according to Gallup, just 24% of Palestinians supported a two-state solution, a drop from 59% in 2012.

Notable individuals

Ehud Olmert, Israel's Prime Minister from 2006 to 2009, told Politico on 16 October 2023 that the two-state solution "is the only real political solution for this lifelong conflict". On 6 November 2023, he told CBC that "a two-state solution should still be the goal of the Israeli government".

Ehud Barak, Israel's Prime Minister from 1999 to 2001 and Minister of Defense from 2007 to 2013, told TIME on 6 November 2023 that "The right way is to look to the two-state solution".

Interviewed by Ezra Klein on 8 December 2023, Nimrod Novik, a member of the executive committee of Commanders for Israel’s Security (CIS), reiterated the CIS's view that the two-state solution is "the only solution that [...] serves Israel’s security and well-being long-term."

Ami Ayalon, the head of Israel's Shin Bet internal security service from 1995 to 2000, said on 14 January 2024 in an interview with The Guardian that "Israel will not have security until Palestinians have their own state".

On 17 July 2024, Ehud Olmert and former Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister Nasser al-Kidwa, signed a joint proposal for an end to the Gaza war, and subsequent steps towards a two-state solution.

Yair Golan, former IDF deputy chief of staff and current leader of The Democrats, a political party formed by a merger of the Israeli Labor Party and Meretz, said in a July 2024 interview with the Guardian, "Our vision is a two-state solution [...]".

International positions regarding two-state solution

Following the 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel and the subsequent Israel–Hamas war, multiple governments renewed the long-dormant idea of a two-state solution. This received serious pushback from Israel's government, especially from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Support

Global Alliance for the Implementation of a Palestinian State and a Two-State Solution

On 26 September 2024, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud and Norway's Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide co-chaired a meeting of representatives of about 90 countries, held on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, to launch a global alliance to strive for a two-state solution.

G7

In the statement issued after their virtual meeting of 6 December 2023, the Leaders of the G7 wrote that they are "committed to a Palestinian state as part of a two-state solution that enables both Israelis and Palestinians to live in a just, lasting, and secure peace."

European Union

Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, wrote on 15 November 2023: "We need to work with our regional partners towards [...] the two-state solution [...] it remains the only viable way to bring peace to the region."

In her address to the G20 leaders on 22 November 2023, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, said: "We have to [...] work for a two-state solution. This is the only way to ensure lasting peace for Israeli and Palestinian people as neighbours."

Arab League

In a statement issued following its 16 May 2024 meeting in Manama, the 22-member Arab League called for an international conference "to resolve the Palestinian issue on the basis of the two-state solution".

United States

President Joe Biden has made numerous statements in favour of a two-state solution, as have Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.

China

China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi has stated that "China calls for [...] the formulation of a specific timetable and road map for the implementation of the 'two-state solution'".

Germany

Germany, in a governmental declaration of 2021, repeated in November 2023, wished for an independent Palestinian state side by side with Israel, in peace with each other, and 'based on the 4 June 1967 borders' unless 'the conflicting parties agree' about changing those borders, while also the Palestinian refugee problem "needs a just and realistic solution".

In November 2023, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz criticised Israel's settlement policy in the West Bank, the violence by Israeli settlers against the indigenous population of the West Bank, and he repeated calls for a two-state solution for Israel and the Palestinians.

In December 2023, Germany’s Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock added that Hamas must free all their (more than 130) Israeli hostages immediately, must lay down its arms, and that "leaving Hamas in power in Gaza would be a permanent roadblock on the path to a two-state solution"; "the Palestinians need a team of leaders who can give them the security and good governance they deserve".

India

India's External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, at the February 2024 Munich Security Conference ('Peace through Dialogue'), referring to the prevailing situation in Gaza, said that a two-state solution to the Palestine issue is now "more urgent" than before.

United Kingdom

The previous Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and Foreign Secretary David Cameron, strongly advocated a two-state solution. David Cameron and German Minister of Foreign Affairs Annalena Baerbock published a joint statement, supporting a two-state solution. Keir Starmer, the current Prime Minister, wrote that the only solution that can break the cycle of violence is "a two-state solution, with Israel [...] safe and secure alongside the [...] Palestinian state.".

France

President Emmanuel Macron has advocated a two-state solution.

Italy

Following a meeting with Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammed Mustafa, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani reiterated Italy's support for the two-state solution.

Canada, Australia and New Zealand

Canada's Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Australia's Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and New Zealand's Prime Minister Christopher Luxon have issued a joint statement, saying "We recommit ourselves to [...] a just and enduring peace in the form of a two-state solution".

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal Bin Farhan has said that Saudi Arabia would be interested in a normalisation deal with Israel that is linked to a two-state solution.

Opposed

Israel

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly and emphatically rejected a two-state solution.

Iran

President Ebrahim Raisi has rejected a two-state solution, instead proposing a "single state based on ballot boxes involving Palestinians of all faiths".

Non-governmental supporters of a two-state solution

North America

New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman has strongly supported President Biden's calls for a two-state solution and criticised Prime Minister Netanyahu's opposition.

Twenty-seven former Jewish leaders of organizations including AIPAC, the Jewish Agency for Israel, the Jewish Federations of North America, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations and the Union for Reform Judaism, wrote a letter to President Biden on 14 December 2023, calling for a "steadfast US commitment to the pursuit of two states for two peoples".

UK

In "The Jewish Manifesto for the General Election 2024" published on 21 June 2024, the Board of Deputies of British Jews called for "a negotiated two-states model", resulting in "a secure Israel alongside a viable Palestinian state". On 17 July 2024, the Board of Deputies reaffirmed its support for "a two state solution with a secure Israel alongside a viable Palestinian state."

Other solutions

Trump's peace plan for the creation of the State of Palestine.

The main alternative is the binational solution, which could either be a twin regime federalist arrangement or a unitary state. Other alternatives are the three-state solution and the Jordanian option, also known as the "no-state solution".

Three-state solution

The three-state solution has been proposed as another alternative. The New York Times in 2009 reported that Egypt and Jordan were concerned about having to retake responsibility for Gaza and the West Bank. In effect, the result would be Gaza returning to Egyptian rule, and the West Bank to Jordan.

Jordanian option

The "Jordanian option" refers to various proposals aimed at resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict through the involvement of the Kingdom of Jordan. These proposals generally involve Jordan retaking control of parts of the West Bank or establishing a federation or confederation with a Palestinian state.

In the 1950s and 1960s, King Hussein of Jordan and his officials promoted the idea that "Jordan is Palestine and Palestine is Jordan," aiming to present Jordanians and Palestinians as one unified people with a shared destiny. Following the 1967 Six-Day War, which resulted in Jordan losing the West Bank to Israel, Israeli leaders Yigal Allon and Abba Eban presented King Hussein with the Allon Plan, which suggested returning parts of the West Bank to Jordan. However, disagreements over this plan led to a stalemate in negotiations. In 1986, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and King Hussein of Jordan reached an agreement advocating for a peaceful solution to the conflict based on a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. This idea was further explored through the secret Peres–Hussein London Agreement of April 1987, resulting from covert discussions between Israel and Jordan. In 1988, King Hussein renounced Jordan’s claims to the West Bank and Palestinian affairs. Despite Jordanian opposition to the confederation idea, leading to limited advocacy from Israeli leaders, renewed interest in the Jordanian option has emerged as a potential solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Dual citizenship

A number of proposals for the granting of Palestinian citizenship or residential permits to Jewish settlers in return for the removal of Israeli military installations from the West Bank have been fielded by such individuals as Arafat, Ibrahim Sarsur and Ahmed Qurei.

Israeli Minister Moshe Ya'alon said in April 2010 that "just as Arabs live in Israel, so, too, should Jews be able to live in Palestine." ... "If we are talking about coexistence and peace, why the [Palestinian] insistence that the territory they receive be ethnically cleansed of Jews?"

The idea has been expressed by both advocates of the two-state solution and supporters of the settlers and conservative or fundamentalist currents in Israeli Judaism that, while objecting to any withdrawal, claim stronger links to the land than to the state of Israel.

New-state solution

Map showing the Sinai Peninsula along the Mediterranean Sea with Gaza and Israel on the right side.

The New-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict proposes to resolve the conflict by establishing a new city-state on the Sinai Peninsula along the Mediterranean Sea close to Arish. The implementation of a New-state solution would involve the establishment of a democratic independent sovereign State of Palestine away from the State of Israel in the current State of Egypt.

See also

• United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine (1947)
• List of Middle East peace proposals
  • One-state solution
  • Three-state solution
• Jordanian option
  • Jordanian annexation of the West Bank (1950-1967/1988)
  • King Hussein's federation plan (1972)
  • Peres–Hussein London Agreement (1987)
• Allon Plan (1967)
• State of Palestine (declared 1988)
• State of Judea (declared 1988)
• Madrid Conference of 1991
• Oslo Accords (1993, 1995)
• Palestinian Authority (est. 1995)

General concepts

• From the river to the sea
• Greater Israel
• Halachic state
• Palestinianism
• Zionism

Bibliography

• Ashton, Nigel (2008). King Hussein of Jordan. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-09167-0. No Google Books preview (August 2024).
• Bani Salameh, Mohammed Torki; El-Edwan, Khalid Issa (2016). "The identity crisis in Jordan: historical pathways and contemporary debates". Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity. 44 (6). Routledge: 985–1002.

• Peters, Joel; Newman, David, eds. (2015). Routledge Handbook on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. London and New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. ISBN 9781138925373. No Google Books preview (August 2024).

• Quandt, William B. (2005). Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (3rd ed.). Washington, D.C., Berkeley and Los Angeles: Brookings Institution Press and University of California Press. pp. 261–262. ISBN 9780520246317. Retrieved 26 August 2024.
• Siniver, Asaf, ed. (2023). Routledge Companion to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-1-032-24901-8.
• Sharnoff, Michael (2024). "Visualizing Palestine in Arab postage stamps: 1948-1967". Middle Eastern Studies. Routledge. Retrieved 27 August 2024.

• Shemesh, Moshe (2010). "On Two Parallel Tracks—The Secret Jordanian-Israeli Talks (July 1967–September 1973)". Israel Studies. 15 (3). Indiana University Press. Retrieved 26 August 2024 – via JSTOR.
• Shlaim, Avi (2008). Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace. New York: Knopf. ISBN 978-1-4000-4305-7.

Further reading

• Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World (Funk and Wagnalls, New York, 1970).

External links

• The Future of the TwoState Solution, Giora Eiland, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, February 2009 Archived 2012-03-03 at the Wayback Machine
• Two-state solution-discredited – without workable alternative, Beate Zilversmidt, The Other Israel, May 2006 Archived 2017-07-01 at the Wayback Machine
• "Two-State Chimera, No-State Solution". Why there won't ever be two 'states'. Cameron Hunt, Counter Currents, May 2007
• "Banging Square Pegs into Round Holes," Dore Gold, ed. David Pollack, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 2008 Archived 2012-03-03 at the Wayback Machine
• "The Middle East conflict and the two-state solution," RearVision, ABC Radio National, September 23, 2009
• Taking the two-state solution seriously, Opinion by Alain Dieckhoff, March 2009, European Union Institute for Security Studies
• A Demilitarized Palestinian State Archived 2016-11-04 at the Wayback Machine, On the meaning of that & summary of security arrangement out of previous Israeli-Palestinian accords, Reut Institution (a Think Tank)

Peace efforts with confrontation states

There were parallel efforts for peace treaties between Israel and other "confrontation states": Egypt, Jordan and Syria after the Six-Day war, and Lebanon afterwards. UN resolution 242 was accepted by Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, but rejected by Syria until 1972-1973.

In 1970, US Secretary of State William P. Rogers proposed the Rogers Plan, which called for a 90-day cease-fire, a military standstill zone on each side of the Suez Canal, and an effort to reach agreement in the framework of UN Resolution 242. The Egyptian government accepted the Rogers Plan even before Anwar Sadat became president. Israel refused to enter negotiations with Egypt based on the Rogers peace plan.

No breakthrough occurred even after President Sadat in 1972 surprised most observers by suddenly expelling Soviet military advisers from Egypt and again signaled to the United States government his willingness to negotiate based on the Rogers plan.

Madrid (1991–93)

Main article: Madrid Conference of 1991

Yitzhak Rabin, Bill Clinton, and Yasser Arafat at the Oslo Accords signing ceremony on 13 September 1993

In 1991, just after the First Gulf War, a breakthrough occurred when US president George H.W. Bush (with the help of Secretary of State James Baker) called a conference in Madrid, Spain between Israel and the Arab nations "directly involved in the Arab–Israeli conflict ... which ... was to serve only as a preamble to direct bilateral and multilateral talks between Israel and its neighbors", dubbed the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991. Talks continued in Washington, DC, but with few results.

Oslo (1993–)

Main article: Oslo Accords

The slowpaced Madrid talks were upstaged by a series of secret meetings between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators hosted by Norway. These meetings produced the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords between Palestinians and Israel, a plan discussing the necessary elements and conditions for a future Palestinian state "on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338". The agreement, officially titled the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP), was signed on the White House lawn on 13 September 1993. Rabin, Arafat and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres were awarded the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts. On behalf of the Israeli people, Rabin said: "We who have fought against you, the Palestinians, we say to you today, in a loud and a clear voice, enough of blood and tears ... enough!"

Various "transfers of power and responsibilities" in the Gaza Strip and West Bank from Israel to the Palestinians took place in the mid-1990s. The Palestinians achieved self-governance of major cities in the West Bank and the entire Gaza Strip. Israel maintained and continues to maintain a presence in the West Bank for security reasons, in 2013 Israel still has control of 61% of the West Bank, but the Palestinians control civic functions for most of the Palestinian population.

After the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, the peace process eventually ground to a halt. The settlements' population almost doubled in the West Bank. Later suicide bombing attacks from Palestinian militant groups and the subsequent retaliatory actions from the Israeli military made conditions for peace negotiations untenable.

1996–99 agreements

Newly elected Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared a new policy following the many suicide attacks by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad since 1993, including a wave of suicide attacks prior to the Israeli elections of May 1996. Netanyahu declared a tit-for-tat policy which he termed "reciprocity," whereby Israel would not engage in the peace process if Arafat continued with what Netanyahu defined as the Palestinian revolving door policy, i.e., incitement and direct or indirect support of terrorism. The Hebron and Wye Agreements were signed during this period, after Israel considered that its conditions were partially met.

Hebron agreement

Main article: Hebron Agreement

Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, also known as The Hebron Protocol or Hebron Agreement, began 7 January and was concluded from 15 January to 17 January 1997 between Israel and the PLO. This agreement dealt with the redeployment of Israeli military forces in Hebron in accordance with the Oslo Accords. The agreement dealt with redeployments in Hebron, security issues and other concerns.

Wye River Memorandum

Main article: Wye River Memorandum

The Wye River Memorandum was a political agreement negotiated to implement the Oslo Accords, completed on 23 October 1998. It was signed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. It was negotiated at Wye River, MD (at the Wye River Conference Center) and signed at the White House with President Bill Clinton as the official witness. On 17 November 1998, Israel's 120-member parliament, the Knesset, approved the Wye River Memorandum by a vote of 75-19. The agreement dealt with further redeployments in the West Bank, security issues and other concerns.

Camp David 2000 Summit

Main article: Camp David 2000 Summit

In 2000, US President Bill Clinton convened a peace summit between Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. In May of that year, according to Nathan Thrall, Israel had offered Palestinians 66% of the West Bank, with 17% annexed to Israel, and a further 17% not annexed but under Israeli control, and no compensating swap of Israeli territory. The Israeli prime minister reportedly offered the Palestinian leader approximately 95% of the West Bank and the entire Gaza Strip if 69 Jewish settlements (which comprise 85% of the West Bank's Jewish settlers) be ceded to Israel. East Jerusalem would have fallen for the most part under Israeli sovereignty, with the exception of most suburbs with heavy non-Jewish populations surrounded by areas annexed to Israel. The issue of the Palestinian right of return would be solved through significant monetary reparations. According to Palestinian sources, the remaining area would be under Palestinian control. Depending on how the security roads would be configured, these Israeli roads might impede free travel by Palestinians throughout their proposed nation and reduce the ability to absorb Palestinian refugees. Borders, airspace, and water resources of the Palestinian state would have been left in Israeli hands.

President Arafat rejected this offer and did not propose a counter-offer. No tenable solution was crafted which would satisfy both Israeli and Palestinian demands, even under intense U.S. pressure. Clinton blamed Arafat for the failure of the Camp David Summit. In the months following the summit, Clinton appointed former US Senator George J. Mitchell to lead a fact-finding committee that later published the Mitchell Report.

Clinton's "Parameters" and the Taba talks

Proposed in the Fall of 2000 following the collapse of the Camp David talks, The Clinton Parameters included a plan on which the Palestinian State was to include 94-96% of the West Bank, and around 80% of the settlers were to become under Israeli sovereignty, and in exchange for that, Israel would concede some territory (so called 'Territory Exchange' or 'Land Swap') within the Green Line (1967 borders). The swap would consist of 1-3% of Israeli territory, such that the final borders of the West Bank part of the Palestinian state would include 97% of the land of the original borders.

At the Taba summit (at Taba) in January 2001 talks continued based on the Clinton Parameters. The Israeli negotiation team presented a new map. The proposition removed the "temporarily Israeli controlled" areas from the West Bank, and the Palestinian side accepted this as a basis for further negotiation. However, Prime Minister Ehud Barak did not conduct further negotiations at that time; the talks ended without an agreement and the following month the right-wing Likud party candidate Ariel Sharon was elected as Israeli prime minister in February 2001.

Beirut summit

Main articles: Arab Peace Initiative and Beirut Summit

The Beirut summit of Arab government leaders took place in March 2002 under the aegis of the Arab League. The summit concluded by presenting a plan to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres welcomed it and said, "... the details of every peace plan must be discussed directly between Israel and the Palestinians, and to make this possible, the Palestinian Authority must put an end to terror, the horrifying expression of which we witnessed just last night in Netanya", [2] referring to the Netanya suicide attack perpetrated on the previous evening which the Beirut Summit failed to address. Israel was not prepared to enter negotiations as called for by the Arab League plan on the grounds that it did not wish for "full withdrawal to 1967 borders and the right of return for the Palestinian refugees".

The "Road Map" for peace

Main article: Road map for peace

President George W. Bush, center, discusses the Peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel, left, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in Aqaba, Jordan, 4 June 2003.

In July 2002, the "quartet" of the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia outlined the principles of a "road map" for peace, including an independent Palestinian state. The road map was released in April 2003 after the appointment of Mahmoud Abbas (AKA Abu Mazen) as the first-ever Palestinian Authority Prime Minister. Both the US and Israel called for a new Prime Minister position, as both refused to work with Arafat anymore.

The plan called for independent actions by Israel and the Palestinian Authority, with disputed issues put off until a rapport can be established. In the first step, the Palestinian Authority must "undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere" and a "rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus" must "begin sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure." Israel was then required to dismantle settlements established after March 2001, freeze all settlement activity, remove its army from Palestinian areas occupied after 28 September 2000, end curfews and ease restrictions on movement of persons and goods.

Israeli–Palestinian talks in 2007 and 2009

From December 2006 to mid-September 2008, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority met 36 times; there were also lower-level talks. In 2007 Olmert welcomed the Arab League's re-endorsement of the Arab Peace Initiative. In his bid to negotiate a peace accord and establish a Palestinian state, Olmert proposed a plan to the Palestinians. The centerpiece of Olmert's detailed proposal is the suggested permanent border, which would be based on an Israeli withdrawal from most of the West Bank. Olmert proposed annexing at least 6.3% of Palestinian territory, in exchange for 5.8% of Israeli land, with Palestinians receiving alternative land in the Negev, adjacent to the Gaza Strip, as well as territorial link, under Israeli sovereignty, for free passage between Gaza and the West Bank. Israel insisted on retaining an armed presence in the future Palestinian state. Under Abbas's offer, more than 60 percent of settlers would stay in place. Olmert, for his part, was presenting a plan in which the most sparsely populated settlements would be evacuated. Olmert and Abbas both acknowledged that reciprocal relations would be necessary, not hermetic separation. They also acknowledged the need to share a single business ecosystem, while cooperating intensively on water, security, bandwidth, banking, tourism and much more. Regarding Jerusalem the leaders agreed that Jewish neighborhoods should remain under Israeli sovereignty, while Arab neighborhoods would revert to Palestinian sovereignty. The Palestinians asked for clarifications of the territorial land swap since they were unable to ascertain what land his percentages affected, since Israeli and Palestinian calculations of the West Bank differ by several hundred square kilometres. For them, in lieu of such clarifications, Olmert's 6.3-6.8% annexation might work out closer to 8.5%, 4 times the 1.9% limit the Palestinians argued a swap should not exceed. The talks ended with both sides claiming the other side dropped follow-up contacts.

Following the conflict that erupted between the two main Palestinian parties, Fatah and Hamas, Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip, splintering the Palestinian Authority into two polities, each claiming to be the true representatives of the Palestinian people. Fatah controlled the Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank and Hamas governed in Gaza. Hostilities between Gaza and Israel increased. Egypt brokered the 2008 Israel–Hamas ceasefire, which lasted half a year beginning on 19 June 2008 and lasted until 19 December 2008. The collapse of the ceasefire led to the Gaza War on 27 December 2008.

In June 2009, reacting to President Obama Barack's Cairo Address, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared for the first time conditional support for a future Palestinian state but insisted that the Palestinians would need to make reciprocal gestures and accept several principles: recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people;demilitarization of a future Palestinian state, along with additional security guarantees, including defensible borders for Israel; Palestinian would also have to accept that Jerusalem would remain the united capital of Israel, and renounce their claim to a right of return. He also claimed that Israeli settlements retain a right to growth and expansion in the West Bank. Palestinians rejected the proposals immediately. Later that year, the White House announced that it would host a three-way meeting between President Obama, Prime Minister Netanyahu, and President Mahmoud Abbas, in an effort to lay the groundwork for renewed negotiations on Mideast peace.

2010 direct talks

Main article: Direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians (2010–11)

See also: 2010 Palestinian militancy campaign

In September 2010, the Obama administration pushed to revive the stalled peace process by getting the parties involved to agree to direct talks for the first time in about two years. While U.S. President Barack Obama was the orchestrator of the movement, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton went through months of cajoling just to get the parties to the table, and helped convince the reluctant Palestinians by getting support for direct talks from Egypt and Jordan. The aim of the talks was to forge the framework of a final agreement within one year, although general expectations of a success were fairly low. The talks aimed to put the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to an official end by forming a two-state solution for the Jewish and Palestinian peoples, promoting the idea of everlasting peace and putting an official halt to any further land claims, as well as accepting the rejection of any forceful retribution if violence should reoccur. Hamas and Hezbollah, however threatened violence, especially if either side seemed likely to compromise in order to reach an agreement. As a result, the Israeli government publicly stated that peace couldn't exist even if both sides signed the agreement, due to the stance taken by Hamas and Hezbollah. The US was therefore compelled to re-focus on eliminating the threat posed by the stance of Hamas and Hezbollah as part of the direct talk progress. Israel for its part, was skeptical that a final agreement was reached that the situation would change, as Hamas and Hezbollah would still get support to fuel new violence. In addition, the Israeli government rejected any possible agreement with Palestine as long as it refuses to recognize Israel as a Jewish state.

This is in accordance with the principle of the two-state solution, first proposed in the 1980s. The mainstream within the PLO have taken the concept of territorial and diplomatic compromise seriously and have showed serious interest in this. During the 2010 talks, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas said that the Palestinians and Israel have agreed on the principle of a land swap, but Israel has yet to confirm. The issue of the ratio of land Israel would give to the Palestinians in exchange for keeping settlement blocs is an issue of dispute, with the Palestinians demanding that the ratio be 1:1, and Israel offering less. In April 2012, Mahmoud Abbas sent a letter to Benjamin Netanyahu reiterating that for peace talks to resume, Israel must stop settlement building in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and accept the 1967 borders as a basis for a two-state solution. In May 2012, Abbas reiterated his readiness to engage with the Israelis if they propose "anything promising or positive". Netanyahu replied to Abbas' April letter less than a week later and, for the first time, officially recognised the right for Palestinians to have their own state, though as before he declared it would have to be demilitarised, and said his new national unity government furnished a new opportunity to renew negotiations and move forward.

2013–14 talks

Main article: 2013–14 Israeli–Palestinian peace talks

The 2013–2014 Israeli–Palestinian peace talks were part of the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. Direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians began on 29 July 2013 following an attempt by United States Secretary of State John Kerry to restart the peace process.

Martin Indyk of the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. was appointed by the US to oversee the negotiations. Indyk served as U.S. ambassador to Israel and assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs during the Clinton administration. Hamas, the Palestinian government in Gaza, rejected Kerry's announcement, stating that Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas has no legitimacy to negotiate in the name of the Palestinian people.

The negotiations were scheduled to last up to nine months to reach a final status to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by mid-2014. The Israeli negotiating team was led by veteran negotiator Justice Minister Tzipi Livni, while the Palestinian delegation was led by Saeb Erekat, also a former negotiator. Negotiations started in Washington, DC and were slated to move to the King David Hotel in Jerusalem and finally to Hebron. A deadline was set for establishing a broad outline for an agreement by 29 April 2014. On the expiry of the deadline, negotiations collapsed, with the US Special Envoy Indyk reportedly assigning blame mainly to Israel, while the US State Department insisted no one side was to blame but that "both sides did things that were incredibly unhelpful."

Pre-peace talk compromises

Before the peace talks began, both sides offered concessions. The Palestinian Authority offered to put on hold international recognition as a state by applying to international organizations while Israel offered the release of 104 Palestinian prisoners, 14 of whom are Arab-Israelis and all of whom had been in Israeli jails since before the 1993 Oslo I Accord. The prisoners were responsible for killing, in all, 55 Israeli civilians, 15 Israeli security forces personnel, one French tourist and dozens of suspected Palestinian collaborators.

Commenters have however pointed out that Israel had already promised to release these same 104 Palestinians, back in 1999 under the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, but never did. Critics also worry that Israel will simply quietly re-arrest the potentially released Palestinians, and state that Israel is using the slow release to hold the negotiations hostage and that the main goal of the release is to bolster Israel's image. According to the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report, Israel's decision not to release the prisoners at the time was due to significantly increased violence against Israel by their partner in the memorandum, the PLO, leading up to the Second Intifada. In the time leading up to the planned release, Israel perceived "institutionalized anti-Israel, anti-Jewish incitement; the release from detention of terrorists; the failure to control illegal weapons; and the actual conduct of violent operations" as a sign that "the PLO has explicitly violated its renunciation of terrorism and other acts of violence, thereby significantly eroding trust between the parties."

Discussions

Over the 9 months period, John Kerry met with the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas on 34 occasions, and Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu roughly twice as many times. On 29 July 2013, as Israeli and Palestinian negotiators met for a second day in Washington to discuss renewing peace talks, Mahmoud Abbas said "in a final resolution, we would not see the presence of a single Israeli – civilian or soldier – on our lands." His comments drew immediate condemnation from Israeli officials, who accused him for discriminating against Jews.

On 13 August, the first day, the Palestinian team leaders were Saeb Erekat and Muhammed Shtayyeh while their Israeli counterparts were Tzipi Livni and Yitzhak Molcho. The US mediators were Martin Indyk and Frank Lowenstein. On 13 August, Israel released the first batch of 26 Palestinian prisoners. On 19 August, Mahmoud Abbas called for the US to step up its involvement in the talks, saying its role should be proactive and not merely supervisory. On 20 August, Israel urged the United States to back Egypt's military government, saying failure to do so would risk derailing the peace talks. On 22 August, Mahmoud Abbas said that no progress had been made in the first four talks. He also said that the Palestinian right of return would likely have to be waived in the event of any peace agreement. He also walked back his earlier statement that he wanted a Palestinian state without a single Israeli; he said that what he meant was no Israelis who were "part of the occupation", but that he wouldn't have a problem with Jews or Israelis coming to Palestine for business or tourism reasons, as long as they were not an occupying force.

On 5 September 2013, Palestinian negotiator Nabil Shaath said that Israel has yet to put any new offers on the table, that Israel has only allowed Martin Indyk to attend one of the six talks so far, and that the Palestinian leadership would not accept "temporary solutions", only a permanent peace deal. On 8 September, Israel accused the Palestinians of leaking information about the talks, which are supposed to be kept secret, to the press. An Israeli official also stated that some of the information leaked by Palestinians was not true. On 25 September, both Israel and the Palestinians agreed to intensify peace talks with an increased United States role.

On 26 September, Mahmoud Abbas spoke in front of the UN Security Council, and welcomed the resumption of peace talks while at the same time criticizing Israel's settlement building. The Israeli delegation was not present for Abbas' speech, because they were observing the holiday of Sukkot. Hamas and the Islamic Jihad called for a third intifada, and a spokesman for Hamas' armed wing said that the current peace talks were "futile".

On 17 October 2013, Abbas reiterated his view that he would not accept any Israeli military presence on Palestinian territory. On 22 October, Israel and the Palestinians are reported to have discussed the issue of water. On 27 October, Israel prepared to release another round of Palestinian prisoners to create a positive climate for the ongoing peace talks. On 28 October, Netanyahu categorically rejected the Palestinian right of return and said that Jerusalem must remain undivided. On 29 October, the second stage of the Palestinian prisoners' release was completed as 26 prisoners were released.

On 6 November, Israeli negotiators said there will not be a state based on the 1967 borders and that the Separation Wall will be a boundary. On 14 November, the Palestinian team quit the negotiations blaming the "escalation of settlement-building."

On 4 December 2013, Saeb Erekat told John Kerry that the peace talks with Israel were faltering and urged Kerry to salvage them. Also, an Israeli newspaper reported that Israel was prepared to hand 2000 hectares (5000 acres, or 7 sq. mi.) of land to the Palestinians to show that it was prepared to allow Palestinian projects on these lands. The land had been privately owned by Palestinians but militarily occupied by Israel. On 26 December, Likud ministers led by Miri Regev began pushing a bill to annex the Jordan Valley, which would prevent Netanyahu from accepting the American proposal for the Jordan Valley and border crossings into Jordan to be placed under Palestinian control, with border security provided by IDF soldiers and the US. On 30 December, Saeb Erekat said that the peace talks had failed, citing the aforementioned Israeli bill to annex the Jordan Valley. Erekat said that denying the Palestinian state a border with Jordan would be a clear step toward apartheid, and that the PA should instead unilaterally seek international recognition and membership in organizations. Erekat also said that "Israel wants to destroy the two-state solution through its daily practices." The PLO senior official also rejected the idea of extending the peace talks beyond their nine-month deadline. On 30 December, Israel released its third set of prisoners, consisting of 26 Palestinian security prisoners.

On 1 January 2014, Maariv reported that Israeli and American leaders had been discussing, and seriously considering, the possibility of ceding parts of the Arab Triangle to the Palestinians in exchange for Jewish settlements in the West Bank. The residents of the Triangle would automatically become Palestinian citizens if this happened. This idea is similar to the Lieberman Plan. Rami Hamdallah also said that despite Erekat's insistence that the talks had failed, the Palestinians would continue participating in the talks until the April deadline. On 5 January, hardliners in Netanyahu's coalition threatened to withdraw from the government if he accepted the 1967 borders as a baseline for talks. Dovish opposition parties, such as Labor, said they would join if this occurred, in order to prevent the coalition from breaking up completely. On 9 January, according to insiders, support for a two-state agreement within the Knesset stood at 85 in favor to 35 opposed. In addition to the Labor Party, American negotiators were also attempting to persuade Haredi parties Shas and United Torah Judaism, both of which are generally supportive of the peace process, to join the government to keep negotiations alive.

On 10 January 2014, Israel approved plans for 1,400 settler homes. Saeb Erekat responded by saying "The recent announcement shows Israel's clear commitment to the destruction of peace efforts and the imposition of an apartheid regime". Tzipi Livni, who also opposed new settler homes, was responded by Israeli politician Ze'ev Elkin, who suggested the settlements were vital for Israel's security: "The path that Livni recommends means we will have to say goodbye to our security," he said. On 14 January, Israel's defense minister Moshe Ya'alon rejected the negotiations and insulted John Kerry, saying he was acting based upon "messianic feeling", and that "The only thing that can 'save' us is that John Kerry will get a Nobel Peace Prize and leave us alone." Yuval Steinitz, another members of the Likud, expressed general agreement with Ya'alon's views, but disagreed with the personal insult. However, Yaalon later issued an official apology in a written statement sent to media from the Defense Ministry. On 18 January, Israel's finance minister Yair Lapid threatened to take his party, Yesh Atid, out of the coalition if peace talks did not advance. This would have toppled the government and forced either the formation of a new coalition, or early elections.

On 21 January 2014, Israel announced plans for 381 new settler homes in the West Bank. The Palestinians condemned this move, and also ruled out the possibility of the peace talks extending beyond the nine-month deadline. On 22 January, Abbas said he would like Russia to take a more active role in the negotiations. On 27 January, the Palestinians said they would not allow "a single settler" to remain in a Palestinian state, but that this did not stem from anti-Jewish attitudes. Rather, Jews living in the West Bank would have the option of remaining if they renounced their Israeli citizenship and applied to be citizens of Palestine. A poll has shown that 4.5% of Jewish settlers would consider becoming Palestinian citizens under such an arrangement. On 31 January, according to Martin Indyk, the framework for the US-backed Middle East peace deal will allow up to 80 per cent of Jewish settlers to remain in the West Bank. The deal would redraw borders so that some 80 per cent of settlers' homes would be redesignated as being in Israel, while other parcels land would be handed back to Palestinian control in a proposed land-swap deal. Another key point of the framework would be that Israel would be allowed to retain a role in maintaining security along the West Bank's border with neighbouring Jordan. The new security arrangements would see a zone created with hi-tech fences equipped with sensors and drone surveillance planes flying overhead. Also the final peace treaty could also provide compensation for victims on both sides of the historic conflict.

On 3 February 2014, Abbas suggests that US-led NATO troops patrol a future Palestinian state instead of Israeli troops having a presence in Jordan Valley, but Israeli settlers and soldiers have five years to leave Palestine once the state is formed. On 6 February, Israel reportedly sought to annex 10 percent of the West Bank, but Palestinian negotiators insisted that they keep at least 97 percent. On 9 February, ministers voted down a proposal by Likud legislator Miri Regev to annex certain West Bank settlements and the roads leading to them.

During the course of negotiations, Netanyahu followed the precedent of Israel's former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and made recognition of Israel as a Jewish state a requirement for peace. Some news sources falsely reported that Netanyahu was the first Israeli Prime Minister to make such a requirement. Urging Abbas to recognize Israel as the Jewish-nation state, he reportedly said:

'it's time for the Palestinians to stop denying history. Just as Israel is prepared to recognize a Palestinian state, the Palestinian leadership must be prepared to recognize the Jewish state. In doing so you will tell your people that, though we have a territorial dispute, Israel's right to exist is beyond dispute. You would finally make it clear that you are truly prepared to end the conflict."

To that end, he announced his intention to introduce such a definition of Israel in a Basic Law. The proposed law would be in addition to Israel's declaration of independence of May 1948 which defines Israel as a Jewish state. Justice Minister Tzipi Livni expressed concern over the proposal. Although she was in favor of defining Israel more clearly in law as "the national home of the Jewish people and a democratic state", she has expressed opposition to "any law that gives superiority" to the Jewish nature of state over the country's democratic values. Livni also said she could only support legislation where "Jewish and democratic would have the same weight, not more Jewish than democratic, nor more democratic than Jewish".

Abbas dismissed this demand, pointing out that the Palestinians had already extended recognition of the State of Israel, both in 1988 and in the 1993 Oslo Accords. He added that, neither Jordan nor Egypt, with whom Israel had made peace treaties had been asked to recognize Israel's Jewish character. The Palestinians would never accept Israel as a 'religious state' since, it would damage the rights of Israel's Palestinian minority and

'to accept it now as a Jewish state would compromise the claims of millions of Palestinian refugees whose families fled the fighting that followed Israel's creation in 1948 and were not allowed to return."

On 28 March 2014, Israel failed to release the fourth tranche of 26 Palestinian prisoners, as scheduled, in what Palestinian sources say was a violation of the original terms for the peace talks, According to Israeli officials, the Palestinians had publicly claimed that they would break off peace talks once the final batch of prisoners were released. Israel reportedly demanded an extension of the April 29 deadline before the release. The agreement had included a Palestinian undertaking not to sign up for international conventions. After Israel withheld the prisoners' release, Mahmoud Abbas went ahead and signed 15 conventions regarding adhesion to human and social rights. Israel then demolished several EU funded humanitarian structures in E1 and stated the prisoners' release depended on a Palestinian commitment to continuing peace talks after the end of April deadline. Some days later, Israel approved tenders for 708 more Israeli residential units beyond the Green Line, in Gilo, followed by various sanctions against Palestinians in retaliation for their joining of international conventions.

At the end of March, Haaretz reported that the United States, Israel and the Palestinian Authority were negotiating a "grand bargain" to "salvage peace talks". Kerry and Netanyahu discussed a possible deal to extend them until the end of 2014 and to ensure the Palestinians didn't make unilateral moves at the United Nations. The Israeli proposal conditioned the release of the fourth tranche of 26 Palestinian prisoners on an extension of the negotiations beyond the current deadline of 29 April and included the release about 400 low-profile Palestinian prisoners, as well as the 26 high-profile prisoners, including 14 Israeli Arabs. It excluded the high-profile prisoners Marwan Barghouti and Ahmad Saadat who Israel categorically refused to release. Israel also offered to put an unofficial freeze on most settlement construction outside of East Jerusalem for the next eight months. Israel said it would resolve the status of family reunification requests submitted by some 5,000 families in the West Bank and Gaza. According to Israeli officials, the United States would release Jonathan Pollard as a concession to Israel. On 23 April 2014, The Jerusalem Post reported that Abbas listed 3 conditions for extending peace talks beyond the 29 April deadline; that the borders of a future Palestinian state be dealt with during the first three months of the extended talks, a complete freeze on all settlement construction, and the release without deportation of the fourth batch of Palestinian prisoners, including Israeli-Arabs.

2014 Fatah–Hamas Reconciliation

Israel reacted angrily to the Fatah–Hamas Gaza Agreement of 23 April 2014 whose main purpose was reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, the formation of a Palestinian unity government and the holding of new elections. Israel halted peace talks with the Palestinians, saying it "will not negotiate with a Palestinian government backed by Hamas, a terrorist organization that calls for Israel's destruction", and threatened sanctions against the Palestinian Authority, including a previously announced Israeli plan to unilaterally deduct Palestinian debts to Israeli companies from the tax revenue Israel collects for the PA. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused Abbas of sabotaging peace efforts. He said that Abbas cannot have peace with both Hamas and Israel and has to choose. Abbas said the deal did not contradict their commitment to peace with Israel on the basis of a two-state solution and assured reporters that any unity government would recognize Israel, be non-violent, and bound to previous PLO agreements. Shortly after, Israel began implementing economic sanctions against Palestinians and canceled plans to build housing for Palestinians in Area C of the West Bank. Abbas also threatened to dissolve the PA, leaving Israel fully responsible for both the West Bank and Gaza, a threat that the PA has not put into effect.

Notwithstanding Israeli objections and actions, a Palestinian Unity Government was formed on 2 June 2014.

Break-down of the talks and post-mortem assessments

On 2 May 2014, the Hebrew daily newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth cited an anonymous senior American official as placing the blame for the break-down in talks mainly on Israel's settlement stance, directly quoting the remark: 'Netanyahu did not move more than an inch." Israeli sources in Jerusalem later reported that the remarks came from the US Special Envoy Indyk himself, who was reportedly preparing to hand in his resignation. Whoever the source of the comment, the White House cleared the interview in which the remarks were made. In this the officials appeared to be referring to the Israeli government announcement of a record 14,000 new settlement housing units. Mark Landler has written that the remark attributed to Indyk reflected the President's own views:

Publicly, Mr. Obama has said that both sides bear responsibility for the latest collapse. But the president believes that more than any other factor, Israel’s drumbeat of settlement announcements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem poisoned the atmosphere and doomed any chance of a breakthrough with the Palestinians.

In a talk later given at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Indyk stated that Netanyahu had shown enough flexibility to come within the zone of an agreement. However, Indyk also stated that Netanyahu was undermined by members of his coalition, who kept making announcements of new settlements. Although Israeli sources insisted that Netanyahu negotiated in good faith. In an interview with The New York Times, Indyk further added that his impression was that, 'For Israelis . .(t)The Palestinians have become ghosts,' citing what he felt was the most meaningful personal moment in the talks, when the Palestinian Director of Intelligence, Majid Faraj, told his Israeli counterparts across the table, "You just don't see us." He also said that "there is so much water under the bridge... the difficulties we faced were far more because of the 20 years of distrust that built up".

Pope Francis during his three-day pilgrimage to the Middle East, intervened in the collapsed peace process, endorsing the State of Palestine, calling the situation "increasingly unacceptable" and issuing an invitation to both the Israeli and Palestinian presidents to join in a prayer summit at his home in the Vatican. A meeting was scheduled to that effect for 6 June.

In June 2014, a leaked recording from an unknown date showed that chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat believed the reason Netanyahu entered the peace talks was to build more settlements and disliked how President Mahmoud Abbas had committed to not go to international bodies.

However, Israeli national security adviser Joseph Cohen revealed a 65-page document that chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat submitted to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas on 9 March, three weeks before Israel was to release the final batch of Palestinian prisoners. In it, Erekat proposed a strategy for the PA during the final month of negotiations and after 29 April, when the talks were originally scheduled to end before their premature collapse. Erekat recommended applying to join various international conventions, informing the U.S. and Europe that the Palestinians wouldn't extend the talks beyond 29 April, demanding that Israel nevertheless release the final batch of prisoners, intensifying efforts to reconcile with Hamas to thwart what he termed an Israeli effort to sever the West Bank from Gaza politically, and various other diplomatic and public relations moves. Cohen concludes that even while the Palestinians were talking with Washington about the possibility of extending the peace talks, they were actually planning to blow them up, and had been planning to do so even before Abbas met with U.S. President Barack Obama on 17 March.

According to Peace Now, during the nine months of peace talks Israel set a new record for settlement expansion at nearly 14,000 newly approved settler homes. Despite freezing settlements was not a precondition to restart peace talks, Palestinian official Nabil Shaath condemned settlement construction, saying "the settlement activities have made negotiations worthless." For its part, Israeli spokesman Mark Regev condemned sporadic Palestinian incitement, saying "the terrorist attacks against Israelis over the last few days are a direct result of the incitement and hatred propagated in Palestinian schools and media." According to B'Tselem, during this same period forty-five Palestinians and six Israelis were killed.

Reactions

US Secretary of State John Kerry said that if the peace talks failed, there would likely be a third intifada. Despite all efforts of John Kerry, Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas blamed Israel for the lack of progress, saying "the problem is with the Israeli side and not with us." In January, a PLO member reported that the US implied a threat to cut all aid to the Palestinian Authority and a future inability to control Israeli settlement expansion if a peace agreement was not reached.

EU Ambassador to Israel, Lars Faaborg-Andersen said if peace talks fail, Israel will likely be blamed for the break down. Yair Lapid said that the country could be targeted by an economically costly boycott if peace talks with the Palestinians fail, signalling that concerns about growing international isolation have moved centre stage in Israel's public discourse.

Some critics believe that Israel is only trying to "put on a show," claiming the Israelis do not seek a peace agreement, but are using these peace talks to further other goals, including improving their image, strengthening their occupation of the West Bank, and decreasing the viability of Palestine as a state free of Israeli occupation. Henry Siegman faults the United States, arguing that it is 'widely seen as the leading obstacle for peace' for its repeated failure to use leverage against Israel, and for failing to impose red lines for an agreement, and leading Israeli leaders to believe no consequences would ensue were Israel to reject American proposals.

Danny Danon stated that the Palestinians failed to make concessions during the negotiations period and that they were only interested in seeing militants released from prison. Netanyahu told Kerry "I want peace, but the Palestinians continue to incite, create imaginary crises and avoid the historical decisions necessary for a real peace."

Reactions to Israeli settlements approvals

Israel was accused by Palestinian officials of trying to sabotage the peace talks by approving nearly 1200 new settlement homes shortly before the negotiations were due to start. Israeli settlements are considered illegal under international law, though Israel disputes this. Israeli government spokesman Mark Regev stated that these settlements would "remain part of Israel in any possible peace agreements."

The British Foreign Office Minister Alistair Burt said: "We condemn the recent decisions taken by the Israeli authorities to advance plans for 1096 settlement units in the West Bank, and to approve the construction of 63 new units in East Jerusalem. Israeli settlements are illegal under international law, undermine trust and threaten the viability of the two-state solution."

On 13 August, Israel approved another 900 settler homes in East Jerusalem in addition to the 1,200 settlements announced on the 10th. On 30 October, Israel stated it would go ahead with plans to build 3,500 more homes for settlers. Netanyahu then said "any further settlement construction may stir unnecessary clashes with the international community".

See also

• 2014 Fatah–Hamas Gaza Agreement
• 2014 kidnapping and murder of Israeli teenagers
• Kidnapping and murder of Mohammed Abu Khdeir
• 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict

External links

"The Middle East Peace Process" (PDF). Retrieved 16 August 2013.

"The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations - What's next?" (PDF). Retrieved 15 February 2016.

In April 2014, Israel suspended talks due to the new Palestinian Unity Government.

Abbas' peace plan

On 25 August 2014, Abbas announced that he would be presenting to John Kerry a new proposal for the peace process; on 3 September 2014 Abbas presented the proposal to John Kerry. Abbas' plan calls for nine months of direct talks followed by a three-year plan for Israel to withdraw to the 1967 lines, leaving East Jerusalem as Palestine's capital. As part of the plan, Israel will freeze all settlement construction as well as release the final batch of prisoners from the previous talks.

The first three months of the plan would revolve around the borders and potential land swaps for the 1967 lines. The following six months would focus on issues including refugees, Jerusalem, settlements, security and water.

Abbas stated that if Israel rejected the claim he would push for charges against Israel in the International Criminal Court over the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict. Additionally if rejected, Abbas stated he would turn to the UN Security Council for unilateral measure for a Palestinian State. On 1 October 2014 Abbas stated he would be presenting his plan to the UNSC within two to three weeks, with an application to the ICC to follow if it failed to pass the UNSC.

In December 2014, Jordan submitted the proposal to the UNSC, which failed when voted on later that month. Later that month as previously threatened, Abbas signed the treaty to join the ICC. Israel responded by freezing NIS 500 million ($127 million) in Palestinian tax revenues. In response to the tax freeze, the PLO announced that they may dissolve the PA, leaving Israel fully responsible for both the West Bank and Gaza.

Alternative peace proposals

Another approach was taken by a team of negotiators led by former Israeli Justice Minister Yossi Beilin, and former Palestinian Information Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo following two and a half years of secret negotiations. On 1 December 2003, the two parties signed an unofficial suggested plan for peace in Geneva (dubbed the Geneva Accord). In sharp contrast to the road map, it is not a plan for a temporary ceasefire but a comprehensive and detailed solution aiming at all the issues at stake, in particular, Jerusalem, the settlements and the refugee problem. It was met with bitter denunciation by the Israeli government and many Palestinians, with the Palestinian Authority staying non-committal, but it was warmly welcomed by many European governments and some significant elements of the Bush Administration, including Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Yet another approach was proposed by a number of parties inside and outside Israel: a "binational solution" whereby Israel would formally annex the Palestinian territories but would make the Palestinian Arabs citizens in a unitary secular state. Championed by Edward Said and New York University professor Tony Judt, the suggestion aroused both interest and condemnation. It was not actually a new idea, dating back as far as the 1920s, but it was given extra prominence by the growing demographic issues raised by a rapidly expanding Arab population in Israel and the territories. Considering the huge political and demographic issues that it would raise, however, it seems an improbable solution to the problem.

The Elon Peace Plan is a solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict proposed in 2002 by former minister Binyamin Elon. The plan advocates the formal annexation of West Bank and Gaza by Israel and that Palestinians will be become either Jordanian citizens or permanent residents in Israel so long as they remained peaceful and law-abiding residents. All these actions should be done in agreement with Jordan and the Palestinian population. This solution is tied to the demographics of Jordan where it's claimed that Jordan is essentially already the Palestinian state, as it has so many Palestinian refugees and their descendants.

Some difficulties with past peace processes

A common feature of all attempts to create a path which would lead to peace is the fact that more often than not promises to carry out "good will measures" were not carried out by both sides. Furthermore, negotiations to attain agreement on the "final status" have been interrupted due to outbreak of hostilities. The result is that both Israelis and Palestinians have grown weary of the process. Israelis point out the fact that the Gaza Strip is fully controlled by the Hamas who do not want peace with a Jewish state. According to the Israeli view, this limits the ability of the Palestinians to make peace with Israel and enforce it over the long term. Furthermore, in the Israeli view, a violent overtake of the West Bank by the Hamas as a result of the creation of an unstable new state is likely. Lastly, rhetoric from high-ranking Fatah officials promising a full, literal Palestinian right of return into Israel (a position no Israeli government can accept without destroying the Jewish character of Israel) makes peace negotiations more difficult for both sides. The Palestinians point out to the extensive and continuing Israeli settlement effort in the West Bank restricting the area available to the Palestinian state.

An attempt to change the rules was made by Condoleezza Rice and Tzipi Livni when they brought forth the concept of a shelf agreement. The idea was to disengage the linkage between negotiations and actions on the ground. In theory this would allow negotiations until a "shelf agreement" defining peace would be obtained. Such an agreement would not entail implementation. It would just describe what peace is. It would stay on the shelf but eventually will guide the implementation. The difficulty with this notion is that it creates a dis-incentive for Israel to reach such an agreement. The lack of clarity about what happens after agreement is reached will result in insurmountable pressures on Abbas to demand immediate implementation. However, from the Israeli point of view, given the fact that the Palestinians are not ready to create a stable state, such an implementation process will almost guarantee instability in the Palestinian areas with a possible Hamas takeover as happened in Gaza.

As things stand now this brings the process to another impasse. To avoid it some definition of what happens after a shelf agreement is needed. One possible idea by this essay is to agree ahead of time that following attainment of a final status agreement there will be a negotiated detailed and staged implementation agreement which would define a process which would allow the creation of a stable functional Palestinian state in stages and over time. In Aug 2013 an indication that such an idea can be acceptable to the Palestinians was given by Mahmud Abbas in a meating with Meretz MK-s. In the meeting Abbas stated "that there cannot be an interim agreement but only a final status deal that can be implemented in stages".

Joint economic effort and development

Main article: Projects working for peace among Israelis and Palestinians

Despite the long history of conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, there are many people working on peaceful solutions that respect the rights of peoples on both sides.

In February 2006, Mordechai Ezra deHurst (nom de guerre/nom de plume) submitted a proposal to UNESCO Amman, Jordan for the establishment of a trade agreement between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians to mass manufacture the electric automobile and for the establishment of a UN Regional Human Rights - Terrorism Claims Court to be established in East Jerusalem that the rule of law be utilized to resolve claims which neither side wishes to abandon such as the border security, right of return, land claims, outlawing honor killings, a regional penal commission to review prisoner exchanges and the like. Under this proposal acts of terrorism would result in land forfeiture as a penalty, and all land disputes as well as human rights cases would be adjudicated in a UN Claims Court. Hurst's proposal has been revised to include protection of antiquities under the Anglo-American Treaty of 1924 and advocates that a "Peace and Reconciliation Summit" during the Feast of Tabernacles be held on the Temple Mount that as a gesture of peace the parties to the conflict agree to the rule of law to resolve their long standing dispute. <https://www.scribd.com/doc/267599668/Steps-Towards-Peace>

In March 2007, Japan proposed a plan for peace based on common economic development and effort, rather than on continuous wrangling over land. Both sides stated their support. This became the Peace Valley plan, a joint effort of the Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian governments to promote economic cooperation, and new business initiatives which can help both sides work together, and create a better diplomatic atmosphere and better economic conditions. It is mainly designed to foster efforts in the private sector, once governments provide the initial investment and facilities.

Arab–Israeli peace diplomacy and treaties

• Proposals for a Palestinian State
• Paris Peace Conference, 1919
• Faisal–Weizmann Agreement (1919)
• Peel Commission
• 1949 Armistice Agreements
• Allon Plan
• Rogers Plan
• Geneva Conference (1973)
• Camp David Accords (1978)
• Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty (1979)
• Madrid Conference of 1991
• Oslo Accords (1993)
• Israel–Jordan peace treaty (1994)
• Camp David 2000 Summit
• Projects working for peace among Israelis and Arabs
• List of Middle East peace proposals
• International law and the Arab–Israeli conflict

See also

• Israeli transfer of Palestinian militant bodies (2012)
• The Land of the Settlers
• Peace Now
• OneVoice Movement
• Tolerance Monument
• Arab League and the Arab–Israeli conflict
• Americans for Peace Now
• Seeds of Peace
• The Case for Peace
• PeaceMaker (computer game)
• Projects working for peace among Arabs and Israelis
• List of Middle East peace proposals
• The Environmental Provisions of Oslo II Accords
• Israeli-Palestinian economic peace efforts

External links

• Israel-Palestinian Negotiations, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• The Reut Institute
• BBC News - History of Mid-East peace talks
• Palestinian-Israeli Relations, MyJewishLearning.com
• "Netanyahu's two-state mask has slipped" by Henry Siegman
• "The Arab-Israeli Peace Process Is Over. Enter the Era of Chaos" by Lee Smith
• "Netanyahu lowers expectations for Israeli-Palestinian peace" by Lahav Harkov
• A presentation of the Lubavitcher Rebbe's views on the Jewish people's connection with the Holy Land, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the so-called "Land for Peace" issue
• The Israel Project: Timeline of Israeli-Arab Peace Initiatives since 1977
• The History of the Peace Process in the Context of the 2013 John Kerry Peace Efforts Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Palestinian Territories August, 2013
• Beyond Intractability: A Free Knowledge Base on More Constructive Approaches to Destructive Conflict
• The Jerusalem Fund Resources