Skip to main content
We gratefully acknowledge support from the Simons Foundation, member institutions, and all contributors. Donate
arXiv logo
Cornell University Logo

Computer Science > Human-Computer Interaction

arXiv:2111.08209v1 (cs)
[Submitted on 16 Nov 2021]

Title:Exploring Usable Security to Improve the Impact of Formal Verification: A Research Agenda

Authors:Carolina Carreira (INESC-ID and IST, University of Lisbon, Portugal), João F. Ferreira (INESC-ID and IST, University of Lisbon, Portugal), Alexandra Mendes (HASLab, INESC TEC and Universidade da Beira Interior, Portugal), Nicolas Christin (Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA)
View PDF
Abstract:As software becomes more complex and assumes an even greater role in our lives, formal verification is set to become the gold standard in securing software systems into the future, since it can guarantee the absence of errors and entire classes of attack. Recent advances in formal verification are being used to secure everything from unmanned drones to the internet.
At the same time, the usable security research community has made huge progress in improving the usability of security products and end-users comprehension of security issues. However, there have been no human-centered studies focused on the impact of formal verification on the use and adoption of formally verified software products. We propose a research agenda to fill this gap and to contribute with the first collection of studies on people's mental models on formal verification and associated security and privacy guarantees and threats. The proposed research has the potential to increase the adoption of more secure products and it can be directly used by the security and formal methods communities to create more effective and secure software tools.
Comments: In Proceedings AppFM 2021, arXiv:2111.07538
Subjects: Human-Computer Interaction (cs.HC); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Logic in Computer Science (cs.LO)
Cite as: arXiv:2111.08209 [cs.HC]
  (or arXiv:2111.08209v1 [cs.HC] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2111.08209
Journal reference: EPTCS 349, 2021, pp. 77-84
Related DOI: https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.349.6

Submission history

From: EPTCS [view email] [via EPTCS proxy]
[v1] Tue, 16 Nov 2021 03:11:29 UTC (16 KB)
Full-text links:

Access Paper:

  • View PDF
  • TeX Source
  • Other Formats
license icon view license
Current browse context:
cs.HC
< prev   |   next >
new | recent | 2021-11
Change to browse by:
cs
cs.CR
cs.LO

References & Citations

export BibTeX citation

Bookmark

BibSonomy logo Reddit logo

Bibliographic and Citation Tools

Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?)
Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?)
Litmaps (What is Litmaps?)
scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?)

Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article

alphaXiv (What is alphaXiv?)
CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers (What is CatalyzeX?)
DagsHub (What is DagsHub?)
Gotit.pub (What is GotitPub?)
Hugging Face (What is Huggingface?)
Papers with Code (What is Papers with Code?)
ScienceCast (What is ScienceCast?)

Demos

Replicate (What is Replicate?)
Hugging Face Spaces (What is Spaces?)
TXYZ.AI (What is TXYZ.AI?)

Recommenders and Search Tools

Influence Flower (What are Influence Flowers?)
CORE Recommender (What is CORE?)

arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators

arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.

Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.

Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.

Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)