The British Broadsheet Press and the Representation of “The Mosque” in the Aftermath of Post-7/7 Britain

Abstract

The role of the mosque has become increasingly vital, particularly in contemporary societies such as Britain, where both the place and status of religion in public life are constantly discussed and debated. Indeed, in the contemporary period, the role of the mosque has several dimensions, ranging from a social space, educational and cultural exchange, and community cohesion centre to a knowledge hub. In this context, this paper suggests that a mosque should be seen as an independent religious institution, although these are influenced by and responsive to governments, elites, pressure groups, public bodies, etc. Using a thematic analysis of news items in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph over a period of two years (8 July 2005–7 July 2007), it finds that in the aftermath of 7/7, the mosque as a religious place and an institution for British Muslims is largely seen as incompatible and a threat to secular British society and that it is linked with radicalisation and terrorism. According to Quranic texts and revelations, it is indeed a fact that mosques are open to all. This is logical since God’s mercy, love, and forgiveness are for all of mankind without any distinction, which is perhaps why the mosque has been the sacred house of God Himself. This study aims to reveal the development of visible hostility in some sections of the British media and political campaigns. Moreover, it intends to trace the determination and idea of the mosque as a religious place and an institution for British Muslims rather than only a place for worship. Finally, this study will argue the role of the mosque in promoting community cohesion and mutual understanding within the Muslim and other faith communities located in Britain.

1. Introduction

Ever since the end of World War I and II, the Middle East, predominantly a Muslim majority region, remains a focal point of the Western media and polity. More importantly, the Iranian Revolution (1979) brought Islam and Muslims into the Western media and political limelight. Thenceforward, a chronological record of the major events that occurred in the Middle East includes the Lebanon War (1982), the First Gulf War (1990), the New York attacks also known as 9/11 (2001), the Invasion of Iraq (2003), the London Bombings also known as 7/7 (2005), the Arab Spring (2010), the Syrian Civil War (2012), the aftermath of the Egyptian revolution and ousted Prime Minister Mohammed Morsi (2011–2012), the Yemen War (2014), and the ongoing war on Gaza, all labelling Islam and Muslims as problematic. Evidently, most sections of the Western press and broadcast media tend to associate Islamic faith, Muslims, their places of worship (mosques), and imams with terrorism, extremism, and radicalisation. In the past four decades, a long list of studies finds Western media representations of Islam and Muslims as noticeably negative (Said 1981; Poole 2002; Richardson 2004; Ameli et al. 2007; Poole and Richardson 2010). Afterwards, several mainstream studies reveal similar patterns in the Western media reporting of Islam and Muslims, which was predominantly destructive (Alsultany 2012; Moore et al. 2008; Piela 2016). Notably, Western media reporting on Islam and Muslims shows a consistent pattern. Several recent studies trace a recurring negative depiction of Islam and Muslims in the Western media (Ewart and O’Donnell 2018; De Rooij 2023; Ahmed 2024).

This reporting trend also shows how sections of the Western media mainly largely overlook the positive contributions of Muslims in Western societies but haste to mention their shortcomings. Too often, Western media establishes metaphors such as hijab-wearing Muslim women to symbolise oppression and extremism; Islam is a “dangerous”, “backward”, and “irrational religion”, that poses “threat”, to post-1950s and 1980s secular Western societies, and mostly it uses phrases “Islamist” and “Islamism” to misrepresent Muslims and their faith (Hanif 2021, pp. 75–271; Awan and Rahman 2016, p. 3; Moore et al. 2008, p. 14).

Correspondingly, The Daily Telegraph and The Guardian have published a series of articles written either by their own analysts or by government officials and politicians in which “Islam”, “Islamism”, “Islamists”, and “Islamic ideology” are presented as major “threats” to Britain (The Daily Telegraph, 12 July 2005; 2 February 2024; The Guardian, 22 July 2005; 22 February 2024). Evidently, the broadsheet reporting pattern as well as officials’ rhetoric remains the same after almost 20 years.

Since 7/7, the British Muslims are routinely experiencing a distorted image in the sections of the British media. The significant question arises as to why the British media misrepresents Muslims, their faith, places of worship such as mosques, and even Islamic festivals and traditions such as Eid Al-Adha (the day Muslims sacrifice animals) as negative. Forlornly, in the aftermath of the London Bombings in July 2005, British Muslims came under the media spotlight, thus subjecting the role of mosques to public debate. Especially when Channel 4 broadcasted an episode of its current affairs programme “Undercover Mosques” in January 2007. However, despite a few complexities arising because of the London incident, mosques are seen as peaceful places that promote tolerance and cohesion in a diverse society. This study aims to reveal the realism behind the developing and noticeable hostility in some sections of the British media as well as in political and pressure group campaigns. Additionally, the purpose of this study is to trace the determination and idea of the mosque as a religious place and an institution for British Muslims. Finally, this study will discuss the role of the mosque in promoting community cohesion and mutual understanding between Muslims of other communities.

1.1. Background of Mosque

From the early days of Islam, the mosque has been seen not merely as a building of wood and stone but as a place of spiritual and inspirational gain, a facilitator of knowledge and community bonding. Hence, the multilayered purpose of the mosque is clearly visible, from sacred mosques in Makkah and Madinah to the rest of the early historic mosques in splendid cities under Muslim rule in Spain, the Indian subcontinent, the Balkans, North Africa, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East.

The ancient mosques all over the world display the Islamic history of art and civilisation but even today they are seen as the legacy of Muslim rulers who promoted knowledge in their time by erecting great mosques that became universally known as leading educational institutions, such as the Al-Azhar University of Cairo (970–972). Notably, prominent Muslim scholars, scientists, and theorists were all once students in these mosques. Flood (2001) mentions the Caliph Al-Walid bin ‘Abd al-Malik, who famously created the Great Mosque of Damascus as a treasure of its inhabitants. Although the presence of mosques in Europe dates to Muslim rule in Spain, they became known in the British Isles in the nineteenth century when early English converts and Muslim traders built a mosque in Wales. However, Shahed Saleem (2012) noted that the first purpose-built mosque was founded by Hungarian orientalist and linguist Gottlieb Leitner in 1889 in Woking, Surrey, as an educational institute (Saleem 2012). Thereafter, because of the influx of post-World Wars I and II Muslim migrant workers who came to work in the textile industry and resided in “inner towns” of England, mosques as places of worship and as religious schools began to emerge.

A list of scholars has established that the idea of “inner city” initially emerged in the United States and was brought to the United Kingdom, where it means “urban poor” (Andrews et al. 2021). The sections of the British media established associations of the London bombers with mosques and routinely seen and presented mosques as places that harbor radical imams and hatepreachers who allegedly promote anti-Western thoughts in youth Muslims, which mainly builds a problematic image of mosques.

Also, some critics see British mosques are not open to everyone, and especially they think Muslim women are subject to restricting entry into mosques (Lewicki and O’Toole 2017; Cheruvallil-Contractor and Gilham 2023; Ahmed 2024). Most UK mosques offer a separate place for women to pray, while many mosques do not have separate places for women to attend the mosque. Some scholars put forward a logic, as men and women cannot concentrate on prayers, although Islam allows both to perform Hajj together. Correspondingly, Orthodox Jews and Christians also separate men and women while praying for similar reasons (House 1978; Hirsch and Reinman 2003; Luehrmann 2015). Recent theological debates on mosques among leading scholars and jurists have offered rational examples to respond to widespread misunderstandings about Muslim women’s roles in mosques1.

1.2. Development of the Mosque in Britain as a Place of Worship

Britain’s first mosque was built in the 1860s at 2 Glyn Rhondda Street, Cardiff2. Since then, mosques have increased in Britain given the rise in the Muslim population. However, the historical records relating to the construction of nineteenth century mosques reflect the challenges to and struggles of Muslims, who confronted misconceptions, fear, and hostility regarding their proposal to build a mosque. This may have been a consequence of the confrontation between Turkey and Britain at that time, which in turn gave rise to negative feelings among some sections of the British public. Ansari (2011) presents a chronological record of the building of the East London Mosque, which was seen in the context of the confrontation between Britain and the Ottoman Empire. Relatedly, Ansari mentioned many British politicians, including the Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Sir Arthur Hirtzel, to oppose the idea of a mosque (cited in Ansari 2011, p. 11).

Evidence shows that since 9/11 and 7/7, Islam as a religion was connected to acts of terror, which in turn increased hostility to mosques in Europe that became targets of hate crimes and victims of vilification due to the belief that they were hubs of extremism. Worse was to follow when some European countries, such as Sweden and Austria, decided to ban mosque minarets in 2009. According to a BBC report of 29 November 2009 (BBC 2009), “more than 57% of voters and 22 out of 26 cantons—or provinces—voted in favour of the ban.” In Britain, immediately after the 7/7 incident, Tony Blair announced a “12-point plan” to counter the threat of terrorism. The eleventh point on this list was the “Consultation on a new power to close a place of worship used as a centre for fomenting extremism” (The Guardian, 5 August 2005). This possibly applied to a few mosques where the government thinks a few elements of extremism exist in the form of allegedly radical imams such as Abu Hamza al-Masri. Notably, al-Masri was described as a “hatepreacher”, “radical Islamist”, “supporter of Sharia law”, “hook-handed militant”, “violent jihadist”, and “terror glorifier” who had links with radical organizations such as al-Qaeda (The Guardian, 7 February 2006 and 15 November 2007). Importantly, the self-proclaimed cleric al-Masri was finally extradited to the US, where he faced terror charges and was found guilty, but it also revealed al-Masri was on the payroll of MI5 (The Daily Telegraph, 7 May 2014). The fact of the matter is that prior to the 7/7 bombings, MI5 knew two of the bombers who were under surveillance, but it failed to act (The Guardian, 11 May 2006). It is noteworthy that an ordinary British Muslim Mosque is not only a place of worship, but it also offers a range of services, including social spaces, community activities, including marriages and funerals, educational centers, seminars, conferences, and exhibitions venues, cafes, and restaurants.

Since then, several political and pressure groups, such as the BNP have organised campaigns to ban the building of new mosques in some areas of Britain. However, it is important to note that the BNP, as a neo-fascist group, has attacked Labour, Liberal Democrats, and Conservatives and has little influence in British politics. Notably, prior to the 7/7 incident, British mosques had never been seen as places for promoting extremist ideas, perhaps because sections of the press, politicians, public bodies, and pressure groups had not seen mosques as exporters of extremism or the threat of terrorism. Unfortunately, ever since the 7/7 incident, mosques have been presented as places where British children are being radicalised.

More recently, British Prime Minister David Cameron unveiled a brand-new strategy to fight extremism, calling for the closure of mosques engaging in promoting extremism and radicalisation (see The Independent, 19 October 2015). As time passes, mosques have begun to see some pressure groups both within and outside the British Muslim community, such as the MWC (Muslim Women Council)3, which has just a handful of members and has been lobbying for women-only mosques in Britain. However, it is imperative to consider that such groups and voices are not representative of the mainstream Muslim community, just as the BNP is not representative of British society. In fact, in many ways, the mosque as an institution has now become a victim of prejudice and interference never seen before on such a scale. Moreover, to some extent, because of a bad press and other factors such as the control politics of the government and mosque committees, particularly in the aftermaths of 9/11 and 7/7, the mosque, which was a source of comfort and tranquility, has increasingly been seen as a threat to secular values and as having links with extremists.

2. The Image of Mosques in the British Media: Myths and Misconceptions

In Britain, since the London bombings, most sections of the mainstream media frequently portray mosques, religious schools [Madrassahs], and other religious charitable institutions as negative and intolerant. For instance, most media reports carry images of mosques’ crescents, domes, children reading the Qur’an, and mostly demonstrations outside mosques, often presenting people chanting slogans such as Allah-o-Akbar (meaning, God is great) and wearing headbands with similar captions. Such images produce certain specific messages, for instance, that mosques are problematic places and hubs of exporting radicalisation and extremism.

This representation is visible in the exhaustive work of Burhan Wazir, who toured distant places in Britain, visiting 1200 mosques and interviewing leading Muslim scholars, community leaders, and politicians. In his article Mosques: Source of Spiritual Comfort, or So Out of Touch? published in The Times, Wazir wrote, “Ever since the era-defining 11 September 2001, Britain’s two million Muslims have been the subject of a series of cruel and damaging portrayals” (The Times, 26 July 2004). His point of view is acknowledged by many, as Humayun Ansari points out that “in many ways a new awareness of Islam in Britain—by Muslims and non-Muslims alike—has been heightened since 11 September” (cited in Wazir 2004, p. 4).

Wazir also finds that, since 9/11, mosques and imams have been widely seen as suspicious; for example, he reminds us of “the shoe-bomber”, Richard Reid, a white convert who was linked to Finsbury Park Mosque in North London (ibid., The Times, 26 July 2004). Similarly, the perpetrators of the 7/7 bombings were frequently linked with their local mosques in Hyde Park and the Beeston area of Leeds [Grand Mosque] in news media reports. For instance, the Evening Standard (15 July 2005 and 15 June 2006), the Manchester Evening News (13 July 2005), and BBC local radio (July 2005) mentioned that Lyndsay Jermain, one of the four London bombers, went to Leeds Grand Mosque to pray. In the same pattern, the headlines in the Evening Standard [Preachers ‘Poisoned’ mind of bomber, 12 May 2006], Daily Mail [Mosques taught my man to be a suicide bomber; 7/7 killer’s mind was poisoned, says widow, 24th September 2005], and Financial Times [Activists blame mosques for lack of guidance, 18 July 2005] indicate the irresponsible reporting of some sections of the press that submerges all positive efforts under one simple, negative account.

Ansari (2011) provides evidence of the negative media reports that were published during 7th–9th April 1970, particularly in The Sun, The Times, and The Daily Telegraph, representing Bengali Muslims as ‘backward, fearful, and disliked’ while the mosque was targeted thirty-eight times, resulting in the deaths of five Bengalis (Ansari 2011, pp. 44–46). Contrary to these newspaper reports, The Independent on 13th August 2005 published a headline that read: London Bombings: The Truth Emerges; No link between July 7 and July 21 attacks; No evidence of a terror mastermind in Britain; xBombers radicalised in gyms. This report eliminated the accusations that London bombers were brainwashed in mosques. In the same vein, in a report in The Observer published on 18th of June 2006, Urmee Khan reveals her remarkable experience of living in the Beeston Muslim community in Leeds, where the local mosques were trying to help disaffected young people in their communities who were seemingly engaged in unproductive activities.

However, despite few constructive portrayals of Muslims, evidence shows growing attacks on mosques are mostly the result of bad press4; hence, mosques are being increasingly linked with growing extremism, terrorism, and other social ills that help shape radical thinking. Jonathan Githens-Mazer and Robert Lambert’s recent report Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Hate Crime: A London Case Study5 affirms that the rise in hate crimes against Muslims and the growing number of attacks on mosques are a product of news media reports that portray mosques as negative. Notably, this report was based on facts and resulted from empirical data. Unfortunately, one negative media report can easily undo all the hard work and efforts that may have taken far more energy and time than that required to write a few words.

For a case in point, let us now consider the front page of a local newspaper, Asian Express6, which published a two-page story about a local right-wing activist, Gavin Boby, who has been presented as ‘Proud’ and ‘Brave’, as the headline reads ‘MOSQUE BUSTER’: Free advice on how to oppose Islamic places of worship! The capital letter ‘O’ is designed, as seen in the attached scan copy, to suggest the ‘hook man’, probably Abu-Hamza Al-Masari, with a red cross suggesting ‘no’ to a mosque. On page 4 of the same edition, the newspaper carries another story compiled by Louise Healy called Leaked Government Memo Claims Muslim Schools Promote Extremism; the report further claims that the religious schools are parties to the promotion of radical thinking. In opposition to this is Emmeline Saunders’ report (2009), which carries the opinion of leading British scholars that religious schools are performing above average compared to government schools (Saunders 2009, p. 1).

The London bombings caused huge damage to the image of the mosques in Britain. This was the result of some sections of the British media portraying mosques as suspicious and perhaps having links with extremism. The opposite is true since none of the people involved in those appalling acts were religious or active members of any mosque committees. Notably, in the Hyde Park area of Leeds, the Leeds Grand Mosque and Leeds Makkah Mosque (which also earned the title of a model mosque) run a series of community events, including iftar (fast-breaking) in Ramadan, Social gatherings such as Eid Day celebrations, seminars, conferences, and study circles are organised by active members of mosques. Thus, media accusations against mosques in relation to the London bombers are evidently weak.

Martin Hodgson (2007)’s article published in the Guardian stated that “evidence of extremism in mosques ‘fabricated’” (The Guardian, 13 December 2007). Some may have attended mosques, but they did not participate in any Islamic gatherings or teachings in the mosque. However, one should acknowledge that Britain adopts a more tolerant policy towards Islam and Muslims in comparison to its European counterparts. Reviewing the literature on the media portrayal of mosques, it appears that in most cases the misgivings are the result of a lack of knowledge of Islam and Muslims, which generates misconceptions among non-Muslims, and this often occurs because of irresponsible reporting by some sections of the press (Ahmed 2003; Ghauri and Umber 2019; Suryandari and Arifin 2021). Robert Pape (2003) finds that most of the suicide attacks carried out during the period 1980–2001 and even afterwards were the result of social and economic deprivation and political turmoil in certain parts of the world; they had no links with religion (Pape 2003, pp. 345–57).

Pape also dismisses the idea that these suicide bombers were religiously motivated since most of them were secular, such as Tamil Tigers, Kurdish Guerrillas, and several other groups. These narratives suggest that, in many ways, the role and place of the ‘mosque’ in European societies reflect some sort of religious discrimination because, so far, no groups within or outside Christian, Sikh, Jewish, or Hindu communities have asked for separate places of worship for women.

3. Methodology

This study adopts a thematic analysis approach to examine the role and place of British mosques in contemporary British society, particularly in the aftermath of the 7/7 incident. Thus, it also offers a critique of the misrepresentation of the mosque in the British Broadsheet Press. Notably, part of the database in this paper is derived from my doctoral thesis entitled ‘Reporting British Muslims: The Re-Emergence of Folk Devils and Moral Panics in Post-7/7 Britain (2005–2007)’, which was related to the image of the mosque in the British press, mainly The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, over a period of two years (8 July 2005 to 7 July 2007). For this purpose, I selected two British broadsheets, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, which are internationally well-known and are of two different political orientations, liberal and conservative views.

Thus, this study considered a two-part mixed approach that consists of both qualitative and quantitative methods. These methods are widely recognised and applied in academia in the fields of sociology, anthropology, and criminology. Since my research was based on representations of British Muslims in the British media, this study considers the thematic analysis method to be relevant and simple. Several leading studies have used content analysis (these include Miller and Brewer 2003, p. 43; Neuendorf 2002, p. 27; Payne and Payne 2004, pp. 51–52). Moreover, several studies have backed thematic analysis, particularly Braun and Clarke’s approach (Braun and Clarke 2006), which is also functional in this study apart from the original thesis.

Initially, newspaper stories relevant to ‘mosques’ were collected using the search engine Lexis-Nexis, which is a reliable source of newspaper data gathering in comparison to other search engines such as the Pro-Quest and online archives (see Appendix A). Initially, I used the terms and phrases “Islam, Muslims, 7/7, and mosque” in the Lexis-Nexis search engine to record the influx of news coverage in two broadsheets, namely: The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph. This exercise produced a large set of data comprising mosque stories as follows:

Total Number of Mosque Stories in the Sample
Years	The Daily Telegraph	The Guardian
2005	271	411
2006	246	384
2007	172	312

The decision was made to shrink the data and the time-period as the broadsheet selection was redesigned to obtain a maximal and close examination of the subject. I decided to omit the word ‘mosque’ as a connotation because it captures a large bulk of news stories about mosques mostly outside Britain. The total number of stories collected falls into three main categories: local mosque stories (England); stories relating to international mosques, particularly in the Middle East; and mosques related to 7/7, i.e., Finsbury Park and local mosques in Leeds and London that were associated with the London bombers in some way.

The following

Table 1. The Guardian.

Types of Journalism	Year (8 July 2005–7 July 2007)
Comment and Debates	14
News Reports	19
Investigative News Reports	2
Editorials	4
G2 Special Report	2
Interviews	3
Special Report	1
Feature	1
Focus	3
Total	49

and

Table 2. The Daily Telegraph.

Types of Journalism	Year 8 July 2005–7 July 2007
Comment and Personal Views	5
News Reports	9
Interviews	1
Editorials	-
Personal views	3
Total	18

show the different types of journalism discussing mosques, their roles, and their relevance to British society, particularly in the wake of the 7/7 incident in both broadsheets over the period of 8 July 2005–7 July 2007.

Drawing on the original data, I collected eighteen initial codes relating to mosques directly and indirectly and six sub-theme codes that all combine to form three major themes: security threat, incompatibility, and social space.

The significance of the 7/7 event: significance for the context of the article:

On 7 July 2005, four suicide Muslim bombers attacked their own country of birth and residence, killing 52 and injuring over 770 innocent civilians, including Muslims in London. The incident is also referred to as 7/7, thus equate it to the 9/11 coordinated suicide attacks on New York. Notably, only two weeks later, four more attempted and failed attacks followed that changed the political landscape of the United Kingdom7. Following those events, the British media hurried to establish connections between perpetrators and mosques to suggest that mosques harbour and breed radicals and extremists. Furthermore, it uses phrases “Islamist” and “Islamic terrorism” for Muslim perpetrators to suggest perhaps Islam has inspired them to be terrorists. It is particularly noted that in the aftermath of the 7/7, most sections of the British media purposely chose and disseminated images of mosques, minarets, crescents, children reading Quran, hijab-wearing women, and beard Muslims entering and praying in the mosques to suggest that these people are backward, incompatible, and a threat to our secular society. Most importantly, following the 7/7 bombings, hate crimes against the Muslims increased while Muslims became easy targets of racist abuse, verbal and physical attacks, mosques were vandalised and evidently Islamophobia became a normal behaviour.

Relevance of data sampling, timeframe and broadsheets selection criteria:

One key reason for the selected period (2005–2007) was to examine the reactions of the British broadsheet press in the aftermaths of the London bombings. It is important to note that three of the four bombers were born and bred in Britain and have attacked their own country of birth. Since then, the UK has constantly experienced several tragic incidents of terrorism; for example, the Glasgow Airport attack (2007), the Manchester Arena bombings (2017), and the London Bridge attack (2019), all involved Muslim youths. Arguably, it is a valid and relevant inquiry because terrorism is an ongoing challenge that is mainly centered on Muslims, as visible in the reaction of the British broadsheet press reporting. Notably, it appears that with every occurrence, the Western media reaction was identical in nature—that perpetrators have attended mosques. Why does mosque come into discussion? Have they attended university? College? Musical event? Thus, that makes a case of contextual associations, as Hitler, Stalin, and modern-day invaders may have attended churches and universities. As the West moves away from religion, liberal and conservative press outlets such as The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph are more secular in nature and less considerate of faith, believing that socio-cultural problems have roots in religion. According to the Press Gazette8 May 2024 report of the UK top ten news websites, both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph maintain fifth and ninth place, with readership of 20.7 m and 15.1 m, respectively. Both newspapers are politically aligned with Labour and Conservative supporters, where The Guardian is liberal and The Daily Telegraph is seen as a conservative paper. Overall, The Guardian has opposed wars in the Middle East, while The Daily Telegraph has supported the Iraq War, and currently it favours war on Gaza.

3.1. The Findings: Key Themes

3.1.1. Security Threat

Noticeably, both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph allocate more space and coverage to unpopular and self-styled Muslim Islamic scholars who were often presented as hate preachers, such as Anjem Chaudhary and Abu Hamza. Moreover, controversial figures and self-appointed experts on Islam and Muslims, such as former Muslims Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Ed Husain, receive extraordinary space that presents them as scholars of Islam. In turn, such patterns of reporting emerged to build a highly negative image of Islam because of these hate preachers’ and self-appointed scholars’ narratives of Islam. Such reporting had more to do with agenda-setting and was less concerned with presenting reality. Notably, in most types of journalism published in both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, the discussions and debates surrounding Islam, such as radicalisation, extremism, and the role of mosques were largely based on the views and opinions of the above-mentioned self-proclaimed experts and scholars.

Thus, narratives come into view suggesting that Islam advocates violence and hatred of non-Muslims and non-believers. For this article, I include Abu Hamza’s portrayal in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, both of which presented him as a hate preacher. Abu Hamza was accused of “inciting murder and racial hatred” and “maintained he never helped al-Qaeda or other militant groups” (BBC 2014). The dataset shows that the sub-theme code “Hate preachers, Abu Hamza, Finsbury Mosque promote anti-Western feelings and radicalisation” appears 20 times in a total of 274 stories, with a frequency of 7.29%. In other words, in all the mosque-related stories published in both newspapers, Abu-Hamza appeared in 20/68 × 100 = 29.41%. In the main, these reports suggest that Abu-Hamza, during his time at the Finsbury Park Mosque, radicalised youngsters and spread hatred of Britain. He propagates his own version of Islam, denounces British politicians, and discredits Britain’s system and its foreign policies. Particularly, the media reporting presented a blend of statements made by Abu Hamza and the authorities, which means a mixture of facts and assumptions.

Reviewing the press reporting on mosques, this study finds that the press establishes a link between ‘extremists’, ‘fundamentalists’ (including all other troublemakers) and the mosques. In the database, hate preachers appeared to receive more media attention and space compared to moderate voices. An example is the image of Abu-Hamza and his cemented connection with Finsbury Park Mosque. Both broadsheets described Hamza as a hatemonger and anti-Western, using derogatory language such as “hook.” In one of The Telegraph comment pieces, Denis MacShane (2006) quotes David Blunkett’s diaries in which “he refers to the arrest of the Finsbury Park radical Islamist imam, Abu Hamza, in January 2003” (The Daily Telegraph, 17 October 2006). Further, MacShane notes that:

For months! For years, every other politician in Europe had been complaining about the failure of Britain to act against Hamza and the other ideologues of hate who were turning young Muslim minds-long before 9/11 or the Iraq conflict-into cauldrons of hate against democracy, and some, tragically, into self-immolating killers of innocent men, women, and children.

(The Daily Telegraph, 17 October 2006)

Sean O’Neill and McGrory’s (2006) study offer a chronological record of Abu-Hamza’s alleged involvement in recruiting, spying, training, operating, and backing acts of terrorism and extremism in Britain from March 1994 to July 2005 (O’Neill and McGrory 2006, p. xvii). However, scholars are clearly divided on this subject. For example, Nick Kollerstrom9 dismisses O’Neill and McGrory’s (2006) narrative of Abu-Hamza based on his investigation (2011) that carries references to Nick Davies (2009) and Nafeez Ahmed (2006, pp. 158–67) in which Ahmed disputes the reputation and association of Abu-Hamza with various secret services such as MI5 (BBC 2014).

Overall, press reporting gives the impression that mosques harbour extremists and that people who go to religious schools are suspicious. Several scholars point out the creation of an environment that presents or perceives Islam as a ‘threat or fear’ and depicts its followers as ‘terrorists’, ‘extremists’, and ‘fundamentalists’ who attend mosques, which, according to many media outlets, spread hatred and extremism and propagate separation and violence in society (Baker 2006, pp. 90–95; Esposito 1999, pp. 45–50).

Apart from my own findings at a national level, Finsbury Park Mosque and Abu-Hamza generate a large volume of news stories in the broadsheet and tabloid press to an extent that ordinary people begin to see the mosque as a threat to security because it harbours radicals and extremists. In such different narratives, Finsbury Park Mosque was associated with “Londonistan”, “Paris Metro bombings”, and other terror-related activities. Consider one of several examples in which mosques are directly linked with extremism, terrorism, and other related wrongdoings. Steven Swinford (2011), a Daily Telegraph reporter, published a story under the headline: WikiLeaks: how Britain ‘became a haven for migrant extremists’: When Finsbury Park Mosque opened nearly 20 years ago, it was intended to be a centre for peaceful worship, feted by the Prince of Wales and seen as an emblem of multi-cultural Britain. He further refers to Guantanamo WikiLeaks files claim that

By the late 1990s, the mosque in North London had become a “haven” for extremism, where disaffected young men from around the world were radicalised before being sent to al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. At least 35 Guantánamo detainees passed through Finsbury Park…Regent’s Park Mosque, East London Mosque….

(The Daily Telegraph, 25 April 2011)

However, these broadsheets also reported several incidents that mentioned British anti-terror police stop and search activities and arresting of Muslim youths near mosques. Hence, the British media may not have a direct role in stirring up hatred and prejudice against mosques, but the reporting approach and methods of representation clearly indicate that most of those political groups and individuals who are hostile to mosques are in fact somewhat misled by the media. In addition, several studies raise concerns over the media representations of Islam and Muslims in Britain, particularly after the 9/11 and 7/7 incidents, such as Akbarzadeh and Smith (2005), Kabir (2010), and Sian et al. (2012). In my own study, the sub-theme code suggesting British mosques’ linkage with the 7/7 bombers who used mosques as meeting points appeared in a total of 16 different types of journalism in the original dataset, i.e., 16274 × 100 = 5.83%. A similar number of news stories relating to the image of mosques regarding the 7/7 incident can be expressed as 16/68 × 100 = 23.52%.

Notably, in the aftermath of the 7/7 incident, both broadsheets presented mosques using various problematic labels, such as platforms that promote extremism and radicalisation among young British Muslims. Most importantly, the overall dataset shows that approximately 25% (68/274 × 100 = 24.81%) of all types of journalism talked about British mosques in the context of the 7/7 incident. Notably, the database results are evident of how broadsheets play an essential role in shaping public opinion of British mosques. Relatedly, several studies have noted the considerable influence of the press on the public’s view of mosques in particular; these include (Baker et al. 2013; Haji et al. 2021; Sian et al. 2012; Hoskins and O’Loughlin 2010). Soon after the 7/7 bombings, Muslim images were typecast which evidently aided in the rise of anti-Muslim hatred, and Muslims were treated with suspicion in society (Ameli and Merali 2015).

Despite worrying negative media portrayals of Muslims, one might say that, of course, not all sections of the British media are responsible for stirring up hatred of and bigotry against Muslims. Notably, on a few occasions notable journalists have resigned from their news organisations because of those organisations’ anti-Muslim hatred, and some news organisations acknowledge the positive roles played by Muslims. Examples include the following story: “Daily Star reporter Richard Peppiatt resigns in protest at what he says is the newspaper’s anti-Muslim propaganda” (The Guardian, 4 March 2011). In the same vein, the British press offered a very positive portrayal of ‘race murder’ victim Tariq Jahan, father of 19-year-old Haroon Jahan, who appealed for calm in August 2011 at the height of tension between communities in Birmingham resulting from the racially motivated murders of three Muslim teenagers outside a mosque.

Simran Jeet Singh (2014) has compiled various data sources and writes that the ignorance of Islam is a prime reason for the shocking increases in hate crimes against Muslims in the West and America in particular (The Guardian, 9 September 2014). Singh’s views are worth considering because, unfortunately, most sections of the mainstream press and broadcasters have failed to understand and educate people about the role of the mosque. The result is growing bigotry and opposition to the building of new mosques in various countries across Europe, including Britain, because some people see this as a sign of Muslims taking over Europe (see The Economist, 30 August 2007). This fear is becoming institutionalised in the sense that responsible people are using different political and media platforms to air such thoughts. Inayat Bunglawala quotes Alison Ruoff of Premier Christian Radio:

If we want to become an Islamic state, this is the way to go. You build a mosque, and then what happens? You have Muslim people moving into that area, all the shops will then become Islamic, all the housing will then become Islamic and as the Bishop of Rochester has so wisely pointed out, and that will be a no-go area for anyone else. They will bring in Islamic law. We cannot allow that to happen.

(Bunglawala 2008)

The most disturbing aspect is that many members of the media and politics constantly view mosques as a threat to secularism, even though many British people are not actively religious. While this article sheds light on the media portrayal of mosques, particularly in the aftermath of the 7/7 incident, it also includes a few illustrations of recent political campaigns in Europe and America to demonstrate how this threat is perpetrated. Instead of advocating a crackdown on those engaging in hate speech, the media has in fact singled out the “mosque” as an institution that harbours extremists and spreads hatred of the West. This foments extremism among some young British Muslims.

Most of the reporting in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph about mosques reflects problematic narratives that create panic and fear of mosques among the public by suggesting that these places are sources of increasing radicalisation and extremism. This belief receives a great deal of currency in both broadsheets’ reporting to the extent that Tablighi Jamaat has been accused of promoting extremism. Jamie Doward’s report describes, “Tablighi Jamaat, an evangelical Islamic group which each year sends hundreds of young British Muslims to fundamentalist religious schools in Pakistan”, and states that “two of the 7/7 bombers, Mohammed Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, attended Tablighi Jamaat mosques. Counter-terrorism sources say it is more likely that radicalised young Muslims are attracted to Tablighi Jamaat than the other way around” (The Observer, 5 November 2006). However, many scholars view Tablighi Jamaat as a harmless and peaceful spiritual movement, such as Coward and Smith (2004), Horstmann (2007), and Zubaida (2003). The newspaper assumptions of Tablighi Jamaat are mistaken, as it has millions of followers around the world, including Britain, and evidently, they are not involved in acts of terrorism.

Notably, George W. Bush and Tony Blair publicly admitted that God had asked them to invade Iraq (The Guardian, 7 October 2005). Surely, they used religion as a pretext to legitimise their massacres in Iraq and Afghanistan. How does Allah SWT (God) allow His creation to be killed? For argument’s sake, if we reverse this position, are those terrorists serving the mission of their God not equal to the Western politicians? In fact, the West is not the only victim of terrorism; more Muslims are on the losing side. Another point is that Western politicians have played a huge role in promoting and sponsoring terrorism in the shape of state terrorism; the West is thus not just on the receiving end but is also contributing to terrorism. Again, a philosophical question arises: If terrorists have attended madrassas, isn’t it also fair to point out the connection between warmongers and their institutions?

Paradoxically, most of the press reporting on mosques established links between the London bombers and mosques at home and abroad. Both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph writers and contributors assumed that the London bombers had travelled to Pakistan and attended madrassas, (mosque schools) there. Furthermore, The Daily Telegraph published several stories claiming that the London bombers were radicalised in Pakistani madrassas for example, (The Daily Telegraph, 4 September 2005 and 9 September 2006). Notably, British broadsheet reporting of madrassas comprises terms such as “terrorist factories”, “terror schools”, “Jihadists”, “Wahabbis”, and “radicalism”, along with notions that “they teach hatred of the West.” All these labels suggest that mosque schools are behind global terrorism. In the dataset, both The Daily Telegraph and The Guardian articles about madrassas and Tablighi Jamaat included derogatory language such as “Army of Darkness”, and their numbers were often exaggerated (see The Daily Telegraph, 20 August 2006; The Observer, 24 September 2006). However, it is important to note that newspaper reporting is presumably based on statements and opinions and hence merely factual.

The fear factor is the key to the media representation of mosques and mosque schools, linking all social ills and troubles such as terrorism and radicalisation with these places. In recent years, several scholarly studies have observed the increasingly negative portrayal of madrassas and mosques (Bergen and Pandey 2006, p. 117; Cherti and Bradley 2011; Poole and Williamson 2021). As mentioned earlier, most of the anti-mosque campaigns have been a result of the negative portrayal of mosques: examples include (Ahmanideen and Iner 2024). As a result of negative media reporting, mosques are facing growing abuse, vandalism, threats, violence, and hate crimes (ITV, 2023). The Iram Sawar report found “Almost 90% of mosques across the UK have experienced acts of hate crimes” during the year 2022 (ibid.). Given the constant deceptive anti-mosque trends, it is relevant to consider two comic-strips that reflect how anti-mosque sentiments are prevalent among right-wing parties and individuals.

3.1.2. Incompatible

British mosques are often linked with controversial and sensitive issues such as radicalisation, extremism, cartoon controversies, veils, and sharia courts, bringing these places of worship and spiritual institutions engaging in several community-related activities into the media spotlight. Following the 7/7 incident, the belief that mosques are incompatible with the secular British way of life has gained considerable popularity. This has occurred mainly because of the negative and biased image of Islam that floats around in the media, politics and public spaces. In the last decade, several opinion polls, surveys, and think-tank reports have disclosed public perceptions that view Islam as negative and incompatible with British values. Mehdi Hasan (2015) puts it as follows:

Depending on which poll you believe, a majority of Brits believe “Muslims create problems in the UK”, link “Islam with extremism”, and would be “bothered” by the building of a big mosque in their neighbourhood. Since 7/7, anti-Muslim hate crimes have soared. Mosques have been firebombed while headscarf-clad women have been physically attacked.

(The Guardian, 5 July 2015)

Drawing upon the dataset (see Figure 1), it is evident that the sub-theme code “Islam preaches peace and harmony and has no link with terrorism”, which suggests an open-minded view of Islam, appears a total of 16 times, meaning that 16/274 × 100 = 5.83% of the items of journalism in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph portray Islam positively. Notably, of these 16 types of journalism reflecting a positive image of Islam, The Guardian has published 11 stories, while The Daily Telegraph has published only five stories presenting a constructive image of Islam. However, within the period 5 July 2005–8 July 2007, I noticed that the sub-theme code “Islam link with terrorism, extremism, radicalization and women’s issues”, which is reflective of closed-mindedness, also appears 16 times, accounting for 5.83% of the total reporting in both broadsheets.

In the aftermath of the 7/7 incident, the focal point of the split and conflict of interest between Muslims and non-Muslims, there was great emphasis on the point that the Islamic values or way of life are incompatible with British values. Here, this means that a tiny minority of Muslims, such as veiled women, bearded men, and mosquegoers are often described as backward, outdated, and illiterate. Drawing on the database, it became evident that certain events, such as the Prophet (P.B.U.H.) cartoons controversy, the veil, sharia, and suicide attacks, immediately brought mosques into the media spotlight.

In February 2006, a few British Muslim organisations staged protests outside the Danish embassy in London while others gathered in local mosques to discredit the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten which published disrespectful and distasteful caricatures of Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H.). At this point, both The Guardian and The Telegraph ran a series of articles, special reports, comment pieces, and editorials mostly suggesting that British Muslims do not endorse criticism of their religion because they are not moderate and open-minded in comparison to their non-Muslim British fellow citizens. Further, a few writers and contributors of these newspapers suggested that British Muslims hate freedom of speech and are anti-Western and anti-democratic. Such views were perhaps due to the presence among the protestors of Omar Khayam, a drug addict dressed like a suicide bomber who was on parole and whose filthy behaviour terrified ordinary people. Moreover, his malicious behaviour resembled and equated to an incitement to murder in Victorian Britain.

In its editorial on 5 February 2006, The Daily Telegraph deplored the attitude of a handful of Muslim protestors who were chanting slogans such as “Freedom go to hell” and “Britain you will pay—7/7 is on its way.” It wrote that those protesting were in fact in many ways “abusing—the freedom of protest and freedom of assembly that are foundation stones of British democracy. Yet, even as they exploited these hard-won liberties, they were calling for them to be abolished” (The Daily Telegraph, 5 February 2006).

Admirably, the British press, including The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, declined to reprint those repulsive cartoons in a solidarity campaign to defend freedom of speech alongside European newspapers. However, The Daily Telegraph writes in its editorial that it regards those images “as vulgar and fatuously insulting. However—and this is the crucial point—we reserve absolutely our right to make our own decision, free of threat and intimidation” (ibid.). Further, The Daily Telegraph criticises the attitude of Jack Straw, who condemns the Danish newspaper cartoon publishers but fails to discredit Muslim protestors (ibid.).

Despite The Daily Telegraph’s view of the protestors, it states: “There is no excuse for gratuitous offence…some Muslims might like to consider how insulting their own views on women’s rights, theocracy, and Western practices [are]…The offensiveness of these views is no reason to close British mosques or Islamic newspapers” (The Daily Telegraph, 5 February 2006). It is important to note that The Guardian’s investigative report published on 11 February 2006 discloses that “A key role in organising the demonstration was played by an Islamist sect whose supporters have repeatedly been linked to violence and terrorism…Al-Ghurabaa, the organisation that takes credit for the protest” was a known problematic group (The Guardian, 11 February 2006). In addition, both newspapers defended freedom of speech and opposed the British government’s idea of closing some mosques used by hate preachers to spread anti-Western feelings and the proposal to ban Hizbut Tahrir.

Overall, the cartoon controversies raise two important issues of concern to the West. The first is freedom of speech, and the second is the place of religion in secular Western societies such as Britain. Keith Laybourn (2024) pointed out that although such notions are true, Christian religion in Britain has also been subjected to frequent mocking and attacks. Laybourn mentioned George Jacob Holyoke, who coined the term secularism and was convicted of Blasphemy, felt that social order separated from religion (Laybourn 2024). Perhaps for some individuals, this situation reflects similarities between pre-modernism and postmodernism. For example, today in many societies, including the UK, it is considered inappropriate to kill someone for apostasy because many people considered religion10 as a private matter, but it is generally considered appropriate to kill someone for treason because it is a political matter. Similarly, in some places, it is not considered to invade a country for religious reasons, but it is considered appropriate to invade a country in the name of democracy. Moreover, in pre-1960s British society, public display of affection was seen as a bad practice, but it is now an accepted norm. Thus, British society has enormously changed its moral, social, and cultural norms and accepts others following them, whether right or wrong11.

However, in the broader debate on the cartoon controversy, The Guardian also provided a platform to Muslim writers and contributors such as Fareena Alam, who condemned the cartoon protestors, arguing that their distasteful actions do not match the teachings and characteristics of the Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H.). Alam (2006) writes that “the principles on which the Prophet stood are much more generous than that…” (The Guardian, 12 February 2006).

She argues that the editors of the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten have shown the worst form of ignorance of Islam as well as hostility to it because the fact that they had “rejected cartoons lampooning Jesus three years ago on the grounds that they would offend their readers made their protestations of free speech seem cynical” (The Guardian, 12 February 2006). Hence, Alam concludes that “freedom of speech is not absolute. It has to be in service of something, such as peace or social justice. How have these cartoons, and the hypocritical defence of them, served these ideals?” (The Guardian 12 February 2006).

According to scholarly studies, it is evident that most media narratives on Islam in fact reflect what George Orwell called “Double Speak”, meaning different standards of representation for different sets of people. As William Blum (2006) writes, “The Western world was shocked when Iran condemned Salman Rushdie to death because of his book they called ‘blasphemous’. But the United States has also condemned blasphemers to death—Castro, Allende, Sukarno, and a host of others…” (Blum 2006, p. 40). Essentially, in all these debates, such as those on the veil and freedom of speech, which bring modernity into the discussion, the key point is ignorance of Islam. To be fair, the reverse of this assumption is also true.

3.1.3. Social Space

In contemporary Western societies, religious places play a significant role in bringing together people of faith communities. Several notable studies acknowledge that religious institutions and places such as mosques, churches, gurdwaras, temples, and synagogues provide social spaces for local faith communities and help people of other faiths integrate and socialise with groups and individuals from dissimilar cultures, religions, and social classes (Biddington 2021, p. 179; Numrich 2023, p. 157; McAndrew and Sobolewska 2015, p. 62). Overall, the types of journalism within the dataset published by both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph show that these broadsheets and their contributors, albeit to a diminishing degree, recognise the fact that mosques can play a significant role in community building and fighting extremism and radicalisation.

In the dataset, the sub-code theme “Mosques are promoting community cohesion” appears only three times, that is, 3/68 × 100 = 4.41% types of journalism in both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, with a ratio of 2:1 talk of mosques as a social space and community-bonding platform. Furthermore, within the dataset, only 1.1% of the journalism presents open-minded and positive views of British mosques. For example, mosques foster community cohesion and provide spaces for different groups within the community to mix.

In the aftermath of the 7/7 incident, The Guardian ran a two-part G2 special report called “One Friday”, published on 1 November 2006. It featured 40 British Muslim men and women of different professional backgrounds around the country, including politicians, activists, teachers, imams, and doctors, exploring their experience of being Muslims in the wake of the July bombings in London. All the participants were asked to share their experience of a particular Friday and how it felt to be Muslim in Britain today. Almost everyone mentioned the mosque and its significant role in their personal lives. Life for ordinary Muslims has become more challenging since the 7/7 incident, and it continues to be difficult with mosques being constantly accused of radicalisation and extremism. However, overall, the participants agree that the mosque is not just a place for prayers at Friday gatherings; it is in fact a platform that facilitates a sense of community. To clarify, this study uses “community” in a broader sense that includes Muslims of dissimilar ethnic backgrounds, non-Muslim neighborhoods, and includes interfaith work. Relatedly, Shaykh Ibrahim Mogra shares his experience of a particular Friday:

I dealt with media requests. I went to a mosque for Friday prayer, where I had discussions with people about the veil and Iraq. I act as a point of contact in a community. Muslims are worried that their lives will become harder.

(The Guardian, 1 November 2006)

In addition, at the government level, it has been acknowledged that mosques do have an influential role in community bonding, which might help to combat problems such as the growing sense of disengagement among young British Muslims who feel ignored and alienated within the broader society. A report published in October 2002 by the “Select Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales” finds that mosques that serve as “religious centres” in fact undertake several different roles and offer a variety of services, such as “being simply a place to perform the ritual prayers to a comprehensive service to the local community encompassing religious education, social service, counselling, and adult education. Such mosques play an important part in the life of the local community” (Parliament Reports, 2002). Notably, several recent studies also identify similar recurring trends about the role of mosques in facilitating education, health, social, and economic welfare for Muslim communities, as well as fostering interfaith dialogue among Muslims and non-Muslims (Betul 2022; Mustafa et al. 2017; Karimullah 2023).

The Imam of Leeds Makkah Mosque, Qari Muhammad Asim (2011), writes that “the mosque is uniquely positioned in British society to offer guidance and practical assistance regarding real issues affecting the lives of young Muslims” (Asim 2011, p. 10). Asim went on to explain the growing importance of the mosque as a social space provider by fostering interactions among young people. He noted:

As the Muslim community has changed and grown over the last 20 years, so has the role of mosques. The younger generation expects mosques to assume a more central role, moving away from a simple centre of prayer to a social space in the community with a role in helping Muslims integrate into the community and fight marginalisation. As a result of the changing needs of young Muslims, there are increasing numbers of mosques in the UK that are providing extensive services to the Muslim community.

(Asim 2011, p. 21)

In present circumstances, most mosques acknowledge the need to provide a social space for the local community. In the aftermath of the London Bombings, Leeds Makkah Mosque and Leeds Grand Mosque are two of the best examples of social spaces available to local Muslims. In addition, most mosques offer a place for weddings, social gatherings, funerals, sports such as indoor badminton and table tennis, and evening classes for elderly people as well as children. More importantly, most mosques organise exhibitions, seminars, conferences, and cultural events designed to benefit local communities. In this regard, the Leeds Grand Mosque and the Leeds Makkah Mosque12 in the Hyde Park area of Leeds are two relevant illustrations.

In this way, most mosques provide social space to people of different backgrounds and assist in the formation of interest groups within broader communities. In post-7/7 Britain, politicians and religious leaders have emphasised the need to develop a close-knit community that not only fosters cohesion but also shapes a much more cohesive society. From David Cameron’s “Big Society” (2010) election manifesto to government policies such as “community cohesion”, the idea is to develop cohesive communities (Dillon and Fanning 2011; Jones 2013; McCabe 2010). Unfortunately, some of the best efforts of the British government to develop a strong sense of shared community have not produced the desired results. In the aftermath of the August 2011 London riots, several leading political and religious figures stressed the need to fix a broken society (The Guardian, 11 August 2011). Fairly speaking, the 1980s riots in Bradford and contemporary problems of disengaging Muslim youths also signal the breakdown of community. Hence, despite the positive role of religious institutes, there are emerging challenges for them to counter. Other religious communities, including Christians, Jews, and Hindus are facing the same challenges.

Indeed, a sense of belonging and a shared common goal can achieve cohesive community bonding. In this regard, on a broader level, the principles of Islam such as Salah (prayers), Zakat (charity), Hajj (pilgrimage), and Brotherhood are basically designed to bind all Muslims together, regardless of tribe, race, colour and ethnicity, into one Ummah or nation. The concept of one Ummah, derived from the Quran is in fact the best example of community cohesion (Ahmed 1975; Saleh and Baqutayan 2012). It is here that the Islamic principles together with the fine principles, of Christianity and Judaism, can help bind a society together based on shared and common goals, as occurred in Medina and medieval Spain. The historical archives indicate that this model was successful in Muslim Spain, Mughal India, the Ottoman Balkans, and Eastern Europe. Members of the world’s major faiths, such as Christians, Jews, Sikhs, Hindus, and Buddhists have all lived together peacefully.

The Historical Contextualisation and implications of Mosque coverage debates: Past to present (2005–2024).

This study is based on the representation of mosques in British broadsheets The Daily Telegraph and The Guardian report of the tragic event of 7/7, which occurred on 7 July 2005. Nearly 20 years on, this study’s findings and observations within the historical context and the implications of the British media reporting of mosque debates emerged since then and have shown similar reoccurring patterns and trends. Given the ongoing concerns about rising Islamophobia and the excavating of Muslim exclusionary discourses in Western Europe, which revolve around issues of identity, belonging, religion, culture, and multiculturalism, as well as concerns about terrorism and counterterrorism, once again mosques have become a dominant feature of the media reporting. Notably, about 20 years ago, the British broadsheet press reporting on mosques reflected a focal point that Islam is a threat to Britain. The key debates that emerged were “modernity”, “British Islam”, “modern Islam”, “moderate Muslims”, “Sharia law”, “jihadists”, “radicals”, and “caliphate”. Relatedly, the word “Islamist” appears as a synonym for ‘violent ideology’ ranging from the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda, and Hizbut-Tahrir to Al-Muhajiroun in Britain. Within the dataset, the phrase “Islamist” denotes hate preachers, radicals, and extremists, such as Abu-Hamza al-Masri, Anjem Choudary, and Omar Bakri Muhammad, who have been accused of making hate speeches.

Despite considerable differences in the interpretation, presentation, and argumentation in reporting, both broadsheets held similar views of mosques that harbour radical imams and hate preachers to promote “Islamic ideology” and “anti-Western values”. In various other articles and reports, The Daily Telegraph published the views of several commentators who repeatedly raised this concern that British radicals intend to replace secular values with Sharia law, which would happen under a caliphate. The fear of a caliphate was a prominent feature of both broadsheets, probably the London bomber’s ringleader, and even today, al-Qaeda and ISIS radicals and terrorists wear a black band on their forehead, describing the coming of the caliphate which was a hallmark of the coverage of 7/7. Alongside the fear of radicals’ attacks on public and defense infrastructure, their aim of establishing a caliphate frequently appeared in both newspapers.

The Dataset:

No.	Color	%Age Share	Sub-Theme-Code
1	Sky blue	15%	STC 46, “Britishness is our culture; our British values must be adopted”
2	Blue Lapis	11%	STC 39, “British Muslims have created social ghettos and live in parallel lives rooted in their cultural and religious beliefs/ideologies such as separate schools, veils, this leads to radicalisation”
3	Blue sapphire	9%	STC 32, “British Government promotes the idea of British Islam/Modern Islam/moderates (Sufi Islam, Council of Imams) to counter Islamic radicalism”
4	Orange carrot	9%	STC 49, “Engaging with Muslims include government initiatives such as road shows, reaching out in the community, combating Islamophobia, listening to Muslims leadership etc.”
5	Orange apricot	7%	STC 41, “Hate preachers, Abu Hamza, Finsbury Mosque promote anti-Western feelings and radicalisation.”
6	Purple	7%	STC 44, “British Muslims do not endorse ‘Freedom of Speech’ and criticism of their religion for example Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) cartoons”
7	Green	7%	STC 52, “British Muslims are victims for example bad press etc.” (Sympathetic view)
8	Purple Orchid	6%	STC 24, “British mosques link with 7/7 bombers, meeting point, promoting extremism and radicalization, problematic labels, non-English speaking imams, etc. (close-Views)”
9	Red	6%	STC 6, “British Islamists, Sheikh Omar Bakri and his associates such as al-Qaradawi and Abu Izzadeen are anti-Western hate preachers who must be denounced and banned”
10	Light sky blue	4%	STC 29, “Hate preacher such as Anjem Chaudhary’s statements”
11	Blue Cerulean	4%	STC 54, “Problems within the Muslim community for instance widely acknowledged leadership, imams and mosques, sectarian divide etc.”
12	Purple violet	4%	STC 62, “Jack Straw veil controversy fuel Islamophobia in the British society”
13	Blue azure	3%	STC 20, “Londoners showed strength after bombings”
14	Blue arctic	2%	STC 4, “Islamist extremists and white imperialist racists are two identical troublemakers”
15	Orange yam	1%	STC 25, “Mosques are promoting community cohesion etc. (Open-minded Views)”
16	Green pear	1%	STC 33, “Radical Islam and Militant Muslims are also a challenge to Muslim regimes therefore the West must make an alliance with modern Muslims”
17	Green lime	1%	STC 40, “Representing Livingstone as hate preachers Qaradawi friend who hate gays, Jews, etc. closed views, anti-Semitic”
18	Pink	1%	STC 58, “Government select, promote and engage with like-minded British Muslims”
19	Red cherry	1%	STC 59, “Freedom of speech boundaries should be drawn in order to avoid confusion and conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims”

The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph mainly presented the British mosques as negative. These newspapers associated mosques with extremism, radicalism, and terrorism and suggested that mosques are ideological warehouses that export violence and anti-Western sentiments. Overall, both newspapers offer mixed portrayals of British mosques in two sub-theme codes (STC 24, “British mosques link with 7/7 bombers, meeting point, promoting extremism and radicalization, problematic labels, non-English-speaking imams, etc. (close-minded view)” and (STC 25), “Mosques are promoting community cohesion, etc. (open-minded views)”. Despite the two newspapers’ diverse opinions on mosques, the negative portrayals of mosques outnumbered the balanced views. The notion of mosques as places of community cohesion, which is an open-minded view of Islam, accounts for only 1.09% of the reporting in comparison to approximately 9% of the reporting space that links mosques with the 7/7 incident. In turn, much of the reporting on mosques in this dataset reflects closed views of Islam.

On a positive note, both newspapers recognise that extremists were banned from their local mosque committees on various grounds, including clashes with elders and imams. They also accept that mosques promote community cohesion by providing a space for different groups of Muslims such as Arabs, Asians, Africans, and white Muslims. Additionally, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph reported government officials and non-Muslim members of the community have visited mosques to foster social cohesion. Soon after the London bombings, most sections of the media, including these two newspapers, linked a few local mosques in Leeds and London with the bombers, suggesting that they had visited these places, and turned them into suicide bombers. Since then, the government has described Leeds Makkah Mosque and Cambridge Mosque as ‘role models’, suggesting that these two mosques are modern.

Almost, twenty years on, the findings of this study have become more relevant and valid as recent waves of attacks on mosques have increased following the 2024 UK riots. Once again, sections of the British media blamed Muslims for the troubles in Leeds and the killing of three innocent girls in Southport. Later, it appeared that the Roma community was behind the Leeds rioting, and an African Christian was involved in the barbaric slaughter of white girls. Coincidentally, the violent mobs attacked mosques in Southport, Liverpool, Belfast, and London, smashed windows, vandalized mosque buildings, threatened imams, and physically attacked bearded Muslim men and hijab-wearing Muslim women (The Guardian, 11 August 2024; Daily Sabah, 8 August 2024). Initially, soon after the 7/7 bombings, violent mobs attacked mosques in Leeds and London on the assumption that mosques nurture anti-Western discourses, host hate preachers and imams, and back radical and extremist ideologies that fuel hatred among young Brits. Initially, this study detected a systematic anti-mosque campaign within British broadsheets, the tabloid press, and sections of politics. Now, almost 20 years have passed, and the 2024 UK riots affirm how the British media’s negative reporting aims to distort, demonize, and discredit Islam and Muslims by endorsing deeply rooted Islamophobia and anti-mosque narratives leading to attacks on mosques.

This study proposes that policymakers rethink their policy on Islamophobia and treat it equally with anti-Semitism to protect future generations of British Muslims and mosques. Additionally, this study argues that the British broadsheet and tabloid press narrative of mosques has played a huge role in shaping public opinion, especially among the youngsters (Gen Z), who were children at times during the 7/7 bombings. Nearly 20 years later, following the UK riots of 2024, they attacked mosques, believing that what they had been told about mosques—namely, that they are hubs of radicals and extremists who hate Britain—was true. Since 7/7, every incident has brought mosques under attack, even though the perpetrators are not Muslims but Christians, and no one has dared to attack churches. Notably, the British press was wrong and racist about the Iraq War, and once again, it is wrong on mosques.

4. Conclusions

Drawing on the British broadsheets’ representation of mosques in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph over a two-year period (7 July 2005–8 July 2007), this study concludes both broadsheets perceive the role and place of mosques in secular British society through their own blurred lens that reflects mosques are incompatible and a security threat to British society. One of the key reasons for such a biased view is that broadsheets were reporting the tragic incident of the 7/7 bombings that was carried out by perpetrators who professed to be Muslims. Relatedly, the broadsheets clearly focused more on a handful of radical imams in a few British mosques in comparison to a vast majority of the mosques and mosque attendees. Hence, a picture was painted that British mosques harbor extremists, radicals, fundamentalists, jihadists, and terrorists who are anti-Western and want to attack Britain. In doing so, the broadsheet’s view of Islam and Muslims was based on those handful of radicals who were misinterpreting Islam for their own gains, as well as the few reporters who aim to get public attention by feeding them sensational news stories. Additionally, both broadsheets presented cherry-picked and out-of-context verses of the holy Quran to establish views that Islam limits the role of women in the society; mosque goers are religious people and misfits to live in a secular society.

Drawing on a dataset, this study detects a continuing derogatory image of mosques in both broadsheets. For clarity, this study admits that it is challenging to tell whether something is derogatory or factual, as the author has looked at what was written rather than examining whether it was right or wrong. Although the overall database also reflects the presence of some favourable views of mosques—i.e., that they provide a social space and play a significant role in community bonding this perspective was largely marginalised.

Evidently, in a considerable number of types of journalism, including news reports, features, and comment pieces, various writers, reporters, and commentators in these broadsheets mostly linked mosques in Leeds, Dewsbury, and London with the 7/7 bombers even though the perpetrators had been banned from their local mosques. A few local mosques were directly accused of harbouring radicals, extremists, and hatemongers, particularly the perpetrators of the 7/7 incident who were [supposedly] radicalised during their visits to madrassas and mosques in Pakistan.

In addition, the reporting also suggests that the bombers, used mosques as meeting points and places to distribute the jihadist literature and collect money. Based upon the findings, this study suggests that one way forward would be to make a clear distinction between hate speakers, self-proclaimed radical clerics, imams, and mosques as an institution while reporting. Overall, this study also notes that distorted images of mosques—such as the crescent, children reading Quran, and radical imams—denote the expansion of Islam in Europe, casting fear among the public to believe that their way of life is in danger; hence, mosques are seen as incompatible and a security threat. In the contemporary period of history, it is essential to review the discourse on mosques and consider them as established institution, like other private and public regulatory bodies.