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Cited By

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Zhang XXue GYu RYang DTang J(2017)Countermeasures Against False-Name Attacks on Truthful Incentive Mechanisms for CrowdsourcingIEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications10.1109/JSAC.2017.265922935:2(478-485)Online publication date: 1-Feb-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659229
Carvalho Rodrigues FXavier E(2017)Non-cooperative capacitated facility location gamesInformation Processing Letters10.1016/j.ipl.2016.09.001117:C(45-53)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.ipl.2016.09.001
Feldman MRon T(2015)Capacitated Network Design GamesTheory of Computing Systems10.1007/s00224-014-9540-157:3(576-597)Online publication date: 1-Oct-2015
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Index Terms

Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
1. Mathematics of computing
2. Theory of computation
  1. Design and analysis of algorithms

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Published In

EC '03: Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce

June 2003

292 pages

ISBN:158113679X

DOI:10.1145/779928

General Chair:
Danny Menasce
George Mason University
,
Program Chair:
Noam Nisan
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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Published: 09 June 2003

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June 9 - 12, 2003

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EC '03 Paper Acceptance Rate 21 of 110 submissions, 19%;

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Zhang XXue GYu RYang DTang J(2017)Countermeasures Against False-Name Attacks on Truthful Incentive Mechanisms for CrowdsourcingIEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications10.1109/JSAC.2017.265922935:2(478-485)Online publication date: 1-Feb-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659229
Carvalho Rodrigues FXavier E(2017)Non-cooperative capacitated facility location gamesInformation Processing Letters10.1016/j.ipl.2016.09.001117:C(45-53)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.ipl.2016.09.001
Feldman MRon T(2015)Capacitated Network Design GamesTheory of Computing Systems10.1007/s00224-014-9540-157:3(576-597)Online publication date: 1-Oct-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s00224-014-9540-1
Li GShao JXu DXu W(2014)The warehouse-retailer network design gameJournal of Industrial and Management Optimization10.3934/jimo.2015.11.29111:1(291-305)Online publication date: May-2014
https://doi.org/10.3934/jimo.2015.11.291
Feldman MRon T(2012)Capacitated Network Design GamesProceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory - Volume 761510.5555/2954155.2954167(132-143)Online publication date: 22-Oct-2012
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/2954155.2954167
Manisterski EDavid EKraus SJennings N(2012)Efficient Allocation of Agent Groups for Complex Tasks in Real Cost EnvironmentsProceedings of the 2012 IEEE International Conference on Software Science, Technology and Engineering10.1109/SWSTE.2012.14(54-62)Online publication date: 12-Jun-2012
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/SWSTE.2012.14
Feldman MRon T(2012)Capacitated Network Design GamesAlgorithmic Game Theory10.1007/978-3-642-33996-7_12(132-143)Online publication date: 2012
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33996-7_12
Li XSun ZWang WChu XTang SXu P(2010)Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agentsTheoretical Computer Science10.1016/j.tcs.2009.09.024411:1(174-187)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2010
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.tcs.2009.09.024
Epstein Lvan Stee R(2010)Maximizing the minimum load for selfish agentsTheoretical Computer Science10.1016/j.tcs.2009.08.032411:1(44-57)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2010
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.tcs.2009.08.032
Li XSun ZWang WLou W(2010)Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover gamesJournal of Combinatorial Optimization10.1007/s10878-009-9209-x20:3(259-284)Online publication date: 1-Oct-2010
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10878-009-9209-x
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Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games

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