research-article

KITE: Exploring the Practical Threat from Acoustic Transduction Attacks on Inertial Sensors

Authors:

Lingfeng Zhang,

Kui RenAuthors Info & Claims

SenSys '22: Proceedings of the 20th ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems

Pages 696 - 709

https://doi.org/10.1145/3560905.3568532

Published: 24 January 2023 Publication History

Abstract

In cyber-physical systems, inertial sensors are the basis for identifying motion states and making actuation decisions. However, extensive studies have proved the vulnerability of those sensors under acoustic transduction attacks, which leverage malicious acoustics to trigger sensor measurement errors. Unfortunately, the threat from such attacks is not assessed properly because of the incomplete investigation on the attack's potential, especially towards multiple-degree-of-freedom systems, e.g., drones. To thoroughly explore the threat of acoustic transduction attacks, we revisit the attack model and design a new yet practical acoustic modulation-based attack, named KITE. Such an attack enables stable and controllable injections, even under frequency offset based distortions that limit the effect of prior attacking approaches. KITE exploits the potential threat of transduction attacks without the need of strengthening attackers' abilities. Furthermore, we extend the attack surface to multiple-degree-of-freedom systems, which are more widely deployed but ignored by prior work. Our study also covers the scenario of attacking moving targets. By revealing the practical threat from acoustic transduction attacks, we appeal for both the attention to their harm and necessary countermeasures.

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Cited By

Hosseinzadeh SVoutos DBarrie DOwoh NAshawa MShahrabi A(2024)Design and Development Considerations of a Cyber Physical Testbed for Operational Technology Research and EducationSensors10.3390/s2412392324:12(3923)Online publication date: 17-Jun-2024
https://doi.org/10.3390/s24123923
Gao MZhang LShen LZou XHan JLin FRen K(2024)Exploring Practical Acoustic Transduction Attacks on Inertial Sensors in MDOF SystemsIEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing10.1109/TMC.2023.327728723:5(3539-3557)Online publication date: May-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/TMC.2023.3277287
Zhang JWang YTu YRampazzi SLin ZLee IHei X(2024)ADC-Bank: Detecting Acoustic Out-of-Band Signal Injection on Inertial SensorsSecurity and Privacy in Cyber-Physical Systems and Smart Vehicles10.1007/978-3-031-51630-6_4(53-72)Online publication date: 5-Feb-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51630-6_4

Index Terms

KITE: Exploring the Practical Threat from Acoustic Transduction Attacks on Inertial Sensors
1. Security and privacy
  1. Network security
    1. Mobile and wireless security
  2. Security in hardware

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cover image ACM Conferences

SenSys '22: Proceedings of the 20th ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems

November 2022

1280 pages

ISBN:9781450398862

DOI:10.1145/3560905

General Chairs:
Jeremy Gummeson
University of Massachusetts Amherst
,
Sunghoon Ivan Lee
University of Massachusetts Amherst
,
Program Chairs:
Jie Gao
Rutgers University
,
Guoliang Xing
The Chinese University of Hong Kong

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Published: 24 January 2023

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Research Institute of Cyberspace Governance in Zhejiang University
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SenSys '22: The 20th ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems

November 6 - 9, 2022

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SenSys '22 Paper Acceptance Rate 52 of 187 submissions, 28%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 174 of 867 submissions, 20%

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Cited By

Hosseinzadeh SVoutos DBarrie DOwoh NAshawa MShahrabi A(2024)Design and Development Considerations of a Cyber Physical Testbed for Operational Technology Research and EducationSensors10.3390/s2412392324:12(3923)Online publication date: 17-Jun-2024
https://doi.org/10.3390/s24123923
Gao MZhang LShen LZou XHan JLin FRen K(2024)Exploring Practical Acoustic Transduction Attacks on Inertial Sensors in MDOF SystemsIEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing10.1109/TMC.2023.327728723:5(3539-3557)Online publication date: May-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/TMC.2023.3277287
Zhang JWang YTu YRampazzi SLin ZLee IHei X(2024)ADC-Bank: Detecting Acoustic Out-of-Band Signal Injection on Inertial SensorsSecurity and Privacy in Cyber-Physical Systems and Smart Vehicles10.1007/978-3-031-51630-6_4(53-72)Online publication date: 5-Feb-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51630-6_4

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