research-article

Themis: An On-Site Voting System with Systematic Cast-as-intended Verification and Partial Accountability

Authors:

Hervé Chabanne,

Véronique Cortier,

Alexandre Debant,

Emmanuelle Dottax,

Pierrick Gaudry,

Mathieu TuruaniAuthors Info & Claims

CCS '22: Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Pages 397 - 410

https://doi.org/10.1145/3548606.3560563

Published: 07 November 2022 Publication History

Abstract

We propose an on-site voting system Themis, that aims at improving security when local authorities are not fully trusted. Voters vote thanks to voting sheets as well as smart cards that produce encrypted ballots. Electronic ballots are systematically audited, without compromising privacy. Moreover, the system includes a precise dispute resolution procedure identifying misbehaving parties in most cases.

We conduct a full formal analysis of Themis using ProVerif, with a novel approach in order to cover the modular arithmetic needed in our protocol. In order to evaluate the usability of our system, we organized a voting experiment on a (small) group of voters.

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Cited By

Devillez HPereira OPeters TYang Q(2024)Can we cast a ballot as intended and be receipt free?2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)10.1109/SP54263.2024.00176(3440-3457)Online publication date: 19-May-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/SP54263.2024.00176
Mieno TOkazaki HArai KFuta Y(2024)How to Formalize Loop Iterations in Cryptographic Protocols Using ProVerifIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2024.336845312(31605-31625)Online publication date: 2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3368453

Index Terms

Themis: An On-Site Voting System with Systematic Cast-as-intended Verification and Partial Accountability
1. Security and privacy
  1. Formal methods and theory of security

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cover image ACM Conferences

CCS '22: Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

November 2022

3598 pages

ISBN:9781450394505

DOI:10.1145/3548606

General Chairs:
Heng Yin
University of California, Riverside
,
Angelos Stavrou
Virginia Tech
,
Program Chairs:
Cas Cremers
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
,
Elaine Shi
Carnegie Mellon University

Copyright © 2022 ACM.

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Publication History

Published: 07 November 2022

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CCS '22: 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

November 7 - 11, 2022

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Overall Acceptance Rate 1,261 of 6,999 submissions, 18%

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Cited By

Devillez HPereira OPeters TYang Q(2024)Can we cast a ballot as intended and be receipt free?2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)10.1109/SP54263.2024.00176(3440-3457)Online publication date: 19-May-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/SP54263.2024.00176
Mieno TOkazaki HArai KFuta Y(2024)How to Formalize Loop Iterations in Cryptographic Protocols Using ProVerifIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2024.336845312(31605-31625)Online publication date: 2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3368453

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