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Waves of Malice: A Longitudinal Measurement of the Malicious File Delivery Ecosystem on the Web

Published: 02 July 2019 Publication History

Abstract

We present a longitudinal measurement of malicious file distribution on the Web. Following a data-driven approach, we identify network infrastructures and the files that they download. We then study their characteristics over a short period (one day), over a medium period (daily, over one month) as well as in the long term (weekly, over one year). This analysis offers us an unprecedented view of the malicious file delivery ecosystem and its dynamics. We find that the malicious file delivery landscape can be divided into two distinct ecosystems: a much larger, tightly connected set of networks that is mostly responsible for the delivery of potentially unwanted programs (PUP), and a number of disjoint network infrastructures that are responsible for delivering malware on victim computers. We find that these two ecosystems are mostly disjoint, but it is not uncommon to see malware downloaded from the PUP Ecosystem, and vice versa. We estimate the proportions of PUP-to-malware in the wild to be heavily skewed towards PUP (17:2) and compare their distribution patterns. We observe periodicity in the activity of malicious network infrastructures, and we find that although malicious file operations present a high degree of volatility, 75% of the observed malicious networks remain active for more than six weeks, with 26% surviving for an entire year. We then reason on how our findings can help the research and law enforcement communities in developing better takedown techniques.

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cover image ACM Conferences
Asia CCS '19: Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
July 2019
708 pages
ISBN:9781450367523
DOI:10.1145/3321705
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Published: 02 July 2019

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Author Tags

  1. big data
  2. delivery
  3. downloader graph
  4. malware
  5. pup
  6. web security

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