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Cardinal Contests

Authors:

Patrick HummelAuthors Info & Claims

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), Volume 6, Issue 2

Article No.: 7, Pages 1 - 32

https://doi.org/10.1145/3232862

Published: 21 July 2018 Publication History

Abstract

We model and analyze cardinal contests, where a principal running a rank-order tournament has access to an absolute measure of the quality of agents’ submissions in addition to their relative rankings. We show that a mechanism that compares each agent’s output quality against a threshold to decide whether to award her the prize corresponding to her rank is optimal amongst the set of all mixed cardinal-ordinal mechanisms where the jth-ranked submission receives a fraction of the jth prize that is a non-decreasing function of the submission’s quality. Furthermore, the optimal threshold mechanism uses exactly the same threshold for each rank.

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Cited By

Takasi GDawande MJanakiraman G(2023)Optimal cardinal contestsProduction and Operations Management10.1111/poms.1404332:11(3433-3451)Online publication date: 1-Nov-2023
https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14043
Liu BLu J(2023)Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contestsJournal of Economic Theory10.1016/j.jet.2022.105594208(105594)Online publication date: Mar-2023
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105594
Jin YCarman MZhu YXiang Y(2020)A technical survey on statistical modelling and design methods for crowdsourcing quality controlArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2020.103351287(103351)Online publication date: Oct-2020
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2020.103351
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Index Terms

Cardinal Contests
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences
    1. Economics

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Information

Published In

cover image ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Volume 6, Issue 2

May 2018

159 pages

ISSN:2167-8375

EISSN:2167-8383

DOI:10.1145/3241735

Editors:
David Pennock
Microsoft
,
Ilya Segal
Stanford University

Issue’s Table of Contents

Copyright © 2018 Owner/Author.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author.

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 21 July 2018

Accepted: 01 March 2018

Revised: 01 September 2017

Received: 01 September 2016

Published in TEAC Volume 6, Issue 2

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Cited By

Takasi GDawande MJanakiraman G(2023)Optimal cardinal contestsProduction and Operations Management10.1111/poms.1404332:11(3433-3451)Online publication date: 1-Nov-2023
https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14043
Liu BLu J(2023)Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contestsJournal of Economic Theory10.1016/j.jet.2022.105594208(105594)Online publication date: Mar-2023
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105594
Jin YCarman MZhu YXiang Y(2020)A technical survey on statistical modelling and design methods for crowdsourcing quality controlArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2020.103351287(103351)Online publication date: Oct-2020
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2020.103351
Gezer A(2020)Improving IEEE 802.15.4 performance with a switched Gold sequence chip formationWireless Networks10.1007/s11276-020-02354-826:6(4579-4593)Online publication date: 15-May-2020
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s11276-020-02354-8
Dawande MJanakiraman GTakasi G(undefined)Optimal Cardinal ContestsSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.4024460
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4024460
Dawande MJanakiraman GTakasi G(undefined)Crowd-Sourcing for Data Science and Quantifiable Challenges: Optimal Contest DesignSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.3740224
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3740224
Liu BLu J(undefined)Optimal Prize Design in Rank-Order ContestsSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.3565671
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3565671

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