research-article

Public Access

Pretzel: Email encryption and provider-supplied functions are compatible

Authors:

Henrique Fingler,

Lorenzo Alvisi,

Michael WalfishAuthors Info & Claims

SIGCOMM '17: Proceedings of the Conference of the ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication

Pages 169 - 182

https://doi.org/10.1145/3098822.3098835

Published: 07 August 2017 Publication History

Abstract

Emails today are often encrypted, but only between mail servers---the vast majority of emails are exposed in plaintext to the mail servers that handle them. While better than no encryption, this arrangement leaves open the possibility of attacks, privacy violations, and other disclosures. Publicly, email providers have stated that default end-to-end encryption would conflict with essential functions (spam filtering, etc.), because the latter requires analyzing email text. The goal of this paper is to demonstrate that there is no conflict. We do so by designing, implementing, and evaluating Pretzel. Starting from a cryptographic protocol that enables two parties to jointly perform a classification task without revealing their inputs to each other, Pretzel refines and adapts this protocol to the email context. Our experimental evaluation of a prototype demonstrates that email can be encrypted end-to-end and providers can compute over it, at tolerable cost: clients must devote some storage and processing, and provider overhead is roughly 5x versus the status quo.

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54776-8_13
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Index Terms

Pretzel: Email encryption and provider-supplied functions are compatible
1. Information systems
  1. World Wide Web
    1. Web applications
      1. Internet communications tools
        Email
2. Security and privacy
  1. Cryptography
  2. Security services
    1. Privacy-preserving protocols

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cover image ACM Conferences

SIGCOMM '17: Proceedings of the Conference of the ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication

August 2017

515 pages

ISBN:9781450346535

DOI:10.1145/3098822

Copyright © 2017 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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New York, NY, United States

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Published: 07 August 2017

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SIGCOMM '17

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SIGCOMM

SIGCOMM '17: ACM SIGCOMM 2017 Conference

August 21 - 25, 2017

CA, Los Angeles, USA

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Overall Acceptance Rate 462 of 3,389 submissions, 14%

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Cited By

Kjamilji A(2024)Privacy-Preserving Zero-Sum-Path Evaluation of Decision Trees in Postquantum Industrial IoTIEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics10.1109/TII.2024.338452320:8(10178-10191)Online publication date: Aug-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/TII.2024.3384523
Pohle EAbidin APreneel B(2024)Fast Evaluation of S-Boxes With Garbled CircuitsIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security10.1109/TIFS.2024.340214519(5530-5544)Online publication date: 2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2024.3402145
Hashemi MForte DGanji F(2024)Time Is Money, Friend! Timing Side-Channel Attack Against Garbled Circuit ConstructionsApplied Cryptography and Network Security10.1007/978-3-031-54776-8_13(325-354)Online publication date: 29-Feb-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54776-8_13
Sun XMo DWu DYe CYu QCui JZhong H(2023)Efficient regular expression matching over hybrid dictionary-based compressed dataJournal of Network and Computer Applications10.1016/j.jnca.2023.103635215(103635)Online publication date: Jun-2023
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnca.2023.103635
Kjamilji ABerke Güney O(2023)Highly Efficient Secure Linear Algebra for Private Machine Learning Classifications over Malicious Clients in the Post-Quantum WorldJournal of King Saud University - Computer and Information Sciences10.1016/j.jksuci.2023.101718(101718)Online publication date: Aug-2023
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2023.101718
Nguyen TKarunanayake NWang SSeneviratne SHu P(2023)Privacy-preserving spam filtering using homomorphic and functional encryptionComputer Communications10.1016/j.comcom.2022.11.002197(230-241)Online publication date: Jan-2023
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comcom.2022.11.002
Merino LCabrero-Holgueras J(2023)Secure Multi-Party ComputationTrends in Data Protection and Encryption Technologies10.1007/978-3-031-33386-6_17(89-92)Online publication date: 27-Apr-2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33386-6_17
Bao YSundararajah KMalik RYe QWagner CJaber NWang FAmeri MLu DSeto ADelaware BSamanta RKate AGarman CBlocki JLetourneau PMeister BSpringer JRompf TKulkarni MTilevich EDe Roover C(2021)HACCLE: metaprogramming for secure multi-party computationProceedings of the 20th ACM SIGPLAN International Conference on Generative Programming: Concepts and Experiences10.1145/3486609.3487205(130-143)Online publication date: 17-Oct-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3486609.3487205
Ahmad ISarker LAgrawal DEl Abbadi AGupta T(2021)CoeusProceedings of the ACM SIGOPS 28th Symposium on Operating Systems Principles10.1145/3477132.3483586(672-690)Online publication date: 26-Oct-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3477132.3483586
Kjamilji ALevi ASavas EGuney O(2021)Secure Matrix Operations for Machine Learning Classifications Over Encrypted Data in Post Quantum Industrial IoT2021 International Symposium on Networks, Computers and Communications (ISNCC)10.1109/ISNCC52172.2021.9615794(1-8)Online publication date: 31-Oct-2021
https://doi.org/10.1109/ISNCC52172.2021.9615794
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