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Control-Flow Integrity: Precision, Security, and Performance

Authors:

Stefan Brunthaler,

Mathias PayerAuthors Info & Claims

ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), Volume 50, Issue 1

Article No.: 16, Pages 1 - 33

https://doi.org/10.1145/3054924

Published: 04 April 2017 Publication History

Abstract

Memory corruption errors in C/C++ programs remain the most common source of security vulnerabilities in today’s systems. Control-flow hijacking attacks exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities to divert program execution away from the intended control flow. Researchers have spent more than a decade studying and refining defenses based on Control-Flow Integrity (CFI); this technique is now integrated into several production compilers. However, so far, no study has systematically compared the various proposed CFI mechanisms nor is there any protocol on how to compare such mechanisms. We compare a broad range of CFI mechanisms using a unified nomenclature based on (i) a qualitative discussion of the conceptual security guarantees, (ii) a quantitative security evaluation, and (iii) an empirical evaluation of their performance in the same test environment. For each mechanism, we evaluate (i) protected types of control-flow transfers and (ii) precision of the protection for forward and backward edges. For open-source, compiler-based implementations, we also evaluate (iii) generated equivalence classes and target sets and (iv) runtime performance.

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Pesin BBoulmé SMonniaux DPotet MStark KTimany ABlazy STabareau N(2025)Formally Verified Hardening of C Programs against Hardware Fault InjectionProceedings of the 14th ACM SIGPLAN International Conference on Certified Programs and Proofs10.1145/3703595.3705880(140-155)Online publication date: 10-Jan-2025
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Index Terms

Control-Flow Integrity: Precision, Security, and Performance
1. General and reference
  1. Document types
    1. Surveys and overviews
2. Security and privacy
  1. Software and application security
  2. Systems security
    1. Information flow control

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cover image ACM Computing Surveys

ACM Computing Surveys Volume 50, Issue 1

January 2018

588 pages

ISSN:0360-0300

EISSN:1557-7341

DOI:10.1145/3058791

Editor:
Sartaj Sahni
Department of Computer and Information Science and Engineering / University of Florida / Gainesville, FL 32611

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Publication History

Published: 04 April 2017

Accepted: 01 January 2017

Revised: 01 December 2016

Received: 01 April 2016

Published in CSUR Volume 50, Issue 1

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