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Provenance-based Integrity Protection for Windows

Published: 07 December 2015 Publication History

Abstract

Existing malware defenses are primarily reactive in nature, with defenses effective only on malware that has previously been observed. Unfortunately, we are witnessing a generation of stealthy, highly targeted exploits and malware that these defenses are unprepared for. Thwarting such malware requires new defenses that are, by design, secure against unknown malware. In this paper, we present Spif, an approach that defends against malware by tracking code and data origin, and ensuring that any process that is influenced by code or data from untrusted sources will be prevented from modifying important system resources, and interacting with benign processes. Spif is designed for Windows, the most widely deployed desktop OS, and the primary platform targeted by malware. Spif is compatible with all recent Windows versions (Windows XP to Windows 10), and supports a wide range of feature rich, unmodified applications, including all popular browsers, office software and media players. Spif imposes minimal performance overheads while being able to stop a variety of malware attacks, including Stuxnet and the recently reported Sandworm malware. An open-source implementation of our system is available.

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cover image ACM Other conferences
ACSAC '15: Proceedings of the 31st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
December 2015
489 pages
ISBN:9781450336826
DOI:10.1145/2818000
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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  • ACSA: Applied Computing Security Assoc

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Published: 07 December 2015

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