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vVote: A Verifiable Voting System

Published: 09 June 2015 Publication History

Abstract

The Prêt à Voter cryptographic voting system was designed to be flexible and to offer voters a familiar and easy voting experience. In this article, we present our development of the Prêt à Voter design to a practical implementation used in a real state election in November 2014, called vVote. As well as solving practical engineering challenges, we have also had to tailor the system to the idiosyncrasies of elections in the Australian state of Victoria and the requirements of the Victorian Electoral Commission. This article includes general background, user experience, and details of the cryptographic protocols and human processes. We explain the problems, present solutions, then analyze their security properties and explain how they tie in to other design decisions.

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Published In

cover image ACM Transactions on Information and System Security
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security  Volume 18, Issue 1
June 2015
126 pages
ISSN:1094-9224
EISSN:1557-7406
DOI:10.1145/2786062
  • Editor:
  • Gene Tsudik
Issue’s Table of Contents
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 09 June 2015
Accepted: 01 March 2015
Revised: 01 December 2014
Received: 01 July 2014
Published in TISSEC Volume 18, Issue 1

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  1. Verifiable electronic voting systems
  2. voting protocols

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  • Research-article
  • Research
  • Refereed

Funding Sources

  • Fonds National de Recherche (FNR) Luxembourg SeRTVS project
  • EPSRC Trustworthy Voting Systems project EP/G025797/1

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