Stability and competitive equilibrium in matching markets with transfers
Pages 29 - 34
Abstract
This note surveys recent work in generalized matching theory, focusing on trading networks with transferable utility. In trading networks with a finite set of contractual opportunities, the substitutability of agents' preferences is essential for the guaranteed existence of stable outcomes and the correspondence of stable outcomes with competitive equilibria. Closely analogous results hold when venture participation is continuously adjustable, but under a concavity condition on agents' preferences which allows for some types of complementarity.
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Index Terms
- Stability and competitive equilibrium in matching markets with transfers
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Published: 01 December 2011
Published in SIGECOM Volume 10, Issue 3
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