research-article

A behavioral study of bargaining in social networks

Authors:

Tanmoy Chakraborty,

Michael Kearns,

Jinsong TanAuthors Info & Claims

EC '10: Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce

Pages 243 - 252

https://doi.org/10.1145/1807342.1807382

Published: 07 June 2010 Publication History

Abstract

We report on a series of highly controlled human subject experiments in networked bargaining. The basic interaction between two players is the decision of how to share a mutual payment; we extend this to situate the players in a network. Various theories predict, to different levels of uniqueness, what the shares will be. We analyze our experimental results from three points of view: social efficiency, nodal differences, and human differences; and contrast our behavioral results with the theories.

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Cited By

Liu XHu ZDeng XKuhlman C(2023)A Calibration Model For Bot-Like Behaviors In Agent-Based Anagram Game Simulation2023 Winter Simulation Conference (WSC)10.1109/WSC60868.2023.10408394(221-232)Online publication date: 10-Dec-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/WSC60868.2023.10408394
Hajaj CJoveski ZYu SVorobeychik Y(2021)Robust coordination in adversarial social networks: From human behavior to agent-based modelingNetwork Science10.1017/nws.2021.5(1-36)Online publication date: 17-May-2021
https://doi.org/10.1017/nws.2021.5
Hajaj CYu SJoveski ZGuo YVorobeychik YElkind EVeloso MAgmon NTaylor M(2019)Adversarial Coordination on Social NetworksProceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3306127.3331866(1515-1523)Online publication date: 8-May-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3306127.3331866
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Index Terms

A behavioral study of bargaining in social networks
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences
    1. Economics

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Published In

cover image ACM Conferences

EC '10: Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce

June 2010

400 pages

ISBN:9781605588223

DOI:10.1145/1807342

General Chair:
David C. Parkes
Harvard University, USA
,
Program Chairs:
Chrysanthos Dellarocas
Boston University, USA
,
Moshe Tennenholtz
Technion and Microsoft Israel R&D Center

Copyright © 2010 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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SIGecom: Special Interest Group on Economics and Computation

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 07 June 2010

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EC '10

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SIGecom

EC '10: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

June 7 - 11, 2010

Massachusetts, Cambridge, USA

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Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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Cited By

Liu XHu ZDeng XKuhlman C(2023)A Calibration Model For Bot-Like Behaviors In Agent-Based Anagram Game Simulation2023 Winter Simulation Conference (WSC)10.1109/WSC60868.2023.10408394(221-232)Online publication date: 10-Dec-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/WSC60868.2023.10408394
Hajaj CJoveski ZYu SVorobeychik Y(2021)Robust coordination in adversarial social networks: From human behavior to agent-based modelingNetwork Science10.1017/nws.2021.5(1-36)Online publication date: 17-May-2021
https://doi.org/10.1017/nws.2021.5
Hajaj CYu SJoveski ZGuo YVorobeychik YElkind EVeloso MAgmon NTaylor M(2019)Adversarial Coordination on Social NetworksProceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3306127.3331866(1515-1523)Online publication date: 8-May-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3306127.3331866
Yan RZhu YLi DWang YChen W(2018)Minimum Cost Stable Outcome in Exchange Networks2018 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM)10.1109/GLOCOM.2018.8648060(1-6)Online publication date: Dec-2018
https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCOM.2018.8648060
Zhan JLuo XFeng CHe M(2018)A multi-demand negotiation model based on fuzzy rules elicited via psychological experimentsApplied Soft Computing10.1016/j.asoc.2017.07.01367:C(840-864)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.asoc.2017.07.013
Leider S(2018)Behavioral Analysis of Strategic InteractionsThe Handbook of Behavioral Operations10.1002/9781119138341.ch7(237-285)Online publication date: 19-Oct-2018
https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119138341.ch7
Richert DCortes J(2016)Distributed Bargaining in Dyadic-Exchange NetworksIEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems10.1109/TCNS.2015.24762153:3(310-321)Online publication date: Sep-2016
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Coviello LFranceschetti M(2016)An Instance of Distributed Social Computation: The Multiagent Group Membership ProblemIEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems10.1109/TCNS.2015.24536713:1(79-90)Online publication date: Mar-2016
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Abolhassani MBateni MHajiaghayi MMahini HSawant A(2014)Network Cournot CompetitionWeb and Internet Economics10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_2(15-29)Online publication date: 2014
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Richert DCortes J(2013)Distributed linear programming and bargaining in exchange networks2013 American Control Conference10.1109/ACC.2013.6580551(4617-4622)Online publication date: Jun-2013
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