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Minimizing collateral damage by proactive surge protection

Published: 27 August 2007 Publication History

Abstract

Existing mechanisms for defending against distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks are generally reactive in nature. However, the onset of large-scale bandwidth-based attacks can occur suddenly, potentially knocking out substantial parts of a network before reactive defenses can respond. Even for traffic flows that are not under direct attack, significant collateral damage will result if these flows pass through links that are common to attack routes. This paper presents a proactive-surge-protection (PSP) mechanism that aims to provide a broad first line of defense against DDoS attacks. Our solution aims to minimize collateral damage by providing bandwidth isolation between traffic flows. This isolation is achieved through a combination of traffic forecasting, proportional allocation of network capacity, metering and tagging of packets at the network perimeter, and preferential dropping of packets inside the network. Our solution is readily deployable using existing router mechanisms. Simulations across three large backbone networks show that up to 95.5% of the network could suffer collateral damage without protection, but our solution was able to reduce the amount of collateral damage by 60.5-97.8%, even with a coarse-grained forecasting scheme.

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      cover image ACM Conferences
      LSAD '07: Proceedings of the 2007 workshop on Large scale attack defense
      August 2007
      73 pages
      ISBN:9781595937858
      DOI:10.1145/1352664
      Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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      Published: 27 August 2007

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      Author Tags

      1. admission control
      2. denial of service
      3. malicious attacks

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      SIGCOMM07
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      SIGCOMM07: ACM SIGCOMM 2007 Conference
      August 27, 2007
      Kyoto, Japan

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