Article

Applying metaheuristic techniques to search the space of bidding strategies in combinatorial auctions

Authors:

Peter R. WurmanAuthors Info & Claims

GECCO '05: Proceedings of the 7th annual conference on Genetic and evolutionary computation

Pages 2097 - 2103

https://doi.org/10.1145/1068009.1068356

Published: 25 June 2005 Publication History

Abstract

Many non-cooperative settings that could potentially be studied using game theory are characterized by having very large strategy spaces and payoffs that are costly to compute. Best response dynamics is a method of searching for pure-strategy equilibria in games that is attractive for its simplicity and scalability (relative to more analytical approaches). However, when the cost of determining the outcome of a particular set of joint strategies is high, it is impractical to compute the payoffs of all possible responses to the other players actions. Thus, we study metaheuristic approaches--genetic algorithms and tabu search in particular--to explore the strategy space. We configure the parameters of metaheuristics to adapt to the problem of finding the best response strategy and present how it can be helpful in finding Nash equilibria of combinatorial auctions which is an important solution concept in game theory.

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Cited By

Sui XLeung H(2011)Adaptive bidding in combinatorial auctions in dynamic marketsEvolving Systems10.1007/s12530-011-9035-02:4(219-233)Online publication date: 14-Jul-2011
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12530-011-9035-0
Vorobeychik YWellman MDunkin AIngalls R(2009)Strategic analysis with simulation-based gamesWinter Simulation Conference10.5555/1995456.1995517(359-372)Online publication date: 13-Dec-2009
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/1995456.1995517
Bichler MShabalin PPikovsky A(2009)A Computational Analysis of Linear Price Iterative Combinatorial Auction FormatsInformation Systems Research10.1287/isre.1070.015120:1(33-59)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2009
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1287/isre.1070.0151
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Applying metaheuristic techniques to search the space of bidding strategies in combinatorial auctions
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences
    1. Economics
2. Theory of computation
  1. Design and analysis of algorithms

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cover image ACM Conferences

GECCO '05: Proceedings of the 7th annual conference on Genetic and evolutionary computation

June 2005

2272 pages

ISBN:1595930108

DOI:10.1145/1068009

Editor:
Hans-Georg Beyer
Vorarlberg University of Applied Sciences, Austria
,
General Chair:
Una-May O'Reilly
CSAIL, MIT

Copyright © 2005 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Publication History

Published: 25 June 2005

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GECCO05

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GECCO05: Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference

June 25 - 29, 2005

Washington DC, USA

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Overall Acceptance Rate 1,669 of 4,410 submissions, 38%

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Cited By

Sui XLeung H(2011)Adaptive bidding in combinatorial auctions in dynamic marketsEvolving Systems10.1007/s12530-011-9035-02:4(219-233)Online publication date: 14-Jul-2011
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12530-011-9035-0
Vorobeychik YWellman MDunkin AIngalls R(2009)Strategic analysis with simulation-based gamesWinter Simulation Conference10.5555/1995456.1995517(359-372)Online publication date: 13-Dec-2009
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/1995456.1995517
Bichler MShabalin PPikovsky A(2009)A Computational Analysis of Linear Price Iterative Combinatorial Auction FormatsInformation Systems Research10.1287/isre.1070.015120:1(33-59)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2009
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1287/isre.1070.0151
Vorobeychik YWellman M(2009)Strategic analysis with simulation-based gamesProceedings of the 2009 Winter Simulation Conference (WSC)10.1109/WSC.2009.5429347(359-372)Online publication date: Dec-2009
https://doi.org/10.1109/WSC.2009.5429347
Wilenius JAndersson A(2007)Discovering Equilibrium Strategies for a Combinatorial First Price AuctionThe 9th IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology and The 4th IEEE International Conference on Enterprise Computing, E-Commerce and E-Services (CEC-EEE 2007)10.1109/CEC-EEE.2007.41(13-20)Online publication date: Jul-2007
https://doi.org/10.1109/CEC-EEE.2007.41
Sureka AWurman PPechoucek MSteiner DThompson S(2005)Using tabu best-response search to find pure strategy nash equilibria in normal form gamesProceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems10.1145/1082473.1082628(1023-1029)Online publication date: 25-Jul-2005
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1082473.1082628

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