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Algorithms versus mechanisms: how to cope with strategic input?

Published: 14 September 2017 Publication History

Abstract

Online markets and platforms rely on human user decisions as inputs. This generates the challenge of managing user incentives and misbehaviors as strategic entities. Surprisingly, one can show that designers do not require much additional computational power to overcome this challenge.

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cover image XRDS: Crossroads, The ACM Magazine for Students
XRDS: Crossroads, The ACM Magazine for Students  Volume 24, Issue 1
Incentives and Gamification
Fall 2017
61 pages
ISSN:1528-4972
EISSN:1528-4980
DOI:10.1145/3140569
Issue’s Table of Contents
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

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Publication History

Published: 14 September 2017
Published in XRDS Volume 24, Issue 1

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