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مجلس الأمن
السنة التاسعة والسبعون

الجمعية العامة
الدورة التاسعة والسبعون
البند 61 من جدول الأعمال
بناء السلام والحفاظ على السلام

رسالة مؤرخة 26 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2024 موجهة إلى الأمين العام من الممثل الدائم لليابان لدى الأمم المتحدة

يشرفني أن أحيل إليكم طيه موجز المشاورات غير الرسمية، بشأن تعزيز العلاقة بين مجلس الأمن ولجنة بناء السلام، التي أجريت من أجل استعراض هيكل بناء السلام لعام 2025 والتي استضافتها اليابان بصفتها المنسق غير الرسمي بين مجلس الأمن ولجنة بناء السلام في عام 2024.

وآمل أن يكون هذا الموجز مرجعًا يستعان به في مواصلة الدفع قدمًا بمناقشات وإجراءات مجلس الأمن ولجنة بناء السلام والدول الأعضاء والكيانات داخل الأمم المتحدة وخارجها، كما آمل أن يُعتبر، في جملة أمور، مساهمةً في استعراض هيكل بناء السلام لعام 2025 ترمي إلى زيادة تعزيز العلاقة بين المجلس ولجنة بناء السلام وتعزيز التكامل بينهما بغية الحفاظ على السلام والأمن الدوليين المستدامين.

وأرجو ممتنًا تعميم هذه الرسالة ومرفقها باعتبارهما وثيقة من وثائق الجمعية العامة، في إطار البند 61 من جدول الأعمال، ومن وثائق مجلس الأمن.

(توقيع) يامازاكي كازويوكي
السفير فوق العادة والمفوض
الممثل الدائم لليابان لدى الأمم المتحدة



المرفق

Summary of the Informal Consultations on Strengthening the Relationship between the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) towards the 2025 Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (PBAR)

(Overview)

1. Japan, as the Informal Coordinator between the UNSC and the PBC in 2024, convened Informal Consultations of the members of the two UN bodies at the Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN in New York on 9 September 2024, to discuss how to strengthen the relationship between the two bodies, aiming at contributing toward the 2025 PBAR.
2. In addition to 3 briefers, 35 current and incoming/expected members of the SC and the PBC, including 22 Ambassadorial-level participants, took part in the Informal Consultations. All those participants who spoke in the consultations reiterated the need to strengthen the relations with concrete actions.
3. During the discussion, participating Member States reiterated that:
 - (a) The PBAR will be an ideal opportunity to create a coherent approach collaboratively within the UN peacebuilding architecture (PBA) including the PBC, and the SC towards peacebuilding and sustaining peace including conflict prevention that can address the root causes of conflicts;
 - (b) The PBC's advisory role needs to be further refined and utilized by the SC for their relevant products, such as resolutions, including on peace missions' mandates;
 - (c) For transitions and drawdowns of UN missions, the role of the PBC is crucial and can be strengthened, including its links with the wider UN system;
 - (d) On cross-cutting topics, the PBC can offer complementary support for SC agenda items;
 - (e) A follow-up mechanism, including a feedback loop for the PBC's activities (meetings, briefings, advice, visits, etc.), should be established to ensure and assess the SC's implementation of the PBC's advice to help increase consistency and impact;
 - (f) Increased mutual formal and informal dialogues and communication as well as regular interaction between the SC and PBC are encouraged, in formats that are focused and impactful;
 - (g) Joint visits and missions between the SC and PBC or their members should be explored; Country visits by either the SC or the PBC could be joined by the other body's President/Chair or members, as relevant;
 - (h) Formalization and expansion of the Informal Coordinator can be explored, given their crucial role;
 - (i) Good practices should be accumulated and continued;
 - (j) The incentives of working with the PBC should be more clearly articulated among SC members;
 - (k) Better support for the PBC and PBSO should be sought, including financially, given their critical roles.

(Suggested Action for the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission)

4. The participants reiterated that both the SC and the PBC should make efforts to achieve the following:

(a) The SC should:

Promote peacebuilding, sustaining peace and conflict prevention by:

(i) Considering a comprehensive and coherent approach towards sustainable peace and prevention by utilizing the PBC and other UN bodies;

Utilize the PBC's advisory role by:

(ii) Requesting the PBC's advice and the PBC Chair's briefings more systematically and well in advance of scheduled meetings;

(iii) Sharing clear and focused guidance and expectations for advice among both bodies' members;

(iv) Ensuring that the PBC is aware of its schedule in advance so that efforts can be made to align the programmes of work (PoWs) of both bodies;

Utilize the work of the PBC in transitions, withdrawals, and/or cross-cutting topics of UN missions by:

(v) Utilizing effectively and drawing upon the PBC's written advice and briefings, where appropriate, to inform the SC's decisions and reflect its elements in Council products, statements and deliberations, especially regarding mandate renewals;

(vi) Considering further possibilities to further utilize the advisory, bridging, and convening roles of the PBC to enhance complementary support for each SC agenda item, where appropriate;

Strengthen the relationship by:

(vii) Continuing to organize mutual formal and informal dialogues and communications related to sustaining peace and prevention, in formats that are focused and impactful, to further synchronize, synergize, and strategize the work of the SC and the PBC;

(b) The PBC should:

Promote peacebuilding and sustaining peace including conflict prevention by:

(i) Advancing national ownership at all levels, including women and youth, of countries on its agenda;

Enhance the PBC's advisory role by:

(ii) Starting negotiations for the advice at the earliest possible with clear timeline for the submission, so all PBC members can negotiate constructively and facilitate better scheduling and coordination to produce timely advice that is of value added to the SC;

(iii) Ensuring clarity and substance in its advice, including through clear, action-oriented, relevant and targeted recommendations;

(iv) Submitting advice at least 1 week before a Council meeting and at least 1 month before the SC penholder begins drafting a resolution or other products;

(v) Utilizing and engaging in dialogue among the Chairs and Vice Chairs of the PBC, SC Presidents and relevant penholders and interested parties to ensure that advice is timely, aligned with the SC's strategic objectives and effectively used in its work;

(vi) Considering ways to monitor, follow-up on and/or receive feedback from the SC on the PBC's advice, including whether/how the advice is utilized in the work of the SC;

(vii) Handing over the Informal Coordinator's established good practices to their successors;

Strengthen the work of the PBC in transitions, withdrawals, and/or cross-cutting topics of UN missions by:

(vii) Considering developing and enhancing the PBC's agendas to complementarily support SC agenda items, with a long-term perspective;

(viii) Exploring the potential roles of the PBC in relation to UN missions that are/will be in transitions or withdrawal processes, including links with the wider UN system;

(ix) Exploring cross-cutting topics in the SC meetings where the PBC can complement the SC's work, such as rule of law, human rights, the WPS and the YPS agendas, including links with the wider UN system;

Strengthen the follow-up mechanism for the PBC's activities (meetings, briefings, advice, visits, etc.) by:

(x) Utilizing the role of the Vice Chairs and informal coordinator with the UN organs, the PBSO, and tools of the PBF, and/or considering any new formats.

(Looking Ahead: Recommendations for the PBAR)

5. Recommendations to the PBAR process to further these objectives are:

Promoting the importance of sustaining peace by:

(a) Prioritizing and investing in prevention;

Further strengthening the PBC's advisory role by:

(b) Exploring ways to submit quality and timely advice in a systematic manner; the SC can consider standing request to the SC agenda on which the PBC has already constantly provided advice to the SC;

(c) Exploring ways to refine drafting and negotiation processes, by utilizing the role of the PBC Chair and Vice Chairs, informal coordinator, PBSO, and more;

(d) Considering what other expertise the PBC could draw on to support its work and submit valuable advice in terms of analytical and academic insights, as other SC subsidiary organs do;

(e) Creating a mechanism that monitors and receives feedback from the SC on how it uses and implements the advice that it receives from the PBC;

(f) Formalizing and/or expanding the role of the Informal Coordinator to bring further advantages;

Strengthening the work of the PBC in transitions and withdrawals by:

(g) Ensuring a greater continuity of UN engagement at the political level by exploring how countries exiting the SC's agenda could better avail themselves of the PBC's platform in a systematic manner;

Accumulating, continuing, and reflecting good practices and strategizing engagements by:

(h) Considering what constitutes a good peacebuilding strategy as a basis for improved engagement with peacebuilding;

(i) Utilizing and strengthening the PBSO, including the Peacebuilding Impact Hub; the Impact Hub can also help track both PBC and PBF activities and their impact, which can feed the PBC to make it more effective.

Enclosure I: Concept Note

Enclosure II: List of Participants

Enclosure I

Informal Consultations on Strengthening the Relationship between the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)

towards the 2025 Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture (PBAR)
9 September 2024 8:15-9:50 A.M. at the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations

Overview

The Security Council (SC) has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) has the mandate to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to support the development of integrated strategies to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. It is in the interest of both the SC and the PBC to further devise and pursue ways to strengthen complementarity to promote sustaining peace.

In 2005, the Security Council, together with the General Assembly, decided to establish the PBC as an intergovernmental body¹. In 2016, the SC acknowledged the importance of strong coordination, coherence and cooperation with the PBC and noted its intention to regularly request, deliberate on and draw upon the specific, strategic and targeted advice of the PBC². In 2020, the SC called on the PBC to continue strengthening its advisory, bridging and convening roles, as well as to continue updating its working methods to increase its efficiency and impact in support of peacebuilding and sustaining peace efforts³. Japan, as an informal coordinator between the SC and the PBC in 2024, has worked to strengthen the relationship between these two bodies on the points below, about which and not limited to, the participating Member States are invited to present further good practices, ideas and suggestions:

1 Improvement of substance and timeline of the PBC's advice/briefings to the Council

One of the main purposes of the Commission is to provide advice to the Council at the latter's request⁴. While the quantity of requests for such advice has increased both in written and briefing format⁵, the SC should more systematically seek the PBC's advice⁶, either through briefings by the PBC Chair to add perspective to SC discussions, or timely written advice⁷ the SC can draw upon in crafting its products including mandates of the UN peace operations. Accordingly, the PBC should

¹ Twin Resolutions establishing the Peacebuilding Commission ([A/RES/60/180-S/RES/1645 \(2005\)](#))

² Twin Resolutions for PBAR in 2016 ([A/RES/70/262](#) and [S/RES/2282 \(2016\)](#))

³ Twin Resolutions for PBAR in 2020 ([A/RES/75/201](#) and [S/RES/2558 \(2020\)](#))

⁴ [A/RES/60/180](#) and [S/RES/1645 \(2005\)](#), Para 16

⁵ Instances of written advice numbered 8 in 2022, then 9 in 2023, and 6 so far in 2024. Briefings by the PBC Chairs numbered 4 in 2022, then 5 in 2023, and once so far in 2024.

⁶ Secretary-General (SG)'s New Agenda for Peace page 22

⁷ Japan believes that the SC President should request its advice approximately 2 months before a scheduled meeting, especially on regularly scheduled meetings, to leave the PBC with sufficient preparation time.

improve its substance and timeline⁸ to ensure such advice is of value add to the SC's discussions and products.

After 2023, the PBC began restructuring its advice with a view to making more targeted recommendations to the SC. The PBC started convening expert level meetings and/or informal coordination among related actors including the SC President and the penholder, to discuss the contents and timeline of its advice. Subsequently, elements of the PBC's advice have been considered and reflected in a few SC mandate renewal resolutions⁹.

2 Possible further PBC engagement that can provide complementary support to SC agenda items

The SC decided that the PBC Organizational Committee (OC) shall establish the agenda of the PBC based on the requests for advice from the SC, Member States and the Secretary-General (SG)¹⁰.

In the past five years, the PBC has convened and submitted its advice to the Council on Colombia, UNMISS (in South Sudan), Central African Republic (CAR), the Great Lakes Region, WPS, YPS, and prevention, in addition to general peacebuilding work.

In relation to countries transitioning off the SC's agenda, the PBC has supported and can further support such countries not only through its advice, but also by convening meetings, leveraging funding and providing coordination. For example, the PBC successfully supported Cote d'Ivoire (2004 to 2012), Burundi (2006 to 2022), Guinea-Bissau (2006 to 2023), CAR (2007 to present), and Liberia¹¹ (2016 to present), through the PBC Country Configurations as well as The Gambia¹².

The SC and the PBC should consider how they might encourage countries on the SC's agenda to engage the PBC strategically to ease the burden on the Council and enable the PBC to play the role for which it was intended in support of countries' national efforts to build and sustain peace.

3 Mutual Interactive Dialogue between the SC and the PBC

Below are examples of meetings that relate to both bodies.

- (a) Security Council briefings¹³

⁸ Japan believes that the PBC should submit its written advice at least 7 to 10 days before the meeting, or around 30 to 40 days (this varies) before the adoption and before the SC penholder starts drafting products.

⁹ For example, the mandate renewal resolution of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia ([S/RES/2704 \(2023\)](#)) reflected the importance of including youth in the peace process, as had been articulated in the PBC's advice.

¹⁰ See [A/RES/60/180](#) - [S/RES/1645 \(2005\)](#), Para 12

¹¹ See related resolution [S/RES/2066 \(2012\)](#)

¹² PBC Chair's Summary of the Ambassadorial-level meeting on the 2025 Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture: The Gambia's experience in peacebuilding and sustaining peace

¹³ The PBC Chair presented the PBC annual report (from 2012 until 2018).

- (b) Security Council Open Debates on “Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace”¹⁴
- (c) Arria-formula meetings inviting all members of both the SC and the PBC¹⁵
- (d) Informal interactive dialogues¹⁶
- (e) Stock taking sessions¹⁷
- (f) Informal briefings and seminars held by either Member States, UN bodies, academics and/or civil society¹⁸

Objective

This event will be held to discuss concrete proposals on how to strengthen the relationship between the SC and the PBC. A summary of the discussion will be submitted as input for the 2025 PBAR.

Guiding Questions

1. (PBC advice) How can the members of the SC and the PBC, as well as all related stakeholders, improve the substance, timeline and decision-making processes of the PBC in its provision of advice to the SC? What is required for the advice to receive greater consideration by the SC for the benefit of its decision-making processes and products?

¹⁴ For example: “The New Agenda for Peace - Addressing Global, Regional and National Aspects of Conflict Prevention” (by Sierra Leone, 2024); “Promoting Conflict Prevention—Empowering All Actors Including Women and Youth” (by Japan, 2024)

¹⁵ For example: “Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace through Comprehensive Approaches - Investment in People, including Empowerment of Women” (by Ecuador, Mozambique and Japan, 2024); “Mind the gap: enhancing the dialogue and cooperation between the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission” (by Brazil, 2023)

¹⁶ For example: “Ambassadorial-Informal Interactive Dialogue with the President of the Security Council on “Addressing Root Causes of Conflict while promoting post-pandemic recovery in Africa”” (by the PBC Chair, 2021); “Peacebuilding: Implications of COVID 19 on peacebuilding and sustaining peace in conflict-affected countries” (2020); “Peace and security in Africa (Activity of the PBC and PBSO in the Sahel)” (2019); “Explore practical ways to enhance the advisory role of the PBC to the Council during the formation, review and drawdown of peacekeeping operations and special political missions mandates” (2018)

¹⁷ After the role of the Informal Coordinator was created by Rwanda in 2012, the coordinator used to organize a meeting among the Member States who were members of both bodies, as well as the PBC Chair and Country-Specific Configuration Chairs to assess the PBC’s advice and to consider good practices and activities going forward that may be useful. This practice continued until 2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic.

¹⁸ For example: a Roundtable Discussion on: “Furthering the Conversation on Conflict Prevention” (by Security Council Report (SCR), 2024); “Looking Ahead to the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review: Exploring Innovative Approaches to assess the Implementation of Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace” (by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) and New York University (NYU), Center on International Cooperation (CIC), 2024)

2. (Possible further PBC engagement related to the SC) On what regional or thematic agendas does the SC appreciate its collaboration with the PBC, or can the PBC use its expertise and knowledge to provide added value to the SC's work?

3. (Mutual dialogue between the SC and the PBC) What agenda items—including country-specific, regional, and thematic issues—should the SC and the PBC discuss together more, and what benefits can be gained from such meetings? What kind of meeting formats are ideal to this end? Where, especially in the past five years, have there been meaningful, efficient, and effective mutual dialogues between the two bodies, and what obstacles to advancing such collaboration have been encountered?

4. Any further suggestions or good practices from the past five years to strengthen the relationship between the SC and the PBC? How can such ideas be put into action?

5. How can we utilize the opportunity provided by the PBAR to implement such ideas?

Format

The meeting will be held on Monday, 9 September 2024, from 8:15 to 9:50 A.M. at the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations.

Members of the SC and the PBC are invited to participate at the Permanent Representative/Deputy Permanent Representative level (Invitation is transferable to expert level). The incoming members of both bodies are invited to participate as observers.

8:15 A light breakfast will be served

8:30 Opening Remarks

- H.E. Mr. YAMAZAKI Kazuyuki, Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations

8:33 Briefings

- Ms. Elizabeth Spehar, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support Office (ASG), Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA)
- H.E. Mr. Martin Kimani, Executive Director of the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at New York University (NYU)
- Ms. Shamala Kandiah Thompson, Chief Operating Officer and incoming Executive Director of Security Council Report (SCR)

8:48 Open Discussion, Q&A

9:45 Summary Remarks

- Representative of Japan

9:50 End of Seminar

Enclosure II

Informal Consultations on Strengthening the Relationship between the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)

9 September 2024

Briefers

1. Ms. Elizabeth Spehar, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support Office, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA)
2. H.E. Mr. Martin Kimani, Executive Director of the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at New York University (NYU)
3. Ms. Shamala Kandiah Thompson, Chief Operating Officer and incoming Executive Director of Security Council Report (SCR)

Council Members

4. Japan (Chair)
5. Algeria (also a PBC member)
6. China (also a PBC member)
7. Ecuador
8. France (also a PBC member)
9. Malta
10. Mozambique
11. Republic of Korea (also a PBC member)
12. Russian Federation (also a PBC member)
13. Sierra Leone
14. Slovenia
15. Switzerland
16. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (also a PBC member)
17. United States of America (also a PBC member)

Members of the Peacebuilding Commission

18. Bangladesh
19. Brazil
20. Canada
21. Croatia
22. Egypt
23. Germany
24. Italy
25. Kenya

26. Nepal
27. Norway
28. Peru
29. Poland
30. Qatar
31. Rwanda
32. South Africa
33. Sweden
34. Uruguay

Incoming Council Members

35. Denmark (also a PBC member)
36. Greece

Prospective Members of the Peacebuilding Commission

37. Australia
 38. Kingdom of the Netherlands
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