"Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty."

Frédéric Koessler (2003)

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DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00036-X

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type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2020-02-24

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Frédéric Koessler:
Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty. J. Econ. Theory 110(2): 393-399 (2003)

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