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International Game Theory Review, Volume 7
Volume 7, Number 1, March 2005
- Vladimir Turetsky, Valery Y. Glizer:
Continuous Feedback Control Strategy with Maximal Capture Zone in a Class of Pursuit Games. 1-24 - Judith Timmer, Peter Borm, Stef Tijs:
Convexity in Stochastic Cooperative Situations. 25-42 - Laurence Kranich, Andrés Perea, Hans Peters:
Core Concepts for Dynamic TU Games. 43-61 - M. Josune Albizuri, Javier Arin, Juan F. Rubio-Ramirez:
An Axiom System for a Value for Games in Partition Function Form. 63-72 - Yosi Ben-Asher, Eitan Farchi:
Compact Representations of Search in Complex Domains. 73-90 - Michael J. Ryan:
Intervening duality Strategic Equivalence and nonconstant Sum Bimatrix Games. 91-105 - Reinoud Joosten:
A Note on Repeated Games with vanishing Actions. 107-115
Volume 7, Number 2, June 2005
- Werner Güth, Maria Vittoria Levati, Boris Maciejovsky:
Deadline Effects in Sequential Bargaining - an Experimental Study. 117-135 - Gila E. Fruchter, Charles S. Tapiero:
Dynamic Online and Offline Channel Pricing for Heterogeneous Customers in Virtual Acceptance. 137-150 - Bettina Rockenbach:
A Strategic Analysis of Speculative Trade in a Two-Sided Asset Market with Information Diversity. 151-170 - Yosi Ben-Asher, Eitan Farchi:
Compact Representations of Search in Complex Domains. 171-188 - William T. Harbaugh, Anne van den Nouweland:
Demonstrating Worker Quality through Strategic Absenteeism. 189-209 - Matthias Kräkel:
Helping and Sabotaging in tournaments. 211-228 - Ivar Kolstad:
Evolution with endogenous mutations. 229-240
Volume 7, Number 3, September 2005
- Michael H. Breitner:
Introduction to this Special Issue. 241-243 - Fumiaki Imado:
Some Features of the Game between the Supersonic ASM and the Counterattack AMM. 245-260 - Hans W. Knobloch:
Disturbance Attenuation in Control Systems. 261-283 - Sergey S. Kumkov, Valery S. Patsko, Josef Shinar:
On Level Sets with "Narrow Throats" in Linear differential Games. 285-311 - Guiomar Martín-Herrán, Sihem Taboubi:
Shelf-Space Allocation and Advertising Decisions in the Marketing Channel: a differential Game Approach. 313-330 - Thomas L. Vincent, Robert A. Gatenby:
Modeling Cancer as an Evolutionary Game. 331-346 - Hans-Jörg von Mettenheim, Michael H. Breitner:
Coarse-Grained Parallelization of the Advanced Neurosimulator Faun 1.0 with PVM and the Enhanced Cornered rat Game Revisited. 347-365
Volume 7, Number 4, December 2005
- Silvia Di Marco, Alain Rapaport:
Characterization and Approximation of Value Functions of differential Games with Maximum Cost in Infinite horizon. 369-393 - Steffen Jørgensen, Guiomar Martín-Herrán, Georges Zaccour:
Sustainability of Cooperation overtime in Linear-Quadratic differential Games. 395-406 - Rod Garratt, James E. Parco, Cheng-Zhong Qin, Amnon Rapoport:
Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation. 407-429 - Jens Leth Hougaard, Bezalel Peleg, Lars Peter Østerdal:
The Dutta-Ray Solution on the Class of Convex Games: a Generalization and Monotonicity Properties. 431-442 - Alex Possajennikov:
Cooperation and Competition: Learning of Strategies and Evolution of Preferences in Prisoners' Dilemma and Hawk-DOVE Games. 443-459 - Alexei F. Cheviakov, John M. Hartwick:
Beckmann's Edgeworth-Bertrand duopoly Example Revisited. 461-472 - Marco Slikker:
Link Monotonic Allocation Schemes. 473-489 - Guilherme Carmona:
On Games of Perfect Information: Equilibria, ε-Equilibria and Approximation by Simple Games. 491-499 - Timothy Mathews:
"May I please Pay a Higher Price?": Sustaining Non-Simultaneous Exchange through Free Disposal of Bargaining Advantage. 501-515 - Vladislav Kargin:
Uncertainty of the Shapley Value. 517-529 - Christian Bauer:
Solution uniqueness in a Class of Currency Crisis Games. 531-543 - Rana Barua, Satya R. Chakravarty, Sonali Roy:
A New Characterization of the Banzhaf Index of Power. 545-553
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