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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 116
Volume 116, July 2019
- Michael Trost:
On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules. 1-37 - Ronald Stauber:
A strategic product for belief functions. 38-64
- Esteban Peralta:
Bayesian implementation with verifiable information. 65-72
- Stephan Müller, Holger A. Rau:
Decisions under uncertainty in social contexts. 73-95 - Evan Piermont, Roee Teper:
Exploration and correlation. 96-104 - Hans Peters, Marc Schröder, Dries Vermeulen:
Claim games for estate division problems. 105-115 - Rebecca Elskamp, René Kirkegaard:
Scale effects in multi-unit auctions. 116-121
- Dimitrios Xefteris:
Strategic voting when participation is costly. 122-127
- Francesca Barigozzi, Nadia Burani:
Competition for talent when firms' mission matters. 128-151
- Eduardo M. Azevedo, Daniel Gottlieb:
An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection. 152-157
- Daphne Chang, Roy Chen, Erin L. Krupka:
Rhetoric matters: A social norms explanation for the anomaly of framing. 158-178 - Heinrich H. Nax, Jonathan Newton:
Risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run. 179-184 - Aviad Heifetz, Martin Meier, Burkhard C. Schipper:
Comprehensive rationalizability. 185-202 - Maximilian Mihm, Kemal Ozbek:
On the identification of changing tastes. 203-216 - Isabelle Brocas, Juan D. Carrillo, T. Dalton Combs, Niree Kodaverdian:
The development of consistent decision-making across economic domains. 217-240 - Lydia Mechtenberg, Jean-Robert Tyran:
Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice. 241-259 - Péter Csóka, P. Jean-Jacques Herings:
Liability games. 260-268 - Jaideep Roy, Randy Silvers, Ching-Jen Sun:
Majoritarian preference, utilitarian welfare and public information in Cournot oligopoly. 269-288
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