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ORCID6th ACM-EC 2005: Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
- John Riedl, Michael J. Kearns, Michael K. Reiter:
Proceedings 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2005), Vancouver, BC, Canada, June 5-8, 2005. ACM 2005, ISBN 1-59593-049-3 - Alon Altman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Ranking systems: the PageRank axioms. 1-8 - Alexandr Andoni, Jessica Staddon:
Graceful service degradation (or, how to know your payment is late). 9-18 - Samuil Angelov, Sven Till, Paul W. P. J. Grefen:
Dynamic and secure B2B e-contract update management. 19-28 - Liad Blumrosen, Noam Nisan
:
On the computational power of iterative auctions. 29-43 - Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Mahdian, Amin Saberi:
Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders. 44-51 - Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Aranyak Mehta, Viswanath Nagarajan:
Fairness and optimality in congestion games. 52-57 - Yiling Chen, Chao-Hsien Chu, Tracy Mullen, David M. Pennock:
Information markets vs. opinion pools: an empirical comparison. 58-67 - Nicolas Christin, Andreas S. Weigend, John Chuang:
Content availability, pollution and poisoning in file sharing peer-to-peer networks. 68-77 - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Communication complexity of common voting rules. 78-87 - Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of (iterated) dominance. 88-97 - Esther David, Alex Rogers, Jeremy Schiff, Sarit Kraus, Nicholas R. Jennings:
Optimal design of English auctions with discrete bid levels. 98-107 - Edith Elkind:
True costs of cheap labor are hard to measure: edge deletion and VCG payments in graphs. 108-116 - Michal Feldman, John Chuang, Ion Stoica, Scott Shenker:
Hidden-action in multi-hop routing. 117-126 - Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Li Zhang:
A price-anticipating resource allocation mechanism for distributed shared clusters. 127-136 - Pedro Ferreira, Marvin A. Sirbu:
Inefficiency in provisioning interconnected communication networks. 137-146 - Keith B. Frikken, Mikhail J. Atallah, Chen Zhang:
Privacy-preserving credit checking. 147-154 - Craig Gentry, Zulfikar Ramzan, Stuart G. Stubblebine:
Secure distributed human computation. 155-164 - Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian, David C. Parkes:
Online auctions with re-usable goods. 165-174 - Jason D. Hartline, Robert McGrew:
From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions. 175-182 - Alan Holland, Barry O'Sullivan:
Robust solutions for combinatorial auctions. 183-192 - Samuel Ieong, Yoav Shoham:
Marginal contribution nets: a compact representation scheme for coalitional games. 193-202 - Nicole Immorlica, David R. Karger, Evdokia Nikolova, Rahul Sami:
First-price path auctions. 203-212 - Ming-Yang Kao, Xiang-Yang Li, Weizhao Wang:
Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: a general framework. 213-222 - Tapan Khopkar, Xin Li, Paul Resnick:
Self-selection, slipping, salvaging, slacking, and stoning: the impacts of negative feedback at eBay. 223-231 - Debasis Mishra, Bharath Rangarajan:
Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem using the Shapley value. 232-239 - Ahuva Mu'alem:
On decentralized incentive compatible mechanisms. 240-248 - David C. Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Nick Elprin, Adam I. Juda, Sébastien Lahaie, Benjamin Lubin, Loizos Michael, Jeffrey Shneidman, Hassan Sultan:
ICE: an iterative combinatorial exchange. 249-258 - Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Congestion games with failures. 259-268 - Pearl Pu, Li Chen:
Integrating tradeoff support in product search tools for e-commerce sites. 269-278 - Amir Ronen, Daniel Lehmann:
Nearly optimal multi attribute auctions. 279-285 - Michael E. Saks, Lan Yu:
Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains. 286-293
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