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Moshe Tennenholtz
Person information
- affiliation: Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel
- award (2012): ACM - AAAI Allen Newell Award
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2020 – today
- 2024
- [j85]Itai Arieli, Omer Madmon, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Reputation-based persuasion platforms. Games Econ. Behav. 147: 128-147 (2024) - [c174]Narun Krishnamurthi Raman, Taylor Lundy, Samuel Joseph Amouyal, Yoav Levine, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Moshe Tennenholtz:
STEER: Assessing the Economic Rationality of Large Language Models. ICML 2024 - [c173]Haya Nachimovsky, Moshe Tennenholtz, Fiana Raiber, Oren Kurland:
Ranking-Incentivized Document Manipulations for Multiple Queries. ICTIR 2024: 61-70 - [c172]Tommy Mordo, Moshe Tennenholtz, Oren Kurland:
Sponsored Question Answering. ICTIR 2024: 167-173 - [c171]Yotam Gafni, Ronen Gradwohl, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Prediction-Sharing During Training and Inference. SAGT 2024: 425-442 - [i98]Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Receiver-Oriented Cheap Talk Design. CoRR abs/2401.03671 (2024) - [i97]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Omer Madmon, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Robust Price Discrimination. CoRR abs/2401.16942 (2024) - [i96]Eilam Shapira, Omer Madmon, Roi Reichart, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Can Large Language Models Replace Economic Choice Prediction Labs? CoRR abs/2401.17435 (2024) - [i95]Narun K. Raman, Taylor Lundy, Samuel Joseph Amouyal, Yoav Levine, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Rationality Report Cards: Assessing the Economic Rationality of Large Language Models. CoRR abs/2402.09552 (2024) - [i94]Yotam Gafni, Ronen Gradwohl, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Prediction-sharing During Training and Inference. CoRR abs/2403.17515 (2024) - [i93]Haya Nachimovsky, Moshe Tennenholtz, Fiana Raiber, Oren Kurland:
Competitive Retrieval: Going Beyond the Single Query. CoRR abs/2404.09253 (2024) - [i92]Omer Madmon, Idan Pipano, Itamar Reinman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On the Convergence of No-Regret Dynamics in Information Retrieval Games with Proportional Ranking Functions. CoRR abs/2405.11517 (2024) - [i91]Tommy Mordo, Moshe Tennenholtz, Oren Kurland:
Sponsored Question Answering. CoRR abs/2407.04471 (2024) - 2023
- [j84]Ronen Gradwohl, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Coopetition Against an Amazon. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 76: 1077-1116 (2023) - [c170]Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Mediated Cheap Talk Design. AAAI 2023: 5456-5463 - [c169]Ziv Vasilisky, Oren Kurland, Moshe Tennenholtz, Fiana Raiber:
Content-Based Relevance Estimation in Retrieval Settings with Ranking-Incentivized Document Manipulations. ICTIR 2023: 205-214 - [c168]Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Resilient Information Aggregation. TARK 2023: 31-45 - [c167]Yotam Gafni, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Optimal Mechanism Design for Agents with DSL Strategies: The Case of Sybil Attacks in Combinatorial Auctions. TARK 2023: 245-259 - [c166]Ronen Gradwohl, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Selling Data to a Competitor (Extended Abstract). TARK 2023: 318-330 - [i90]Ronen Gradwohl, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Selling Data to a Competitor. CoRR abs/2302.00285 (2023) - [i89]Eilam Shapira, Reut Apel, Moshe Tennenholtz, Roi Reichart:
Human Choice Prediction in Language-based Non-Cooperative Games: Simulation-based Off-Policy Evaluation. CoRR abs/2305.10361 (2023) - [i88]Itai Arieli, Omer Madmon, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Reputation-based Persuasion Platforms. CoRR abs/2305.16694 (2023) - [i87]Omer Madmon, Moshe Tennenholtz:
The Search for Stability: Learning Dynamics of Strategic Publishers with Initial Documents. CoRR abs/2305.16695 (2023) - [i86]Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Strengthening Nash Equilibria. CoRR abs/2312.14745 (2023) - [i85]Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz:
The Value of Mediation in Long Cheap Talk. CoRR abs/2312.14793 (2023) - 2022
- [j83]Reut Apel, Ido Erev, Roi Reichart, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Predicting Decisions in Language Based Persuasion Games. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 73: 1025-1091 (2022) - [j82]Maya Raifer, Guy Rotman, Reut Apel, Moshe Tennenholtz, Roi Reichart:
Designing an Automatic Agent for Repeated Language-based Persuasion Games. Trans. Assoc. Comput. Linguistics 10: 307-324 (2022) - [c165]Ronen Gradwohl, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Pareto-Improving Data-Sharing✱. FAccT 2022: 197-198 - [c164]Ronen Gradwohl, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Coopetition Against an Amazon. SAGT 2022: 347-365 - [c163]Roy Shahmoon, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Data Curation from Privacy-Aware Agents. SAGT 2022: 366-382 - [c162]Yotam Gafni, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Long-term Data Sharing under Exclusivity Attacks. EC 2022: 739-759 - [c161]Oren Kurland, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Competitive Search. SIGIR 2022: 2838-2849 - [i84]Yotam Gafni, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Long-term Data Sharing under Exclusivity Attacks. CoRR abs/2201.09137 (2022) - [i83]Amir Ban, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Budget-Constrained Reinforcement of Ranked Objects. CoRR abs/2203.14305 (2022) - [i82]Ehud Karpas, Omri Abend, Yonatan Belinkov, Barak Lenz, Opher Lieber, Nir Ratner, Yoav Shoham, Hofit Bata, Yoav Levine, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Dor Muhlgay, Noam Rozen, Erez Schwartz, Gal Shachaf, Shai Shalev-Shwartz, Amnon Shashua, Moshe Tennenholtz:
MRKL Systems: A modular, neuro-symbolic architecture that combines large language models, external knowledge sources and discrete reasoning. CoRR abs/2205.00445 (2022) - [i81]Ronen Gradwohl, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Pareto-Improving Data-Sharing. CoRR abs/2205.11295 (2022) - [i80]Roy Shahmoon, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Data Curation from Privacy-Aware Agents. CoRR abs/2207.06929 (2022) - [i79]Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Mediated Cheap Talk Design (with proofs). CoRR abs/2211.14670 (2022) - 2021
- [j81]Reshef Meir, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Representative Committees of Peers. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 71: 401-429 (2021) - [j80]Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with an Application to False-name Manipulation. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 72: 99-135 (2021) - [c160]Omer Ben-Porat, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Protecting the Protected Group: Circumventing Harmful Fairness. AAAI 2021: 5176-5184 - [c159]Gregory Goren, Oren Kurland, Moshe Tennenholtz, Fiana Raiber:
Driving the Herd: Search Engines as Content Influencers. CIKM 2021: 586-595 - [c158]Alexander Spiegelman, Idit Keidar, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Game of Coins. ICDCS 2021: 954-964 - [c157]Yoav Levine, Barak Lenz, Opher Lieber, Omri Abend, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Moshe Tennenholtz, Yoav Shoham:
PMI-Masking: Principled masking of correlated spans. ICLR 2021 - [c156]Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with Application to False-name Manipulation. IJCAI 2021: 210-216 - [i78]Maya Raifer, Guy Rotman, Reut Apel, Moshe Tennenholtz, Roi Reichart:
Designing an Automatic Agent for Repeated Language based Persuasion Games. CoRR abs/2105.04976 (2021) - [i77]Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with Application to False-name Manipulation. CoRR abs/2108.09216 (2021) - [i76]Gregory Goren, Oren Kurland, Moshe Tennenholtz, Fiana Raiber:
Driving the Herd: Search Engines as Content Influencers. CoRR abs/2110.11166 (2021) - 2020
- [j79]Omer Ben-Porat, Sharon Hirsch, Lital Kuchy, Guy Elad, Roi Reichart, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Predicting Strategic Behavior from Free Text. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 68: 413-445 (2020) - [j78]Gal Bahar, Itai Arieli, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Multi-issue social learning. Math. Soc. Sci. 104: 29-39 (2020) - [j77]Moran Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz, Omri Weinstein:
Distributed Signaling Games. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 8(2): 7:1-7:26 (2020) - [c155]Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Designing Committees for Mitigating Biases. AAAI 2020: 1942-1949 - [c154]Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz:
VCG under Sybil (False-Name) Attacks - A Bayesian Analysis. AAAI 2020: 1966-1973 - [c153]Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Incentive-Compatible Classification. AAAI 2020: 7055-7062 - [c152]Gal Bahar, Omer Ben-Porat, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Fiduciary Bandits. ICML 2020: 518-527 - [c151]Omer Ben-Porat, Lital Kuchy, Sharon Hirsch, Guy Elad, Roi Reichart, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Predicting Strategic Behavior from Free Text (Extended Abstract). IJCAI 2020: 5020-5024 - [c150]Omer Ben-Porat, Itay Rosenberg, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Content Provider Dynamics and Coordination in Recommendation Ecosystems. NeurIPS 2020 - [c149]Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Incentive-Compatible Selection Mechanisms for Forests. EC 2020: 111-131 - [c148]Gregory Goren, Oren Kurland, Moshe Tennenholtz, Fiana Raiber:
Ranking-Incentivized Quality Preserving Content Modification. SIGIR 2020: 259-268 - [c147]Ziv Vasilisky, Moshe Tennenholtz, Oren Kurland:
Studying Ranking-Incentivized Web Dynamics. SIGIR 2020: 2093-2096 - [c146]Gilie Gefen, Omer Ben-Porat, Moshe Tennenholtz, Elad Yom-Tov:
Privacy, Altruism, and Experience: Estimating the Perceived Value of Internet Data for Medical Uses. WWW (Companion Volume) 2020: 552-556 - [i75]Omer Ben-Porat, Sharon Hirsch, Lital Kuchy, Guy Elad, Roi Reichart, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Predicting Strategic Behavior from Free Text. CoRR abs/2004.02973 (2020) - [i74]Ronen Gradwohl, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Coopetition Against an Amazon. CoRR abs/2005.10038 (2020) - [i73]Gregory Goren, Oren Kurland, Moshe Tennenholtz, Fiana Raiber:
Ranking-Incentivized Quality Preserving Content Modification. CoRR abs/2005.12989 (2020) - [i72]Ziv Vasilisky, Moshe Tennenholtz, Oren Kurland:
Studying Ranking-Incentivized Web Dynamics. CoRR abs/2005.13810 (2020) - [i71]Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Incentive-Compatible Selection Mechanisms for Forests. CoRR abs/2006.00600 (2020) - [i70]Gal Bahar, Omer Ben-Porat, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Learning under Invariable Bayesian Safety. CoRR abs/2006.04497 (2020) - [i69]Reshef Meir, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Representative Committees of Peers. CoRR abs/2006.07837 (2020) - [i68]Yoav Levine, Barak Lenz, Opher Lieber, Omri Abend, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Moshe Tennenholtz, Yoav Shoham:
PMI-Masking: Principled masking of correlated spans. CoRR abs/2010.01825 (2020) - [i67]Reut Apel, Ido Erev, Roi Reichart, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Predicting Decisions in Language Based Persuasion Games. CoRR abs/2012.09966 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [j76]Moshe Tennenholtz, Oren Kurland:
Rethinking search engines and recommendation systems: a game theoretic perspective. Commun. ACM 62(12): 66-75 (2019) - [j75]Omer Ben-Porat, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Multiunit Facility Location Games. Math. Oper. Res. 44(3): 865-889 (2019) - [j74]Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 7(3): 14:1-14:27 (2019) - [c145]Omer Ben-Porat, Gregory Goren, Itay Rosenberg, Moshe Tennenholtz:
From Recommendation Systems to Facility Location Games. AAAI 2019: 1772-1779 - [c144]Omer Ben-Porat, Itay Rosenberg, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Convergence of Learning Dynamics in Information Retrieval Games. AAAI 2019: 1780-1787 - [c143]Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Social Learning and the Innkeeper's Challenge. EC 2019: 153-170 - [c142]Omer Ben-Porat, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Regression Equilibrium. EC 2019: 173-191 - [c141]Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Sequential Voting with Confirmation Network. TARK 2019: 19-34 - [i66]Ori Plonsky, Reut Apel, Eyal Ert, Moshe Tennenholtz, David Bourgin, Joshua C. Peterson, Daniel Reichman, Thomas L. Griffiths, Stuart J. Russell, Evan C. Carter, James F. Cavanagh, Ido Erev:
Predicting human decisions with behavioral theories and machine learning. CoRR abs/1904.06866 (2019) - [i65]Omer Ben-Porat, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Regression Equilibrium. CoRR abs/1905.02576 (2019) - [i64]Gal Bahar, Omer Ben-Porat, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Fiduciary Bandits. CoRR abs/1905.07043 (2019) - [i63]Omer Ben-Porat, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Protecting the Protected Group: Circumventing Harmful Fairness. CoRR abs/1905.10546 (2019) - [i62]Gilie Gefen, Omer Ben-Porat, Moshe Tennenholtz, Elad Yom-Tov:
Privacy, altruism, and experience: Estimating the perceived value of Internet data for medical uses. CoRR abs/1906.08562 (2019) - [i61]Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz:
VCG Under Sybil (False-name) Attacks - a Bayesian Analysis. CoRR abs/1911.07210 (2019) - [i60]Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Incentive-Compatible Classification. CoRR abs/1911.08849 (2019) - 2018
- [j73]Reshef Meir, Gil Kalai, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Bidding games and efficient allocations. Games Econ. Behav. 112: 166-193 (2018) - [j72]Kobbi Nissim, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Segmentation, Incentives, and Privacy. Math. Oper. Res. 43(4): 1252-1268 (2018) - [c140]Omer Ben-Porat, Moshe Tennenholtz:
A Game-Theoretic Approach to Recommendation Systems with Strategic Content Providers. NeurIPS 2018: 1118-1128 - [c139]Gregory Goren, Oren Kurland, Moshe Tennenholtz, Fiana Raiber:
Ranking Robustness Under Adversarial Document Manipulations. SIGIR 2018: 395-404 - [c138]Reut Apel, Elad Yom-Tov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Characterizing Efficient Referrals in Social Networks. WWW (Companion Volume) 2018: 23-24 - [c137]Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Incentive-Compatible Diffusion. WWW 2018: 1379-1388 - [i59]Reut Apel, Elad Yom-Tov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Characterizing Efficient Referrals in Social Networks. CoRR abs/1805.00252 (2018) - [i58]Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Incentive-Compatible Diffusion. CoRR abs/1805.08013 (2018) - [i57]Alexander Spiegelman, Idit Keidar, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Game of Coins. CoRR abs/1805.08979 (2018) - [i56]Omer Ben-Porat, Moshe Tennenholtz:
A Game-Theoretic Approach to Recommendation Systems with Strategic Content Providers. CoRR abs/1806.00955 (2018) - [i55]Kobbi Nissim, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Segmentation, Incentives and Privacy. CoRR abs/1806.00966 (2018) - [i54]Omer Ben-Porat, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Competing Prediction Algorithms. CoRR abs/1806.01703 (2018) - [i53]Gregory Goren, Oren Kurland, Moshe Tennenholtz, Fiana Raiber:
Ranking Robustness Under Adversarial Document Manipulations. CoRR abs/1806.04425 (2018) - [i52]Omer Ben-Porat, Itay Rosenberg, Moshe Tennenholtz:
A Game Theoretic Approach to Learning and Dynamics in Information Retrieval. CoRR abs/1806.05359 (2018) - [i51]Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Recommendation Systems and Self Motivated Users. CoRR abs/1807.01732 (2018) - [i50]Oren Dean, Yakov Babichenko, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Paradoxes in Sequential Voting. CoRR abs/1807.03979 (2018) - [i49]Omer Ben-Porat, Gregory Goren, Itay Rosenberg, Moshe Tennenholtz:
From Recommendation Systems to Facility Location Games. CoRR abs/1809.02931 (2018) - 2017
- [j71]Noga Alon, Moran Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Revenue and Reserve Prices in a Probabilistic Single Item Auction. Algorithmica 77(1): 1-15 (2017) - [j70]Uriel Feige, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Optimization with Uniform Size Queries. Algorithmica 78(1): 255-273 (2017) - [j69]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Sequential commitment games. Games Econ. Behav. 105: 297-315 (2017) - [j68]Ran Ben-Basat, Moshe Tennenholtz, Oren Kurland:
A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Adversarial Retrieval Setting. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 60: 1127-1164 (2017) - [j67]Uriel Feige, Tomer Koren, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Chasing Ghosts: Competing with Stateful Policies. SIAM J. Comput. 46(1): 190-223 (2017) - [c136]Ori Plonsky, Ido Erev, Tamir Hazan, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Psychological Forest: Predicting Human Behavior. AAAI 2017: 656-662 - [c135]Erez Karpas, Alexander Shleyfman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Automated Verification of Social Law Robustness in STRIPS. ICAPS 2017: 163-171 - [c134]Omer Ben-Porat, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Best Response Regression. NIPS 2017: 1499-1508 - [c133]Nimrod Raifer, Fiana Raiber, Moshe Tennenholtz, Oren Kurland:
Information Retrieval Meets Game Theory: The Ranking Competition Between Documents? Authors. SIGIR 2017: 465-474 - [c132]Omer Ben-Porat, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Shapley Facility Location Games. WINE 2017: 58-73 - [c131]Moshe Babaioff, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan, Gali Noti, Carlo Curino, Nar Ganapathy, Ishai Menache, Omer Reingold, Moshe Tennenholtz, Erez Timnat:
ERA: A Framework for Economic Resource Allocation for the Cloud. WWW (Companion Volume) 2017: 635-642 - [c130]Omer Lev, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Group Recommendations: Axioms, Impossibilities, and Random Walks. TARK 2017: 382-397 - [i48]Moshe Babaioff, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan, Gali Noti, Carlo Curino, Nar Ganapathy, Ishai Menache, Omer Reingold, Moshe Tennenholtz, Erez Timnat:
ERA: A Framework for Economic Resource Allocation for the Cloud. CoRR abs/1702.07311 (2017) - [i47]Omer Ben-Porat, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Shapley Facility Location Games. CoRR abs/1709.10278 (2017) - 2016
- [j66]Moshe Babaioff, Moran Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Mechanism Design with Strategic Mediators. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 4(2): 7:1-7:48 (2016) - [c129]Moran Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz, Omri Weinstein:
Distributed Signaling Games. ESA 2016: 41:1-41:16 - [c128]Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Moshe Tennenholtz:
A Hydraulic Approach to Equilibria of Resource Selection Games. EC 2016: 477 - [c127]Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups. EC 2016: 637-654 - [c126]Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Economic Recommendation Systems: One Page Abstract. EC 2016: 757 - [c125]Omer Ben-Porat, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Multi-unit Facility Location Games. WINE 2016: 478-479 - [r1]Moshe Tennenholtz, Aviv Zohar:
The Axiomatic Approach and the Internet. Handbook of Computational Social Choice 2016: 427-452 - [i46]Omer Ben-Porat, Moshe Tennenholtz:
The (l, k) Facility Location Duel. CoRR abs/1602.03655 (2016) - [i45]Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Designing social networks for efficient learning. CoRR abs/1605.02489 (2016) - [i44]Irit Hochberg, Guy Feraru, Mark Kozdoba, Shie Mannor, Moshe Tennenholtz, Elad Yom-Tov:
A Reinforcement Learning System to Encourage Physical Activity in Diabetes Patients. CoRR abs/1605.04070 (2016) - [i43]Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups. CoRR abs/1605.09548 (2016) - 2015
- [c124]Ran Ben-Basat, Moshe Tennenholtz, Oren Kurland:
The Probability Ranking Principle is Not Optimal in Adversarial Retrieval Settings. ICTIR 2015: 51-60 - [c123]Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Omer Lev, Moshe Tennenholtz:
How Robust Is the Wisdom of the Crowds? IJCAI 2015: 2055-2061 - [c122]Moshe Babaioff, Moran Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Mechanism Design with Strategic Mediators. ITCS 2015: 307-316 - [c121]Gil Kalai, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Bidding Games and Efficient Allocations. EC 2015: 113-130 - [c120]Yishay Mansour, Aviad Rubinstein, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Robust Probabilistic Inference. SODA 2015: 449-460 - [c119]Omer Lev, Moshe Tennenholtz, Aviv Zohar:
An Axiomatic Approach to Routing. TARK 2015: 194-206 - [i42]Moshe Babaioff, Moran Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Mechanism Design with Strategic Mediators. CoRR abs/1501.04457 (2015) - [i41]Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Economic Recommendation Systems. CoRR abs/1507.07191 (2015) - 2014
- [j65]Reshef Meir, Tyler Lu, Moshe Tennenholtz, Craig Boutilier:
On the value of using group discounts under price competition. Artif. Intell. 216: 163-178 (2014) - [j64]Uriel Feige, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On fair division of a homogeneous good. Games Econ. Behav. 87: 305-321 (2014) - [j63]Gleb Polevoy, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Signaling Competition and Social Welfare. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 2(1): 1:1-1:16 (2014) - [j62]Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 2(2): 5:1-5:19 (2014) - [c118]Uriel Feige, Tomer Koren, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Chasing Ghosts: Competing with Stateful Policies. FOCS 2014: 100-109 - [c117]Uriel Feige, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Invitation games and the price of stability. ITCS 2014: 93-102 - [c116]Yossi Azar, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Sequential decision making with vector outcomes. ITCS 2014: 195-206 - [c115]Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Walrasian Equilibrium with Few Buyers. SAGT 2014: 170-181 - [c114]Peter Izsak, Fiana Raiber, Oren Kurland, Moshe Tennenholtz:
The search duel: a response to a strong ranker. SIGIR 2014: 919-922 - [i40]Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Noncooperative Market Allocation and the Formation of Downtown. CoRR abs/1403.7536 (2014) - [i39]Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Physical Computation of Nash Equilibrium: 'Hydraulic' Resource Selection. CoRR abs/1403.7605 (2014) - [i38]Moran Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz, Omri Weinstein:
Display Advertising with Information Mediators. CoRR abs/1404.2861 (2014) - [i37]Uriel Feige, Tomer Koren, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Chasing Ghosts: Competing with Stateful Policies. CoRR abs/1407.7635 (2014) - 2013
- [j61]Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Adversarial Leakage in Games. SIAM J. Discret. Math. 27(1): 363-385 (2013) - [j60]Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Approximate Mechanism Design without Money. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 1(4): 18:1-18:26 (2013) - [c113]Noga Alon, Dvir Falik, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Bundling Attacks in Judgment Aggregation. AAAI 2013: 39-45 - [c112]Noga Alon, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz:
The Value of Ignorance about the Number of Players. AAAI (Late-Breaking Developments) 2013 - [c111]Itai Ashlagi, Brendan Lucier, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Equilibria of Online Scheduling Algorithms. AAAI 2013: 67-73 - [c110]Yagil Engel, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Posted Prices Exchange for Display Advertising Contracts. AAAI 2013: 276-282 - [c109]Uriel Feige, Gil Kalai, Moshe Tennenholtz:
The Cascade Auction - A Mechanism for Deterring Collusion in Auctions. AAAI 2013: 313-319 - [c108]Erez Karpas, Tomer Sagi, Carmel Domshlak, Avigdor Gal, Avi Mendelson, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Data-Parallel Computing Meets STRIPS. AAAI 2013: 474-480 - [c107]Reshef Meir, Tyler Lu, Moshe Tennenholtz, Craig Boutilier:
On the Value of Using Group Discounts under Price Competition. AAAI 2013: 683-689 - [c106]Noga Alon, Yishay Mansour, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Differential pricing with inequity aversion in social networks. EC 2013: 9-24 - [c105]Uriel Feige, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Competition among asymmetric sellers with fixed supply. EC 2013: 415-416 - [c104]Sigal Oren, Michael Schapira, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Pay or Play. UAI 2013 - [c103]Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Moshe Tennenholtz:
The Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem. WINE 2013: 1-14 - [c102]Moran Feldman, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Competition in the Presence of Social Networks: How Many Service Providers Maximize Welfare? WINE 2013: 174-187 - [i36]Ryan Porter, Amir Ronen, Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Mechanism Design with Execution Uncertainty. CoRR abs/1301.0595 (2013) - [i35]Moshe Tennenholtz:
On Stable Multi-Agent Behavior in Face of Uncertainty. CoRR abs/1302.1570 (2013) - [i34]Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Equilibrium in Labor Markets with Few Firms. CoRR abs/1306.5855 (2013) - [i33]Sigal Oren, Michael Schapira, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Pay or Play. CoRR abs/1309.6854 (2013) - [i32]Gil Kalai, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz:
General-sum Bidding Games. CoRR abs/1311.0913 (2013) - 2012
- [j59]Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Bayesian ignorance. Theor. Comput. Sci. 452: 1-11 (2012) - [c101]Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz, Yoram Bachrach, Peter B. Key:
Congestion Games with Agent Failures. AAAI 2012: 1401-1407 - [c100]Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Stability scores: measuring coalitional stability. AAMAS 2012: 771-778 - [c99]Yossi Azar, Uriel Feige, Moshe Tennenholtz, Michal Feldman:
Mastering multi-player games. AAMAS 2012: 897-904 - [c98]Fiana Raiber, Oren Kurland, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Content-based relevance estimation on the web using inter-document similarities. CIKM 2012: 1769-1773 - [c97]Kobbi Nissim, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy. ITCS 2012: 203-213 - [c96]Noga Alon, Moshe Babaioff, Ron Karidi, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Sequential voting with externalities: herding in social networks. EC 2012: 36 - [c95]Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Signaling schemes for revenue maximization. EC 2012: 514-531 - [c94]Moran Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Interviewing secretaries in parallel. EC 2012: 550-567 - [c93]Dvir Falik, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On Coalitions and Stable Winners in Plurality. WINE 2012: 256-269 - [c92]Noga Alon, Iftah Gamzu, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Optimizing budget allocation among channels and influencers. WWW 2012: 381-388 - [i31]Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization. CoRR abs/1202.1590 (2012) - [i30]Yoram Bachrach, Reshef Meir, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Solving Cooperative Reliability Games. CoRR abs/1202.3700 (2012) - [i29]Gleb Polevoy, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Signalling Competition and Social Welfare (Working Paper). CoRR abs/1203.6610 (2012) - [i28]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Robust Learning Equilibrium. CoRR abs/1206.6826 (2012) - [i27]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On the Value of Correlation. CoRR abs/1207.1362 (2012) - [i26]Moshe Tennenholtz:
Reputation Systems: An Axiomatic Approach. CoRR abs/1207.4163 (2012) - [i25]Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Sequential Information Elicitation in Multi-Agent Systems. CoRR abs/1207.4165 (2012) - 2011
- [j58]Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Congestion games with failures. Discret. Appl. Math. 159(15): 1508-1525 (2011) - [j57]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Simultaneous Ad Auctions. Math. Oper. Res. 36(1): 1-13 (2011) - [c91]Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Economical Graph Discovery. ICS 2011: 476-486 - [c90]Yuval Emek, Ron Karidi, Moshe Tennenholtz, Aviv Zohar:
Mechanisms for multi-level marketing. EC 2011: 209-218 - [c89]Nicole Immorlica, Adam Tauman Kalai, Brendan Lucier, Ankur Moitra, Andrew Postlewaite, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Dueling algorithms. STOC 2011: 215-224 - [c88]Uriel Feige, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Mechanism design with uncertain inputs: (to err is human, to forgive divine). STOC 2011: 549-558 - [c87]Noga Alon, Felix A. Fischer, Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Sum of us: strategyproof selection from the selectors. TARK 2011: 101-110 - [c86]Yoram Bachrach, Reshef Meir, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Solving Cooperative Reliability Games. UAI 2011: 27-34 - [c85]Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Revenue Enhancement in Ad Auctions. WINE 2011: 391-398 - [i24]Nicole Immorlica, Adam Tauman Kalai, Brendan Lucier, Ankur Moitra, Andrew Postlewaite, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Dueling Algorithms. CoRR abs/1101.2883 (2011) - [i23]Uriel Feige, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Mechanism design with uncertain inputs (to err is human, to forgive divine). CoRR abs/1103.2520 (2011) - [i22]Michal Feldman, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Stability Scores: Stability and Revenue Enhancement in Ad Auctions. CoRR abs/1105.5983 (2011) - [i21]Moshe Tennenholtz:
Competitive Safety Analysis: Robust Decision-Making in Multi-Agent Systems. CoRR abs/1106.4570 (2011) - [i20]Ronen I. Brafman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Learning to Coordinate Efficiently: A Model-based Approach. CoRR abs/1106.5258 (2011) - [i19]Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
K-Implementation. CoRR abs/1107.0022 (2011) - 2010
- [j56]Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Walking in circles. Discret. Math. 310(23): 3432-3435 (2010) - [j55]Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz:
A note on competitive diffusion through social networks. Inf. Process. Lett. 110(6): 221-225 (2010) - [j54]Alon Altman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
An axiomatic approach to personalized ranking systems. J. ACM 57(4): 26:1-26:35 (2010) - [j53]Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Strategyproof Approximation of the Minimax on Networks. Math. Oper. Res. 35(3): 513-526 (2010) - [j52]Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Structured coalitions in resource selection games. ACM Trans. Intell. Syst. Technol. 1(1): 4:1-4:21 (2010) - [c84]Itai Ashlagi, Moshe Tennenholtz, Aviv Zohar:
Competing Schedulers. AAAI 2010: 691-696 - [c83]Ronen I. Brafman, Carmel Domshlak, Yagil Engel, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Transferable Utility Planning Games. AAAI 2010: 709-714 - [c82]Michal Feldman, Adam Kalai, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Playing Games without Observing Payoffs. ICS 2010: 106-110 - [c81]Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Adversarial Leakage in Games. ICS 2010: 111-119 - [c80]Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Bayesian ignorance. PODC 2010: 384-391 - [c79]Uriel Feige, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Responsive Lotteries. SAGT 2010: 150-161 - [c78]Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Adam Tauman Kalai, Azarakhsh Malekian, Moshe Tennenholtz:
A Novel Approach to Propagating Distrust. WINE 2010: 87-105 - [c77]Ola Rozenfeld, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Near-Strong Equilibria in Network Creation Games. WINE 2010: 339-353 - [e4]David C. Parkes, Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Proceedings 11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2010), Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, June 7-11, 2010. ACM 2010, ISBN 978-1-60558-822-3 [contents] - [i18]Alon Altman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Nonmanipulable Selections from a Tournament. Computational Foundations of Social Choice 2010 - [i17]Kobbi Nissim, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy. CoRR abs/1004.2888 (2010)
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [j51]Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Strong mediated equilibrium. Artif. Intell. 173(1): 180-195 (2009) - [j50]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Two-terminal routing games with unknown active players. Artif. Intell. 173(15): 1441-1455 (2009) - [j49]Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Taxed congestion games with failures. Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. 56(2): 133-151 (2009) - [j48]David C. Parkes, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Special Section of Games and Economic Behavior dedicated to the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. Games Econ. Behav. 67(1): 1 (2009) - [j47]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Mediators in position auctions. Games Econ. Behav. 67(1): 2-21 (2009) - [j46]Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Congestion games with load-dependent failures: Identical resources. Games Econ. Behav. 67(1): 156-173 (2009) - [j45]Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Random Order Congestion Games. Math. Oper. Res. 34(3): 706-725 (2009) - [c76]Thomas Ågotnes, Wiebe van der Hoek, Moshe Tennenholtz, Michael J. Wooldridge:
Power in normative systems. AAMAS (1) 2009: 145-152 - [c75]Moshe Tennenholtz, Aviv Zohar:
Learning equilibria in repeated congestion games. AAMAS (1) 2009: 233-240 - [c74]Danny Kuminov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
User modeling in position auctions: re-considering the GSP and VCG mechanisms. AAMAS (1) 2009: 273-280 - [c73]Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Asynchronous Congestion Games. Graph Theory, Computational Intelligence and Thought 2009: 41-53 - [c72]Alon Altman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Nonmanipulable Selections from a Tournament. IJCAI 2009: 27-32 - [c71]Ronen I. Brafman, Carmel Domshlak, Yagil Engel, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Planning Games. IJCAI 2009: 73-78 - [c70]Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Partition Equilibrium. SAGT 2009: 48-59 - [c69]Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Approximate mechanism design without money. EC 2009: 177-186 - [c68]Andrey Klinger, Moshe Tennenholtz:
K-SNCC: group deviations in subsidized non-cooperative computing. TARK 2009: 174-183 - [c67]Ola Rozenfeld, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Consistent Continuous Trust-Based Recommendation Systems. WINE 2009: 113-124 - [i16]Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Strategyproof Approximation Mechanisms for Location on Networks. CoRR abs/0907.2049 (2009) - [i15]Noga Alon, Felix A. Fischer, Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Sum of Us: Strategyproof Selection from the Selectors. CoRR abs/0910.4699 (2009) - 2008
- [j44]Ryan Porter, Amir Ronen, Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Fault tolerant mechanism design. Artif. Intell. 172(15): 1783-1799 (2008) - [j43]Alon Altman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Axiomatic Foundations for Ranking Systems. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 31: 473-495 (2008) - [j42]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On the Value of Correlation. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 33: 575-613 (2008) - [c66]Moshe Tennenholtz:
Game-theoretic recommendations: some progress in an uphill battle. AAMAS (1) 2008: 10-16 - [c65]Alon Altman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Strategyproof deterministic lotteries under broadcast communication. AAMAS (3) 2008: 1549-1552 - [c64]Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Asynchronous congestion games. AAMAS (3) 2008: 1605-1608 - [c63]Danny Kuminov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
As Safe As It Gets: Near-Optimal Learning in Multi-Stage Games with Imperfect Monitoring. ECAI 2008: 438-442 - [c62]Itai Ashlagi, Piotr Krysta, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Social Context Games. WINE 2008: 675-683 - [c61]Reid Andersen, Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Uriel Feige, Abraham D. Flaxman, Adam Kalai, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Trust-based recommendation systems: an axiomatic approach. WWW 2008: 199-208 - 2007
- [j41]Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Learning equilibrium as a generalization of learning to optimize. Artif. Intell. 171(7): 448-452 (2007) - [j40]Moshe Tennenholtz:
Ex-post equilibria in combinatorial auctions. SIGecom Exch. 7(1): 43-44 (2007) - [c60]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Learning Equilibrium in Resource Selection Games. AAAI 2007: 18-23 - [c59]Roy Fox, Moshe Tennenholtz:
A Reinforcement Learning Algorithm with Polynomial Interaction Complexity for Only-Costly-Observable MDPs. AAAI 2007: 553-558 - [c58]Alon Altman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Incentive compatible ranking systems. AAMAS 2007: 84 - [c57]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Routing games with an unknown set of active players. AAMAS 2007: 195 - [c56]Alon Altman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
An Axiomatic Approach to Personalized Ranking Systems. IJCAI 2007: 1187-1192 - [c55]Ola Rozenfeld, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Routing Mediators. IJCAI 2007: 1488-1493 - [c54]Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Congestion games with load-dependent failures: identical resources. EC 2007: 210-217 - [c53]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Mediators in position auctions. EC 2007: 279-287 - [c52]Danny Kuminov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Competitive Safety Strategies in Position Auctions. WINE 2007: 108-118 - [c51]Ola Rozenfeld, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Group Dominant Strategies. WINE 2007: 457-468 - [c50]Itai Ashlagi, Andrey Klinger, Moshe Tennenholtz:
K-NCC: Stability Against Group Deviations in Non-cooperative Computation. WINE 2007: 564-569 - [e3]Peter Cramton, Rudolf Müller, Éva Tardos, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Computational Social Systems and the Internet, 1.7. - 6.7.2007. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 07271, Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum fuer Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany 2007 [contents] - [i14]Alon Altman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
An Axiomatic Approach to Personalized Ranking Systems. Computational Social Systems and the Internet 2007 - [i13]Peter Cramton, Rudolf Müller, Éva Tardos, Moshe Tennenholtz:
07271 Summary - Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Computational Social Systems and the Internet 2007 - [i12]Peter Cramton, Rudolf Müller, Éva Tardos, Moshe Tennenholtz:
07271 Abstracts Collection - Computational Social Systems and the Internet . Computational Social Systems and the Internet 2007 - 2006
- [j39]Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations - The anonymous case. Games Econ. Behav. 55(2): 385-406 (2006) - [c49]Alon Altman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Quantifying Incentive Compatibility of Ranking Systems. AAAI 2006: 586-591 - [c48]Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Strong Mediated Equilibrium. AAAI 2006: 691-696 - [c47]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Resource selection games with unknown number of players. AAMAS 2006: 819-825 - [c46]Alon Altman, Avivit Bercovici-Boden, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Learning in One-Shot Strategic Form Games. ECML 2006: 6-17 - [c45]Itai Ashlagi, Moshe Tennenholtz, Dov Monderer:
Robust Learning Equilibrium. UAI 2006 - [c44]Ola Rozenfeld, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Strong and Correlated Strong Equilibria in Monotone Congestion Games. WINE 2006: 74-86 - 2005
- [j38]Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Non-cooperative computation: Boolean functions with correctness and exclusivity. Theor. Comput. Sci. 343(1-2): 97-113 (2005) - [c43]Ronen I. Brafman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Optimal Efficient Learning Equilibrium: Imperfect Monitoring in Symmetric Games. AAAI 2005: 726-731 - [c42]Alon Altman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On the Axiomatic Foundations of Ranking Systems. IJCAI 2005: 917-922 - [c41]Gal Bahar, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Sequential-Simultaneous Information Elicitation in Multi-Agent Systems. IJCAI 2005: 923-928 - [c40]Alon Altman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Ranking systems: the PageRank axioms. EC 2005: 1-8 - [c39]Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Congestion games with failures. EC 2005: 259-268 - [c38]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On the Value of Correlation. UAI 2005: 34-41 - [i11]Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
The Value of Correlation in Strategic Form Games. Computing and Markets 2005 - [i10]Kevin Leyton-Brown, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Local-Effect Games. Computing and Markets 2005 - [i9]Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Congestion games with failures. Computing and Markets 2005 - [i8]Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Overcoming Free Riding in Multi-Party Computations. Computing and Markets 2005 - 2004
- [j37]Ronen I. Brafman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Efficient learning equilibrium. Artif. Intell. 159(1-2): 27-47 (2004) - [j36]Ron Holzman, Noa E. Kfir-Dahav, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions. Games Econ. Behav. 47(1): 104-123 (2004) - [j35]Moshe Tennenholtz:
Program equilibrium. Games Econ. Behav. 49(2): 363-373 (2004) - [j34]Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
K-Implementation. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 21: 37-62 (2004) - [j33]Ryan Porter, Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Fair imposition. J. Econ. Theory 118(2): 209-228 (2004) - [c37]Moshe Tennenholtz:
Transitive voting. EC 2004: 230-231 - [c36]Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Behavorial mechanism design as an online marketing tool. EC 2004: 246-247 - [c35]Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Sequential Information Elicitation in Multi-Agent Systems. UAI 2004: 528-535 - [c34]Moshe Tennenholtz:
Reputation Systems: An Axiomatic Approach. UAI 2004: 544-551 - 2003
- [j32]Ronen I. Brafman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Learning to Coordinate Efficiently: A Model-based Approach. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 19: 11-23 (2003) - [c33]Kevin Leyton-Brown, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Local-Effect Games. IJCAI 2003: 772-780 - [c32]Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
k-Implementation. EC 2003: 19-28 - [e2]Joseph Y. Halpern, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Proceedings of the 9th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK-2003), Bloomington, Indiana, USA, June 20-22, 2003. ACM 2003, ISBN 1-58113-731-1 [contents] - 2002
- [j31]Aviv Bergman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On the Natural Selection of Market Choice. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 5(4): 387-395 (2002) - [j30]Moshe Tennenholtz:
Tractable combinatorial auctions and b-matching. Artif. Intell. 140(1/2): 231-243 (2002) - [j29]Moshe Tennenholtz:
Competitive Safety Analysis: Robust Decision-Making in Multi-Agent Systems. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 17: 363-37 (2002) - [j28]Ronen I. Brafman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
R-MAX - A General Polynomial Time Algorithm for Near-Optimal Reinforcement Learning. J. Mach. Learn. Res. 3: 213-231 (2002) - [c31]Kevin Leyton-Brown, Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Bidding Clubs in First-Price Auctions. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 373-378 - [c30]Moshe Tennenholtz:
Competitive Safety Analysis. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 404-410 - [c29]Ronen I. Brafman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Efficient Learning Equilibrium. NIPS 2002: 1603-1610 - [c28]Ryan Porter, Amir Ronen, Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Mechanism Design with Execution Uncertainty. UAI 2002: 414-421 - [c27]Moshe Tennenholtz:
Game Theory and Artificial Intelligence. Foundations and Applications of Multi-Agent Systems 2002: 49-58 - [i7]Ron Holzman, Noa E. Kfir-Dahav, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Bundling Equilibrium in Combinatorial auctions. CoRR cs.GT/0201010 (2002) - [i6]Kevin Leyton-Brown, Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Bidding Clubs in First-Price Auctions. CoRR cs.GT/0201017 (2002) - 2001
- [j27]Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz, Hal R. Varian:
Economics and Artificial Intelligence. Games Econ. Behav. 35(1-2): 1-5 (2001) - [j26]Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On Rational Computability and Communication Complexity. Games Econ. Behav. 35(1-2): 197-211 (2001) - [c26]Ronen I. Brafman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
R-MAX - A General Polynomial Time Algorithm for Near-Optimal Reinforcement Learning. IJCAI 2001: 953-958 - [c25]Moshe Tennenholtz:
Rational Competitive Analysis. IJCAI 2001: 1067-1072 - [c24]Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Fair Imposition. IJCAI 2001: 1083-1088 - [i5]Moshe Tennenholtz:
Rational Competitive Analysis. CoRR cs.AI/0112015 (2001) - 2000
- [j25]David Fitoussi, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Choosing social laws for multi-agent systems: Minimality and simplicity. Artif. Intell. 119(1-2): 61-101 (2000) - [j24]Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Optimal auctions revisited. Artif. Intell. 120(1): 29-42 (2000) - [j23]Ronen I. Brafman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
A near-optimal polynomial time algorithm for learning in certain classes of stochastic games. Artif. Intell. 121(1-2): 31-47 (2000) - [j22]Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
k-Price Auctions. Games Econ. Behav. 31(2): 220-244 (2000) - [j21]Michal Penn, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Constrained multi-object auctions and b-matching. Inf. Process. Lett. 75(1-2): 29-34 (2000) - [j20]Ronen I. Brafman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
An axiomatic treatment of three qualitative decision criteria. J. ACM 47(3): 452-482 (2000) - [j19]Ruth Aylett, Kerstin Dautenhahn, Jim Doran, Michael Luck, Scott Moss, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Can models of agents be transferred between different areas? Knowl. Eng. Rev. 15(2): 197-203 (2000) - [c23]Kevin Leyton-Brown, Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz:
An Algorithm for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions. AAAI/IAAI 2000: 56-61 - [c22]Moshe Tennenholtz:
Some Tractable Combinatorial Auctions. AAAI/IAAI 2000: 98-103 - [c21]Noa E. Kfir-Dahav, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Mechanism Design for Resource Bounded Agents. ICMAS 2000: 309-316 - [c20]Kevin Leyton-Brown, Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Bidding clubs: institutionalized collusion in auctions. EC 2000: 253-259
1990 – 1999
- 1999
- [j18]Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Dynamic Non-Bayesian Decision Making in Multi-Agent Systems. Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. 25(1-2): 91-106 (1999) - [j17]Keith Decker, Michael Fisher, Michael Luck, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Continuing research in multi-agent systems. Knowl. Eng. Rev. 14(3): 279-283 (1999) - [c19]Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Distributed Games: From Mechanisms to Protocols. AAAI/IAAI 1999: 32-37 - [c18]Ronen I. Brafman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
A Near-Optimal Poly-Time Algorithm for Learning a class of Stochastic Games. IJCAI 1999: 734-739 - [c17]Moshe Tennenholtz:
Electronic Commerce: From Economic and Game-Theoretic Models to Working Protocols. IJCAI 1999: 1420-1428 - 1998
- [j16]Moshe Tennenholtz:
On Stable Social Laws and Qualitative Equilibria. Artif. Intell. 102(1): 1-20 (1998) - [c16]David Fitoussi, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Minimal Social Laws. AAAI/IAAI 1998: 26-31 - [c15]Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Optimal Auctions Revisited. AAAI/IAAI 1998: 32-37 - [c14]Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Distributed Games. TARK 1998: 279-292 - 1997
- [j15]Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On the Emergence of Social Conventions: Modeling, Analysis, and Simulations. Artif. Intell. 94(1-2): 139-166 (1997) - [j14]Ronen I. Brafman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Modeling Agents as Qualitative Decision Makers. Artif. Intell. 94(1-2): 217-268 (1997) - [j13]Shmuel Onn, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Determination of Social Laws for Multi-Agent Mobilization. Artif. Intell. 95(1): 155-167 (1997) - [j12]Ori Ben-Yitzhak, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On the Automatic Synthesis of Social Laws for Mobile Robots. A Study in Artificial Social Systems. Comput. Artif. Intell. 16(4): 355-375 (1997) - [j11]Ori Ben-Yitzhak, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On the Automatic Synthesis of Social Laws for Mobile Robots. A Study in Artificial Social Systems. Part 2: Analysis and Discussion. Comput. Artif. Intell. 16(5): 445-463 (1997) - [j10]Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Dynamic Non-Bayesian Decision Making. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 7: 231-248 (1997) - [j9]Moshe Tennenholtz:
On planning while Executing in stationary environments. J. Exp. Theor. Artif. Intell. 9(1): 37-50 (1997) - [c13]Ronen I. Brafman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On the Axiomatization of Qualitative Decision Criteria. AAAI/IAAI 1997: 76-81 - [c12]Moshe Tennenholtz:
On Stable Multi-Agent Behavior in Face of Uncertainty. UAI 1997: 445-452 - [i4]Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Dynamic Non-Bayesian Decision Making. CoRR cs.AI/9711104 (1997) - 1996
- [j8]Yoram Moses, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Off-Line Reasoning for On-Line Efficiency: Knowledge Bases. Artif. Intell. 83(2): 229-239 (1996) - [j7]Moshe Tennenholtz:
Convention evolution in organizations and markets. Comput. Math. Organ. Theory 2(4): 261-283 (1996) - [j6]Ronen I. Brafman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On Partially Controlled Multi-Agent Systems. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 4: 477-507 (1996) - [c11]Ronen I. Brafman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On the Foundations of Qualitative Decision Theory. AAAI/IAAI, Vol. 2 1996: 1291-1296 - [c10]Moshe Tennenholtz:
On Stable Social Laws and Qualitative Equilibrium for Risk-Averse Agents. KR 1996: 553-561 - [c9]Noa E. Kfir-Dahav, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Multi-Agent Belief Revision. TARK 1996: 175-194 - [i3]Ronen I. Brafman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On Partially Controlled Multi-Agent Systems. CoRR cs.AI/9606102 (1996) - 1995
- [j5]Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On Social Laws for Artificial Agent Societies: Off-Line Design. Artif. Intell. 73(1-2): 231-252 (1995) - [j4]Yoram Moses, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Artificial Social Systems. Comput. Artif. Intell. 14(6): 533-562 (1995) - [j3]Andrea Schaerf, Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Adaptive Load Balancing: A Study in Multi-Agent Learning. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 2: 475-500 (1995) - [j2]Moshe Tennenholtz:
On computational social laws for dynamic non-homogeneous social structures. J. Exp. Theor. Artif. Intell. 7(4): 379-390 (1995) - [c8]Ronen I. Brafman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Towards Action Prediction Using a Mental-Level Model. IJCAI 1995: 2010-2016 - [e1]Amihai Motro, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Next Generation Information Technologies and Systems (NGITS '95), Second International Workshop, Naharia, Israel, June 27-29, 1995. 1995 [contents] - [i2]Andrea Schaerf, Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Adaptive Load Balancing: A Study in Multi-Agent Learning. CoRR cs.AI/9505102 (1995) - 1994
- [j1]Shmuel Safra, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On Planning while Learning. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 2: 111-129 (1994) - [c7]Ronen I. Brafman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Belief Ascription and Mental-Level Modelling. KR 1994: 87-98 - [i1]Shmuel Safra, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On Planning while Learning. CoRR abs/cs/9409101 (1994) - 1993
- [c6]Yoram Moses, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Off-line Reasoning for On-line Efficiency. IJCAI 1993: 490-495 - [c5]Yoram Moses, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Multi-entity Models. Machine Intelligence 14 1993: 65-90 - 1992
- [c4]Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz:
On the Synthesis of Useful Social Laws for Artificial Agent Societies (Preliminary Report). AAAI 1992: 276-281 - [c3]Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Emergent Conventions in Multi-Agent Systems: Initial Experimental Results and Observations (Preliminary Report). KR 1992: 225-231
1980 – 1989
- 1989
- [c2]Moshe Tennenholtz, Yoram Moses:
On Cooperation in a Multi-Entity Model. IJCAI 1989: 918-923 - 1988
- [c1]Uriel Feige, Adi Shamir, Moshe Tennenholtz:
The Noisy Oracle Problem. CRYPTO 1988: 284-296
Coauthor Index
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