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# AN INVESTIGATION OF

## THE

# FAILURE OF LAWN LAKE DAM LARIMER COUNTY, COLORADO

Conducted by The Office Of The State Engineer

> JERIS A. DANIELSON STATE ENGINEER

February 14, 1983

#### **Division of Water Resources** DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 1313 SHERMAN STREET DENVER, COLORADO 80203

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#### INTRODUCTION

This report covers a history of the development and use of the Lawn Lake Reservoir Dam and the details of the State Engineer's investigation of the cause of the failure which occurred on July 15, 1982.

Lawn Lake Dam was a 24-foot high structure with a capacity of about 817 acre-feet of water, located in Rocky Mountain National Park, in Section 25, Township 6 North, Range 74 West, Sixth Principal Meridian. The site is on the Roaring River, tributary to the Fall River, ten miles upstream from Estes Park in Larimer County. The site is at an elevation of approximately 11,000 feet in a subalpine (Spruce-Fir) zone about 100 feet below timberline. The area is underlain by Precambrian igneous, plutonic and metamorphic bedrock that hold up steep slopes and produce thin, immature soils. The region was intensely glaciated during the Pleistocene leaving behind typical alpine glacial landforms and materials including deposits of till and glaciofluvial sediments. The original Lawn Lake was created by a recessional moraine.

The investigation was conducted, under the direction of the State Engineer, by the Dam Safety Branch of the Division of Water Resources with the assistance of the Geotechnical Unit and the Water Supply Branch and with assistance by the Colorado Department of Highways, Dr. Wayne Charlie of Colorado State University, and Ralph Mangone, a metallurgical expert.

The members of the Dam Safety Branch, the Geotechnical Unit, and the Water Supply Branch, who contributed to the investigation and analytical tasks were Alan Pearson, Chief, Dam Safety Branch, Steve Spann, Supervising Water Resource Engineer, John Van Sciver, Senior Water Resource Engineer, Jim Norfleet, Senior Water Resource Engineer, Louis DeGrave, Senior Water Resource

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Engineer, George Van Slyke, Supervising Water Resource Geologist, George Moravec, Senior Water Resource Geologist, Alan Berryman, Senior Water Resource Engineer, and Larry Dezman, Senior Water Resource Engineer. The members of the Department of Highways who conducted the geotechnical work were Frank Abel, Ken Geisert, Keith Berry, George Pavlik, and Steve Bignal. The State Engineer appreciates the significant contributions made by these persons to the investigations.

Whenever a failure or incident at a dam occurs, both the professional and private community seek to find an answer or a reason for the failure. The former are interested in learning from the event to prevent future occurrences, and the others for various reasons, including liability for the failure. Colorado law places sole liability for damages due to dam failure on the dam owner, regardless of the cause; however, the State Engineer's duty is to determine, if possible, the cause of failure in order to mitigate future events.

Investigation of the incident began immediately upon receipt of notice of the failure. The problem of access was a major problem during the investigation since there are no roads to the dam and the National Park Service prohibits vehicular access. The most practical means of getting to the dam with manpower and equipment is by helicopter. Coordination and dissemination of information among the several agencies investigating the failure was provided by the FEMA, Region VIII office, which proved to be very helpful in our investigation.

Several on-site investigations took place based on the findings of the initial inspection made on the day of failure. The investigations were prompted by various pieces of evidence and information that surfaced as the

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investigation continued. The investigations, evidence, and information will be covered in this report. Knowledge of the history and performance of the dam is an important part of understanding the causes for failure of the dam. The first part of this report includes a description of the dam and reservoir's development and use. The investigation, as well as the analysis conducted, will be described and a hypothesis for failure formulated from the findings.

A difficult problem in the investigation of this dam failure is the absence of eyewitness accounts. Although persons reported hearing sounds in the night, there was no visible distress to the dam as recent as a day before the failure, and the deficiency that caused the failure became obliterated by the failure itself.

This report is written in a narrative form in order to minimize the number of pictures and diagrams that would need to be designed for reproduction. References are made to the bibliography where the studies, reports, maps, and pictures are contained. These are located in the State Engineer's files.

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#### HISTORY

#### 1902 - 1931 Construction of the Dam and Enlargements

In June of 1902, the stock holders of the Farmers Irrigation Ditch and Reservoir Company (FIDRC) elected to complete the Lawn Reservoir by making a cut to draw off 12 feet of water from the existing mountain lake, and to construct a dam to impound a total of 24 feet of water. The company duly filed a map and statement on June 30, 1902<sup>1</sup>\* in the State Engineer's Office showing the existing lake to be 16.4 acres in surface area and the dam to be 24 feet high to the spillway, creating a reservoir having 47.1 acres of surface area and 810.6 acre-feet of usable storage. The company also filed construction plans with the State Engineer which were approved by him on August 19, 1902. The design engineer was Mr. E. C. McAnelly of Fort Collins. The State Engineer designated the plans and specifications as  $0C-39^3$ . The following year the company filed for a permit from the United States Land Office to obtain right of way for the dam and reservoir<sup>24</sup>. This filing showed the existing lake to be 14.4 acres in area, and the dam 19.4 feet high creating a reservoir 42.6 acres in area and having 498 acre-feet of usable storage (BLM 89583). The reservoir was ultimately decreed in the District Court for Larimer County for a capacity of 759.6 acre-feet, including a refill<sup>2</sup>.

During this period (1902-1903), the company engaged Mr. Hugh Ramsey to construct a wagon road to Lawn Lake from Fall River in Horseshoe Park, and to make a cut to draw off 12 feet of water from the lake. He subsequently bid to make the cut two feet deeper. This was confirmed by Mr. T. W. Jaycox's letter

<sup>\*</sup> Superscripts refer to references in the Bibliography at the back of this report.

report from his on-site inspection on September 9th and 10th, 1903<sup>5</sup>. Mr. Ramsey was hired to haul the outlet pipe and headgate to the dam, and to install the outlet pipe, excluding construction of the access well.

A record of an agreement to construct the outlet ditch specified that it shall "begin 150 feet below the reservoir and then northwest to about 300 feet into the reservoir...". The ditch and pipe, however, were constructed on a bearing nearly due west as surveyed by the United States Geological Survey after the failure, which made it more perpendicular to the dam.

The greatest detail on the construction of the dam is contained in Mr. T. W. Jaycox's letter report dated September 22, 1903<sup>5</sup>. He does state, however, that the pipe and valve were in place, the concrete foundation and sides were completed, and the lead poured around the pipe before his inspection. A copy of his letter report is in Appendix D.

The notable statements in his report relate to the amount of pipe installed upstream and downstream of the valve; the valve rests on a stone foundation; the pipe was leaded into the valve using hot lead, and caulked; and the loose rock fill had a slope of 1:1 (on the downstream side) and a top width of five feet.

The remainder of the construction and enlargement details are sketchy with only occasional statements in the minutes of the company's annual meetings. From these minutes, from correspondence in the National Park Service files<sup>24</sup>, and data shown on several capacity surveys<sup>32,33</sup>, it appears that the height of the dam was 20.35 feet to the spillway, with a reservoir capacity of 611.96 acre-feet in September 1907<sup>32</sup>. An enlargement of the dam to 24 feet at the spillway and the reservoir to 817.18 acre-feet took place on September 23, 1931<sup>33</sup>. There are no records of these enlargements being

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approved by the State Engineer. Surveys by the National Park Service in October of 1959 indicate the dam was 24.4 feet high at the spillway, and 27.9 feet to the crest of the dam. The following table summarizes the several referenced data:

#### TABLE 1

		Height of Dam in feet	Res. Surface area in acres		Res. Capacity in acre-feet	
Reference	Date	(to spillway)	Low	HWL	Low	HWL
Water Filing 91	1/23/02	-	-	-	-	803.5
Decree	6/10/01	(24.0)	(16.4)	(47.1)		(759.6)
Water Filing 98	6/30/02	24.0	16.4	47.1	-	810.6
BLM #89583	5/14/03	19.4	14.4	42.6	-	498.0
Capacity Survey	9//07	20.35	-	45.29	-	611.96
Decree	8/01/31	Refill				(759.6)
Capacity Survey	9/23/31	24.0	-	49.4	-	817.18
NPS Survey	10/23/59	24.4	-	49.5	-	-

It should be noted that the spillway had only 3.5 feet of freeboard in 1959, according to the National Park Service survey, whereas the State Engineer's orders in 1951<sup>5</sup>, and Mr. Spreng's accounting of the work he did in 1954<sup>21,28</sup>, should have provided six feet of freeboard.

The plans OC-39, which were approved by the State Engineer, were not followed, for the completed dam resembles the plan in concept only. Except for the outlet works, the records indicate the dam was constructed by the company's own forces, under the direction of the President of the Board of Directors.

#### 1951 - 1955 Repairs and Alterations of the Dam and Spillway

In 1951, due to an inspection and report by Special Deputy State Engineer, Clark Schnurr, State Engineer Hinderlider directed that the bottom width of

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the spillway be increased to 30 feet; the downstream slope of the dam be increased from 1 1/2:1 to 2:1, the dam height increased to provide at least six feet of freeboard for the spillway, and other actions be performed related to keeping the spillway clear of obstructions<sup>5</sup>. This directive was modified the same year, however, to lowering the spillway at least two feet to provide six feet of spillway freeboard, and to increase the bottom width to 30 feet<sup>5</sup>.

The details of the work during this period are based on a telephone conversation<sup>21</sup> and an interview with Mr. Edward Spreng of Johnstown, Colorado<sup>28</sup>. As a young man, Mr. Spreng and the company's ditch superintendent, Mr. Tim Wright, during the months of September and October, 1954, worked on the dam and outlet. The two of them, with the aid of horses and slip, hand tools, and logistical support from the president of the board of directors, Tom McKee, excavated the spillway, removed timber from the reservoir, and repaired the outlet gate.

It does not appear that the spillway was lowered materially, but was widened to about 30 feet in 1954. If the spillway was lowered two feet, the usable capacity of the reservoir would have been approximately 721 acre-feet according to the capacity survey made in 1931 (CS-51)<sup>33</sup>. Storage records maintained by the Division Engineer show the gage as 24 feet, and the capacity as 824 acre-feet (later changed to 817 acre-feet) for the period 1954 to 1974, the length of the record.

Mr. Spreng's account of the work done to the outlet provides an explanation of the configuration of the outlet "dry well" at the time of failure. As Mr. Spreng describes it, "Mr. McKee wanted Tim and me to see if we could discover why the outlet gate wasn't working properly". They began to dig around the operating stem, which stuck up through the embankment fill at the

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crest of the dam (there was no well per plans and specifications OC-39). After digging a hole around the stem as far as they could, and not finding any problem, they returned to Loveland to relate the situation to Mr. McKee. They returned the following week, and with the aid of Mr. McKee, who had timber transported to the dam by horse, shored the excavation and completed a 4x4 foot well down to the valve bonnet. Mr. Spreng related how the digging was relatively easy and they had no water problems. (Storage records show the reservoir empty for two seasons prior to the excavation). He removed the bonnet from the valve and found the screw on which the gate leaf moved was stripped. The screw was removed, taken to Loveland for repair, and reinstalled.

A 30-inch diameter corrugated metal pipe (CMP) was transported to the site in pieces by horses, and reassembled using an acytelene torch. It was placed inside the cribbed excavation, the bottom being level with the bottom of the bonnet. The excavation was then backfilled with earth to the bottom of the nut on the top of the bonnet. The cribbing was removed and the outside of the CMP backfilled to the crest of the dam. On January 8, 1955, the ditch superintendent reported to the Board of Directors that conditions at Lawn Lake were in good shape.

#### 1982 Post-Failure Surveys

The United States Geological Survey's field investigations after the failure show that the dam's crest was eight to ten feet wide, sloping towards the reservoir, the height from the invert of the entrance to the outlet to the crest of the spillway was approximately 24 feet, the upstream slope varied from 1.25 to 1.67:1, the downstream slope averaged 1.25:1, the spillway was 25

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to 30 feet wide, and had a minimum freeboard of about three feet<sup>34</sup>. The United States Geological Survey is preparing a capacity survey map, which was not available at the writing of this report.

The preceding establishes the history of construction and alteration of the dam as can reasonably be determined.

#### EVENTS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO FAILURE

According to Henry Schmidt, ditch superintendent for the company, the reservoir was filled during the 1978 irrigation season, remained full through 1979, and was drained in the Fall of 1980. The reservoir remained empty during the 1981 season, and began to fill during the 1982 season. On September 21, 1980, the gate was closed an amount equal to one-half of the previous opening on August 14, 1980. No adjustments were made in 1981. On July 8, 1982, Mr. Schmidt and two other men went to the dam to close the valve. One of the men descended the well to oil the operating nut and reported that the well was dry. Mr. Schmidt said there was no sign or sound of running water. He also went to the discharge end of the outlet and observed that a small amount of water was still running. He attributed this to something being stuck in the gate leaf, preventing total closure. There is an eyewitness report in the NPS file about the men "cussing" the operation of the valve. (See Appendix E)

He spoke of, and had photographed, the snow cover below the dam as well as the drainage area. He remembered that the gage rod in the reservoir was damaged but that the reservoir was 2 to 2.5 feet below the high water line as observed on a large rock on the dam. He estimated the reservoir was two-thirds full, about 450 acre-feet. (Note: Capacity Survey 51 indicates that 450 acre-feet is equivalent to about gage 16, which would be eight feet below the spillway, two feet below the spillway at gage 22 is equivalent to 721 acre-feet). He left the dam feeling everything was in good shape.

In spite of several people having been on or near the dam, as recently as the day before the failure, no one observed anything which would have aroused

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their suspicions<sup>25</sup>. The only unusual event spoken of by the visitors camped near the dam were sounds described as wind, or a distant waterfall, during the morning of July 15, 1982 from about 2:00 a.m. to 4:00 a.m. They were awakened in the night and were concious of the sound. One wondered why the tent was not flapping from such a strong wind. Another camper was fishing in the spillway until about 8:45 p.m., July 14, and related that the wind was causing two foot high waves, and water was running over the spillway. He felt the dam was okay. Another camper relates discussing the noise with fellow campers about 9:30 p.m. on July 14th, and waking up periodically during the night noting that the noise had increased. Several campers who were located downstream from the dam, related how they were awakened about 6:00 a.m. on July 15th by 15ud thundering noises. When they looked to see what was happening, they saw 25 to 30 foot waves of muddy water carrying trees and rocks down the stream valley. (See Appendix E).

#### DESCRIPTION OF FAILURE AND DAMAGES

The first indication that something unusual was occurring in Horseshoe Park was reported by an A-1 Trash Service employee who was enroute to pick up trash in the Endovalley area<sup>24,38</sup>. He arrived at the Lawn Lake Trail head about 6:18 a.m., July 15, 1982, and heard a deafening noise and saw dirt in the air. At first, he thought a plane was crashing, but when he traveled up the road to investigate, he observed flooding and debris in the Roaring River. He then looked up the drainage and saw trees and rocks being thrown into the air. He quickly went to the trail head emergency phone and called the National Park Service dispatcher who received the call at 6:22 a.m. Park Rangers responded to the situation and notified the Estes Park Police Department at 6:43 a.m. (See Appendix E for copies of statements obtained by the National Park Service from witnesses.)

Estimates of the peak discharge from the dam breach as determined by the United States Geological Survey "dam break" investigation at Lawn Lake Dam, are about 20,000 cfs, reducing to about 7700 cfs at Cascade Reservoir in Horseshoe Park, and 5400 cfs at Lake Olympus<sup>37</sup>. The Cascade Reservoir, owned by the City of Estes Park, in Horseshoe Park began to overtop about 7:15 a.m. and failed at 7:42 a.m., sending an intermediate surge of about 14,000 cfs down the Fall River. The head of the flood entered Estes Park about 8:30 a.m.<sup>38</sup>. The flooding washed away bridges, destroyed road systems, inundated business and residences, destroyed a hydroelectric plant, fish hatchery, and caused three confirmed deaths. Damages have been claimed to exceed \$31,000,000<sup>35</sup>.

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The Governor declared a state-of-emergency on July 15, and requested a Presidential declaration for Larimer County, which was made on July 22, allow-ing numerous recovery programs to begin<sup>35</sup>.

#### INVESTIGATION OF THE FAILURE

#### Field Investigations

As a result of the initial inspection of the failure on July 15, it was concluded from physical evidence that the dam could not have failed due to overtopping, but could have failed by piping due to several possible causes, or from embankment instability. Further investigation and analyses were recommended by staff members<sup>7</sup>.

A second investigation trip was planned and completed on July 22, 1982 where geotechnical and geologic information were gathered from the dam and foundation, the extent of rodent activity was investigated, the remains of the outlet works were examined, the spillway was surveyed for further hydraulic analysis, and extensive surface and air photography were obtained<sup>11,13</sup>.

The soil samples obtained were transported to the Colorado Department of Highways' Staff Materials Laboratory for standard soil property testing, permeability, and triaxial shear strength determinations. The data gathered were analyzed and recorded in several memoranda/reports by the several engineers and geologists taking part in the investigation<sup>11,15,29,34,36</sup>. These data were used to develop a model of the dam for stability analysis. The reports on these investigations are contained in Appendices A, B, and C.

After examining the remains of the outlet works, the possibility that the gate-valve failed due to cracking because of rocks being jammed between the gate leaf and the seat was raised. In order to pursue this possibility, Mr. Ralph Mangone, an expert metallurgist, examined the pictures of the valve to determine if there was any reason to believe that the valve failed because of the rocks being jammed in the gate leaf. Mr. Mangone concluded that the

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breaks were fresh and probably caused by impact during the failure. Subsequent investigation of the valve on September 2, 1982 did not reveal any additional evidence that the valve was cracked before the failure.

C Shortly after consulting with Mr. Mangone, it was revealed that a piece of lead caulking was found at the site. After obtaining this evidence, it was <u>C</u> decided to retrieve more of the lead caulking since it appeared that the condition of the caulking was instrumental in understanding the possible С reason for failure. A third inspection trip was planned and completed on V September 2, 1982, which resulted in the finding of a significant amount of C the lead caulking and other metal parts of the outlet works. The remains of the outlet were also examined more closely and photographed to assist in the interpretation of the evidence  $^{17,20,23}$ .

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Following is a brief description of possible causes of failure and the conclusions reached.

#### Overtopping

It was concluded from the first investigation on July 15, 1982, that overtopping was not a reason for failure. The high water line in the reservoir was found to be about three feet below the crest of the dam<sup>7</sup>. This was corroborated by the findings of the United States Geological Survey from their surveys of the dam and reservoir<sup>34</sup>.

The National Weather Service provided meteorological information in the vicinity of Estes Park, and it is concluded that weather was not a factor in the failure. Rainfall during the period from July 10-15, 1982 totaled 0.11 inch at Estes Park, and no large rainfall amounts were received in the area during this period. Precipitation at Estes Park from October 1, 1981 through June 1982 totaled 10.88 inches, which was 1.06 inches above normal for the period. Snowpack for the winter of 1981-82 in the mountains surrounding Estes Park was approximately 125 percent of normal.

#### Rodent Damage

Marmot burrows are located in the crest of the remaining dam and downstream slope, as well as in the sides of the spillway banks downstream from the control section. They are also located throughout the immediate area of the dam. No burrows were observed on the upstream slope of the dam<sup>11</sup>.

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Each burrow found on the remaining portion of the dam was excavated to determine its extent. The maximum distance of any of the burrows was three feet below the crest of the dam, and the maximum length was about four feet. None of the burrows extended below what would be considered the phreatic surface of the dam. There is no reason to believe that the dam's interior was extensively burrowed to cause the failure of the dam, although it cannot be totally ruled out, since a major section of the dam was washed away during the failure which may have contained the critical burrowing activity. The inspections and photographs made in prior years, however, do not indicate that there E was abnormal rodent activity in the dam. It is concluded that rodent activity was probably not the cause of failure.

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#### Frost Penetration

It was speculated by Dr. Wayne Charlie of Colorado State University, who was a member of the second investigation team on July 22, 1982, that soil property changes induced by freeze-thaw cycles of the soils and/or ice lense development could be a possible cause of failure. He stated the soils in the dam were frost susceptible and that the conditions at the site due to climate, frost penetration in excess of ten feet, and melting of snow, could have affected the strength and permeability of the dam<sup>15</sup>. Although these conditions are evident, it doesn't explain why the conditions, which existed during the 80-year life of the dam, became critical this year. It could be assumed that the strengths and permeabilities found during the investigation reflect the changed soil property characteristics and were included in the stability analysis. No ice lenses or frozen ground were found during the investigation, however, they could have thawed prior to the failure, particularly if they

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were a causitive factor. Investigation of this cause was limited due to resources and expertise in the specialized area. An expert on the subject of frozen soil would need to be engaged to conduct an analysis of the phenomenon. It is concluded, however, that the effects of frost penetration were reflected by the soil parameters used in the stability/permeability analysis.

#### Earthquake

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Mr. Waverly Person of the United States Geological Survey's National Earthquake Information Center, was interviewed to see if any earthquake activity occurred in the vicinity of the dam at the time of the failure. He reported that no activity occurred during that time and, further, that no activity has ever been measured in that area.

Mr. Person said that the records were available at the center for review, and they were at a scale which could be analyzed for blasting activity if desired.

#### Embankment Stability

The details of the stability analyses are contained in references 14 and 15 and Appendices A, B, and C.

The initial analysis assumed that the embankment section through the outlet (maximum section) was undrained, similar to a homogeneous dam, which resulted in a factor of safety of less than one. This condition would cause an unstable slope and probable slip failure. It was concluded from the evaluation of the records of storage and the permeabilities obtained from the laboratory testing, however, that steady-state seepage must have existed at

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the time of failure and the assumption of no drainage was not likely. Some type of drainage probably existed within the dam section which kept the seepage from reducing the strength of the materials to a state of stress which would cause the materials to fail under normal conditions. Some other abnormal condition existed which caused the failure.

#### Lead Caulked Seal Between the Gate Valve and Outlet Pipe

During the investigation, it was learned that a piece of lead was found at the dam<sup>17</sup>. Lead caulk was used to form the seal between the outlet pipe and the gate valve<sup>5</sup>. This was contrary to the plans and specifications, OC-39, which required that the valve be encased in "concrete for three feet above the pipe and two feet below the pipe and one foot thick".<sup>4</sup> No evidence of any concrete around the gate valve was found during the investigation.

Examination of the piece of lead indicated it was in poor condition, being corroded and deteriorated to the point it would make a poor water tight seal<sup>20</sup>. This evidence prompted a third trip to the dam on September 2, 1982 with a metal detector, with the object of finding the rest of the lead caulking and other metal parts of the outlet, and close examination and photographing of the gate valve and outlet pipe<sup>23</sup>.

About 144 inches of lead caulking were found and the locations plotted on a map, as well as photographed. The lead caulking was brought to Denver for further examination and is in the State Engineer's possession. These additional pieces of lead are also in poor condition and of differential thicknesses. The ends of the pieces are deformed in some cases and have cold joints in others. The thicknesses of the lead found would also be inadequate to fill the annular space between the pipe and valve flange, according to measurements made in the field<sup>23</sup>.

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Examination of the valve revealed that there were signs of leakage from the joint between the flange and the pipe located at the top, due to the presence of tuberculated orange-colored stain similar to the upstream face of the gate leaf and other parts of the outlet which were exposed to the water. This is in contrast to the blackened surfaces of the rest of the upstream flange, where the lead caulking was in contact with it.

#### Outlet Pipe Bedding

In order to determine the condition of the bedding of the remaining outlet pipe, and if there is any evidence that a void existed under it, the outflow from the reservoir should be diverted and the pipe carefully excavated and examined. The following description of the manner in which the embankment was breached is hypothesized from the remains of the dam, and the location of the evidence found during the investigation. The facts that were observed are:

- The breach occurred at the maximum section of the dam where the outlet works were located. The dimensions of the breach are about 27 feet deep, the top width is 91.5 feet, and the bottom width is 58 feet.
- 2. There were discernible sounds heard by nearby campers in the night and early morning hours that sounded like strong winds, or a distant water fall. These were heard as early as 9:30 p.m. on July 14th, and from 2:00 a.m. to 4:00 a.m. on July 15th. A wall of water was cascading down the Roaring River at 6:00 a.m. on July 15th. (See Appendix E)
- There are sand plumes on the natural ground (moraine) on each side of the scoured streambed below the dam.
- 4. The corrugated metal pipe that was installed as the dry well for the operating stem in 1954 was found on the natural ground downstream from the dam. The top 15 1/2 feet was intact, the bottom 7-8 feet is missing. The hinged hatch cover is missing.
- 5. The value stem, which was attached to the operating nut on the value by gravity, has a nearly 90 degree bend at the lower end, just above the socket. It was found about 100 feet downstream from its origin. See reference 23.

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- 6. Parts of the downstream outlet pipe were found downstream from the dam in a battered and broken condition. Several feet of the outlet were not found. The pieces found were scattered from the dam to about one mile downstream.
- 7. The gate value and several of the broken pieces were found within 200 feet from their original location in a line with the axis of the outlet pipe. They were found on the bedrock surface which was scoured clean by the large flows during the full breach.
- 8. The lead caulking for the gate valve was found within fifty feet of its original location on the bedrock surface.
- The geotechnical investigations and stability analyses indicate that the state of stress in the dam was near failure condition.

These facts indicate that the dam failure probably began as a small hole or void caused by piping at the level of the outlet conduit. As the hole was enlarged by the internal erosion of the embankment materials from the escaping water, the increased flows exceeded the capacity of the outlet channel, spreading out over the moraine below the dam. The materials being eroded were deposited along the fringes of the flow, subsequently being partially removed as the larger flows began to scour the moraine upon which they were deposited.

The reservoir must have been discharging through the hole for many hours, and at a sufficiently large rate to be heard during the night by the campers at the site. The hole enlarged sufficiently around 5:00 a.m. to 5:30 a.m. to cause the overlying material to collapse into the hole and flowing water, resulting in the total breach of the dam. The outflow increased to its

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maximum amount very quickly, carrying the corrugated metal dry well downstream on its crest and depositing it in the brush on the left side of the flooded area where it escaped being dislodged during the scouring by the rest of the The toppling of the corrugated metal dry well bent the operating outflow. stem over, but did not dislodge it from the valve. The erosive force of the waters gradually eroded the foundation of the downstream portion of the outlet pipe and dislodged it from its place. It is not certain whether the pipe was removed in pieces or in one piece ultimately becoming broken and scattered downstream. With its downstream support removed, the valve was dislodged from its connection to the upstream portion of the outlet pipe, the lead caulking being deposited within 50 feet of its origin, probably due to its small size and heavy weight, and the gate valve transported over the bedrock surface to its resting place. It appears that the valve housing was hit by a large boulder, at its resting place, which knocked the large piece of the lower right hand quadrant off the value and washed it further downstream  $^{23}$ .

It does not appear, by the evidence found, that a massive slope failure occurred as the primary cause of the breach of the dam resulting in the erosion of the dam from the top down. This conclusion is based on the existence of the sand plumes, which indicate that the initial failure was gradual with the sand being deposited on the existing morainal surfaces by lesser flows before the total breach flows began, scouring the moraine down to bedrock.

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#### Findings

The evidence found in this investigation leads to the conclusion that the failure was caused by the deflection and/or deterioration of the lead caulking at the connection between the outlet pipe and the gate-valve, resulting in a situation which increased the potential for piping of dam material and/or affected the pore pressure distribution in the embankment, which could reduce the strength of the materials in the dam to a state of stress which could cause a portion of the slope of the dam to slough.

Piping is the backward erosion of earthen materials due to the velocity of the leaking water being sufficient to dislodge the individual soil particles from their matrix and transporting them from the dam. A hole is developed from the downstream exit point back towards the source of leakage. A path for the concentration of the leakage sometimes exists due to improper backfilling and resulting voids along an outlet conduit.

A credible explanation for the situation to develop into a failure after nearly 80 years of use is based on the leakage not becoming pressurized unless the gate was in some stage of total, or nearly total, closure and the reservoir close to full or having sufficient potential energy to influence the leakage from the joint.

Storage records for the reservoir for the periods from 1938 to 1973 and from 1978 to 1981 are available, but not the discharge records. During the early years, the reservoir was operated on a fill during the runoff and empty in the fall basis, but, during the period from 1960 through 1973, the reservoir was full during all the months of the year. Unfortunately, it is not

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possible to determine whether the gate was totally or partially closed during these periods. It was assumed it was closed sufficiently to maintain the level of the reservoir at the spillway.

Another reason for the progressive nature of the deterioration would be the slow deterioration of the lead caulking itself during the periods of high pressure leakage. In accordance with Mr. Mangone's consultation, the lead could erode due to high pressure leakage.

#### Discussion

Whether or not the leakage from the valve connection had a path or void to flow through, would determine how it affected the dam.

If there were no void, the pressure from the leak could create a local "bulge" in the steady-state phreatic condition within the dam. This could cause a slough in the downstream slope which would expose the seepage from the reservoir within the dam (steady-state phreatic condition). The seepage within the dam has a higher potential energy, and could cause the dam materials to be washed from their place. This condition, and the leaking water from the deteriorated seal, could readily erode a hole back to the valve. With a flow path existing from the downstream face of the dam back to the valve, the potential energy existing within the dam under steady-state seepage could be sufficient to pipe the easily erodible materials of the dam lengthening the piping path to the upstream face of the reservoir. Once the void was through the dam, it would only be a matter of time before a total breach would occur due to the water flowing through the hole.

If there were a void, even of a small size, existing along the pipe, the leakage would have followed this path of least resistance. The possibility of

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a void existing beneath or along an outlet is great, unless care is taken during backfilling of an outlet. Modern practice requires the use of shaped beddings, and sometimes fresh concrete placed under and around the pipe to assure a positive cutoff. Cut-off collars are also placed around outlet pipes to increase the seepage path length along the pipe. In the case of Lawn Lake's outlet, the cut-off collars were not constructed, and the outlet pipe was bedded and nearly backfilled before the State Engineer's representative inspected it in 1903. In addition, the valve and pipe were not encased in concrete as specified by the engineer. Finally, according to our investigation, it appears that the source of the materials for the backfilling of the outlet pipe were the finer glacial materials from the surface of the moraine to the left of the outlet ditch. Investigations showed that these materials were nonplastic and would offer little resistance to erosion. Resistance to piping, however, may have been improved by the addition of the cement to the fill as described in T. W. Jaycox's report<sup>5</sup>.

The rockfill on the downstream slope, which existed at the outlet section, the rocky nature of the channel, and flows from the outlet pipe itself could conceal any piping condition occurring along the outlet. The fine material may have collected in the rockfill itself as it was piped from the embankment. Again, once a significant flow path was piped back to the valve, the potential energy within the embankment could readily pipe a hole to the upstream slope of the dam.

A couple of items that relate to the condition of the outlet are noted. One is a reference in the June 22, 1906 minutes of the company's annual meeting by its ditch superintendent of a "cave" that occurred where the reservoir discharges into the pipe, and the suggestion that the necessary stone and

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cement work be done as soon as possible. The other is that the water in the reservoir during the investigation of July 22, 1982 was noted to be running through cracks in the concrete headwall at the entrance to the pipe. It is assumed that the concrete headwall existing today was constructed at the suggestion of the superintendent in 1906.

#### Conclusions

It is concluded that the failure occurred due to leakage under high pressure from the leaded connection of the outlet pipe and valve, causing progressive piping of the dam embankment in the vicinity of the outlet pipe during periods of high reservoir levels and gate closure and sudden collapse of the embankment allowing rapid evacuation of the reservoir.

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- 1. Water filings, maps and statements for the Lawn Reservoir, numbered 91 and 98, filed January 23, 1902 and June 30, 1902 in the State Engineer's Office.
- 2. Findings and decrees for the Lawn Reservoir, claimant Farmers Irrigation Ditch and Reservoir Company, No. 4862, District Court, District No. 4, and No. 10077, District Court, District No. 4.
- 3. Plan and cross-section of dam and outlet of Lawn Reservoir, approved by State Engineer, Addison J. McCune, on August 19, 1902, file OC-39.
- 4. Contract and specifications for the dam and outlet of the Lawn Reservoir (undated, unsigned), State Engineer file OC-39.
- 5. State Engineer's correspondence file, Lawn Lake Dam, 3104.51, September 22, 1903 to August 12, 1980 (especially T. W. Jaycox's report of 9/22/03).
- 6. State Engineer's Preliminary Hazard Determination File, Lawn Reservoir Dam, 3104.51.
- 7. Inspection Report, Lawn Lake, OC-39, W. Div. 1, W. Dist. 4, July 15, 1982 by Jim Norfleet and John Van Sciver, Division of Water Resources, Dam Safety Branch (Failure Report).
- Office memo, Jim Norfleet, Division of Water Resources, Dam Safety Branch, July 19, 1982. Telephone conversation with a Larry Ledwich, State Division of Disaster Emergency Services, who visited dam site on Saturday, July 15, 1982.
- 9. Inspection of Outlet System and Debris, July 22, 1982, by Jim Norfleet, Senior Water Resource Engineer, and Wayne Charlie, Colorado State University.
- 10. Memo of meeting, Lawn Lake investigation schedule, July 22, 1982, John Van Sciver, Division of Water Resources, Dam Safety Branch.
- 11. Inspection Report, Lawn Lake, OC-39, Division 1, District 4, July 22, 1982 (exploration trench of downstream slope @ Station 3+87, mapping and investigation of rodent activity, spillway profile, and cross-sections), Alan Pearson and John Van Sciver, Division of Water Resources, Dam Safety Branch.
- 12. Office memo, John Van Sciver, Division of Water Resources, Dam Safety Branch, July 22, 1982, telephone conversation with Bob Jarrett, USGS, Water Resources Division, about his findings/activities at the dam site on July 21, 1982.
- 13. Scope of Lawn Lake Dam Failure Investigation, Dam Safety Branch, July 26, 1982, by Alan Pearson, Division of Water Resources, Dam Safety Branch.

#### LAWN LAKE DAM FAILURE INVESTIGATION

#### APPENDICES

- A. Geologic/Geotechnical Notes
- B. Laboratory TestingC. Slope Stability Analysis

#### OFFICE OF THE STATE ENGINEER February 14, 1983

Jeris A. Danielson State Engineer

#### LAWN LAKE DAM FAILURE INVESTIGATION

### Geologic/Geotechnical Notes

#### Appendix A

by

George Van Slyke, Supervisor, Geologist James Norfleet, Senior, Water Resources Engineer John Van Sciver, Senior, Water Resources Engineer

#### LAWN LAKE DAM GEOLOGIC/GEOTECHNICAL NOTES

#### APPENDIX A

#### GENERAL

On July 15, 1982, Lawn Lake Dam failed due to unknown causes. On July 22, several members of the Dam Safety Branch inspected the dam in an attempt to determine the cause of failure. We were taken to the site by helicopter.

#### GEOLOGIC SETTING

The dam is located on an old glacial moraine. The moraine material appear to be a maximum of 25 feet thick in the immediate vicinity of the dam and overlies pre-Cambrian igneous rocks. These igneous rocks range in composition from granite to diorite. They are fractured and jointed with a fracture spacing of about one foot. Three distinct joint sets are evident: (1) parallel to the dam axis, dipping about 45° downstream and 30° to 45° upstream; (2) normal to the dam axis, dipping 70° to 80° toward the right (south) abutment; (3) at about 45° to the dam axis, dipping about 60° downstream (See sketch A-1 and photos A-8 and A-9).

The granites appear relatively fresh with very little weathering. The rock is very hard and "rings" with a strong hammer blow.

It appears that the glacial moraine originally formed a dam across a natural depression in the valley.

#### OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING CONSTRUCTION

In the early 1900's, the lake was enlarged and controlled outlet installed. Fill was placed on top of the natural moraine dam and an area excavated through the moraine for placement of the outlet pipe. The cut was filled with material of unknown composition (this material was washed out at the time of failure). An additional 7 to 9 feet of sandy fill was placed on top of the moraine. At this height (approximately 5 feet below the crest), a layer of organic material appears to cover the entire dam.

The origin of this organic material is unknown; however, it appears that this layer may be the result of the growth of grass on the surface of a dam approximately five feet less in height than the present dam. (See photo A-5) Due to the appearance of this organic layer, the "shorte" dam must have existed for a considerable time before an additional five feet of fill was placed.

## OBSERVATIONS OF JULY 15, 1982 (Ref: Inspection Report dated July 15, 1982)

#### Geologic and Geotechnical Findings

The right side of the breach was carefully examined for signs of weakness

which may have existed within the embankment. The following specific items were noted:

An organic clay/silt seam, 12 inches in thickness, was found running through the dam approximately five (5) feet below crest elevation. This organic seam was totally saturated and free water was released when a sample was squeezed. Soil temperature was between 35 and 40 degrees and the soil did display a slight degree of plasticity.

A relatively clean sand lense was found running through the dam above the foundation, approximately 10 feet below crest elevation. This sand seam was totally saturated and the soil formed a "mud flow" when agitated by foot.

A lense of peat was found running along the foundation of the dam approximately 12 feet below crest elevation. Tree roots were growing in this peat layer.

For a description of other features observed, refer to inspection report by John VanSciver and Jim Norfleet, dated July 15, 1982.

## OBSERVATIONS OF 7-22-82

On the day of the inspection, both sides of the breach were logged, samples taken, the channel section around the outlet pipe was inspected, and photographs (both air and ground) were taken. (See photos A-1 through A-7)

Logging of both sides of the breach show very good correlation from side to side. Seven distinct layers are present on the right side and nine on the left. The two lowest layers on the left are not present on the right. These represent filling to bring the left side up to the approximate level of the right side. From that point up, all layers are generally similar on both sides. Although there are variations within layers, they were easily divided into the general classifications as shown in Figure A-1.

Visual classification done at the site appears to be in general agreement with laboratory results. Discrepancies seem to be due to individuals "seeing" more fines and less gravel than the lab.

The dam above the moraine is composed entirely of silty and poorly graded sands with varying amounts of fines and gravel. Also, as noted in the logs, considerable amounts of organic material were found. Distinct color changes probably resulted from various borrow areas. (See photos color changes probably there is some variation in material type within A-1 and A-5) Although there is some variation in material type within a layer, the environment from which they were taken was similar. Based on this, we estimate that there were between four and seven borrow areas. All the fill is in a semi-compact, friable state and is moist except layer seven which appears to be saturated.

The channel of the breach has a number of large granitic boulders near

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what remains of the outlet pipe (See sketch A-1 and photo A-7). One of the boulders has a black, sooty coating on the right (south) side. Also found near this boulder at the water surface was a black coarse sand. This sand is extremely friable and very weakly cemented. It is composed almost entirely of coarse sand and is very open (i.e., point to point contact of sand grains). On close examination, it was found that this sand is composed of granitic fragments and the black is a sooty surface coating similar to that on the boulders.

Based on observations and construction photos, it appears that the black soot may have come from a coal fire built in the area during construction for heating rivets and lead and for keeping warm.

- photo A-1: Right side of breach.
- Photo A-2: Downstream toe on right side of breach.
- Photo A-3: Foundation on right side of breach.
- Photo A-4: Close-up of trench excavation on right side of breach.
- Photo A-5: Left side of breach.
- Photo A-6: Trench excavation on left side of breach.
- Photo A-7: Foundation on left side of breach.
- Photo A-8: Rock in stream channel immediately downstream of dam.
- Photo A-9: Rock in stream channel 100 feet downstream and beyond.
- Photo A-10: Seep area downstream on left side of stream channel. Flowing water present.

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Layer	No. GENERAL	DESCRIPTIONS
1	Silty Sand (SM)	65% fine to coarse sand 20% non-plastic fines 15% subrounded gravel to 6" maximum Material is generally moist, tan to light brow with occasional limonite stains. Contains monthinner layers with varying amounts of gravel and fines. A 3" thick layer of GP-GM was loo on the right side between 10" and 1'1" below crest.
2	Silty Sand (SM) (Organic)	55% fine to coarse, mostly fine sand 20-25% slightly plastic, organic fines 20-25% subrounded gravel to $2\frac{1}{2}$ " maximum Material is dark gray to black, contains abun pieces of wood. Moist. Due to the fineness the sand, this material appears to be an orga silt by visual classification.
3	Silty to Poorly Graded Sand (SM-SP)	65% fine to medium with occasional coarse san 10% non-plastic fines 25% subrounded gravel to 3" maximum Contains small layers which are skip-graded <b>a</b> ing medium sand size. Brown, moist. Contain some organic debris (wood chips).
4	Silty to Poorly Graded Sand (SM-SP)	75% mostly fine to medium sand 10% non-plastic fines 15% subrounded gravel to 1" maximum Occasional layers of very silty material. Da brown, moist.
5	Silty Sand (SM)	75% fine to medium sand 20% non-plastic to slightly plastic fines 5% fine subrounded gravel to 1" maximum Dark reddish brown to gray-brown, moist. Occa sional organic streaks.
6	Left side Silty to Poorly Graded Sand (SM-SP)	73% mostly fine sand 7% non-plastic fines 20% fine gravel to 5/8" maximum Brown, moist.
	Right side Gravel (GW)	55% gravel to 3" maximum 40% mostly fine sand 5% non-plastic fines Brown, moist.
7	Silty Sand (SM)	70% fine to coarse sand 20% non-plastic fines 10% subrounded gravel to 1" maximum Dark reddish brown with rust streaks and gray mottling, moist to saturated. Right side cont less fines (dropping to 5%). Left side contai up to 40% fines.

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
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8*	Silty Sand (SM)	Similar to layer 6 except saturated.
9*	Silty Sand (SM)	65% mostly fine sand 15% non-plastic fines 20% subrounded gravel to 4" with occasional cobbles and boulders to 1' which have coating of organic silt. Wet to saturated, reddish brown with limonite satins and wood fragments.
Moraine		A mixture of large granite boulders, cobbles, sand and non-plastic fines. No apparent bedding.

\* Layers 8 and 9 are not present on the right side of the breach.

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# LAWN LAKE DAM



JOINT ATTITUDES See Photos A-8 and A-9

SKETCH A-

FIGURE A-I: See Attached Descriptions of Sofi Layer I through 9.

7-22-82

# LAWN LAKE DAM











PHOTO A-1











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PHOTO A-6




PHOTO A-7





PHOTO A-9

PHOTO A-8



PHOTO A-10

## LAWN LAKE DAM FAILURE INVESTIGATION LABORATORY TESTING

## APPENDIX E

by

James Norfleet, Senior, Water Resources Engineer George Van Slyke, Supervisor, Geologist

#### LAWN LAKE DAM FAILURE INVESTIGATION LABORATORY TESTING

APPENDIX B B

#### LABORATORY TESTING

As stated in Appendix A (Geologic/Geotechnical Notes), seven sack samples were obtained from various strata on the left side of the breach. The left side samples were numbered 1L through 7L, and a nuclear test was performed to determine the density and moisture content of the material below the nuclear test gage. The percent gravel was used to correct the field density for placement density of the minus #4 in laboratory triaxial shear tests. The results of field density and moisture tests are presented on Figures B-1 through B-7.

A small moisture sample was obtained from each of the seven sack samples for a laboratory moisture determination. The moisture content as determined in the laboratory was within three percent of the field moisture for four of the seven samples, no. 1L, 2L, 5L, and 7L. The difference in moisture content between the field and laboratory for the other three samples was as much as 20 percent. The large variation is primarily due to the different size soil sample volumes. The variations could also be attributed to the rock moisture, wood chips or roots in the field sample which were not present in the laboratory samples.

In addition to the seven sack samples obtained from the left side, 13 small sack samples were obtained from various strata on the right side of the breach for laboratory classification. The right side samples are numbered 1R through 13R. Field density and moisture tests were not performed on the right side.

### STANDARD PROPERTIES

The following standard property tests were performed on the samples obtained:

Gradation Analysis Specific Gravity of Minus #4 Material Bulk Specific Gravity of Plus #4 Material (Samples No. 1L through 7L only) Absorption (Plus #4 Material, Samples No. 1L through 7L only) Atterburg Limits

The specific gravity of the minus #4 material, bulk specific gravity of the plus #4 material, and absorption for the samples are listed on Figure B-8. A summary of results from gradation analysis and Atterburg limits is presented in Figure B-9. Individual gradation curves are plotted and presented in Figures B-10 through B-29. Samples obtained from the left side of the breach contained between 7 and 26 percent non-plastic to low plasticity fines. Five samples were classified as borderline between a poorly graded sand and a silty sand SP-SM. The other two were classified as SM. The higher liquid limits for samples no. 2L and 5L are a result of the presence of organic material. Organic material absorbs a large amount of water which does not add to the liquidity of the sample during the test.

The most significant difference between material from the right side and material from the left side was the two gravel layers found at a depth of 10 inches and 10' 10" on the right side of the breach. The layer at the 10-inch depth was three inches thick and the layer at the 10' 10" depth was one foot thick. The amount of material passing the #200 sieve in the gravel layers were six percent and four percent, respectively.

In general, the standard property test results and visual field classifications are in agreement, indicating mostly sandy material was used for the construction of the embankment.

#### LABORATORY PERMEABILITY

Three samples were selected for permeability testing, samples no. 5L, 6L, and 7L. The samples were remolded into a six inch diameter mold, seven inch high. The samples tested included the plus #4 fraction and were placed at their respective field density and moisture content. The test was performed under a constant six inch head. The results are presented on Figures B-30 through B-32.

The results indicate only one sample was impervious, sample, no. 5L. The other two samples, no. 6L and 7L, had permeability rates of 0.7 feet/day and 6.6 feet/day, respectively.

#### TRIAXIAL SHEAR

Three samples were selected for shear testing, samples no. 2L, 5L, and 6L. For each sample, the minus #4 fraction was remolded into a 2.85 inch diameter by 6.35 inch high specimen. The field density and moisture content was adjusted for the rock present in the bulk sample to determine placement density of the minus #4 material. The nomographs shown on Figures B-33 through B-35 were used for the moisture/density correction.

The triaxial shear tests were multiple-stage on a single specimen. Each stage was performed with the specimen confined by a different lateral pressure. A strip-chart was used to record deviator load, axial strain, and pore pressure. Each stage was completed when the deviator was observed to be changing less than five pounds in 30 minutes. At the end of the first stage, the specimen was unloaded and the second higher lateral pressure applied. The third stage was performed in the same manner. All samples were backpressured to saturation prior to loading. Samples no. 2L and 6L were tested in a consolidated-drained (CD) mode and sample no. 5L was tested in a consolidated-undrained (CU) mode. The following is a list of confining pressures for the tests:

Sample No.	Type of Test	Effective Confining Pressure (psi)
2L	CD	5, 10, and 20
5L	CU	7, 15, and 30
6L	CD	10, 20, and 30

Failure criteria was based upon maximum deviator load at the end of each stage. This point was estimated to be 95% of the peak strength.

The results are presented on Figures B-36 through B-55.

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The results from the triaxial shear test indicate the weaker zones of material existed at depth of 5' 7" (Sample No. 2L) and 9' 9" (Sample No. 5L). The test for sample No. 2L resulted in an effective stress friction angle ( $\phi$ ') of 18.4 degrees and cohesion of 1.4 psi. The test for Sample No. 5L resulted in a total stress friction angle ( $\phi$ ) of 22.2 degrees and cohesion of 1.3 psi.

Even though the samples had to be remolded, the values obtained from the triaxial sher tests were within an acceptable range of values for the type of material tested. The type of test performed on the samples were chosen to represent conditions observed in the field.

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### NUCLEAR DENSITY TEST

Moisture		sity	Material	Class
	Flush or Trans. & "	Air Gap Gap	Project	Lake Car
			Test Number	<u>L</u>
90°			Date7-22-	82
1087	4985			below crest
1105	4961		Depth Below Grade	or Thickness <u>4'- 7''</u>
2) 2/92	2) 9946	)		21, 7 Wet Density
,	4973 CPM	∕l ÷ into	In-Place	8.7Lbs. of H <sup>2</sup> O/ft
<u>3940</u> STD	7060 STE	)	In-Place	_3 Dry Density
.278 Ratio	0 <u>704</u> Rati	oAGR	In-Place	7. 7% Moisture
Name of Pit			Curve Values	-#4 W/R
Curve No.			Optimum Moisture	
AASHTO T-99		-180 🛛 Method	- Max Dry Density	······
Tested by	ster kingen	I	% Relative Compact	on%
	mber <u>8066</u>		Soil Classification _	
			% Retained on No. 4	Sieve (Rock) <u>37</u> %
		CALCULATION	S FOR PERCENT ROCK	
Dry Wt. Rock	····· <del></del> ÷	- Dry Wt. Total S	H <sup>2</sup> O in Rock) (x 100) = Dry V Sample =%	+ #4 and % - #4
0/ HA v Mavin		of . #4 Plus % + #4	ORMULA AND CALCULATION (19 x (.9 x Wt. per cu ft of + #4	BOOKDECEIVED
% - #4 X WaXIII	+ %	v (q v =	, v (.9 x wt. per cu it or + #4	NOCKRECEN 1982
/// *			um Dry Density Corrected fo	TO RESUMFER
			ROCK COMPACTION CYL	INDER MOISTURE DATA
			% R Wet Weight % S Dry Weight	
			% T Loss (R-S)	
	I CYLINDER DEN	ISITY DATA	/ Moisture by Dry ≦ / Moisture by Dry / ((T ÷ S) x	-
Gross Wt.				
Net Wt.	(Factor)		- 100 +% H²O x 10	00 = pcf Dry Densi
STANDARD C Moisture	OUNT		REMARKS	······································
woisture	Density			
and and and and an a				*********
	and an a state of the state of			FIGURE
СРМ	)  CPN	1		······
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### NUCLEAR DENSITY TEST

Moisture	Densit	•	MaterialClass
	Flush or Trans. <i>乱</i> "	Air Gap Gap	Project LAWN LAKE DAM
			Test Number
90°	90°		Date 7-22-82
2109	5449		Station 5'-7" below crest
2141	5400	And and the second statement of the second statement o	Depth Below Grade or Thickness <u>5'-7''</u>
24250	7) 10 849	)	In-Place /18, 0 Wet Density
	_ <u>5424</u> CPM -	÷ into	In-Place 20.8 Lbs. of H <sup>2</sup> O/ft <sup>3</sup>
3940 STD	7060_STD		In-Place 97,2 Dry Density
.539_Ratio		AGR	In-Place <i>Z1, 4</i> % Moisture
			Curve Values -#4 W/R
Curve No.			Optimum Moisture
AASHTO T-99	AASHTO T-1	80 🛛 Method	Max Dry Density
Tested by	tim Regned		% Relative Compaction%
	nber <u>8066</u>		Soil Classification
			% Retained on No. 4 Sieve (Rock) <u>16</u> %
		CALCULATIONS	FOR PERCENT ROCK
Wet Wt. Rock .	····· ÷ (	(100 +% H Dry Wt. Total Sa	<sup>12</sup> O) (x 100) = Dry Wt. Total Sample <sup>2</sup> O in Rock) (x 100) = Dry Wt. Rock ample =% + #4 and % - #4
	ROCK	CORRECTION FO	RMULA AND CALCULATIONS
	um Dry Density of +% x (		x (.9 x Wt. per cu ft of + #4 Rock)
-,,,,	+ =	pcf Maximu	m Dry Density Corrected for Rock
% - #4 % + #4	x % + x % +	H²O in - #4 = H²O in + #4 =	ROCK COMPACTION CYLINDER MOISTURE DATA % R Wet Weight % S Dry Weight
	cted Optimum Mo		% T Loss (R-S) % Moisture by Dry Weight :%
	CYLINDER DENS	SITY DATA	((T ÷ S) × 100)
Gross Wt Tare Wt		(Wet Den.)	
Net Wt.	X		100 +% H <sup>2</sup> O x 100 = pcf Dry Density
STANDARD CO Moisture	DUNT Density		REMARKS
	200000		
alanan (1997)			
)CPM	) CPM		FIGURE B-

NUCLEAR	DENSITY	TEST
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Moisture	Densi		Material	Class
	Flush or Trans. <u>&amp;</u> .''	Air Gap Gap	Project	Laks Dam
				L
90°	90°			82
2438	4768			below crest
2364	4757			Thickness
2) 4802	2) 9525	)		3.5 Wet Density
,	<u>4762</u> CPM			<u>4./</u> Lbs. of H <sup>2</sup> O/ft <sup>3</sup>
	7060 STD	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		<u>?, 4</u> Dry Density
	<u>.674</u> Ratio	AGR		4.2 % Moisture
			Curve Values	-#4 W/R
Curve No.				
		180 🛛 Method	Optimum Moisture	
			Max Dry Density _	
	tore Rquel	<u></u>	% Relative Compaction	
Equipment Num	nber <u>8035</u>		Soil Classification	
			% Retained on No. 4 S	Sieve (Rock)%
		CALCULATIONS F	OR PERCENT ROCK	
		•	D) (x 100) = Dry Wt. Total Sa	•
Wet Wt. Rock	••••	(100 +% H <sup>2</sup> C	D in Rock) (x 100) = Dry Wt.	Rock
Dry Wt. Rock	·····	Dry Wt. Total Sam	nple =% +	#4 and % - #4
	ROCK	CORRECTION FOR	MULA AND CALCULATION	IS
% - #4 x Maximi	um Dry Density o	f - #4 Plus % + #4 x	(.9 x Wt. per cu ft of + #4 Re	ock)
% ×	+% x	(.9 × =	)	
	+ =	pcf Maximum	Dry Density Corrected for	Rock
			DCK COMPACTION CYLIN	
			% R Wet Weight % S Dry Weight	
			% S Dry Weight % T Loss (R-S)	
Totar Conc	Cieu Opinium me		Moisture by Dry We	
COMPACTION	CYLINDER DENS	SITY DATA	((T ÷ S) × 100)	-
Gross Wt.			• •	-,
Tare Wt.		(Wet Den.)		
	X	_=÷1(	00 +% H <sup>2</sup> O x 100	= pcf Dry Density
STANDARD CC			REMARKS	
Moisture	Density	-	<u></u>	
	·	-		······································
		-		
		-		FIGURE
)CPM	,СРМ	-		в-3

	NU	CL	EAR	DEN	SITY	TEST
--	----	----	-----	-----	------	------

Moisture	Density	MaterialClass
	Flush or Air Gap Trans.	Project Lown Lake Dam
		Test Number <u>4 L</u>
90°	90°	Date 7 - 2 2- 8 2
2863	7862	Station <u>8'-8" below CREST</u>
2856	7781	Depth Below Grade or Thickness& '
2) 5719	2) 15643 )	In-Place <u>123,6</u> Wet Density
2860 CP	M _ <u>782/</u> CPM ÷ into	In-Place 29.5 Lbs. of H2O/ft3
<u>3940 STI</u>	D _7030_STD	In-Place 94, / Dry Density
.726 Rat	tio _ <u>1.108</u> RatioAGR	In-Place <u>37.3</u> % Moisture
Name of Pit _		Curve Values -#4 W/R
Curve No		Optimum Moisture
AASHTO T-9	9 🔲 AASHTO T-180 🗆 Method	Max Dry Density
Tested by	Steve Bignall	% Relative Compaction%
Equipment N	umber _ <u>7065</u> _	Soil Classification
	· .	% Retained on No. 4 Sieve (Rock)%
	CALCULATIONS FO	DR PERCENT ROCK
Wet Wt. Rock	k	) (x 100) = Dry Wt. Total Sample in Rock) (x 100) = Dry Wt. Rock ple =% + #4 and % - #4
		IULA AND CALCULATIONS
	imum Dry Density of - #4 Plus % + #4 x (	· ·
% X	+% × (.9 ×=	
	+ = pcf Maximum	Dry Density Corrected for Rock
% - #4 % + #4	OISTURE CORRECTION FOR - #4 W/RO x % H <sup>2</sup> O in - #4 = x % H <sup>2</sup> O in + #4 = rrected Optimum Moisture =	_% S Dry Weight
COMPACTIO Gross Wt.	N CYLINDER DENSITY DATA	((T ÷ S) × 100)
Tare Wt.	(Factor) (Wet Den.)	
Net Wt		0 +% H²O x 100 = pcf Dry Density REMARKS
Moisture	Density	
		FIGURE B-4
)	)	
CP	МСРМ	

î	1	U	С	L	E	A	R	D	E	Ν	S	ľ	T	Y	Т	ε	S	Т

Moisture	Densi	-	Material	CI	ass
	Flush or Trans. <u>后</u> "	Air Gap Gap		IWA LOKE K	)qm
			Test Number	54	
90°	90°			22-82	
3055	737/			'-9" belo-	
				Grade or Thicknes	
3057	7348	an a		126. 8	
2)6112	2) 14719	)			
	<u>7360</u> CPM	÷ into		31.8	
<u>3940</u> STD	<u>7060 S</u> TD			15.0	
<u>. 776</u> Ratio	<u>1.042</u> Ratio	AGR	In-Place	33,4	% Moisture
Name of Pit			Curve Values	#4	W/R
Curve No.		•	Optimum Mo	isture	
AASHTO T-99		180 🛛 Method	Max Dry Den	sity	
Tested by	ten Bignel	2	% Relative Co	ompaction	%
	nber <u>8066</u>		Soil Classific	ation	
			% Retained of	on No. 4 Sieve (Ro	ck)%
			FOR PERCENT RO	CK	
Wet Wt, Rock	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	(100 +% H	<sup>12</sup> O) (x 100) = Dry W <sup>12</sup> O in Rock) (x 100) ample =	= Dry Wt. Rock _	
	ROCK	CORRECTION FO	RMULA AND CALC	ULATIONS	
% - #4 x Maxim	ium Dry Density o	f - #4 Plus % + #4	x (.9 x Wt. per cu ft	of + #4 Rock)	
% ×	+% ×	(.9 x =	)		
<u></u>		pcf Maximu	im Dry Density Corr	ected for Rock	
OPTIMUM MO	ISTURE CORREC	TION FOR - #4 W/ H2O in - #4 =	ROCK COMPACT	ON CYLINDER MO	DISTURE DATA
% + #4	%	H²O in + #4 =	% S Dry Weig	ht	
Total Corre	ected Optimum M	oisture =	% T Loss (R-S	6) by Dry Weight : _	%
COMPACTION	CYLINDER DEN	SITY DATA		÷ S) x 100)	
Gross Wt.					
Tare Wt Net Wt	(Factor)	(Wet Den.)	- 100 +%	H2O x 100 =	pcf Dry Densi
STANDARD C	OUNT		REMARKS		
Moisture	Density				
			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
)	)				
CPM	CPM	l			B-5

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# NUCLEAR DENSITY TEST

Moisture	Den Flush or		Material	Class
	Trans. 🖉	Air Gap Gap	Project Laws La	KE DAM
			Test Number	
90°	90°		Date	
2093	5138		Station below	
2135	5192		Depth Below Grade or Th	
2) 4228	2) 10 330	)	In-Place <i>20,0</i>	
2114 CPM	5165 CPN	l÷ into	In-Place 20.7	
<u>3940 STD</u>	_7060_STD		In-Place 9 9, 3	
.536 Ratio	. <u>732</u> Ratio		In-Place <u>zo. 8</u>	
Name of Pit				#4 W/R
Curve No.			Optimum Moisture	₩ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
AASHTO T-99	AASHTO T-	180 🛛 Method		
Tested by	two Bignes	JJ	% Relative Compaction	
Equipment Nur	nber66		Soil Classification	
			% Retained on No. 4 Siev	×
	·······	CALCULATIONS F	OR PERCENT ROCK	
Dry Wt. Rock	••••••	Dry Wt. Total Sam	0 in Rock) (x 100) = Dry Wt. Potal Samp ple =% + #4 MULA AND CALCULATIONS	ck and % - #4
% - #4 x Maxim			• (.9 x Wt. per cu ft of + #4 Rock)	
		.9 x =		
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			Dry Density Corrected for Roc	k
/0 - #+	X % I	-140 in - #4 =	CK COMPACTION CYLINDEI % R Wet Weight _% S Dry Weight	
Total Corre	cted Optimum Mc	bisture =	% S Dry Weight % T Loss (R-S)	
	CYLINDER DENS			<u>%</u>
Tare Wt.	(Factor)	(Wet Den.)		
STANDARD CO	X	<u>= ÷ 10</u>	0 +% H²O x 100 = REMARKS	pcf Dry Density
Moisture	Density			*******
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				
	-			
				FIGURE B-E
)	)			FIGURE B-€
СРМ	СРМ			B

В-б

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NUCLEAR I	DENSITY	TEST
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Moisture	Densit		Material	CI	ass
	Flush or Trans. <u>6</u> ."	Air Gap Gap	Project	WN Lake	Dam
			-	76	
<u>90</u> °	90°			- 22-82	
67	7654			below cre	
1765	7605			Grade or Thicknes	/
	2) 15259			124,9	
	СРМ -	÷ into		16.6	-
		· ···-		108,3	
	Ratio	AGR		15.3	
			Curve Values		W/R
Curve No.				sture	• · ·
		180 🛛 Method	·	ity	
	tens Ringual		•	mpaction	⁰∕₀
	nber <u>806 â</u>	£		tion	
Equipment				n No. 4 Sieve (Roc	
		-	FOR PERCENT ROCI	·	/K)/u
Wet Wt. Rock	····· — ÷ (	(100 +% H <sup>2</sup> )	<sup>2</sup> O) (x 100) = Dry Wt. <sup>2</sup> O in Rock) (x 100) = mple =	Dry Wt. Rock	
	ROCK (	CORRECTION FOF	RMULA AND CALCU	LATIONS	
% - #4 x Maximi	um Dry Density of	f - #4 Plus % + #4 >	x (.9 x Wt. per cu ft of	f + #4 Rock)	
% ×	+% x /	(.9 x =	)		
	+=	pcf Maximur	m Dry Density Correc	ted for Rock	
					ISTURE DATA
% - #4 % + #4	X % r × % ł	-1²O in - #4 = -1²O in + #4 =	% R Wet Weight % S Dry Weight		
			% S Dry weight % T Loss (R-S) _		
<u> </u>	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		% Moisture by	y Dry Weight :	%
COMPACTION Gross Wt.	CYLINDER DENS	JITY DATA	( (T ÷	S) x 100)	
Tare Wt.		(Wet Den.)			
Net Wt.	×		100 +% H <sup>2</sup>	<sup>2</sup> O x 100 =	pcf Dry Densit
STANDARD CC			REMARKS		
Moisture	Density				
				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	FIGURE
)	)			· ·	
,СРМ	,СРМ			<b></b>	B-7

DOH Form No. 193 Revised: July, 1978

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### TEST REPORT

DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS - STATE OF COLORADO Staff Materials Branch 4340 East Louisiana Avenue Denver, Colorado 80222

9/3/82

# BULK SPECIFIC GRAVITY OF + #4 MATERIAL

TEST NO.	SPECIFIC GRAVITY	ABSORPTION (%)
1 т.	2.58	1.21
2 L	2.52	2.25
2 L 3 L	2.58	1.21
	2.58	1.21
4 L 5 T	2.58	1.21
5 L	2.58	1.21
6 L 7 L	2.55	1.42

# SPECIFIC GRAVITY OF - #4 MATERIAL

TEST NO.	SPECIFIC GRAVITY
1 L	2.65
2 L	2.57
3 L	2,65
μ́L	2.65
5 L	2.54
6 L	2.65
7 L	2.63

## SAMPLES TAKEN RIGHT SIDE OF BREACH

1 F	R	2.67
2 F	R	2.63
3 F	R	2.62
4 F	R	2.64
5 F	R	2.62
6 F	R	2.62
7 F	R	2.48
8 F	R	2.66
9 F	R	2.65
10 I	R	2.62
11 I	R	2.65
121	R	2.64
13 1		2.62

STATE OF COLORADO Department of Highways Division of Highways DOH Form No. 323 October, 1978

### LABORATORY REPORT ON ITEM 203

#### (Embankment or Borrow) PRELIMINARY CONSTRUCTION

Field Sheet No. Project No. Division of Water Resources Location Lawn Lake Dam District Date 9/3/82

Test Station and Log		Max.			Percen	t Passing	)		T	Τ			Unified	Lab Moist	Field Mois
No.	No. Siztion and Log Size	3	1	3/4	3/8	#4	#10	#40	#200	L L.	P I	Classification	%	%	
1 L	4' 7"		89	70	68	64	60	56	38	8	NV	NP	SP-SM	7.4	7.5
2 L	51 711		100	87	85	81	75	62	35	20	40	6	SM (OL)	25.0	21.
3 L	7' 1"		100	92	90	85	79	72	50	10	NV	NP	SP-SM	10.6	24.
4 L	81 81		100	91	90	87	82	77	56	9	NV	NP	SP-SM	10.6	31.
5 L	91 91		100	99	97	94	90	76	51	26	56	13	SM	29.8	33.
6 L	11' 0"		100	94	92	88	80	70	42	7	NV	NP	SP-SM	10.5	20.
7 L	13' 0"		100	90	89	84	77	67	44	13	NV	NP	SP-SM	12.1	15
			SAMPI	es ta	KEN R	GHT SI	DE OF	BREACH							
1 R	10" to 111"		100	69	66	57	49	40	24	6	NV	NP	GP-GM		
2 R	111" to 214"			<b>-</b>	100	95 -	91	78	44	21	NV	NP	SM		
3 R	2'4" to 3'1"				100	95	90	77	48	26	26	1	SM		
4 R	3'1" to 3'3"						100	96	52	9	NV	NP	SP-SM		
5 R	313" to 319"	·				100	95	84	60	32	NV	NP	SM		
6 R	319" to 419"				100	95	91	84	56	19	29	3	SM		
7 R	5111" to 616"		100	90	90	85	80	73	46	23	49	2	SM		
DISTRIBL Staff Co Staff De Staff Ma	nstruction sign	Notes and Sar	nples by	·							Reg	ت ــ EDLA gional Fa	T-99 C T-180 Rigid Pavement Flexible Pavement Ctor y Index		

and the owner of the second

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Address of the second contract of the state of the second LABORATORY REPORT ON ITEM 203 (Embankment or Borrow)

Field Grant Project No. Division of Water Resources

Location Lawn Lake Dam

Date District

9/3/82

Percent Passing Test Moist Class, and R Max. ΡI Station and Log LL No. Size Group Index % Value 3 #40 #200 1 3/4 3/8 #4 #10 6111" to 7110" 98 98 75 31 SP-SM 100 57 9 NV NP 8 R 88 9 R 7'10" to 10'4" 97 94 91 38 NP 82 66 12 NV SP-SM 100 36 13 10 R 1014" to 10110" 100 97 94 80 NV NP SM 10110" to 11110" 61 33 15 NV NP 11 R 100 61 52 44 4 GW 12 R 11'10" to 12'7" 98 67 29 100 90 5 NV NP SW-SM NP 96 96 92 59 31 13 R 4' 9" to 5' 11" 100 88 80 NV SM /Sample #13 - No depth identification of sample sack. □ T-99 □ T-180 Rigid Pavement DISTRIBUTION Flexible Pavement Notes and Samples by \_\_\_\_\_ □ Staff Construction 18\* EDLA □ Staff Design Regional Factor **Staff Materials** Serviceability Index

District Office - as required

Are special corrosive resistant culverts reg'd?

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FIGURE

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Division of Highways

DOH Form No. 323 October, 1978

PRELIMINARY CONSTRUCTION Are special corrosive resistant culverts reg'd?




FIGURE φ





FIGURE ₽-=







FIGURE B-13



B-14

FIGURE

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



FIGURE ሞ ū



FIGURE

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No. Carl





FIGURE **B-1**7



B-18

FIGURE

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SIEVE ANALYSIS

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



FIGURE φ 6

FIGURE B-19







FIGURE **B-**21



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FIGURE

B-22




FIGURE **B-23** 




FIGURE B-24

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



FIGURE ω T N CD



B-26

FIGURE B-2






FIGURE B-2

-27



B-28

FIGURE B-28



### CONSTANT HEAD PERMEABILITY TEST

Sampl	le	Ν	٥.	<u>5L</u>	919"	
Lab.	No	•	_7	92 <u>-8</u>	2	

Project _	Div. of Water Reso	
Location	Lawn Lake Dam	and the second second
Date	9/3/82	and a second

Diameter of specimen	6	inches
Length of specimen	7_	inches
Area of specimen	.1964	sq.ft.
Volume of specimen	.1145	cu.ft.

Gs		
. <u> </u>	st.	Det.
Dry weight	10.9	lbs.
Dry Density _	95.0	lbs/cu.ft

$$K_t = \frac{QL}{THA}$$

 $K_{20} = K_t \frac{V_t}{V_{20}}$ 

Trial No.	Water Temp. C	Tin t Mir		Quanti Q CM <sup>3</sup>	ty	Qua	unti Q FT-		Head h Inch <b>es</b>		Fee	K <sub>t</sub> et/day	,	K <sub>2</sub> Feet	0 /day
1	MATER	IAL IS	IMPER	HEABLE.	NO	FLOW	OF	WATE	THROUGH	SA	PLE	AFTER	3	DAYS.	
		•													
 															Alternational Alternational
														· ·	
									<u></u>						
															. <u> </u>

Sample N o. <u>6L 11'0"</u> Jab. No. <u>793-82</u>

Project	Div. of Water Resources
Location	Lawn Lake Dam
Date	9/3/82

Diameter of specimer	n <u>6</u>	inches
Length of specimen	7	inches
Area of specimen	.1964	sq.ft.
Volume of specimen	.1145	cu.ft.

G <b>s</b>	Es	st.	Det.
Dry we	ight	11.4	1bs.

Dry Density <u>99.3</u>lbs/cu.ft.

$$K_t = \frac{QL}{THA}$$

$$K_{20} = K_t \frac{V_t}{V_{20}}$$

Trial No.	Water Temp. C	Tim <b>e</b> t Min.	Quantity Q CM <sup>3</sup>	Quantity Q FT3	He <b>ad</b> h Inches	K <sub>t</sub> Feet/day	K <sub>20</sub> Feet/day
1	20°	40	100	.0035	6	•75	•.75
2	20°	45	100	.0035	6	.67	.67
3	20°	45	100	.0035	6	.67	.67
	AVERAGE	:= .70 feet,	Hay = 8.4 in	ches/day			

.

### CONSTANT HEAD PERMEABILITY TEST

Sampl	le	N	۰.	<u>7L</u>	1310"
Lab.	No	5.	_7	94-82	

Diameter of specimen <u>6</u> inches Length of specimen <u>7</u> inches Area of specimen <u>.1964</u> sq.ft. Volume of specimen <u>.1145</u> cu.ft.

Project Div. of Water Resources Location Lawn Lake Dam Date \_\_\_\_\_ 9/3/82


•	G <sub>s</sub>	Est.	Det.
	Dry weight	12.4	lbs.
		400 0	

Dry Density 108.3 lbs/cu.ft.


 $K_t = \frac{QL}{THA}$ 


 $K_{20} = K_t \frac{V_t}{V_{20}}$ 

Trial No.	Water Temp. C	Time t Min.	Quantity Q CM <sup>3</sup>	Quantity Q FT3	H <b>ea</b> d h Inches	K <sub>t</sub> Feet/day	K <sub>20</sub> Feet/day
1	21 °	21.75	500	.0177	6	6.96	6.75
2	21 •	22.25.	500	.0177	6	6.79	6.59
3	21 °	22.50	500	.0177	6	6.72	6.52
4	21 •	22.50	500	.0177	6	6.72 .	6.52
	AVERAGE	E = 6.6 feet,	day = 79.2	inches/day			



B-33





B-35

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DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS STATE OF COLORADO Materials Division Form DOH 161 July 1967

# TRIAXIAL DATA SHEET

Sample No. <u>2L</u> Depth <u>5' 7"</u> Lab. No. <u>789–82</u> Proving Ring Factor			Project No. <u>Div. of Water Resources</u> Location <u>Lawn Lake Dam</u> Structure Date9/3/82 Tested By
Height of Specimen	h = 6.320	_in_	
Diameter of Specimen	d= 2.850	_in.	
Area of Specimen	A <sub>0</sub> =.7854d <sup>2</sup>	<u> </u>	_in <sup>2</sup>
Volume of Specimen	V <sub>o</sub> = A <sub>o</sub> h	40.318	_in <sup>3</sup>
Volume of Specimen ÷ 1728	V0234	_ ft. <sup>3</sup>	Moisture (as rec'd)25.0
			Liquid Limit40
Wt. Sample Wet + Tare			Plastic Limit34
Tare		_ gms.	Plastic Index6
Wt. Sample Wet	1083.4	gms.	
Wt. Sample Wet ÷ 453.6	2.39	_ lbs.	Color Brown Sand
Wt. Dry Sample W <sub>s</sub>	<u>924.8</u>	_ gms.	Sieve Analysis
Wt. of Water W <sub>w</sub>	158.6	_ gms.	Passing 3"
w = W <sub>w</sub> /W <sub>s</sub>		_ %	1" <u>87</u> 3/4" <u>85</u> 3/8" <u>81</u>
	v	· ·	3/8" #F4
In Place Density = Wet Wt./V <sub>o</sub>		4.1.	$\frac{4}{10} - \frac{62}{35}$
Dry Density = I.D./I+w		- <u>lbs.</u> ft <sup>3</sup>	<i>#</i> 60
Specific Gravity		•••	<b>#</b> ≠200 <u>20</u>
V <sub>w</sub> = W <sub>w</sub> x 3.534 x 10 <sup>5</sup>	.0056	_ ft. <sup>3</sup>	Classification
$V_{s} = \frac{W_{s}}{SG} \times 3.534 \times 10^{-5}$	.0127	_ ft. <sup>3</sup>	Visual Silty Sand
$V_v = V_0 - V_s$			Corps. of Engineers
Degree of Saturation V <sub>W</sub> /V <sub>V</sub>			AASH0
Void Batio e = V./Ve	<b>"</b> 984		•

B-36


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# TRIAXIAL DATA SHEET

a second a children a

ample No2L		Project No
epth		Location
ab. No		Structure
roving Ring Factor		Date
		Tested By
	AFTER TEST RUN	
eight of Specimen	h = <u>6.130</u> in.	
lameter of Specimen	d =2.884 in.	
rea of Specimen	Ao = .7854d <sup>2</sup> =6.533	in <sup>2</sup>
olume of Specimen	Vo = Aoh= 40.04	<u>.7</u> in <sup>3</sup>
alume of Specimen ÷1728	V0232 ft.3	Moisture (as rec'd)
<b>1</b>		Liquid Limit
t. Sample Wet + Tare	gms.	
Tare	<sup>*</sup> gms.	Plastic Limit
t. Sample Wet	<u>= 1211.2</u> gms.	Plastic Index
<b>t.</b> Sample Wet ÷ 453.6	<u>2.67</u> ibs.	Color
t Dry Sample W <sub>s</sub>	989.5gms.	Sieve Analysis
. of Water W <sub>w</sub>	<u></u>	Passing 3"
w = W <sub>w</sub> /W <sub>s</sub>	22.4 %	1" 3/4"
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	3/8"
Place Density = Wet Wt./V <sub>a</sub>	<u>= 115.1 lbs.</u>	7/4 7/10
Density = I.D./I+w	• •	<i>1</i> /40
Spc.	•••	≠¢60 ₹¢200
ecific Gravity		
₩ <sub>W</sub> x 3.534 x 10 <sup>-5</sup>		Classification
$\frac{W_{s}}{S.G.} \times 3.534 \times 10^{-5}$		Visual
• V <sub>0</sub> - V <sub>s</sub>	<u>.0096</u> ft.3	Corps. of Engineers
ree of Saturation V <sub>W</sub> /V <sub>V</sub>	•	AASHO
a Ratío e ≠ Vv∕Vs		



OFFICE OF THE STATE FNGINEER

		OFFICE	OF THE STATE E	NGINEER	
BY_JIM_	NORFLE	ET			DATE 017 28 1982
TITLE 5A	omple A	<u>lo. 22</u>			SHEET OF
POINT No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	Deviator (Ibs) 0 7 9 10.5 13.0 13.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 36.0 36.0 36.0 41.0 45.0 47.5 50.0 51.0	Stress (psi) 1.1 1.4 1.9 2.5 1.4 1.9 2.5 4.1 2.5 5.4 7.7 8.0	5TAGE I Deformation (in) 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.032 0.039 0.045 0.058	Strain % 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.27 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.51 0.62 0.71 0.81 0.92	SHEET OF Area = 6.379 in <sup>2</sup> Length = 6.320 in
16	53.0	8.3	0.062	0.98	
		5	TAGE II	-	
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 0 11 2	0 31.5 40.0 53.5 60.0 65.0 73.0 77.5 77.0 77.5 79.0 34.0	0 3.4 6.3 9.4 10.2 10.8 11.8 12.1 12.4 13.2	0 0.007 0.013 0.020 0.026 0.033 0.039 0.039 0.045 0.045 0.058 0.065 0.065	0 0.11 0.21 0.32 0.42 0.53 0.62 0.73 0.93 1.04 1.15	Area = 6.379 in <sup>2</sup> Length = 6.258 in


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DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES OFFICE OF THE STATE ENGINEER

OFFICE OF THE STATE ENGINEER					
BY_JIM	NORFLE	ET			DATE 027 28 1982
TITLE	AMPLE N	o. 2L			SHEET_2_ OF_2
BINT No.	DEVIATOR (Ibs)	S Stress (psi)	TAGE III Deformation (in)	5TRAIN (%)	1
12345373171234537	0 35.5 76.0 61.0 72.0 33.0 74.5 104.5 104.5 113.5 117.5 127.0 127.0 127.0 133.0	0 4.0 7.2 1.3 13.7 13.8 14.6 17.8 18.0 19.6 19.6 20.7	0 0.007 0.013 0.020 0.024 0.038 0.038 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.056 0.056 0.062 0.069 0.069 0.080 0.080 0.088 0.094 0.094	0.11 0.21 0.32 0.42 0.52 0.71 0.81 1.21 1.29 1.42 1.42 1.42 1.42	Area = 6.379 m <sup>2</sup> Longth = 6.186
; 3 ; ] 20	35.0   39.0   41.0	21.2 21.8 22.1	0.106 0.112 0.114	.7   .8  1.84	


There are two (2) figure B-39s because there are three (3) stages.

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STRAIN- %

B-40



B- 41 FIGURE

**DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS STATE OF COLORADO** Materials Division Form DOH 161 July 1967

# TRIAXIAL DATA SHEET

Sample No. 5L		F
Bepth		Ĺ
Proving Ring Factor		C
		1
Height of Specimen	h = 6.350 in.	
	4 2.850 ···	
Diameter of Specimen		
Area of Specimen	An = .7854d <sup>2</sup> =6.379	_in <sup>2</sup>
Volume of Specimen	Vo = Aoh= _40.507	_in <sup>3</sup>
-Volume of Specimen +1728	······································	N
- Algen		L
Wt. Sample Wet + Tare	gms.	
Max.,		. F
Tare	* * gms.	
• Wt. Sample Wet	= 1222.8 mms	•
AND CONTRACT OF CONTRACT.		c
Wt. Sample Wet + 453.6	<u>2.70</u> lbs.	
	012.1	
Wt. Dry Sample W <sub>s</sub>	* gms.	5
Wt. of Water Www	- 280.7 ams	F
·		•
w * W <sub>w</sub> /W <sub>s</sub>	<u>29.8</u>	
	115./ lbs.	
in Place Density = Wet Wt./Vo		
Dry Density = I.D./1+w	<u>= 88.9 lbs.</u>	
	11.	
Specific Gravity	= 2.54	
N - W 7 674 - 1075		
$W_{W} = W_{W} \times 3.534 \times 10^{-5}$		2
$W_{s} = \frac{W_{s}}{S.G.} \times 3.534 \times 10^{-5}$	<u>=0131ft.3</u>	•
$v_v = v_o - v_s$	ft.3	(
Degree of Saturation Vw/Vv		
regree of Suluration VWV VV	•	
Void Ratio a - V. /V.	.79	

Project No.	Div. of Water Resources
Location	Lawn Lake Dam
Structure_	
Date	9/3/82
Tested By	

Moisture (as rec'd)	29.8
Liquid Limit	56
Plastic Limit	43
Plastic Index	13
ColorBlack Si	lty Sand

### Sieve Analysis

Passing 3"	100	
, <b>1</b> "		
3/4*	97	
3/8"	94	
<i>#</i> #4	90	1
7/=10	76	$\mathbf{F}$
<i>7</i> /40	51	
<i>7</i> #60		1
<i>#</i> \$200	26	L

<u>Classification</u>				
Visual	Black Silty Sand			
Corps. of Engineers				
AASHO				

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DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS STATE OF COLORADO Materials Division Form DOH 161 July 1967

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TRIAXIAL DATA SHEET

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
Sample No5L Depth Lab. No Proving Ring Factor		Project No Location Structure Date Tested By
Height of Specimen	h = <u>5.880</u> in.	
Diameter of Specimen	d =in.	
Area of Specimen	Ao =.7854d <sup>2</sup> =6.537	in <sup>2</sup>
Volume of Specimen	Vo = Aoh= <u>38.43</u> 8	3 in.3
Volume of Specimen ÷1728	<b>V</b>	Moisture (as rec'd)
Wt. Sample Wet + Tare	gms.	Liquid Limit
Tare	<sup>s</sup> gms.	
Wt. Sample Wet	<u>= 1204.8</u> gms.	Plastic Index
Wt. Sample Wet ÷ 453.6	= <u>2.66</u> ibs.	Color
Wt. Dry Sample W <sub>s</sub>	<u>955.1</u> gms.	<u>Sieve Analysis</u>
Wt, of Water W <sub>w</sub>	* <u>249.7</u> gms.	Passing 3"
w = W <sub>W</sub> /W <sub>S</sub> In Place Density = Wet Wt./V <sub>O</sub> Dry Density = I.D./1+w	<u>119.6</u> <u>lbs.</u>	1"       3/4"       3/8"       3/8"       4/4 4       4/4 4       4/4 0       4/4 0       4/4 0       4/4 0       4/4 0       4/4 0       4/4 0       4/4 0       4/4 0       4/4 0       4/4 0       4/4 0       4/4 0       4/4 0       4/4 0
Specific Gravity		
$V_{W} = W_{W} \times 3.534 \times 10^{-5}$		<u>Classification</u>
$V_{s} = \frac{W_{s}}{S.G.} \times 3.534 \times 10^{-5}$	<u>=0133_</u> ft. <sup>3</sup>	Visual
$V_{v} = V_{0} - V_{s}$	.0089 ft.3	Corps. of Engineers
Degree of Saturation V <sub>W</sub> /V <sub>V</sub>	<u>98.9</u> %	AASHO
Void Ratio e = V <sub>V</sub> /V <sub>S</sub>	.67	

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
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


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
N	2 ]		OF THE STATE E		$\sim$	
BY)1M	NORFLE			DA		28,1982
	LAMOLE A	10. <u>5</u> L		Sł	HEET 0	)F
		5	TAGE I			
BINT NO.	DEVIATOR (163)	Stress (psi)	Deformation (in)	Axial Strain (%)	Pore Ressu (psi)	RE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	0 24 40 50.5 57.5 64.0 69.0 74.0 78.0	0 3.8 6.3 7.9 7.0 10.0 10.8 11.6 12.2	0 0.013 0.052 0.030 0.039 0.046 0.054 0.054 0.062	0 0.20 0.35 0.47 0.60 0.72 0.85 0.98 1.09	0 8 1 2 2 2 4 6 6 2 3 2 6 6 6 2 3 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6	Area = 6.379% Length = 6.3
		STI	ige II			
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 7 9 7 9 10 11	0 40 69 88 100 108 115 121 126.5 132.0 140.0	0 6.3 10.8 13.8 15.7 16.9 18.0 19.0 19.8 20.7 21.9	0 0.013 0.035 0.038 0.049 0.062 0.074 0.086 0.097 0.109 0.125	0 0.21 0.40 0.60 0.78 0.99 1.18 1.37 1.54 1.74 1.74 1.99	02.0 4.0 5.6 7.2 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6	LENGTH = 6.2
12345673701234	0 47 90 122 147.5 172.5 173.5 217.0 235.0 245.5 255.0 263.5	Stad 0 7.4 14.1 19.1 27.0 30.3 32.5 34.0 35.6 35.6 38.5 40.0 41.3	E III 0 0.013 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.0249 0.065 0.085 0.101 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.187 0.187 0.203	0.21 0.44 0.60 1.06 1.38 1.34 1.88 2.14 2.39 2.71 3.04 3.30	0 2.4 5.6 10.8 13.9 14.8 16.0 16.4 17.4 17.4 17.4 17.4	L <i>e</i> ngth=6



AXIAL STRAIN - %



AXIAL STRAIN - %






FIGURE 8-49

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## TRIAXIAL DATA SHEET

Sample No. 6L Depth Lab. No. 793-82 Proving Ring Factor		Project No. <u>Div. of Water Resources</u> Location <u>Lawn Lake Dam</u> Structure Date <u>9/3/82</u> Tested By
Height of Specimen	h = 5,500 in.	
Diameter of Specimen	d = <u>2.850</u> in.	
Area of Specimen	Ao = .7854d <sup>2</sup> = <u>6.379</u>	in <sup>2</sup>
Volume of Specimen	Vo = Aoh= 35.08	5_in <sup>3</sup>
Volume of Specimen ÷1728	$V_0 = .0203$ ft. <sup>3</sup>	Moisture (as rec'd) <u>10.5</u>
t. Sample Wet + Tare	-	Liquid Limit <u>NV</u> Plastic Limit <u>NP</u>
	gms.	Plastic Index <u>NP</u>
It. Sample Wet It. Sample Wet ÷ 453.6	_	Color Brown
t. Dry Sample W <sub>s</sub>	<u>=820.₀0</u> gms.	Sieve Analysis
Wt. of Water W <sub>w</sub> w = W <sub>w</sub> /W <sub>s</sub>		Passing 3" 100 1" 94 3/4" 92 3/8" 88 80
n Place Density = Wet Wt./V <sub>o</sub>	= <u>99.5</u> <u>ibs.</u>	7×4
ry Density = I.D./I+w	• •	7#40 <u>42</u> 7#60 <u>7</u>
pecific Gravity	<u>* 2.54</u>	74 200 <u> </u>
= W <sub>W</sub> x 3.534 x 10 <sup>-5</sup>	•0034ft. <sup>3</sup>	Classification
$= \frac{W_s}{S.G.} \times 3.534 \times 10^{-5}$	<u>•0114</u> ft. <sup>3</sup>	Visual Brown Sand
• • V <sub>0</sub> - V <sub>5</sub>	ft. <sup>3</sup>	Corps. of Engineers
gree of Saturation V <sub>W</sub> /V <sub>V</sub>		AASHO
oid Ratio e = Vy/Vs	.78	

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Page I

FIGURE B-50

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
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# TRIAXIAL DATA SHEET

Sample No. <u>6 L</u> Depth <u>Lab. No. </u>		Project No Location Structure
Proving Ring Factor		Date Tested By
	AFTER TEST RUN	
Height of Specimen	h = <u>5.064</u> in.	
Diameter of Specimen	d= <u>2,970</u> in.	
Area of Specimen	$A_0 = .7854d^2 = 6.929$	in <sup>2</sup>
Volume of Specimen	V <sub>o</sub> = A <sub>o</sub> h <u>35.090</u>	<u>)</u> in: <sup>3</sup>
Volume of Specimen $\div$ 1728	V = .0203 ft.3	Moisture (as rec'd)
		Liquid Limit
Wt. Sample Wet + Tare		Plastic Limit
	gms.	Plastic Index
Wt. Sample Wet		Color
Wt. Sample Wet ÷ 453.6		
Wt. Dry Sample W <sub>S</sub>	= <u>814.6</u> gms.	Sieve Analysis
Wt. of Water W <sub>w</sub>	= <u>154.0</u> gms.	Passing 3"
w = W <sub>w</sub> /W <sub>s</sub>	<u> 18.9</u> %	3/4" 3/8"
In Place Density = Wet Wt./V <sub>0</sub>	$= \frac{105.4}{\text{ft.}^3}$	##4
Dry Density = I.D./I+w	· 1.	7/40 7/60 7/200
Specific Gravity	2.54	<i>"</i> 200 <u> </u>
$V_{\rm W} = W_{\rm W} \times 3.534 \times 10^{-5}$	•0054 ft. <sup>3</sup>	<u>Classification</u>
$V_{s} = \frac{W_{s}}{S.G.} \times 3.534 \times 10^{-5}$	•0113 ft. <sup>3</sup>	Visual
$v_v = v_o - v_s$	•0090 ft. <sup>3</sup>	Corps. of Engineers
Degree of Saturation $V_W/V_V$	<u> </u>	AASHO
Void Ratio e = Vy/Vs		


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DIVISION	0 F W	ATER RESOURCES
OFFICE OF	THE	STATE ENGINEER

OFFICE OF THE STATE ENGINEER							
	SAMPLE	No. 6	L		DATE <u>017 33 1982</u> SHEET OF		
PULLT No.	DEVIATOR (165)	S STRESS (psi)	TAGE I Deformation (in)	an Axial Strain (%)			
1 234567371011	0 8.5 12.0 34.0 45.0 54.0 61.5 68.0 73.0 78.0 82.5 26.5	037315674276 1.3.5.1.5674276 1.1.2.76 1.1.2.76	0 0.008 0.018 0.027 0.037 0.037 0.0346 0.065 0.074 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.096 0.110	0.15 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.1 1.1 1.1 0.00 0.1 1.1 1	Area = 6.377;n² Length = 5.5 in		
		ST	AGE II				
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1	0 86 133.5 151.5 171.5 188.0 200.0 209.0 209.0 216.5 224.0 224.0 229.0	0 13.0 23.1 23.1 23.1 23.1 23.1 23.1 25.1 35.1 35.1	0 0.025 0.050 0.066 0.038 0.109 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.159 0.159 0.174 0.186	0.46 0.43 1.63 1.63 1.63 2.37 2.37 2.37 3.45 3.45	Longth = 5.37 in		
Stage III							
1234567870112	98.0 191.0 255.0 271.5 311.5 330.5 346.5 346.5 372.0 385.0 396.0	0 15.4 10.0 15.9 10.0 15.9 15.9 15.9 15.9 15.9 15.9 15.4 15.9 15.4 15.9 15.4 15.4 15.4 15.4 15.4 15.4 15.9 15.4 15.9 15.4 15.9 15.4 15.9 15.9 15.9 15.9 15.9 15.9 15.9 15.9	0 0.020 0.033 0.047 0.076 0.042 0.110 0.128 0.147 0.166 0.188 0.210	0.3? 0.77 0.77 1.77 2.77 2.77 2.77 2.77 2.77 2.77 2	Longelie 510 in		

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AXIAL STRAIN - %

FIGURE B-54

SAMPLE No. 6L N SHEARING STRESS - psi 30 40 50 60 NORMAL STRESS - psi 

#### LAWN LAKE DAM FAILURE INVESTIGATION SLOPE STABILITY ANALYSIS

### APPENDIX C

### by

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Steve Spann, Supervisor, Water Resources Engineer Louis DeGrave, Senior, Water Resources Engineer James Norfleet, Senior, Water Resources Engineer

#### LAWN LAKE DAM FAILURE INVESTIGATION SLOPE STABILITY ANALYSIS

#### APPENDIX C

#### THE MODEL

Transverse Cross-Sections of the dam were developed from data provided by the U.S. Geologic Survey. A drawing of the right and left side sections are presented in Figures C-1 and C-2. A third drawing was developed from the left and right side cross-sections to depict the configuration at the maximum section. The length of the outlet was obtained from a report by Mr. Jaycox dated September 22, 1903. Old photos were used to assist in developing the maximum section. The drawing of the assumed maximum section at the outlet is shown in Figure C-3.

The stratigraphy of the embankment stability model was constructed from geological mapping of the adjacent sections performed on July 22, 1982 (See Figure A-1). Similar materials were grouped together and the same shear strength was assigned to layers having similar properties. The backfill around the outlet was assumed to be the same native material as the first layer above the glacial moraine. A list of the assigned properties for the model are presented in Table C-1.

#### THE STUDY

The Bishop method was used to determine the stability of the Lawn Lake Dam. The computer program uses an approximate form of the limiting equalibrium approach developed by Bishop. The program estimates the factor of safety for a circular arc slope failure of an embankment. The factor of safety is defined as the ratio of the resisting forces to the driving forces. Hence, a factor of safety greater than 1.0 implies a stable structure. A factor of safety equal to 1.0 implies a state of balance equalibrium. This program has a search routine which examines numerous failure arcs until the minimum factor of safety is found.

To complete the embankment model previously discussed, a phreatic water surface had to be estimated. It was assumed that the steady state phreatic water surface would be similar to one which develops in a homogeneous dam. While this is not a true representation of the actual phreatic water surface, it is considered adequate for an initial evaluation.

The minimum factor of safety was found to be 0.586 for the first assumed phreatic water surface, as shown on Figure C-4. Because the factor of safety is less than 1.0, the dam would be unstable with a phreatic water surface as depicted.

The first model obviously was not a normal operating condition because it would be unstable. The first reaction was that perhaps the dam did not store water long enough to establish the level of the assumed steady state. The test data, however, indicates the coefficient of permeability for the major portion of the embankment was 0.7 feet per day. Assuming a coefficient of 0.7 feet per day, it was estimated that steady state seepage would develop within a period of 20 days. A review of the storage records compiled by the Division I hydrographers shows the reservoir was full for about 2,000 consecutive days between 1959 and 1965, providing sufficient time to establish steady state seepage. Therefore, other factors which affect the level and extent of the steady state must have been present.

Based on the results of the initial study, we then, assumed that the structure had internal drainage. Internal drainage would cause the phreatic water surface to be lower than first assumed.

The plans, OC-39, showed a rock fill in the downstream portion of the embankment. Photographs taken during the 1979 inspection show the toe of the dam was covered by rockfill around the outlet, but the depth of the rock can only be surmised.

A second study was performed to determine the phreatic water surface which has a minimum factor of safety near 1.0. Results of the second study are shown in Figure C-5 along with the phreatic water surface which produced a minimum factor of safety near 1.0.

Close inspection of photographs No. A-1 and A-5 in the geologic section (Appendix A) of this report, reveal a phreatic water surface nearly equivalent to that shown on Figure C-5. The phreatic water surface shown in the photographs, support the assumption that the toe was drained.

#### CONCLUSIONS

The results of the slope stability analysis indicate the dam was near impending failure for the assumed conditions. Comparing the phreatic water surface in the photographs (A-1 and A-5, Appendix A) with the phreatic water surface shown in Figure C-5 reveals distinct similarities. Records also show the reservoir was full for several consecutive years; sufficient time to establish the state of seepage presented on Figure C-5. Because the dam was near a state of impending failure, a small imbalance in the resisting forces or additional driving forces could cause failure.

An imbalance in the resisting forces could be attributed, but not limited, to an increase in pore pressure within the embankment. An increase in pore water pressure can be a result of an increase in the reservoir height above any previous maximum level, or a leaking outlet system. A leaking outlet would transfer the pressure of the reservoir to the point of the leak. For Lawn Lake, a leak near the valve or in the portion of the pipe upstream of the valve would significantly increase the potential for failure.


Although not a consideration of the slope stability analysis, a leak in the outlet system could erode a void within the embankment due to the highly erodible nature of the material from which the dam was constructed. If a sufficiently large void developed, the embankment above the void could collapse. A collapse of any portion of the embankment would lead to instability of the remaining embankment and the total failure of the dam.

An increase in the driving forces could have also led to the failure of the dam. A large snowbank for instance, on the slope, would effectively add a surcharge weight to the embankment. This would seem unlikely in July, although snowdrifts were observed near the right toe of the dam and downstream on the right side of the river channel as late as July 8, 1982. Also, the melt water from a snowdrift could saturate the embankment. A saturated downstream slope would have increased the potential for failure. This phenomenon is not uncommon for high mountain dams, especially those dams having a steep downstream slope inclination. A case in point is the recent surface slide on Yamcolo Dam.

In summary, for the conditions analyzed, the Lawn Lake Dam by today's standard did not possess an acceptable factor of safety against a sliding failure. Current design practice requires a minimum factor of safety of 1.5 for reservoir embankments like Lawn Lake. A factor of safety of 1.5 would preclude failure when minor changes in the resisting or driving forces occur.


### TABLE C-1


Soil Number	Inplace Density (PCF)	Cohesion (PSI)	(DEGREES)	TAN <b>\$</b>
A	121.7	0.0	30	0.577
В	102.1	1.4	18.4	0.333
C	123.5	0.0	32	0.625
D	115.4	1.3	22	0.408
E	120.0	0.0	32	0.625
FOUNDATION				
(Glacial Moraine	135.0	100.0	45	1.000




1

SCALE 1"= 10"





SCALE |" = 10"






FIGURE C-3




FIGURE C-4




FIGURE C-5

### APPENDIX D

# LETTER REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION OF

LAWN LAKE RESERVOIR

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•

T. W. JAYCOX

September 22, 1903

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•

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State of Colorado L.G. Carpenter state engineer

LAWN LAKE RESERVOIR.

Denver, Colo., Sept. 22nd, 1903.

Professor L.G.Carpenter,

OFFICE.

Dear Sir: ---

This reservoir is being made by onlarging the capacity of a natural lake, by placing an earth dam across the outlet.

It is situated in Section \_\_\_\_\_Tp. \_\_\_R. \_\_\_W and is at timber line. The formation is morannial and appears sufficiently consolidated to form a practically tight reservoir.

A trench has been cut through the barrier to a depth that will give fourteen feet of water above the flow line of the outlet pipe to the level of the spillway. The outlet pipe is 36 inches in diameter, of 3/16 sheet steel, taper built, onlargement seams double riveted, circular seams single riveted. It was brought on the ground in 12 ft. lengths, and field riveted in place in the trench. A light weight Ludlow gate valve 36 inches in diameter is placed at or near the center line of the dam; 48 feet of pipe being above and 36 feet of pipe being below the valve. This valve rests on a stone foundation, is to be placed in a solid mass of concrete across the trench, to a height to the bottom of upper casing of valve.

The pipe is placed in a concrete bed 8 inches thick across the full width of the trench, and embedded in concrete to the height of the center for its entire length, and covered with four inches of concrete, placed around the upper half, above the valve.

The pipe was leaded into the valve using hot lead, and caulked.

State of Colorado L.G. CARPENTER STATE ENGINEER

L.G.C.

-2-

The embankment to be of looce rock and earth, the loose rock being stones from the excavation for spillway, and gathered from the surface, having a slope of about 1 to 1 on the back, and steeper on the upper face, being hand placed, and a top width of five feet. The earth part is to have a slope of 4 to 1, rip-rapped, and a top width of five feet. A small portion of the loose rock part and almost none of the earth embankment was in place at the time of inspection.

The pipe and valve were in place, the concrete foundation and sides completed, and the lead poured around the pipe when I arrived on  $\langle$ the ground.

Iola and Byckerhoff cement were used. The work was being done by the Company, and what I saw was well done.

Instructions were given as to the method of formingthe earth embankment, and to step back the sides of the trench when filling it.

The inspection was made September 9th and 10th, 1903.

The weather was snowy and cold and probably but little more work can be done here this season.

Furnis Finites

Puelt And Rive moles a.

### APPENDIX E

INVESTIGATION OF THE FAILURE OF LAWN LAKE DAM

STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES OBTAINED BY THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

D46 Memorándum	
To:	Files

James D. Haryster, Public Affairs Officer

Subject:

From:

Lawn Lake Dam failure in Rocky Mountain NP

Upon learning at the Megional Office of the Lawn Lake dan failure on Thursday, July 15, 1982, five representatives of the RO drove to Estes Park and Rocky Mountain NP headquarters. The group included Jim Randall, Bill Mekeel, Ron Hermance and Curt Manefee of the Solicitor's Office.

-9/2

We reached park headquarters via the Mary's Lake road through residential areas of Estes Park that had escaped all flood damage.

At park headquarters at about 12:15 p.m., we met with Superintendent Chet Brooks, Assistant Superintendent Jim Godbolt and Chief Manger Dave Essex. They offered a recapitulation of the day's events, commencing at 6:26 a.m. when an employee of the A-1 Trash Service alerted park headquarters from the Lawn Lake trailhead that a flood emergency appeared to be heading down Roaring Miver and Fall Miver toward the Aspenglen Campground.

It appeared at the time that one Steven See of Hilbert, Wisconsin, was missing and preximed dead, and that as many as 7 or 8 other persons were unaccounted for, including 3 from the Aspenglen Campground. Two members of the park staff had suffered injuries, the worst of them a broken ankle (Jack Gartner).

Two helicopters had been chartered from Continental Divide Melicopters. It. Gov. Nancy Dick had been to the city and the park. Superintendent Brooks had been in touch with an aide to Representative Hank Brown, and efforts were under way to obtain bridges from the Army Corps of Engineers to provide access to areas cut off by floodwaters and by roast failures.

The park staff indicated that one Donay Manson (Hansen?), a research assistant to Dave Stevens, had visited Lawn Lake on Wednesday, July 14 (the day previous) and reported that there was considerable water offerflowing the dam's spillway. There apparently was no reason to be concerned for the safety of the dam at the time, ? however.

Bill Mekeel quoted one Alan (Allen?) Pearson (Merson?) of the State Engineers' Office that the dam had last been inspected in August 1978.

(In a telephone call by Marpster to Mike Baugher at about 1 p.m., Baugher advised that our Washington Office reported an inspection by unidentified Soil Conservation Service employees on April 30, 1981. Further, Baugher said an individual had called him during the morning to say he (the individual) was at the dam on Thursday, July 8, and had observed three "farmer types" struggling with a valve, cursing and fuming about its stubbornness. They told him, he said, that the valve was "tricky.")

SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD				
ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER			
Rocky Mountain National Park	8 2 0 6 0			
LOCATION OF INCIDENT.	DATE OF INCIDENT			
Same	0 7 1 5 8			
NATURE OF INCIDENT				
Flood				
COMPLAINANT'S NAME	COMPLAINANT'S ADDRESS			
Statement - Donay Hanson	P.O. Box 1567, Estes Park, CO 80517			

RESULTS	OF INVESTIGATION

I arrived at Lawn Lake Patrol Cabin Monday, July 12, 1982 at 9:30 p.m. and stayed until approximately 3:00 p.m. Wednesday, July 14. During that time I was making observations of the bighorn sheep as part of the research for Rocky Mountain National Park. Since I was not interested in the lake or dam I did not spend much time observing the lake, dam or spillway. Wednesday morning, around 8:00, when I filled my water bottle from the spillway, I noticed that it was full and the volume of water was that of a river the size of the spillway. It was approximately a foot deep. The lake was full and, with the wind from a front that passed through, the waves were breaking on top of the dam. This lasted about an hour. As to the level of the water on the dam and any seepage or flow of water below the dam, I did not notice anything at all. Other than a rain Tuesday afternoon, there was no significant amount of precipitation during the time I was there. The ground was soggy around the lake from the runoff and the frequent rainstorms this summer.

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## SUPPLEMENTARY CASE. INCIDENT RECORD

ONGANIZATION (PARK) NAME	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER
Rocky Mountain National Park	8 2 0 6 0 3
LOCATION OF INCIDENT.	DATE OF INCIDENT
Same	0 7 1 5 8 2
NATURE OF INCIDENT'	

Flood

COMPLAINANT'S NAME	COMPLAINANT'S ADDRESS
Statement - Kenneth Franks	1986 Flickinger Hill, Woorster, OH 44691
RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION	

ACCOUNT OF INVESTIGATION

I was fishing off Spillway corner of dam last evening and quit at 8:45 P.M. Waves were 2 feet high, wind strong, a small amount of debris in spillway area, water going over spillway OK - not high. I awoke after midnight (sometime) I could hear a roar that I thought was the wind. I went to fish at 7:30 and found the dam broken. The people who camped at Lawn Lake last night are OK. One campsite is vacant -(not used.)

I saw no other hikers after a family of four- man, woman, 2 children they had water bottles only, and said they had to pick up their son at the YMCA Camp at 4P.M. We met them at Lawn Lake at 1 P.M., the last time. I think they got out O.K.

I saw no people other than those accounted for at Lawn Lake campsite this A.M.

SUBMITTED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE)

/s/ Kenneth D. Franks

APPROVED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE)

aurie Stannon

7/15/82

SUPPLEMENTARY CA	SE/INCIDENT RECORD					•			
ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME		CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER							
Rocky Mountain National Park			8	2 0	) 6	0			
LOCATION OF INCIDENT.			DATE OF INCIDENT						
Same			0	7]	. 5	8			
NATURE OF INCIDENT									
Flood									
COMPLAINANT'S NAME	COMPLAINANT'S ADDRESS								
Statement - Joanne Franks	1986 Flickinger Hill	., Woos	ster	, Oł	4/	4691			
RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION			-						
(Site #7-1 @ Lawn Lake) We left Lawn Lake trailhead mid morning for		-							

After setting up camp, we hiked up to Crystal Lake, which took an 1 1/2 hr. Stayed at Crystal for 1/2 hr., then headed down. We got caught in a rain storm, which lasted a short time. Arrived at campsite around 5 PM & started to prepare supper. My husban went to the lake to fish. Supper finished & cleaned up by 7:30 PM. We noticed 1 othe fellow camped nexted to us. Approx. 9 PM we turned in. During the night I heard what sounded like a freight train, & just thought a storm was whipping up, & fell back to sleep. It wasn't until approx. 7:30 AM that we realized the dam had broken. When the helicopter landed there were 3 more people appear who had also camped.

We met no one on the way to Crystal Lake.

SUBMITTED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE) /s/ Joanne Franks

APPROVED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE)

ndusn

SUFFLEMENTARY CA	SE/INCIDENT RECORD							
Rocky Mountain National Park		CASE	/INC BER	ÎDEI	VT	·	····.	
LOCATION OF INCIDENT.			8	2	0	6	0	3
Same		DAT				1T )A T	<u> </u>	<u>, 8</u>
NATURE OF INCIDENT			0	7	1	5	8	2
Flood								
COMPLAINANT'S NAME	COMPLAINANT'S ADDRESS			<b>.</b>				Sakaa
Statement- Debra J. Franks	29 Millhaven Ct., Ric	hmond	1, '	VI	23	233		

RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

We left lawn lake Trailhead at 10:05 AM 7/14/82: parents, brother (23), brother's girlfriend (-23), myself. Slowly hiked up trail with frequent rest stops. People passed on the way: one young male on way out with fishing pole (no pack) low in hike (still in aspen); middle aged male fishing in creek farther up; family of four (father, mother, two children of elementary age) on way up to lake for day hike (sale they had to be back to YMCA by 4:30-saw them at 12:30PM still on way up); single male on way up to lawn for overnight; man and woman on way down (we passed them at 12:30PM); two young men at lake at dam looking like they were there just for day hike; family of three (small child, husband, wife) also camped at lake. Reached campsite 2PM, set up camp. Hiked up to Crystal Lakes and back to camp by 5PM. Cooked supper, father fished, in bed 8:30 PM. Sometime after 9:30(10?) heard extra roar (we thought was wind). Slept - didn't know lake was gone until up at 8:00 AM.

APPROVED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE)

suron M.Hi

07/15/52

#### THAN FROM AND FORMED REDOVED.

### SUPPLEMENTARY CASE INCIDENT RECORD

ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME				CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER								
Rocky Mountain National Park					8	2	0	6	0			
LOCATION OF INCIDENT,												
Same					0	7	1	5	8			
NATURE OF INCIDENT												
Flood												
COMPLAINANT'S NAME	COMPLAIN	NANT'S ADDI	RESS									
Statement - Kerry Franks	1986 F1	ickinger	Hill,	Woos	te	c, (	H	44	691			
RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION												

Camped @ Lawn Lake 7/14 w/Franks party.

At 2-4 AM (7/15) I awoke and heard a roar. At that time I assumed it was just wind, however, I thought it strange that the tent was not fluttering.

In the morning (8-9 AM) I saw the dam had broken. Camp was packed up and left via helicopter.

SUBMITTED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE) /s/ Kerry Franks 7/15

APPROVED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE) 82

#### PREVERSE CELL CONSERVED CONTRACTOR

### SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD

ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME	CASE		IDEI	NT			
Rocky Mountain National Park		8	2	0	6	0	13
LOCATION OF INCIDENT,	DATI		INC O		IT )A	1	ΥŖ
Same		0	7	1	5	8	2
NATURE OF INCIDENT							

Flood

COMPLAINANT'S NAME	COMPLAINANT'S ADDRESS
Statement - Thomas Gunning	878 S. Dexter #302, Denver, CO 80222

RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

Started at Lawn Lake trail head 10:30 am 7-14-82. Met several parties coming down the trail as I was going up. Met party of husband & wife & two children (about 10 yr. old). They were hiking for the day. Also met them at lake they were heading back down (about 2:30 pm) Their son was climbing Baker w/ the YMCA.Also met party of 5 that also camped at Lawn Lake. Arrived at Lake at 2:30 pm. Met 2 young met at dam (I believe they were from Illinois). They were getting ready to head to the bottom.

I woke up at 3:30 am (7-15-82) & heard a roaring noise (which I assume was the river after the dam broke) I got up at 6:50 am & noticed the Lake was lower. I went to the dam, seeing it was washed out. Met Dave Bux at dam & watched the river washing out the river bed.

SUBMITTED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE) /s/ Thomas A. Gunning 7/15/82

APPROVED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE) Henderson 7/15/62

SUPPLEMENTARY CAS	E/INCIDENT	RECORD
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ORGANIZATION	(PARK)	NAME
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#### Rocky Mountain National Park

### LOCATION OF INCIDENT.

#### Same

#### NATURE OF INCIDENT

#### Flood

COMPLAINANT'S NAME

Statement - Jeanne

	COMPLAINANT'S ADDRESS	
	650 Prospect St.	- (r)
Jones	Shreve, OH 44676	

CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER 8

DATE OF INCIDENT

MO

0 7 1 5 8

2 0

6

DA

0

#### RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

We arrived at the campsite at about 2:10 & set up camp. We then hiked up to Crystal Lake at got back - 5:30. Ate supper, went to bed. About 9:30 we were talking about the noise which sounded like high winds to them but it sounded like a distant waterfal to me. During the night I woke up periodically & the noise had increased but there was no wind hitting the tent. At 8:00 we checked out the path; the dam broke right where the spillway had been. -100 feet away from the break was a big rusty wheel  $lodge_{ee}$ among some rocks & 1/4 mile away was a big metal cylinder lodged among some pine trees on the left bank. The helicopters then began to circle.

### SUBMITTED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE) /s/ Jeanne Jones 6/15/82

APPROVED BY (SIGNATURE AND-DATE)

aurie Shannon

7/15/82

#### NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

#### SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD

CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER						
- 8 2 0 6 0 3						
DATE OF INCIDENT						
MO, DA, YR						
0 7 1 5 8 2						

Flood

COMPLAINANT'S NAME	COMPLAINANT'S ADDRESS
Statement - Maggie Box	1510 N. Choctaw Ave. Claremore, OK

RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

We started out Monday to Roaring River Camp site. Camped there Mon & Tue nights. Started up the trail on Wed around 10 a.m. Saw nothing unusual. We pasted a party of four (man women 2 teenage girls) on the trail. Near the last switch backs. The man told my husband they were going to camp where ever because they were tired. My husband got up around 6 a.m. Thurs morning to walk. He saw the dam had broken. He took pictures of the water levels. At 6 a.m. the sound from our campsite was like a train engine.

SUBMITTED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE) /s/ Maggie Helton Box 7/15/82

APPROVED BY ISIGNATURE AND DATE Henduson 7/15/82

SUPPLEMENTART	ISE INCIDENT RECORD
ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER
Rocky Mountain National Park	
LOCATION OF INCIDENT.	DATE OF INCIDENT
Same	7     1     5     8     2
NATURE OF INCIDENT	
Flood	
COMPLAINANT'S NAME	COMPLAINANT'S ADDRESS
Statement - Ann E. McMann	P.O. Box 179, Coos Bay, OR 97420
RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION	
I was camping with Margaret Brault and ear	ly in the morn. Margaret awakened me by

saying "What's that noise?" - listened a moment and could only think it must be thunder - I unzipped tent flap & Margaret saw a "Wall" of water and said it's a flash flood and I could only see a dark portion of the river coming downriver above us. I grabbed my sweater & Margaret & I ran out of the tent & ran to higher ground above us. We stopped up higher on the hill to turn around & watch the river, mud & rocks "boiling" past us & filling portions of the flat part of Roaring River C.G. We looked back and could see the tent & packs were untouched - we waited longer trees were falling, rocks were making great noise - then when things seemed to be stabler (possibly 45'-60'??) we went back to the tent site and gradually hauled part of gear to higher ground. We looked toward C.S.#1 (saw nothing, saw no one - walked up to overlook above the Horseshoe Park - watched helicopters, park service trucks thru bincos - went back for packs (Margaret went back 1st) & decided to wait above RR.C.S. area in case Park Service came there - about 11 AM 2 men camping at Up. Chipm came thru - we all four walked to flat river bed - too fast to cross - all four went back up Ypsilon Trail to clearing above Valley - walked downhill clearing area - saw Park Ser. persons on E. side of river - told us to go downstream - walked to flat bottom valley - met there by 2 Park Serv. men & 1 women - arranged copter to take us to Park Hdqtrs.

SUBMITTED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE) /s/ Ann E. McMann 7/15/82

APPROVED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE)

Jaurie Shannon 7/15/82

SUPPLEMENTARY CASE, INCIDENT RECOR	RD					-	
ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME	CAGE/INCIDENT NUMBER						
Rocky Mountain National Park	8	2	0	6	0	3	
LOCATION OF INCIDENT,	DATE OF					YR	
Same	0	7	1	5	8	2	
NATURE OF INCIDENT							
Flood							

COMPLAINANT'S NAME	COMPLAINANT'S ADDRESS
Statement - Daniel Sumita	6047 S. Campbell, Chicago, IL 60629

#### RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

Hiking from the Lawn Lake trailhead up to the Ypsilon Creek Campsite our party encountered two twenty year old males w/backpacks in shorts (no shirts) who passed us up on the trail. Later walking toward us (at the trailhead) we passed one sinche male hiker, later another single male, and then a group of four (two females and 2 males. Once at the trail split we passed 3 males and a female sitting on the bridge. Once at the campsite we built a fire had dinner and went to bed. At about 6:20 AM all in our party was awakened by a loud tree breaking thunder, by the time we looked out the first surge of water was 50 feet from our tent sending trees crash downward along/w tons of earth and boulders water and debris also reached our tent as we scrambled uphill with the first pieces of gear we could grab when we finally realized the danger was over near our tent we pulled our gear and tent up the hill and watched the destruction.

APPROVED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE)

aurie Stannon

7/15/02

HA HONAL PARE SERVICE								
SUPPLEMENTARY CAS	E/INCIDENT RECORD							
ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME	· · · · · ·	OASE/I		N'T				
Rocky Mountain National Park			3 2	0	6	0	3	
LOCATION OF INCIDENT.		DATE				i		
		Г	<u>MO</u>	+		t-'	R	
Same			) 7	1	5	8	2	
NATURE OF INCIDENT					,			
Flood	••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••					,	;	
COMPLAINANT'S NAME	COMPLAINANT'S ADDRESS							
	Moraine Route, Box 1							
Statement - Laurie Shannon RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION	Estes Park, CO 8051	.7						
On 07/15/82 while on my lieu day, I w to respond to the rescue cache becaus approx. 0800 hrs. I was requested to Cashman had been camping at Roaring R when the flood occurred. Cashman sta coffee, and his partner Steven See wa continued growing louder when Cashman and a wall of water coming down the d ground. He stated when he looked bac area had been destroyed by the flood. River and when reached the Endovalley to cross and then proceeded east unti to Headquarters. When I interviewed what hostile about answering question 12:00 hrs. noon before making any pho apartment in the Park Annex for rest. I interviewed all the other campers end the assistance of Rangers Henderson and evacuated by helicopter they were brow We had each of them fill out statement	e of the dam breaking interview Steven Cash iver Campsite #1 in t ted that he had been s asleep when he hear looked up and saw tr rainage. He stated t k the tent with See i Cashman hiked down Road, he walked west 1 he contacted a Rang Cashman he was extrem s. We asked Cashman ne calls. Cashman wa He was later by Range vacuated from the Law nd McKinley. As the ught in groups to us	at Law man at the Law up at o d a low rees sn hat he n it wa the we until ger who hely up to please to please then r Hendo r Lake campers at Head	wn La Head h Lal laybi ud ro appin ran as go st s: he : tran set a tran erson dra: s wen lquan	ake. iqua ce d reak bar. for one ide four spo and vait inag ce	A rte rai drai bou hi and of d a rte was un rte s.	t rs. nag ink he lde ghe th Roa: br: th son til d to son til ith	o Ang Ioa rs r e rin idg im me- o A	

We had each of them fill out statements (344's) as well as making notes on a separate piece of paper which was attached to the statement. We asked questions from all trying to account for all campers or hikers who might have been in the drainage on 7-14-82 to 7-15-82. We basically followed the format of Who, What, When, Where, How and Why during the interviews. Most of the campers were cooperative but did not have alot of information. After the interview they were given transportation if needed. After the interviews we were fairly confident that we had accounted for all the campers in the drainage with the exception of any illegal campers who might have been up the drainage. After obtaining a list of all the people the campers had encountered during the day, we then asked them to relate their account of the flood.

I was clear at 1600 hrs.

On 07-16-82 I participated as a searcher in Ranger Powers search group. We searched from Aspenglen Campground down to approx 1-1/2 miles below the Park boundary along Fall River. Nothing was found.

SUBMITTED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE)	APPROVED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE)
Jaurie channon 07/15/52	David f. Ener \$2/37

HATIONAL	PARE	SERVICE
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### SUPPLEMENTARY CASE. INCIDENT RECORD

ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME	CASE/INCIDENT
Rocky Mountain National Park	8 2 0 6 0 3
LOCATION OF INCIDENT.	0 2 0 0 0 3 GATE OF INCIDENT MO , DA , YE
Same	
NATURE OF INCIDENT	

Flood

COMPLAINANT'S NAME	COMPLAINANT'S ADDRESS
	829 West Franklin
<u>Statement - Steven R. Cashman</u>	Appleton, WI 54911
BESULTS OF INVESTIGATION	

Went to bed last night about 10:00. We both woke up cause we couldn't sleep. We talked for a while and went back to sleep. This was around 3:00. I woke up early this morning & woke Steve up. he was to tired to get up. I bilt a fire & made coffee. I started to hear a sound like an air plane. Also there were loud booms. It got louder and louder. I thought it was breaking the sound beareyer. I kept looking for a plane but couldn't see one. I got suspicious and started to look up stream. I saw trees crashing over and a wall of water coming down. I staried to run as fast as I could for high ground. There was a defining roar. I fell and got up and kept running. I stood on high ground and watched it wipe out our camp sight. It knocked everything In it path over Steve didn't stand a chance. I watched for 15 minutes and then started down the Mt. for help.

I got to the road on the oposit side of the river from the car. I walked back and forth for about an hour. Then I walked up the valley and around they other river at the picknick area. I walked along the mt sides till I saw a rangers truck about 1/2 mile away. I ran to It and told him what happened. If we would of been warned what to whatch for I could of woke Steve up. He would still be alive.

SUBMITTED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE)

APPROVED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE) Jamie Stannon 7/15/82

1

SUPPLEMEN	TARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD
ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER
Rocky Mountain National Park	8 2 0 6 0
LOCATION OF INCIDENT.	DATE OF INCIDENT
Same	
NATURE OF INCIDENT	
Flood	
COMPLAINANT'S NAME	COMPLAINANT'S ADDRESS
Statement - Rick Krainas	7808 S. Homan, Chicago, IL 60652
RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION	
At $11:15(A_M_{\odot})$ 7-14-82 we headed	up Long Lake trailhead. We made many stops and it

took us 4 1/2 hrs. Along the way we saw many hikers but very few backpackers.

backpackers we saw were 2 ladies (In early 40's) and 4 men who were trailworkers.

When we arrived at camp we setup and did some exploring. We ate and went to bed early. We were awakened at approximately 6:00(A.M.) by a loud thundering noise. We looked out the tent and saw waves about 25-30 ft. carrying trees and rocks everywhere. We began to bring all valuables to high land. Then we saw other campers hiking around making sure everybody's OK. Then there were 4 rescuers who gathered

SUBMITTED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE)

everybody to a helicopter landing spot.

/s/ Rick Krainas 7/15/82

APPROVED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE) 07/15/82

The

SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD										
ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME		CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER								
Rocky Mountain National Park		8	2	0	6	0	3			
LOCATION OF INCIDENT,	DATE OF INCIDENT MO DA					YR				
Same		0	7	1	5	8	2			
NATURE OF INCIDENT										

Flood

COMPLAINANT'S NAME	COMPLAINANT'S ADDRESS 2448 W. Balmoral
Statement - Robert C. Kendall	Chicago, IL 60625

RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

Left for Lawn Lake Trail 11:15 AM. Made it to Ypsilon Creek Site #1 about 4:30 PM. Set up camp and ate 7:30 PM. Went to bed 9:00-9:30PM. Awoke at 5:50 AM and began to hear what sounded like thunder then came crashing noises and we all looked out a saw a 25-30' wall of water seything throu the trees, probably 100 yds away. We ran to higher ground and watched. This was 6:00 AM. We watched the total destruction of the creek for 3 hours, then about 11:30 AM the trail rangers came and got us all in one place, for the copters to pick us up - about 1 PM.

SUBMITTED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE)

/s/ RC Kendall 7/15/82

APPROVED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE)

Laurie channon 7/15/82

SUPPLEMENTARY CAS												
ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME				CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER								
Rocky Mountain National Park				2	0	6	0	3				
LOCATION OF INCIDENT,			DATE OF INCIDENT									
					<u>                                      </u>		<u> </u>	YR				
Same				7	1	5	8	2				
NATURE OF INCIDENT												
·												
Flood	,											
COMPLAINANT'S NAME	COMPLAINANT'S ADDRESS											
	605 Glendale											
Statement - Steve Wilde	Glenview, IL 600:	25										

RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

At about 6:15 AM I awoke to the sound of trees smashing and water rushing. We looked to the river and saw trees and water rushing by. We went to the lower campsites and saw that everyone was fine. We went back to our campsite and saw Wheelers trail cre They yelled across the river to stay still and wait. Some time later they came down the other side of the river. They collected people from the lower campsites and we went to a spot where the helicopter could pick us up.

SUBMITTED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE)

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/s/ Steve Wilde 7/15/82

APPROVED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE) Jaurie Shannon 7/15/82

#### NATIONAL PARE SERVEL

### SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD

ORGANIZATION (FARK) NAME	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER	
Rocky Mountain National Park	8 2 0 6 0	3
LOCATION OF INCIDENT.	DATE OF INCIDENT	
Same	0 7 1 5 8	2
NATURE OF INCIDENT		

Flood

COMPLAINANT'S NAME	COMPLAINANT'S ADDRESS
Statement - Tim Wood	1756 Henley St. Glenview Ill 60025

RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

I woke up at 6:15 and the ground was shaking. I heard some trees braking I got out off the tent and saw a wall of water rushing down the river. I wached the water for till the ranger came. I saw them akrost the river. They told us to stay there. They come about two hours later. We went to a clearing and wated for the Helakopter. Then they took us to the ranger station.

SUPPLEMENTARY CAS	E INCIDENT RECORD
ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME	CALL INCLUENT NUMBER
	8 2 0 6 0 3
Rocky Mountain National Park	DATE OF INCIDENT MO , DA , YR
LOCATION OF INCIDENT.	
	01711151812
NATURE OF INCIDENT	
Flood -	1, 1 1, 1/ 2 K.
COMPLAINANT'S NAME	COMPLAINANT'S ADDRESS
statement -Stephen W. Gillette	Box 2162
	Estes Park, CO 80517
<ul> <li>truck I hear a very dealening holder of that a jet was crashing and to go up th</li> <li>About 30 yds from Roaring River Bridge kimbs) on road. Stopping and looking u into the air. Truck in reverse to the around to go to trailhead emergency pheentering off 34. Decided to block road</li> <li>6:22, call dispatch - ask whats going of thing just burst. There is a massive 3 the A-1 Trash Driver. Get Dan Davis do road till Dan gets here.</li> <li>Ranger Shultz arrive where I have my to the Endovalley winter closure gate. We both then go to the bridge on 34. After getting to the bridge I see an K</li> </ul>	I notice some water and debris (logs and up-hill I see trees and rocks being thrown Endovalley winter closure gate - turn one. Notice Blazer (Michigan plates) d and run to phone. on up Endovalley? I think a lake or some- landslide - I have the road blocked. I'm own here. Not going to let anyone up the ruck blocking access. Shultz and I proceed He ask me to lock it. He is on the radio. While there, I see much more water and Debri one high wall of water and debris coming to book the road with some blockades that I and by the time I finishwater is coming

2

SUBMITTED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE) High 2) Thulit 7-22-52 Conif Fisher 92/3 RA 10-343 Rev. 3-73)

### United States Department of the Interior NATIONAL PARK SERVICE CASE INCIDENT RECORD

Page 1 of 2

ORGANIZATION CODE	2. ORGANIZATION (P	ARK) NAME			3. LOCATION CODE 4. CASE/INCIDENT NO					
	Rocky Mountai	n National	National Park				8	2,0	6,0,3	
LOCATION OF INCIDENT		6. WHEN	MO.	OAY	YR.	24	HRS.	MIN.	7. DAY	
aring River/Fall Ri	aring River/Fall River Drainages					HOUR	0 6	2 6	WEEK 5	
OFFENSE/INCIDENT CODE	9. NATURE OF INCID	ENT				10. HOW	REPORT	£0		
	Lawn Lake Dam	Failure				Telc	ohone			
I. REPORTED BY		12. ADDRE	.55				13.	HOME		
teven Gillette		AI Tras	AI Trash Service, Estes Par				PHONE 0	BUSINE	s\$86-57L0	
4. RECEIVED BY		15. WHEN P	RECEIVE	D:				16. TIM	ADCAST	
ispatch Center		DATE	07/15	/82				062		
7. INVESTIGATED BY		18. OFFICE	R/RANG	ER NO.	19. WHEN INVESTIGATED DISPOSITI					
ann Shultz - Park Ra	nger			<u> </u>	DATE	07/15	TIME	0628	20.	
21. INVOLVED PERS	ONS .22.	A00	RESS	· · · ·	23.	PHONE	24.	25. 26. RACEAGE	27. DATE OF	
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#### 18. DETAILS OF INCIDENT

metime around daybreak on Thursday morning, July 15, 1982, the Lawn Lake Dam failed, elassing 820 acre feet of water into the Roaring River drainage. The resulting water, ock, and debris, which emptied into the Horseshoe Park area, was first reported at :26 am by an AI Trash Service employee who was enroute to pick up trash in the ndovalley area. Park Rangers immediately began to respond to the Horseshoe Park area is the Estes Park Police Department was notified of the situation at 6:h3 am. Park isitors were evacuated from Horseshoe Park and a Park Ranger was dispatched to spenglen Campground to evacuate campers from the walk-in campsites along the river, otification being completed by 7:12 am/ Park Rangers also notified the Operator of ascade Cottages of impending flood conditions. During this period of time employees t Park Headquarters were compiling a list of registered campers in backcountry ampsites at Lawn Lake and along the Roaring River drainage and obtaining a helicopter ith which to carry out rescue operations in these backcountry areas. At 7:30 am a escue team started up into the Roaring River drainage on foot to attempt contact with urvivors. At this time flood waters draining Horseshoe Park began to flow over the ascade Dam. At 7:h3 am the Cascade Dam went out, creating a crest flood down the Fall iver alongside the Aspenglen Campground area. Somotime prior to this crest moving ownstream, eye witnesses in the campground observed three persons who had previously een evacuated from the walk-in river campsites reenter the evacuated area by walking een evacuated from the walk-in river campsites reenter the evacuated area by walking ver a foot bridge which was completely covered by water. These three individuals were pparantly swept away as the flood crest from the Cascade Dam failure moved through the

	31.	31. ESTIMATED VALUE					RECOVERED							
QUANTITY	PROPERTY STOLE	EN OR DAMAGED	5	5T1M/	ATEL			32. C	ATE	33.	VALUE			
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04. PROPERT	EST VALUE	35 TOTAI		,	1	1	1	00	36. TOTAL		L. !	1 1 1!	1	00
NVESTIGAT	ED BY (Signature and Date)		APPR	oyri	7 8 Y	(Sign	aturn	and Dat	"U		~	-/	/	•

FORM NO. 10-344 (Rev. 3-73)

### U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

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Page 2 of 2

SUFFLEMENTART CASE/INCIDENT RECORD								
ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER							
Rocky Mountain National Park		8	2	0	6	0	3	
LOCATION OF INCIDENT.	DATE OF INCIDENT MO , DA , YR						'R	
Roaring River/Fall River Drainages		0	7	1	5	8	2	
NATURE OF INCIDENT								

Lawn Lake Dam Failure

COMPLAINANT'S NAME

#### COMPLAINANT'S ADDRESS

RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

river campsites area to a height of several feet. This crest also took out the entrance road into Aspenglen Campground preventing any further vehicle or foot access across the road bridge. At this time another rescue team was started into the campground on foot from the Deer Ridge Junction area, reaching the campground in approximately one half hour. This team reported a lot of water running throungout the campground to a depth of 5 or 6 inches in places but no life threatening situations with the exception of three persons who reportedly went back into the river campsites area. This crew then began to search for these missing persons along both sides of the river below the campground, continuing their efforts throughout the afternoon. The rescue team moving up the Roaring River drainage reported contacts with stranded campers on the west side of the river at several locations. These stranded campers were advised to stay put until other rescue personnel could move down the drainage from above and make contact with them. At 8:44 am, a helicopter began transporting rescue personnel into the Lawn Lake area to contact campers at the lake and also to begin hiking down both sides of the drainage to contact survivors. At 8:49 am a report was received from the rescue team moving up the drainage that they had been informed by a camper at the Roaring River campsites that he had observed a companion get swept away in his tent. This was the first report of a possible fatality in the Roaring River drainage. After transporting rescue personnel into the Lawn Lake area the helicopter began flying survivors out to Horseshoe Park as rescue personnel were able to conduct them to suitable helipad locations. At 11:17 am, a second helicopter began assisting in transportation of survivors, search and rescue personnel and carrying out aerial reconnaisance. After all survivors were located and transported to safety, rescue personnel intensified recovery searches in the Horseshoe Park area and along the Fall River below Aspenglen Campground for known missing persons, continuing the searches throughout the remainder of the day. During the afternoon, additional Ranger personnel along with food and supplies were delivered by helicopter into the Aspenglen Campground area. By midnight the National Park Service had constructed an emergency road into the campground from the south side of the river. Only four individuals left that night, the rest indicating they would rather wait until morning to drive out. Three Park Rangers (one a Para-Medic) spent the night in the campground to provide security and emergency medical attention if needed. One hundred chicken dinners were delivered to the campground that evening. The following morning campers began an organized evacuation of the campground.



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