Alexis Pinchard
I am a former fellow of the Ecole normale supérieure (Paris) and a former non-residential fellow of the Center for Hellenic Studies (Harvard University) in Washington, D.C., where I was pursuing research in Greek philosophy with special interest in Indo-Iranian comparative cosmology (2010-2011). In France, I am a “professeur agrégé” of philosophy in the selective “Classes Préparatoires aux Grandes Ecoles” (« khâgne » and « hypokhâgne » A/L, i.e. the Humanities Section of the “CPGE”). I am qualified by the French National Council of Universities (CNU) for the job of Lecturer in Philosophy (« Maître de conférences »). My current teaching regularly deals with ancient philosophy, especially Plato, Pre-Socratics and Aristotle, with a supplementary interest in continental metaphysics. Moreover I have had opportunities to teach philosophy and ancient cultures at a variety of institutions in France and abroad (University of Leipzig, of Aix-Marseille, of Reims and of Tours).
I possess an excellent knowledge of Greek and Sanskrit, as it is testified by several published translations (large extracts of Proclus, of Plato and Aristotle, Paippalāda Saṃhitā 18.26). I am qualified by the French CNU also for the job of Lecturer in Classics and Sanskrit. My experiences in cross-comparative studies have supported the expansion of my horizons beyond French Academy. For example I wrote two recent papers in English (« The History of Sphoṭa: from Ontology to Epistemology? » and « The Argumentative Value of Āgamic Quotations in the Sphoṭasiddhi by Bharata Miśra », for the Journal of Indian Philosophy, currently under review). Linguistics, however, functions in my scholarship chiefly as a means to pursue a novel understanding of fundamental ancient assumptions about ontology, especially Plato’s ontology. Besides many papers, reviews and presentations on Plato (for example my review of Delcomminette’s Le Philèbe de Platon, and my paper entitled « L’expérience du beau et la séparation des Formes chez Platon »), I recently published a book (a revised version of my PhD dissertation), Les langues de sagesse dans la Grèce et l’Inde anciennes (Droz, Genève, 2009, 638 pages), which tries to bring a new approach to Plato’s theory of Ideas through a paradigm shift concerning the origins of Greek philosophy. The ontological aspect of my work clearly appears in several chapters of this book, such as that entitled « De la complexité du signe à la complexité de l’être », and in refereed articles published in international journals, such as that entitled « Les langues indo-européennes sont-elles les langues de l’être? Le témoignage indo-iranien », in Antiquorum Philosophia 4).
Let me briefly present the results of this first book, which has also been reviewed has been already reviewed in several journals (see Alberto Bernabé Pajarès in BMCR and R. Schmitt in Indo-Iranian Journal 53). In order to find a rule organizing the homonymy of the Greek word sophía, which designates the plain cleverness of the riddle-decipherer so much as the universal knowledge based on the highest reality, I suggest reading again the fundamental texts of philosophy with a new method: structural comparitivism. This method has already proved its systematizing power in grammar and mythology. India, by having elevated true speech to the rank of spiritual excellence, has a privileged place in this comparison. Thus we become able to deduce Plato's famous “theory of Ideas”, which is the real center of Greek wisdom in spite of its controversial aspect — or even because of it —, from the very old contrast between the language of the gods and the language of the men: this contrast has been clearly explained by the Vedic seers and is present in poetic most of the tradition of an Indo-European descent, including Homer and the Orphic tradition. Therefore the Sophists can no longer serve as a simple foil for philosophers seeking the essence of things: they incarnate a legitimate sapiential option that recognizes the creative power of names. Indeed the trace of a common filiation of these two antagonist interpretations of wisdom lies in the fact that both swear allegiance to the Eleusinian mysteries of immortality, each one pretending to be their one legitimate heir. These rituals, which are supposed to bring a man to his own perfection along an inner path, constitute the most likely source for Plato’s undemonstrable assumptions about ontology, inasmuch as his ontology contrasts the default of the sensible realm with the perfection of the intelligible realm.
Of course, this way to inquire about Plato’s ontology implies a close connection with Pre-Socratic studies. Moreover, I published several papers dealing with the Neo-Platonist tradition (3 published papers or chapters of book about Proclus), so that I can conceptually situate my research in a long chronology.
I possess an excellent knowledge of Greek and Sanskrit, as it is testified by several published translations (large extracts of Proclus, of Plato and Aristotle, Paippalāda Saṃhitā 18.26). I am qualified by the French CNU also for the job of Lecturer in Classics and Sanskrit. My experiences in cross-comparative studies have supported the expansion of my horizons beyond French Academy. For example I wrote two recent papers in English (« The History of Sphoṭa: from Ontology to Epistemology? » and « The Argumentative Value of Āgamic Quotations in the Sphoṭasiddhi by Bharata Miśra », for the Journal of Indian Philosophy, currently under review). Linguistics, however, functions in my scholarship chiefly as a means to pursue a novel understanding of fundamental ancient assumptions about ontology, especially Plato’s ontology. Besides many papers, reviews and presentations on Plato (for example my review of Delcomminette’s Le Philèbe de Platon, and my paper entitled « L’expérience du beau et la séparation des Formes chez Platon »), I recently published a book (a revised version of my PhD dissertation), Les langues de sagesse dans la Grèce et l’Inde anciennes (Droz, Genève, 2009, 638 pages), which tries to bring a new approach to Plato’s theory of Ideas through a paradigm shift concerning the origins of Greek philosophy. The ontological aspect of my work clearly appears in several chapters of this book, such as that entitled « De la complexité du signe à la complexité de l’être », and in refereed articles published in international journals, such as that entitled « Les langues indo-européennes sont-elles les langues de l’être? Le témoignage indo-iranien », in Antiquorum Philosophia 4).
Let me briefly present the results of this first book, which has also been reviewed has been already reviewed in several journals (see Alberto Bernabé Pajarès in BMCR and R. Schmitt in Indo-Iranian Journal 53). In order to find a rule organizing the homonymy of the Greek word sophía, which designates the plain cleverness of the riddle-decipherer so much as the universal knowledge based on the highest reality, I suggest reading again the fundamental texts of philosophy with a new method: structural comparitivism. This method has already proved its systematizing power in grammar and mythology. India, by having elevated true speech to the rank of spiritual excellence, has a privileged place in this comparison. Thus we become able to deduce Plato's famous “theory of Ideas”, which is the real center of Greek wisdom in spite of its controversial aspect — or even because of it —, from the very old contrast between the language of the gods and the language of the men: this contrast has been clearly explained by the Vedic seers and is present in poetic most of the tradition of an Indo-European descent, including Homer and the Orphic tradition. Therefore the Sophists can no longer serve as a simple foil for philosophers seeking the essence of things: they incarnate a legitimate sapiential option that recognizes the creative power of names. Indeed the trace of a common filiation of these two antagonist interpretations of wisdom lies in the fact that both swear allegiance to the Eleusinian mysteries of immortality, each one pretending to be their one legitimate heir. These rituals, which are supposed to bring a man to his own perfection along an inner path, constitute the most likely source for Plato’s undemonstrable assumptions about ontology, inasmuch as his ontology contrasts the default of the sensible realm with the perfection of the intelligible realm.
Of course, this way to inquire about Plato’s ontology implies a close connection with Pre-Socratic studies. Moreover, I published several papers dealing with the Neo-Platonist tradition (3 published papers or chapters of book about Proclus), so that I can conceptually situate my research in a long chronology.
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Venue: Sree Sankara University of Sanskrit, Kalady
Topic: The issue of the essence of human being in modern times
Audience: Mostly researchers on Sanskrit Literature, Veda, Philosophy etc.
Duration: 2 hours each
Synopsis : The issue of the essence of human being in modern times
Nowadays the common view about human being is a kind of nāstika view, if I may use the Brahmanic terminology. Human being, with all its specificities, seems to be the mere result of the Darwinian biological evolution just as every animal. And life itself is conceived of as a mechanical interaction between material particles without any reference to a teleological explanation. Thus there is no human exception in comparison to other living beings and even in comparison to other things in the universe. The essence of human being does no longer depend on any divine or transcendent reality which would act as its origin or its model ; no Self is present in the body so that consciousness consists only in natural electric connections within the brain. Such a view is powerfully sustained by the fact that modern science, in which it is rooted, is perfectly efficient. It also reinforces the development of techno-capitalism at the global level of Earth without letting any possibility of an ethical limitation. To sum up such a view might result in the very destruction of our humanity.
Can philosophy refute this view inside each of us without denying the obvious fact that modern natural sciences have a real value for knowledge at their own level? Such a refutation might be very difficult by relying only on Western philosophical tradition. For the best Western metaphysicians — René Descartes (1596-1650 CE) for example — were anti-materialist but, inasmuch as they have sharply distinguished matter and mind as two heterogeneous substances, they also provided the ultimate ground for modern natural sciences and their reducing of every being to a quasi mathematical object. Thus these Western metaphysicians gave birth to the obsessing technical power through which Europe mastered nature and other cultures during five centuries. Now the whole world feels very weak towards its own fascination for technical power. We cannot resist our own quest for power. However rejecting metaphysics cannot be the right solution because only metaphysics saves the feeling that the most important reality is invisible and kindred with our intimate Self. Therefore philosophy has to find new arguments. Vedic tradition, interpreted in the perspective of Platonic speculations on memory, could contribute to such a task. For example, the fact that the Veda is still being orally taught could be interpreted as a proof that human mind, far from being a mere effect of matter, is so free that it is responsible for its own eternity or its own decline. Vedic tradition might be a major attempt of mind to save himself.
1) Day 1 : The current nāstika view, its effects and its causes
2) Day 2 : Some unsatisfying attempts to refute this view
3) Day 3 : New arguments
Day-5 (Friday, 27th Feb, 2015): Dr. C. N. Neelakantan endowment annual lecture in Veda
Venue: Sree Sankara University of Sanskrit, Kalady
Topic: The Vedic sentence “satyam asmi” of Jaiminiya Brahmana and its reflections in ancient Greek
Audience:Mostly researchers and post graduate students on Sanskrit Literature and Veda
Duration: 1 hour
Synopsis: The sentence “satyam asmi” (JB I, 50) and its consequences on the meaning of AS-
The verbal root AS- has several meanings in Sanskrit, just as “to be” in English and ésti in ancient Greek: it can assert the existence of something or work as a copula which links the subject and the predicate in a sentence. My lecture aims at tracing back the origin of such an ambiguity and at showing that it did not develop at random. The Vedic sentence satyam asmi (JB I, 50), by containing twice AS- under various forms, might embody this origin. Since a sentence of the form satyam + AS- can be uttered only by a divine entity about himself, the root AS-, while functioning as a copula, might reflect the language of gods in the language of men. It moderates the ancient contrast between these two kinds of language.
Day-6 (Saturday, 28th Feb, 2015): Invited lecture
Venue: Brahmaswom Madhom, Thrissur
Topic: “Know thyself ” (gnōthi seauton / jānīhy ātmānam): Can we get a better understanding of this injunction by comparing Plato’s Alcibiades and the Chandogya-Upaniṣad?
Audience: A group of Veda chanters (mostly kids and youth) and veda enthusiasts (any age)
Duration: 2 hours
Day-7 (Sunday, 1st March, 2015): Discussion on and demonstration of Kausheetaka Brahmana by a group of Rigveda experts
Venue: Naaraas Mana, Edappal
Duration: 2 hours
Day-8 (Monday, 2nd March, 2015): Invited lecture
Venue: University of Calicut
Topic: Plato’s criticism against writing and the metaphysical value of memory
Audience: Mostly researchers on Sanskrit Literature, Veda, Philosophy etc.
Duration: 2 hours
Synopsis: Plato’s criticism against writing and the metaphysical value of memory
At the end of the Phaedrus Plato (Greek philosopher, 427-347 BC) criticizes writing for the transmission of philosophy inasmuch as it could substitute the living practice of argumentative dialogue with unjustified opinions. Teaching was conceived of as a way make the student able to think by himself, but not as a mere transfer of doctrinal contents in a passive mind. According to Plato, writing could prevent the student from using correctly his memory to grasp the invisible archetypes of everything, which his soul is supposed to have contemplated before his birth. But we know this criticism against writing through a book which Plato himself wrote! Thus, in which extent does Plato really refuse writing? In which extent such a refusal is to be compared with the Vedic way to teach orally and to learn by heart the Veda? Following a chronological pattern should we distinguish an old form of transmission, which might have occurred within the “family maṇḍala-s” of the gveda and which might have let a certain creative freedom to the brahmacārin as a future Rṣi, from the merely passive repetition of the Brāhmaṇas time till now?