Robert Brandom's neo-pragmatist interpretation of Hegel suggests that Hegel understands norma... more Robert Brandom's neo-pragmatist interpretation of Hegel suggests that Hegel understands normative statuses, and therefore all conceptual commitments, as social achievements based on reciprocal recognition. This is expressed in the slogan ‘For Hegel, all transcendental constitution is social institution.’1 An important problem with this interpretation lies in its oversight that Hegel's concept of true infinite is presupposed and operative in Hegel's account of recognition in Phenomenology. This paper argues that Hegel's theory of recognition in the Phenomenology is based on his logical concepts and therefore cannot institute them.
This presentation is a critique about Brandom’s interpretation of Hegel’s concept of recognition.... more This presentation is a critique about Brandom’s interpretation of Hegel’s concept of recognition. As such, it does not appear to fit naturally in a congress about Hegel’s answer to Kant. On the other hand, it should be noted that Brandom’s project has often been characterized as „an attempt to usher analytic philosophy from its Kantian to Hegelian stage“. Brandom’s reading of recognition plays a central role in this in this so-called Hegelian turn and is closely linked with the complex web of relations between Hegel and Kant and the way we and analytic philosophers read them today. In my view, one of the most interesting and also the most problematic aspects of Robert Brandom’s interpretation of Hegel is his thesis that Hegel understands normative statuses, and therefore all conceptual commitments, as social achievements based on mutual recognition. This is expressed in the slogan „For Hegel, all transcendental constitution is social institution.“ This reading has paramount significance and is celebrated as one of the key as aspects the post-Sellarsian philosophical framework what Rorty called the Hegelian stage in Analytic Philosophy. Rorty eloquently expressed one of the core ideas of this position which derives from the connection Brandom sees between concepts, norms and mutual recognition as follows: If you have cultural politics, you do not need either metaphysics or the illusory visions of the empiricists. The only way to bring together the primacy of the practical with the sociality of reason is to assert that cultural politics is autonomous, and that cultural freedom is the ultimate expression of human dignity.1 Under this reading, Hegel becomes a pragmatist, social constructivist and cultural relativist, at least, with respect to concepts. Without denying that there are certain dimensions which are irreducibly Hegelian in the impetus Sellars, Brandom and McDowell have given to the evolution of the post-empiricist analytic philosophy, the way I see it, this reading misinterprets the relationship Hegel sees between the social and rational. The projection of this problem to contemporary Hegel scholarship is one of the central aspects of the ongoing debate between metaphysical and non-metaphysical interpretations of Hegel. If Brandom is right in saying that for Hegel normative statuses, and therefore all conceptual commitments, are social achievements based on mutual recognition, then there is a non-metaphysical Hegel that is at least, at its core, compatible with what historical Hegel wanted to achieve. On the other hand, it is not difficult to find many passages in Hegel that contradicts with this reading. A good example is the following from the Introduction of Science of Logic:
Hegel’in dünyası Marx’ın ve yakın zamanda ondan oldukça farklı bir bağlamda Rolf-Peter Horstmann’... more Hegel’in dünyası Marx’ın ve yakın zamanda ondan oldukça farklı bir bağlamda Rolf-Peter Horstmann’ın bize hatırlatmış olduğu gibi ters yüz olmuş bir dünyaydı. Hegel de bunun farkındaydı ve bilinçli olarak Fenomenoloji’nin belki de en önemli geçişlerinden birini oluşturan kendinin-bilincine geçişi anlattığı alt bölüme o meşhur başlığı koymuştu: “Altüst-olmuş Dünya”. Eğer dünya ve içindeki yerimizle ilgili sıradan algımızın en derinlerinde ters giden bir şeyler olduğuna dair bir sezginiz yoksa Hegel’in düşüncesi her zaman tuhaflığını ve tekinsizliğini koruyacaktır. Oysa özgürlüğün yeni bir aşamasını aramak için bir tersyüz olmadan daha azının yeterli olmayabileceğine dair bir sezgi taşıyorsanız, Hegel düşüncesinin labirentleri içerisinde yeni bir ilham aramaya devam etmek iyi bir fikir olarak görünebilir. Böyle bir arayışa ilham veren ve günümüzün içinden çıkılmaz görünen ötekiyle-karşılaşma sorunlarına ışık tutan yeni-Hegelcilerin ‘habis’ metafizikten arındırdıkları iyi huylu Hegel değil, özgürlüğün temelinde öznelliğin mutlak olumsuzluğunu gören, özgürlüğü ötekide-kendinde-kalmak olarak anlayan Hegel ve onun spekülatif düşüncesidir.
Hegel’in düşüncesinin içeriğinden kaynaklanan zorluklarla uğraşmaya girişmeden genel olarak metaf... more Hegel’in düşüncesinin içeriğinden kaynaklanan zorluklarla uğraşmaya girişmeden genel olarak metafizik kavramının kendisiyle ilgili bir dizi kaygı ve şüpheyle yüzleşmek durumundayız.Burada kanımca başat olduğunu düşündüğüm üç temel kaygı gurubuna değineceğim. Bunlar sırasıyla 1) metafiziğin bilgikuramsal geçerliliği ile ilgili şüpheler, 2) metafiziğin kuramsal ve pratik faydasıyla ilgili şüpheler, 3) metafizik tutumları genel olarak özgürlükçü-olmayan, dogmatik ve hatta totaliter dünya görüşleriyle ilişkilendiren politik kaygılar. Bu genel girişin ardından 20. Yüzyılın başından günümüze değin analitik felsefenin Hegel ile olan ilişkisinin anahatlarını ortaya koyacağım. Bu sunumla tarihsel olarak Hegel’e karşı en olumsuz tutumu benimsemiş olan analitik felsefe geleneğinin geçen yüzyıl boyuncaki iç dönüşümün Hegel’in metafizik sisteminin yeni ve eleştirel bir bakışla ele alınmasına uygun bir tarihsel zemin oluşturduğunu göstermek istiyorum. Ardından Hegel’in metafiziğinin ve de genel olarak felsefesinin temel kavramı olan doğru sonsuzluk kavramını tartıştıktan sonra bu kavramın çağdaş felsefenin en merkezi sorunlarından biri olan bilincin zor sorunuyla ilişkisini kurarak bu kavramın bu temel sorunun çözümüne ışık tutabilecek özgün bir içeriği olduğunu savunacağım. Amacım Hegel’in metafizik kuramının genel olarak varsayıldığı gibi onun çağdaş felsefeye etkin bir katkıda bulunmasının önündeki bir engel olmasının tam aksine çağdaş felsefenin en merkezi ve zor sorunlarından birinin çözümüne ışık tutacak kavramsal kaynakları içerdiğini göstermek. Bunu yaparak Hegel’in metafiziğinin gerçekte ne olduğunun eleştirel ve sistematik bir değerlendirilmesinin yapılmasına ve onun çağdaş felsefe ve daha geniş tarihsel bağlamımız açısından önem ve işlevinin ortaya konulmasına katkıda bulunmayı hedefliyorum.
Working Draft of an unpublished paper.
The objective of this paper is to present the nucleus of... more Working Draft of an unpublished paper.
The objective of this paper is to present the nucleus of Hegel’s account of normativity and position it within the broader context of the historical and contemporary discussions. One of Hegel’s fundamental claims in the Science of Logic and the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences is that the ontological forms described in Logic has an irreducible normative function. In Hegel’s lights, the scope of normativity cannot be limited to our practical or social performances and connected to our conscious agency but there is immanent normativity in nature and in spirit that is quite independent of our conscious attitudes. A finite thing involves an inherent tension between what it is and what it ought to be. This tension is an irreducible aspect of being determinate and is an active force that manifests itself in various ways. For Hegel, this active immament normativity, in its various and gradually developing embodiments is the common metaphysical deep structure of the law-governedness of nature, unconscious purposefulness or goal-drivenness in life phenomena and the self-conscious and self-determining normativity in human subjectivity and agency at the same time.
forthcoming in Hegel Bulletin, Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Robert Brandom’s neo-pragmatist interpretation of Hegel stipulates that Hegel understands normati... more Robert Brandom’s neo-pragmatist interpretation of Hegel stipulates that Hegel understands normative statuses, and therefore all conceptual commitments, as social achievements based on reciprocal recognition. This is expressed in the slogan “For Hegel, all transcendental constitution is social institution.” An important difficulty with this interpretation lies in its oversight that Hegel’s concept of true infinite is already operative in Hegel’s account of recognition in Phenomenology. “[H]ow can the Concept [in the logic], which Hegel does not hesitate to call the logos, the foundation of all determinate concepts and the truth of that which is, with all its ontological significance, be instituted by reciprocal recognition based on social negotiation unless we accept that the process of social negotiations itself is already constituted, in the ontological sense, by the Concept at the first place?” What is missed in Brandom’s account is the concept of true infinite which is in Hegel’s words the basic concept of philosophy and the speculative thought in its determining feature. A genuine Hegelian-turn in contemporary philosophy would require that this complex notion be domesticated in a manner faithful to its meaning for Hegel.
Draft of a paper that has been presented in the Philosophy of Non-Classical Logics Workshop in th... more Draft of a paper that has been presented in the Philosophy of Non-Classical Logics Workshop in the 5th World Congress on Universal Logic.
Proceedings of the 29th International Hegel Conference in Istanbul.
Co-edited by Andreas Arndt... more Proceedings of the 29th International Hegel Conference in Istanbul.
Co-edited by Andreas Arndt, Myriam Gerhard, Jure Zovko, Onay Sozer and Alper Turken.
The objective of this paper is to discuss Aristotle’s influence on Hegel’s idea of speculative ph... more The objective of this paper is to discuss Aristotle’s influence on Hegel’s idea of speculative philosophy. My aim is to demonstrate the specific ways in which Hegel’s overall program for a speculative philosophy is influenced by his reading of Aristotle, both the strengths and the weaknesses he saw in it. It will be argued that one might read Hegel’s concept of the infinite form as a response to Aristotle’s question in Metaphysics: What is ousia? This response incorporates not only the strengths that Hegel sees in the very first principle of Aristotle’s philosophy but also it involves his attempt to overcome the deficiencies that he attributed to it. At the same time, it also incorporates the very nucleus of what Hegel thought as the positive and enduring result of Kant’s critical turn. The general character of Hegel’s criticism of Aristotle’s philosophy can be expressed in that Hegel thinks that although Aristotle grasped the unity of the finite and infinite in their distinction, and the more specific unity of universal and individual that is dependent upon it, he has not developed this fundamental speculative insight to its full logical conclusions. Only if the form can determine its own content and make it adequate to its form, it can be the infinite form and only such a concept of form will give us the complete solution to the problem “what is ousia?”. Hegel sees the idea of an active self-determining form already in play in Aristotle’s concept of energeia. So not only the main problem of Hegel’s Science of Logic but also his solution to it has been extensively inspired by Aristotle. According to this, Hegel’s Science of Logic can be seen as an attempt to complete Aristotle’s metaphysics.
Kadıköy Belediyesi tarafından organize edilen Hegel Söyleşileri'nde yaptığım konuşmanın metni:
Ç... more Kadıköy Belediyesi tarafından organize edilen Hegel Söyleşileri'nde yaptığım konuşmanın metni: Çağdaş düşüncenin ve daha genel olarak da kültürün en temel huzursuzluğunun kendilik temasıyla ilgili olduğunu düşünüyorum. En derinde bütün bu sorunlarda kadim bir felsefi soruyla karşı karşıyayız: Kendi-olmak nedir ve bir şey olmaktan farkı nedir? Hegel’in bu soruya verdiği kapsamlı ve kendine özgü yanıtı anahatlarda ortaya koymaya çalıştım. Kendilik kavramı ve onunla ilgili olguları Hegel’in başkasında-kendinde-kalma kavramı aracılığıyla anlamaya çalıştım. Hegel’in bugün canlı ve önemli olmasının temel nedeni kendi-olma olgusuyla, çağdaş tinin bu en derin huzursuzluğuyla ilgili henüz daha tam olarak kavranmamış, içselleştirilmemiş ve sahiplenilmemiş zengin bir felsefi miras bırakmış olmasıdır.
This is the initial draft of my upcoming talk in the International Hegel Congress in Tampere.
T... more This is the initial draft of my upcoming talk in the International Hegel Congress in Tampere.
The motivation of this talk is to sketch the outline of a potential application of Hegel's metaphysics to a specific problem in contemporary philosophy of mind. Specifically, I will argue that approaching what David Chalmers called as the hard problem of consciousness equipped with Hegel's concept of the true infinite opens up some novel conceptual possibilities on this central problem of the contemporary philosophy of mind.
Robert Brandom's neo-pragmatist interpretation of Hegel suggests that Hegel understands norma... more Robert Brandom's neo-pragmatist interpretation of Hegel suggests that Hegel understands normative statuses, and therefore all conceptual commitments, as social achievements based on reciprocal recognition. This is expressed in the slogan ‘For Hegel, all transcendental constitution is social institution.’1 An important problem with this interpretation lies in its oversight that Hegel's concept of true infinite is presupposed and operative in Hegel's account of recognition in Phenomenology. This paper argues that Hegel's theory of recognition in the Phenomenology is based on his logical concepts and therefore cannot institute them.
This presentation is a critique about Brandom’s interpretation of Hegel’s concept of recognition.... more This presentation is a critique about Brandom’s interpretation of Hegel’s concept of recognition. As such, it does not appear to fit naturally in a congress about Hegel’s answer to Kant. On the other hand, it should be noted that Brandom’s project has often been characterized as „an attempt to usher analytic philosophy from its Kantian to Hegelian stage“. Brandom’s reading of recognition plays a central role in this in this so-called Hegelian turn and is closely linked with the complex web of relations between Hegel and Kant and the way we and analytic philosophers read them today. In my view, one of the most interesting and also the most problematic aspects of Robert Brandom’s interpretation of Hegel is his thesis that Hegel understands normative statuses, and therefore all conceptual commitments, as social achievements based on mutual recognition. This is expressed in the slogan „For Hegel, all transcendental constitution is social institution.“ This reading has paramount significance and is celebrated as one of the key as aspects the post-Sellarsian philosophical framework what Rorty called the Hegelian stage in Analytic Philosophy. Rorty eloquently expressed one of the core ideas of this position which derives from the connection Brandom sees between concepts, norms and mutual recognition as follows: If you have cultural politics, you do not need either metaphysics or the illusory visions of the empiricists. The only way to bring together the primacy of the practical with the sociality of reason is to assert that cultural politics is autonomous, and that cultural freedom is the ultimate expression of human dignity.1 Under this reading, Hegel becomes a pragmatist, social constructivist and cultural relativist, at least, with respect to concepts. Without denying that there are certain dimensions which are irreducibly Hegelian in the impetus Sellars, Brandom and McDowell have given to the evolution of the post-empiricist analytic philosophy, the way I see it, this reading misinterprets the relationship Hegel sees between the social and rational. The projection of this problem to contemporary Hegel scholarship is one of the central aspects of the ongoing debate between metaphysical and non-metaphysical interpretations of Hegel. If Brandom is right in saying that for Hegel normative statuses, and therefore all conceptual commitments, are social achievements based on mutual recognition, then there is a non-metaphysical Hegel that is at least, at its core, compatible with what historical Hegel wanted to achieve. On the other hand, it is not difficult to find many passages in Hegel that contradicts with this reading. A good example is the following from the Introduction of Science of Logic:
Hegel’in dünyası Marx’ın ve yakın zamanda ondan oldukça farklı bir bağlamda Rolf-Peter Horstmann’... more Hegel’in dünyası Marx’ın ve yakın zamanda ondan oldukça farklı bir bağlamda Rolf-Peter Horstmann’ın bize hatırlatmış olduğu gibi ters yüz olmuş bir dünyaydı. Hegel de bunun farkındaydı ve bilinçli olarak Fenomenoloji’nin belki de en önemli geçişlerinden birini oluşturan kendinin-bilincine geçişi anlattığı alt bölüme o meşhur başlığı koymuştu: “Altüst-olmuş Dünya”. Eğer dünya ve içindeki yerimizle ilgili sıradan algımızın en derinlerinde ters giden bir şeyler olduğuna dair bir sezginiz yoksa Hegel’in düşüncesi her zaman tuhaflığını ve tekinsizliğini koruyacaktır. Oysa özgürlüğün yeni bir aşamasını aramak için bir tersyüz olmadan daha azının yeterli olmayabileceğine dair bir sezgi taşıyorsanız, Hegel düşüncesinin labirentleri içerisinde yeni bir ilham aramaya devam etmek iyi bir fikir olarak görünebilir. Böyle bir arayışa ilham veren ve günümüzün içinden çıkılmaz görünen ötekiyle-karşılaşma sorunlarına ışık tutan yeni-Hegelcilerin ‘habis’ metafizikten arındırdıkları iyi huylu Hegel değil, özgürlüğün temelinde öznelliğin mutlak olumsuzluğunu gören, özgürlüğü ötekide-kendinde-kalmak olarak anlayan Hegel ve onun spekülatif düşüncesidir.
Hegel’in düşüncesinin içeriğinden kaynaklanan zorluklarla uğraşmaya girişmeden genel olarak metaf... more Hegel’in düşüncesinin içeriğinden kaynaklanan zorluklarla uğraşmaya girişmeden genel olarak metafizik kavramının kendisiyle ilgili bir dizi kaygı ve şüpheyle yüzleşmek durumundayız.Burada kanımca başat olduğunu düşündüğüm üç temel kaygı gurubuna değineceğim. Bunlar sırasıyla 1) metafiziğin bilgikuramsal geçerliliği ile ilgili şüpheler, 2) metafiziğin kuramsal ve pratik faydasıyla ilgili şüpheler, 3) metafizik tutumları genel olarak özgürlükçü-olmayan, dogmatik ve hatta totaliter dünya görüşleriyle ilişkilendiren politik kaygılar. Bu genel girişin ardından 20. Yüzyılın başından günümüze değin analitik felsefenin Hegel ile olan ilişkisinin anahatlarını ortaya koyacağım. Bu sunumla tarihsel olarak Hegel’e karşı en olumsuz tutumu benimsemiş olan analitik felsefe geleneğinin geçen yüzyıl boyuncaki iç dönüşümün Hegel’in metafizik sisteminin yeni ve eleştirel bir bakışla ele alınmasına uygun bir tarihsel zemin oluşturduğunu göstermek istiyorum. Ardından Hegel’in metafiziğinin ve de genel olarak felsefesinin temel kavramı olan doğru sonsuzluk kavramını tartıştıktan sonra bu kavramın çağdaş felsefenin en merkezi sorunlarından biri olan bilincin zor sorunuyla ilişkisini kurarak bu kavramın bu temel sorunun çözümüne ışık tutabilecek özgün bir içeriği olduğunu savunacağım. Amacım Hegel’in metafizik kuramının genel olarak varsayıldığı gibi onun çağdaş felsefeye etkin bir katkıda bulunmasının önündeki bir engel olmasının tam aksine çağdaş felsefenin en merkezi ve zor sorunlarından birinin çözümüne ışık tutacak kavramsal kaynakları içerdiğini göstermek. Bunu yaparak Hegel’in metafiziğinin gerçekte ne olduğunun eleştirel ve sistematik bir değerlendirilmesinin yapılmasına ve onun çağdaş felsefe ve daha geniş tarihsel bağlamımız açısından önem ve işlevinin ortaya konulmasına katkıda bulunmayı hedefliyorum.
Working Draft of an unpublished paper.
The objective of this paper is to present the nucleus of... more Working Draft of an unpublished paper.
The objective of this paper is to present the nucleus of Hegel’s account of normativity and position it within the broader context of the historical and contemporary discussions. One of Hegel’s fundamental claims in the Science of Logic and the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences is that the ontological forms described in Logic has an irreducible normative function. In Hegel’s lights, the scope of normativity cannot be limited to our practical or social performances and connected to our conscious agency but there is immanent normativity in nature and in spirit that is quite independent of our conscious attitudes. A finite thing involves an inherent tension between what it is and what it ought to be. This tension is an irreducible aspect of being determinate and is an active force that manifests itself in various ways. For Hegel, this active immament normativity, in its various and gradually developing embodiments is the common metaphysical deep structure of the law-governedness of nature, unconscious purposefulness or goal-drivenness in life phenomena and the self-conscious and self-determining normativity in human subjectivity and agency at the same time.
forthcoming in Hegel Bulletin, Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Robert Brandom’s neo-pragmatist interpretation of Hegel stipulates that Hegel understands normati... more Robert Brandom’s neo-pragmatist interpretation of Hegel stipulates that Hegel understands normative statuses, and therefore all conceptual commitments, as social achievements based on reciprocal recognition. This is expressed in the slogan “For Hegel, all transcendental constitution is social institution.” An important difficulty with this interpretation lies in its oversight that Hegel’s concept of true infinite is already operative in Hegel’s account of recognition in Phenomenology. “[H]ow can the Concept [in the logic], which Hegel does not hesitate to call the logos, the foundation of all determinate concepts and the truth of that which is, with all its ontological significance, be instituted by reciprocal recognition based on social negotiation unless we accept that the process of social negotiations itself is already constituted, in the ontological sense, by the Concept at the first place?” What is missed in Brandom’s account is the concept of true infinite which is in Hegel’s words the basic concept of philosophy and the speculative thought in its determining feature. A genuine Hegelian-turn in contemporary philosophy would require that this complex notion be domesticated in a manner faithful to its meaning for Hegel.
Draft of a paper that has been presented in the Philosophy of Non-Classical Logics Workshop in th... more Draft of a paper that has been presented in the Philosophy of Non-Classical Logics Workshop in the 5th World Congress on Universal Logic.
Proceedings of the 29th International Hegel Conference in Istanbul.
Co-edited by Andreas Arndt... more Proceedings of the 29th International Hegel Conference in Istanbul.
Co-edited by Andreas Arndt, Myriam Gerhard, Jure Zovko, Onay Sozer and Alper Turken.
The objective of this paper is to discuss Aristotle’s influence on Hegel’s idea of speculative ph... more The objective of this paper is to discuss Aristotle’s influence on Hegel’s idea of speculative philosophy. My aim is to demonstrate the specific ways in which Hegel’s overall program for a speculative philosophy is influenced by his reading of Aristotle, both the strengths and the weaknesses he saw in it. It will be argued that one might read Hegel’s concept of the infinite form as a response to Aristotle’s question in Metaphysics: What is ousia? This response incorporates not only the strengths that Hegel sees in the very first principle of Aristotle’s philosophy but also it involves his attempt to overcome the deficiencies that he attributed to it. At the same time, it also incorporates the very nucleus of what Hegel thought as the positive and enduring result of Kant’s critical turn. The general character of Hegel’s criticism of Aristotle’s philosophy can be expressed in that Hegel thinks that although Aristotle grasped the unity of the finite and infinite in their distinction, and the more specific unity of universal and individual that is dependent upon it, he has not developed this fundamental speculative insight to its full logical conclusions. Only if the form can determine its own content and make it adequate to its form, it can be the infinite form and only such a concept of form will give us the complete solution to the problem “what is ousia?”. Hegel sees the idea of an active self-determining form already in play in Aristotle’s concept of energeia. So not only the main problem of Hegel’s Science of Logic but also his solution to it has been extensively inspired by Aristotle. According to this, Hegel’s Science of Logic can be seen as an attempt to complete Aristotle’s metaphysics.
Kadıköy Belediyesi tarafından organize edilen Hegel Söyleşileri'nde yaptığım konuşmanın metni:
Ç... more Kadıköy Belediyesi tarafından organize edilen Hegel Söyleşileri'nde yaptığım konuşmanın metni: Çağdaş düşüncenin ve daha genel olarak da kültürün en temel huzursuzluğunun kendilik temasıyla ilgili olduğunu düşünüyorum. En derinde bütün bu sorunlarda kadim bir felsefi soruyla karşı karşıyayız: Kendi-olmak nedir ve bir şey olmaktan farkı nedir? Hegel’in bu soruya verdiği kapsamlı ve kendine özgü yanıtı anahatlarda ortaya koymaya çalıştım. Kendilik kavramı ve onunla ilgili olguları Hegel’in başkasında-kendinde-kalma kavramı aracılığıyla anlamaya çalıştım. Hegel’in bugün canlı ve önemli olmasının temel nedeni kendi-olma olgusuyla, çağdaş tinin bu en derin huzursuzluğuyla ilgili henüz daha tam olarak kavranmamış, içselleştirilmemiş ve sahiplenilmemiş zengin bir felsefi miras bırakmış olmasıdır.
This is the initial draft of my upcoming talk in the International Hegel Congress in Tampere.
T... more This is the initial draft of my upcoming talk in the International Hegel Congress in Tampere.
The motivation of this talk is to sketch the outline of a potential application of Hegel's metaphysics to a specific problem in contemporary philosophy of mind. Specifically, I will argue that approaching what David Chalmers called as the hard problem of consciousness equipped with Hegel's concept of the true infinite opens up some novel conceptual possibilities on this central problem of the contemporary philosophy of mind.
Influential philosophers such as Brandom and Pippin argued that for Hegel, the distinguishing fea... more Influential philosophers such as Brandom and Pippin argued that for Hegel, the distinguishing feature of the conceptual is to be normative. The concept of spirit should be understood as the domain of normative activity, encompassing all forms of distinctively human practices ranging from the rational activity of giving and taking reasons to social and political activity. According to this, at the very heart of the concept of freedom lies a deeper concept of normative autonomy which amounts to the capacity of human beings to decide about the norms that will bind them. Both Brandom and Pippin made influential cases that such notion of normativity does not require ontological footing but can be established and maintained based on Hegel’s innovative concept of mutual recognition. I argue in this paper that this cannot be the case and normative autonomy of human beings cannot be secured on the basis of merely social recognitive practices unless Hegel’s theory of mutual recognition is complemented by a theory of human motivations based on an ontological theory of human subjectivity or selfhood. At a minimum, freedom and normative autonomy require that an individual has a capacity to feel a lack or dissatisfaction when she is not free. Such a feeling of lack or dissatisfaction requires that freedom and normativity has an ontological aspect that cannot be reduced to social recognitive practices. Similar to the hard problem of consciousness that occurs when we try to account for consciousness merely in physical terms, there is an analogous hard problem of normativity that occurs when we try to account for normativity merely in social terms.
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The objective of this paper is to present the nucleus of Hegel’s account of normativity and position it within the broader context of the historical and contemporary discussions. One of Hegel’s fundamental claims in the Science of Logic and the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences is that the ontological forms described in Logic has an irreducible normative function. In Hegel’s lights, the scope of normativity cannot be limited to our practical or social performances and connected to our conscious agency but there is immanent normativity in nature and in spirit that is quite independent of our conscious attitudes. A finite thing involves an inherent tension between what it is and what it ought to be. This tension is an irreducible aspect of being determinate and is an active force that manifests itself in various ways. For Hegel, this active immament normativity, in its various and gradually developing embodiments is the common metaphysical deep structure of the law-governedness of nature, unconscious purposefulness or goal-drivenness in life phenomena and the self-conscious and self-determining normativity in human subjectivity and agency at the same time.
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Co-edited by Andreas Arndt, Myriam Gerhard, Jure Zovko, Onay Sozer and Alper Turken.
Drafts
The general character of Hegel’s criticism of Aristotle’s philosophy can be expressed in that Hegel thinks that although Aristotle grasped the unity of the finite and infinite in their distinction, and the more specific unity of universal and individual that is dependent upon it, he has not developed this fundamental speculative insight to its full logical conclusions. Only if the form can determine its own content and make it adequate to its form, it can be the infinite form and only such a concept of form will give us the complete solution to the problem “what is ousia?”. Hegel sees the idea of an active self-determining form already in play in Aristotle’s concept of energeia. So not only the main problem of Hegel’s Science of Logic but also his solution to it has been extensively inspired by Aristotle. According to this, Hegel’s Science of Logic can be seen as an attempt to complete Aristotle’s metaphysics.
Talks
Çağdaş düşüncenin ve daha genel olarak da kültürün en temel huzursuzluğunun kendilik temasıyla ilgili olduğunu düşünüyorum. En derinde bütün bu sorunlarda kadim bir felsefi soruyla karşı karşıyayız: Kendi-olmak nedir ve bir şey olmaktan farkı nedir? Hegel’in bu soruya verdiği kapsamlı ve kendine özgü yanıtı anahatlarda ortaya koymaya çalıştım. Kendilik kavramı ve onunla ilgili olguları Hegel’in başkasında-kendinde-kalma kavramı aracılığıyla anlamaya çalıştım. Hegel’in bugün canlı ve önemli olmasının temel nedeni kendi-olma olgusuyla, çağdaş tinin bu en derin huzursuzluğuyla ilgili henüz daha tam olarak kavranmamış, içselleştirilmemiş ve sahiplenilmemiş zengin bir felsefi miras bırakmış olmasıdır.
The motivation of this talk is to sketch the outline of a potential application of Hegel's metaphysics to a specific problem in contemporary philosophy of mind. Specifically, I will argue that approaching what David Chalmers called as the hard problem of consciousness equipped with Hegel's concept of the true infinite opens up some novel conceptual possibilities on this central problem of the contemporary philosophy of mind.
The objective of this paper is to present the nucleus of Hegel’s account of normativity and position it within the broader context of the historical and contemporary discussions. One of Hegel’s fundamental claims in the Science of Logic and the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences is that the ontological forms described in Logic has an irreducible normative function. In Hegel’s lights, the scope of normativity cannot be limited to our practical or social performances and connected to our conscious agency but there is immanent normativity in nature and in spirit that is quite independent of our conscious attitudes. A finite thing involves an inherent tension between what it is and what it ought to be. This tension is an irreducible aspect of being determinate and is an active force that manifests itself in various ways. For Hegel, this active immament normativity, in its various and gradually developing embodiments is the common metaphysical deep structure of the law-governedness of nature, unconscious purposefulness or goal-drivenness in life phenomena and the self-conscious and self-determining normativity in human subjectivity and agency at the same time.
Co-edited by Andreas Arndt, Myriam Gerhard, Jure Zovko, Onay Sozer and Alper Turken.
The general character of Hegel’s criticism of Aristotle’s philosophy can be expressed in that Hegel thinks that although Aristotle grasped the unity of the finite and infinite in their distinction, and the more specific unity of universal and individual that is dependent upon it, he has not developed this fundamental speculative insight to its full logical conclusions. Only if the form can determine its own content and make it adequate to its form, it can be the infinite form and only such a concept of form will give us the complete solution to the problem “what is ousia?”. Hegel sees the idea of an active self-determining form already in play in Aristotle’s concept of energeia. So not only the main problem of Hegel’s Science of Logic but also his solution to it has been extensively inspired by Aristotle. According to this, Hegel’s Science of Logic can be seen as an attempt to complete Aristotle’s metaphysics.
Çağdaş düşüncenin ve daha genel olarak da kültürün en temel huzursuzluğunun kendilik temasıyla ilgili olduğunu düşünüyorum. En derinde bütün bu sorunlarda kadim bir felsefi soruyla karşı karşıyayız: Kendi-olmak nedir ve bir şey olmaktan farkı nedir? Hegel’in bu soruya verdiği kapsamlı ve kendine özgü yanıtı anahatlarda ortaya koymaya çalıştım. Kendilik kavramı ve onunla ilgili olguları Hegel’in başkasında-kendinde-kalma kavramı aracılığıyla anlamaya çalıştım. Hegel’in bugün canlı ve önemli olmasının temel nedeni kendi-olma olgusuyla, çağdaş tinin bu en derin huzursuzluğuyla ilgili henüz daha tam olarak kavranmamış, içselleştirilmemiş ve sahiplenilmemiş zengin bir felsefi miras bırakmış olmasıdır.
The motivation of this talk is to sketch the outline of a potential application of Hegel's metaphysics to a specific problem in contemporary philosophy of mind. Specifically, I will argue that approaching what David Chalmers called as the hard problem of consciousness equipped with Hegel's concept of the true infinite opens up some novel conceptual possibilities on this central problem of the contemporary philosophy of mind.