Books by Lisa Bortolotti
When we talk about delusions we may refer to symptoms of mental health problems, such as clinical... more When we talk about delusions we may refer to symptoms of mental health problems, such as clinical delusions in schizophrenia, or simply the beliefs that people cling to which are implausible and resistant to counterevidence; these can include anything from beliefs about the benefits of homeopathy to concerns about the threat of alien abduction.
Why do people adopt delusional beliefs and why are they so reluctant to part with them? In Why Delusions Matter, Lisa Bortolotti explains what delusions really are and argues that, despite their negative reputation, they can also play a positive role in people's lives, imposing some meaning on adverse experiences and strengthening personal or social identities. In a clear and accessible style, Bortolotti contributes to the growing research on the philosophy of the cognitive sciences, offering a novel and nuanced view of delusions.
Philosophy of Psychology: An Introduction (Polity), 2021
Are we rational creatures? Do we have free will? Can we ever know ourselves? These and other fund... more Are we rational creatures? Do we have free will? Can we ever know ourselves? These and other fundamental questions have been discussed by philosophers over millennia. But recent empirical findings in psychology and neuroscience suggest we should reconsider them.This textbook provides an engrossing overview of contemporary debates in the philosophy of psychology, exploring the ways in which the interaction and collaboration between psychologists and philosophers contribute to a better understanding of the human mind, cognition and behaviour. Miyazono and Bortolotti discuss pivotal studies in cognitive psychology, social psychology, developmental psychology, evolutionary psychology, clinical psychology and neuroscience, and their implications for philosophy.Combining the latest philosophical and psychological research with an accessible style, Philosophy of Psychology is a crucial resource for students from either discipline. It is the most up-to-date text for modules on philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mental health and philosophy of cognitive science.
The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs (OUP), 2020
In an ideal world, our beliefs would satisfy norms of truth and rationality, as well as foster th... more In an ideal world, our beliefs would satisfy norms of truth and rationality, as well as foster the acquisition, retention, and use of other relevant information. In reality, we have limited cognitive capacities and are subject to motivational biases on an everyday basis. We may also experience impairments in perception, memory, learning, and reasoning in the course of our lives. Such limitations and impairments give rise to distorted memory beliefs, confabulated explanations, and beliefs that are elaborated delusional, motivated delusional, or optimistically biased.
In this book, Lisa Bortolotti argues that some irrational beliefs qualify as epistemically innocent, where, in some contexts, the adoption, maintenance, or reporting of the beliefs delivers significant epistemic benefits that could not be easily attained otherwise. Epistemic innocence does not imply that the epistemic benefits of the irrational belief outweigh its epistemic costs, yet it clarifies the relationship between the epistemic and psychological effects of irrational beliefs on agency. It is misleading to assume that epistemic rationality and psychological adaptiveness always go hand-in-hand, but also that there is a straight-forward trade-off between them. Rather, epistemic irrationality can lead to psychological adaptiveness, which in turn can support the attainment of epistemic goals. Recognising the circumstances in which irrational beliefs enhance or restore epistemic performance informs our mutual interactions and enables us to take measures to reduce their irrationality without undermining the conditions for epistemic success.
Delusions in Context, 2018
This open access book offers an exploration of delusions—unusual beliefs that can significantly d... more This open access book offers an exploration of delusions—unusual beliefs that can significantly disrupt people’s lives. Experts from a range of disciplinary backgrounds, including lived experience, clinical psychiatry, philosophy, clinical psychology, and cognitive neuroscience, discuss how delusions emerge, why it is so difficult to give them up, what their effects are, how they are managed, and what we can do to reduce the stigma associated with them. Taken as a whole, the book proposes that there is continuity between delusions and everyday beliefs. It is essential reading for researchers working on delusions and mental health more generally, and will also appeal to anybody who wants to gain a better understanding of what happens when the way we experience and interpret the world is different from that of the people around us.
We talk about irrationality when behaviour defies explanation or prediction, when decisions are d... more We talk about irrationality when behaviour defies explanation or prediction, when decisions are driven by emotions or instinct rather than by reflection, when reasoning fails to conform to basic principles of logic and probability, and when beliefs lack coherence or empirical support. Depending on the context, agents exhibiting irrational behaviour may be described as foolish, ignorant, unwise or even insane.
In this clear and engaging introduction to current debates on irrationality, Lisa Bortolotti presents the many facets of the concept and offers an original account of the importance of judgements of irrationality as value judgements. The book examines the standards against which we measure human behaviour, and reviews the often serious implications of judgements of irrationality for ethics and policy. Bortolotti argues that we should adopt a more critical stance towards accepted standards of rationality in the light of the often surprising outcomes of philosophical inquiry and cognitive science research into decision making.
Irrationality is an accessible guide to the concept and will be essential reading for students and scholars interested in the limitations of human cognition and human agency.
Synopsis available for download!
CONTENTS
Synopsis
1: The Background
2: Procedural Rational... more Synopsis available for download!
CONTENTS
Synopsis
1: The Background
2: Procedural Rationality and Belief Ascription
3: Epistemic Rationality and Belief Ascription
4: Agential Rationality and Belief Ascription
5: Beliefs and Self Knowledge
6: Conclusions
Bibliography and Reference List
For reviews and other information about the book, go to: http://sites.google.com/site/lisabortolottiphilosophy/books/delusions
Contents and sample chapter available for download!
CONTENTS
Preface – Lisa Bortolotti
Par... more Contents and sample chapter available for download!
CONTENTS
Preface – Lisa Bortolotti
Part one: Happiness and the Meaningful Life
1. Happiness and Meaningfulness: Some Key Differences (T. Metz)
2. Happiness, Temporality, Meaning (J. Cottingham)
3. Tragic Joyfulness (P. Tabensky)
4. Shape and the Meaningfulness of Life (L. James)
5. Immortal Happiness (M. Quigley and J. Harris)
6. “I am well, apart from the fact that I have cancer”: Explaining Well-being within Illness (H. Carel)
7. Suffering in Happy Lives (M.W. Martin)
Part two: Happiness and the Mind.
8. Reflections on Positive Psychology (E. Duncan, I. Grazzani-Gavazzi and U. Kiran Subba)
9. Face Value. Perception and Knowledge of Others’ Happiness (E. Zamuner)
10. The Politics of Happiness: Subjective vs. Economic Measures as Measures of Social Well-being (E. Angner)
11. Happiness and Preference-Satisfaction (I. Law)
12. The Politics of the Self: Stability, Normativity and the Lives we can Live with Living (J. Lenman)
13. Happiness and Life Choices: Sartre on Desire, Deliberation and Action (J. Fernández)
14. The Reflective Life and Happiness (V. Tiberius)
References and Bibliography
Index
For reviews and other information about the book, go to: http://sites.google.com/site/lisabortolottiphilosophy/books/happiness
Sample chapter available for download!
CONTENTS
Introduction - Psychiatry as Cognitive Neur... more Sample chapter available for download!
CONTENTS
Introduction - Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: An Overview (M.R. Broome and L. Bortolotti)
Psychiatry as Science
Chapter 1. Is Psychiatric Research Scientific? (R. Cooper)
Chapter 2. A Secret History of ICD and the Hidden Future of DSM. (K.W.M. Fulford and N. Sartorius)
Chapter 3. Delusion as a Natural Kind. (R. Samuels)
The Nature of Mental Illness
Chapter 4. Mental Illness is Indeed a Myth. (H. Pickard)
Chapter 5. Psychiatry and the Concept of Disease as Pathology. (D. Murphy)
Reconciling Paradigms
Chapter 6. On the Interface Problem in Philosophy and Psychiatry. (T. Thornton)
Chapter 7. What does Rationality Have to Do with Psychological Causation? Propositional attitudes as Mechanisms and as Control Variables. (J. Campbell)
Chapter 8. Mad Scientists or Unreliable Autobiographers? Dopamine Dysregulation and Delusion. (P. Gerrans)
Psychiatry and the Neurosciences
Chapter 9. When Time is Out of Joint: Schizophrenia and Functional Neuroimaging. (D. Lloyd)
Chapter 10. Philosophy and Cognitive-Affective Neurogenetics. (D. Stein)
Chapter 11. An Addictive Lesson: A Case Study in Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience. (L. Stephens and G. Graham)
Phenomenology and Scientific Explanation
Chapter 12. Understanding Existential Changes in Psychiatric Illness: The Indispensability of Phenomenology. (M. Ratcliffe)
Chapter 13. Delusional realities. (S. Gallagher)
Delusions and Cognition
Chapter 14. Delusions: a Two-Level Framework. (K. Frankish)
Chapter 15. Explaining Pathologies of Belief. (A.M. Aimola Davies and M. Davies)
Moral Psychology and Psychopathology
Chapter 16. Mental Time Travel, Agency and Responsibility. (J. Kennett and S. Matthews)
Chapter 17. Motivation, Depression and Character. (I. Law)
Conclusion: The Future of Scientific Psychiatry. (L. Bortolotti and M.R. Broome)
One of the best books of 2009 for the Guardian, according to Mary Warnock:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2009/nov/22/books-of-the-year-2009.
For reviews and other information about the book, go to: http://sites.google.com/site/lisabortolottiphilosophy/books/psychiatry
CONTENTS
Introduction: What is Science?
Chapter 1: Demarcation
Chapter 2: Reasoning
Chapter 3... more CONTENTS
Introduction: What is Science?
Chapter 1: Demarcation
Chapter 2: Reasoning
Chapter 3: Knowledge
Chapter 4: Language and Reality
Chapter 5: Rationality
Chapter 6: Ethics
Conclusion: Science as an Activity
Glossary
Thematic Bibliography
Index
For reviews and other information about the book, go to: http://sites.google.com/site/lisabortolottiphilosophy/books/Introduction
Papers by Lisa Bortolotti
Frontiers in Psychiatry, 2023
Patients seeking emergency care for self-harm and suicidality report varying experiences from bei... more Patients seeking emergency care for self-harm and suicidality report varying experiences from being believed and taken seriously to not being believed and taken seriously. Epistemic injustice provides a conceptual framework to explore how peoples’ experiences of self-harm and suicidality are believed or not. We use an empirical method –conversation analysis – to analyze epistemics in clinical communication, focusing on how knowledge is claimed, contested and negotiated. In courtroom, police and political interaction, conversation analysis has identified communication practices implying implausibility in a person’s story to contest and recharacterize their accounts.
Transcultural Psychiatry, 2023
According to a naturalist conception of what counts as a disorder, conspiracy beliefs are patholo... more According to a naturalist conception of what counts as a disorder, conspiracy beliefs are pathological beliefs if they are the outcome of a cognitive dysfunction. In this article, I take issue with the view that it is pathological to believe a conspiracy theory. After reviewing several approaches to the aetiology of conspiracy beliefs, I find that no approach compels us to view conspiracy beliefs as the outcome of a dysfunction: a speaker's conspiracy beliefs can appear as implausible and unshakeable to an interpreter, but in a naturalist framework it is not pathological for the speaker to adopt and maintain such beliefs.
Philosophies, 2023
Is curiosity a virtue or a vice? Curiosity, as a disposition to attain new, worthwhile informatio... more Is curiosity a virtue or a vice? Curiosity, as a disposition to attain new, worthwhile information, can manifest as an epistemic virtue. When the disposition to attain new information is not manifested virtuously, this is either because the agent lacks the appropriate motivation to attain the information or because the agent has poor judgement, seeking information that is not worthwhile or seeking information by inappropriate means. In the right circumstances, curiosity contributes to the agent’s excellence in character: it is appropriate to praise the agent for being curious, blame the agent for not being curious, and also prompt the agent to cultivate such curiosity, at least in some of the relevant contexts. We believe curiosity can also manifest as a moral virtue when it helps an interpreter view a speaker as an agent with a valuable perspective on the world. Especially in interactions where either there is a marked power imbalance between interpreter and speaker, or interpreter and speaker have identity beliefs that lead them to radically different worldviews, curiosity can help foster mutual understanding, and prevent the interpreter from dismissing, marginalizing, or pathologizing the speaker’s perspective.
Lisa Bortolotti argues that there is more to judging delusions than whether they accurately refle... more Lisa Bortolotti argues that there is more to judging delusions than whether they accurately reflect the world
The Philosophy of (Im)politeness, 2021
In this chapter we explore the value of politeness in conversation. In Sect. 1, we introduce the ... more In this chapter we explore the value of politeness in conversation. In Sect. 1, we introduce the apparent tension between the pragmatic and epistemic value of politeness. It would seem that politeness has epistemic drawbacks by compromising informative and sincere communication, but also has benefits by enhancing the quality of interpersonal relationships. In Sect. 2, we ask whether it is socially rational to have polite conversations, emphasizing the potential advantages of those conversations in which people sacrifice informativeness or sincerity for the sake of politeness. In Sect. 3, we argue that polite conversations also have epistemic benefits, and argue that politeness is defensible not only from a pragmatic perspective, but also from an epistemic one.
Resistances. Journal of the Philosophy of History
In this paper, I borrow Neil Levy’s account of bad beliefs as a starting point to discuss how the... more In this paper, I borrow Neil Levy’s account of bad beliefs as a starting point to discuss how the social turn in epistemology affects our understanding of the formation, persistence, and spreading of conspiracy beliefs. Despite the recent convergence of philosophers and psychologists on the importance of studying the social dimensions of cognition, current models of conspiracy beliefs differ substantially as to the role that agents have in adopting and maintaining conspiracy beliefs. As a result, the proposals also differ in the remedial strategies they recommend. Here I endorse an integrative approach, which I call “agency in context”, combining explanations of bad believing in terms of the agent’s cognitive habits and information processing with societal failures in providing the support agents need to recognize marks of epistemic authority in sources of information and acquire the critical skills for the evaluation of competing explanations.
In this paper we have two main aims. First, we present an account of mood-congruent delusions in ... more In this paper we have two main aims. First, we present an account of mood-congruent delusions in depression (hereafter, depressive delusions ). We propose that depressive delusions constitute acknowledgements of self-related beliefs acquired as a result of a negatively biased learning process. Second, we argue that depressive delusions have the potential for psychological and epistemic benefits despite their obvious epistemic and psychological costs. We suggest that depressive delusions play an important role in preserving a person’s overall coherence and narrative identity at a critical time, and thus can be regarded as epistemically innocent .
Asian Journal of Philosophy
In chapter 3 of Delusions and Beliefs, Kengo Miyazono argues that, when delusions are pathologica... more In chapter 3 of Delusions and Beliefs, Kengo Miyazono argues that, when delusions are pathological beliefs, they are so due to their being both harmful and malfunctional. In this brief commentary, I put pressure on Miyazono’s account of delusions as harmful malfunctioning beliefs. No delusions might satisfy the malfunction criterion and some delusions might fail to satisfy the harmfulness criterion when such conditions are interpreted as criteria for pathological beliefs. In the end, I raise a general concern about attributing pathological status to single beliefs out of context, and gesture towards the idea of pathology as a failure of agency to which some beliefs can contribute but that can only be identified by considering the person as a whole.
Reti Saperi Linguaggi, Jun 7, 2021
Conspiracy theories are often compared to clinical delusions and correlations have been found bet... more Conspiracy theories are often compared to clinical delusions and correlations have been found between accepting a conspiracy theory and schizotypal traits. In this paper, we explore some of the similarities and differences between conspiracy theories and persecutory delusions. We compare them in relation to surface features, aetiology, and downstream effects. In relation to surface features and aetiology, we argue that there is some overlap between conspiracy theories and persecutory delusions. In relation to downstream effects, we argue that persecutory delusions are characterized by severe disruption to one’s life, whereas conspiracy theories are in general not psychologically harmful to those who accept them. We conclude by commenting on the consequences of comparing conspiracy theories to delusions. Delusions are symptoms of psychiatric disorders and there is a specific kind of stigma often directed at those who suffer from mental illness. The political use of comparing delusions and conspiracy theories—when such comparison is aimed at producing or reinforcing stigmatization and exclusion—is problematic and should be avoided.
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Books by Lisa Bortolotti
Why do people adopt delusional beliefs and why are they so reluctant to part with them? In Why Delusions Matter, Lisa Bortolotti explains what delusions really are and argues that, despite their negative reputation, they can also play a positive role in people's lives, imposing some meaning on adverse experiences and strengthening personal or social identities. In a clear and accessible style, Bortolotti contributes to the growing research on the philosophy of the cognitive sciences, offering a novel and nuanced view of delusions.
In this book, Lisa Bortolotti argues that some irrational beliefs qualify as epistemically innocent, where, in some contexts, the adoption, maintenance, or reporting of the beliefs delivers significant epistemic benefits that could not be easily attained otherwise. Epistemic innocence does not imply that the epistemic benefits of the irrational belief outweigh its epistemic costs, yet it clarifies the relationship between the epistemic and psychological effects of irrational beliefs on agency. It is misleading to assume that epistemic rationality and psychological adaptiveness always go hand-in-hand, but also that there is a straight-forward trade-off between them. Rather, epistemic irrationality can lead to psychological adaptiveness, which in turn can support the attainment of epistemic goals. Recognising the circumstances in which irrational beliefs enhance or restore epistemic performance informs our mutual interactions and enables us to take measures to reduce their irrationality without undermining the conditions for epistemic success.
In this clear and engaging introduction to current debates on irrationality, Lisa Bortolotti presents the many facets of the concept and offers an original account of the importance of judgements of irrationality as value judgements. The book examines the standards against which we measure human behaviour, and reviews the often serious implications of judgements of irrationality for ethics and policy. Bortolotti argues that we should adopt a more critical stance towards accepted standards of rationality in the light of the often surprising outcomes of philosophical inquiry and cognitive science research into decision making.
Irrationality is an accessible guide to the concept and will be essential reading for students and scholars interested in the limitations of human cognition and human agency.
CONTENTS
Synopsis
1: The Background
2: Procedural Rationality and Belief Ascription
3: Epistemic Rationality and Belief Ascription
4: Agential Rationality and Belief Ascription
5: Beliefs and Self Knowledge
6: Conclusions
Bibliography and Reference List
For reviews and other information about the book, go to: http://sites.google.com/site/lisabortolottiphilosophy/books/delusions
CONTENTS
Preface – Lisa Bortolotti
Part one: Happiness and the Meaningful Life
1. Happiness and Meaningfulness: Some Key Differences (T. Metz)
2. Happiness, Temporality, Meaning (J. Cottingham)
3. Tragic Joyfulness (P. Tabensky)
4. Shape and the Meaningfulness of Life (L. James)
5. Immortal Happiness (M. Quigley and J. Harris)
6. “I am well, apart from the fact that I have cancer”: Explaining Well-being within Illness (H. Carel)
7. Suffering in Happy Lives (M.W. Martin)
Part two: Happiness and the Mind.
8. Reflections on Positive Psychology (E. Duncan, I. Grazzani-Gavazzi and U. Kiran Subba)
9. Face Value. Perception and Knowledge of Others’ Happiness (E. Zamuner)
10. The Politics of Happiness: Subjective vs. Economic Measures as Measures of Social Well-being (E. Angner)
11. Happiness and Preference-Satisfaction (I. Law)
12. The Politics of the Self: Stability, Normativity and the Lives we can Live with Living (J. Lenman)
13. Happiness and Life Choices: Sartre on Desire, Deliberation and Action (J. Fernández)
14. The Reflective Life and Happiness (V. Tiberius)
References and Bibliography
Index
For reviews and other information about the book, go to: http://sites.google.com/site/lisabortolottiphilosophy/books/happiness
CONTENTS
Introduction - Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: An Overview (M.R. Broome and L. Bortolotti)
Psychiatry as Science
Chapter 1. Is Psychiatric Research Scientific? (R. Cooper)
Chapter 2. A Secret History of ICD and the Hidden Future of DSM. (K.W.M. Fulford and N. Sartorius)
Chapter 3. Delusion as a Natural Kind. (R. Samuels)
The Nature of Mental Illness
Chapter 4. Mental Illness is Indeed a Myth. (H. Pickard)
Chapter 5. Psychiatry and the Concept of Disease as Pathology. (D. Murphy)
Reconciling Paradigms
Chapter 6. On the Interface Problem in Philosophy and Psychiatry. (T. Thornton)
Chapter 7. What does Rationality Have to Do with Psychological Causation? Propositional attitudes as Mechanisms and as Control Variables. (J. Campbell)
Chapter 8. Mad Scientists or Unreliable Autobiographers? Dopamine Dysregulation and Delusion. (P. Gerrans)
Psychiatry and the Neurosciences
Chapter 9. When Time is Out of Joint: Schizophrenia and Functional Neuroimaging. (D. Lloyd)
Chapter 10. Philosophy and Cognitive-Affective Neurogenetics. (D. Stein)
Chapter 11. An Addictive Lesson: A Case Study in Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience. (L. Stephens and G. Graham)
Phenomenology and Scientific Explanation
Chapter 12. Understanding Existential Changes in Psychiatric Illness: The Indispensability of Phenomenology. (M. Ratcliffe)
Chapter 13. Delusional realities. (S. Gallagher)
Delusions and Cognition
Chapter 14. Delusions: a Two-Level Framework. (K. Frankish)
Chapter 15. Explaining Pathologies of Belief. (A.M. Aimola Davies and M. Davies)
Moral Psychology and Psychopathology
Chapter 16. Mental Time Travel, Agency and Responsibility. (J. Kennett and S. Matthews)
Chapter 17. Motivation, Depression and Character. (I. Law)
Conclusion: The Future of Scientific Psychiatry. (L. Bortolotti and M.R. Broome)
One of the best books of 2009 for the Guardian, according to Mary Warnock:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2009/nov/22/books-of-the-year-2009.
For reviews and other information about the book, go to: http://sites.google.com/site/lisabortolottiphilosophy/books/psychiatry
Introduction: What is Science?
Chapter 1: Demarcation
Chapter 2: Reasoning
Chapter 3: Knowledge
Chapter 4: Language and Reality
Chapter 5: Rationality
Chapter 6: Ethics
Conclusion: Science as an Activity
Glossary
Thematic Bibliography
Index
For reviews and other information about the book, go to: http://sites.google.com/site/lisabortolottiphilosophy/books/Introduction
Papers by Lisa Bortolotti
Why do people adopt delusional beliefs and why are they so reluctant to part with them? In Why Delusions Matter, Lisa Bortolotti explains what delusions really are and argues that, despite their negative reputation, they can also play a positive role in people's lives, imposing some meaning on adverse experiences and strengthening personal or social identities. In a clear and accessible style, Bortolotti contributes to the growing research on the philosophy of the cognitive sciences, offering a novel and nuanced view of delusions.
In this book, Lisa Bortolotti argues that some irrational beliefs qualify as epistemically innocent, where, in some contexts, the adoption, maintenance, or reporting of the beliefs delivers significant epistemic benefits that could not be easily attained otherwise. Epistemic innocence does not imply that the epistemic benefits of the irrational belief outweigh its epistemic costs, yet it clarifies the relationship between the epistemic and psychological effects of irrational beliefs on agency. It is misleading to assume that epistemic rationality and psychological adaptiveness always go hand-in-hand, but also that there is a straight-forward trade-off between them. Rather, epistemic irrationality can lead to psychological adaptiveness, which in turn can support the attainment of epistemic goals. Recognising the circumstances in which irrational beliefs enhance or restore epistemic performance informs our mutual interactions and enables us to take measures to reduce their irrationality without undermining the conditions for epistemic success.
In this clear and engaging introduction to current debates on irrationality, Lisa Bortolotti presents the many facets of the concept and offers an original account of the importance of judgements of irrationality as value judgements. The book examines the standards against which we measure human behaviour, and reviews the often serious implications of judgements of irrationality for ethics and policy. Bortolotti argues that we should adopt a more critical stance towards accepted standards of rationality in the light of the often surprising outcomes of philosophical inquiry and cognitive science research into decision making.
Irrationality is an accessible guide to the concept and will be essential reading for students and scholars interested in the limitations of human cognition and human agency.
CONTENTS
Synopsis
1: The Background
2: Procedural Rationality and Belief Ascription
3: Epistemic Rationality and Belief Ascription
4: Agential Rationality and Belief Ascription
5: Beliefs and Self Knowledge
6: Conclusions
Bibliography and Reference List
For reviews and other information about the book, go to: http://sites.google.com/site/lisabortolottiphilosophy/books/delusions
CONTENTS
Preface – Lisa Bortolotti
Part one: Happiness and the Meaningful Life
1. Happiness and Meaningfulness: Some Key Differences (T. Metz)
2. Happiness, Temporality, Meaning (J. Cottingham)
3. Tragic Joyfulness (P. Tabensky)
4. Shape and the Meaningfulness of Life (L. James)
5. Immortal Happiness (M. Quigley and J. Harris)
6. “I am well, apart from the fact that I have cancer”: Explaining Well-being within Illness (H. Carel)
7. Suffering in Happy Lives (M.W. Martin)
Part two: Happiness and the Mind.
8. Reflections on Positive Psychology (E. Duncan, I. Grazzani-Gavazzi and U. Kiran Subba)
9. Face Value. Perception and Knowledge of Others’ Happiness (E. Zamuner)
10. The Politics of Happiness: Subjective vs. Economic Measures as Measures of Social Well-being (E. Angner)
11. Happiness and Preference-Satisfaction (I. Law)
12. The Politics of the Self: Stability, Normativity and the Lives we can Live with Living (J. Lenman)
13. Happiness and Life Choices: Sartre on Desire, Deliberation and Action (J. Fernández)
14. The Reflective Life and Happiness (V. Tiberius)
References and Bibliography
Index
For reviews and other information about the book, go to: http://sites.google.com/site/lisabortolottiphilosophy/books/happiness
CONTENTS
Introduction - Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: An Overview (M.R. Broome and L. Bortolotti)
Psychiatry as Science
Chapter 1. Is Psychiatric Research Scientific? (R. Cooper)
Chapter 2. A Secret History of ICD and the Hidden Future of DSM. (K.W.M. Fulford and N. Sartorius)
Chapter 3. Delusion as a Natural Kind. (R. Samuels)
The Nature of Mental Illness
Chapter 4. Mental Illness is Indeed a Myth. (H. Pickard)
Chapter 5. Psychiatry and the Concept of Disease as Pathology. (D. Murphy)
Reconciling Paradigms
Chapter 6. On the Interface Problem in Philosophy and Psychiatry. (T. Thornton)
Chapter 7. What does Rationality Have to Do with Psychological Causation? Propositional attitudes as Mechanisms and as Control Variables. (J. Campbell)
Chapter 8. Mad Scientists or Unreliable Autobiographers? Dopamine Dysregulation and Delusion. (P. Gerrans)
Psychiatry and the Neurosciences
Chapter 9. When Time is Out of Joint: Schizophrenia and Functional Neuroimaging. (D. Lloyd)
Chapter 10. Philosophy and Cognitive-Affective Neurogenetics. (D. Stein)
Chapter 11. An Addictive Lesson: A Case Study in Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience. (L. Stephens and G. Graham)
Phenomenology and Scientific Explanation
Chapter 12. Understanding Existential Changes in Psychiatric Illness: The Indispensability of Phenomenology. (M. Ratcliffe)
Chapter 13. Delusional realities. (S. Gallagher)
Delusions and Cognition
Chapter 14. Delusions: a Two-Level Framework. (K. Frankish)
Chapter 15. Explaining Pathologies of Belief. (A.M. Aimola Davies and M. Davies)
Moral Psychology and Psychopathology
Chapter 16. Mental Time Travel, Agency and Responsibility. (J. Kennett and S. Matthews)
Chapter 17. Motivation, Depression and Character. (I. Law)
Conclusion: The Future of Scientific Psychiatry. (L. Bortolotti and M.R. Broome)
One of the best books of 2009 for the Guardian, according to Mary Warnock:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2009/nov/22/books-of-the-year-2009.
For reviews and other information about the book, go to: http://sites.google.com/site/lisabortolottiphilosophy/books/psychiatry
Introduction: What is Science?
Chapter 1: Demarcation
Chapter 2: Reasoning
Chapter 3: Knowledge
Chapter 4: Language and Reality
Chapter 5: Rationality
Chapter 6: Ethics
Conclusion: Science as an Activity
Glossary
Thematic Bibliography
Index
For reviews and other information about the book, go to: http://sites.google.com/site/lisabortolottiphilosophy/books/Introduction