Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR STEPHEN J. LEDOGAR

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
Initial interview date: March 1, 2000

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Defense Department - National Military Command Center Vietnam	1967
State Department - Office of Vietnam Information	1967-1968
State Department - EAP - Vietnam Desk Officer Vietnam Working Group Pacification desk Tet offensive Wheeler trip Embassy attacked Westmoreland troop request U.S. public support of Vietnam War Speechmaking U.S. mistakes "Wise Men"	1968-1969
State Department - FSI - Economic Training	1969
Paris, France - Vietnam Peace Talks Post-war retrospect Ambassador Lodge Press corps Negotiations U.S. politics POWs and MIAs North Vietnamese and the press South Vietnamese delegations Phil Habib Issues Misspeaks Ambassador Bruce Kissinger talks Cambodia invasion Ambassador William Porter	1969-1972
Stanford University - Senior Training Student behavior	1972-1973
Brussels, Belgium - Political Officer "Codfish War" Turkey-Greece European Economic Community Portugal	1973-1976

State Department - Security Assistance 1976-1977
- Arms sales
- NATO
- Nuclear issues
- Weaponry
- French
- Russians

Senior Seminar 1977-1978

Interim Assignments 1978-1981

Brussels, Belgium - NATO - DCM 1981-1990
- European Union
- French attitude
- Helsinki process
- CSCE
- Congressional interest
- NATO organizations
- Spain
- Vienna
- Conventional Forces, Europe [CFE] Treaty
- MBFR

Geneva, Switzerland - Conference on Disarmament - Ambassador 1990-1997
- Conference on Disarmament
- Participants
- Chemical weapons
- Iraq
- Desert Storm
- Nuclear testing
- Verification
- India/Pakistan
- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [CTBT]
- Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA]
- Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT]

Retirement 1997

INTERVIEW

Q: Today is March 1, 2000. This is an interview with Stephen J. Ledogar. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy. What do you go by? Steve?

LEDOGAR: Yes.

Q: Let's start at the beginning. When and where were you born? Tell me something about your family?

LEDOGAR: I was born in New York City in 1929. I was one of four children of my father Edward Ledogar, who was a self-employed attorney. My mother was a homemaker. We grew up in New York City, Queens County. I went to school at Fordham University in the Bronx. My period in college was interrupted by four years in the U.S. Navy during which time I became a naval aviator.

Q: I want to go back. Was your family Catholic?

LEDOGAR: Yes.

Q: Did you go to Catholic schools in New York?

LEDOGAR: Yes, I did, all parochial schools followed by a Catholic high school in Brooklyn. Fordham is a Jesuit university.

Q: What did you think of the elementary school system? Did you feel that there was a division between Catholics and Protestants?

LEDOGAR: Oh, yes. It was a competition of sorts. But it was rather benign. At that time, the Catholic elementary schools were completely staffed by nuns. Lay teachers were few and far between. That has totally changed today. The high school was run by the Christian Brothers and was staffed by ½ to 2/3 brothers with the rest being lay teachers. Then the university was maybe 10% Jesuit fathers and the rest were all lay teachers.

Q: In elementary school, were the nuns traditional disciplinarians?

LEDOGAR: Especially in those days. We would get whacked around. The classes were quite large so discipline was rather strict. That was also true in high school. Physical chastisement was not unknown. A ruler on the knuckles and that sort of thing.

Q: In elementary school, what sort of things do you recall as far as subjects and sports that particularly interested you?

LEDOGAR: I went to a very progressive school in parochial school terms, a school which was very big on extracurricular activities. They had a band. They had a brigade. They had a marching band. They even had an orchestra in grammar school. They had all kinds of programs for afterschool activities - theater, roller skating… I can't remember them all. The only one I can remember that was not there was the Boy Scouts.

Q: What sort of things did you get involved in?

LEDOGAR: I played the fife in the marching band. But I kind of drifted away from extracurricular activities at school for two reasons. One, we lived quite far away. Also, I still was attached to buddies from a previous neighborhood. They were gravitating toward the Scouts, so I kind of went back to the old gang and went through a scouting program. Then at about the end of grade school, I got involved pretty much with the old gang in the sport of bicycle racing. This was during World War II, so there weren't many cars on the road. We did an awful lot of road riding and racing including great distances. This pulled me away from this rather advanced elementary school and its activities. But I somehow managed to stick with the marching band.

Q: I take it the bikes were Schwinns or something like that?

LEDOGAR: No, we had European imports, all custom made. The hardest thing was to get tires during the war. They used sew-up tires which were imported from Europe and were very hard to come by.

Q: During the high school days, a good part of World War II was on. Were you interested in reading the paper, finding out where things were, and following events?

LEDOGAR: Absolutely. We not only played war as kids, but I was with a couple of friends who did a lot of drawing. An awful lot of drawing would be sequential battlefield scenes. We even had some of these war games. Our older brothers were beginning to be called up in the draft. I can remember participating in the war bond and war stamp campaigns. Of course, there were all of the elements of rationing that kept the war in front of you. I paid quite a bit of attention to the news.

Q: I'm a year older than you. I was born in 1928. One of the things I got out of the experience was a sense of geography, Guadalcanal…

LEDOGAR: Absolutely. One of the games that we had employed little lead models of ships. We devised a naval war game. We were quite a bit ahead of the technology we were reading about as regards the role of aircraft carriers being more important than battleships in the war, more of a threat. So, we were very conscious of the war. I think that that led to a sense of geography. I had uncles in the Pacific. Some of the older guys in the neighborhood were going off to war.

Q: Just to go back to your family, where did your father go to school?

LEDOGAR: He went to public schools in New York, Queens, and Brooklyn. My mother also grew up in Brooklyn. At that time, one could get a law degree without first having to get a prior bachelor degree. You could go directly into an LLB program and that's what he did. He had served in World War I. That's another influence on my awareness of geography and history. He'd tell war stories and tell us about where it was he served, which was both down in Mexico chasing Pancho Villa and also in France. I suppose that era of war really did teach us a lot of geography and history.

Q: What were your major lines of concentration at Fordham?

LEDOGAR: In the last year of high school, I signed up for and was successful in getting a scholarship from the U.S. Navy called the Naval Aviation College Program. This was a post-World War II follow-on to what used to be called the V-5 program. The aviation portion, unlike the NROTC (Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps) surface portion of the navy, required that you do two years of college, then go off and do your flight training and your obligated service, with the promise that they would send you back to finish college sometime later. Well, I did that. The "blackshoe" (surface navy) portion of it was the NROTC, and they had 52 colleges that were designated and had staffs to teach naval science during the otherwise civilian portion of your college education. The aviation portion allowed you to go to any accredited college, but they had certain requirements. You had to take two years of English and one year of Physics before you left for flight training. So, that pushed me towards the Physics department. Then when we were halfway through freshmen year, there was a change in the program. The Navy realized that the design of the aviation program wasn't very efficient. First of all, they didn't have the money to give us the summer training between freshman and sophomore year as they had planned. Then they decided it was less efficient to bring everybody in the program down to Florida in June at the end of sophomore year. So, they directed that those of us in college that would allow it, should accelerate by using the summer to pick up the second half of the English requirement and come down to Pensacola in February. Well, I was so anxious to get down to Pensacola, to begin fulfilling my life's dream to be a naval aviator, that I immediately went in that direction. That had consequences for me when I tried to finish up four years later. But I did fulfill the requirements, and I left for Pensacola in February of '49.

Q: So, you had had approximately two years of college.

LEDOGAR: A year and a half, plus a summer school. By the way, I was a member of the Fordham track team and the drum major of the Fordham marching band during that year and a half.

Q: How did you find flight training?

LEDOGAR: That was my then lifelong dream. I was extremely enthusiastic about it. I remember being a little surprised that the facilities seemed a bit dilapidated. The facilities were wooden buildings and dirt and grass runways. But training moved along quite smartly. They had a very tough period of preflight school where you did nothing but drill and salute and scrub your room and pass inspections and basic military stuff. Then once you got started going to live at outlying air bases where the planes were it got much more relaxed on the military side. Overall, I found basic training was very well done.

Q: After you finished your basic training, what did you do?

LEDOGAR: Basic flight training was a function of how fast you could move through. If

you were doing well, you'd move a little bit faster. But the pace reflected whether they had the money to fund gasoline.

Q: This was before the Korean War and the military was really hurting for money.

LEDOGAR: Exactly. The Marines don't train their own aviators. They take graduates of naval flight training. In '49 and '50 the Marines hadn't taken any pilots into the Corps since World War II because they had an oversupply. In fact, in '49 and '50, they were still cutting back. When the Korean War broke out, as it did while we were still in advanced training...

Q: June 25, 1950.

LEDOGAR: Suddenly, things changed. By this time I had graduated from basic and moved to advanced flight training in "Skyraider" dive bombers at Corpus Christi, Texas. Jet aircraft had just been introduced to the fighter side. I was on the single engine carrier aircraft side of naval aviation, not the multi-engine patrol plane side. I was, like many others, quite anxious to try to get assigned to the jets. The Marines came along and said, "If you sign up with us, we guarantee that you'll get into jets," but there was something that seemed a little bit fishy about the offer. I stayed with the navy.

First of all, I had been preselected and then frozen into a track of carrier aviators that went to the Atlantic fleet. The Korean War was peculiar for the U.S. Navy in that it was the first test of a concept learned in World War II: That the nation had to have a "two-ocean" navy. Then, of course, in '48, the U.S. realized exactly what Soviet intentions were and in 1949 formed the North American Treaty Organization [NATO]. This caused a very rigid division within the Navy into the Atlantic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet. In 1950, if you were in the Atlantic fleet, by God you were going to stay there. The Pacific fleet would take care of the navy role in the Korean War effort. You had really two separate U.S. navies at that period. I was in the Atlantic fleet. So, after this final requirement of six actual carrier landings in the "Skyraider," I got my wings in September of '50. One distinguished member of our class was Neil Armstrong.

Q: The first man on the Moon.

LEDOGAR: Yes. Then I was assigned to an East Coast squadron of carrier-based bombers. I spent the Korean War mostly in the Mediterranean. But those fellows who did opt for the Marines indeed got to fly jets for about 20 hours and then they were put back into propeller planes and put into combat in Korea very promptly, and they really took a walloping. Many of my classmates were shot down. We were using World War II tactics where airplanes came in and closely supported the ground troops, but the North Koreans and the Chinese were the first soldiers in history who, instead of diving into a ditch when they were being attacked by low flying airplanes, instead turned around and shot back at the attackers. Small arms fire was really wreaking havoc with Marine Corps Aviation. All the public attention was on the MIG jets and the Sabre jets in "MIG Alley," but the aviators who were taking the pounding were the ones who were learning the lesson that

close air support of ground troops ought not be *too* close.

Q: While you were in the Mediterranean, were you getting any feel for the foreign world?

LEDOGAR: Oh, yes. One of the things that was attractive about an assignment to the Atlantic fleet was that most of the sea duty was in the Mediterranean. The sixth fleet had been established there permanently. Except for the coastal reserves and training elements, most of the Atlantic forces were in the Mediterranean. In terms of a large fleet, the Med is not a very big area, so we came into port frequently. The time I was there included two long deployments in the Mediterranean of about six months each. In 1951-'52 we were not going to Spain, but we had frequent port calls in France, all over Italy, Greece, Turkey, Malta but not Israel or Egypt. We visited North Africa, Libya, Algeria, Tunis, and Morocco, where there was a U.S. naval supply station.

Q: What carriers were you on?

LEDOGAR: As I said, I did two long deployments; the first was in 1951 on the U.S.S. Oriskany. The second was in 1952 on the U.S.S. Coral Sea. That brings up a story. When I was applying to get into the Foreign Service, it was at a time when the Board of Oral Examiners was using, as so many folks in those days were, kind of Freudian tricks to see whether or not a candidate could take stress. If a candidate was doing well, they would cut you off, and if you were foundering, they'd pour the stress on. One guy was your friend and one guy was your antagonist, etc. They asked me the same question you just did: "What were those two ships named after?" I said that at that period of time most of American carriers were named after famous battles in American history. "What was the Oriskany named after?" "The Battle of Oriskany." "Tell me about the Battle of Oriskany." I had been a history major and I happened to know the answer to that. "Who were the opposing generals?" I said, "General Herkimer on the American side," and then I went blank and took a wild guess. I was dead wrong and they nailed me. I have never since forgotten that. The British Commander at Oriskany was Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger.

Q: Herkimer bled to death on the battlefield. Coral Sea I guess you got.

LEDOGAR: Yes. Coral Sea was a famous aircraft carrier battle early in World War II: the first major naval engagement in history in which the opposing fleets were never within gun range of each other. So, those were the two ships.

Before each trip to the Mediterranean deployments I had training deployments to the Caribbean and especially to Guantanamo, Cuba, which at the time was being used as a training center for the fleet.

The big carriers did not stop elsewhere in the Atlantic, but within the Mediterranean, when you had enough shore leave, you could go into France. I went to Paris. You could go to various places inland from the Port of Genoa. I went to Rome, Venice, and to Switzerland and did quite a bit of traveling. When flying high over the Mediterranean in

good weather you could see great distances - you didn't have to fly very long before you approached the shoreline of a new country.

Q: Were you married at this time?

LEDOGAR: No, I didn't get married until quite a bit later, by which time I had already finished the navy, two more years of college, law school and a couple of Foreign Service tours.

My first contact with the Foreign Service was during these port calls in the Mediterranean. This would be the late spring and summer of 1951 and again in '52. I can recall going to a couple of diplomatic receptions. I recall one time the U.S. naval attaché in Athens had to meet me and give me some classified information before I took off and flew out to the ship. A few exposures like that.

I loved flying, but I did not take to the military stuff that was not airborne: the guff on the ground, if you will, the military life. So, when the opportunity came to revert to the U.S. Naval Reserve… We were actually regular Naval officers. I took it. The idea of the NROTC and NAACP was to augment the production of the U.S. Naval Academy by using civilian universities. They offered regular Navy commissions… But the Korean War was winding down. The requirements for personnel were winding down. It became more difficult to be retained in the regular navy. I didn't want to be retained. I wanted to go back to college and get on with other things, with an eye toward flying in the Naval Reserve on weekends so that I could have the better part of both worlds. Then in 1952, even though the Korean War was still on, my obligated service period was up and I was released and returned to Fordham University.

I was very anxious to get into junior year, but I couldn't do that in Physics. Not having some of the building blocks of the second half of sophomore year (I had differential but not integral calculus; I had had courses in heat and light but not electricity), I lacked certain required courses. So, there were not very many disciplines open to me because I lacked a full sophomore year. I was able to get into the Department of Social Sciences majoring in history. Therefore, instead of going for a physics degree, I went for a history degree. I had to do some scrambling to make up missing elective points.

Q: In what area of history were you concentrating?

LEDOGAR: Social and cultural history of the United States in the late 19th century, around the turn of the century. That would seem to be the concentration, but I also had quite a bit of European history.

Q: What were you thinking of doing while you were going to school?

LEDOGAR: I had no plan other than that I wanted to get a graduate degree. Since I was older… When I went to college at first, all the GIs from World War II were there, so I was three or four years younger than my peers. When I came back after my military

service, I was three or four years older than my peers and in a different discipline. Also, I had been living fairly well as a naval officer. I wasn't prepared to go back to being totally broke. So, I decided to get a job after college and go to law school at nighttime. I was not really intending to practice law.

Q: What did you see law doing for you?

LEDOGAR: Training in how to think and how to write and how to analyze problems, and at the same time keeping doors open and giving me a great qualification that could be used later on.

When I took the physical examination to go into the Naval Aviation College Program, I was 17 years of age and 6'4", which was right at the upper margin for height dimensions. I was able to scrunch down and get by, even though by the time I started in flight training, I was probably closer to 6'5". It really worked out alright. A curious historical development: the United States Navy during the period of the '30s put its dollars into the acquisition of carrier-based aircraft that used radial engines. An air-cooled radial engine is much bigger in diameter than a liquid cooled in-line engine. Therefore, the fuselage of a Navy plane was wider, larger. Space was ample in naval carrier based aircraft. The U.S. Air Force, like the British and the Germans to a certain extent, concentrated on liquid-cooled engines which were in-line, like automobile engines were at that time. Therefore, fuselages were much narrower and space was at a premium. So, even in World War II, the Air Force had an upper limit of 6'2". The Navy had 6'4". Cockpit space was not a problem. In fact, it was an advantage for a tall person like me. In the old conventional landing gear style, where your tail was down and you were taxiing around and you had to look up over the nose, I could put the seat all the way up and still reach the pedals and taxi without having to go blind and make S turns. Gradually, as we moved into the era of jets, Navy cockpits became much smaller. The future for someone who was 6'5" as a Naval pilot became increasingly questionable. When I went into the Naval Reserves, by then they required that pilots had to have a hard helmet for safety, a crash helmet that took up even more space. I realized that I was being squeezed out of carrier-based aircraft. So, that's another reason why I didn't see a great future for myself in the Navy.

It was in September '52 that I went back to Fordham and became a history major. I finished off college in two years, junior and senior years. As I pointed out, I was roughly three to four years older than my classmates. So, I didn't have very strong bonds to the folks I went to college with. I was a dayhop, not a boarder. During my college years I had a three and a half year hiatus for military service. In the first part, I was younger than everybody else. Then I was older when I came back. Also, with neighborhood sports and weekend flying, I had quite a few distractions. So, Fordham was not the center of my extracurricular activities, although I did run on the cross country track team and participated in a couple of other sports. Then I graduated in '54 and decided on going to law school.

Q: During this time at Fordham, the second time, one of the great issues at the time was Senator McCarthy and his charges? How did this play?

LEDOGAR: It was of interest at school, but more so at home… I guess I had more of an internationalist aspect, but my father and other relatives thought that with an Irish name like McCarthy, he was probably okay. They were instinctively anti-Communist and tended, without being rabid supporters, to give the Senator the benefit of the doubt, at least in the beginning. I remember being rather shocked by some of the things that McCarthy did, including running roughshod over the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, including those two fellows that he had as his gumshoes (Cohen and Shine). I watched a lot of the hearings. I paid a certain attention to the news. So, it seemed to me that not so much the people at Fordham, but in the Irish Catholic family that I grew up in, it took them a while to shed their pro-McCarthy prejudices and see things the way they were.

Q: This is something that's often overlooked, but particularly at the beginning, religion was an element in the McCarthy period. I think it later dissipated.

LEDOGAR: And people forget that there was some substance to the Senator's cause. There was an awful lot of progress being made by the Marxist-Leninist socialists in various universities. I can remember that at the time in New York City, City College and Queens College were considered hotbeds of radicalism. So, the Red Scare was not totally a figment.

Q: No. And the whole Algier Hiss thing. I mean, he was guilty.

LEDOGAR: Yes.

Q: You got your degree at Fordham when?

LEDOGAR: '54. It was a BS in history.

Q: Then you were going to law?

LEDOGAR: Yes, I got a job with an insurance company, the Surety bonding section, in downtown New York. It was sort of the legal department handling fidelity and contract bond losses. I started out as a trainee and got general training in insurance and then worked especially on contract bond losses. These were performance bonds that builders must post to guarantee performance and completion of a job in timely fashion for the amount agreed, and that all workers would be paid, and so forth. That was really quite an experience. I wound up having quite a bit of authority and did a lot of traveling. It would be a long time again in government before I was authorized to handle equivalent amounts of public money. It was in the legal department that this work was done. I was sort of a paralegal, but I was going to Law school at nighttime. Night law school at that time was essentially ¾ time. It took you four years of night law school to get a degree. If one was really serious about a career in law, a full three year daytime law school probably would have been a better choice, if you could afford it. Moreover, in the mid-1950s there had been a curious development in that the Court of Appeals, which is the highest court in New York State, had rendered a judgement about the practice of law in New York, the

effect of which was to cause thousands of established and practicing certified public accountants to either give up their tax practices or to go to law school to get a law license. The decision was, in effect, that if you gave tax advice without a law license, you would get in trouble. A lot of CPAs were affected, so the New York night law schools became crowded with middle-aged professional accountants who in order to survive had to get a law degree and get it quick. That caused the night law schools to become very strict and one-dimensional, not very penetrating. These people wanted to know and know quickly and surely only what they had to do to pass the bar examination. They were not interested in how a legal theory developed in old English law, nor in how some of the legal niceties predicted directions that legal theories might follow. The positive effect was that you didn't dare show up for class and waste anybody's time. If you were called on in class and weren't prepared, you stood up and said, "Not prepared." Your classmates would kill you if you wasted anybody's time by fudging or pretending. So, again, it produced for me a desired result and I did pass the bar on my first attempt. But I wound up not getting a first-class legal education.

Q: Here you were, you had what I guess was a promising career in the insurance company and you got your law degree. When did you get your law degree?

LEDOGAR: 1958.

Q: What were you pointed towards doing? Insurance?

LEDOGAR: I thought for a while I might continue with insurance, but the field became a bit of a drag and filled with routine. Frankly, I don't remember knowing at that time (1958 at age 29) what I really wanted to do. Somehow I started to think about trying to go into the Foreign Service. For me, Foreign Service was never a case of: "Oh, this is what I always wanted to do." That was the way I felt when I went into flight training. But for me, going into Foreign Service was more of a segue. I had had some overseas background from being in the Navy. I didn't know what I wanted to do. I finished up a graduate degree which was not a step for a particular purpose. In fact, I never interviewed for any law firm.

But one evening in my fourth year, one of the girls in the class and I both came in late. We had a system where if the lecture had started, you didn't go take your alphabetically assigned regular seat. You had to sit by the door so as not to disturb the class. I came in late and so did this classmate, Betty Gunderson. The lecture was numbing and she was filling out an application for the Foreign Service Exam. I remember looking over and reading it and asking her, "Where do you get those?" She told me and I sent away for an application.

I wasn't doing very much else at this time except studying for finals and the bar exam. I filled out an application and sent it in. I took the Foreign Service written exam and passed it. When it came time for the Foreign Service oral entrance exam, my emphasis was on passing the New York bar exam. I probably exuded an "I don't care all that much" attitude, which may or may not have had an impact. But I did pass the oral, did the

medical exam and got a security clearance. Then finally the bar exam came and I took that. The results came out and I had passed. I became a member of the New York Bar in early 1959. Then I really had nothing on my plate. I was still working for the insurance company but was becoming disillusioned.

All this time, I was flying fighter jets with the Naval Reserve "Weekend Warriors" in Brooklyn, and doing a number of other activities. That's the sort of thing you do when you're in your 20s. I now don't understand how I managed to do all of those skiing weekends in northern Vermont, lots of partying, and somehow or other managed to get to the theater… With a gang of friends, I rented a summer place out in the Hamptons.

There was a short period of time when because of a medical technicality, I missed an FSO (Foreign Service Officer) class that was going to start at the Foreign Service Institute in the late spring of '59. In anticipation I had to quit my job. So, I had a period of several months where I had actually left the insurance company, but it was not until September that I was going to go down to Washington to start FSO training. That summer I worked for my brother, a lawyer, on a part-time basis when he needed someone to do things like real-estate closings and motions that were not too complex. He was busy and just needed a hand, so I worked on an hourly basis. On that slim basis I put into my resume "the private practice of law" with fingers crossed. I was able to do an awful lot of flying that summer.

Q: What were you flying?

LEDOGAR: F9F Grumman "Cougars" and later FJ-3 North American "Furies," the naval version of the Sabre Jet. But we "Weekend Warriors" were beginning to see the handwriting on the wall. I had this problem of height and being a little jammed into the cockpit. Also, the Navy decided that its Naval Reserve aviation dollars would be better spent by de-emphasizing the jet fighter programs because there was not enough time or money to keep us carrier-landing and weapons-qualified. If you were in the patrol plane discipline or in anti-submarine warfare, you didn't have the problem of having to keep current in carrier landings and having to shoot and dive-bomb and rocket, etc. So they decided that the Naval Reserve Program was better directed to build up reserves in these multi-engine disciplines. The fighter program was allowed to dwindle down. In support of this strategy they came out with a rule saying that any naval aviator who had flown jets in the fleet during the past three years could replace any aviator in the reserve program who had not. So, gradually, those of us who had transitioned to jets from propeller planes were being replaced by young fellows who had grown up in jets and really knew how to use them to optimal effect. A smart decision, incidentally. So I was just hanging onto my Naval Reserve billet when I got my first Foreign Service assignment. Although it was to Montreal and I probably could have carried on weekending in Brooklyn for a few more months, the game wasn't worth the candle.

Q: You came into the Foreign Service when?

LEDOGAR: September of '59.

Q: What was your Foreign Service class like?

LEDOGAR: I can remember some of the statistics. On the average, we were 27 years old, we averaged one graduate degree. I can't remember whether there were any women or not. I don't think there were. I can picture the whole bunch of them. There were only a few bachelors. I was one. One fellow was 33 years of age. Three of us were 30 and I was one of them. There were a couple of guys who did not have a graduate degree and who were in their early 20s. They all seemed to be much more literate in political science than I. I think I could hold my own in history. It was a very interesting class, the survivors from which did fairly well in their careers. Five or six of the original twenty-five made it to the Ambassador level. There was considerable attrition in the early years.

Q: Where did you want to go?

LEDOGAR: I wanted to go to Europe. This was before they had the junior officer rotational training program. We were encouraged in expressing assignment preferences to try to get a variety of regional and functional assignments in the early years. I wound up being assigned to Montreal, which technically was in the European Bureau, to a visa officer position. That worked out to be not quite as ominous as it sounded. Having taken the consular course, there was not an awful lot of consular work that appealed to me. But the then Consul General in Montreal, himself a former Foreign Service inspector, had taken a look at his new post through the eyes of a Foreign Service inspector, and he recognized that he had a lot of officers there who were sort of reluctant victims of the Wristonization program. They were former civil servants who had been pushed into the Foreign Service. A number of them were not interested in going overseas or had family problems that made it difficult for them to go far away. They tended to be pushed into the U.S. border posts, so the Consul General decided that he had an excess of former State Department librarians who were taking care of aged mothers. He didn't have the raw material he thought would really help him fulfill his political, economic, and commercial missions. So, he looked to the young visa officers who were FSO-8s to alleviate his problems. We were put into visa duty in the non-immigrant section in the summertime, but then during the wintertime, we were given assignments to work in the political and economic sections. That helped to give us several perspectives. This was before they had their junior officer rotational thing. So my memories of substance in my assignment in Canada are mostly from the work I did in the economic section.

Q: You were in Canada from '59 to when?

LEDOGAR: '59 is when I started in the Foreign Service. By the time I finished training, A-100, the consular course, etc., it was early spring of '60. I was in Montreal from 60-'62.

Q: Were there any Canadian-American issues? You were pretty low in the totem pole, but you were an observer.

LEDOGAR: Within the context overall, the U.S.-Canadian relationship was very close and very intimate. We are each other's biggest trading partners. There were, however, some abrasive issues. One set that sticks in my mind was the so-called "split run" questions with regard to publications and broadcasting. Essentially, this was Canadian irritation at U.S. laissez-faire attitudes which allowed U.S. magazines like *Readers Digest* and *Time Magazine* and others to publish "Canadian" editions if they wanted to. The U.S. didn't care. Publishers would take their basic magazine, take out a couple of articles, replace them with a couple of Canadian-slanted articles, and then go sop up all of the Canadian advertising dollars. Similarly with radio and television broadcasts along the border. Somebody who was broadcasting in northern New York or Vermont would manage to pick up Canadian sponsors. So, the Canadians were trying to correct this and were threatening restrictive legislation. We were working to try to get some of our publishers to be sensitive to the way the Canadians saw this as a threat to their own basic magazines, and also sensitive to how much they would lose if "Canadian" editions of U.S. media were outlawed. Canada's *Maclean's* magazine, for example, was very prominent in saying that the competition for the Canadian advertising dollar was unfair because these big American publications, for very little additional cost, could produce a "Canadian" edition that was thicker and slicker and had more resources behind the stories, and so forth. So, that was one of the things we worked on.

Another one that I found rather interesting concerned liquor. My arrival at post in Montreal, early '60, coincided with the end of the regime of a rather reactionary Quebec province premier by the name of Maurice Duplessis. He was quite a tyrant and dictatorial, very right-wing, and very corrupt. In Canada, the whole question of alcohol and beverage control was a Provincial prerogative. So, the Province of Quebec set its own rules on foreign imports. The Quebec alcohol and beverage commission did not allow any bourbon whiskey to come into the province. I'm sure there was a little bit of a deal with the Canadian whiskey manufactures. Bourbon and Canadian whiskey are very close. Oddly enough, the U.S. couldn't get any U.S. vodka into Quebec either. That was more Mr. Duplessis' anti-Communist attitudes. He thought all vodka was Soviet and who wanted that?
So, we had the U.S. Bourbon Institute trying to encourage our economic section in Montreal to crack this wall. We did succeed. It was a rather interesting way that we were able to get U.S. bourbon accepted. In 1961, the Canadian hotel industry, especially in Montreal and Quebec City, went on a big push to attract U.S. trade organizations to hold conventions in their facilities. We at the U.S. consulate made the case that "You're not helping to attract big U.S. conventions, especially with certain kinds of associations, where the businessmen at the end of a hard day would normally go down to the bar and order a bourbon and branchwater, only to find out that in Montreal you can't get a glass of bourbon. It's not helping your convention business." This argument was developed. In the process, I learned a little bit about spirits through folks from the U.S. Bourbon Institute coming up to Montreal and talking to me about the differences between Canadian whiskey and bourbon. What broke the ice was when we finally got 12 big convention hotels excepted from the anti-bourbon rule. Then the Quebec Commission quickly found that it was too cumbersome to have to have a separate stock and controls, and they just let as much bourbon in as could be sold.

Q: Did you come up against the Bronfman Liquor empire?

LEDOGAR: I didn't know what was going on behind the scenes.

Q: Did you get any feel for Diefenbaker, the Canadian prime minister? From the American perspective, he was kind of a loose cannon. Did that reflect itself in Montreal at all?

LEDOGAR: Not too much. We at the U.S. Consulate in Montreal were more engaged in provincial politics. At that time, I think there were 10 or 12 U.S. constituent posts across Canada. Our embassy in Ottawa would just have the Consulates feed out political and economic stuff into them.

Incidentally, I made an early reputation for myself in that I had a friend, a journalist who was American, who had gone to school at the University of Toronto. She was very aggressive. I think they called them "investigative reporters" later on. She really dug for stories. She came to me one time and started inquiring about what kinds of deeds would cause one to lose one's American citizenship. At that time, fairly fresh from the consular course, I could rattle off the answer to that pretty easily. As you may recall, it was at that time fairly easy to lose your American citizenship.

Q: Oh, yes. Taking oath of allegiance to other places, voting… It changed within a couple of years.

LEDOGAR: Exactly. Well, this newswoman had a lot of contacts in the netherworld. She was asked if she would participate in what was known as "telegraphing," which was quite simply election fraud - the nefarious practice of getting your hands on legitimate registration chits that were issued to voters a week or so ahead of time and either stealing them or forging them or duplicating them - all sorts of things. The description of the person was there. Then there would be a pool of street people of all ages, sizes, and shapes. When they had a chit and needed someone to approximate a description, they would look around and cast someone from the pool and send them off to the polls. Her story came out in banner headlines in *MaClean's Magazine*, under the title "How I Voted 22 Times on the 20th of June." She, an American, voted 22 times in a Canadian election. I told her, "I can guarantee you won't lose your American citizenship if you tell me in detail how it's done." I got the whole story of the way this network of voting fraud was organized and executed-details she could not publish-and I wrote some colorful diplomatic despatches. Fortuitously, the party that she was working for fraudulently was defeated by the good guys. It was Rene Leveque, who was quite famous later on, whom she was working against. When he won anyway, she had a story. If the Union Nationale Party had won, then it was just election fraud. But when the Liberals won, despite all the cheating by the Conservatives, she was able to expose it as she did in this story, which was a real show-stopper… So, for a brand new officer, I got a couple of good political reports at that time.

Q: Who was the consul general?

LEDOGAR: Gerard Gaspard.

Q: Was there any thought or consideration about perhaps Quebec going independent?

LEDOGAR: The separatist movement was at its very beginnings at that time. They had not yet begun terrorism. They did so shortly after I left. There may have been the first of the so-called mailbox bombings toward the end of my tour in '62, but separatism was certainly was boiling in the salons and among the French-Canadian young Turks.

Q: As a young officer, did you have much contact with the French speakers?

LEDOGAR: I probably had as much as anyone in the consulate. As a bachelor, I was going around to various social events. The higher your rank, the more you had to deal with the establishment, which in Montreal was mostly Anglo-Canadian. So, the Consul General might have a couple of… For example, of the Consul General's few French Canadian contacts would be future Canadian prime minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who was then a law professor at the University of Montreal. But the boss would much more likely pay attention to the chairmen of the boards of the Bank of Montreal and the Canadian Pacific Railroad and so forth, all Anglos. But we were very conscious of the differences and the separatist storm was really gathering. I was in Italy on my second tour when things in Quebec started getting ugly and they started hurting people.

Q: You were Catholic. Did you get any feel for the Catholic Church there? Later, the Catholic Church was practically repudiated by the younger québécois. From your experience in New York, did you find this a different church than you had been exposed to before?

LEDOGAR: Well, there were political overtones. The Catholic Church in Quebec was quite reactionary and had been much too cozy with the former political regime, which was the Conservative Union Nationale. In many ways, the church kind of turned a blind eye to the source of some of the largesse that came its way. But I'll tell you an interesting story. Going back for decades, the French Canadian citizenry felt discriminated against, including in financial institutions-getting mortgage money, and so forth. So, the parishes of the church, in order to try to organize better economic opportunity for their parishioners, started little church banks, known as "Caisse Populaire." These parish banks soon became quite affluent. The French Canadian citizens would deposit their savings there and would borrow mortgage money from there. It was non-profit. People were dealing with these matters in an honest and straightforward fashion. They repaid their loans and the "Caisse Populaire" became very solvent. Just after I arrived at post, Duplessis died. There was a Conservative successor for three or four months. Then they had this election, the one in which my friend voted 22 times. The Liberals came in. It was a landslide.

The Union Nationale had the blue color. The Liberals were red and white. Some parish

priests were saying before the election, “Where is Heaven? Heaven is in the sky. What’s the color of the sky? Blue. Where is Hell? Down there? What is the color of that? Red.” But of course they weren’t telling you how to vote or anything like that. But the Liberals came in. They had a strong sense of French-Canadian nationalism. As the saying went, they no longer wanted to be “Hewers of wood and drawers of water” for the Anglos. Rather, they wanted not just to export raw materials but to process them. They wanted to build steel mills and not just to ship ore. They wanted to add value in the aluminum industry and in the paper industry. So, in order to develop these things, they needed capital. Where was their capital? The “Caisse Populaire” were loaded. The Liberals clumsily started making noises to the effect that they would require these parish churches to produce funds that could be used for the capital development of new secondary industries, and so forth. There was a very sharp negative reaction on the part of the Catholics. “We may be in favor of some of your ideas, but don’t you touch our money.” That was not understood by very many people, but if you understood the banking system, it became quite clear. The Quebec Catholics jealously guarded the parish banks. That was for the mortgages. That was where you could borrow money to start small businesses and to send the kids to college. Not that they were against building steel mills, but not with that money.

Another thing that might be of interest: the visa business. In summer months I did non-immigrant visas and that was the largest part of the Consulate General’s business. Canadians don’t need visas to visit the United States, but so-called “new Canadians” do, those immigrants to Canada who are not yet Canadian citizens, but are awaiting their time. In 1956 Canada was very open, and I think admirably so, in taking in Hungarian refugees after the Hungarian revolution came acropper at that time. There were a lot of new Canadians who had stateless papers but they were of Hungarian origin. There had been a practice in Austrian refugee camps, to which many Hungarians had fled, of moving people through and letting them go off to Canada much more expeditiously if they came across with information about the Communist regime in Hungary - in other words, if they would snitch on somebody. So, there was a lot of finger pointing, which the new Canadians from Hungary thought was rather good-natured. One way to grease the skids to get your exit out of Austria was to point out somebody and say, “He was a Communist.” So, on the Canadian and U.S. records, there were a whole lot of these former Hungarian workers who had been tagged as having been members of a Communist union. The U.S. law said that if you had to belong nominally to an organization in order to have a livelihood, that was excusable. But some of the finger pointing had been a little bit too vigorous. We had a number of problems where the name searches would come up with somebody saying that this guy was a shop steward and a dedicated Communist Party member. It became fairly apparent after a while that there was a pattern to this. You could get, as I did one time, a substantive group of people from the same shop in a helicopter factory outside of Budapest, and I got the whole story as to how they pretty much went en masse across the border, went into camp, and agreed that in round-robin fashion “I’m going to point at him and he’s going to point at him and so forth, and we’ll all get out.” There was a whole lot of testimony in which they revealed this. I think that was of interest and helped ease up some of the blackballing.

Q: Were these non-immigrant Hungarians true visitors or were they going to the United States and staying there?

LEDOGAR: Oh, no, they were true visitors. They wouldn't even come to the visa officers' attention before they had been very effectively screened. We had requirements that people had to produce bank books and job letters and mortgages and other things that made it quite clear that they were coming back home to Canada. The visas were mostly for skiing in Vermont or shopping in northern New York. We had no problems with people jumping or overstaying. We were dealing with people who very clearly were putting in their time to become Canadian citizens and were gainfully employed in Canada, and that's where their families settled and were making their homes.

Q: What was the impression that you were getting from your social contacts about what one might describe as the Kennedy phenomenon? He was elected at the end of 1960. The Canadians pay a lot of attention to American politics. Did he catch on in Quebec, too?

LEDOGAR: Very much so. That was also my experience in Italy, where I spent the period up to and including his death. President Kennedy was much more popular in Canada and in Italy than he was in the U.S. and was regarded with an adulation that I didn't find to be the case in the U.S., where his legislative record was not terribly sterling. He had a number of difficulties in terms of solid accomplishments and was a whole lot less successful at home than he was popular in these foreign countries.

Q: That's true. It's often forgotten that he won by a very narrow margin.

LEDOGAR: It wasn't decided until the next morning.

Q: This weighed very heavily. He was not that adventurous until circumstances forced it on him.

You left Canada in '62 and went to Italy.

LEDOGAR: Via Italian language training at FSI. Again, this was a period of time before the rotational training of junior officers was institutionalized. I was still was trying to get a variety of experiences, so I applied for an administrative job at a European post at the largest post where I would be in charge of the administrative section, with language training en route. So, that in effect meant someplace in Germany or Italy. I went to Milan.

Q: You were there from when to when?

LEDOGAR: '62-'64. I was the administrative officer of the U.S. Consulate General.

Q: Who was the consul general?

LEDOGAR: Earl T. Crain.

Q: How was he?

LEDOGAR: He was an old-school character who motivated his people with fear.

Q: He inspected me in Saudi Arabia a little earlier on, '59 or so. I didn't warm to him at all.

LEDOGAR: No. It was hard to warm to him. He was a very decent, conscientious fellow, but he had a forbidding exterior.

Q: He later was consul general for a long time in Paris.

LEDOGAR: Yes. That was just before he took over in Milan.

Q: What was your impression of Italy in this '62-'64 period?

LEDOGAR: Of course, that was the period where the prosperity in northern Italy suddenly burst forth and it became almost a joke about how suddenly the Milanese were superconsumers and conspicuous spenders. There was a lot of money floating around. Of course, the prosperity divisions between northern and southern Italy were very vivid. Milan was extremely vital and even exciting at that time. It was also quite smog-ridden and polluted. I don't know how it is today, but that was rather shocking. As an administrative officer, I didn't have the opportunity to get involved much in the economic and political questions.

Q: What were your major concerns in the administrative job?

LEDOGAR: The biggest surprise was my own naivete. I thought that if I took a publication called the "Foreign Service List" and looked up a post and it said there were 14 officers, I figured I was going to be administering 14 officers. I got there and found that I had well over a hundred personnel folders. Of course, I knew there had to be FSNs (Foreign Service Nationals, or local employees), but I didn't realize that I also had the U.S. Information Service [USIS] in Milan and all of their locals. But it didn't stop there by a long shot. All throughout the consular district, there were little pockets of American civilians, all of whom were administered by the nearest State Department administrative officer, namely me. I had a couple of people way up in the northern part near the lake district who were at a U.S. Air Force quality insurance inspection station because some Italian contractor was overhauling U.S. Air Force airplanes… At the railroad station in Milan there was a military non-commissioned officer who was stationed there to move U.S. service personnel from one train to another. At one point, a guy came in and said, "I understand I report to you for rations and quarters." I said, "What agency do you work for?" He said, "Tennessee Valley Authority." Sure enough, when I looked it up, when TVA has people assigned abroad, they are administered by the State Department. Here was a guy who was sent over to be a resident quality inspector at a pipe factory in Lecco and he was there for a couple of years. This was somebody else I had to… If he was going to hire an Italian secretary, I had to administer the secretary, and so on. It turned

out to be a whole lot more personnel work than I had originally expected. On the other hand, we were not a fiscal servicing post. Most of the money stuff was done in Rome. So that aspect of administrative work was mostly taken care of by the Embassy.

Q: Who was the ambassador during this period?

LEDOGAR: For most of the time, it was Frederick Reinhart.

Q: From your point of view, was the embassy far away?

LEDOGAR: I thought support was quite good and timely for all of our vouchers and payrolls. Anything having to do with money was bounced off the Embassy. That was quite smooth. The Ambassador came up to Milan a number of times usually for big events like grand gala openings at La Scala, things where the upper level establishment of the province were involved. The biggest thing that occurred there that was directly in my area was the establishment of a U.S. Trade Center. In the early '60s President Kennedy became quite concerned over the U.S. balance of payment deficit. We had a big exercise known as BALPA [Balance of Payment]. This included all sorts of things. For example, USG (United States Government) personnel overseas could no longer buy foreign cars and have them shipped to the next post.

Another of the things was a program to establish U.S. trade centers in a number of commercially important cities around the world and Milan was selected for one of them. As resident U.S. administrative officer, I had the job of working with the U.S. Department of Commerce to identify the place, sign the lease, and get the contractor started to modify the space. Then some officers came from the Department of Commerce, but you had to get staff and transportation and all the things necessary to put another U.S. establishment in that city. That took quite a bit of attention and was very interesting. It was very satisfying to see the first U.S. trade show being put on at the new U.S. Trade Center. That all occurred while I was there. But as far as getting into provincial or even national politics, I really was not involved.

Q: Did you have any problems with all these scattered people all over the place? Were they behaving?

LEDOGAR: Pretty much. I don't remember difficulties. One problem we had was that people in the Trade Center, especially if they had been working on a temporary basis while we were getting it set up, really resisted the requirement that their staff personnel had to be integrated into the State Department staff system. They couldn't quite understand why dependents of American business people, who in many cases were more skilled and less expensive, couldn't be used if they were available. You had to explain to those folks - and it was a lesson I had to first learn myself - that in order to run a Foreign Service secretarial corps, there had to be worldwide assignability. You couldn't use up all the attractive positions in attractive cities in Europe with resident Americans so that when some gal who had labored away in Bangui came up for reassignment she found there was no place in Europe because all the positions were occupied. You had to keep a circular

flow worldwide. That was understandable in theory, but was not terribly persuasive to an American official of the Department of Commerce who wanted to get his reports out immediately in English. So, we had some problems with that.

We also had a very interesting experience in my time that had a very heavy administrative angle to it. In summer of '63, President Kennedy was on a world tour. It was the same tour where he had gone to Berlin and visited the wall and did the "Ich bin ein Berliner" statement. Then he had gone to other places, including Ireland to visit the land of his ancestors. He was headed toward Rome as the last stop. But as happened to be the case, the College of Cardinals reached a decision and white smoke appeared out of the chimney of the Sistine Chapel. I think it was the first John Paul. The Pope was identified and was to be coronated, and coronation was to occur on the day that the Kennedy party was to arrive in Rome. So, they made a quick change and decided, I think with encouragement from the Italian security officials, to delay 24 hours. So, the decision was to stop in northern Italy in our consular district to visit a place up in Bellaggio, which was a chateau and some property on Lake Como that the Ford Foundation had acquired and was using for scholarly purposes. They decided that that would be a good place for the Kennedy party to take a day off. That meant that suddenly at the U.S. Consulate General in Milan, we were putting on a presidential visit on very short notice. The Milan airfield was quite far away from Bellagio, so you had all of the communications and all of the security and all of the transportation considerations, not to mention the staffing of a presidential visit, except that it was hastily thrown together. There was a lot of administrative responsibility there. But it worked out okay.

Q: Did you have any problems with the Italian unions?

LEDOGAR: No, I don't recall any. Dealing with the police was rather frustrating, but it was a different system that we had to get used to. In 1963 when Kennedy was shot, one of the administrative problems we had was dealing with the outpouring of spontaneous and very emotional reaction of the Italian people. The response to the invitation to come sign the book at the Consulate General was so great that there were lines around the block. We were up on the ninth floor of a skyscraper. The elevator was becoming so overloaded with pulling up one heavy load of mourners after another that we had to kind of shut things down for a while and then pace the elevator. It was astounding. People were weeping. It was a little bit surprising for those of us who were reading about politics in the United States, where Kennedy was not regarded as quite so god-like.

Q: Kennedy wasn't that popular at home. I was in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, at the time. We had the same thing there. It was a generational thing.

LEDOGAR: I think that's so. He appealed to the younger people. He was a younger president. He had a lot of glamour.

Q: In 1964, where did you go?

LEDOGAR: I was coming towards the end of my assignment and feeling I'd probably be

sent back to the United States for a Washington tour, when suddenly I and a few dozen other Foreign Service officers, of grades FSO-7, 6, and 5, who were bachelors, who had served at least one tour abroad, who spoke French, got a cable saying that we had been assigned to the Agency for International Development [AID] and were to proceed to Washington for 10 months of training followed by 20 months in Vietnam in the field development program. The cable wound up with a bureaucratic formulation, the real meaning of which was: "Ambassador or Mr. Consul General, don't waste your energy trying to fight this assignment. The President is behind it. We don't care if the individual is your favorite staff aide, trying to break this assignment isn't going to work." That proved to be the case.

What had happened was that in a conference in Guam, I think, where President Johnson had traveled to the Pacific and met with the U.S. country team from Saigon and some senior South Vietnamese officials and so forth, they decided that what they had to do to prevail in the war was to win the hearts and minds of the rural people. The way to do that, they decided, was to bring all sorts of government goods, services, and programs to the grassroots level. The problem there was that the folks, the U.S. professionals who dealt with foreign aid, worked at the level of the Saigon ministries. You had experts who worked with the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Public Works, but you didn't have anybody who worked at the rural level in all of these disciplines. The President said, "Well, who does?" The response was that if we were thinking of generalists for field work, we would have to tap the Foreign Service. "Get them." The responsibles said, "Well, let's go for officers of class 7, 6, or 5 who are bachelors, who have been abroad before, who have some French, and get them into training." Some of the anointed ones were sent out immediately to Vietnam. The bulk of us went to Vietnamese language training and some other field training courses. So in 1964 I was very quickly out of Italy and sent to Washington once more, and to FSI, this time studying Vietnamese.

Q: How did you find Vietnamese?

LEDOGAR: It was rather easy to get to a primitive level of capability, provided you could hear the tones and you weren't tone deaf and you didn't gag too much on the total lack of cognates, but from there it got to be extremely difficult to go beyond that. They had a fairly good language training program thrown together rapidly. But two things that hurt me were that they taught a dialect which was not the dialect of the province I was eventually assigned to. They taught essentially the southern dialect, overlooking the fact that the northern five provinces of South Vietnam were in the old area of Annam where they had a different dialect. I was assigned to one of those. Also, they were still in the period in the FSI School of Languages in which they believed learning a foreign tongue was all an exercise in hearing, imitating, and twisting your tongue the way a baby learned. They wouldn't let you really write things out. I think that was a mistake. Yes, there was a good emphasis on the athletic tongue and sound training. But eventually you have to recognize that to be literate in a language you've got to write. There was quite a diversity within our group of about 20 in the ability to move forward in the language. Some really took to it remarkably well. Others just couldn't handle it at all.

Q: How many of you were in this group?

LEDOGAR: I was in the first group of FSO officers. I think that we were probably 15 FSOs, of whom five were sent out immediately without any training. Then 10 of us and 10 other guys recruited directly from other disciplines by AID formed a class of 20, and that was the first group in training. We were followed up by other classes, but it was not long before the authorities decided that being an AID provincial representative was a bigger job than junior officers were natural for. If nothing else, senior AID representatives need to have a rank equivalent to the senior U.S. military people in the provinces. So they decided they wanted to go for FSO-3s and 4s, rather than 5s, 6s, and 7s. So, this corvée of junior officer bachelors dried up after about the third or fourth class, and then they started getting these more senior folks who were volunteers or who were brought in mostly from other civilian disciplines. That caused a great deal of difficulty for the more junior members of my group, including for those who thought that after 10 months of intensive training, they were entitled to a little bit of home leave. I knew through some sources that there were only a couple of jobs of full-fledged AID province representative left in the Saigon AID field office. First come, first served. So I forewent leave and got out there very quickly, and I did get my own province. Many of my classmates were somewhat more junior and stopped for 10-14 days of home-leave en route, which they were entitled to do. When they got to Saigon, however, they found out that they were being assigned as number two to some of these civilian recruits that were being brought in at the higher level.

Q: You got out there in '65. You were there from '65 to when?

LEDOGAR: Early '67.

Q: Talk about getting there. You went to Saigon and they looked you over and assigned you?

LEDOGAR: I went to Saigon and reported to USOM [United States Operation Mission], which was the name for the AID field office. I was told to take the next plane and go to Quang Tri Province, which was the northernmost province in South Vietnam and included the southern half of the DMZ (De-Militarized Zone). It was rather quiet at that time. I went up there. Later on, a few weeks later, a classmate was assigned as my deputy. Most of the others in my group of FSOs were sent out as deputy province representatives.

Q: Were you in Quang Tri the whole time?

LEDOGAR: I was in Quang Tri for about a year, during which time the security situation deteriorated rapidly. But, just about the time that things were getting extremely bad in terms of security, I was pulled down to Saigon to participate in a special interagency study. It was called the Revolutionary Development Joint Task Force. The idea was to take a close up look at roles and missions and to try to recommend clear distinctions as to

which agency would perform which mission. There was quite a bit of overlap among U.S. field agencies, and friction between programs. Who was to advise the Vietnamese on pacification, on psychological warfare, on public works, etc.?

Q: Let's go to Quang Tri. Could you describe Quang Tri at that time? It was right on the DMZ. Quang Tri City is the only city there.

LEDOGAR: It's about the only city, but another important feature is that about halfway north on Route 1 between Quang Tri City, the capital, and the southern half of the De-Militarized Zone, was a town called Dong Ha. It was there that one of the major national roads, Indochina Route 9, went off to the west. It went into Laos and then it turned directly south. Actually, that was a shorter way to get to Saigon from Quang Tri, because South Vietnam is shaped like a banana or a bow (convex to the east). If you went over at the very northern part of Quang Tri and took this Route 9 down south, it was like a western string to the bow and it was quicker and fewer kilometers to get to Saigon.

But on the way up into the mountains on Route 9, you came to Khe Sanh, which later became quite infamous. That was one of the districts of the Quang Tri province. There were a couple of other districts, two of them on the plains, a couple in the foothills. The whole province was relatively secure at the time I first got there, except that Route 9 had been cut and parts were in the hands of the North Vietnamese or the Viet Cong. So, Khe Sanh was isolated from the capital and accessible only by air. There were several other areas in this province that were kind of rough. The famous "Street Without Joy" was along the ocean in the southern part of the province. That had been made famous by Bernard Fall writing about the French experience in Indochina in the early '50s.

Like most of the provinces, Quang Tri was mountainous in the west and then the foothills and the sandy plains are along the coast. Not a wealthy province. There wasn't much in the way of raw material there. There was coffee and some tea in the mountainous area, some highland rice, mostly lowland rice in the flatlands along the side of Route 1. Mostly Buddhist. Some Catholic. In a way, Quang Tri depended on the city of Hué, which was the capital of the next province to the south. Hué was an old time city where there were universities and cultural attractions and so forth. Quang Tri was very much a backwater.

Q: What was the situation along the DMZ?

LEDOGAR: We still had to respect the demilitarized concept. The friendly half of this DMZ was one of Quang Tri province's districts, so Quang Tri had to have a civilian province chief, unlike every other province in South Vietnam which had military chiefs. There were no military forces in the DMZ, but there were police. They were, maybe, paramilitary. They carried machine guns, not just pistols and clubs. But there was not much population there. Each side of the river which formed the border had a flagpole, and the two flagpoles were getting taller and taller and the flags were getting bigger and bigger. Both North Vietnam and South Vietnam would blare propaganda back and forth at each other across a river with smashed railroad and automobile bridges lying in it. So, there wasn't much purpose in going up there.

Q: You didn't have an American military up there.

LEDOGAR: We had American military advisors to the South Vietnamese (ARVN) units that were stationed there. There were considerable South Vietnamese forces in Quang Tri province. There were three battalions. There was one up beyond Khe Sanh. There was a U.S. Special Forces team that had so-called mercenaries (native Montagnard recruits) at Khe Sanh itself. There were two battalions in closer to Quang Tri. Each district had advisors to the district chief and his district forces, and that would require a small unit of U.S. military advisors.

Q: Was there much concern at that time, the time you were in Quang Tri, about infiltration through the DMZ?

LEDOGAR: The strict answer to your question is, during the time I was there, it went from very little concern to outright North Vietnamese invasion right through the DMZ in that one year. But in the beginning, Quang Tri province was being bypassed by the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which ran down through Laos at that latitude. The North Vietnamese infiltration was further south through Laos and into the so-called Highlands of South Vietnam's II CORPS. That's where the roughest part was prior to 1966. The United States Marines when they arrived in country were assigned to I CORPS or the northern five provinces, and headquartered in Danang. These All-American units were building up during my time, but we still had U.S. Army officers as advisors to the regular South Vietnamese units and also to the district forces.

Q: Before the outright invasion, what was your job?

LEDOGAR: It was to oversee and dispense U.S. development programs and materials in cooperation with the province chief. There was cement. There was roofing. There were pigs and corn. We had medical teams that worked in various places, sometimes setting up shop just to do a series of operations like on hare-lip kids. We had programs in public health, public works, agriculture. We had a couple of guys on my team who ran around helping farmers deal with animal diseases and other kinds of agricultural extension services to… In a sense my job was making sure AID kept our provincial warehouse fully stocked, and then working with the province chief to help empty it out and get stuff out to the various programs. That was a lot of work. But also, you went around as an advisor to him. I traveled a lot with the province chief. As I said, he was a civilian because one of his districts which was in the DMZ had a civilian chief, unlike the rest of South Vietnam. But we always traveled with a military escort. When moving about with an escort I always had a weapon handy, so as not to be an unnecessary burden to the escort if we got into a firefight. My deputy, Richard Brown, myself, and one or two other civilian officials lived in a reasonably nice house on the northern edge of Quang Tri City. We had two bodyguards outside the house at night. I had an M-1 carbine that stayed in my bedroom at night and in my vehicle when my driver was on duty. I also had a Belgian 9 MM handgun that lived in my attaché case.

Q: What was your impression of the province chief?

LEDOGAR: I think he was a moderately competent fellow. He was probably skimming off a little bit at the edges, but I would not call him corrupt, using the criteria of the rest of the country. He was quite conscientious and courageous. Unfortunately, he didn't speak much English.

Q: Was he from the area himself?

LEDOGAR: Yes, he was, but that brings up a phenomenon that was one of the major problems of U.S. experience in Vietnam. Going back into the history of the French experience, after the border was drawn between North Vietnam and South Vietnam and the DMZ was established, there was a period of time when the border was open to whomever wanted to travel north or south. The Catholics, especially the educated Catholics, especially the Frenchified Catholics from the north, came down in hundreds of thousands to the south, recognizing that there was not much future for them with the Communist Viet Minh administration in the North. A small number of Communist cadre were brought from the south to the north for training and to form the nucleus of the guerrilla forces to be reintroduced back to the south. But of the northerners who came down, they were of a higher social class for the most part than the average southern farmer. They had an accent that was quite harsh to the southerners. They had a certain arrogance and sense of superiority. They quickly came into leadership positions. They filled up the army and many of the government positions. So, you had the phenomenon of the battle for the hearts and minds of the Southern refugees and the farmers. The local senior military officers of the ARVN spoke with a harsh northern dialect. They tended to treat farmers like imbeciles. At nighttime, the local Viet Cong guy who had training in the north came into the village and was one of them. He spoke their dialect and was a farm kid himself. So, you had this very difficult circumstance.

Q: Had we reached the point where there was a rather elaborate system of reporting on the American part about the pacification effort in villages and districts?

LEDOGAR: Yes, that was being codified when I got there. It was being abused and that was really scandalous. Our gung-ho leaders in Saigon designed reporting forms where you had to be objective and check boxes. They would read, "How is security in X village? Your choices were "much better," "a little bit better," or "about the same." So there was no box to say "This place has gotten worse" or "This problem has gotten worse." We were coloring maps blue at times, meaning secure for political reasons. This was true especially when American military forces started operating themselves, and not just advising South Vietnamese forces. In a way you had to have a certain amount of understanding. The American forces would mount an operation, go in, clean out some valley, and at the end of the day, they would stand holding the ground, and there would be 100 dead North Vietnamese young men and 10 dead Americans; the U.S. commander, as far as he understood things, had won. He had just won that battle. This was the problem of the entire war. Then the helicopters come and he returns to base. It comes time to write the report and he says, "Color that valley blue. We just pacified it." They

didn't do a damn thing. All they did was go in, have a battle, and kill more folks than they lost. But as soon as they left, the place belonged to the Viet Cong again. That went on over and over again in that province, in the other provinces, and throughout the entire country. We never could understand that we were winning the battles but losing the war. We never could understand that a body count of ten dead Viet Cong to one American killed was perfectly acceptable to the Communist side. Pretty soon, there would be no more Americans. There were a whole lot of mistakes we made of this kind. I stayed with Vietnam for eight years. I saw and heard and participated in and was involved at policy levels and defended our policy in Vietnam for a long period of time. I still haven't resolved my doubts, except I believe our cause was just, but our grasp was faulty.
Q: Did you get any feel about how the central government in Saigon was taking hold down at the district and village level?

LEDOGAR: Yes. It was not doing very well. That became increasingly clear. One of the things that was a constant problem and became a very real crisis in I CORPS was that the radical Buddhist clergy in Saigon started this terrible movement against the central government, and they started exposing corruption and mismanagement. They caused the government entities in the northern provinces to separate from Saigon control. So, we had the circumstance there where we Americans were advising in the CORPS area in the northern provinces, but the folks who we were advising were no longer connected to Saigon. Of course, that meant that their troops were not being paid and all kinds of other problems. We had to deal with the Buddhist clergy. There were all kinds of problems that were involved.

Q: On your part, how did you work with the Buddhist clergy? Were they approachable?

LEDOGAR: They were approachable, but they were a little bit difficult. They had chips on their shoulders and there was a good reason for that. Because of U.S. legislation and the nature of our aid programs, we were prohibited from giving any U.S. aid for religious purposes unless it clearly was consistent with one of our programs and only incidentally attached to a religious institution. The Catholic church - and here the Catholic clergy was very smart - would say, "We want to build a health clinic. Can you help us?" And we were allowed to do that, provided they didn't divert any of the materials to the church. The Buddhists would see them and come in and say, "We want to build a pagoda." We would have to explain to them, "Build a health clinic, I can help you out. Build something that's consistent with something social and we can help you out, but I can't help you build a religious building." They'd say, "See, you favor the Catholics." This went on over and over again. I don't know why we were unable to make this distinction, but we were seen by the Buddhist clergy as favoring the Christians.
Q: With the village and district leaders, did you have any particular control or would you just keep an eye out and say, "Let's try to deal with this or make them a little more aggressive in making programs work?"

LEDOGAR: Well, first of all, I and members of my AID team visited districts as often as we safely could. We tried to work through the American military advisors at district level. For the most part they understood the programs and tried to make them work. Also,

we dispensed material "goodies" through the district teams. I would say that it was a totally engrossing 24 hour a day job. You lived and breathed every aspect of the problem. You had nothing else to do in this rural province. There was essentially nothing else. Furthermore, it was so far away from Saigon that it was difficult to go down there on weekends. I found out that by the time I would get to Saigon on a Saturday, the American AID employees stationed there were running out of the building to go off to Bangkok to be with their families. It was terribly annoying to come in from the field and find out that you were working that weekend and nobody else was. So, it was kind of a "we-they" attitude that developed between the AID people in the field and the headquarters folks.

Back to the field again, a lot of the work that an AID field representative did, if he were wise, was with the resident senior U.S. military advisor. This was the officer usually around lieutenant colonel level who was in charge of the compound where all the U.S. advisors to the local Vietnamese units had their bases and where the advisors would come for a shower and a hot meal at the end of the week. If you were lucky, you had a fellow who would pay attention and who would motivate his district advisors to work with AID programs. But many of our military folks were really not terribly skilled in dealing with the citizenry. They felt they were in a hostile environment and couldn't trust any of these natives. That was a big problem, the inability to distinguish friend from foe. There was not a very high sensitivity about the negative impact that certain military actions can have on the livelihood of farmers. Timber was extremely precious and soldiers would come along and grab major pieces of wood from houses to build bunkers. Well, that's the backbone of the farmer's house. All kinds of things like that. You spent a lot of time trying to influence the American military and help them understand. At the same time, I was in a province that spoke a different dialect than I had been trained in, so I found that my advantage in Vietnamese was not all that great. I spoke French to the province chief, but his French was not famous.

I can recall one time when we AID advisors in the northern five provinces were pulled in by the regional AID director to Danang to meet with a visiting U.S. congressional delegation that included Senator Ted Kennedy and Senator John Tunney of California. We had been briefed to make sure that during the course of this reception, our province chiefs each had a chance to speak privately with each of the Senators. I brought my chief over to see Senator Kennedy, and he with his bad back said, "Come on, let's go over here and sit down." We sat down on the couch. The Senator knew how to use an interpreter. The province chief got all flustered and he couldn't speak French all of a sudden. Kennedy was trying French but he was not doing very well. So, the chief said, "Ledogar here can speak Vietnamese. He'll interpret for me." I panicked. That's a tough job. But Kennedy sat himself in the middle facing the chief there and I was back over here, which is the proper setup. Fortunately, the questions remained general. Kennedy said, "Mr. Province Chief, tell me what your biggest problems are." So, the chief started rattling off a mile a minute and I'd pick up a few words like 'security' or 'refugees.' But, I knew his problems as well as he did. I was his advisor. In fact, I'd try to focus him more intently on some of his problems and less on others. So I let him go on for a while. Then I spilled it all out as though he had said it all. I do remember that the Senator was quite amazed and complimented me after this interview on how well I spoke the language. Well, it was

a sham. I picked up a few words and using clues and my knowledge of the general situation just elaborated.

The war was an all-engrossing situation and one could clearly see things were deteriorating. U.S. troops were moving in. They had not yet come into Quang Tri province. The Marines were assigned to I CORPS by this time, so we were still working with the U.S. military advisors, who were Army. But there were signs that the North Vietnamese, taking advantage of the Buddhist struggle movement, were beginning to infiltrate major units directly across the DMZ. Indeed, shortly after I was pulled down to Saigon, all hell broke loose. They had several big battles around the DMZ between the U.S. Marines and the North Vietnamese.

Q: These were American Marines. While you were there, a place like Khe Sanh and all that, which later in '69 or so became quite a hotspot, was that country up in the hills pretty much Viet Cong/North Vietnamese territory?

LEDOGAR: Not downtown Khe Sanh and not the military base or the airfield. So, we would fly in there - and I did several times - and we could visit the district headquarters and the local units, the regional forces, and the Montagnard units that the U.S. Special Forces team was training and really commanding. But without heavy military escort, you couldn't go very far from that airport. You could not go back down Route 9 to Dong Ha at that time. The first of the U.S. Marine operations which did occur while I was still living in Quang Tri was exactly to try to clear that route. They brought a reinforced battalion to Khe Sanh, flew them in and had them march the road down eastward towards the coast, the old French national route. Of course, they fought their way through and the Communists closed in behind them. That was the first operation in the province by main U.S. forces. It was called "Operation Virginia."

Q: Did we have a fairly elaborate setup along the DMZ to pick up who was coming across?

LEDOGAR: I don't think so, but all I would get was processed intelligence reports. I'm not sure how they were gathered. We had what were called LRRP [long range reconnaissance patrols]. These so-called 'lurps' were made up of mixed U.S. and Vietnamese forces. They would have random places to land and then they would patrol in patterns around those places. They picked up quite a bit of intelligence. Then I didn't know how much was being gotten by signal intelligence nor how much was being gotten by other sources. But I think that it became quite clear that main force North Vietnamese units were moving into the province through the DMZ. That became very vivid when, shortly after I was pulled down to Saigon, there were great big battles that occurred between the U.S. Marines right there in Northern Quang Tri province. We called them "Operation Hastings" and "Operation Prairie." Clearly, the North Vietnamese were coming right through the DMZ.

Q: By the time you left Quang Tri after about a year, I take it you were not very optimistic about how the government rule and pacification was taking place?

LEDOGAR: No, I saw a year-long downward trend throughout the area. On the other hand, U.S. forces were just beginning to be engaged, and we were seeking main force contact in order to try to get away from this guerrilla hit and run sort of stuff where we were not doing very well. One of the metaphors I used at that time was that it was like a master surgeon was advising a local surgeon, but the patient on the operating table was getting worse and was going to die. Maybe the advisor ought to take the scalpel. We were going to have to solve the basic security problem ourselves, and not try simply to advise the South Vietnamese forces.

Q: In '66, when did you come down to Saigon?

LEDOGAR: It was '66. It was approximately June.

Q: You were in Saigon from when to when?

LEDOGAR: For about six months. I still was technically the AID province representative on loan to the Saigon Embassy for this study. It was to be overseen by the Deputy Ambassador who then was Bill Porter. He commissioned an interagency study team that included representatives from each of the U.S. agencies involved in field operations. Where they could, they tried to get someone who was from another agency on loan to the agency that was contributing someone. So, I was a State Department officer on loan to AID, so I came down as the representative of AID on this. There was another guy in our group who was a USIS officer who was on loan to the Embassy. They kind of got people who had more than one discipline, allegiance, or point of view.

Q: What were you looking at?

LEDOGAR: We had a license to hunt that was unlimited. We were looking at the entire effort. We had resources put at our disposition - helicopters and other means of transportation - and a proper introduction that would tell anybody all the way up to a two or three star general that we were people working for the Ambassador and they should answer our questions. We were trying to find out "How do you see your task? What are its limits?" Where there were two organizations - let's say one from USIA (U.S. Information Agency) and one from the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) - who were both trying to run cadre programs, one for information purposes, the other for security programs, we sought to identify how their roles and missions overlapped or left gaps. Was there a good division of labor or could we make a clearer line or could we assign the responsibility to one group and leave the other free to do one of their other assignments? But we were looking not only at the U.S. units but also at the South Vietnamese units. So, were the South Vietnamese rangers so ruthless that they were causing more people to side with the Communists than they were killing Communists? In other words, were they part of the problem, as seemed to be the case? They were a wild bunch who were given to terrible behavior. It was like 16th century mercenary forces who after they had finished the killing would go on looting and rampaging and raping, and they had no connection whatsoever with the people in that area. Some pretty tough recommendations came out of

this. In our group was Daniel Ellsberg, who was then a hawk. He was borrowed from Ed Lansdale, who had a special mission there in pacification in connection with Lansdale's famous work in the Philippines. Ellsberg, of course, later became a famous anti-war dove, and infamous leaker of the "Pentagon Papers."

Q: That's right. One of the problems that everyone who has dealt with the American military, particularly coming out of the non-military side, is that the reports tend to be either quite optimistic or "we can do the job" or "the job is getting done" or of this nature. I think that causes a problem because you tend not to see how the situation actually is on the ground.

LEDOGAR: That's true. Part of it is cultural. It's the "can do" optimism and the "we'll prevail," sort of football spirit that has virtue but sometimes lacks in the sophistication that is going to help you uncover some of your basic problems. We also had a phenomenon that was pernicious in that Robert Komer had established himself as the special assistant to President Johnson for the conduct of the war, and was trying to run everything out of Washington. All reports were directed to the White House. Then Komer was suddenly, after my time in Quang Tri province, sent out to Vietnam to be in charge of the pacification program. He then gathered all reporting lines directly to himself in Saigon, so Washington suddenly was totally cut out. Then we had these new reporting forms where it was impossible to report lack of progress, because you could only comment on how well we were doing. They were called "progress reports." There was no way that you could squeeze in *lack* of progress or deterioration.

There were a number of structural mistakes of that sort that we were making in Vietnam, where we were kidding ourselves. When you look back on it, we never figured out what the other side did with its wounded. The other side prevailed in that conflict and never flew a single combat air sortie. They had some logistical sorties with their helicopters up and down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but in country we never had any combat sorties. Folks who were bombing the north ran into trouble with MIGs, some of which were flown probably by Russians or Chinese. There were an awful lot of mistakes, and yet as I look back on it - and for a number of years after my eight year stint on Vietnam affairs, I kind of blanked it all out and tried to forget the whole thing, figuring nothing was going to be sensible for years to come and just didn't bother reading and analyzing the early books written about the U.S. experience in Vietnam.

Q: In a way, it's helpful to capture now that it's been percolating for some time, but also to capture how we saw it at that time. What was the feeling about the advantages and disadvantages and whither should we go about the introduction of main line American troops into the battle as opposed to trying to beef up the ARVN?

LEDOGAR: I think we were doing this at the same time. The South Vietnamese were very much in favor of working with American main forces because with the U.S. troops came all kinds of support, particularly air support, logistics support, artillery, transportation, and so forth, and all of the communications that were involved with the above. And yet there was a dependency that was developing. I'm not saying I could see

this at the time I was in Quang Tri, but I can't separate it all because I spent so much time focused on this. But a dependency was being built up and also a fear on the part of the South Vietnamese nationalists that the Americans were at some point going to walk away from the war, which we did. That becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy. I could see that even back when I was in province, that many South Vietnamese who would have a natural inclination to be friendly were very leery of being seen too close to the Americans because of the potential consequences if what eventually did happen happened. So, you would get a cold shoulder or some withdrawal if you crossed somebody's threshold. They wanted to make it clear that you were there at your choice and not at their choice.

Then an American civilian in the provinces couldn't help but have very close contact with the U.S. military advisors, who worked hand in glove with their district chiefs. You would hear the advisors' stories and frustrations and how they'd think they would be making progress and all of a sudden they'd have a setback. They thought the South Vietnamese guy they were working for was clean and then they'd discover that he had his hand in the till, or that he was being professional when the Americans were around, but he was being a tyrant and not taking care of his own troops when their backs were turned.

I saw cases where there was torture going on and the U.S. military would let their opposition to torture be known and then would sort of withdraw from the scene, but where could they go? They couldn't travel alone. They had to travel with the military unit they were with. One day I remember flying into a rough area with the province chief. It was a South Vietnamese operation in which they had just caught the Viet Cong district counterpart and the Viet Cong guy was being worked over by his captors, but the American captain and his assistant or first lieutenant were standing over in the corner. They made it clear to me that they had professed to their counterparts their objection to torture, but what could they do? They had to walk out with the South Vietnamese troops later on. Even an ARVN general came in and really lost face because he got so provoked by the obstinacy of this prisoner that he took his general's baton, took a swipe at this guy and broke his stick over his head. There was total frustration. There we were, in a circumstance which encapsulated the whole structure. It was extremely vivid… It was all hanging out.

Just to carry that scene further in order to give you an example of some of the things that we would run into: At the end of the morning which included this torture incident, the province chief and I caught a helicopter back to the province headquarters because the general from Hué was officially visiting us. There was a lunch that the province chief put on for the general and I was there.

Q: We're talking about a Vietnamese general.
LEDOGAR: Yes, the one who had cracked his stick over the captured Viet Cong leader's head. About the time that the dessert came, the general and the province chief were talking about how useless it was to try to extract information from a hard-core Viet Cong, so right there the general ordered the captor's assassination. That was the sort of thing that happened. What can you do? He said, "I want that guy killed." Now, all this was in Vietnamese and I couldn't understand everything, but clearly they were arguing about the

pros and cons of continuing torture. The general said, "He'll never talk. We're never going to get anything sensible out of him."

And yet on another day, we would confront atrocities on the other side. This one day we got a call early in the morning to go into a remote friendly town that had been hit by the Viet Cong in the night. We had to go overland because of the probability that the road was mined, and with a military escort. All of the local popular forces, the good guys, that were unfortunate enough to have been captured had been assassinated. This wild grieving was going on. The Vietnamese have professional grievers that are employed by families to really do the heartwrenching wailing. Just as though we might have singers at a funeral, they have grievers. The bodies were laid out there and… There was one case where the Viet Cong had come into the hooch of a woman who was blind and she had two or three children. But she happened to be the wife of a South Vietnamese policeman. The Viet Cong just sprayed the whole room with machine gun fire, killing the children, because she was married to somebody on the other side. She was wounded, but she was going around blind trying to find out what had happened to her kids. She couldn't see. This was not every day, but there were so many of these heartwrenching experiences that you could not help but be caught up in it all. One impression cascading in on another one.

The local representative of the CIA's overt program, which was called the "Revolutionary Development Cadre Program," a predecessor to CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support), had ways of getting bags of Vietnamese money to support his programs so that he was able to meet the cash payroll for his folks. I had one particularly bad circumstance. Saigon's payrolls were late for the South Vietnamese local military forces. We would have serious defections if we couldn't get some sort of payroll through to some regional forces. This CIA guy loaned me sufficient Vietnamese money to give to the district chief to pay his troops for whatever the pay period was. All I had to give him was a hand receipt. That's the kind of stuff that was going on there. He later was reimbursed. He had "walk-around" money enough to advance the pay of a full company of local forces.

Of course, we were dependent on the CIA's Air America for our air transport because that was the only way to go back and forth from Quang Tri to Danang or to Saigon. That was exciting. You'd get shot at every now and then.

You had sort of a rich life as a field operator. It was not your typical Foreign Service post. I had a good friend, an FSO and former language school classmate who was assigned at that time to a more peaceful province in the South. He came up to Quang Tri and visited me and my deputy and spent a day with us. That happened to be a day where all hell broke loose. AID managed to get me an airplane for the day so that my team and I could visit an outlying district. We ran into a roadblock on the way to the airport. Then we got into an airplane that flew into bad weather and nearly crashed into a mountain. We landed in Khe Sanh, did our business, started back, and then got lost because of the bad weather. We had to divert to Danang. But we had with us everybody in the Quang Tri U.S. province team. We even had our doctors with us. It was not very often we had a plane to get up to Khe Sanh. So, I had to get them all back to Quang Tri province from

Danang, and that meant borrowing the regional bus and driving back, which was a sporting course, especially since it was toward the end of the day. From Danang, we went up over the Pass of the Clouds on Route 1, across the mountains. We actually had an automobile accident on the way, so everything was thrown in. This was the road from Danang up to Hué. We got shot at south of Hué, but no one was hurt. We got into Hué, and by this time it was too late to go all the way to Quang Tri, so we had to spend the night in the city. My visitor and I were invited to the residence of the U.S. consul in Hué. I remember being served a martini there by a white gloved waiter. Here was this absurd thing. We were being shot at and nearly crashing into a mountain and all sorts of difficulties during the course of the day but by cocktail time, we were back with good old Mother State Department in a decent residence. My friend from further on South got the impression that we in Quang Tri lived that way every day.

Q: Who was that?

LEDOGAR: Desaix Anderson.

Q: Who was the consul in Hué at the time?

LEDOGAR: I think it was Sam Thomsen.

Q: After you finished this study of about four months, what happened to it? What were you all pushing towards?

LEDOGAR: I was pushing to get back to my province, where the reports were very bad, because by that time major contact had developed between the U.S. Marines and the North Vietnamese, who were coming straight across the border. This was important, heavy main force combat and not guerilla warfare in any way. But the U.S. authorities started a move, of which our study was one of the first steps, to unify all of the U.S. civilian operations that had to do with field operations. In the meantime, the U.S. military command in Vietnam, like any big headquarters operation was divided into departments - the J-1, J-2, J-3, etc. J-33 (the field support and sub-section of J-3) - was renamed Revolutionary Development Support [RDS]. That was the then current euphemism for pacification. On the civilian side, we were working towards the unification of civilian operations, so that the overt CIA cadre operation, the USIA field operation, the AID operation, and a couple of others would be brought together - even the psychological warfare units of the U.S. Army or the U.S. military would be spun off to USIA and all would be brought together into what was to be termed the Office of Civil Operations (OCO). I was offered a good job in OCO as part of a package that would have had me sign on for another two years in Vietnam. The answer to the question is that I was not released to go back to Quang Tri province and my former assignment. In fact, they started to look for my replacement there. I did go out, pack up, and said goodbye, but by this time I had become one of the guys in a large residence in Saigon working towards the establishment of OCO. But before the OCO really got established, the authorities decided to take integration one step further: to unify all U.S. pacification efforts in Vietnam.

The CO of OCO and the RDS of the military side were merged and became CORDS, which is bringing together all the civilian and military programs that had to do with the pacification program. This was all under Robert Komer, who was brought from the White House out into the field. Later, it was Colby, later director of the CIA, who was the head of the CORDS program. The advisors in the field were to be unified and instead of having an AID advisor and a MACV (Military Assistance Command Vietnam) advisor, there would be a CORDS advisor that could be either a military or civilian officer. Staff would be integrated. So, I was working on that and some other issues in Saigon at our headquarters and then I was sent to CINCPAC (Commander in Chief, Pacific Command) headquarters in Hawaii for a week-long RDS conference. By this time, it was December 1966. At that time, two things happened. One was a young lady whom I had known and gotten very serious about came out to Honolulu from New York and we met and hit it off again. Then I had a little bit of annual leave coming and we flew back to New York together. I arrived a few hours after my father had died suddenly. That was a bit of a jolt. Since he was in the private practice of law and I was, at least on paper, a lawyer, I thought I could be of use in settling his affairs. The combination of these two events led me to answer the offer of a promotion in Saigon that, thanks very much, but I was just not inclined to re-up. So, I went back out to Saigon and finished up my regular tour there and collected my stuff. I took advantage of a USIA invitation to go the rest of the way around the world and stopped in Milan, Italy, where I had been posted before and could speak to the Vietnam situation in Italian. That and a couple of other public affairs assignments enabled me to go back to New York westward out of Saigon.

Q: What was the reaction you were getting in Milan and elsewhere where you were talking about this? Had it reached the point where people were anti what we were doing or was there still a question?

LEDOGAR: Mostly still questioning at that time. But our allies were beginning to become quite alarmed. I really left Vietnam quite early in ’67. Of my original twenty month assignment, I spent only a little more than a year operational as an AID province representative in peace. Then about three or four months was in this “how to win the war” special commission. And then I had a bunch of odd jobs around Saigon and headquarters. By February or March of 1967 I was back in Washington.

Q: Where did you go in early ’67? Did you get married?

LEDOGAR: I did in mid-’67.

Q: What is the background of your wife?

LEDOGAR: She is an American, a professional actress. Her stage name is Marcie Hubert. Her father was a French-Canadian who later became American. Marcie is from Connecticut. She has three sisters. I think she and I met in New York first… We came close to getting married before I went to Vietnam, but decided that wasn’t a very good idea. But we stayed in close touch and got married soon after I got back.

After my posting with AID in Vietnam I was assigned by the Department to be a State Department representative in the Pentagon's National Military Command Center [NMCC]. At that time, the Department kept manned, 24 hours a day, a desk for a mid-level State Department representative in the NMCC, always ready to give political advice if called upon. This was a rotational watch. It was a curious job. The Department of Defense in reciprocation had a field-grade military officer on 24 hour watch at that time in the State Department command center, always ready to give military advice. But with a war raging, the State Department needed more military advice than the Pentagon needed political advice. What we State reps at NMCC wound up doing was really supporting the military guy in the State Department. He needed to have someone to gather potentially politically sensitive military information and material and we would pouch it over to him every couple of hours; he was the one who would interpret regularly, or on demand, the military developments of the war for the Secretary of State. So, we were not doing an awful lot to directly support the military authorities but rather helping the State Department through the military rep. I learned quite a bit about how the U.S. military operates, but it was not a terribly challenging or satisfying assignment.

Q: Did you get any feel for the military attitude from the Pentagon towards the Vietnam War?

LEDOGAR: Oh, yes. That became quite clear. What everybody has sensed and written about was the frustration with the hobbles and the restrictions that were imposed by the Congress, the White House, and other civilian authorities on the conduct of the war. You could just feel the frustration and resentment that the problem was not being turned over to professionals who could use their own judgement as to how to prevail. That was especially clear in the selection of bombing targets and was exacerbated by the fact that we were losing aircraft and pilots in powder puff, militarily ineffective attacks on insignificant targets, and yet were not permitted to hit strategically important targets or ones close to centers of power lest there be a possibility of hitting many civilians or a Russian or a Chinese ship in Haiphong Harbor. That was quite clear. At the same time, I witnessed the Pentagon's frustration with the fact that the U.S. military authorities in country did not seem to succeed in locating and closing with enemy main forces in a decisive fashion. There was a Pentagon frustration at the inability to come to grips with the problem. Of course, that's where the North Vietnamese leadership was brilliant. They would strike and melt away. They would cause significant U.S. casualties and there was no significant outcome otherwise.

Q: You were doing this from '67 to when?

LEDOGAR: I only did NMCC for about six months in '67, from roughly March to October. I was married while I was in this job. I can't remember exactly how much longer after that, but I was then suddenly yanked out, which seemed to be my fate at the time, to help in a special new unit that was being created in the Department's Bureau of East Asian Affairs. It was called the Office of Vietnam Information. We were a group of Foreign Service officers who had the responsibility of essentially following the U.S. congressional debate on Vietnam. We looked for misinformation and knowledge gaps,

and tried to identify Congressmen we thought ought to know more about the subject than they apparently did. We would then offer information to them in the form of briefings or in some cases draft whole speeches. Also, we would support friendly Senators and Congressmen who were well disposed to U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia with information and articulation. That included knocking down arguments that we regarded as fallacious or ill-founded, or not well-reasoned, and so forth. A very touchy operation!

Q: In a way, government departments aren't supposed to lobby Congress.

LEDOGAR: Right, but we were doing it. Our product was not often transmitted directly. It was sent to the White House where the White House congressional liaison folks would flog it to the legislators involved. It was quite clear that at times there were quids pro quo in terms of things that were of interest to the particular Congressman; so much so that after a number of months of this activity, the office of Vietnam information was probably the only group in the history of U.S. bureaucracy that ever recommended its own demise. My colleagues and I could see the handwriting on the wall and the beginning of Congressional resentment. People were starting to say, "Hey, wait a minute. What's going on here? We were just informing ourselves about the legislation!" Then we got counterpressure through the White House from the Senate to say "Get out of here." We were disbanded. There were only about five of us. But that curious activity took up the rest of '67, and into January of 1968.

In '68, I was assigned to the Vietnam Desk. At that time, it was headed by John Burke. Phil Habib was the Deputy Assistant Secretary to whom we reported. Bill Bundy was the Assistant Secretary. The desk was called the Vietnam Working Group then.

Q: You did this in early '68.

LEDOGAR: In fact, almost all of '68.

Q: '68 was an interesting time. You got in on it just in time, didn't you?

LEDOGAR: I got in on it just in time for a politically pivotal year, mind you. I was then still fairly recent with experience in-country. Less than a year after a wide-ranging 20 month tour in Vietnam, I was assigned in the Vietnam Working Group to the pacification desk. When the Tet offensive occurred in late January or early February '68, General Wheeler, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was assigned by the president to go out and assess what happened. Two places on his aircraft were given to the State Department. I was identified by Phil Habib as his spear carrier. I went out on what became an historical mission. We flew out on February 23rd after the Tet offensive, which we had watched, as the rest of the world did, on television, including the Viet Cong attack on the U.S. Embassy. Since I was in the Working Group, I was on the task force that was set up in the Operations Center all during that night as the Tet experience was developing, so we were fairly close to what was going on.

Habib took me along on the Wheeler trip, I believe, because I had recent experience in-

country and it was a broad experience. It was not just one province. I had traveled the entire country in this roving roles and missions study.

So, we went out to Vietnam on this VIP plane, on which the general had 12 military staff plus a doctor. Phil and I were the only two civilians on the plane. I didn't have very much to do on the way out. But Phil had said to me that as soon as we landed - and we were on a high priority mission - he wanted me to get out of Saigon, go out to the field, and go see as many of my old buddies all around the country so that I could and find out from them what happened. He would take Saigon, where he had been political counselor, and work with the leadership. I had a helicopter at my disposal. That's what I did. I choppered around, two days up north and one down south in the delta. Actually, each night, we came back to overnight in Saigon, but I went to perhaps fifteen different provinces. I couldn't get into Hué because the battle was still going on there. But I had a lot of buddies who were still in the Delta. I went to Ben Tre, where it had been claimed "we had to destroy the city in order to save it," and all of that stuff. Of course that turned out to be a reporter's phrase, not that of a U.S. army major. I really learned what I could through the observations of people whose judgement I respected. They were for the most part Foreign Service officers who were still in-country. Most of the U.S. military I had known had rotated out.

The situation around Saigon was still so tenuous that after our chores in the country we all had to make our way out of Saigon by small aircraft to Bangkok, and that's where the big plane waited for General Wheeler and the rest of us to gather. We went back to Washington via Hawaii. We had another civilian on the way home, Bob Komer, the U.S. pacification czar, who was pretty exhausted and dismayed at the really unexpected blow that had been inflicted on the U.S. and South Vietnamese by the Tet offensive.

Curiously, official U.S. military judgement about the Tet offensive was not too far wrong: in military terms, the Tet offensive was a success for South Vietnam. An enormous number of Viet Cong cadre were killed. They surfaced and came running out saying, "You're liberated" and they would get stoned or clubbed to death by the citizenry. They were not as popular as they thought they were. They sacrificed a huge number of South Vietnamese indigenous Communist cadre and guerrillas in this effort to strike everywhere at the same time. But unfortunately the damage had been done by some very low level Viet Cong actions with very high visibility. U.S. television network cameras were focusing from the outside watching the U.S. Embassy being attacked over the shoulders of the attackers. The impression was that these guys were in the ascendancy everywhere.

Q: As it turned out, they didn't even get in to the Embassy. I have an interview with Allen Wendt, who was inside.

LEDOGAR: As a matter of fact, Phil Habib came into the State Department Operations Center the night of the Tet offensive and said, "Has anybody telephoned the Embassy?" We were standing around and saying, "Good heavens, we never thought of that." "Well, get them on the line." We got the duty officer Allen Wendt, who incidentally had been

the officer on assignment in 1964 to the State Department Office of Personnel, who had been put in charge of selecting the original State Department guys who were sent to AID. I just met Allen yesterday and some of these memories flooded back. I can remember Phil on the phone that night saying, "What's going on? Get down! Keep your head down! Put your head under the desk! What's going on? Look around! Get your head down!"

Q: As a matter of fact, Wendt was saying that he had very good communication with Washington but he couldn't get anybody from Tan Sanh Hut to come out. They were all busy, except the military police who were able to keep the Vietnamese sapper unit - they killed the leader - and they were rather ineffective.

LEDOGAR: Well, the guy who was in charge of that Roles and Mission study group I had participated in, George Jacobson, shot the last Viet Cong sapper. Jake lived in a residence that was right next to the embassy compound. There was the famous picture of one of the MPs (military police) lofting a-

Q: 45.

LEDOGAR: Yes, that's right, a 45 Caliber automatic pistol from the Embassy lawn up to Jake on a balcony. It was dawn. The MPs had driven the last Viet Cong into the ground floor of Jake's residence and were using tear gas to flush him out. When we were traveling around the country, Jake, for his personal security, carried only one thing and that was a hand grenade. That was in his attaché case. The rest of us all had sidearms, some kind of weapon. But Jake, a retired army colonel, thought a hand grenade was all he'd have a chance to use. So he was caught in his own bedroom with only his hand grenade and by this time it's dawn. The last of the sappers came over the fence and into his residence and was downstairs. The MPs threw tear gas in. They were flushing the Viet Cong upstairs, so Jake quickly ran to the balcony and he got one of the U.S. MPs to loft up a 45 pistol. Jake got it, went into the corner of the bedroom, and sat there. The guy came in with teargas in his eyes and squeezed off a couple of rounds that went in the wrong direction and Jake shot him. That's his account.

Q: I remember seeing on TV the pistol being tossed up to him.

LEDOGAR: Yes. That was a minor squad-size Viet Cong action and yet it shocked the world. A couple of weeks later here we are in the airplane coming back to Washington and two things are happening. The more colorful way I can tell it is that I was busy with the colonels and the doctor in the front of the VIP cabin, and the bigshots were in the back talking among themselves or playing poker on this long flight back to Hawaii. I wrote out a handwritten report to Phil. Then I didn't have much more to do. I could only give him so much that would be of use at that time at that high level. I told him what I had heard and what I had concluded about what went on in the countryside. I didn't have a chance to talk to him because he was involved with the generals and Bob Komer the whole way back. When we got to Pearl Harbor, the FSO who was the political advisor there met us and drove Phil and me to the BOQ. Phil said to me, "What are you hearing up front there?" I said, "I don't know. They haven't shown me any papers, but I gather

that they're asking for a substantial influx of additional U.S. troops." "What do you mean by substantial?" I said, "I gather they're talking about two and a half divisions." "How many do you think that is?" I said, "Well, if they're heavy divisions, that probably could be as many as 60,000." Then he turned to me and said, "206,000 troops because they're not divisions. They're division slices. The U.S. Army is created in a pyramid like this. You've got so many divisions down on the bottom and when you take a division, you take a slice of all the support that goes with it. So, that's 206,000 and that's going to be the headline in the *New York Times* 24 hours after we get back. "Mark my word." I said, "Phil, that's impossible. There are 16 of us on this airplane. It seems to me that the cover of anybody who leaked that would be blown immediately."

Of course, Phil was absolutely right. We got back to Washington on February 28th. It was the headline in the *New York Times* a day after: "Westmoreland asks for 206,000 more troops to put this victory over the top." That's what occurred. It was one of the things in my judgement that caused an additional loss of support and credibility for the U.S. war effort. Even though Tet was technically a military victory, that was not the time to ask for… We had 545,500 authorized U.S. forces in Vietnam at the time. The requested increment would have been in effect an increase by 40%. It would have meant calling out the reserves and going to Congress for supplemental funds.

Q: Yes. What were you getting from your colleagues that you were visiting?

LEDOGAR: It varied in each case, but it was a substantiation of the fact that the Viet Cong came out of the woods and to a large extent got mowed down. But they did a hell of a lot of damage. In many cases, there was a lot of damage caused by the friendly forces who were trying to deal with them. Now, incidentally, in the province where it was alleged that an American major had said "We had to destroy the town to save it," senior U.S. military said hey had interviewed every single American major who had been anywhere near that province. U.S. authorities convinced themselves that no one had said that. Later on in a book it was revealed that the journalist who had first reported that slogan confessed: "Well, the alleged major didn't actually say that, but that's the kind of thing the U.S. military was saying." There were an awful lot of those sorts of media developments that helped to expand the gulf between the U.S. officials and the public.

At any rate, we got back to Washington and within a matter of hours, it was all over the public domain exactly what Westmoreland was asking for. The reaction to that was explosive.

Q: Why don't we stop at this point? We'll pick this up the next time. You're back from the Wheeler mission.

***

Today is March 2, 2000. Steve, you wanted to give me the dates of the Wheeler mission.

LEDOGAR: Yes. I have a note here saying that it was February 23 outbound and

returning on the 28th of February. This was 1968 immediately following the Tet offensive.

Q: You mentioned how Habib had told you that they were talking about additional Division Slices. Did this make any sense for you? What was the plan?

LEDOGAR: To the extent that I understood it, the plan was to try to conventionalize the war. If, as seemed to be the indication, the Viet Cong - the indigenous southern Communist military structure - had been largely defeated, then it was felt that the Communist side would pursue the war with conventional North Vietnamese forces. Also, there was a considerable urgency to get on with things and not allow the conflict to drag out. But there is a rich and revealing story of the next five weeks, one in which I was not a first-party participant, but I know quite well from being on the fringes and reading a lot of books about that period: how the decision was made not to add additional forces, which incidentally would have required additional appropriations from Congress, the calling out of reserves, and doing a number of other difficult things in an economically strained time. We all know that Johnson was criticized for not putting the country on a war footing to begin with, and for the heavy inflation that followed. Instead, there was a series of deep draft reconsiderations of the U.S. war policy.

For the purpose of this interview, in my understanding it began with the President assembling a group of senior advisors who were called the "Wise Old Men," statesmen-

Q: Acheson, Lidle, Clifford, and so forth.

LEDOGAR: Yes. There were three briefings that were given to this group, one on politics by Phil Habib, one on the military situation by General De Puy, and one on the intelligence situation by a man named George Carver. These were very sobering, very straightforward and honest, classified assessments. There were a lot of details I didn't know or couldn't repeat. Some of this I later became aware of when I was helping to write the Southeast Asia foreign policy portion of the history of the Johnson Administration. In the end, the calculation was made that even if the president gave the Pentagon or the military establishment all that they asked for, all 206,000 troops and other additional resources, there simply was not sufficient time remaining to bring those forces to bear and to seek out and destroy the enemy before the United States would fall apart politically. The briefings, which were very highly classified, were on the internal U.S. social circumstances: on the rate at which support for the war effort was eroding, on how civil disobedience and actual street violence were increasing, and on how the financial curve lines for inflation and social disaffection, and everything else were such that the judgement was that these various trend lines intersected too soon. In other words, the country falls apart in the near term and you hit a crisis before there could conceivably be a military victory.

Q: All I know is that from most of '68 through '70, the country was pretty stable.

LEDOGAR: Yes, because one month after the Wheeler Trip on March 31, 1968,

President Johnson got up and made a speech on Vietnam in which he called for partial cessation of the bombing of the North, peace talks, and incidentally in a final paragraph that was closely guarded until delivered, said "I'm not going to run again for a second term" He was taking himself out. As I said, this was March 31, 1968. Shortly after that first phase, the 'preliminary conversations' phase, of the Paris Peace Talks between just North Vietnam and the United States opened. That was in May of that year.

Q: What were you getting from the people you talked to in Vietnam and were telling Habib? The South Vietnamese army had held up against this attack.

LEDOGAR: First of all, it was evident that there was a lot of destruction. It was also evident that the performance of the South Vietnamese military was spotty. It seemed quite clear that the indigenous Communist cadre, the Viet Cong, had surfaced and suffered substantially, but the North Vietnamese were also running around and there didn't seem to be an awful lot of intestinal fortitude on the part of the South Vietnamese forces, the ARVN, to stand up and fight the northerners, who by this time had come into the country in substantial numbers.

I'm getting ahead of my story and should go back and review 1967. We've gotten into '68 too soon. In 1967, I came back from my tour in Vietnam and went to the National Military Command Center and did the watch officer business. Then I went to the Department's Office of Vietnam Information. We were lobbying Congress and that got to be quite dicey. It was right on the edge of government employees lobbying the Congress. So, I was assigned to the Vietnam Working Group. Then I found myself touring all over the U.S., participating in debates about Vietnam and U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. It was a question of being assigned to do so, but I welcomed it. I was anxious to improve my public speaking and public affairs capabilities. There was a great demand for government defenders of U.S. policy. Everybody was holding a symposium on Vietnam and they wanted to have a spectrum of opinion. Universities, citizen groups, and other sponsors were most anxious to have someone who would come and defend the government's point of view. These programs were financially supported by the organizers. If the State Department sent a speaker, the State Department was reimbursed for transportation and lodging. No honoraria or anything like that was allowed. I did an enormous amount of traveling all over, including Washington State and Florida and almost everywhere in between. I was constantly on the road and very much engaged in debates about the Vietnam War. In many of the forums, I would find that the format was stacked up so that the government position was sort of like the right hand side of the spectrum, and all the critics, the other three speakers, would be various levels more to the left of what was going on, including some people who were calling outright for a Communist victory. It was very heated. I had a firsthand immersion in the debate and an opportunity to sense how whatever support there was for the Vietnam War was crumbling. It was not just reading the inside-the-beltway newspapers that gave me an impression of where the country stood on Vietnam, but being out in the sticks. You recall that protests did reach the point where we had the so-called "Resurrection City" on the Capitol Mall, and had marches across Memorial Bridge, and hundreds of thousands of folks marching on the Pentagon. One thing that was noticeable was that the composition of these

demonstrations became more and more centrist as responsible mainstream citizen groups began to support what was in the beginning mostly radicals and extremists. You had all sorts of organizations and political leaders whom one would consider to be main-stream responsible critics throwing their lot in with the anti-war movement. There was a lot to the judgement that the country was coming apart.

Q: How about you? Were you undergoing any change as you went through this?

LEDOGAR: Well, I would think of it more in terms of sophistication. I always did believe - and still do to the extent I think about it, which isn't very often - that the objective of our Vietnam war policy was an honorable one, and that the essence of the conflict was not an internal struggle between competing factions for the upper hand within one nation, but rather an attempt by North Vietnam to impose its views on South Vietnam through force. That gets into the whole essence of the Vietnam conflict. Later, we'll talk about the argument over the shape of the table in Paris. That's all part of the same thing. Was the conflict essentially a civil war in which outsiders, the United States and others, were helping one side? Or was the essence of the conflict an attempt by North Vietnam to reacquire by force what it had signed away in the 1954 agreement with the French, the Geneva Accords? If it was the latter, then there was quite a legitimate set of reasons for us to try to assist the Republican side and to resist the Marxist side. If you accepted what was pretty well accepted at that time, that there could be consequences in surrounding countries all falling to communism if this one was let go - the domino theory - then you tended to believe the cause was just.

When it comes around to the execution, then I have some very strong criticisms about things we did and did not do. My criticisms were not simply of the sort that "if we knew then what we know now," but also that we should have known better back then. We made a bunch of stupid mistakes militarily, politically, and in public affairs. Exactly where and how we might have corrected the course of action is subject to a whole lot of judgements, and many of them were more sophisticated than those that said "We have no business there. Get out" or worse yet, "I don't give a damn about our forces. We have no business there. Let the other side win." We had all kinds of critics of that sort. So I did not personally go through a transition where I was a supporter of the war and wound up after all of this an opponent. To this day, I remain a supporter of the objective but a critic of the execution, and of how we made some pretty stupid mistakes.

Q: My personal view is on your side, except I wonder whether South Vietnamese society was such - and particularly the political society - that maybe it just was not strong enough to hold no matter what.

LEDOGAR: I think that that probably proved to be the case. In the end, after we signed the peace accords and we continued to give support, the object stated many times by President Johnson and later by President Nixon in particular, was to threaten the North with the Vietnamization program: we would get out but we would get out so slowly and turn over so effectively the responsibilities and the wherewithal to an increasingly competent South Vietnamese regime, including the armed forces, that they would be able

to handle the thing themselves. In other words, the North Vietnamese would not be able to gain their objective through the United States in Paris unless they made compromises. But it didn't work out that way because the structure was not strong enough. Once they saw the rate at which the U.S. was getting out - and Congress made us get out a lot faster than we would have on our own - and saw that we were constrained by Congress to give less aid than would have been necessary, the South Vietnamese felt abandoned and they crumbled. They crumbled big time and rapidly.

Q: Now back to 1968 when you came back from the Wheeler Mission. You had been around the country beforehand. Did you and perhaps Phil Habib know that sending 206,000 people wasn't going to fly in the United States?

LEDOGAR: In the months that followed the return from the Wheeler trip, I think almost everyone in the administration came to that conclusion. That was the conclusion the Wise Men came to. That certainly was the conclusion of the briefings that were given to them, including the one by Phil Habib. That was eventually the President's conclusion, that reinforcement and escalation was not the right direction to go. In fact, the right direction was to begin what was codified by President Nixon within a year, to begin to make a plan for an orderly withdrawal. The rest of 1968, after Johnson dropped his political bombshell and Humphrey became the Democratic candidate and Nixon became the Republican candidate, looking towards November of that year, we still had the debate going on. The Paris Peace Talks were coming together and the negotiation there started, but remember it was at first limited to only two parties - in our view, the two *external* parties. None of the contending South Vietnamese forces were represented.

Q: You came back from the Wheeler trip in late February of '68. What did you do?

LEDOGAR: I went back to my job in the Vietnam Working Group. I also continued spending a lot of time on the road.

Q: Now it's after the Tet offensive. Did you find a change?

LEDOGAR: Yes. The Tet offensive had an enormous emotional and psychological impact in the United States even though the small part the public saw of it was militarily insignificant - a squad of sappers trying to jump over the fence and attack the U.S. Embassy, which was a suicide mission. There were a lot of problems about slanted press reporting, but for many other reasons there was a fundamental lack of public commitment that made any U.S. casualties increasingly regarded as an unreasonable price - "It wasn't our responsibility; we shouldn't be there." Of course for the longest time in the U.S., I think until 1967, we had conscription and were drafting American fellows to go over there and fight in Vietnam. The South Vietnamese did not have a draft. They had an all volunteer force. That was one of the basic mistakes we made, taking over the fighting the way we did.

But, yes, by late 1968 I did continue in my responsibilities, but also I started to look towards my next assignment. I was very anxious at the time to try to repair what I

regarded as a hole in my own background, about never having really studied economics and trade. So, I signed up for the FSI economic training course.

Q: This was the six month course that gave you the equivalent of a bachelor's degree in economics.

LEDOGAR: Exactly, provided you already had at least a Bachelor's degree in something else. I was to have gone in the middle of '68, but I was extended at the Vietnam Desk. Then I finally got my orders to go in January of '69. Indeed, down the hall here (at FSI, Foreign Service Institute) somewhere is a picture of the January 1969 economic training class. I'm in that picture because we had our picture taken on the first day. Before the first week ended, however, I got another one of those foreign service draft notices. I was assigned to quit FSI and immediately go to Paris to the Vietnam Peace Talks Delegation on very short notice.

The so-called Paris Preliminary Conversations took place between May and November of 1968 between the United States and North Vietnam. Ambassadors Harriman and Vance headed the U.S. Delegation. On the North Vietnamese side, Xuan Thuy was in charge. Remember that Nixon was elected in November. The Preliminary Conversations ended just before the election. In effect, the agreement was that in exchange for a total cessation of U.S. bombing of the north, the wider talks would be organized. They would include two additional parties, the Viet Cong on the Communist side and the government of the Republic of Vietnam on the "good guys'" side. But of course Nixon was not going to be inaugurated until January. In that period between November and January, the Paris talks were in a hiatus. We devoted ourselves to working out the procedures for those wider talks before the substantive exchanges began.

Q: Were you involved in that?

LEDOGAR: From the Washington end, but by the end January, I was over there in Paris.
Q: While you were in Washington during the late '68 period, you got involved in the preparation for the talks?

LEDOGAR: Yes. For our original U.S. delegation in Paris members were all pulled from their Washington jobs temporarily. Nobody knew how long the wider Peace Talks were going to take. One of the guys from my office in the State Department had been pulled out and sent over there. Everyone was on loan from his Washington job without families until I went over. By January of 1969 Washington realized that this was not going to be a quick negotiation. It was a real hardship for someone who leaves his family and Washington responsibilities behind to concentrate and stick it out. It was also politically not very wise to have our people shuttling back and forth, rotating. But yes, I was in the State Department office that was backstopping the Peace Talks. I went to Honolulu for another conference on how to win the war and came back and started in the economic training course. Two or three days into it, I got a phone call saying that I was to go to Paris. The purpose was to go over there on a full-time basis to replace the guy, Jim Rosenthal, who was the first choice, but he was too important and was needed back on

the Vietnam Desk. The Vietnam working group used the old bureaucratic trick that when you have a levy and you're required to contribute a person to a particular effort, the one person that you want to volunteer is the one who was transferred out and for whom you've already gotten a replacement. In other words, it was a slot out of the hide of the Foreign Service Institute at that time, not out of the Office of Vietnam Affairs. I went to Paris and was there for almost four years.

Q: You went out in January '69 and were there until early summer of 1972.

LEDOGAR: I should mention, to follow up on some personal notes, that in August of '67, I got married. By that time, I was in the Watch Center at the Pentagon. My wife was working here in Washington at the Arena Stage and at the Center Stage in Baltimore. We did not have children immediately. When in January of '69 we were transferred to Paris, she had to give six weeks notice to break her contract according to the Actor's Equity rules, and she followed me to Paris shortly thereafter and stayed for the duration.

Q: Can you reconstruct your feelings before you went out on how you thought the talks were going to go? Would it take a long time? Were you optimistic, pessimistic? Was this a sellout?

LEDOGAR: I did not feel it was a sellout, but by this time, having had the experience from Washington of dealing with the North Vietnamese during the so-called Preliminary Conversations in 1968, we knew that we were up against some tough characters who were going to play this forum for propaganda. Whether there would be substantive negotiations or not was not yet evident, but people knew that it was going to be hard. No, we certainly didn't consider it a sellout and we did not have any instructions that would suggest that in any way.

My predecessor, Jim Rosenthal, and later myself were sent out there to reinforce the press and public affairs part of the Delegation. The U.S. and world press descended on Paris in enormous numbers. There were thousands of accredited journalists. When I got there in January things were in transition. Cyrus Vance and General George Signius were kind of holdovers from the Johnson era. They stayed for one month to help the Republican-selected Delegation organize. President Nixon assigned Henry Cabot Lodge and Lawrence Walsh as Ambassadors. Since Johnson had Harriman and Vance, Nixon had to have two as well. The large U.S. Delegation to the wider talks included representatives of all concerned agencies. From the State Department, Phil Habib, who had been freed from his Deputy Assistant Secretary job in Washington, was the equivalent of political counselor and was career. There were senior military advisors that began with a series of four star generals. Fred Weyand was the first in 1969, and then Julian Ewell followed. Only later did we replace them with a three star general. The press spokesman of the Delegation in the Preliminary Conversation phase had been appointed from the White House. His name was Bill Jordan. But when the wider conversations began, Jordan's professional deputy, Harold Kaplan, took over as the press spokesman for the new Delegation (Kappy was a USIA career officer who had had a lot of experience as spokesman in Vietnam). Henry Cabot Lodge had a prejudice against press

spokesmanship and public affairs by USIA folks that was borne, he said, of his experience as Ambassador to Vietnam. Whatever it was, he acquired a distaste for career USIS public affairs officers. Lodge felt that they were all really aspiring to a subsequent career in the media, and therefore were too kind and gentle with the press. He had been well served by appointing a Foreign Service officer as Embassy spokesman the first time he was Ambassador in Saigon from 1963-1969. So, Ambassador Lodge had a prejudice in favor of using substantive Foreign Service officers to deal with the press. He thought that someone who really knew the politics could pick up the techniques of dealing with the press. So, Cabot Lodge insisted on an FSO as a deputy to Kaplan. That's how I wound up in the job.

Q: Was Frances Cook there at all?

LEDOGAR: Yes. She arrives soon on the scene.
Q: With Cabot Lodge, one always thinks of Barry Zorthian. Did Cabot Lodge not care for him?

LEDOGAR: I think Barry was the kind of fellow that Cabot Lodge thought might be looking towards a subsequent career.

Q: He became sort of a figure. He wasn't just a spokesperson.

LEDOGAR: Oh, yes. And Kaplan had been Zorthian's deputy in Saigon.

Q: Before we move on to what you were doing, what was the impression you were getting of Cabot Lodge? I've heard stories about him. One was that he was laid back. Two was that he was kind of distant, that he wasn't a hard driver of himself anyway.

LEDOGAR: He certainly was a sort of person that kept himself aloof. I thought he worked diligently. It was evident that he really cared, especially about the plight of prisoners of war and missing in action. We'll get into this business of when Paris became a center for wives of those who were POWs or MIAs trying to find out whether they were wives or widows. But Lodge had some idiosyncracies. He was a very nice person to work for. The curious thing is that shortly after all of this started, Hal Kaplan got an offer to go to work in private industry. I don't know whether he was just tired of the whole business, but he took the offer, retired, and left the press spokesmanship in my hands. I didn't have an awful lot of experience. I had done a lot of speaking around the country fielding questions, but not from professional newsmen. So, I had a baptism by fire.

A U.S. Delegation tradition had been established in the Paris talks that before each meeting - and we had weekly plenaries with the other parties - the Press Spokesman would meet with the Ambassador and give him ideas about what were the topics of the day, what might be on newspeople's minds, and if asked certain questions how he might handle them. Well, it was just the exact opposite. I would go up 20-25 minutes before we left to go to the Hotel Majestic meeting site and I got a tutorial from Lodge in how to handle the press - the wisdom of a real professional. Everything from how and when you

sat for cameras to how to keep your collar from rolling up behind you, how to use cue cards, and various other techniques… It was priceless.

Q: He was a consummate politician.

LEDOGAR: Yes, indeed. I thought since I was working so intimately with him that I ought to read more about him. I read a biography and was astounded at some of his accomplishments. His wife was an absolutely splendid lady. I know that he was criticized as a politician for not working very hard with Nixon the first time around, being too laid back. This was not the same kind of physically exhausting routine that I imagine it was on the campaign trail. Lodge lived in the Hotel Crillon, which was about 50 meters from the front door of our Embassy, where the delegation offices were.

I will say this about Lawrence Walsh. I think that he was a poor choice as Lodge's alter-ego because he was not suited for international diplomacy. He was a federal judge whom I had admired when I was a law student in New York. If I had time while I was in Law School when I was in the federal court neighborhood, I would just drop into his courtroom to see what was going on. He had a splendid career in that. But I don't think diplomacy, especially with Communists, was his forté. He was unhappy. A couple of times when Lodge had to be back in Washington and Walsh took the head of the Delegation role, he got flustered and was getting angry at insults and distortions, and he at times resorted to jargon himself. That didn't go down very well with anyone in that circumstance, getting int o a polemics exchange with trained Communists. I think he soon decided that the Paris Peace Talk game was not for him and he glided away. Washington never did fill that slot. There was no real role for a second ambassador.

As the negotiations went on, it became increasingly clear that the other side was not only not interested in real negotiations, they were only trying to use the forum for propaganda purposes. In terms of their official negotiating position, they insisted on trying to achieve more diplomatically than they would have gained even by total military victory. If they drove all the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces into the sea, they would not gain as much as their negotiating position was requiring. Hanoi was demanding not only the title to South Vietnam and the elimination of all the South Vietnamese forces and the withdrawal of American forces, among other things, but also that this title be guaranteed by the United States and others. Moreover, they insisted on war reparations. So, it was an extraordinary negotiating position that they held onto for a couple of years. But it became increasingly clear that not much was going to happen, so the press corps started to slip away. Visiting media hotshots went home and the portfolio was left to the Paris bureaus of the various media. Our Delegation also adjusted in size accordingly for the long haul.

Q: You had the administrative talks about getting the expanded Paris conference together. Had that taken place?

LEDOGAR: That was just being completed when I arrived in Paris. I had watched most of it from the Washington end. It's very important that historians understand that what was glibly termed as an irresponsible "argument over the shape of the table" was not

quite that bad. The fact was that there was an interregnum between the end of the Johnson era - he had become a lame duck - and the Nixon administration. There had to be a change in the composition of the negotiations, the Preliminary Conversations had to end, and the South Vietnamese delegations (one from each side) needed to arrive. Importantly, agreements were needed on how the wider negotiations were going to be conducted.

I talked before about my analysis as to what the essence of the conflict was. That was not just my own, but everybody's judgement in the U.S. and South Vietnamese Administrations. It was not a question of four parties of equal legitimacy, but it really was a question of, on one side of the conflict, the legitimate South Vietnamese government and its Delegation and the United States Delegation which was allied to them. Those were the allied "good guys" from our point of view. On the other side, the Viet Cong was not an independent entity, certainly not a government as they fashioned themselves. They were a paramilitary organization that was trained and very clearly totally controlled by the North Vietnamese, who called all the shots. But they wanted to have it, to pretend that it was, the opposite; that there was this legitimate Viet Cong Government and just a few northerners who had big hearts and wanted to come and help them out in the guise of being volunteer "popular forces." The Communists never did admit that regular North Vietnam troop units were in the South. It's ludicrous to anyone who knew what was going on there. So, they wanted to have, if you will, a dynamic, four-sided table, each side occupied by one of the four parties to the endeavor. We wanted to have a two-sided table with the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese arranging themselves however they wanted on one side. Clearly they were a single entity. As I said, we wanted a two-sided (our side and your side) configuration.

It was not as trivial as it was reported in the press and public. It was fundamental as to how the negotiations were going to be conducted, and it had to be dealt with before we could get on with substance. And, even if procedure was agreed to, you couldn't really get on with substance because the Communist side wouldn't let you until President Nixon was clearly in office and calling the shots. They would not deal with the lame-duck Johnson administration between November of '68 and January of '69.

Q: You had been dealing with this under the Johnson administration. What was your feeling about this new administration, the Nixon administration, and Vietnam?

LEDOGAR: As I recall, one thought that Humphrey would be softer on the whole Vietnam question than Nixon would be. As Vice President to Johnson and democratic candidate in 1968, Humphrey had been most uncomfortable supporting his President's policy there. People thought that he certainly wouldn't even keep as vigorous a line as Johnson did. One thought at that time that Nixon and the Republican administration would be tougher about a number of decisions, including military action against the North, including the risk of a wider war, including standing firm with our military forces who were in combat. I thought that it was going to be a turn to the hawkish side rather than a turn to the dovish side even beyond what Johnson had indicated he was willing to do. Humphrey, if elected, probably would have sought or taken more initiatives to try to

wind the thing down even at the expense of some of our objectives. So, strictly in terms of the war effort, I thought U.S. interests would be better served under Nixon, but I'm not an admirer of President Nixon over Hubert Humphrey.

Q: Obviously, as you went there, you knew it was going to be a rough battle, but was the feeling "We're going to be marking time until this thing is settled on the battlefield?"

LEDOGAR: I don't recall thinking in those terms, but we certainly were extremely attentive to the military situation. In fact, one of the things about serving in Paris, as I did for a considerable length of time, was that it was a very clear-eyed place to observe the military conflict. You didn't have a lot of the smoke and dust of Saigon and being so close to the military scene, and yet you didn't have all the politics of Washington. We kind of had the best of both worlds. We had military and intelligence people on our Delegation who brought all of the information to us every day and we were able to follow the military situation each day even before Washington woke up. We had a very substantial military composition to the Delegation and that is what they did; they followed military developments, interpreted them, and advised us about how and to what extent they might be reflected in our presentations, in our positions, our recommendations to Washington, and so forth. Anyone of any senior capacity going back to Washington in those days from Saigon would go back via Paris and come in and brief us. Ambassador Bunker, John Paul Vann, and senior U.S. military leaders would all stop in Paris and talk to us about the situation. To the extent that I can recall that period and my own feelings, I, maybe in a triumph of hope over expectation, expected that something was going to break open. It turned out I underestimated the North Vietnamese ability to continue to stonewall for as long as they did, and they were taking very substantial casualties. We had periodic bombing halts and so forth. That was one campaign that we watched very carefully.

A good portion of our time was taken up with the phenomenon of a number of American officials and celebrities who came to Paris, sought meetings with U.S. negotiators, and tried to tell us what U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia ought to be. Many times I had to stand and answer these folks, including a couple of U.S. Representatives from Congress. They would come over and shake their fists and say, "Don't you understand what the American people want?" I would just reply with some version of the following, while trying not to get into a shouting match: "Yes, indeed. I hear what you are saying. I also know the Constitution, and if you want to affect what my orders are, then you talk to Washington or you go to the voting polls and you affect U.S. foreign policy that way. You don't come here and talk to the tip on the point of the negotiating pen and try to tell us to violate our instructions and bend things more in the direction that you advocate. Maybe you're right about the American people and their attitude towards this, but until my instructions have changed, I'm going to pursue the policy as it's laid down by the president and you wouldn't have it any other way if you thought about it." But that didn't stop the people. They kept coming over, trying to tell us what was going on. The French, as the hosts for the negotiations, had undertaken to keep the atmosphere neutral, but they were having an increasingly difficult time because a lot of folks wanted to come over to Paris and demonstrate somewhere about the Vietnam War.

Then we started to get visits to Paris by delegations of American women, wives of U.S. servicemen who were listed as either POWs or MIAs. When it was quite clear that the Communist side was not going to negotiate on such things as cease fire, withdrawal of forces, and other major issues, we thought at least we should call attention to the plight of American POWs and the total malfeasance of Hanoi on their obligations under international law to release the names of those they had, to allow international observation, to allow for correspondence, and so forth. They wouldn't identify who they held. There were very clear indications that the prisoners were being badly treated. Under the Johnson Administration we had a policy of playing the POW issue sort of low-key. Hanoi was very skillfully dribbling out a few POWs from time to time in big propaganda barrages where they would invite ultradove American critics of U.S. policy to come to Hanoi and there would be a big celebration of "progressive" American anti-war opinion and of the Hanoi righteousness. Then they would release to them a couple of prisoners. I think there were three groups of three that were released that way. The Berrigan brothers were involved in one of these sorry episodes.

Q: These were Catholic priests in the anti-war movement.

LEDOGAR: Yes. We learned a certain amount from talking to these few released fellows about how, when these anti-war figures, the Jane Fondas and others, came to Hanoi, treatment of the hundreds of POWs worsened. The decision was made in Washington that the U.S. would not go that quiet diplomacy route anymore. We were going to start not just talking in public but shouting about Hanoi's poor performance. The Paris Peace Talks were not getting anywhere. We had very reasonable proposals on the table that were categorically rejected. The proposals of the other side demanded a 120% victory before negotiations could even start. So, we spent a good portion of time in a crescendo of speeches, highlighting and discussing and otherwise calling attention to the POW issue.

Q: As the U.S. Delegation Press spokesman, how did you work? Did you go out there and read a statement and accept questions?

LEDOGAR: The most important thing was to be completely informed and to participate in the preparation and articulation of our public point of view. We quickly realized that the North Vietnamese were very anxious to have this forum, not for substantive negotiations but for public information. For them, it was a direct point of contact with the mainstream Western press. Even Western journalists who I discussed this with including a few I accused of favoring the Communist side in their stories were quite frank in saying the U.S. should not expect "fair" treatment or evenhandedness in Paris. They would say, "Look, you've got people who we can talk to in Washington, in Saigon, and lots of other places. There's no inability on your part to get your message out about Vietnam. But this is the only place where we have direct access to Hanoi officials. You bet we're going to favor them." It was a very tough job. I recall once I got very upset with one particular journalist for a major U.S. newspaper.

Q: Who was this?

LEDOGAR: His stories for 11 out of 12 consecutive weeks led with a propaganda statement by the North Vietnamese or Communist side alleging atrocities or some form of misconduct on the part of the allied side. Each week, they began like this: "Today, the Communist side accused the South Vietnamese of mistreating prisoners in tiger cages" or "Today, the Americans bombed the populated village of such and such, killing so many schoolchildren. The South Vietnamese denied it. Otherwise, at the 46th meeting of the Paris Vietnam Peace Talks, there was no substantive progress." That was the formula. I know that the journalists don't write the headlines, but the headlines reflect the leads and the leads in each case were what the Communist side alleged. When I pointed this out, not only was there no remorse, the journalist said, "What do you expect? This is their window to the western mainstream press. You shouldn't expect that you're going to get evenhanded treatment here. We may try to treat the substantive issues in an evenhanded way when you both ever get around to talking about them, but if they want to use this forum to talk about a real or alleged atrocity or massacre, you bet we're going to report that. That's going to be the lead story if nothing else is happening." It was very frustrating to be up against that. Also, we tried to adopt the policy of not responding, especially in the press conferences, to charges of atrocities. We didn't always have all the facts at hand. That wasn't the purpose of the Paris talks. We kept saying, "We're here to negotiate, not to engage in polemics." But after a while, that gets to be a losing game. You have to respond. This isn't just American press. This was the whole international press corps.

Q: What was your impression of the press corps?

LEDOGAR: They were fairly responsible over all, quite ruthless, very competitive among themselves. The charge that they'd sell their grandmothers for a good story is largely true. I learned some curious things. Intuitively you might suspect that the ABC, NBC, CBS bureau chiefs would be competitors. It didn't take long to find out that they were not competitors so much with each other there in Paris, as they were competitors with their respective colleagues in some other place like Beirut. They were competing for their local Paris story to get on their respective evening news programs, so they were inclined to hype it up and make it sound more newsworthy than the story that was coming from the Middle East or someplace else. Not only did they get their names on the air ("This is so and so from the Paris Peace Talks"), also, according to union rules, they had to be paid extra when their names and images and so forth appeared. They were very competitive. Then you find out that your intuition that the electronic media would be in total competition with the pen and pencil media was wrong. Sometimes they would work out little cross-media deals where one journalist from one responsible newspaper of record would conspire with a television journalist from a major network so that their versions of events would support each other. They'd come out with an angle on a story or sometimes push the envelope of truth. When a T.V. editor would say "What's your basis for this?" The T.V. reporter would say, "Look at *The New York Times*." They would cross-support each other by being able to refer their editors to somebody else who also had the same angle. There were all kinds of very charming and admirable things about

journalists… But there is a limit to how far you could trust them.

Q: Was there a matter of off-microphone sitting down and having a drink with some of the major correspondents, talking about what was really happening or was it an adversarial situation?

LEDOGAR: Very much the former. I should have pointed out that that was the larger portion of my job, backgrounding the press. I learned that you have to be quite careful that, to the extent you can, you should make yourself available even when it's inconvenient. Try to be sure that it is the journalist who sets the ground rules and you the person who agrees to them, and not you who imposes the ground rules. Otherwise, you get into this pernicious practice of them saying "a government spokesman who refused to be identified" or "who spoke under condition of anonymity" or something like that. So, I adopted the practice of responding to someone who said, "Could we kick the ball around a little bit?" by answering, "Sure, come on," especially to journalists who came in and out of Paris, as increasingly became the norm after the first few months. They wanted me to help them get back up to speed. They would ask me, "What are the ground rules?" I always tried to reply, "Whatever you want. I'll talk to you on the record. I'll talk to you on background. I'll talk to you on deep background. You set the rules. I would add that I would probably be able to say more in one circumstance than in the other. But if I find out that you infer in your story that I was the one who spoke on condition of anonymity, then next time you come back to town, I'm not sure I'm going to be available." Now remember a very important thing. I was very much in demand in Paris. If you were not an official spokesman whom journalists may in the future need access to, the whole issue of "ground rules" is moot. Picture a guy who happens to have been witness to a crime responding to a newsman who comes over and sticks a microphone in his face and asks, "What did you see?" The guy says, "Well, on background, I'll say so and so." That's ridiculous. He's a passerby and most likely, nobody is ever going to count on him as a source again, so what's the incentive to respect his confidence? But, in Paris, I had the ability to really turn off somebody who broke the ground rules. So, it was not just professional integrity. It was also a question of a source drying up.

Q: Did you find that the responsible reporters understood the impossibility of what the North Vietnamese were insisting on or were they just reporting on a day to day basis?

LEDOGAR: Yes. I found that they were quite aware of what was going on. I suppose if you had a litmus test, you would probably find at least as much anti-war sentiment among the American press corps as in the country at large - if anything, more, but I also found that for the most part they did not let that interfere with their reporting, their personal instincts. The thing that we found annoying was more the practices that they adopted of giving preferential treatment and attention to what the other side was saying even though it had nothing to do with the negotiations. They had requirements to file so many stories and they wanted to stay in Paris and be on the beat in case something did happen. They had to file stories, and why not report the propaganda and atrocity claims of the other side?

Q: During the early part of this period, early '69 to mid-'70, I was in Saigon. Everyone was chasing around trying to look at tiger cages and mistreatment of prisoners and this sort of thing. Let's talk about the POW issue and how you dealt with it over the period of time and some of the personalities involved and how we played this for the press and with the North Vietnamese.

LEDOGAR: The North Vietnamese were extremely skilled in handling the U.S. press and taking advantage of our public affairs institutions. It was really impressive to see how they knew the sore spots and were able to push buttons and get the kind of reactions that they wanted. I don't know where they got the training. But on the prisoner of war issue, as we raised the heat, there was increasing attention. We were pointing out that the issue of living up to the Geneva Convention on POW's was not something that was the normal part of negotiations. This was a humanitarian thing where they were in violation of international norms. We highlighted the fact that they wouldn't even identify the prisoners they held, no less give them basic rights of communication and decent treatment and so forth. We did all kinds of things to keep the issue in the spotlight. At one point, we gave the Hanoi side a list of 1,400-some odd names and said, "Would you check off on the list which ones you still hold?" Now, there were problems for them in that… Let's take the case of pilots who were shot down over the North and either parachuted or survived a crash. Sometimes the citizenry would be the first one to get to these pilots before the government forces got there. The citizenry were a little bit upset about having been bombed. They would really mistreat the individual pilot and sometimes execute him or beat him to death. You might have a photograph of this fellow being led around, but then he was killed. Was that on orders of Hanoi? One doesn't know. But we do know that there were a number of folks that they published photos of as being alive and apparently in their hands who never made it out.

Then there is the question of in wartime, especially when there is a huge amount of violence with heavy guns, some people get obliterated, or a plane gets hit and goes down in flames into a cloud. No one knows if the pilot ejected. Then there was a question of some of the people that we had fighting in clandestine operations having used a "nom de guerre," (a different name that few people knew) so we had to put two names on our list, at least two names. So, you have a problem about getting an accurate account. No doubt about the fact that Hanoi was far from meeting the minimum standards. It was proven to our satisfaction that they had actually identified less than one out every three people that they held. They had allowed something like only one out of 10 to send out letters. They were supposed to allow each prisoner one letter a month in and out under the Geneva Convention. How many would receive letters? We had the testimony of one of our airmen who had been released to pacifists that a young Vietnamese soldier once came around to a cell at the Hanoi Hilton and handed one of the three POWs there a letter. They asked the soldier, "How come one of us gets to correspond with his family, a second is allowed only to receive letters, not to send, and the third is allowed nothing either way?" This young soldier, according to our former POW, said, "Well, that's simple. It's to confuse the enemy."

There were all kinds of malfeasance and shortcomings in Hanoi's basic responsibilities

with regards to POWs. We took the position that this wasn't something that was negotiable. This was something that they should do because it's an international obligation. Soon, the wives of U.S. POWs and MIAs started coming over to Paris. Some of them were received by the North Vietnamese delegation and sent away with nothing. Some of them were just refused audiences and wouldn't be given access at all. A few of them received and eventually got word back that their man was either alive, dead, or unknown. We found that it was difficult to figure out a pattern of North Vietnamese behavior, but one thing that we thought we identified was that those wives who were seen by the press or the public or maybe other sources of intelligence as having come to Paris and gotten a briefing at the U.S. Embassy had less chance of getting in to see the Communists than those who did not. These women were brave and well-behaved and you had to have sympathy for them. But they were not very experienced in international affairs and didn't speak foreign languages and so forth. The very idea of not coming to their own Embassy to be briefed, but getting on the telephone and calling up the North Vietnamese themselves, was a little bit daunting. That's where we chose to have a young female Foreign Service officer there, a USIA officer, take charge, go out and meet these groups, and give them counsel and advice. She would take care of their basic requirements of food, lodging, and communications, maybe make the telephone calls for them, handle the transportation, and do all the things that you would like to do instinctively for these Americans in difficulty, but things which might be inimical to their chances of getting their audience if not done quietly. That's where this officer, Frances Cook, came in. When there were no American women in town trying to find out if they were wives or widows, Frances was attached to my press section and did some public affairs work that was not directly related to the wives. But when a group came over, her primary responsibility was to get out and go meet them and to do all of these things for them away from the Embassy. Frances was first-rate.

Q: She's been ambassador to several places.

LEDOGAR: Yes. She integrated into the Foreign Service from USIA after the Vietnam Peace Talks and had a brilliant career.

Q: In these press conferences, how would you respond to… I assume that the North Vietnamese could come up with an atrocity a day. War is war. There may be truth or there may not be. You say at the beginning we weren't responding?

LEDOGAR: The basic U.S. instinct was to try to say, "We're not here to deal with charges about conduct of the war. We're not interested in your polemics. We're here to negotiate. As soon as you've got something of substance to say, go ahead." The South Vietnamese were less capable of staying aloof from polemics. The South Vietnamese had what may be an Asian, Vietnamese, or Buddhist instinct that a charge launched and not addressed takes on an air of credibility, so they often rose to the bait.

Q: It does in the journalistic world.

LEDOGAR: It does. But really blatant propaganda should be swatted down. We would

say to our Vietnamese allies, “Don’t get sucked in. Don’t get into a pissing contest with a skunk.” Often, and sometimes this was a very wise thing to do, the U.S. representatives would “no comment” the atrocity charge and we would leave it to the South Vietnamese Delegation to respond. They would deal with them fairly straightforwardly, summarily, and not get into “So is your sister” kind of responses. But a lot of the mudslinging was done at the press conferences which followed the weekly plenary meetings. The plenary meetings were usually on Thursdays. Each was followed by four press conferences given by the press spokesmen of each of the four Delegations in rotation. Each week, the order would change. The U.S. Delegation Chief would have brief contact with the press as we left our mission on the morning of the plenary. Then the second press contact was as we walked into the Hotel Majestic, where the meetings took place. The third was as we left. At these three brief encounters the Ambassador would make a one or two sentence statement, and take one or two questions as he walked by the microphones. Then there were the formal, sit-down, on-the-record briefings. When my turn came, I would go up and take questions from the international press until all questions were exhausted, so my briefings would sometimes last 15 minutes or sometimes 45 minutes. I would field questions in French or even Italian if somebody wanted, and paraphrased them, but I always responded on the record in English. Even the other parties kind of settled on English, although the North Vietnamese used more French.

It soon became the practice - in fact, almost immediately - that while the plenary meetings were not open to the press and public, we soon were briefing and even handing out copies of all statements that were made in the plenaries.

Later we’ll have to get into the whole other series of contacts under the rubric of the Paris Peace Talks. Here I’m talking about our weekly so-called plenary meetings that were restricted but the content of which was made public after the fact. But there are various other formulations that one could have and at times we did use. One could have a circumstance where we had restricted meetings and agreed that we were not going to brief on everything. Now, that is more the meaning of the term of “restricted meeting.” Where news of what took place was restricted, we would just say certain things, either by practice or by agreement among the negotiators. Or we could meet other than in the Hotel Majestic, where the formal rules applied. Then you get into the levels of secret talks. In other words, secret in that nobody outside even knows they’re taking place unless a special effort is made to talk about aspects of them, either by agreement or by one side deciding to blow the cover of a failed series. Then there were the super-secret talks, ones that were taking place where even members of the Delegations didn’t know that some of their own people were meeting elsewhere. So, we had at various times each of these types and sometimes several levels of conversations going on. What I’ve been talking about so far in this interview is the weekly meetings and the on-the-record press conferences that followed. There is a whole history to the other levels of contacts that were part of the Vietnam Peace Talks, which I’ll be glad to get into later.

Q: Early on, what was your impression of the South Vietnamese delegation?

LEDOGAR: They were quite competent and professional. They were from a social strata

that was clearly uppercrust. One couldn't help but wonder how democratic they were. Our South Vietnamese probably among themselves found U.S. conduct difficult. They probably chafed a little bit about "sleeping with an elephant." The Americans to them were so "big and clumsy." But I found that they were very cooperative. I certainly had an excellent relationship with my counterpart, Mr. Danh, who was their spokesman. Our families became friends.

Q: Did these elements stay about the same for four years?

LEDOGAR: Pretty much. They had a lot of stability in their delegation.

Q: What about the Viet Cong?

LEDOGAR: They were not very competent. The leader, Madame Binh, was a real dragon lady. But that doesn't mean she wasn't intelligent. She was quick on her feet.

The compromise in the dispute over this shape of the negotiating table was agreement on a set of three tables. A large circular table which was effectively divided into two areas by the proximity of two little tables that were set exactly 24 centimeters from the big one at points 180 degrees apart. Clerical folks sat at the small tables. In the allied semicircles the two allied Ambassadors sat side by side the two Delegations strung out (let's call that six o'clock), with the Americans to the left of our Ambassador and the South Vietnamese to the right their Ambassador. Thus the allied side occupied from about 4:30 to 7:30, so we were very close together. Our Delegations could communicate very easily with notes or something else. On the Communist semicircle, they did everything they could to separate their two delegations. The North Vietnamese were way over here at about 2:00 o'clock and the Viet Cong were way over here at about 10:00 o'clock, leaving the largest possible gap in between the two in their semicircle. One result was that that made it very difficult for the two Communist delegations to be discreet about communicating between each other.

This was not a very urgent thing because all during the Vietnam Peace Talks, we worked in three languages. Every single word that we said was translated into French and then the French was translated into the opposite language. So, you had plenty of time, and plenty of time to get bored, especially if you understood all three languages because you'd hear things over and over again.

So, it wasn't that there was a lack of time, but with this huge space, especially if you kept a question short, if you tried to toss a tough or tricky question to the Viet Cong Delegation, there wasn't an opportunity for Madam Binh to get her instructions from the North. The North called all the shots. We played a few games like that. They demonstrated that in political terms the Viet Cong were rather pathetic with regards to their pretense to sovereignty. It was clear that they didn't really represent anything independent. They were just an extension of the Hanoi delegation, although they probably all were native southerners, from their dialects. If one of the Viet Cong delegates had to go to the men's room he always had to have a colleague escort lest there

be a defection or an indiscretion of some sort. We had no social contact with them and seldom even saw them other than across the huge table. Even moving around corridors to and from the meeting hall, the French orchestrated it so that delegations didn't pass each other in the hallways. We each had our private offices for lunch break. The French did a very good job as hosts. They probably bugged the hell out of everything, especially the private offices, so that they could keep well informed.

Q: The North Vietnamese delegation.

LEDOGAR: The North Vietnamese Delegation was curious in that the Ambassador and ostensible head, Xuan Thuy, was a senior and competent professional diplomat. But from time to time, they had a visitor in Paris, a kind of commissar who was quickly recognized as a member of the politburo in Hanoi and the real force in town, Le Duc Tho. When he was in town, he always deferred in public to his Ambassador, who did all the talking. At times Kissinger was meeting in secret talks elsewhere in Paris with Le Duc Tho, but that's another story. As 1969 unfolded, it became clear that nothing was really going to happen by way of substantive negotiations. The talks drifted off into a total stalemate around June. Henry Cabot Lodge had made it clear that he wasn't going to stick with this for more than a year. The decision was made in Washington that when Lodge left, he was not going to be replaced unless there were some signs that the North Vietnamese were going to be serious. Lodge did have six secret meetings with the North Vietnamese during 1969. I did not attend those. I think they've been well written about. Then we went into a hiatus where Phil Habib was left in charge of the U.S. Delegation.

Q: What would you do?

LEDOGAR: We would continue to meet every week. At first, the North withdrew their Ambassador because they charged that there had been a "downgrading." Mind you, they had had Lodge and Walsh for six months and then Lodge for another four or five months. Then, as I said, around December of '69, Phil Habib, whom they had known as sort of a political counselor, the senior professional, not a political appointee, was left in charge.

Q: During this time, during '69, was it pretty much laying out the boundaries? Was there anything constructive being done or was it just going through the motions?

LEDOGAR: There was a lot of going through the motions, but there was also a certain amount of repackaging that went on in the plenary dialogue. I attended all the plenaries and was a direct participant in working up the weekly U.S. presentations.

On the other side when they replaced their hard line new phrases, they always put new initiatives in the mouths of the Viet Cong Delegation, trying to make it look as though the southern Communists were the ones who were pushing events, but it was all dictated by and handed to them by the Hanoi delegation. Each time they came out with a new package, be it in seven or eight or nine points, it was very clear to us that it was a superficially more attractive packaging of the same old and totally unacceptable requirements. The Communists wanted immediate withdrawal of the United States forces

and they would discuss cease fire only after U.S. departure. The Americans had to get out and had to guarantee the installation of Hanoi's government and pay war reparations. In substance it was just beyond the pale. But from time to time it was put in a less objectionable tone. Once when this occurred in October of 1970, we had a quick meeting within the U.S. Delegation after the Viet Cong came out with a "new" plan. By this time newly arrived Ambassador Bruce was in charge. He said, "Well, what are we going to do with this? People have already been touting it out on the streets and handing out copies to the press corps." One of our people said, "Well, you know Mr. Ambassador, our former press spokesman Harold Kaplan once used a press line in a situation like this. He said, 'It seems to us to be like old wine in new bottles.'" Bruce said, "Oh, I like that." So, we left the meeting hall and as usual Bruce stepped out front and took a couple of questions from the journalists. Somebody said, "Well Mr. Ambassador, what do you think of the new peace plan in Eight Points?" Bruce said, "I think it's like new wine in old bottles." We jumped into the car. I always rode back to the office with the Ambassador and Phil Habib because sometimes we met more press representatives that hung around in front of the Embassy. In the car Bruce said, "That was alright, wasn't it, Steve?" I said, "No, Sir, that was not alright." What we had wanted to get across was that this is the same old Hanoi stuff, but it's been repackaged in a new wrapper. He said, "Oh, well, what did I say?" I said, "Well, you said the opposite." Bruce chuckled and replied, "Oh, well, you fix it in your press conference. Tell them I'm an old man and I misspeak a lot." So, sure enough, by the time we got back to the embassy, it was already on the tickers that apparently something important had happened. The Ambassador had said in effect that it may look like the old stuff but it's a new product that we've got to examine. The stock market in New York even started to react. I was to give my on-the-record press conference later on that day. When I got up there was wild interest and animation. The questions were predictable: "Well, what did the Ambassador say? What did that mean, new wine in old bottles?" I said, "What the Ambassador meant to say was 'old wine in new bottles.' He was trying to connote that this Eight Point Plan in nothing more than the same dreary old substantive positions in new, perhaps more attractive, packaging." "Well, if he meant to say that, then why did he say the other thing?" Back and forth.

At the end of the press conference, I got a note passed to me and by a fellow from one of the television networks. It simply said, "Steve, see Matthew 9:17." That was it. He signed his name. I went back after this was over and went to the Embassy library and got out the Bible. Sure enough, there was the parable - and it's actually in three of the gospels. As I recall the thrust is something like no more would a man who had found the light and adopted new ways return to his sinful old ways than would a… It goes on for two or three examples and the final one of them is, "Nor would a vintner put his brand new wine into leaky old wineskins." "Wineskins" is translated in the King James as "bottles." The whole point was that it's new wine going into substandard old bottles. That's not a very wise thing to do. Our recommended misquote would have met the case, but it did not reflect the Bible. So, I went in to see David Bruce and said, "Well, Sir, it turns out that even though you got bad advice from your staff, and you were under a lot of stress, you got the Bible right." He was pleased as punch.

Q: When did you see a change coming around? During this '69 period, I'm sure there

were long telegrams going back and forth between the White House, the State Department, and the Delegation of what to say and how to say it. Who was calling the shots?

LEDOGAR: Well, there was an enormous number of cables going back. We reported every text and every word that was said. Harriman and Vance had rightly established back in the Preliminary Conversations in 1968 the point that tactics were to be left to the negotiators. The Delegation had a set of instructions and how we carried them out was our business, and we were not going to clear every word in our statements in advance with Washington. That pertained all the way through. We were mostly reporting after the fact, but there was a series of high level cables in which our Delegation chiefs, as any negotiator does, wrote for a different level. From time to time you write for the policy level, not the guys who are going through all the speeches and looking for little nuggets. The Ambassador says in effect, "Here is my analysis of the present situation. In the circumstances, this is what I recommend should be done. I recommend that I be instructed to do so and so." Those high level policy cables went back and forth. I was not in a position at that time in Paris where I was asked to make an awful lot of input on those. They were being written under the responsibility of the Ambassador, by his closest political advisors. I saw them all. I recall that they dealt with nuance and tactics. No one in 1969 was recommending that we change our fundamental position.

Q: One of the almost weaknesses of the American character in something like this is a matter of lack of long-term ability to hold firm. We keep trying something, maybe changing the wineskins, continuing to try to say "Maybe this or that will work." Sometimes if you do this and the other side holds firm, they can always see that at some point if you're trying to change and trying something, there is always something that's less strong than something else. It's just by nature.

LEDOGAR: That's true, and you're right about Americans having that weakness. We tend to start negotiating with ourselves when we don't get any real dialogue with the other guy. "Suppose I said it this way?" I suppose that we suffered a little bit of that. There were so many people looking at it, and all these words which were being published. Our fundamental principles were not very complex, though they were very controversial. We thought that there should be a cease-fire. We agreed to the principle of withdrawal of U.S. forces, but we thought the North Vietnamese forces should be withdrawn, too. We were willing to talk about a number of things, including postwar economic development. But until there was such a time as we had an expression of willingness on their part to engage on any of these subjects, it was hard to get into nuance. Cease-fire is cease-fire.

Q: What were you talking about?

LEDOGAR: Who was responsible for lack of progress. Now, it's kind of hard to talk about this without noting that some of the things that were happening I learned about only later. I'll jump ahead with the story.

Q: What was your impression of our military reports from what was happening in the field and also from the CIA in Vietnam? You must have been looking over your shoulder all the time at what was happening.

LEDOGAR: Yes, indeed, we were. We had daily military briefings pulled together for the Ambassador and his folks by the military contingent of our Delegation, drawing on the reporting from Saigon as interpreted by experts who were all veterans of the conflict. I don't think that we had any judgements unique to us. There were a lot of disappointments and a lot of surprises as to how the other guy could take the punishment that he was taking and still come back. The Communist Vietnamese seemed to be logistical geniuses. They certainly were adept at camouflage and disappearance and tunneling, and a whole lot of other things that frustrated us. I can recall one of the sort of sardonic jokes: a young North Vietnamese fellow struggles for months down the Ho Chi Minh Trail carrying two mortar rounds in a knapsack. He gets into place near Saigon and there is a comrade with a mortar. The young fellow drops the two rounds down the mortar tube. Clunk! Then the comrade says, "Now go back and get two more." The whole complexity of the war would flood in all the time. In Paris we had an excellent position to observe, but I don't think we came to any unique conclusions. It was terribly frustrating that we couldn't seem to achieve basic military objectives, to draw the North into main force combat and deal with their forces. But could I go back to something we were discussing before?

I want to try to deal with this question of the different levels of the Paris Vietnam Peace Talks. In May 1969, there was a series of six secret meetings which Ambassador Lodge had with the North Vietnamese ambassador, Xuan Thuy. Each Ambassador was accompanied by a small group of assistants and interpreters and notetakers. I didn't go to any of these secret meetings. They got nowhere. Essentially they rehearsed the same substance, and the same stonewalling took place at those meetings as was the case in the plenaries. But I think they led to the departure of Cabot Lodge and the Washington decision to leave things in the hands of Phil Habib. He was career, and not a political appointee, but he was appointed to ambassadorial rank for this purpose by the President.

It was later revealed (in very early '72) that during 1970, after the six secret sessions Lodge had conducted, Henry Kissinger had five of his super-secret talks outside Paris with Le Duc Tho. It was revealed still later that this was done by Kissinger flying in unmarked aircraft to U.S. bases in Germany and then taking a small plane to a French military base on the outskirts of Paris. Kissinger would not even come into Paris; he would just go directly to a North Vietnamese safehouse in the suburbs and have conversations. No one in our Delegation knew about those meetings at that time. I wonder who beside Le Duc Tho were the other people on the other side. They clearly were from the regular North Vietnamese Delegation. So, that's the first disparity. Some of the Hanoi Delegation were in on everything.

During the period when Phil Habib was Chargé before the arrival of David Bruce, there were several of these meetings. I don't have the dates in my notes here, but they were all revealed by President Nixon in January '72. I know that no one in our Delegation, not

even Habib, knew about those Kissinger meetings at that time. When David Bruce arrived, we later learned that those super-secret Kissinger meetings continued. There was a series of about six of them that ended in August of 1970. I later learned that on our Delegation, only David Bruce knew about them, and that Phil Habib and everyone below him did not know. I say that with some purpose. Many of us suspected something was going on somewhere, but I don't know of anyone on our Delegation who would have bet that whatever was going on was in or near Paris. I had strict instructions never to talk to the press about secret meetings. Just stonewall on the whole subject. I think I was fairly consistent in doing that until after the full history of Kissinger's secret diplomacy had been revealed by Nixon. One time, in 1971 I think, one of my on-the-record answers to a question about secret meetings made the *New York Times'* "Quotation of the Day." The questioner asked why I wouldn't comment on secret talks when so much was leaking out or being revealed by Washington. I said I had no comment on why I had no comment. Recall that there were these Delegation to Delegation secret meetings that were not at the Hotel Majestic, and then there were those super-secret visits to Paris suburbs by Kissinger. A lot of journalists seemed to be confused on that distinction. The U.S. defense attaché in the Embassy knew about the super-secret meetings. He was the one who had to arrange Kissinger's travel with the French. He was later director of the CIA - Vernon Walters. But we did not know anything about what he was doing to help logistically arrange for Kissinger and his small party to come to the Paris suburbs. By 1971, there had been six of these meetings. The series was then resumed in the spring of 1971. President Nixon listed the dates of super-secret meetings #7-#12: one in May, one in June, two in July, one in August, one in September. At this time, I think Kissinger was mostly meeting with Xuan Thuy.

For one of these meetings, however - July 12, 1971 - Le Duc Tho was on one of his periodic overt visits to Paris. He had been confronted by newspeople who said, "You know, Henry Kissinger is coming here to Paris from Islamabad and will be in town while you're here. Are you interested in meeting privately with him?" Le Duc Tho said something to the effect of, "Well, I for my part would be available if he wanted a meeting."

So, we had this extraordinary situation where Kissinger was coming to town overtly. But he was intensely interested in diverting the press from his trail. About two weeks later, we learned that he came to town not just from Islamabad, but having just been in China, the secret trip to Peking. He was very interested in covering all of that up. President Nixon was going to announce the opening of China 10 days or two weeks later from San Clemente. So, Kissinger had two tasks while in Paris. One of them in the face of the press frenzy was to keep all of the China stuff covered up. Another one was to get out of the limelight and meet secretly with Le Duc Tho. But the journalists were all over the place. They were following Kissinger's car on motor scooters and they had everything staked out. He was staying at the old U.S. ambassadorial residence and that was staked out. The problem was how to get into a secret meeting and otherwise cover up this whole thing. I was very much involved in his plan because the press corps was kind of my responsibility. I was mislead by Henry Kissinger into putting out untruths. It was quite clear.

Q: [Imitating Claude Raines] "I'm shocked" [laughter]!
LEDOGAR: Sounds like the movie "Casablanca." That was part of the game. In retrospect I don't resent being misled by him. A lot of well-known and honorable people were misled by him, but I thought that matters could have been handled in ways that did not necessarily sacrifice so much goodwill the Delegation had built with the press corps. You spend a lot of time trying to build that up and to deal with them in as honorable way as you can. Silence is not necessarily misleading, but to tell them that one thing is happening when exactly the opposite is happening is something they don't easily forget. But it was a very dicey period in which a whole lot of things took place. When it became quite clear that I was being used to mislead the press, I was annoyed. He wanted to throw the press off his trail. But it was not so much about the meeting with Le Duc Tho because that was accomplished rather neatly with the help of some U.S. clandestine operators who spirited Kissinger out of where he was and into the outskirts, and the newsfolks who were right there staking out the house were not the wiser. It was the China thing that required throwing sand. So Kissinger had this flurry of activity where he was reported to be in one place and then he was reported to be going to meet Frank Sinatra in Maxim's and then he shows up on television at another restaurant with a very attractive young blonde journalist. By this time, I had just drifted away from the whole scene, figuring that enough was enough. I got a call at home and a newsperson said, "Where is Kissinger now?" I said, "I don't know." This guy, who was friendly, said, "I'll tell you where he is, Steve. He's in this restaurant having dinner with Miss So and So. We're standing out here waiting to see what happens next."

I did bump into David Bruce the next day. I kind of made some noises to the effect that I wished it hadn't been necessary to lie to the press, and that all that happened yesterday could have been accomplished without lying. Bruce said, "You know, he actually was going to meet Frank Sinatra at Maxim's, but it turned out that the restrictions on the airport were such that Sinatra couldn't get here from London and take off again before the 11:00 PM noise curfew at Le Bourget."

Now I'm going to jump ahead. David Bruce left Paris in '72. He was not terribly well. He had circulation problems and was told to stop sitting around the Paris meetings so much and to get out and keep active. He went on vacation for a while and then became our first representative to Peking, later Beijing. Then having completed that service, he was named by President Nixon to Brussels to the U.S. Mission to NATO. He replaced Donald Rumsfeld as U.S. permanent representative in 1974. I was there at the time. When a new Ambassador arrived, they arranged to gather the whole staff around, which was considerable. We had about 100 Americans. Bruce spoke to us as a group and then we all kind of filed past to shake hands. A number of our people had served with him before. He had been Ambassador to London for four years and to Germany and had led the Point Four Program in Paris and all sorts of Foreign Service postings. I came by and started to say my name and he just kind of looked up at me and said, "Steve, I want to see you immediately afterwards in my office." When the reception line was completed, I went down to his office and walked in and he said, "Hi, sit down. Good to see you again. Phil never knew." I was kind of stunned into silence. He said, "It's one of the toughest

decisions Henry had to make, but it was decided that it was best that the substance of those secret talks be kept the way it was kept." He didn't say, "Steve, we're sorry we left you out there with egg on your face. Too bad it was necessary to throw people off our trail." He just said, in effect, that not even Phil Habib knew at the time. That was it. That was the total conversation. I thanked him very much and we talked about some pleasantries and that was that. The point is, there had been occurrences that caused people to suspect that negotiations were going on in Warsaw in Peking, in places other than Paris… A lot of speculation but no hard facts. Some of my colleagues on the Delegation somehow or other later convinced themselves that they had known about those Kissinger meetings at the time they were going on in the subterranean level. My conviction is that they didn't. The only one member of the U.S. Delegation who knew was David Bruce and he had been sent specifically to Paris to provide the cover of the weekly plenary sessions for the secret talks; and that 1972 revelation was indeed a very tough blow to Phil Habib, who in 1969 had been left in charge and yet was not even brought into the picture.

Q: Moving toward the end of these sessions, your group was going through the formalities. How did that play out?

LEDOGAR: It played out with business as before, no progress whatsoever. It was a little bit embarrassing to realize that all the time before the Nixon revelations in January of '72, many of the people on the other side of the table knew about these because they were involved in them. All of us on the allied side, everyone except our Ambassador, were not in the picture. So, you realized that at least some of the North Vietnamese had been sitting there smirking at you and drawing their own conclusions.

Q: Do you think they knew or just maybe the top person in the Delegation knew?

LEDOGAR: They had to have at least four or five. They needed notetakers and interpreters and a senior advisor at hand. My guess is that in the Kissinger super-secret talks they probably had about six and we had six.

Q: But our six were all from Washington?

LEDOGAR: Yes, and their six were for the most part drawn from their regular Paris Delegation.

Q: Often on negotiations that are difficult, as we did with the Soviets, there would be a lunch break and everybody would get together and chat a little. This never happened during your time?

LEDOGAR: We never met during lunch break with anyone other than our South Vietnamese allies. I don't recall the issue of informal contacts even coming up. No one was seriously suggesting, "Let's wander down the hall."

Q: How could you keep doing this? If things weren't moving for more than a year…

LEDOGAR: It was very frustrating. Probably most of those on our Delegation who did not have the daily interface with the press and the responsibility to be on your feet and defending not just the negotiating position but also all the other aspects of American conduct of the Vietnam conflict, were even more frustrated than as I. I would meet with journalists almost every morning of the week and then go out to receptions in the evening and run into a bunch of press people there - I had a budget and entertained my press contacts from time to time. I at least had something to do, but it was a very frustrating thing, especially when you saw the casualty lists. We had the question of the cost of the negotiations come up a number of times. People would say, "Well, how much does it cost to keep you guys here in deadlocked negotiations?" They thought that the Ambassador who was put up at the Hotel Crillon and the rest of us were living high on the hog in Paris. I developed a standard answer to the effect that as far as I could calculate, negotiations cost about the same price per year as one Huey helicopter, and we were losing at least one of those helicopters every day in Vietnam. Another line that I developed and I still believe is true is that any emotion, especially frustration or boredom on the part of a diplomat, should be likened to squeamishness on the part of a surgeon. It's unprofessional to be bored or frustrated. You have to get hold of yourself and make sure that you focus on what your responsibility is, and defend your position and make it clear that the other side is responsible for no movement, and not our side. That was a problem and it led to the departure of a number of our people who decided to seek other assignments. Life was too short for this, they decided.

Q: How about the events of May 1970 in Vietnam, going into Cambodia? Did that raise any blip on your work?

LEDOGAR: Oh, yes, and they raised a big blip on the radar screens of the American public. Many critics felt that the Cambodian incursion was a direct and vicious extension of the conflict on the part of the United States. This criticism had a negative effect. Similar to the Bay of Pigs, we got cold feet and we banked the military effort back so that it was indecisive. We took all of the heat of going into Cambodia, but we restricted ourselves to the first 25 kilometers and only for a period of weeks. What we did was militarily ineffective and yet we took all of the abuse for escalating the war.

I keep mentioning Phil Habib because he was my mentor and my direct supervisor. I can remember at certain points that he would point out the downside of acting indecisively in the military field. In 1972 there was a big allied offensive. It was one of the last ones in which U.S. forces were directly engaged. It was into Laos along Route 9 through the mountains to try to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Q: It was basically Vietnamese-run though.

LEDOGAR: That's right. It was entirely Vietnamese ground forces with U.S. air support. Again, we pulled our punch, fearing that this would be regarded as excessive U.S. force. So, we didn't really support them as they should have been supported, and the South Vietnamese got cold feet and cut and ran. It was a disaster and I remember Phil Habib

waving his arms and saying, "By God, if you're going to do something like that, do it decisively." Any political-military expert will observe that truism, one that was always observed by the Soviet Union. When the Soviets moved into Czechoslovakia, they came with everything. It may have looked like overkill, but there was nothing indecisive about a military move by Soviet forces. There was a lot of that indecisive sort of thing from the U.S. in Vietnam.

I should have mentioned that in June '69, President Nixon announced that as part of his plan, which became known as Vietnamization, the first traunche (slice) of U.S. troops would be coming out. I can remember keeping in my desk drawer a little chart that I had designed with the level of U.S. in-country troops on the vertical axis, 535,500 or whatever the number was, straight down to zero; and the months from '69 to '73, that would be the end of the Nixon administration, on the horizontal axis. You could trace a straight line from 535 thousand to zero in four years. As you plotted each successive Vietnamization traunche that was announced, although they varied in size and duration - in the next so many months, so many troops would come out - the plot wasn't far from a straight line. The rate of Vietnamization, in other words, was quite predictable. So, all this time, the last half of '69 and through '70, U.S. forces were coming out in significant numbers. U.S. troop levels were headed down.

There were the Saigon elections. A secret letter to Ho Chi Minh in the middle of '69 was later revealed. Ho Chi Minh died in September of '69. That was the end of the secret talks for a long time. Lodge departed in December of '69. Here I'm speaking from notes I pulled together which compile chronologically what we knew then along with what was later made public. David Bruce was named in July of '70… He did meet with his counterpart in November of that year, but that was not the super-secret level. That was Delegation to Delegation. It was in February of '71 that the South Vietnamese forces went into Laos. That was the first big test of Vietnamization. We later learned that there were Kissinger level talks in May, through September of that year. Of course, July was when Kissinger was in Peking and came through Paris overtly.

Q: I want to come back to you. You say you were there until '72. You left when then?

LEDOGAR: Late spring or early summer. I had some home leave and then I went to senior training at Stanford University.

Q: When you went up towards '72, were you there when we announced that we were going to renew relations of some sort with China?
LEDOGAR: Yes. That was announced in late July or early August of '71.

Q: Was everybody singing the same tune over and over again on both sides?

LEDOGAR: Pretty much, but we thought that that would be received as very bad news by the Communist side, that the U.S. and China were regularizing relations. Similarly, the fact that we had some ongoing contacts including meetings at high levels with the Russians, with the Soviets, we thought that that would be something that would

encourage Hanoi to get on with this problem. But somewhere at the end of ’71, we resumed limited bombings of the North. When David Bruce left in August of ‘71 and before William Porter arrived as head of the U.S. Delegation, there was a brief period when there were no talks at all. The other side, in effect, walked out. Weekly plenaries were also suspended in ’72 between March and May. I was still in Paris at the time.

Q: What were you doing?

LEDOGAR: Not much. Our second child was born in Paris in March ‘72. The Delegation was reading the record of Kissinger talks, which was beginning to come out to those of us who were in the business. We studied what had and what had not taken place.
Q: When the Kissinger talks were revealed, did you have any particular problems with the press or was it that they understood you didn’t know?

LEDOGAR: They understood that we on the Paris-based U.S. Delegation didn’t know. Some of them might have figured, “Well, boy, those guys played this pretty cool because they always said ‘No comment’ to any question about private talks. Maybe they knew something.” They were wrong if they thought that. We knew nothing.

Q: So, what was the status by the time you left in the summer of ’72?
LEDOGAR: By the time I left, the super-secret series with Henry Kissinger became just restricted sessions. They continued and indeed began to produce results in the form of a draft peace treaty. The North Vietnamese insisted that they wanted to reestablish the cover of the weekly plenaries and I did a little bit of that, but then I started training my successor, David Lambertson, and started looking towards getting out of Paris. We did resume the plenaries in May. Then they were suspended later in that month. Then they were resumed in July. By that time, I was all but gone.

Q: Looking back on it, did you feel that the sessions that you had endured had cut out some of the ground that could be built upon for other sessions or were they sterile?

LEDOGAR: That is an interesting question. I think that we broke some of the ground, but whether or not we were merely reflecting decisions that had been taken elsewhere or whether we were actually doing something that helped to focus issues elsewhere is hard to say. You would have to sit down and compare the records of both series of meetings chronologically - the full transcripts of plenaries and the reports from the super-secret talks. I didn’t have that opportunity. I pointed out that in ’71, in about August, William Porter became the Ambassador. David Bruce had left. Porter brought a completely different style to the dialogue. He was a tough character and he believed that if something looks like a duck and waddles like a duck and quacks like a duck, you ought to call it a duck until you have evidence to the contrary. He started using diplomatically harsh language in meetings with the other side. He started calling the Provisional Revolutionary Government the “Viet Cong” to their faces. He would trot out some statistics of the most recent elections in North Vietnam in which politburo member number one allegedly got 98.2% of the vote and politburo member number two got 98.1% of the vote and then the most junior person got only 86% of the vote, and these other curiosities of dictatorships

pretending to be democratic. He affected a tough style. Instead of the U.S. Delegation working on the weekly statement from the more junior level on up the seniority line - where we would sit down and talk about what we had missed and one of the more junior officers would be assigned to draft something - we would all take a whack at the draft and refine it, gently smoothing it and sometimes pulling a punch with diplomatic niceties. Porter took the opposite track. He did the first draft of next week's speech and it would be in brutal tone, and we more junior types we would spend our time saying, "You can't say that." It was very refreshing and satisfying. I don't think the resulting frankness in tone did any damage. I think it probably helped to jolt the other side a little bit. They basked in this business of being international political figures, statesmen. Porter started calling them for what they were: insurgents and aggressors. It was satisfying.

There was a breakdown of neutrality in Paris in early 1972. The French, as hosts of the talks, had undertaken to keep Paris neutral and free of demonstrations about Vietnam. But by 1972, there was such enormous pressure from peace groups from all over the world, European ones in particular, to try to stage so-called peace demonstrations in Paris, that the French broke down and said, "Well, you can't do it in Paris, but we'll let you demonstrate in Versailles." So, there was a convocation of thousands of people in the suburbs who came to Paris for this big event. By this time, anti-war sentiment was the majority public view. Convening for the demonstration were a number of responsible citizens, people of discretion who were not your typical anti-American or anti-administration, knee-jerk thugs. On the eve of the Versailles convocation, some of my friends in the press corps said, "Look, Steve, the best thing you guys can do is totally ignore it. We don't want to have to spend our Saturday and Sunday out in Versailles covering this story. It's not in your interests that we go out there and cover this anti-war crap. Don't get provoked into reacting to it. That's our advice." So, I, of course, passed that on to Ambassador Porter. The next day or so we came out of one of the plenary meetings and as we passed the journalists on the sidewalks as usual, someone said, "Well, Mr. Ambassador, what do you think about this group of anti-war protestors that's gathering in Versailles this coming weekend?" He feigned confusion and then said, "Oh, you mean that horde of Communist-controlled agitators? Oh, I don't have any respect for them." Well, you had in addition to William Sloane Coffin and the Vietnam Veterans against the war, a lot of seriously troubled American citizens of responsibility who felt that it was time to do something about the war. Some of the peace groups were deeply offended that an American Ambassador would say that they were "Communists." Porter had carefully said, "Communist-controlled agitators." We knew from intelligence that there was Chinese money helping to finance this Versailles event in addition to French Communist Party money and resources. We knew quite a bit about organizational details from our intelligence. It might have been better to have ignored the event, but Porter couldn't resist it.

So the next day we had Delegations of protesting American groups at the American Embassy demanding to see Ambassador Porter. Now, back in 1968 when the Paris talks first started we, of the U.S. Negotiating Delegation working out of the U.S. Embassy, had made an arrangement, which was a sensible one, with our American Embassy hosts. Our business was negotiation. Their business was dealing with American citizens. We of the

negotiating delegation should not usurp their responsibility. That was readily agreed early on when we had as Ambassador Sergeant Shriver in Paris. By this time, Arthur Watson was the American Ambassador to France. Suddenly, a bunch of irate American citizens were demanding to get into the Embassy and to confront the Americans they thought had called them Communists. There were American Vietnam veterans in their uniforms and medals. They were saying, "My God, I'm not going to take this. You called me a Communist? I just returned from fighting for my country."

Well, this happened to be on a day when Porter was not in town and I was chargé. Watson insisted on seeing me. He said that he wasn't going to pick up the Vietnam Talks Delegation's dirty laundry and he insisted that by God, it was up to Porter or somebody on his Delegation to deal with these people. I said, "Mr. Ambassador, whatever you wish; but please understand that you are changing an arrangement that has been in effect here since 1968." He was adamant and irate.
So, we decided that my then deputy press spokesman, soon to be my successor, Dave Lambertson, would go down to the Embassy lobby and meet this group. They had with them a protest which was supposedly written in blood on some parchment, and the protestors insisted upon handing it to us. This was in the grand lobby of the American Embassy in Paris. They handed the document to Lambertson and he took one look at it and saw that in it they called President Nixon some terrible names, and so forth. Dave said, "I'm not going to take that." He handed it back to them. The guy reached his hand out, touched it, but drew back just as Dave drew his hand back. The document fell to the floor. There was this confrontation. Lambertson was absolutely not going to back down and we were not going to give these people an audience on substance. So, that's the way it ended. Finally, they left. The parchment stayed on the floor for the char force to clean up. The group was dispersed. It was not pleasant. It certainly was very dramatic. I think it was unwise on Watson's part to break the distinction between the domains of the two Ambassadors. When you think about it, the proper vehicle for American citizens to affect policy is not through the negotiating team in the field, but rather through the democratic process.

Q: Well, I understand Watson was the ne'er-do-well member of the IBM Watsons and he was given Paris as an Ambassador in order to get him away from the IBM business.

LEDOGAR: He was very unpopular and difficult to work for. But it was his building that we were in. At the time, Ambassador Porter was not present. He would often leave the office early to go and use a HAM radio back at his residence and tune into the war. Porter was incredibly well informed about what was going on all over the place. He had this HAM network. It wasn't that he wasn't working. It was just that he felt that he didn't have to sit around the office and push paper. By this time, Habib was gone from Paris. Bob Miller was gone. Haywood Eisham was the deputy. It was not long after that I was out of there, and, after some home leave, on my way to Stanford University.

Q: Why don't we stop here? You left in the summer of '72 for Stanford, where you were going to take some senior training.

LEDOGAR: For me, Stanford was an opportunity to depressurize after eight years of working on Vietnam.

***

Q: Today is January 24, 2001. Steve, you were at Stanford from '72-'73.

LEDOGAR: Yes. It was part of State Department senior training. It was one of the unstructured university programs. At that time, each year two FSOs went to Stanford and two went to Princeton.

Q: Outside of getting decompressed, did you have any specialty?

LEDOGAR: Yes. I decided to approach this opportunity like a kid in a penny candy store with a five dollar bill. I had the whole university at my disposal, yet nothing was formally required. So, I decided to pursue kind of a remedial approach to my existing education and to get exposure in many areas where I felt that I was not well grounded: particularly as regards computers, statistics, and quantitative methodologies; also in international economics and trade. I soon found that while I was carrying a double schedule of courses, I was just auditing them and that, after a while I was not able to do all the work, nor all the reading. That would not have been possible for all the classes I was auditing - both undergraduate and graduate. So I started peeling off some of the courses and getting more serious about a few others. Also I kept trying to get the State Department to give me some idea as to where I would be assigned next because I had a marvelous opportunity to learn in an academic setting about my next assignment. But that did not work out.
The two State Department senior officers at Stanford were attached to the Hoover Institution for War, Revolution, and Peace For Rations and Quarters, where we were treated as visiting National Fellows. The Hoover Institution was politically conservative. Concurrently, we were attached for guidance and academic supervision to Stanford's Political Science faculty. That was fairly liberal, and that proved to be a useful combination because you'd get a whole bunch of insight from two points of view. Regarded as a reactionary academic bastion, the Hoover Institution had suffered greatly when the Stanford student uprising took place in early '72 over the Kent State massacre which came as a result from student protests over the Laos incursion, or whatever. The Institution's main building had its windows broken, façade smashed, and so forth.

At any rate, the student outburst on campus had occurred just the year previous to when we got there. The big Hoover building we were housed in had façades of structural glass and it was a very interesting and attractive piece of architecture, but the kids broke these huge panes of glass. I don't know how they got rocks big enough to do so… Perhaps they had used sledge hammers. There were a lot of cracks in them. The management decided that they would repair a couple of big panes in the back but they weren't going to invest in repairing the more exposed front ones until they had a sense that the student body in academic year 1972-73 was going to calm down. During my year at Stanford a real sea change took place. Pretty soon, the students were all quite conservative because the sixties were over and the Vietnam War was winding down for Americans.

It all my year at Stanford I never found out until too late where I might be sent next. For a while, it was thought I might be going to Delhi. Next the rumor for a while was that I was going to be sent to Kinshasa, Congo (now Zaire). It turned out, really too late to do anything about it at Stanford that I was going to be assigned to the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels.

Q: Up to this point in your career, you spent so much time on Vietnam. Had you really developed any kind of area specialty before that?

LEDOGAR: Nothing. I had a couple of previous assignments that were generalist type things. When I started, it was before they had the junior officer rotational concept, so we were advised to try to choose a variety of assignments early in our careers. I had been two years as a visa/economic officer in Canada and two years as an administrative officer in Italy. Then I was drafted for Vietnam. So of my first twelve years in the Foreign Service I had a total of eight years on Vietnam.

Q: So you were looking for a home.

LEDOGAR: Yes. But one sense of specialization had begun to develop in my mind. Working on the war in Vietnam from both the Saigon side, where I was upcountry, and from Washington and at the Paris Peace Talks - that was a total of eight years - it was all the time a political-military environment. Then I went to NATO and that just kind of continued my political-military vocation, but it transitioned me into European security affairs. From there, I kind of went into a sub-specialization of East-West arms control. So European security, arms control, and disarmament is where I specialized during my last twenty-four years.

Q: As an officer who had been intimately involved in the Peace Talks, did you find that this made you a target or a person of interest at Stanford?

LEDOGAR: I kind of merged into the scenery at Stanford and did not advertise that I was a Foreign Service officer who had spent a lot of time working on Vietnam. I just avoided any discussions and certainly any confrontations over policy. I grew a beard and rode a bike around campus. In the Hoover Institution, however, where we two FSOs had our little office, we were part of a cross-fertilization coffee klatch arrangement they had arranged. Once or twice a week, at 4:00 pm, the Fellows would get together and someone would be appointed to give a talk and lead a discussion among the scholars from all different fields. It was there that I was asked to talk about the Paris Vietnam Peace Talks. By that time, the negotiations were over. The rapid development of events when the breakthrough occurred in late 1972 caused the declassification and release to the public of a whole lot of details that even those of us who were on the Delegation at the time didn't know about, or only knew about in limited amounts. This had to do especially with the secret level of talks that Kissinger had with Le Duc Tho, and with the opening to China, and a number of other things of that sort. So, I did put together a talk and led a discussion on the Paris meetings on Vietnam. As I said, much information had come out

in the months just prior to my getting to Stanford or in my first month there. I was able to put a lot of recently declassified material into context, and I believe my presentation was well received.

Q: Why don't we leave it at this? We'll insert the chronology at this point.

LEDOGAR: Okay. I enjoyed my time at Stanford and I think I profited from it in terms of learning about things, particularly the whole new age of computers. I was behind. I found out quickly that I didn't want to be in Computer Science because that had to do with the cutting edge of technology, but rather the social sciences which had users courses where folks were taught how to use the computers as tools for research. I took a course in statistics, international economics and trade… Then I was informed not long before departure from Stanford of my assignment to the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels. I packed up my family, we drove across the country and took off for Brussels.

Q: You were in Brussels from '73 to when?

LEDOGAR: '76.

Q: What was your job there?
LEDOGAR: Let me talk about it in terms of the three different Ambassadors. When I arrived, Donald Rumsfeld was U.S. permanent representative. At that time, I was put in the mission's large political section as a foot soldier. Just prior to my arrival NATO had a structure where there was a four-person political section and a separate four-person political-military section. This really didn't make much sense, so the two were merged. After the merger we had a seven-person political section headed by Jim Goodby. This was under Rumsfeld. I was assigned to follow what they called the "flanks" of NATO. That meant political developments in the northern flank, which was Iceland, Norway, and Denmark, and the southeastern flank, which was Greece, Turkey, Cyprus.

Q: What a joy [laughter].

LEDOGAR: I got tangled up in a controversy very soon. It began with Iceland and the United Kingdom and their so-called "Codfish War." The Icelanders were convinced that the British were overfishing in the waters around Iceland and they declared a quarantine zone of I think 50 miles. They told everybody, "Keep out of our waters. They are for Icelandic exploitation only." Mind you, this was in 1973, before the Law of the Sea Treaty, back when territorial waters expanded out from national shores only as far as a cannon could fire; three mile limits, and the like. Of course, the British have an affinity for fish and chips and codfish is very popular in the U.K., especially in the northern parts of the United Kingdom near Iceland. The British reaction was, "The hell with this. These are free and open seas." So, things started getting nasty. The Icelandic Coast Guard cutters began to come out and cut the fishing warps, or the fishing gear, of the British trawlers. The Royal Navy said they couldn't stand for that, so they started sending frigates to defend the trawlers, not with guns, but by what they called "shouldering," ie, getting into a position where the Icelandic aggressor ship, the one trying to cut the lines,

had to give way to the frigate according to international rules of the road.

Q: Basically muscling them away.

LEDOGAR: Yes. In nautical terms it was called "shouldering." Matters got quite bitter. Then at one point there was a fatality. The ships were maneuvering so close they were bumping into each other occasionally, with each side playing "chicken." An Icelandic sailor came out to repair some damaged equipment on the deck of one of the Icelandic cutters and he used an electric arc torch. A wave came along spraying the welding area and he was electrocuted. That was the first casualty and there was diplomatic hell to pay. Because of the alphabet, the Icelandic and U.K. representatives sat almost opposite each other at the big roundtables of the North Atlantic Council. The Icelanders called upon all the NATO allies to chastise the United Kingdom. It was really David versus Goliath. The population of all of Iceland back then was something like 275,000 if everybody was home. Iceland has no military forces other than a U.S.-manned NATO force at the NATO base in Keflavik. The U.S. had airplanes and underwater listening capability and so forth in Iceland.

Of course, the Icelandic Delegation to NATO was only two officers and a support staff of two more. NATO was one of only eleven Icelandic diplomatic posts in the world, and the Icelanders at NATO were also accredited to the Belgians and to the European Common Market. So, their's was a pretty small operation. I made a couple of trips to Reykjavik to help cover events. I was only one of the people who were reporting for the U.S. on the Codfish War. I'm sure we had action officers at the Embassies in London and Reykjavik, but still there were only a handful of Americans really following this.

Eventually, the parties called upon the then-Secretary General of NATO, Joseph Luns, a very colorful fellow who had been around for ages, (formerly for 17 years Foreign Minister of the Netherlands), and requested his good offices to try to mediate the dispute. I don't know whether it was he himself who thought up or whether he was just the agent to carry out what was a fairly ingenious compromise. If you can, visualize a circular zone including the waters around Iceland as a pie chart divided into maybe sixteen different pieces, each about 22 and a half degrees. The waters were declared closed except that each week there was an open slice that rotated around the circle. Thus, over the course of so many months, all of the area in question had been opened and over the course of so many months all of it had been closed. That was the compromise. I can't recall all the details.

Q: Were we playing any role outside of going "Ta, ta, ta?"

LEDOGAR: No, the United States was taking the high and noble path of pointing out that NATO was an organization that was not designed to handle disputes between or among its own members. Rather, the alliance was designed to deal with external threats. We contributed nothing beyond rhetoric. We didn't put pressure on anybody that I know of. That was one of my accounts.

Very soon thereafter in the summer of ’74, we were in deep trouble in the Aegean.

Q: I had been consul general in Athens until July of ’74. When I left, all hell broke loose.

LEDOGAR: Yes. In a way the Cyprus crisis was similar in style to the Codfish War but much more dangerous in potential impact. Two NATO members, members of the same club, were each trying to take advantage of a captive audience to plead their case and to enlist sympathies, if not support. The rest of us were saying, “You two are going to have to work this out.” Things actually got to a very dangerous phase where at one point in the summer of ’74, there was a signal heard by many people that a Greek higher echelon air forces command was saying that they had an “enemy” cruiser in their gunsights and they were requesting permission to shoot it, to sink it; they got permission, and sank it. The only thing was that it turned out to be one of their own ships. It was tragic. There was a terrible loss of life. The point is that we could have had a hot war within the Alliance except for that curious blunder.

The Turks invaded Cyprus in 1974 and there was all kinds of stuff going on. We Americans had to scurry around and make sure that the nuclear weapons that we had under dual key arrangements with each of these two allies were fully protected and in no way could they be compromised by either Greece or Turkey. There was a lot to that Cyprus crisis.

Q: Here you are, trying to be the person who is supposed to say what’s happening. I would imagine that in the normal course of events, you have to depend quite heavily on reporting out of capitals and you put it together. You must have found two different worlds in hearing what was being reported from Ankara and what was being reported from Athens by our own missions. And on Nicosia, too.

LEDOGAR: Yes. And the wags would say that if you served in Ankara at the U.S. Mission there, you wound up really hating the Turks and believing the Greeks; and vice versa if you served in Athens.

Q: I have no sympathy at all for the Greek cause. I don’t have any great pro-Turkish thoughts, but I do know that when I have talked to people that the Greeks were really very nasty to the Turkish peasant class. This was a dictatorship. There had just been a military coup in November the year before where the colonels were ousted and a new set of guys came in, including the head of the military police, who was very bad news.

LEDOGAR: Yes. I’m not suggesting that NATO was a central point for action. It was just a central point for a lot of conversation. There was this captive audience and both Greece and Turkey were vigorously represented. They couldn’t resist taking swipes at each other. People would roll their eyes and groan sometimes out loud when one side would start up the propaganda because you knew the other then had to give its own version of it in an equal length of time. And each of them would find some excuse no matter what we were talking about to try to whack the other. When we got around to drafting NATO communiqués, we could say nothing that made even an oblique reference

to the crisis because the communiqué is drafted by consensus; therefore, you couldn't get anything approved. So, having the flanks assignment in the U.S. NATO political section turned out to be quite different than it might have sounded. It sounded like a peripheral job at first.

At the same time, there were other important events going on that I got involved in. After my first year there, Goodby was rotated to Washington and Rumsfeld couldn't seem to make up his mind about who he wanted to replace him. So, I got to be acting political counselor until Frank Perez arrived as permanent political counselor. By this time, the political section was unified. I was acting political counselor for quite a while. That was under Rumsfeld.

Then Rumsfeld was called back permanently to be Chief of Staff at the White House. He had first gone TDY (Temporary Duty) to Washington to be a member of the small commission that chose the new vice president, Rockefeller, when Ford acceded to the presidency upon the departure of Richard Nixon.

Soon after, Rumsfeld was gone. In 1975, of all people we got none other than David Bruce, for whom I had worked in the Paris Peace Talks some years before. In the meantime, Bruce had gone to China as our first Ambassador there and had done a couple of other things outside the U.S. Government for a while. He came back in as head of the U.S. Mission to NATO for most of 1975, as I remember. At the beginning of '74, Kissinger had declared the so-called "Year of Europe." Kissinger was still at the White House as National Security Advisor. He called for a redefinition of our relationship with European friends, first of all within the Alliance, but more challenging to the members, a codification of the relationship between the United States and the European Union. The NATO self-reflection coincided with the 25th anniversary of the North Atlantic Alliance, which was celebrated in Ottawa in the spring of '74. There, NATO published a declaration that said a lot of important things. I don't remember all the new departures, except that we agreed on the benefit to the Alliance of French and British nuclear weapons, and importantly for the future, managed to achieve agreement that events outside the NATO treaty area could have negative impact on the security of the Alliance. That had important implications later on. When you think that 25 years later on, about NATO's role in the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo (outside the NATO treaty area), the declaration proved to be very significant. But at the time, we were talking hypotheticals.

The effort to redefine a relationship between the United States and the European Economic Communities, the Nine, was filled with a number of problems. I'll summarize them as follows. A fellow by the name of Christopher Soames, who had been in the British government but later on became an EC commissioner, was outspoken on the EEC side. In effect, he said, "Wait a minute. You Americans talk like you want to renew or review or put down on paper what the U.S./EEC relationship is, but I know that what you Yankee bastards are trying to do is trade off security considerations against concessions from us Europeans on frozen chicken or corn gluten or other economic products, and that's not acceptable. Security has got to remain in the security area and foreign trade and so forth has got to be considered on its own merits." Furthermore, the European

Community said, “We are just beginning to take the first steps toward European political coordination and eventually political integration.” Kissinger and the United States replied: “We can understand your point about frozen chicken and so forth, but the U.S. has independent and friendly relations with each of the Nine. If you start moving, without taking into account our views, toward political coordination on subjects that we think should be discussed and coordinated within the North Atlantic Alliance or bilaterally, we Americans are going to be confronted with a nicely, neatly, tightly-organized, non-negotiable consensus and no spokesperson to deal with. When is our point of view going to be taken into account if you pre-cook your views on matters of concern to America and Canada and other non-EEC members of the Alliance?” So, this became quite a sharp debate. The two sides couldn’t really resolve it. The final step was kind of the gentlemen’s agreement to approach any difficulties that might come up in what was called the “spirit of Gimnich.” Gimnich is a chateau somewhere near Bonn, where the Nine had gotten together for some final meeting. They said, “Look, we’re not going to sacrifice our frail first efforts at European political cooperation to the booming voice and demands of Washington. On the other hand, we understand your point. So, what we’ll do is, we’ll make sure that whoever is in the European Presidency will have a special vocation to talk to you, inform you, in advance of the European Commission meetings, during, and afterwards. You’ll have plenty of time to know in which direction our debate is going. You’ll have an inside wire to help us learn how you feel.”

So, that’s kind of the way it ended. Nobody was fully satisfied, but it was one of these things that just couldn’t be fully solved. But all of that, including the drafting of these documents, took an enormous amount of time on the part of each of the political sections. Of course, the Europeans started to try putting into practice their political cooperation in the CSCE Helsinki process. That irritated us, too, because we and the other non-EU Nine allies had depended on NATO caucuses for coordination in the Helsinki process. “The Year if Europe” was a kind of a busy period.

I continued working fairly closely with Ambassador Bruce because I was the officer assigned to support him for the weekly Permanent Representatives’ lunch. This is where the Secretary General and the Ambassadors lunched together every Tuesday, just the Ambassadors alone. Many delicate matters were handled in this forum with no notetakers or interpreters; also, many confidences exchanged and sensitive decisions were taken. There was no one there except the Secretary General and the sixteen Ambassadors. So, to be sure that Bruce was prepared for all likely subjects, I would sniff around and ask my counterparts supporting their Ambassadors, “What might your guy bring up at lunch?” The object was to give our respective bosses little white cards or something like that with the briefing points. Then when our tiger came back, we would debrief him and take his notes and put togther a report. It was an excellent job and a chance to work pretty closely with Bruce. Also, in that period of time, the year that Bruce was Permanent Representative, a revolution was occurring in Portugal. The young officers who had returned from Angola overthrew Salazar-

Q: I think Salazar died but the successor government said Salazar was overthrown.

LEDOGAR: Yes. There was a question as to how far to the left Portugal was going to go. Eurocommunism was on everybody's tongue. Here is one area where I think that Kissinger was mistaken. I heard this later from the Ambassador who was Portuguese Permanent Representative at the time. This was a couple of years later when I met him. He said, "You know, Henry Kissinger used the analogy that Eurocommunism and the loss of Portugal would inoculate and make Europe immune to Eurocommunists. The thrust of his analogy was right, but he took it too far. What happened was that the obstreperousness of the extreme leftist Portugese military inoculated Portugal against Eurocommunism."

It happens that Frank Carlucci was our Ambassador in Lisbon. On the election day itself, since he had been portrayed as being excessively interested, Carlucci left Portugal and came to Evére. He spent several hours with David Bruce in his office. I would love to have been a fly on the wall during that conversation. I know that Frank was down emotionally, and maybe in terms of spirit. Those of us who were around when he emerged from Bruce's office thought he looked like a new man. He had gotten a real bucking up from the wise old man. At least that's my "fly on the wall" take on the whole thing. Bruce never said a word about what transpired. We all know that Frank went back to Lisbon and did a splendid job.

Q: Also, he was able to stand up to Kissinger and Kissinger was ready to write off Portugal.

LEDOGAR: That's it. That was what the Portugese NATO Ambassador meant. Kissinger was ready to write off Portugal.

Q: And just cut them off from everything and Carlucci said, "Wait a minute. Let's do something." He worked with NATO to make sure that NATO would be nice to the Portuguese military. At the same time, in Portugal, they were getting quite a bit of support, the socialists, from the West European socialist "mafia."

LEDOGAR: Yes, both of those are true. We later got into the business of the so-called American Brigade in the Portuguese military. That was sort of like U.S. special security assistance to a group in the Portugese military that was playing it straight. There were a lot of deft maneuvers there. I always thought that Frank did a first-rate job.

Q: I think it's one of the great moments in American postwar diplomacy. Luckily, he had had subcabinet status, although he was an FSO in HEW. He could have gone to Gerald Ford on his own. This was clear to Kissinger, who was in effect told, "Don't try to cut us off until we've had the chance."

LEDOGAR: Vernon Walters was around in Europe. Before he retired from the U.S. army, he had been military attaché in Paris. He was a superb linguist and an excellent intelligence gatherer. I knew him in Paris, although not terribly well. At any rate Walters was identified by Kissinger. Immediately after, the Portugese Revolution broke out and he was sent on a mission to Lisbon, sub-rosa. The idea was to find out whether our team

there headed by a political appointee could handle it. Walters reported back, "Sorry, you'd better get yourselves some new people." Immediately, Carlucci was selected. He then was in Brazil. Frank picked Herb Oken as his Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM).
Q: I think actually Carlucci was Under Secretary of HEW at the time.

LEDOGAR: Was he?

Q: Yes. That's where he got his power.

LEDOGAR: At any rate, Carlucci sent Oken out there immediately with authority to clean house. Oken kept the political counselor, who was a classmate of mine and was my source for a lot of this stuff - Charlie Thomas, recently deceased. He just said, "Goodbye" to almost everybody else and started reorganizing. Meanwhile, Carlucci worked the Washington scene. He went around to the head of every U.S. agency that had people on the ground in Lisbon. From each he got a commission and a mandate to do what he subsequently did. Then he arrived in Lisbon suddenly one morning on an overnight flight, immediately went to the Embassy, called a meeting of the country team, and said to them, "Now listen, I'm so and so and I've just been to see not only our Commander in Chief, but also the top dog in each of your agencies and services. I have it from that person eye to eye and handshake to handshake that I'm in charge. There will be absolutely nothing but 100% fidelity to the President through me. There will be no back channel reporting and nothing done by you that I don't know about." He just really read the riot act and at the same time enlisted the cooperation of the whole bunch. They proceeded to do a splendid job. Unlike the Spanish Revolution, the Portugese Revolution had very little bloodshed.

Q: NATO was a prime ingredient, particularly keeping the Portuguese in the NATO thing and in a way attracting on the military side the Portuguese military officers to keep them from being frozen out. Were you aware of any movement within the NATO circles to rally around and do what they could for this?

LEDOGAR: Of course the allies had limited capabilities to interfere in the internal affairs of a fellow NATO member. The informal focus was to support the Portugese military officers who had their heads screwed on right. For a while there, it looked very bad, as all military discipline seemed to break down. We were trying to support the organized Portugese military, including its chain of command, as well as trying to isolate a bogus line of radical junior officers and non-commissioned officers who fashioned themselves as an extreme left shadow regime.

Q: These were low-ranking commissioned officers.

LEDOGAR: They were way off base. It took a while before the good guys got into position where they could really cut off the activities of the bad guys. As was said, it scared the bejesus out of the Portuguese that they were that close to a Communist takeover. They became very good citizens. But these developments were mostly outside of my direct area of responsibility.

Towards the end of my time there at NATO, Robert Strauz-Hupé came in and replaced Bruce, who had lasted just a year. Strauz-Hupé- was an interesting fellow. He just did not have as many interesting things happening during his time at the helm.

Soon, I was off on reassignment in mid-1976. I had managed to turn one of my trips to Reykjavik into an opportunity to stop into Washington to see what was available and to talk to a couple of senior officers. I wound up with an offer of a job in Security Assistance. So, by this time, it's the end of the Ford administration. Kissinger is Secretary of State. I came back to Washington during the presidential campaign of '76. One of the foreign policy planks that Jimmy Carter was running on was that U.S. arms sales had gone "amuck" and the United States had reached an immoral level of international arms transfers. Under the Nixon/Ford era we had gotten to the point where, in Henry Kissinger's words, "The Shah of Iran can have anything he wants." Even before the election, opposition to the high level of U.S. arms sales was already brewing. Congress reacted by passing the Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976 which introduced some curbs to the power. This suddenly thrust the issue of arms transfers onto center stage both in the campaign but also within the Ford administration. There were certain things in the new law that had to be complied with immediately. I was offered a choice between two jobs, both in the field of arms transfers: either in the Political-Military bureau, (PM) as head of an office there, or in the Office of the Under Secretary for Security Assistance.

A fellow by the name of Carlyle Maw had recently been appointed as Under Secretary for Security Assistance. He had been senior legal advisor of the Department under Kissinger. At the time, Kissinger had a lot of legal problems, including the Halperin wire-tap suit, and the nationalization of some multinational corporation in Peru or Colombia. There were a lot of pressing legal things. Maw, who was the department's chief lawyer, was wanted by Kissinger closer at hand, so he rose to the seventh floor and one more level in the bureaucracy, but he continued to be the top lawyer. All this new Security Assistance stuff and arms transfers would have to be taken care of by someone working independently but out of Maw's office. In between the time I received my assignment there and the time I showed up, a fellow who had formerly been Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, named Amos (Joe) Jordan, was brought in to be the Security Assistance guru. So, Maw gave everything to Joe Jordan. Though chosen because I was a lawyer, I wound up working for Joe Jordan and Maw continued to do his legal stuff. It wasn't very many more months before Ford was defeated and Carter came in.

With Carter's arrival came a determination to take a whole new approach to U.S. international arms transfers. The new crowd felt that arms trade and arms aid were really an immoral and sordid commerce. We shouldn't be engaged in it to the extent we were. Carter said we had to cut way back. To discipline ourselves, he said, we should put a collective ceiling on the total dollar amount of the arms we were willing to transfer, as well as national sub-ceilings for individual countries. All kinds of crazy stuff. Military grant aid to our Cold War allies was considered by Carter to be just as bad as cold-blooded sales to right-wing dictators. It was an extremely interesting period.

Q: With these constraints, what about Israel? Was that not part of the game?

LEDOGAR: No, in dividing up the Security Assistance pie, Israel always had its full share fenced off. That was seen to by its many friends in Congress. When you started talking about who was going to get how much of whatever was left, it was always with Israel already taken care of.

But the trouble was the advocates of restraint got a lot of emotion involved. Some would ask, "Why do we ever sell guns and flamethrowers and all sorts of terrible things?" The answer, of course, is because Security Assistance is to help people to defend themselves. In many ways, it's an honorable thing to help out a friend who is in distress and danger. Some people can't afford to provide for themselves. Others would argue, "Yes, but what you're really doing is, you're trying to sell enough of these terrible machines so that the dollar cost to U.S. military of each piece of equipment goes down, and then the United States can better afford more equipment." The pros and cons…back and forth. There still is a lot of emotion attached to arms sales: "merchants of death" and all this jargon.

But with the arrival in office in early 1977 of Jimmy Carter and Cyrus Vance, they wanted to put a woman in a very high position in the State Department. They identified Lucy Wilson Benson and suddenly, bingo, she was made Under Secretary for Security Assistance, the number five slot in the Department pecking order. Lucy was a woman of extraordinary capability and experience. She had been the president of the National League of Women Voters and in that capacity had spent a lot of time testifying before many different Congressional committees on the wide variety of issues that the League chose to take positions on. She was a Democratic political figure from Massachusetts and had held high Massachusetts state office. Lucy was an honorary member of the Massachusetts Congressional Caucus in Washington. She was extremely well connected and was a very intelligent and effective woman. The problem was that she didn't know which end of a gun was the dangerous one. To put her in charge of Security Assistance and U.S. arms transfer policy was almost suicidal. As an Under Secretary nominee, she needed Senate confirmation. In order to get confirmed, she needed a crash course on weapons of war. I was held over as special assistant to the Under Secretary and was in charge of her special education in instruments of death. There were other people, new appointees, in the State Department bureaucracy, who did not need confirmation. They knew that this was a hot political subject, especially early on, and they knew that if they wanted to make their mark on policy, the time to make it was before Lucy got confirmed. So, we had these wild few months in which I was her special assistant. I was in charge of teaching her to distinguish a main battle tank from a self propelled howitzer. She had to learn the differences among F-16s and F-18s and F-15s, and so on. We took her to Aberdeen Proving Grounds and let her fire guns and drive tanks and all kinds of things. I took her on a quick trip to Portugal, Spain, and Morocco because they were close together and we could visit three diverse U.S. Security Assistance teams in the field, and do it all in one long weekend. Meanwhile, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs was end-running us. It was a real bitter, black-belt, bureaucratic struggle. It showed the ineffectiveness of the structure of the State Department at the time, where you had the

Under Secretary level, but Under Secretaries didn't have line command over the Bureaus. They were sort of like commanders of ad hoc policy task forces.

Q: Did Ms. Benson get up to confirmation?

LEDOGAR: She finally got confirmed. She was very intelligent and was doing a fairly good job, but she had one weakness that was easily exploitable. She had a handicapped husband in Amherst, Massachusetts. Every Friday late afternoon, she flew up to Amherst and would come back to Washington about midmorning on Monday. So that's when all policy recommendation memos would move up to the Secretary from the bureaus, late Friday afternoon, Saturday, and early Monday morning, bypassing our office.

Q: Were you all trying to protect her?

LEDOGAR: Yes. But to tell you truthfully, I found to my dismay that in the Vance State Department there was a big difference between affirmative action as a gesture and what I would call real affirmative action. The real thing is where you push someone who is from a minority into a position of responsibility, but then you support that person to make sure that they're effective in that position. Of course, they used Lucy as a token and kept pointing to our senior woman, number five in the chain of command in the State Department. But when it came time to make sure that she was informed and her opinion was sought and respected, there was none of that. I was deeply disappointed that the people who appointed her didn't also decide to make her relevant. She could have been much more effective than she was.

Q: Was there a battle between your office, which was called T, and PM?

LEDOGAR: You bet.

Q: What were the issues?

LEDOGAR: Who was going to make the decisions and who was going to make the recommendations and whether Les Gelb, who was then director (not yet Assistant Secretary), had a direct pipeline to Cyrus Vance and could send his recommendations independently. Bureaucratically, he was supposed to report through Ms. Benson and factor in her take on things. These were policy recommendations that were forming the basis for the Carter Administration's new departure on arms transfers. It was hot stuff at the time. It was a blatant bureaucratic end run. I was trying to get her in the policy loop, but I didn't get very much support from the 7th floor.

The problem with the new departure of the Carter Administration calling for arms transfer restraint was that instinctively Cyrus Vance and Les Gelb and his people tried to carry it out simply by putting into effect Carter's idea of an annual ceiling on the total value of U.S. arms transfers. Little thought was given to applying stricter criteria on proposed transfers, case-by-case. In practice, a ceiling becomes a floor very quickly in this kind of situation. If you say that "We're not going to transfer more than eight billion dollars worth of arms next fiscal year," everybody says, "Oh, yes? What's my share?

How much of that goes to NATO? How much goes to Iran?" Then people want to make sure that if their share is X million dollars, that they get it early and they spend it early. Pretty soon, you find out that rather than hitting eight billion by the end of the year, you're up at eight billion halfway through the year and there are a lot of unfilled requirements. It just doesn't work out to try to tie your own hands artificially for the purposes of self-imposed discipline.

Q: Jimmy Carter came in saying he was going to control this "merchants of death" thing, to cut down on lethal arms sales, sales just for sales sake. Was anything really done with this? Were they really about to put much of a crimp in sales?

LEDOGAR: Well, not really. Several things kind of overtook events. The Shah or Iran was overthrown. There were a couple of other developments. I know of a couple of big sales that were killed. But I was quickly out of it and into another aspect of political-military affairs and not able to keep up with the… I was tapped four or five months into Ms. Benson's tenure to come take over the Office of NATO Affairs in the European Bureau, RPM.

Q: I was going to ask about Secretary Vance. Was he doing something else?

LEDOGAR: Cyrus Vance is a very bright, honorable, and very nice guy. I'd worked with him a couple of times, including very early at the Paris Peace Talks. He's a fine gentleman and so forth, but I don't think he had a lot of stomach for bureaucratic struggles. Vance was Secretary of State while Brzezinski was National Security Advisor. Brzezinski was cutthroat. Cyrus Vance made the mistake of trying to declare good relations between State Department and NSC staff. In practice, that translated into a predicament wherein every time there was a confrontation, the NSC staff prevailed. They didn't have any admonition to get along with us, but we had to get along with them because there was no department support above Bureau level. It was extremely difficult. The only way we could defend ourselves was by overwhelming them with numbers and paper. NSC staffers were few in number. We would just bombard them with decision memos. Rather than trying to cut them out, we cut them in on everything, the tiniest little detail. Soon, they were crying for help.

While struggling with this arrangement, I was working for George Vest in the Bureau of European affairs and Jim Goodby was his deputy assistant. I was by now the NATO Office Director. For most of the time, we had W. Tapley Bennett as our Ambassador to NATO. I did EUR-RPM from the middle of '77 to the middle of '80, ie, Director of the Office of NATO Affairs. That was one of the best jobs in the State Department. It was extremely busy, a mainline office where you were working on all the important European security subjects that the Secretary of State was working on.

Earlier that year, immediately after Jimmy Carter came in, in January 1977, a Summit meeting of NATO took place in London, at which certain measures were taken as short-term improvements in the Alliance's defense posture. A study was commissioned for longer term defense improvements, with a view to reporting to another NATO Summit

the following year, in the spring of 1978, in Washington. In effect, we allies all challenged each other and agreed that we would all try to pull together and increase our individual defense spending by three percent in real terms per year. That long-term defense plan caused an awful lot of work to be going on when I came back into the NATO arena in mid-'77, including having to start preparations for hosting the Washington Summit, which occurred shortly after I became Director. That's a little bit hard, as NATO Director, because you wind up having to do the work of not one state visit, but 15 or 16. The Washington NATO Summit in 1978 wound up being a temperature-taking on the London Summit challenges, especially the three percent defense spending initiative. The long-term program was adopted in Washington. Also around that time we began to get into preparatory work on what became the NATO two-track decision on Euromissiles.

Q: Were you around and had to deal with this rather unfortunate episode of the neutron bomb and Helmut Schmidt?

LEDOGAR: I was indeed.

Q: Do you want to talk about that from your perspective?

LEDOGAR: Yes. Again, this was early in my time as director of NATO. I joined the briefing team that went around major capitals in Europe in which our chief weapons experts from the Pentagon were presenting briefings to key allies about this nuclear weapon that was being developed, which had the properties of enhanced radiation but reduced blast (ERRB). It was dubbed by the press as the "neutron bomb." Some mistakenly thought this terminology was gratuitous slander by waggish journalists at the time; but actually, "neutron bomb" was carryover terminology from the very early post-World War II nuclear period, when the U.S. was developing nuclear-tipped anti-nuclear missile missiles (an extension of the NIKE program). It was decided back in the 1950s that you had a better chance of a kill in trying to intercept an incoming intercontinental missile in space if you used radiation to disable the target rather than a big blast. So, the technology was understood, but we had only just decided that ERRB warheads might be useful in the crowded potential battlefield of Central Europe, where one of the deterrents to NATO using battlefield nuclear weapons in pursuit of our flexible response strategy was the fact that so many Germans would be put at risk, assuming the Soviet attack went into Germany.

So, it was thought that it would be useful to have a nuclear weapon that was very discriminating in that it killed people near ground zero but it did not destroy all nearby buildings, nor people and things more distant. The idea was that an enhanced radiation weapon would be especially useful against heavily armored columns. The Warsaw Pact needed to mass its tanks to try to punch through NATO's forward conventional defenses. A heavy concentration of tanks would present an attractive target for a NATO battlefield nuclear weapon. If such a nuke could be used without endangering our own forces or surrounding civilian areas with an enhanced radiation/reduced blast warhead, you could knock out the crews of tanks without necessarily having to smash the tanks and

vaporizing the countryside. The problem was it was sort of a gruesome sounding weapon, and was susceptible to being portrayed as a "weapon that would kill all the schoolchildren but leave the schools intact."

At the insistence of Congress, we had to organize it so that key European leaders would make commitments to receive these weapons on their territory before we, the United States, went into full production. NATO commitment to deploy was all set to go, and we even got Helmut Schmidt way out on a limb. On the very eve of the NATO meeting at which ERRB production and deployment was to be announced, our then Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, got to his friend Jimmy Carter. Young said, "You can't do this. This is the eve of the UN Special Session on Disarmament. It would just be unthinkable to authorize and speak affirmatively and even threaten the deployment of this weapon at this critical time." So, Jimmy Carter said, "Oh, yes, okay, we'll drop it." Nobody in Carter's immediate entourage even dared or was capable of saying, "Mr. President, you no longer have the freedom to kill the program suddenly, because we've gotten our allies way out on a limb in support of it. We will have to find some other way to buy time and organize a way for Chancellor Schmidt and the others to climb back in again before you saw off the limb." But Carter went ahead. We killed the program and guess what? Helmut Schmidt was furious. The task of informing the Germans fell to George Vest, who had to take some of the first lightening bolts from Schmidt. It was a general disaster of our own making.

There was another thing I'll mention since it's come back into the news here now, as we speak in 2001, after the Bosnian difficulties. We decided in the late '70s that there was an important weapons system that was being developed as a tank killer. It was an airplane called the A-10 "Warthog." It was kind of a big, slow sub-sonic jet built around a big Gatling Gun, with five or six 30 mm. machine gun tubes.

Q: It was a big shell.

LEDOGAR: To give this weapon special punch for it to be able to penetrate enemy tanks, they made the slugs out of depleted uranium. It was recognized that in depleted uranium, (DU), low-grade radiation was still present. The DU rounds were very safe for handling and storage, but if your tank happened to be hit by these rounds, fired in anger, there would be a serious amount of radiation energy released as the slug penetrated the armor, because the DU gasified in the explosion.

Q: Also, the density of these meant that unlike most other things it would penetrate armor.

LEDOGAR: Yes. DU is harder than tungsten, harder than any steel. They also use DU in armor-piercing rounds fired from tank guns called "sabot" penetrators. But our problem was DU rounds for the A-10 aircraft. Trying to profit from the bitter experience of the neutron bomb, we did manage to orchestrate a smooth announcement and deployment. The material was accepted. The A-10 logistic base for the U.S.-European command was near London. The planes were fully deployed to their positions throughout NATO

Europe, but not carrying the depleted uranium munitions unless it was in time of war. The idea was that these DU rounds would be used only in time of war, not for training.

The NATO two-track decision on Euromissiles was worked out at the end of the Carter Administration. (And, incidentally, at the end of my tour in EUR (Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs) at the RPM, or Office of Regional, Political, and Security Issues). This was an effort by the NATO allies to address and try to deal with the destabilizing threat posed by the SS-20s medium range missiles of the Soviet Union. We came up with an Alliance approach, a two-track decision. On the one hand, we would try to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union on Euromissiles and also on strategic arms. We had already had one go at strategic arms control with SALT I and the ABM Treaty. We were in the process of trying another one, SALT II. But at the same time, we felt the need to get a handle on the SS-20. We felt that in order to have real negotiating capital, the Soviets had to understand that on the NATO side, if action in the form of negotiated reductions was not forthcoming, NATO was going to deploy its own Euromissiles. So we formed a group known as the NATO High Level Group, and set about the job of identifying what kind of missiles we would want to deploy ourselves, and where. We selected a combination of 108 new Pershing land-based medium-range missiles, and 464 new ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). These Pershings would all be based in Germany, but the GLCMs would be based in five countries - Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Italy - the so-called "basing countries." That started this long struggle that was very big stuff for a couple of years, as we developed this plan and actually started to manufacture the missiles and build the deployment bases.

The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact started an all-out propaganda campaign, engaging all the Eurocommunists in trying to badmouth our Euromissile deployments as an attempt at escalation on the part of NATO. Some of the basing country governments that had strong center-left coalitions really were hard put to carry out their undertaking to accept deployment on their own territory. This was a very busy time. The problems included how to organize our response to the Soviet SS-20s, arrange it, take the decision, bind the people, and then start spending the money. The Congress said, "We want to have proof that the Allies are going to accept these missiles if we're going to put the money up to build them." Finally we started to bring the systems into Europe. In the meantime, it was time to organize the so-called Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations, which had to be started in Geneva. That's why it was called "two-track." NATO was going to negotiate the Soviet missiles out or it was going to deploy to offset them. Strategic nuclear arms negotiations were also going to begin at that time in Geneva.

Q: In a way, the Soviets started the thing by introducing the missiles.

LEDOGAR: That's right, but they wanted to try to say, "What's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable." They tried to prevent NATO's counter-deployment. But they were unsuccessful. Just to set the context, recall that the INF negotiations began in Geneva in November, 1981. Paul Nitze headed the U.S. negotiating team and Mike Glitman, my predecessor as DCM at U.S. NATO, was chosen as his deputy. In early summer of 1982 the famous "walk-in-the-woods" took place in the countryside near St. Cergue,

Switzerland, 15 or 20 miles north of Geneva. Nitze and his Soviet counterpart, alone on a stroll, worked out a tentative INF compromise on their own personal responsibility, and each undertook to propose the idea to their authorities. I don't know whether Moscow or Washington hated the idea more, but as I recall, the Soviet Ambassador was the first to say that the trial balloon didn't fly at home. In November 1983 when deployment of U.S. INF missiles began in Germany, the Soviets walked out of the INF talks in Geneva. It was not until March 1985 that the new, and eventually successful, round of INF talks started again in Geneva. By this time Glitman was chief U.S. negotiator, and he brought home the bacon.

Let me just touch upon an indirect role that I played in the NATO two-track, or dual-track, Euromissile episode. As I mentioned, the INF consultations within the Alliance had two tracks, the hardware track called the NATO "High Level Group" (HLG), and the arms control track called the "Special Group" or the "Special Consultative Group" (SCG). National representatives to these groups were high level officials from capitals who came together periodically at NATO, where they would consult in an exploratory fashion, each representative speaking not necessarily on behalf of his government, but with knowledge of the general direction of his government's thinking on INF. Both groups were chaired by Americans, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy for the HLG (most of the time this was Richard Perle), and the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs for the SCG (most of the time this was Rick Burt).

While these officials traveled to Brussels with small groups of experts from capitals, the essential business of each meeting took place not at the formal meeting itself, but at a dinner at my residence for heads of delegation. In addition to spreading out a fine meal for the 16 to 18 of us in the dining room around one big table, (my wife and the household staff saw to this behind the scenes), it was my job to chair the meetings as a host, recognizing those who wanted to talk, making sure that everyone had a chance to speak, and, as diplomatically as possible, squelching side comments or conversations. These heads of delegation dinners, and my wife and I put on perhaps 50 or 60 of them over a six-year period, developed a protocol of their own. The USG sprang for a special dining room table, as long and wide as my dining room and space for waiters allowed. We sat with me in the middle on one side, facing a mirror behind the opposite side, which helped me see everyone easily, and the American chairman of the Group sat opposite me as co-host. The representatives of the five INF basing countries were assigned on a rotational basis to the places of honor at each side of the two hosts. Others were rotated from month to month around the other seats "below the salt." From time to time, especially in the SCG, the heads of delegations would have a special guest like Mike Glitman, our INF negotiator from Geneva. I needed to have a solid grasp of the details of the INF issues but it was not my job to speak to substance, rather it was to create the atmosphere so that others could. Needless to say, there were extensive physical and electronic security measures in place at my residence for these meetings. But here we've gotten ahead of ourselves talking about the two-track decision. Let's go back.

Q: You traveled around a great deal. As regards NATO, what was your impression of the commitment, the ability of our NATO allies? Not necessarily an absolute one through ten

ranking, but generally speaking.

LEDOGAR: There were certain features that you could count on as perennials. The allies were very upset when it seemed as though America was taking the lead and calling the shots. Then they were equally if not more upset when it seemed as though the United States was *not* taking the lead and was *not* calling the shots. There was always this ambivalence about the role of the U.S. as NATO leader. Now the French, who saw themselves as number two - and one recalls the admonition that it's always worse to be second best in poker or in love - had this Gaullist holdover from the late '60s that as long as Europe was perceived in an alliance-to-alliance or a bloc-to-bloc dynamic, France would be condemned to be number two and would not be fully independent. They really felt that in Europe they were number one. They didn't want to be seen, as one of them explained to me sort of in a half rage, as the coal tender on a choo-choo train where the United States was the engine and everybody else was following. So the French had this real disdain for a bloc-to-bloc attitude. They, of course, had kicked NATO headquarters out of France.

Q: That was in the mid-'60s.

LEDOGAR: Yes. And they adopted a separate defense posture when they withdrew from the NATO military structure. They had separate positions on a whole lot of things. We were constantly running into problems with France and its theology about what was proper and for which NATO forum, what was not proper, what was strictly defense business and what was political or treaty business. They would not have French forces "integrated" on the NATO side. They talked about a strategy of "toute azimuth," which sounds a bit chilling to friends; in other words, they were prepared to shoot in any direction.

But other allies seemed to become so predictable when you had as much time in NATO as I did (11 and a half years of strictly NATO work broken only by a year off for the Senior Seminar). In late 1981 I went back to Brussels and became deputy chief of mission. So I had really had a lot of NATO time. I found that even as the personalities change, there are certain national characteristics of allied countries that remain constant. Some of these are charming. Some of them are very annoying. The Italians always tried to be the peacemakers. In times of negotiating impasse they always came up with "split-the-difference" solutions. They would compromise anything, even when others of us felt that we were with our backs to the wall and there was no further room for compromise. Other national characteristics were hot and cold. In my time the Scandinavian governments and Portugal were often leftist. It was always a struggle within NATO when leftist elements came into governing coalitions in these various parliamentary democracies, especially if Communist ministers came into high security-related positions. NATO security documents could be compromised. How do you deal with that?

Q: How did you deal with it?

LEDOGAR: There were only a handful of things you could do. One of them was reach

an agreement with the country that they would have to close down their registry of NATO documents. Any document classified beyond confidential would be returned to NATO headquarters and could be read there by certain appointed representatives of the government, but it could not be left in any position where a Communist minister could dial up the archives and demand to see (and copy) sensitive NATO documents. At times, we just canceled certain sensitive meetings or had them without inviting all allied reps. Very difficult. You had to deal with these security problems with a combination of being straight forward and letting leaders of affected allies know that as long as you've got Communist members in your governing coalition, you're just not going to be on distribution for certain sensitive documents. There is also the all powerful tool of a business luncheon hosted at the home of one of the ambassadors. Any group of ambassadors can get together and have lunch together and discuss anything they want. Nobody can say, "I'm left out." If it is not a scheduled meeting, there is no requirement to have everybody at the luncheon table. So, a lot of business was conducted that way, when we were concerned about leaks to the Warsaw Pact through Communist ministers in coalition governments of friendly states.

Q: Two things I'd like to cover. One was the view from NATO and from your perspective of the Soviet menace. This was not a quiet time. The Brezhnev Doctrine was getting cranked up and then you had the Afghanistan invasion. How did that play?

LEDOGAR: That played very poorly like a pail full of icewater in the face to many of us at NATO. It was the end of the concept of detente. It killed SALT II. The U.S. was running up to that treaty in late '79 and briefing it to the Alliance and telling ourselves that this was a pretty good deal, and then the Soviets marched into Afghanistan. That was that. We had the boycott of the Moscow Olympics. Things got very chilly at the end of '79, which happened to be very close to when U.S. self respect was being offended all over the place, including in the Iran-hostage crisis.

Q: What about this resurgence of Soviet might abroad, going into Afghanistan, which was essentially almost a satellite anyway? Did this change things with the French or the Italians trying to find a middle way?

LEDOGAR: On the contrary, I think it was very positive for NATO solidarity. People who began to chafe under good times started looking around for their friends when times started getting bad. It was rather terrifying to a lot of people that the Russians would do this. It was the first time that they really marched into foreign non-Warsaw Pact territory. Of course, Congress was infuriated.

Let me again go back here. I keep following NATO issues that began when I was NATO Director in Washington (1977-80) and following them as they continued when I was U.S. NATO DCM from 1980-'87. I went to the Senior Seminar in academic year 1980-'81. This was my second period of senior training. There were the requisite five or eight years in between. The Senior Seminar was a superb experience. I enjoyed that very much, traveling around the U.S. The big emphasis at that time was knowing the United States, all about the U.S., and very little about foreign affairs.

Q: I was in it from '76-'77.

LEDOGAR: I'm not going to spend a lot of time on the Senior Seminar because as a period of training it would not be of much interest to scholars of foreign affairs.

Q: You went from the Senior Seminar to where?

LEDOGAR: I learned the lesson that it was not a good thing for a career FSO to go into senior training or a short term assignment when U.S. administrations were changing. Instead of having an orderly process working in one job until you knew where you were going to go next when your training was over, you went out into the corridor at the end of the training. So, I was walking the corridor when I got out of the Senior Seminar. I did have some interesting short term assignments. I served on a promotion board. I was a member of a team that wrote the script for one of these big national emergency exercises conducted by FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency). That was kind of fun because you prepositioned cables and designed cataclysmic events that included decapitation nuclear strikes on Washington. But all the time I was angling for the job of deputy chief of mission back at NATO.

I should probably say a little bit more about the Senior Seminar in addition to it being a superb personal experience. I like to think that I was the sort of FSO that the program was designed for. I still had 16 more years in the Foreign Service, and it turned out that I spent 10 of those years as an Ambassador. That's what they were trying to do, to broaden and deepen the background of people who were going to move forward in senior jobs. For a while, the seminar was being used instead as a parking lot for people with assignment problems. As a part of our academic year in the seminar we had the phenomenon of the class study. Each seminarian was given a certain amount of money and a certain amount of time and was supposed to do a serious original study on a subject that was totally unrelated to his own field of expertise. As part of our study of the U.S. energy situation then in crisis, I did my study on van pooling and car pooling in America. That was a lot of fun.

Q: How did it go in the corridors trying to get a job?

LEDOGAR: Of course, the Reagan Administration, a new administration, had begun in early 1981. The two-track decision on Euromissiles had advanced to the point of deployment and the Soviets were calling for nuclear negotiations in Geneva. Early in the first year of Reagan's Administration, there was a summit meeting, at which it was agreed that the U.S. and the USSR would return to the table and have another whack at strategic arms reductions talks and a first whack at medium-range nuclear missile talks. Still in Washington, I had been offered a couple of jobs and they were pretty good jobs, but not in my judgement as good as DCM of U.S. NATO. But Mike Glitman was holding down that NATO DCM job. Washington wanted him to become Deputy in the U.S. Delegation to the Euromissile talks in Geneva. But Mike had certain conditions. He just wasn't interested in having his family in Washington while he went on trips back and

forth to Geneva. Also, he wanted to be sure that he wasn't just the State Department representative on the U.S. INF Delegation, but rather that he would be truly the Deputy and the alter ego to our Chief INF Negotiator, Paul Nitze. Mike's negotiation with the State personnel people was going back and forth, and I was being yanked towards a job in the African Bureau or alternatively towards a job in Vienna on the MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction) Delegation. But I managed to hold on. Suddenly, Glitman was gone to Geneva and I was told to get to Brussels immediately. Tap Bennett, who was still there as our ambassador and whose desk officer I had been for four years, wanted me to come out immediately. It was just six weeks before the December '81 ministerial meeting time. I did that. I wound up serving five and a half more years in Brussels as the DCM of the U.S. mission to NATO.

Q: This was from '81-'87.

LEDOGAR: That's right. There were three U.S. ambassadors to NATO during my time as DCM. The first year and a half of it was Tap Bennett. Then for about three years from mid '83 to late '86 it was David Abshire. Right at the very end of my time, a fellow by the name of Alton Keel came in, but Keel and I overlapped only a short time. I left for my own ambassadorship shortly after he arrived.

Bennett, who had been at U.S. NATO a long time by the time I got there as DCM, was looking forward to his retirement and he knew that I knew the stuff and had been doing NATO for quite a bit of time. So he was quite content to let me handle an awful lot of the top stuff. Then David Abshire came. He was the founding director of the then-called Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, a big think tank guru and a very effective guy. He brought to NATO a whole different vocation, much of which was to continue the type of Foreign Affairs research and analysis work he had carried on in Washington. So, he added this on to the responsibilities of the Ambassador there. Again, I was left doing much of the Ambassadorial-level day-to-day stuff. Abshire didn't speak French and he didn't have a keen interest in a lot of the minutia. So I got to go to an awful lot of the Ambassadorial meetings. I spent a lot of time as Chargé because Abshire was off organizing conferences or doing a lot of special work for Reagan back in Washington.

Q: Taking think tank extension courses?

LEDOGAR: No, he was being briefed. He would organize big international conferences and symposia in Brussels to which he'd get visiting U.S. Senators and Congressmen, senior European statesmen and businessmen, and every think tank director that he could identify from around the world to come together. Abshire would get USIS to put up some money. He was always a master at leverage - "So and So's going to be there. You've got to be there. So and So is putting in money. Don't you think you ought to match that?" U.S. airlines would be told that it would be wonderful if they would supply all the transportation.

Q: I'm not exactly sure what NATO… [laughter] This does bring out the question…

You've watched NATO. We had professionals in there and we've had other people come in there who have had their strengths and weaknesses, but sometimes it doesn't seem to be listed as an absolutely top assignment. Sometimes it gets rather political.

LEDOGAR: Bennett was the first career guy to get the job of Ambassador to NATO in, by then, almost 30 years of the Alliance history, and yet he got his job the same way all of his political predecessors did. He was a good old boy from Georgia. He was a friend of Jimmy Carter and all the guys around him. Abshire, Keel, and Taft followed Bennett. It was years before we had another career guy, Reggie Bartholomew. Then recently we had Sandy Vershrow. In my opinion, the U.S. assigned a mixed bag of political Ambassadors to NATO. Some were quite good, and some were near disasters.

Q: By the time you were back there, did you find that the equation had changed? You had a gradual growth of the European Union. This must have been something that had a certain dynamic. In a way, it's a counterforce and sort of a new solar system.

LEDOGAR: There are two sides to that. The European Union members were becoming more and more organized and beginning to coordinate more and more on political matters, but both the United Kingdom and France were loath to get into military cooperation if such European coordination in any way touched the fact that they were nuclear powers. They wanted to keep the nuclear vocation quite separate and play that with the United States directly, and with Russia and China. Also, the U.S. and the EU were beginning to understand each other more and feel less threatened. Some of the complication of the so-called "Year of Europe" and the idea that U.S. trade concessions would be balanced off against mutual security concessions - people realized nobody was going to play that game. But gradually, the European Union was becoming more of a power as regards coordinating European political positions. At first, it was sort of a joke when these people representing the European Commission would sit down at Western group meetings, semi-camouflaged in National Delegations. The rest of us asked ourselves: "Who is this person? Who does he represent?" But then gradually one realized that as EU political cooperation coalesced and Brussels became more powerful, there was a real reason for an overall EU point of view, especially when they started making modifications to their internal rule of consensus. That made decision-making in the political field easier for them. So, in a sense, yes, there were changes.

But in another sense, pure security matters always remained the furthest away from the likelihood of European political cooperation. More "Pol" and less "Mil" was the gauge for better success for the EU when trying to deal with "Pol-Mil" issues. One reason for that was the particular attitude of France. Since 1973 we had East-West "alliance-to-alliance" conventional disarmament talks going in Vienna: the MBFR talks. France and a couple of other countries didn't play on the basis of "our side, your side." In MBFR, positions were fully coordinated in advance. That was because the underlying problems with which both East and West were trying to come to grips - conventional force in balances and disparities - were all viewed as bloc-to-bloc. We also had quite a bit of East-West security negotiating experience by that time in the various aspects of the Helsinki process, i.e. the security basket in CSCE. Its spinoff entities started to coalesce and spawn

new negotiating forums. They touched on security and cooperation in Europe, as the name CSCE indicates. But, the whole question of trying to organize East-West confidence and security building measures had to be undertaken with the assistance of France. But Paris insisted on the basis of a the committee of the whole, 35 nations under the Helsinki Process. Bloc-to-bloc approaches were discouraged by France. The Americans and several others asked, "How were we going to address the fundamental problem of whether there was a balance or imbalance between the forces of the two sides, or whether there was parity or disparity, or whether there was symmetry or asymmetry in our force postures, without considering the negotiations in terms of NATO versus Warsaw Pact?" After all, each military alliance was committed to maneuver, and if necessary, committed to fight together. That was the core issue. It was our alliance against the Soviet alliance in time of conflict.

In our view, the East had too many tanks. If we were going to have equal security at lower levels of confrontation, we would have to get at the question of the heavy concentration of equipment on the basis of what their alliance had and what our alliance had. Furthermore, the neutral and non-aligned countries of Europe, especially Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Ireland, did not wish to negotiate about their force levels or their territory. But no! The French would not accept this logic. A bloc-to-bloc view is heresy to a Gaulist. It lead to what France hates about Atlanticism, or dependence on American leadership. So, conventional force reductions had to be done somehow on the basis of what each individual country had. There was an intellectual impasse. NATO decided to take a fresh look at it within the Alliance. At the NATO ministerial in the Spring of 1985, ministers put together a High Level Task Force on conventional arms control (HLTF); we started to debate amongst ourselves how to organize a new approach. Shortly before, both the French and the Russians began to talk about how Europe, for security measures, should really be seen in the geographical context of the Atlantic to the Urals, and address the common security problem for the whole European tectonic plate - the whole Eurasian entity, instead of taking the bloc-to-bloc approach. A broad consensus emerged on the basis of this geographic view that there ought to be a new approach towards the conventional arms control in Europe: one that would take into account all of Europe, East, West, neutral, or nonaligned.

Eventually we got the French to agree that NATO would have to organize some combination of the two approaches. While one might have the trappings of the Helsinki process and be associated with the Helsinki way of doing things in one sense, we weren't going to allow Sweden and Switzerland and the other neutral or non-aligned states to deal themselves into an Alliance versus Alliance perspective and still remain neutral. If they didn't have anything to put on the table, then they didn't have any place at the table. We were going to count everybody's forces whether they wanted to be counted or not if they were potentially confronting entities. This went on and on and on. We had terrible fights within NATO in which the opposing views were championed by the United States, especially me, against the French negotiator, namely, Benoit D'Abouville. He overstepped his authority at one point and spent part of the year trying to retract an agreement that he had made. We wouldn't let him; and gradually we worked out an agreement. I was the chief U.S. negotiator, under Washington instruction; the French

foreign office even tried to personalize things and suggest to Washington that I, Steve Ledogar, was the problem because I was a Francophobe! Washington didn't buy any of it, so they of course backed me.

Q: Did you have the feeling that the French proposal was mainly to make France a major player or were they on to something that we were missing?

LEDOGAR: There was an awful lot of old-fashioned Gaullist emotion and theology in their position. On the other hand, I do think that France had some real problems with trying to project Europe as Eurocentric with themselves in the lead. They also had difficulties with the whole North Atlantic concept of the U.S. and Canadian presence in Europe as a World War II holdover. While they wanted American troops in Europe and the U.S. nuclear umbrella extended over Europe, they did not wish to suffer the consequences of a predominant U.S. role. They said they wanted to have Europe for Europeans.

Q: How did the British, Germans, Dutch, and others feel about this?

LEDOGAR: For the most part, if you got them aside where there were no public consequences, they would admit that they agreed with the United States on the need to approach the question of European conventional arms reduction on an Alliance-to-Alliance basis. But they would quickly add, "Don't make me choose in public." They knew that for the longer term their vocation to a unified Europe would be threatened if they were made out to be disloyal to European unity. It was important to understand that. We Americans had to take a lot of heat and listen to disappointing silence from those others. Occasionally you might hear quiet encouragement, an occasional note of understanding or something like that, but the British, Germans, Dutch, Italians, etc., did not want to be forced to come out publicly in front of others as favoring the U.S. position over the French position. It was quite a dicey thing.

Q: It was important to have the continuity to understand from where everybody was coming and you could take your hits from the French and all that and not take them as seriously. I mean, you're not out to win France over in a brilliant burst of oratory.

LEDOGAR: No. A curious thing happened years later when I was U.S. disarmament negotiator in Geneva. I was getting along splendidly well with my French counterpart there. Our two delegations were working especially well together. Once, in a friendly private conversation, he asked, "Where did you ever get this anti-French reputation?" I said, "I was never anti-French. In fact, I'm part French myself. In fact, I love France. My wife is of French descent, my children were both born in Paris, and my daughter's godmother is French. What I despise is the French attitude towards NATO. I've always made that clear." I argued vociferously back in 1986 against the French approach to HLTF, because I thought it was contrary to my own country's interest and to the interests of the Alliance. This guy, the French Ambassador in Geneva, who became a very good friend, said, "I think I understand."

Q: You were dealing with NATO affairs for quite a while now. I'm not sure exactly when the Helsinki Accords started. But it was during the Kissinger period. George Vest was involved. What was the attitude looking at NATO towards the Helsinki Accords as it developed? In a way, particularly the "third basket" turned into a major key in unlocking Eastern Europe. Were you seeing a development of this being a peripheral thing, a growing awareness of how important this was?

LEDOGAR: For the U.S. the CSCE started out under a cloud because Henry Kissinger had absolutely no use for the whole Helsinki process. He thought it was a bunch of gibberish. It was "mush." To him it was all softness and sloppy thinking - the antithesis of "Real Politik." He particularly saw no utility in the humanitarian "third basket." Indicative of his disdain, in order to assuage some elements in Congress Henry even agreed to the establishment of a U.S./CSCE Commission - a joint U.S. executive legislative commission - that dealt in a lot of these matters. That's how far Kissinger regarded CSCE from being a useful instrument of U.S. foreign policy. With the commission in operation, when we had review conferences of CSCE processes, the U.S. Delegation had great problems because some U.S. congressman wanted to come to the negotiations to make speeches - uncoordinated personal speeches - to win brownie points with immigrant constituents. They would make their own policy on humanitarian affairs, on hostage release, on human rights, and so on.
On the other hand, U.S. diplomats who understood the Helsinki Process and learned how to work it realized gradually, and sometimes to their surprise, that what the founders had hoped for was really becoming true. In many East European countries, despite repressive Communist dictatorships, there was a lot of attention to the third basket and to the whole Helsinki process. CSCE represented an international entity, seven of whose members were states of the Soviet Bloc. Citizens of the East could quote CSCE statements, and CSCE communiqués had weight. You could not flout the dictatorship that was ruling you on other things, but you could say, "Hey, look, the CSCE communiqué has said so and so. How come we are not measuring up?" There have been a lot of interesting things written about what the U.S. learned later on. East European defectors started coming out saying, "Keep up the pressure on the CSCE because that makes our critics' voices legitimate." In reality the Helsinki Process had a significant impact on the events that led to 1989, and the breakup of the Iron Curtain.

Q: Czechoslovakia and other places. When it first came out, the main thing was that this would solidify the lines. Everybody agreed to what the boundaries of Europe were, that sort of thing. That's what the Soviets were after.

LEDOGAR: That's exactly what they were after. In CSCE communiqué negotiations they had to agree to pro-human rights passages in exchange for what they required in the security basket: inviolability of 1945 borders, etc.

Q: And they got it and then they got this bowl of mush, which really came back to haunt them.

LEDOGAR: It sure did. The French were looking ahead perhaps more than we were and

they saw that the Helsinki process was a thing to support, and that if you could figure out some way to do the conventional armed forces negotiation under the Helsinki process, that would have its advantages. Of course the main advantage for France was that CSCE was not bloc-to-bloc and thus did not leave the United States in a position of commanding leadership. Paris may have been right about that from their point of view. They might indeed have come out better from the point of view of their current national interests because they didn't have to follow the U.S. lead.

Q: More and more as one looks at this, the United States is put into the role of the leader of things like human rights, coming out for anti-corruption on business, what have you, and the other countries' representatives may privately think, "Yes, that's a good idea. We really have to do that," but we were sort of designated as the tough guy and they would kind of sit there and watch.

LEDOGAR: Yes. And also, we were the tough guy who had to bear the heavy defense spending bills. They had other things that they wanted to emphasize.

Q: Were you feeling the pressure or concern about things such as withdrawing troops from NATO and so on? Was this a sword that was hanging over all of you all the time?

LEDOGAR: Yes, it was. It found many expressions. Many Americans were instinctively opposed to the U.S. continuing to bear such a heavy burden so long after World War II with 300-some odd thousand U.S. troops and so many billions of dollars per year to defend Europe. Why weren't the Europeans doing more themselves? That issue was constantly before us. We were constantly having to respond as best we could to questions about continued U.S. presence in Europe. The standard response was that since we perceived that the threat to our national interests originated with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, we'd much rather confront that threat far from our shores rather than have our troops back here in North America where in the event of WWIII, we would have to fight our way back onto the Continent yet a third time this century.

Then when you asked about how much it was costing us, I can remember at one point the answer that was given in congressional testimony was, "Well, Senator, our bill for our commitment to NATO is either $3 billion or $4 billion or $9 billion, depending upon how you count." That was a perfectly defensible answer. What do you count? Do you count all the supply tail of deployed forces back at Fort Bragg, for example? Do you count all the support structure that's there in Germany, but which is backup so we can deploy forces all through the Middle East in the event of an extra-NATO crisis? There were so many different questions that needed to be answered before you could begin to answer the question as to what NATO cost us. That was a constant theme. We were proactive in congressional relations about U.S. troop levels in Europe when we were at our best. Certainly under Abshire we were. We would say, "Senator, you come on out to NATO. We'll give you a thorough exposure to the issues, walk the terrain, and talk to some of our allies" and so forth. Our objective was to get them to begin to appreciate the realities, not to change their minds.

That proved to be a very important approach in the arms control negotiations. Once the U.S. got to sit down with the Soviet Union in Geneva on SALT and START and INF, we then started in Vienna with the Conventional Talks in Europe. Paul Nitze, who had left the INF talks in the hands of Glitman to finish them off, stayed back in Washington as a special advisor to the Secretary of State on arms control matters. He made a special point of encouraging the Senate to appoint from its membership arms control observers. These folks at Paul's urging would take periodic trips to Geneva and stop by Vienna on the way just to be kept exposed and up to speed with what was going on. In the meantime, key staffers were given cables and kept current with developments in the negotiations. It was sometimes a hell of a drag in terms of timing, when the Senate Arms Control observers arrived on short notice, but when it came to earning support and, more importantly, consent to treaty ratification, it really paid off.

Q: Oh, yes. Congressional and media visits can seem sort of like a fruitless exercise, but in the long run, they are essential.
LEDOGAR: We should have done something like that during the later chemical weapons and Nuclear Test Ban Treaty negotiations, but did not, and therefore we have had this mess with the ratification of those treaties.

Q: Yes. What about the NATO military command? How did this work?

LEDOGAR: Well, you became very aware of it especially at the Ambassadorial and DCM level, when periodically, at least twice a year, we had big military exercises that would last for a week or so; war games, if you will, but ones that were played out as a command post exercise.

In these NATO military exercises, the scenario always had the Warsaw Pact being the aggressor and prevailing in the early weeks of the conflict, especially if you wanted to get to a level where NATO nuclear weapon release procedures would be exercised. The Pact would be winning rapidly, so the issue would arise that the only way we were going to stop them was if we gave authorization to the military authorities to release battlefield nukes. In the exercise scenario the military had to request political release of so many nuclear weapons to give us a rough idea where they wanted to use them. The North Atlantic Council would have to approve it. So, the exercise usually went on just to the point of actual nuclear employment and then the exercise was over. That was once a year. The other big semi-annual exercise of the command structure usually was a more simmering political exercise. There were many other times when you were exposed to the NATO military because they sat in, had a representative at all the big meetings, and we frequently made trips to visit troops in the field. We were quite close to our folks on the international military staff: the U.S. military representative to the NATO Military Committee, and his staff. The NATO Military Committee is the senior military body. That's at NATO headquarters in Brussels. They supervise the three Major NATO Commanders (MNC). One MNC is at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe) and that's the one that people think is the biggest because that's where the American top dog is based and where most of NATO's military might would most likely be attached in time of crisis or war. There is another major NATO field commander, also

an American, based down in Naples at CINCSOUTH (Commander in Chief, Southern Command). A third MNC always a Brit, commands all forces in the area of the English Channel. These three report to the NATO Military Committee at NATO headquarters. The U.S. representative on the headquarters committee is a four star flag officer and he has a staff of U.S. military folks who are right there in NATO headquarters.

I forgot to mention that in 1982 we had the very interesting phenomenon of our NATO ally the United Kingdom going to war with Argentina over the Falklands. That was fascinating, to see how a real crisis worked. The British quickly called a meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee and announced that while the attack on them did not involve NATO directly, being outside the NATO treaty area, the U.K. would be sending substantial British military assets from the Northern Hemisphere to go to the South Atlantic to defend the Falklands. Thus British contingent reinforcement to deal with a possible full NATO mobilization in the event of an East-West crisis would be temporarily degraded. From time to time, the NATO military authorities would be asked to brief the North Atlantic Council ambassadors. On other important conflicts outside NATO's direct area of responsibility, like the Iran-Iraq war or other events that were of potential danger. I also did not mention the 1982 accession of Spain to NATO.

The Spanish people voted for it, didn't they? It was not considered a sure thing.

LEDOGAR: No, it was not. For a long time, the United States was in favor of it and the Spanish authorities were interested, but not yet ready to take the issue of joining NATO to the Spanish people. They did, however, want to study the implications for Spain of acceding to the NATO treaty. So the U.S. used to have kind of a special relationship with the authorities in Madrid that after each semi-annual NATO ministerial meeting, someone would be spun off from the U.S. Delegation from Washington to stop in Madrid on the way home. The idea was to give the Spanish a first hand insight and expert reporting on what we were doing. That job fell to me for four years between 1977 and 1982. While I was NATO Director in Washington I always came home from ministerial meetings via Spain.

Q: What were you gathering from the Spanish? What was in it for them and what was in it for us and how were they reacting?

LEDOGAR: They were acting very businesslike. Having been holding NATO for so many years under Franco at arms length, when King Juan Carlos and the Socialists came in and started to consider NATO membership, the Spanish obviously had to climb a steep learning curve. When the U.S./Spanish NATO working group was formed, I must say the Spanish put good people on the job and these people did their homework. At first they couldn't comprehend some of the arcane things like NATO common military infrastructure, which is very complicated. And yet you'd find out the first time they came back they had studied their papers and they were asking very intelligent questions, and the next time they were asking very penetrating questions. In the process, the Spanish were building up a cadre of people who became very well informed about even NATO minutia, though it was not yet politically ripe to make the public move. Then once they

decided to put the issue to the people, things moved rapidly. In fact, the lead up consultations had been so quiet that we had a curious period when the issue of potential Spanish accession became very active; we, the 15 existing allies, had to turn around and kind of reeducate ourselves as to what were the values of having Spain join up. The inclinations were to look only at political problems. Some allies were overlooking the geostrategic considerations: the territory and the population, the GNP, and the military forces, the navy and air forces and so on. I think Spain moved when the time was right. There were certain Spanish leaders that deserve a lot of credit for making that move. Fifteen years later, a Spaniard became the Secretary General of NATO.

Q: Is there anything else we should cover up to '87?

You were saying that you had a problem which was part of the support system, which was the Department of Defense school, where the children of our military and also our diplomatic service go.

LEDOGAR: In Brussels there was a fairly substantial community of American government employees accredited to Belgium, to the European community, to NATO, and to the international organizations. Because of NATO there were a lot of military personnel. But there was no regular U.S. military base. When in 1966 NATO headquarters left France and moved to Belgium there was established in Brussels a Department of Defense school. At that time, any U.S. government employee in the community could use the DOD school. Children of civilian U.S. government employees, while not required to go there, had to pay tuition if they went anywhere else. The U.S. government would not support education of children of its employees assigned to Brussels other than at the DOD school. Thus, if you were a State Department officer or a CIA officer, you couldn't get reimbursed for any school other than the DOD school. The theory was that the U.S. taxpayers were supporting one government school. Why should they pay "again" to reimburse parents who wanted to send their kids to a non-U.S. government school?

But it turned out that the DOD school that was right there in Brussels, not being on a base, therefore was not enjoying the infrastructure support from a U.S. military establishment, the maintenance personnel, all of the plant material, etc. It was pretty far down the line in terms of priorities for the European DOD school system. It was not drawing good teachers, and the school was just kind of sinking in standards and becoming worse and worse. The American civilian families said, "Look, I didn't join the Foreign Service to go overseas just to be put into a ghetto situation where my kids have to go to a second class school with only Americans. What little advantage my kids can get from being with us abroad is that they can go to school with the foreign kids they play with next door." Then the U.S. military parents' answer would come back, "You're just fancy pants diplomats and you don't like your kids going to school with kids of sergeants and corporals. That's your problem." "No, it isn't that. It's blah, blah, blah."

It became an elitist question and very divisive. The allegation was made that if the civilians were given freedom to go elsewhere with government support, suddenly 25% of

the student body would be pulled out and the critical mass necessary to keep the school in Brussels would dissolve. In that event, the Brussels military kids would have to be bussed all the way down to SHAPE, where there was a big U.S. DOD school that was quite reliable but about 45 miles away. It got to be quite bitter, with parents getting all emotional and flying off the handle, and senior people getting involved.

It didn't help that at the beginning of the Reagan administration, the president appointed a Conservative U.S. businessman to be U.S. Ambassador to Brussels. There were three different English language schools in Brussels that the American community (both business and government) used. Two of them were private and the third was the DOD school. It happened that all three were attended well below capacity - there was more capacity than there were students. The U.S. Ambassador, with his businessman's approach, said, "Look, why don't we close one of the three and fill up the other two? Then instead of all three being at 2/3 capacity, we'll have two schools that will be at full capacity and the redundant resources could be shared." He sort of suggested that the worst of the three schools was the DOD school and he asked, "Why don't we just close that one?"

Well, then the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe — a senior four-star general — came out of his cavalry saddle. He really got very excited and in effect replied to the Ambassador saying, "We make a deal with American servicemen when we order them and their families to leave the United States and the advantages of the American system that they have there. According to that deal, we're going to make family life abroad as much like the United States as we can. There are lots of morale advantages for our people and there are advantages for U.S. policy. It keeps our guys off the streets. There is less friction with the local community. And yes, our people can go to an American commissary and buy canned Chef Boyardee spaghetti even though they are based in Verona, Italy."

There were just these two cultures, U.S. military and U.S. foreign service, clashing. I, being the deputy chief of our mission to NATO, with a delegation that was half military and half civilian, sort of wound up in the middle of this thing, being lobbied by both sides. The curious thing is that the solution came not locally, but with the stroke of a pen in Washington, when someone said, "Well, we don't see why American civilians in Japan or Italy or anywhere should have to go to DOD schools. Why don't we just give U.S. civilian agency parents their allowance and let them choose?" Suddenly the issue was resolved. It turned out that many of the non-military students who were in the Brussels DOD school decided, "Why should we get out now and start in another English language school when we have just one or two more years to graduation?" There was no abrupt drop-off. Also, the DOD realized its Brussels school was not first rate and threw some more money in and upgraded it. So all three schools survived. But the thing I remember was how passionate parents get when the issue is schools for their kids.

Q: You're talking about the kids.

LEDOGAR: That's right.

Q: A good friend of mine, Tom Stern, was DCM in Seoul, Korea, and got into one of these things. He had the people from the Embassy whose kids were going to DOD schools saying, "Well, there are not enough college preparatory courses" and some of the military side said, "We don't have enough vocational training." It was a battle. It is *a cultural problem.*

LEDOGAR: In my own family when my wife heard that I was angling to go back to Brussels for our second tour she said, "I'll go to Brussels, but our kids (then eleven and nine) are not going to go to that DOD school." That's the first thing she said. The reason was that she had played tennis for years over in Brussels with American wives and then back here during my following five years in Washington with the same folks that we knew from our first Brussels tour. The kids of my wife's tennis partners, who had all gone to the DOD school, all seemed to have had problems in later schooling. The mothers were constantly blaming the DOD school, saying that their kids didn't learn good study habits, they didn't have sound foundations in this and that. So I had strict instructions when I went back to Brussels to find another solution for our two kids that was not the DOD school. I was not looking forward to paying tuition for a private school. As a matter of fact, I was very fortunate to be able to get them on a space available/tuition free basis into the European Common Market school, (the English language section), which was a superb school. It was only after our kids had been a couple of years in the European school that this big American community blow-up occurred. Then the Washington Worldwide Ruling provided allowances for USC civilians regardless of proximity to DOD schools. After that policy change, we would received reimbursement for tuition like anybody else, but ours were already in the Common Market school, effectively on scholarship, and doing well.

Q: Is there anything else we should talk about?

LEDOGAR: I had some theories that I developed on the basis of a lot of multilateral political work. I used these thoughts in counseling young officers, especially political officers, when they would arrive for a tour of duty at NATO. My objective was to alert them as to how different a tour in multilateral affairs would be from any previous tour of duty they might have had as a political officer in a bilateral post. A lot of people have attitudes about multilateral diplomacy versus bilateral diplomacy. Any one of us can have prejudices. Mine favor multilateral diplomacy as a profession, but I respect those prefer bilateral diplomatic work. The point is that there are some fundamental differences that one should expect, especially in NATO work. When we would get new political or economic officers arriving, and especially if they had experience in a bilateral post, I thought it was important to warn them from the very beginning, "You've just come from a place where your job was was to get out of the office, learn what's important, learn who is important, what's going on, and then analyze things and report back to Washington those things that affect U.S. interests." If you were doing your job, you were probably not around the Embassy very often. You would have to develop your contacts and you'd have to nurture them and exploit them on your own initiative.

Here, you're going to find political work is quite different. You can have a very successful tour of duty at NATO headquarters and never leave the building. All your contacts are already made. Your committee counterparts from the Netherlands and Norway and so forth; those are your contacts. The fact that a scheduled NATO meeting takes place means it's important to the United States. You've got to make decisions. You may decide how important the meeting is and how much space to devote to it, but you've got to report it. It's an Alliance event that was scheduled here. You will learn how to draft cables here like you've never done before. We produce an enormous amount of reports. We do it at a very high speed. But one thing you will get here in abundance that is very hard to come by at a bilateral post is experience in multilateral negotiation. It has little to do with experience in bilateral negotiation - selling a car or a house, settling a two party dispute, and so forth. Multilateral negotiation is not zero sum. It's not winners and losers. The whole business is moving ahead in a common enterprise to extract the highest common denominator, and getting it right. You should start with the recognition that there are differences. Multilateral diplomacy is different. If you accept that, you'll have an easier time of it. I still feel that that's true.

Another thing, and this is a prejudice of mine, but I did some bilateral work and found it to be true, is that a lot of the bilateral issues were what I call "garbage on the neighbor's lawn" kind of issues. They are not very important in themselves but they take on an importance in the local context. U.S. radio transmitters and magazines are spilling into Canada and sucking up advertising dollars that Canadian radios and pubs would rather have for Canadian media. That kind of stuff. You'll find that in multilateral diplomacy, the issues, while often fuzzy and less clear-cut than bilateral ones, are of a higher caliber.

Let me just run by quickly the remaining events of my five and a half years as U.S. NATO DCM. In '87, during the last few months that I was in my second tour of NATO, I began commuting to Vienna once a week to represent the United States at the CFE [Conventional Forces, Europe] negotiations. Recall that within NATO the allies were hammering out an agreed approach by the sixteen of us to try to engage the seven member Warsaw Pact states. For a while, I was going back and forth every week between Brussels and Vienna between two pretty big jobs. Indeed, for three months in the winter of '86-'87, I was U.S. Chargé ad Interim in NATO between Abshire, who left to be Reagan's Iran-Contra advisor, and his eventual replacement Alton Keel. Keel suddenly came out of the NSC staff because of some political upheaval in the White House.

Beginning in early 1987 with Monday morning working breakfasts at 23 in Vienna, we gradually got going on CFE. Then after a period of time it became clear that this was going to take off into a full-fledged negotiation and that the U.S. would have to have an Ambassador and a full time Delegation there. About that time the U.S. Ambassador who headed our Delegation to the MBFR post was transferred to a new assignment.

Now, funding for the MBFR team came out of the State Department budget. State also had first dibs on controlling the new U.S. CFE Delegation, but it had not budgeted for it. Having been U.S. Representative all during the NATO in-house deliberations, I was a likely candidate. As this new approach to East-West reductions of conventional armed

forces in Europe wound up, the older forum, MBFR, continued, but would be wound down. There were other strong candidates for the new position. I did not hesitate to point out to Washington that if I got the nod for CFE we could do both CFE and MBFR with one team.

That's the way it worked out. Ledogar was the low bid. In the middle of '87, I moved to Vienna; and shortly thereafter, I was appointed as an Ambassador by President Reagan to be in charge of the U.S. Delegations to both CFE and MBFR. There, with the one delegation, I was doing two negotiations. One was the old approach to East-West conventional arms control, MBFR. The other was the design phase for the new approach; ie, to design a mandate for the CFE.

Q: What do you mean by "design phase?"

LEDOGAR: Well, before we 23 members of the CFE {NATO (16) and the Warsaw Pact (7)} could begin talking about actual reductions, we had to agree what we were first going to talk about: what the geographic area would be, what would be on the table, who would participate, and what the rules would be. By going for a detailed mandate first, we agreed on all sorts of things that usually complicate a regular negotiation or are in some of the minor paragraphs of a treaty. In other words, first we specified the scope of the negotiations. Jim Woolsey, who eventually took over the CFE portfolio for the U.S., testified that his job was made relatively easy in many ways because much of the tough procedural stuff was already done by the time he got there to Vienna.

Q: I assume it was the Soviets on one side. Who was on the other side, you and who else?

LEDOGAR: We worked it out that it would be the 16 members of NATO on one side and the seven members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization on the other, i.e., 23 of us would do the negotiations. There were 12 other states who were also members of the CSCE, namely the European neutral and non-aligned states. They would be kept closely informed of progress in the negotiations but they would not participate in any of the meetings, nor would any of their territory or any of their armed forces be considered as negotiable. Because their security would be affected by what happened among the 23, it was recognized that the 12 had a right to inside information and to have their views taken into account. All of this design phase work would fall in the end into a so-called mandate, and this mandate would form part of the final product of the then-ongoing Vienna CSCE review conference. That was in accord with the compromise worked out with France: the new CFE Negotiations would be fundamentally autonomous among members of the Western and Eastern military alliances, yet CFE would be within the framework of the Helsinki Process (i.e., the 35 of CSCE). That's the way it worked out. The mandate was concluded just in time to be promulgated in January 1989 in the Vienna CSCE review conference final document. This coincided with what became known as George Schulz's last waltz in Vienna at the very end of his tenure as U.S. Secretary of State and the end of the Reagan Presidency.

Q: Up to that, were the major events or developments in the Soviet Union with

Gorbachev and the beginning of openness… Were these considered positive things or were we somewhat suspicious about this?

LEDOGAR: No, the major events really started as we were finishing the mandate. The U.S. presidential election was in ’88. The wall came down in ’89.

Q: It was the fall of ’89 when things started to happen. I was wondering whether we were seeing a different Soviet Union as far as looking at negotiating.

LEDOGAR: That’s an interesting question. Again, this was a problem of the interlinking of CSCE and CFE. We on the allied side for the most part had the same negotiators for MBFR and doing the CFE mandate. The Warsaw Pact used their CSCE Ambassadors and Delegations to do the mandate also, while they kept their old MBFR terms in place. So, I had two different Soviet counterparts; the MBFR fellow was old school (and he really was old school, complete with heavy Soviet rhetoric, steel teeth, bad table manners, and a babushka wife). On the CFE/Mandate side was Moscow’s CSCE Ambassador, a Gorbachev type: a slick guy with perfect English and French cuffs and a good sense of humor. He was from head to toe the modern kind of Soviet diplomat. Different countries used different combinations. On the Warsaw Pact side, some of the CSCE ambassadors from those days survived the breakup of the Pact and the Soviet Union, and they continued to serve their country as republics, and are our NATO allies today. Others were Communist thugs who were thrown out when the revolutions occurred. But as far as whether I began to see the walls come tumbling down, it was only right towards the end of my time in Vienna. I stayed after the mandate was completed and started the main reductions phase of CFE as holdover U.S. Ambassador under Bush. But rumor had it that the Bush folks wanted a new ambassador of their own. I lasted only six months into the Bush Administration.

Q: When was the mandate completed?

LEDOGAR: Just at the very end of the Reagan administration, January ’89. The President came into office on January 20th. We American Ambassadors in the field all had to put in our letters of resignation. I was a Reagan appointee and a career officer, and it was a “friendly” accession from Reagan to Bush, but still all sitting Ambassadors had to resign.

Q: You had received ambassadorial rank by this point?

LEDOGAR: Yes, back in ’87 when I went from Brussels to Vienna and took up as head of two negotiations with this one Delegation. I got two Senate confirmations, one to be U.S. Ambassador and representative to the Conventional Stability Talks (the early name of CFE), the other as U.S. Ambassador to the MBFR talks. So, it was a curious thing: I had two commissions, one Delegation, and two basic jobs. Then when Bush came in, we all were informed that in keeping with the traditions of the Service, all sitting ambassadors must send in letters of resignation. You could say anything you wanted in your letter, but were required to use word for word, one particular, unambiguous

resignation sentence.

Then the word that was filtering back from Washington was that, "A lot of you folks are going to get moved around, including you career guys. President Bush, who had just completed two terms as Vice President, is determined that he's going to have his Administration clearly seen as Bush I, not Reagan III." There were certain career people like our ambassadors to Germany and to the START talks in Geneva and there were others like me who were to be not fired but moved around. I knew from friends and scuttlebutt that my Vienna job was being talked about. I knew a couple of people it was being offered to. I knew a couple of other people that were trying to grab it. This was all coming back to me through backchannels from friends and things like that. Once during the first Bush months and while on consultations in Washington, I had a conversation with a good friend, Ron Lehman, who was then Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA (International Security Agency). He said that Jim Baker was trying to present him as his (Baker's) new man in Vienna. Ron said to me, "I don't think I want your job." So, I told him, "You don't want my job. It is not like Max Kampleman at the strategic nuclear talks in Geneva because he is the top dog at three bilateral negotiations. Max has a lot to do with making policy. In Vienna, I'm just the point on the end of the pencil for a multilateral negotiation on conventional arms, the policy for which is made first of all in Washington and then it's coordinated in NATO headquarters. So, in Vienna we don't have much to say about policy. All we do is execute it. It's no Kampleman-type job." It turns out Ron Lehman was offered instead the job of Director of ACDA, and took it. Then there were various other people. Even my friend and predecessor as DCM at U.S. NATO, Mike Glitman, was offered my job. In 1987 Mike had become the U.S. bilateral ambassador to Brussels as a reward for delivering the INF Treaty. The new Bush crowd wanted to free that Brussels job for a political appointee. So they were offering my job in Vienna to Mike, who wanted to stay where he was. It looked as though they had run out of ideas. The full-fledged CFE negotiation, which was a new negotiation, actually started shortly after Bush took office. Secretary Baker came to Vienna for the kickoff in March, 1989. Of course we already had the mandate. All this design, and a lot of the hard, grubby work was already done. We got off to a flying start and pretty soon CFE was moving along well. Then President Bush in Kennebunkport reached some new policy decisions that really caused the negotiations to cascade forward. Other participants, including the Russians, wanted to count not just tanks, big guns, and armored personnel carriers, but also troops, airplanes, and helicopters. Kind of out of the blue, Bush decided, "Why not?" and instructed us to say, "Okay, we'll throw those other three categories on the table, too." Boom! It was full speed ahead to the CFE Treaty.

Q: What was on the table - guns, planes, artillery?

LEDOGAR: It started out as a negotiation limited to main battle tanks, not light tanks, but heavy tanks; artillery pieces, big guns, and armored personnel carriers. The East wanted to put airplanes in the mix. But we said, "They're too mobile, too difficult to locate and count at any one time." The East wanted to negotiate on troops - we said, "No, that's going to get us back into a whole lot of category fights: reserves, border guards, air force personnel, coast guard? We'll only repeat the data debate of MBFR." Helicopters

was pretty much an open question. Nobody had a strong opinion on that.

But suddenly the President decided, "Let's put these other three categories in if that's what the Soviets and their allies want." All at once we had ourselves a red hot negotiation. Then I got a phone call from Washington to tell me that I was being replaced. More precisely, I got a phone call saying that I was going to get a phone call from the Secretary of State and he was going to tell me that I was being transferred. I asked, "Where am I going?" I was told, "To Geneva." Who was coming in? Jim Woolsey. Secretary Baker did call me and confirmed this. At the time I was very disappointed. I wanted to see CFE through to a treaty. It turned out to be the best thing that ever happened to me in my career. Soon after, the CFE negotiations were wrapped up in less than a year, so the job in Vienna ended. I got seven more years as U.S. Disarmament Ambassador in Geneva.

Q: Why don't we talk about that the next time?

LEDOGAR: Okay, that's fine with me.

***

Q: Today is April 11, 2001. Steve, you arrived in Geneva in 1990?

LEDOGAR: Very early '90, yes.

Q: You were there for seven years?

LEDOGAR: Seven and a half years. I left Geneva and retired from the Foreign Service in May of 1997.

Q: We'll start there. Your title when you went to Geneva was what?

LEDOGAR: Ambassador and U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament.

Q: In '90, the Soviet Union was still in existence, but things were beginning to move rather rapidly. What was the situation when you got there vis a vis your work?

LEDOGAR: First of all, let me point out that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) was a direct descendant of the old UN Disarmament Committee. In 1990 the CD included 40 nations. The CD was autonomous in many respects except it was dependent upon the United Nations for rations and quarters, for funding, including office spaces and interpreters. Our meetings took place at the UN headquarters in Geneva. But the Conference on Disarmament had a rotating chairman. (The original arrangement had been an alternating U.S.-Soviet chair). Importantly, it worked by consensus, not by voting, as the UN General Assembly, the Security Council, and most UN Committees did.

Q: 40 nations by consensus?

LEDOGAR: 40 nations by consensus, which is not easy. That figure of 40 members initially diminished because when the two Germanies merged, we went to 39; when Yugoslavia fell apart, we went to 38. So the CD had 37-38 members for most of the time that I was U.S. Representative. At the same time there was increasing pressure over the course of the period I was there, which was seven and a half years, for CD expansion. Eventually in 1996, the Conference on Disarmament was expanded to 60 members, which it is today.

Q: Did it include Israel?

LEDOGAR: Yes. That was an expansion country.

Q: Why didn't it include it at the beginning? Was it just that this was considered at a state of war all the time, so it would just be unworkable?

LEDOGAR: I don't know. I wasn't around at that time, but it was a controversial country. For the most part, the early members were admitted two or three at a time and were less controversial. That was pretty much what the case was. When we went to the expansion from the old format of 40, which by that time was 37-38, to 60, it was a conscious attempt to change from the Big-Five plus non-controversial nations to add nations which were essential to the disarmament process.

Q: Was China in the original group?

LEDOGAR: China was in the original group, yes.

Q: When you got there, how did you see the prospects? What were we trying to get to?

LEDOGAR: When I got there, there was a long-festering negotiation on chemical weapons, which was just then in the process of being revivified. The reason for that is that the United States and the Soviet Union had recently gotten together and agreed that they would really be serious about chemical weapons. The period immediately prior to my arrival in Geneva, the era of Gorbachev's Glastnost and Peristroika, included a meeting at the U.S.-Soviet summit level in Wyoming which produced a memorandum of understanding on the whole subject of chemical weapons. Then there was another summit in Malta. That produced yet again some major moves on chemical weapons, so that by the time I got to the CD in Geneva, the chemical weapons issue was ripe for progress, whereas in prior years it had been just drifting along with everybody repeating their positions. Very importantly - and here I'm jumping ahead a little bit - we were soon into the Persian Gulf War. The United States CW (Chemical Weapons) position up to that point was that we would reduce chemical weapons but we would not agree to eliminate them. By the time I got into the issue, the combination of Wyoming and Malta had produced a basic change in the U.S. position to the extent that we would agree in negotiations to reduce our stockpile down by 98% to two percent, but that final two

percent would be held until such time as we, the U.S., were convinced that it was safe to go to zero. We wouldn't negotiate a firm commitment to go to zero. That two percent represented the modern weapons in the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile of the so-called binary sort. Binary chemical weapons are weapons where the precursors to the final lethal substance are side by side in the bomb or shell, but not yet mixed. When the weapon is launched, either through an artillery tube or from an airplane, the trajectory to the target causes a process of mixing in flight so that when the missile arrives, it contains a lethal nerve gas. But otherwise, as the name suggests, it is much safer to handle because there are two non-lethal components.

Recognizing that the whole U.S. stockpile of unitary chemical weapons was in bad shape, beginning to deteriorate, and even becoming dangerous to us while in storage, the United States Congress ordered it destroyed. So the U.S. was in the process of gradually eliminating its own unitary chemical weapons. So, it wasn't much of a concession for us to say that we would go towards this two percent goal. But since we were going to keep two percent, we could not join with others who made a call for an immediate prohibition on any use of chemical weapons. Such weapons still factored into our national security arrangements and were in the hands of troops, including frontline troops stationed in Germany. That was a stumbling block when I arrived. The U.S. position opposed a blanket prohibition on use.

Q: What were you getting before you went out there? What was the military side of why we needed this?

LEDOGAR: The U.S. Chemical Corps had been in existence since World War I, and it was as natural to the organization of the United States Army as almost every other branch to a professional military man. But CW were always a pain in the rear end to military commanders because they had to have their troops trained and equipped for fighting in the chemical environment. That meant the big cumbersome, protective suits and the gas masks and our troops would have to carry antidotes to nerve gas and so on.

There had been a curious and fortunately substantial amount of time between when I left my previous job in Vienna and when I was able to show up in Geneva to take over in the CD. It had to do with personnel matters. My predecessor in Geneva wanted to stay on an extra month or two. I needed Senate confirmation in the new job. Thus, while waiting, I was able to go through fairly extensive training, including visiting chemical weapons facilities throughout the United States: the plant where we were making binary weapons, the places where all our unitary weapons were stored, the school where they teach U.S. troops and did the training for chemical weapons. I put on a hot suit and went into a live chemical weapons environment and actually handled a little bit of the bad stuff. It was a confidence building thing they gave to the soldiers. I developed a fairly good background in CW. I was also exposed to a little bit of the chemistry, the laboratories up in Aberdeen, Maryland where they did research on chemicals. So I was able to have a fairly good exposure to the subject matter. Then we were soon into the confrontation with Iraq in the Persian Gulf.

Q: It started in August of '90 and ended in February or so.

LEDOGAR: "Desert Shield" was about a six month period during which the U.S. and coalition allies built up our in-theater military presence and then when the shooting started, "Desert Storm" was rather rapid. Now for our negotiation, that was very important because prior to the coalition assault our intelligence indicated that the Iraqis had chemical weapons deployed forward. They had used them not only in their war with Iran, which immediately preceded "Desert Storm," but they had even used them against their own population, the Kurds in northern Iraq, who were not acting properly according to Saddam Hussein. The Kurdish Iraqis were subjected to nerve gas bombings by their own military. So Saddam was not the least bit shy about the use of CW and had a proven capability. The U.S. forces brought along our chemical defensive gear and we inoculated our soldiers against certain kinds of biological threats and the soldiers had the wherewithal to inoculate themselves. But to my knowledge, the U.S. did not bring into the theater our own offensive chemical weapons. Rather, we decided that we were going to employ just conventional weapons using our protective gear and standard tactics to blast through.

It's a pretty interesting subject. When you get down to actual war fighting as opposed to psychological warfare and static defense, there is a limited military role to chemical weapons, especially in mobile warfare. You can deny a geographical zone with persistent chemical agent, but with the straightforward nerve gas that does not stick around, once you've launched it and the wind comes along and blows it away, that's that. Or it can get back in your own face and so forth. But in our conventional arsenal, we had and still have a system which is a multiple launch rocket system [MLRS], essentially a track vehicle with dozens of tubes, each loaded with a small rocket. These things could be armed in various ways, but if you wanted to deny an area to the enemy, you could use proximity fuses and fragmentation warheads and thus obliterate anything that was above ground in the geographical attacked area, which is pretty much the same role as a persistent chemical agent has. So, the point of all of this is that the U.S. military proved to themselves that they were not only just as well off but were probably better off without hauling around our own chemical weapons with all the logistical and political baggage that goes with them. When that conflict was over, as it was in very short order, the Washington political powers were able to obtain an agreement from Pentagon military leaders that it would be okay for the U.S. CW negotiating position in Geneva to join the protocol that would call for total elimination (going to "zero"). Therefore the U.S. could live with a prohibition on "use." So that helped to stimulate our negotiation.

Q: At the time, I think chemical weapons of one sort or another were considered the poor countries' response to the rich countries' nuclear weapons.

LEDOGAR: That was always the belief. People had started talking in terms of "weapons of mass destruction" and that included nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Of those, the cheapest and probably the easiest to acquire technologically were the chemical weapons. So it was thought from the point of view of a number of less developed countries, that having a chemical capability would be kind of an offset against the nuclear

capability of major powers.

On the other hand, it's interesting that during "Desert Storm" the issue arose publicly, and the U.S. Administration was asked by the U.S. press whether we would rule out the use of chemical weapons. The answer was, "We won't rule out anything. Conflict is under way. We will not rule out anything in the course of this conflict." The follow-up question was, "Not even nuclear weapons?" The Vice President, Dan Quayle, said, "We don't rule out anything," making the threat that we would see possible linkage or an escalatory justification if the other side used chemical weapons.

Incidentally, if you ask whether the Iraqis did use chemical weapons in defense of their occupation of Kuwait, for the most part, the answer was "No." It may be that in certain places some chemical agents were released because munitions stores were blown up or something like that. But it would have been accidental. According to the best that I was able to read about CW in that war, the Iraqis had the capability of manufacturing chemical weapons but they didn't seem to have mastered the problem of shelf life. So what they were doing in the years before in the Iranian conflict was sort of pumping the stuff out of the factories, shipping it to the front, and firing. But over the long period leading up to the actual beginning of the shooting, i.e., during Desert Shield, we thought we had a pretty good line on where the Iraqi chemical capability would be. They did have good political control over it. To the best of our knowledge, there never was an attempt to authorize its use and release it. But our troops took their injections, put on their suits, and rolled straight forward with a blitzkrieg that rolled up the Iraqi forces in a few days.
Q: What was the Soviet attitude towards chemical weapons? Was that changing?

LEDOGAR: Yes, it was. Under Gorbachev, to the consternation of a lot of hardliners in the Soviet military, the USSR was apparently serious about entering into a CW prohibition. Indeed, they were quite constructive during the course of the CW negotiations. For them, and this is true even today, the problem was becoming and indeed it became one of a lack of economic resources necessary to destroy the weapons. So almost from the get-go in the negotiations, the Soviets and later Russia started trying to work out some arrangement other than the obvious one that they would have to pay themselves for destruction. Everybody else figured, "You guys have got these things and this is a convention about the destruction of all chemical weapons, all chemical weapons manufacturing facilities, storage facilities, and so forth. So, you possessors have to pay." The Soviets and then pretty soon the Russians recognized that this would present a terrible financial problem. They had by far the largest CW stockpile. We had a lot, but Russia's CW arsenal relative to ours was on the order of 40:28, or so. It was an enormous amount.

We had started pilot plant CW destruction independent of the negotiation. The first facility was out in Tooele, Utah. This pilot plant was to improve the technology and hardware for what was to become eight U.S. destruction facilities around U.S. territory and possessions, one of which was on an island in the middle of the Pacific. But essentially, the U.S. decision was to destroy chemical weapons in place or as close as possible to the military installations on which they were stored. The political problems

and the environmental uproar and everything else about moving these weapons around the country were daunting. Indeed, during my period before going to Geneva, I visited Tooele among other facilities. The pilot destruction plant there proved itself. The technology was high temperature incineration. There were other technologies being explored at the time. The Russians were fooling around with a bunch of other technologies, especially reverse synthesis, i.e., you start to subject the agent to chemical processes that would reverse the process by which it had been made. The trouble is that way you create an awful lot of by-product, that while perhaps not lethal, was very bad for you and for the environment. You get twice as much in bulk waste than when you started. They were also trying out a technology that had to do with taking the weapons and dropping them into pools of liquid nitrogen. That would just shatter the CW warhead. But then you still had to deal with the substances that came out of the nitrogen and they were hazardous. So the technology that's used even today, the one that proved successful, was just high temperature incineration.

Q: You arrived there in 1990. What did your delegation consist of?

LEDOGAR: First of all, I'd like to make sure that people understand that the Conference on Disarmament is essentially a permanent forum. It deals with an agenda that is designed to change as disarmament problems are addressed and solved. So the Conference on Disarmament, in addition to work on CW, would have an agenda that included a wide variety of problems that were not yet ripe for negotiation, or that were being finished off, or that were still in a prediscussion phase. We had discussions but not negotiations on a half dozen different subjects. One of them when I got there was on nuclear testing. At the time of the chemical weapons negotiation, a ban on underground nuclear testing was an agenda item that was put there by others, but the United States was sort of politely saying, "Yes, but not now." We had other attempts to see if we could get the process of negotiations started on things like outer space, small arms, land mines, etc.

So the Delegation included representatives from all of the U.S. national security agencies. We therefore had people from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the Department of Energy, from the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the CIA, and others.

One of the first things I noticed in Geneva was that there was a tendency on the part of the Washington agencies to send people out temporarily for specific times and not have folks assigned to my delegation who were resident in Geneva, who had their families with them, but rather, had desks, regular jobs, and inboxes back in Washington. That is a common problem with U.S. delegations to itinerant international negotiations. But the CD was permanent. I set out on a program to encourage each Agency to put at least one senior advisor in Geneva full-time and I was making considerable progress on that. It wasn't completely achieved. The Joint Chiefs couldn't assign somebody to Geneva because they didn't have the military support structure, so our JCS representative was TDY from the U.S. Army headquarters in Heidelberg, but at least he was in Geneva full-time. We got a full-time person from ACDA (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency). They were not a problem because they were the lead agency on the chemical

weapons thing. But it was always hard to get the State Department to find a slot to keep someone on my delegation permanently. Then depending upon how the negotiations were proceeding and the particular technical phase, folks would come out from Washington agencies to reinforce and to work on particular tasks. So, it was a Delegation during the time I was there that ranged from about 10 permanent core members to as much as 40 total when things were very active.

Q: I would think you would have a problem of the people who would be sent out. Often, they would be task specific and would be sent by their agency saying, "Make sure these guys in Geneva don't do this or that."

LEDOGAR: I'm one of the leading experts on that subject - how to guard against commissars. I have given lectures on it. During my time in Geneva I earned a lot of enemies in Washington by insisting that the primary loyalty of the delegates was to me, not to their Washington bosses. In a sense, it is understandable, especially if you have someone TDY from Washington. His long term career, his evaluating supervisor, his instincts and his family are all in Washington. He feels he's sent to my delegation to represent, for instance, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and therefore should bring with him the point of view the OSD expressed in the interagency process that had resulted in recommendations to the President and decisions that became foreign policy. The trouble is that the Ambassador, in this case me, is not responsible to any Agency, even though he might be, as in my case, a Foreign Service officer, but rather is responsible for carrying out the President's policy. If that's against the original State Department recommendation, then so be it. What you have to guard against is people, who have lost in the interagency push-and-shove, trying to slant policy back towards the way their home office really wanted it in the first place and still thinks it should have been. One of the things that they tend to do is to put their responsibility to their own office in first place and their responsibility to the Delegation in second place.

I can't tell you how many times I reminded, sometimes quite forcefully, young officers that their primary responsibility while serving on the Delegation was to the President and to the President's representative and they were not there to continue the Washington struggle over policy development. We were there to execute policy as handed to us in the front channel by fully cleared guidance. I would say, "If you continue to talk over the telephone to the home office or to report your version of events in backchannel messages, I'm going to rip your phone out and disconnect your private communications; accept that, or you will be sent home." I made sure that each agency in Washington understood that if they put someone on a plane to report to me in Geneva, I didn't regard them as folks from Washington that I had to accept; they were nominees to my team and if they couldn't function on my team after counseling and reminders, there were a certain number of things that I would do. One of them, the least brutal, after you finish trying to get some sense into them and get them to understand the way things must be, was to squeeze that officer out of the information loop.

An Ambassador who goes and hobnobs with all the other Ambassadors, heads of delegation, at lunches and private meetings picks up an awful lot of information. The first

thing you want to do is to share that with your Delegation, but only under the circumstance that they're going to hold it as privileged information for our Delegation. If they start reporting things back to Washington on their private channels there could be chaos. For example: the British Ambassador has got this personal idea that maybe we ought to try to crack a problem this way and he comes in and talks to the American Ambassador and says, "I haven't even informed London yet. What do you think?" Lets say I report this feeler to my guys because I need technical perspective and somebody goes back to Washington with it. With the local confidentiality lost, a Washington agency that doesn't like the idea might call in the British Embassy to explain, and there is hell to pay. You try to have good relations with your British colleagues. If things like this happen, he's not going to confide in you ever again.

The trouble is that many of the people that we send out to interagency delegations in the field are unwilling or incapable of sorting out their primary loyalty and their secondary loyalty. But in my mind, it's the only way you can operate. If one of these things gets very messy you have to be very confident and be willing to say, "Either this guy goes home or you recall me. I'm not going to be out here presiding over a bunch of Washington agency commissars, each with his own independent foreign policy." This aspect of dual loyalties should be taught in this building here, the Foreign Service Institute. I've given a couple of lectures on it. For a while there was a course on how to serve on an international arms control negotiation. It requires that you have supervisors in Washington who are willing to support their ambassadors and heads of delegation. Otherwise, it's chaos. I know of a couple of negotiations which are chaotic from the U.S. point of view. The OSD and the Joint Chiefs have folks on those delegations whose first loyalty is to report back channel to the Pentagon on the U.S. Ambassador. The prejudice is to watch what that clown is doing to sell out the United States.

Q: One of the issues was nuclear testing. I understand that on the United States' side, this was always a big problem. One gets the feeling it's because the nuclear establishment in the U.S. needs something to do, so they continue to do nuclear tests.
LEDOGAR: I don't know, that's a little harsh. But trying to stay a little bit on the chronological progression of things, during the first three years I was in Geneva, which were '90-'92, the U.S. position on the question of whether we should try to negotiate a nuclear test ban was like this: "The United States, so long as it depends upon nuclear weapons for deterrence and extends our nuclear umbrella in favor of our allies, will not, indeed we think it would be immoral to, engage in a total cessation of underground nuclear testing. Some testing is essential for safety and reliability of our existing stockpile, if not for further development." That was our policy. That line on nuclear test ban continued right on through the completion and signing of the Chemical Weapons Treaty, which was in January '93. Then the Conference on Disarmament was flapping around looking for a follow-up task. What were we going to do next? Everybody in the CD who was not a nuclear weapon state wanted to have a crack at a nuclear test ban. At first, the U.S. was very reluctant, but with significant technological improvements in the test simulations, we gradually talked ourselves into agreeing to do so. We talked ourselves into joining in a total nuclear test ban negotiation with the encouragement of the U.S. Congress. But I think we're getting ahead of ourselves; let me go back to the

Chemical Weapons Treaty.

Right after Desert Storm, the U.S. made two major CW policy moves, which resulted in the chemical weapons negotiations going full speed ahead. That was when President Bush announced that we would no longer insist upon the retention of two percent of our CW stockpile, but would in the course of the negotiation agree to the total elimination of our stockpile. That having been said, we therefore would join with others in seeking the total prohibition on CW use. That was the second policy change. So the negotiation really got under way with full vigor. During '92, there were several ministerial level meetings and one summit that helped encourage progress. In fact, there was a lot of East/West arms control and disarmament going on during the early years of Shevardnadze, with glasnost and perestroika and all kinds of things. In terms of East/West arms control, it was a new world. The Soviet Union was breaking up. You had the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) with full independence of many of the various states that had been part of the Soviet Union. We even had the Soviet Ambassador take over as chairman of the CD's CW negotiating committee during 1991. When the USSR dissolved during the course of his chairmanship he became the Russian Ambassador.

Recall that the Conference on Disarmament had many agenda items. When an agenda item became ripe for negotiating, the CD would form a committee which would negotiate a mandate, and then it would elect someone as chairperson for a year to preside over the negotiation. The chair usually rotated annually among East, West, and non-aligned groups. The Russian was chairman during 1991. He was extremely good and straightforward and was clearly dedicated to the achievement of a CW agreement. It shows you how the negotiations were really moving forward. Everybody had their own positions and their own requirements. The negotiation was not free of problems by a long shot, but we brought the competing draft treaty contexts together and completed a final draft in late '92, which was the last full year of the Bush administration.

A very interesting thing occurred during the U.S. election campaign in '92. It's part of the Nuclear Test Ban story. It has to do with Congress passing certain legislation that made the negotiation of a test ban treaty inevitable. But lets just stick with chemical weapons for a while. One of the final problems was to select a city in which the international CW monitoring organization that the treaty created would be located. After a certain amount of political struggle, it was decided it would be in The Hague. Today we have the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW] in The Hague and it is functioning. It has certain problems, but they're pretty much in the category of growing pains. That implementation regime is in pretty good shape.

Q: The group that was negotiating on our side, the Western side, was sort of the U.K., Germany, France, Italy?
LEDOGAR: Yes. In the Conference on Disarmament at that time, there were 10 participants, essentially Western-style democracies, in the Western caucus. It included Japan, Australia, and eight NATO members: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, U.K., and the U.S. The Eastern group was originally the Warsaw Treaty Organization, seven of them. All the rest of the original 40 CD participants were the so-

called neutral and non-aligned. They called themselves the group of 21. Don't try to do the arithmetic because the totals don't add up. East Germany vanished, Yugoslavia self-destructed, and China stood as the "Group of One." The G-21 was made up essentially of the neutral non-aligned - India, Pakistan, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, etc. Sweden was a big leader at that time, but was always having problems because the Swedes were viewed by other neutral non-aligned as rather pro-Western and the delineations weren't too clear. But cohesion within the Western group was very good.

We also did work in smaller, informal groupings. The P3, the U.S., U.K., and France, met regularly. We had one grouping where it was the Berlin powers, which essentially were France, the U.K., the U.S., and Germany. That proved useful for certain issues. That's another thing that a lot of people don't understand. As long as you keep up a facade of every nation being treated equally, a lot of the work gets done in small ad hoc groupings. Frequently, they begin or continue around meals. Nobody can argue that a particular ambassador can't have a few colleagues of his choice over to his house for lunch. These luncheons would be very much business meetings. The idea was to get a few very important people together to try out ideas and to be the board of directors on a particular new issue, to get things launched and set out strategy and so forth. Of course if the U.S. met to coordinate strategy with the P3, these had to be very discreet gatherings. You had to be very careful that you didn't let the next level, the Italians and the Canadians, suspect that they were at the exclusion line, that they didn't make the cut. We even had a couple of meetings of the non-European Union States within the Western group. The U.S., Canada, Australia, and Japan were beginning to see political cooperation among the EU states in the Western group such that we felt that we were being confronted with pre-cooked EU positions that we hadn't been able to influence. That goes on a lot in multilateral negotiations; special groups are formed for all sorts of processes.

Q: What was China's role on the chemical side?

LEDOGAR: They tried to stay independent, but they fashioned themselves as morally and emotionally along the same line as the G21. So if the Chinese didn't have a particular national interest, they would always side with the non-aligned. In the beginning, the discipline on the Warsaw Treaty Organization was very strong, but it didn't take long in the period I'm talking about (early '90s) before you started to see the East Germans disappear. Then the Poles and the Hungarians were applying for membership in NATO, and former Eastern group solidarities began to show cracks and then to turn around. There was quite a bit of flux. But we completed the CW treaty by the end of '92. It was and still is today a very landmark treaty. It has a verification regime the like of which the world had never before even contemplated, with enormous intrusiveness. The watchword was "verification anywhere, anytime, no right of refusal." At first, that jargon was put in by the U.S. side by Pentagon opponents of the very idea of a chemical weapons treaty. The Defense guys thought that calling for verification that strict would be a poison pill, that the Russians would never agree to it. Then within two years of that opening U.S. position, the Russians were able to accept it but we ourselves realized *we* were unable to accept it. So some of the final struggles dealt with exactly what circumstances, in terms of managed access, would obtain when there was a short-notice challenge inspection. The

regime provided for routine inspections that went on all the time according to schedule. These required cooperation between the inspected states and the inspectors. But if any state party to the Treaty had any reason to suspect something illegal might be going on, it didn't have to wait for a routine inspection. Any country could challenge and say, "I don't like what I think is going on in this particular place." If your challenge met minimum requirements for reasonableness, there would be an international inspection team launched on rather short notice to go to the challenged area and take a look to see what was going on.

Then the old problem in international verification regimes arises. Offense versus defense. Short notice intrusiveness sounds pretty good if you look at it from the point of view of what access you're trying to get from potential violators. But if you look at those same levels of intrusiveness from the point of what a nation is trying to protect — secret weapons programs, intelligence facilities, nuclear weapon design labs, and the like — you want to be circumspect about how short the notice would be and what would be the permitted access of foreign inspectors when they came to take a look at someplace that someone chose, possibly on a whim. So challenge inspection was probably the toughest issue that we had. It was one on which the agencies in Washington were sharply divided. Those agencies in charge of sensitive areas that needed protection wanted to say, "No, you're not going to get any of those foreign inspectors in here until I've had a couple of weeks to get ready and then they can only come to the fence and they can't go through the buildings." There was a big struggle over challenge inspection within the U.S. Government. But it is the eternal struggle in any international arms control agreement between on the one hand the offensive angle (what it is that we want to be able to get to inspect on short notice to be sure that others are living up to this agreement), and the defensive angle (how we can protect ourselves against the prospect of losing something confidential that has nothing to do with CW prohibitions, but which has everything to do with our national security from another point of view); for example, an intelligence facility or a place where we're building some next-century weapons system. That's one of the areas where the Commissar problem within the U.S. delegation was very threatening. That was one of the times in my experience as an American negotiator when I had as much or more problem with Washington collectively than with the foreign countries with which we were negotiating.

Q: I've remarked that real diplomacy is engaged among ourselves. Dealing with other countries is in a way cut and dry. Their persuasion is not quite… You have to reach agreements, but real persuasion and muscle is in one's own Delegation, country.

LEDOGAR: Absolutely. There are old clichés that have a lot of truth to them. Kissinger said in one of his memoirs that the trouble with the United States foreign policy is that we spend 50% of our energy negotiating with ourselves, 25% negotiating with our allies, and have only 25% left for our adversaries. Let me give an example. In the early time of strategic nuclear negotiations, where I was following them from the Washington end, you could almost graph the development of a U.S. position in the SALT, START, or INF talks by the opening Joint Chiefs position and the opening Arms Control and Disarmament Agency position, and subsequently plot them as the two extreme

possibilities, with the preferences of all other parties - the Congress, the allies, the adversaries - falling in between. The trick was to draw those two extremes together and when you had them very close together you had an agreement. Others could live with any of the territory between the two U.S. extremes. That has changed over time. The agencies started getting different policy azimuths on the positions at the beginning of the Reagan years.

In the period of the Cold War, the U.S. had developed - especially in the arms control and disarmament arena - an awful lot of experience, mostly in negotiating bilaterally with the Soviet Union. We had SALT I, SALT II, START, the INF treaty, the nuclear space defense negotiations, and a number of others. The establishments in the various agencies in Washington that were responsible for developing policy and for tracking what was going on were populated mostly by folks who had developed their expertise in bilateral negotiations. When we got into big multilateral negotiations, there was a significant lack of understanding. The way it showed itself in my first experience was in a Washington lack of understanding that once they developed a precise U.S. position, it was unlikely to survive in its word-for-word form very long, because it would be subjected to being shaped, twisted, and compromised, and so forth, not just in interface with one opponent, one negotiating partner, but rather with 40, or 60, or 180+. You might find that we favored something that the Australians just couldn't abide. Yet here they are, close friends. It might be a little bit easier to understand and develop an adjustment, to take into account a friendly country's position, than it would be if you ran into, say, a Chinese objection. China, Russia, and India have their own particular points of view and interests. So, it was not like a bilateral U.S./USSR negotiation where you take the U.S. position word-for-word and you bang it against the Soviet position and see what sparks fly. Oddly, there were certain Washington folks who didn't understand multilateral dynamics. I formed the opinion that if we could have had a better interface between multilateral arms control operations and multilateral trade negotiations, we probably could have been better able to cross-fertilize Washington agency interactions. In trade, they're used to working with these coalitions. The coalitions change as you go from frozen chicken to corn gluten, or whatever the subject might be. It depends upon where God or nature in his or her wisdom decided to make deposits of particular natural resources. That forms a natural coalition on that commodity; and trade-offs can be negotiated among different coalitions. In East/West or bilateral arms control negotiations, Washington though in terms of zero-sum security trade-offs, i.e., between rather fixed and permanent camps, East versus West. If we had more understanding of dynamic packages of issues and trade-offs among them, it would have been easier for some people in the arms control business in Washington to understand how multilateral negotiations were different from bilateral.

Q: I would think that one of your most difficult countries in negotiation would be India. India tends to be a difficult country for Americans to deal with anyway.

LEDOGAR: India was difficult in both of my big negotiations.

Q: Also, in this case, they have some stake in it. Other countries didn't have much of a

stake. They were just there, but just to keep the big boys from having too many dangerous weapons to play with. Could you talk about India?

LEDOGAR: Yes, but if I may, I'd like to postpone that.

First of all, on the Chemical Weapons Convention, looking at it from an overall point of view, it really was a remarkable document in the history of international negotiations. It was so sweeping. The basic approach was that rather than try to pick out and isolate and prohibit certain activities in connection with chemistry, we prohibited all chemistry, if you will, and then just said, "Except that you *can* do this and that." In other words, in order to make the scope of the treaty sweeping, the text was designed so that unless a specific activity with chemicals was specifically permitted, it was banned. Thus all chemical activities would be caught in the network of the treaty. So, it had a rather wide scope.

The American chemical industry and also worldwide chemical industry very wisely chose to join with the negotiators early on, and they were cooperative. They were the ones who were going to suffer the disruption and in certain cases the expense of the intrusiveness necessary to verify compliance with the treaty. So they recognized early on that they had an interest in seeing to it that the provisions were as benign, from their point of view, as they could be. I think that was far sighted and very helpful. Indeed during the crucial final weeks of the CW negotiation, a technical advisor from the U.S. Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA), was assigned pro-bono full-time to my Delegation. From my point of view he was just an extra resource, foot soldier, and a useful advisor. From the CMA point of view if the negotiators decided a thing had to be done, and there were two ways to do it, the CMA rep would point to the way that would be less objectionable to them. That was important and was true not only of the U.S. CMA, but also the Japanese association and a Western European association. They were all pretty much on the same wavelength. So this very complex treaty was completed in late '92. It was agreed that the treaty would be opened for signature in Paris in January of '93.
Q: Why Paris?

LEDOGAR: People grabbed at Paris because there were several alternative proposals that were not very attractive. The Belgians had threatened to propose that it be signed at Ypres in Flanders, the first place poison gas was used in World War I. Paris is a good town for treaties. A lot of treaties have been signed there.

Q: The French love to host those things.

LEDOGAR: Yes, and they're very good at it. By this time, Lawrence Eagleburger was Secretary of State, and he headed the U.S. Delegation. He signed the Treaty for us in January of 1993. That was the very end of the Bush administration.

Q: I'm thinking of two countries where there were possible problems. One was Iran and the other was Libya. How did we deal with them?

LEDOGAR: Libya was not a participant in the negotiations, but they certainly were mentioned very frequently. They had a clandestine CW program disguised in various ways. We felt we had the goods on them. They had a chemical weapons facility in Rabda they claimed was a fertilizer plant, but it was very clearly used in nefarious activities. Rabda was very much at the forefront of our minds when we talked about what kind of an inspection regime would be necessary to catch a smoking gun at a place like Rabda.

Iran…? It's hard to get into all of this in unclassified discussion. We had information about chemical weapons programs in a number of countries. It was at one time contemplated that we were going to draw up a list of chemical weapons capable countries, but we soon found out that it was extremely difficult to have a single list labeled "capable" that would capture all those that you wanted to capture. In some cases, people had chemical weapons programs that were ongoing and well known. In other cases, people had chemical weapons programs that were very clandestine and in some cases not even known to the central governing authority (it may have been known only by the military). In some cases, you had countries that had stores of chemical weapons that they didn't want. Either they had made these CW's themselves and had long since abandoned them or the CW's had been left behind by previous invaders. In the 1940s, the Japanese left enormous amounts of chemical weapons behind in China. The biggest issue between those two countries was so-called "old stocks" and how those stocks would be dealt with, and who was going to be responsible to clean up and pay for destruction. You had countries like Belgium which had no chemical weapons capability of their own, but there were a number of cashes of chemical weapons left over from WWI, some individual shells and some stores collected by large farms and put somewhere. You had some countries that were not intending to have a chemical weapons program but were so sophisticated in chemistry (take for example Switzerland) that they could have a chemical weapon within a matter of days if they decided to. So an attempt at policy based on making sure that all the "chemical weapons capable countries," were included fell flat. Agreement in open negotiations on such a category was not possible. We even had a private negotiation going on at one time between myself and my Soviet counterpart to try to see if the two of us, using our sensitive sources, could agree on a single list of nations that were the problem countries in terms of CW. We couldn't agree. It was that kind of thing.

There were so many little nuances that often you had to go the route of broad sweeping prohibitions, making sure that they applied to everybody equally. I can remember at least two countries where CW programs were believed by U.S. intelligence to be unknown to the central authority of each country. So, that was taken care of in these prohibitions. If any weapons were found - and there was a special provision for old stocks - then the party who had left CW stocks behind had to share responsibility with the country in whose territory the stocks had been left. Together they had to get rid of them. It was quite an elaborate affair.

I'm sorry to say that when the Clinton Administration took over in 1993 they did not move the CW treaty immediately toward ratification, although instinctively they were in favor of the treaty. They thought, "That's the Bush Administration's business. We didn't

negotiate it." So they kind of let it languish and didn't move forward with U.S. ratification all during 1993 and 1994. By this time, the Republicans had taken over the Senate and Senator Helms, who had never met an arms control treaty that he liked, took over the Foreign Relations Committee. That was a problem. The CW treaty was before his committee. That is a story in itself. In the end the U.S. was very late in ratifying, and almost missed by a matter of hours being an original party. If we had missed out the consequences would have been fairly serious, because we would not have had the right to have our people in the international CW organization. Fortunately, with an 11th hour bi-partisan effort, we got the thing past Helms and approved by the full Senate. The treaty was actually debated in the Senate in the month or so preceding ratification. At that late date the debate, instead of being on the real implications, was being conducted in the U.S. Senate on all kinds of bogus issues. Somebody alleged that every mom and pop dry-cleaning establishment in Austin, Texas was going to be put out of business because of this treaty. The unfounded fear was that a certain chemical used in dry cleaning was proscribed. It was all nonsense and unworthy of the Senate. When you got around to it, there were some legitimate issues that should have been debated by the Senate and probably would have been if we had asked the Senate to take up the treaty promptly in early '93 when it was first signed. The near disaster was the fault of the Clinton White House and its failure to give CW treaty ratification early priority.

Q: I had asked you about India. How did India work in this?

LEDOGAR: I don't remember them as terribly prominent in the chemical weapons negotiation except that they were one of the leaders in the neutral/non-aligned movement. But they were basically in favor of the CW endeavor. It was in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty that India created havoc. The Conference on Disarmament in '93, once the CW treaty was signed, was essentially out of major work. Incidentally, since the International CW Treaty Implementation Organization was to be established in the Hague, some Geneva delegations people moved their chemical experts to the Hague. Some countries just transferred the CW files and gave the responsibility to resident diplomats in the Hague. The United States decided that we would send a small team there, and otherwise man the periodic CW meetings with senior people out of Washington. So from the Geneva point of view we were finished with CW.

All during 1993 in the CD, we had a whole lot of conversations about what would be the next issue for negotiation. A majority of participants were interested in nuclear testing, but for a long time that was not the U.S. Administration's choice. However, towards the end of the Bush Administration, there had been increasing feeling in the U.S. that something ought to be done about the continuation of underground nuclear tests. A piece of legislation was passed in late 1992 called the Mitchell, Hatfield, Exxon Amendment to the Water and Energy Appropriations Act of 1983. It dealt with nuclear testing and essentially said henceforth there would be in the United States a one-year moratorium on testing. After the moratorium, Congress would appropriate money only for a limited number of further tests, not to exceed 15. These had to be applied for individually by the President. Those tests could only be for purposes of safety and reliability, not for development of new types of weapons, and those 15 tests had to include any British tests

(the British tested in Nevada too). It also said that the U.S. should engage in Nuclear Test Ban negotiations and that by September 30, 1996, the Administration was in effect enjoined by the legislation to have completed a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. After that, there would be no more U.S. testing, unless some other countries tested. It was a very odd piece of legislation, but it was in effect from '93 to '97.

In '93, the CD thrashed around, but kind of exhausted the year in trying to get ourselves sorted out. In '94, the Conference on Disarmament got serious and established a nuclear testing committee and gave that committee a negotiating mandate to begin trying to organize a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. That's when the serious nuclear test ban negotiation started, from my point of view, and that negotiation ended in a treaty two years later in September of '96. That treaty was signed by what is by now over 120 states. But it has not been ratified by the United States. It failed ratification in October 2000. It is not in force, and is not beloved by the current Administration of George W. Bush. But the treaty was big stuff in international affairs at the time.

Curiously, there was much more international pressure to get rid of nuclear testing at that time than there is today, the reason being that France was still testing, China was still testing, and until the Hatfield-Mitchell Amendment, the United States was still testing. During the course of the negotiation, the pressure was really on France and China to stop testing. By the time we began the negotiation, there was a U.S. mandatory moratorium in place. When the mandatory period expired, the issue for Clinton was whether to continue it, or to seek those 15 shots that were allowed. At one time, Clinton was on the verge of asking for nine of them, of which three would go to the Brits, who had a particular need to finish off their Trident warhead. But the U.S. Administration decided that it was not going to go for any at all; that it was going to take the high road of continuing the moratorium. Therefore the last U.S. test was back in '92. The CTBT negotiation was begun in mid-'94, completed in September of '96. It was very intense. That may not seem rapid, but that is rapid for an endeavor of that size.

During this time, there was enormous international pressure to expand the Conference on Disarmament by increasing its membership by at least 50%. A plan was developed by the Australian Ambassador who had been commissioned by the rest of us to come up with a recommendation. He was asked to take all the applicants and screen them out and come up with a list of new members that took in a sufficient number to take the pressure off, but obviously the CD couldn't accommodate everyone who wanted to join. In the group that he recommended to be brought in, which was essentially 22 more, bringing membership up to 60, we wanted to have a balance of interests (geographical, geopolitical, and so forth). It is important to note that at that time, in the Conference on Disarmament we long since had a category of Non-Member Participants. Any UN member country that was interested in a particular subject being negotiated in the CD could participate in the negotiations. They had all the rights and privileges of members except that they just couldn't vote on matters. You didn't actually vote. What you did was when a matter was put up for approval, you either sat silently and let the gavel fall, or you spoke up and denied consensus. So, when we got into the nuclear test ban negotiation, we had Israel as a Non-Member Participant working full-time with the rest of

us. India and Pakistan were already members. The group that we would pick up under the recommended expansion included Austria, Finland, and Ireland. South Africa was also in the new group - very important because they immediately started playing a very important role.

The actual CD expansion was on the verge of being shouted through when suddenly, despite the fact that I had all kinds of Washington acquiescence to support the expansion, Washington finally woke up to the fact that Iraq was on the list. At 2 am Geneva time on the day expansion was to be gaveled down, I got an irate call from a senior White House official. He said, "What is it you're trying to do? Don't you realize we just fought a war with those characters? You mean to say you're going to reward them by letting them come into the Conference on Disarmament?" Now it's not terrible to have your recommendation slapped down by Washington. But all along we kept Washington fully informed on how the CD expansion issue was going. Washington had gone along with the developments, and with their concurrence, we were sort of among those who were in the leadership role to get this membership problem solved. Maybe Washington support was only at the working level and not from the top level officials. That was their problem. In any event, within hours I got an instruction from Washington telling me to break consensus and oppose the whole expansion because key Washington officials had suddenly awakened to the fact that Iraq was on the expansion list. Our allies were flabbergasted, saying "This isn't a reward to Iraq. Iraq is a rogue country and we need to have them involved in the beginning of disarmament negotiations." So it was a very difficult period for the U.S., where for a long time we stood alone, blocking CD expansion. There wasn't a single other country that had any understanding or sympathy for our position of blocking the expansion of the Conference on Disarmament.

Q: Was this Congress or was this somebody on the presidential staff?

LEDOGAR: Somebody on the presidential staff.

Q: Who was it?

LEDOGAR: I know who I got my instructions from, but he was only passing on the word from on high. Warren Christopher was probably the most responsible for this absolute prejudice against the idea of Iraq being in an international organization so long as they were flouting the agreements that had been achieved at the end of the Persian Gulf War. But he had help from William Perry, Secretary of Defense. There was no single person.

Q: What happens when you don't get consensus? This stops everything?

LEDOGAR: Yes. We were vilified by everyone else, especially since we had gone from a leadership role to breaking consensus, and at the very last minute.

Q: How did you respond?

LEDOGAR: To Washington? I just said, "Yes, Sir."

Q: I mean to the people who were blind-sided by this thing? "I have orders from Washington?"

LEDOGAR: That's right.

Q: Did the members of the Delegation of those other countries, including both in and out on the first list and the second list, go back to Washington to say, "What the hell are you doing?"

LEDOGAR: Yes, indeed. And senior U.S. officials, no matter where they went in the world, were being confronted by whomever they talked to with the proposition that there was absolutely no justification for the United States reversal. Nobody bought our reasons even though they probably believed we were sincere. It was a very awkward situation. One of the first things I did was, in order to cover my rear end, I had my people pull out every single cable in which we had reported on CD expansion developments all along, and we listed all the cables and all the responses and the non-responses from Washington, so that nobody could try to make the case that we had acted without authority. It was really a disconnect. In fact, some Washington people who were quite senior said to me, "We understand that the fault is back here. It never came to a sufficiently high level that this was occurring."

Q: Was Iran on the list?

LEDOGAR: Iran had been in the CD all along. That was not a problem.

Q: North Korea?

LEDOGAR: They were on the list.

Q: How was this resolved?

LEDOGAR: Remember most nations of the world had delegations in Geneva accredited to all the U.N. activities there. Remember also that any nation that wished could participate in CD deliberations, though only formal members could block consensus. Once the recommended list of CD expansion countries was made known, all those countries attended CD meetings even though the expansion was not yet formalized. When South Africa joined, there was a very clever guy who was the head of the South African Delegation. This ambassador was very interesting. He was obviously one of President Mandela's men. He was not an experienced diplomat himself because he had been outside the government for so long. But he was extemely intelligent and resourceful. He came up with a scheme that in essence allowed the 22 new folks to become full members without the United States having to say, "Yes." I can't remember the details, but it was a way of satisfying the U.S. fundamental refusal to give Iraq the right ever to stand alone and deny a consensus in the CD. Under the compromise, all 22 new members accepted not standing alone in a veto of progress, all the while reaffirming that everyone

was exercising their sovereign rights in doing so. “I’m volunteering not to exercise my sovereign right in this case.” It was sort of finessed in that way. But it was a success and expansion took place right at the end of the Comprehensive Test Ban negotiation.

Q: How did the rest of the negotiations go once the new members were accepted?

LEDOGAR: As I indicated, most if not all of the new full time CD members were already participating in the CTBT negotiations as very active observers. So their now formal status had very little new impact on the course of the ongoing test ban negotiations. There was, however, a most important if very low profile side bar to the big CD negotiation. That was a private concurrent negotiation that the five declared Nuclear Weapons States (who also happened to be the permanent five on the UN Security Council and therefore were known as the P-5) conducted among ourselves. The P-5 realized early on that the broader negotiation looking to a test ban treaty was really about what we, the five, would stop doing. We were the known testers who would agree to do no more nuclear testing. Now let’s leave aside for now the so-called “threshold” states of India, Pakistan, and Israel. We’ll also leave aside the question of South Africa, which had been a clandestine nuclear state. They had built five or six nuclear weapons of a rather primitive sort, but they had never fired one off. Recently they swore them off and destroyed their stockpile. There was a question as to where North Korea was, and where was Iran regarding nuclear ambition. Lets leave all these folks aside.

The five Declared Nuclear Weapons states - and the declaration was made in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) - were the ones who really brought to the table the most negotiating chips. So, we five agreed early on that we would have to talk among ourselves frequently and profoundly. Therefore, we quickly established a private negotiation among the five right there in Geneva. The curious thing was that it soon became not so much a board of directors for the larger negotiation, because we found that we were content to let the larger negotiation proceed with its deliberations and delineations as to what would be *prohibited*. What the five were primarily interested in was understanding among ourselves and reaching agreement on what would *not be prohibited* by the big treaty. Obviously we were not giving up our nuclear weapons stockpile; our stockpile would remain. As the British Ambassador at the time said, “This CTBT negotiation was about banning the bang and not banning the bomb.” The subject of CTBT was explosive nuclear testing. We intended, for as far into the future as we could see, to keep our nuclear stockpiles; but we wanted to have an understanding among ourselves that there were certain things we could do to maintain our stockpiles in a safe and reliable fashion - to move them or to count them or to keep them clean and dry; just the whole business of activities not prohibited. They were activities that only the five, originally at least, were experienced enough to even debate.

Q: The five being the UK., France, Russia, the U.S., and China.

LEDOGAR: Right. We wanted to make sure that the treaty would not prohibit non-nuclear yield testing of these weapons; rather, that it would permit such testing of the hardware, the software, and even the chemicals, provided that in these simulations there

was no explosion that produced nuclear yield.

There are ways that you can take a nuclear warhead and scoop out some or all of the fissile material and put in some other material that may be heavy so that it liquefies at roughly the same pressure and temperatures of a nuclear implosion. Recall that's how the chemical explosive compresses the plutonium and creates criticality. The imploded fissile material becomes a critical mass and therefore a chain reaction is set off. We five wanted it understood that we would be able to continue simulations including those so-called "hydrodynamic experiments." In other words, leaving aside all the technical blather, we were maintaining the right to conduct certain experiments short of actual nuclear yield of any sort.

For a long time during the course of the negotiation, the five of us were all over the lot about what should be the threshold between what would be permitted and what would be banned. We, the U.S., wanted to say, "You can have a little bit of yield, a very tiny whisper, equivalent to no more than four or five pounds of TNT." The Russians said, "No, we think you ought to be able to have a yield up to 10 tons of that equivalent. The French at one point were saying, "How about 200 tons?" We were all over the lot. Washington was convinced that we needed the flexibility of being allowed this little tiny whisper. During the nuclear testing moratorium in the Eisenhower years, we had perfected ways of conducting these hydronuclear experiments that would have the very tiniest bit of nuclear yield and we found we could learn a certain amount from them. The Russians and the Chinese started saying, "You guys can learn something at those very low yields, but we're not that far along on that technical road, so we're not going to authorize you to continue certain activities that benefit you and don't mean anything to us because we don't operate at that very low threshold."

We had to provide for a lot of related activities in nuclear physics. We're working, all of us, on laser fusion, inertial confinement fusion, and we wanted to be sure that nothing in the treaty would prohibit continued experiments along those lines. Inertial confinement fusion is an attempt to develop energy by creating fusion with the application of energy through very high powered lasers. Nobody has done it economically yet, but it's a field that shows promise. There were all kinds of activities that were highly technical that the five wanted to be sure that we all understood each other and these activities were not going to be ruled out. In the meantime in the broader negotiations, we were talking about what was going to be ruled out. We five wanted to be sure that the language that ruled out nuclear explosions was not so inclusive that it would impact on our ability to simulate. Simulations were necessary to assure the safety and reliability of our stockpiles. They were done in all different ways, including sometimes just as a computer exercise. You could simulate a nuclear explosion on your computer by putting in certain well-calibrated variables from actual tests. Indeed you could experiment and test all the hundreds of parts and sub-systems of a real nuclear warhead without setting it off and in a way that resulted in nuclear yield.

It was not long before the other participants in the negotiation realized that the P-5 were meeting separately and that created a little friction, but we just stiffed it out, and told the

others: “Look, we’re the ones who are really bringing stuff to the table and we have got problems, many of which the rest of you wouldn’t even understand because you’re not into the physics of nuclear weapons. Therefore, we’re going to go ahead and work out these problems among ourselves.” It was on this issue of non-nuclear simulation that we began to have problems with certain neutral/non-aligned countries. India, which was a closet nuclear weapons state, started to become extremely difficult. As we got closer and closer to the end of the CTBT negotiations, they got worse and worse, and finally we finished the negotiation without India. Thus, the CTBT was not formally a product of the Conference on Disarmament, because there was no CD consensus on it. But it was a product developed there. The draft final CTBT treaty text was sort of bootlegged from Geneva to New York and reintroduced in New York as an individual initiative. Because the treaty text developed in Geneva was vetoed by India, the rest of us pulled it around to the back door and put it into the UN General Assembly as an individual national paper that no one could veto. We got everybody but India and one or two others to embrace it in New York.

So, India indeed became a problem. They became a problem for a number of reasons and these were tied up with Indian politics, which I’ll admit I really didn’t fully understand. But essentially, India had reached a point where at least some of its major political elements wanted to resume Indian nuclear testing, and therefore did not want to sign onto prohibitions. At the same time they wanted to try to wrap into the Comprehensive Test Ban, either for altruistic reasons or for narrow national reasons - I’ve never been fully sure myself - commitments on the part of the five nuclear weapons states that would go beyond the cessation of any further nuclear testing, and begin the reductions of the P-5's nuclear weapons stockpiles, essentially under the supervision of the neutral/non-aligned. This of course was not acceptable to any of the nuclear weapons states, certainly not to the United States. It was not acceptable to Russia or China either. The Indians tried consistently as the negotiation went on to insert killer language that would make it impossible for the five. They tried to include in the big treaty language that went in the direction of prohibiting those activities which we five were trying to make sure were not prohibited, such as simulations. India was trying to ban all nuclear weapons activities, even simulations.

In the field of verification once the treaty was in force, Pakistan and some others were at the forefront in trying to rule out any evidence that would be introduced by anyone to the international organization if that evidence had been acquired by so-called “national technical means.” In other words, if anybody’s satellites picked up information, photographs or energy emissions, suggesting that something was wrong somewhere, that evidence could not be considered. We and the majority said, “That certainly *would* be admissible as evidence - not proof, but as evidence, for the international examination of what really is going on.” The instinct behind this prejudice in a lot of the have-not nations is that somehow or other facts picked up by remote sensors advantage those who have satellites to the disadvantage of those who do not have satellites. So they conclude that it is necessary to ban all information that comes from satellites.

Q: This sounds more a tactical thing than…

LEDOGAR: It really was. India and Pakistan have all kinds of apparatus along their common border to look at each other and they're pretending they don't have national technical means. They have the most sophisticated ones that exist along the Kashmir border. So, we had a lot of problems from the Indians, but I think myself that most of them had to do with the fact that the pro-nuclear party in India was increasingly likely to come into power, which indeed it did. Then shortly after the treaty was signed, they popped off what they said were five nuclear test explosions. I don't know what the truth was. But they announced that there were five, all done roughly at the same time. But that was after the treaty was signed, not by them, but by the rest of us. So, India really was a fly in the ointment, so much so that they tried to veto the entire thing - veto it or wreck it.

Q: Did you ever sit down and talk to the Indian Ambassador and say, "What's going on?"

LEDOGAR: Absolutely, regularly. She and I got along very well personally. We had kind of a comic routine going. We were so frequently at odds in the broader forum. We'd get to a lunch often after a big meeting and there we would continue to take light- hearted pot shots at each other and so forth, but as a matter of fact she was quite friendly. She gave a big going away party for me when I left Geneva. She had tough instructions. But we all got along well. It was a strange thing to be, in effect, conspiring with the Russians and the Chinese to the exclusion of the Australians, the Canadians, and the New Zealanders.

Q: You really had to. Common sense would say that you don't drag a bunch of people who don't have a stake in this and want to say something…

LEDOGAR: Absolutely. Originally, the other CD people didn't have a clue as to what the P-5 issues were, what we were talking about. A lot of these people got technical educations as the negotiations dragged on and more and more was being written about technical issues. The terminology became less and less abtruse and more in the common jargon. But it was an extremely fascinating negotiation. You had these two negotiations going on - at five and at forty [countries] - sometimes interacting with each other. The two obviously affected each other because anything you agreed to in the one forum as being allowed - you had to be sure that it was not prohibited in the other forum. And yet you didn't want to have gaps in between the scope of the two undertakings.

Q: How did you find the role of intelligence, not just from our side (I would assume that we would have our satellites and CIA and so on), but the other people, too? Everybody has their own intelligence apparatus, particularly the major nuclear powers. Did you share things?

LEDOGAR: I think U.S. intelligence served my Delegation's needs extremely well. That was especially true in the broader area. We have certain arrangements with certain friendly countries, about which I don't want to go into in much detail, but the cooperation in Geneva was particularly good because we shared intelligence with very close allies.

We shared with them and vice versa. In many cases, close friends were in a better position than we to get local intelligence about what was going on. The CIA is one of those agencies which has vested interests on both sides of the subject coming under arms control negotiation. They have a responsibility on the one hand to collect intelligence about everything that's going on in the world, and to make sure that those collection capabilities remain discreet and uncompromised by foreign inspectors coming to U.S. territory or bases. So, they're very interested in not risking anything that will compromise their capabilities, their methods, their sources, and so forth. On the other hand, the CIA has a responsibility to inform U.S. leadership about what's going on everywhere in the world. So, they want to be sure that our inspectors are able to get in to places of concern, and that they can intrude enough to get sufficiently early warning about what's going on. So, CIA is an agency that must work both sides of the dynamic that is so interesting about multilateral arms control, defense and offense. There are other agencies where all they want to do is protect what they have. For example, it's not the U.S. Army's responsibility to find out what's going on at Rabda in Libya. They're not the first line of responsibility to see what the Indians and the Pakistanis are up to in their nuclear testing installations. They want to make sure that nobody finds out what is going on at the Army base at "such and such" a place, where we might be developing a new weapon. So, they are more concerned with the defensive side of U.S. negotiating policy. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency doesn't tend to have very many assets it needs to protect, but they want to push forward the arms control and disarmament process, so they're more on the offensive side. All these folks are patriots and loyal to the President, but they have different responsibilities, and therefore tend to have different perspectives.

Q: Did you run across the nuclear testers… If you were a scientist and working in nuclear testing, you don't have many other options to do. That's what you do for a living and you had built up an expertise. It's not just money. It's also what you do. Did you find yourself up against an establishment, that you were breaking their rice bowl?

LEDOGAR: I guess to a certain extent there was that. They were very well behaved. All of the nuclear laboratories are under the Department of Energy and they are very cautious about making sure that the Department of Energy is between them and the government for a variety of reasons. They're quite instinctively loyal. But there is another fascinating angle to this that a lot of people would overlook. The challenge to the nuclear weapons establishment to maintain and to be able to certify the safety and reliability of the stockpile with no explosive testing is in many ways greater than was the case when there was explosive testing. For many years we would design nuclear weapons, manufacture them, and deploy them, and then go on and try to develop a next generation which was lighter and more vigorous and could be delivered by even smaller launch vehicles, and yet was more powerful and dependable. That new generation would overtake the earlier ones, and we would move the first ones out of our stockpile. Nobody really got much into the business of how these weapons age and how long a weapon that's designed and put together a certain way can last before you might begin to be concerned as to whether or not it's being adversely affected by extended shelf life.

Nowadays, the nuclear labs are very busy trying to develop ways to assure that our

stockpile of weapons is safe and reliable. The labs are actually taking apart existing weapons and examining in full detail what's going on with the highly volatile chemicals inside, and then putting them back together and making some judgement as to how much longer they will continue to be reliable. Occasionally, you take one weapon and you test it, but you can't test the actual yield, so you might take the basic weapon and subject it to a mock underground test except you have removed the fissile material and put something else in there. Or you take the materials and you bury them underground and have a chemical explosion nearby that subjects them to very high pressures short of criticality and you see what that does. All of this is going on now and there is a question as to whether it's being properly funded. In the debate over CTBT ratification, a point that those of us who are in favor of the treaty being ratified try to make to the opponents of the treaty is that you've got to maintain the stockpile anyway, whether you have a treaty or not. And you've also got to verify because you've got to keep your eye on everybody else in the world and what they're doing, whether you have a treaty or no treaty, except it would be easier if you had a treaty because you would have all the international apparatus to assist us. We've made all of these points. John Shaliskashvili put them together in a very useful report.

Q: He was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

LEDOGAR: Yes, and he was brought in during the last months of the Clinton Administration after the outrageously politicized, vindictive, and irresponsible defeat of CTBT ratification in October of 2000, to prepare a basis for a more focused, less emotional future Congressional look at the treaty. Shali points out in his report that the U.S. is not threatening the laboratories by moving from active underground testing to science based stockpile stewardship. It may be that there are some individuals in the testing community who would like to continue working on new designs. The key is that what we're doing now is maintaining the current stockpile and making sure that it is safe and reliable. We're not developing new types. So, if you have any sour grapes on the part of individual members or organizations within the nuclear weapons community, their complaint would be that all they can do about new types is design them on the drawing boards. They can't truly test to see whether or not the designs are right and that the new types will work. You do a whole lot of testing of this component and testing of that. So, I don't know. There are folks on both sides of the issue, some who figure that the nuclear weapons labs are kind of unguided outfits that are strongly in need of adult supervision. It is said by some that the labs have been getting away with a whole lot and that their vested interest is in the continuation of testing: in a word, that the labs are a nefarious influence on policy. There are others who take the attitude that the labs are just doing what they're told to do. I'm not sure what the truth is. I've met many bomb designers. I always had somebody from the nuclear weapons labs on my delegation because of the close technical expertise they provided. I have found them to be pretty straight shooters.
Q: What was the relation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to all of this?

LEDOGAR: Well, the problem with ACDA was that from the time of the mid-term elections of '94 that put the Republicans in control of the Senate, ACDA's very existence was under vigorous attack. It's downfall really began even before that. Even the

Democrats and the Think Tanks had convinced themselves that ACDA was an agency whose time had passed - that it was a Cold War agency and was redundant, in that it cut into the authority of the State Department. ACDA really should be folded into the State Department, they argued. In fact, in proof of this, I would point to the way the State Department was organized in the Bush Administration. There was a report called "State 2000" that was kind of a handbook adopted by the Baker State Department in 1994. They for the first time put the Under Secretaries of State directly in the chain of command, which I think was a good thing. Then they plugged the regional and functional bureaus into the 7th floor through the Under Secretaries, also okay in theory. By that time, the old Office of the Under Secretary for Security Assistance had become Security Assistance, Science and Technology and then pretty soon it became International Security Affairs. It had developed under the Republicans into quite a powerful Under Secretaryship. The study "State 2000" suggested that in the forthcoming century what was needed was to dismantle ACDA, take all of its assets, and plug them in, along with the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, all under the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs. Trouble was that was not done right away. ACDA was resistant to being dismantled. So, you had the Under Secretary of Political-Affairs under whom were all the geographical bureaus, the Under Secretary of Economic Affairs, who had all of the economic affairs bureaus; but when you got over to International Security you only had the bureau of Political-Military Affairs. ACDA was still separate, but it was under attack and crippled, especially when Jesse Helms took over as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1994. Not surprisingly, the best people began to leave ACDA. They couldn't see a future. Not very many folks were anxious to try to take over the senior ACDA positions. There would be a real question as to whether or not they would get confirmed by the Senate anyway. So, ACDA began to disintegrate.

I had developed over the course of time a respect for the role of ACDA. It's a close call whether arms control should have its own bureaucracy. On the one hand, you can appreciate the discipline that a straight line structure on the State Department foreign affairs side has in bringing forth coordinated positions. You don't have to have the interagency battles at the lower level between ACDA and PM and EUR/RPM, which I was once the director of. On the other hand, arms control and disarmament probably should be looked at in isolation from U.S.-French relations and U.S.-China relations. Somebody ought to be a spokesperson for the pure arms control aspect. That was the statutory role of ACDA. It does bring about a kind of initiative to keep arms control moving. If you're in the arms control business, you always have kind of a natural rabbi in Washington through ACDA. But there were two sides to the question. I came down in favor of an independent ACDA. I reached that conclusion just about the time that it was dissolved. Not very many people will admit this, but the administration bowing to Congress on those consolidations was part of the price that was paid by the Clinton administration to Jesse Helms in exchange for him agreeing to let the Chemical Weapons Convention go through the Senate. The reorganization included eliminating all of USIS and very substantial portions of USAID. So, these so-called Cold War agencies were disintegrating. ACDA was the important one for me. All the time that I was in Geneva, my efficiency report was written by the director of ACDA. Most of the major support and all of my budget came through ACDA. They were very important and very attentive to

maintaining our arms control delegations overseas in operation and well cared for. Other agencies had particular substantive aspects that they were interested in, but they weren't interested in picking up the administration and financing.

I wanted to touch on the Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT]. In a real sense, the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the background against which the Nuclear Testing Treaty has to be seen. The Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970 is the one that codified the fact that there were five nuclear weapons states, the ones which were in existence and recognized and overt at that time. It also said that all other states were invited to sign on as non-nuclear weapon states, and would not try to acquire in any way - manufacturing or purchasing or otherwise - any nuclear weapons capability. NPT set up the International Atomic Energy Agency. That was the verification branch of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I mention this because you have the nuclear weapon states which are the so-called "legitimate" ones, the five recognized by the NPT. By the time of the CTBT almost all of the other nations in the world had already undertaken in the NPT the pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons by any means. In exchange it was agreed that certain nuclear research advantages would be shared by the nuclear weapon states and all that stuff. I mention this to support the observation I made before that the P-5 were the ones who were really bringing the most chips to the table in the nuclear test ban endeavor. In theory if you were a non-nuclear weapon state and you were in compliance with your obligations under the NPT, you had nothing to test. So if you were now giving up testing when you had already given up any possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons, it's not a great leap forward. Mind you Israel, India, Pakistan and a couple of others never did sign onto NPT.

The second point is that many countries, have limited foreign services and international expertise in specific international security subjects. When it comes to the broad and complex field of disarmament, they don't have sub-specialists. They've got disarmament guys who do everything. That's why when you have a conference on one big disarmament issue in one place, you can't have another one simultaneously elsewhere. Only countries like the U.S. and other large ones have the resources to be able to get special experts in NPT and experts in chemical weapons, and other disarmament focal points. In May of 1995, everything in Geneva stopped because everybody who was literate in international security and disarmament matters went to New York for a big conference designed to address the fact that the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was of 25 years duration, was running out. The undertaking and the conference was called the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference. Every five years, there was a review conference to see how NPT things were doing, to try to see whether or not the regime could be strengthened without rewriting the treaty. But here in May 1995 it was going to be the expiration of the treaty unless it was renewed. So, all of us were going to New York. For the U.S. NPT Delegation, the leadership was out of Washington. We had very senior people, including the deputy director of ACDA there. Madeleine Albright as U.S. Ambassador to the UN was the nominal head of Delegation. The Vice President came for part of the conference. So, it was a pretty high powered U.S. Delegation. The U.S. was a major force in bringing about the unlimited extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I was among those who came from Geneva. There was nobody else to talk to in Geneva, so I came and served on the U.S. Delegation in New York, and had quite a bit to

do with the development of certain parts of what was the end product of the NPT Review and Extension Conference. I think that's probably all I need to say about that.

Q: One question. In the renewal, were there any big issues or was everybody saying this was a pretty good thing?

LEDOGAR: There were big issues. The biggest issue of all was an attempt by the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) to gain a tighter, more immediate commitment by the nuclear weapons states (NWS) to accelerate nuclear disarmament. There is a commitment in the NPT treaty itself, but it's sort of general in that the NWS will engage in efforts to reduce their nuclear capability in the context of general and complete disarmament. That is kind of a panacea down the road. Gradually, the NNWS were getting more and more impatient and more belligerent about saying, "That's not good enough. We want you, the P-5, to sign on the dotted line." We would say, "Look at SALT and look at START and look at INF, and look at the unilateral efforts to dispose of fissile material." They would say, "No, we don't want just unilateral efforts. We want to have an international negotiation where you five bring your nuclear weapons, put them on the table, and we'll tell you how to dispose of them and under what kind of timetable." Well, that just wasn't in the cards. So, that was the big issue. The NNWS were trying to increase and make more immediate the obligation that was vaguely set forth in the NPT treaty itself; they wanted it to be incumbent on the NWS to get rid of their nuclear weapons as the NNA would say "in a timebound framework." We worked out some new words and they sounded a little better and a little more urgent, but we did not have the capability of rewriting the treaty which had been ratified by the Senate. So, there wasn't too much to be done except express political commitment to press on with things.

There is another effort that started at that time that looked like it was going to take off and become a real side by side negotiation with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. That was an engagement to henceforth ban the manufacture of fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes. This was known as "fizz cutoff," which again would only affect certain countries, but importantly, it would affect India, Pakistan, and Israel if we could get them in and get this regime organized. If you could in essence freeze the current levels of fissile material where they were, and ban any further production of military fissile material, then you would begin to pull India, Pakistan, and Israel, which still ignore the NPT treaty, into a kind of commitment through the back door that would say, "You may not have to give up your nuclear capability, but you can't produce any more enriched uranium or plutonium." That was on the verge of starting, but then things went awry and it was one of the negative fallouts from the aftermath of the NPT Review and Extension Conference in '95, that and the fact that India was beginning to look to preserve its nuclear capability and flex its muscle. So, fizz cutoff keeps being on the verge of being ready for negotiation, but to my knowledge, it still hadn't started seven years later.

But getting back to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, we had indeed the usual problems with inspection and trying to detail and get right the balance between intrusiveness and protection of national interests. We had a certain amount of problem with the issue of whether or not national technical means could be used in trying to point

the finger and ask for international inspections. We had a couple of other issues that we struggled with, but I can't remember any other major ones that we could elaborate on here without excessive technical explanations. The treaty came together. Towards the end, there were a lot of problems with Washington from my perspective. There were two camps that kind of grew up there about this business of intrusiveness versus protection. It had to do with what the threshold was for getting a challenge inspection. There, the State Department and CIA were kind of lined up on one side. It was a very strange arrangement. But eventually, the thing got done. President Clinton had challenged everyone to finish by the end of 1996, and by George, we did.

Going back to the fact that some nations' disarmament expertise had finite resource limitations, especially the smaller countries, in the autumn each year the UN General Assembly has a committee on disarmament called the First Committee. Literally, everybody from the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva packs up and moves to New York for about six weeks, where we reconfigure ourselves as the UN First Committee on Disarmament. The CD year ends just before we leave for New York. So, we had a real scurry to finish the CTBT treaty. Then we ran into the problem of India saying that if she didn't get the commitment to ban all tests, even simulations, and didn't get a commitment of the five nuclear weapons states immediately to begin a negotiation with oversight from the non-nuclear weapon states about further reductions in their stockpile, and all sorts of other impossible things, India couldn't see its way clear to sign the treaty, or even to allow it to go forward. So, we were in this standoff. The whole thing was ready.

Now, we had had problems of a similar sort, holdouts at the last minute, in the Chemical Weapons Convention four years before. Those of us who were around at that time realized that even in an organization that operates by consensus, you have a certain power which could be called the "tyranny of the majority." It goes like this: "Okay, you're going to veto this endeavor here? The friends of the endeavor are going to meet across the street and we're going to agree on a course of action as to how we're going to push our project forward. You by your veto can't stop the treaty. You can only stop it from being done here." That had worked in the case of the CW Treaty. So here we were in the early autumn of 1996 on the verge of going to New York. The whole draft treaty had been stuffed into a report to the UN General Assembly. Attached to the text of the treaty was a recommendation that it be opened by the Secretary General for national signatures with him as the depository. India vetoed it. So as a CD document it failed. We went to New York and got the Australians there to put the text in a resolution, saying, "Hey, by the way, I have this national initiative and it's got this nifty draft nuclear test ban treaty text attached to it. We think that it ought to be adopted by the General Assembly." The General Assembly operates by vote, not by consensus. Anybody who has a proposition can put it in resolution form and run around and get cosponsors. So, we all ran around and got 150+ cosponsors for this Australian resolution - almost everybody but India. The resolution was adopted and there was the treaty text enshrined in it. The Secretary General declared that it was open for signature. Well, we had the P-5 leaders come to New York and the CTBT was signed by President Clinton representing the host country. He was immediately followed by China, France, Russia, and the UK in alphabetical order, then all the others. There were 70 signatures on the first day - but not India, not

Pakistan, and not North Korea.

Q: How about Israel?

LEDOGAR: Israel signed. That's where the CTBT resides today, signed but not in force. The big fight, one of the last fights that we had during the negotiation, was the provision in the treaty for entry into force. The result was not very satisfactory. In the Chemical Weapons Convention, we used the simple approach that upon deposit of the 65th country's articles of accession, the clock would start ticking and 60 days later the treaty would enter into force. It was recognized that the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would not operate quite so simply. It would be a farce if you didn't have certain countries there. You had to have the five nuclear weapons states and you really had to have the threshold states: India, Pakistan, and Israel. But to draw an entry into force provision that said, "50 or 60 states, but it must include these eight" would deeply offend all those who could have gone the nuclear route 30 years ago but chose to take the high road.

It was politically unacceptable to many countries such as Canada, Australia, and others who felt very strongly about the need to get rid of nuclear testing to have India, Pakistan, and Israel specified as essential states. They would see it as kind of a reward to India, Pakistan, and Israel for having stayed out of the otherwise almost universal NPT regime, especially since all three had gone ahead and developed nuclear weapons programs. So, we had to find some sort of a euphemistic collective rather than just call for a number of any 60 or 65 states. Then we began to worry about, suppose if we specify a collective, one member of that collective might say, "Hey, wait a minute, I want to have my rights to the islands of So and So in the South China Sea recognized by everybody as a condition for me to sign." In other words, somebody might try to hold entry into force of the CTBT as hostage for an unrelated concession. Taking the treaty hostage had to be avoided.

But a curious group that most distressingly included Russia, the UK, and a couple of others said, "If you allow for an entry into forces approach that will let you go forward despite missing one or two specified countries, then the pressure is going to be on everybody else to go ahead and let the thing enter into force and not on the countries that are trying to hold you up." So, they said, "We've got to have a collective and it's got to mean *everybody* in that collective." So, the treaty as it exists today selected a collective which, in effect, was a list of all those countries that have nuclear reactors, whether for power or for research. That includes India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, and a number of folks who are not going to be too easy to placate and get them to sign. Now, most of us believe that you can get India and Pakistan provided you get them together as part of a package where everybody moves at the same time. Neither will sign on before the other. Indeed, China will not deposit its instruments unless India is going to put its down. Indian capability is a threat to China. It is a neighbor. China does not have all that much more in way of deterrence.

So ratification - selling CTBT to the U.S. Senate - is very important, but getting the U.S. to come on board may not be the last fight. You've still got to get India and Pakistan. It's conceivable that North Korea would hold out, but I don't think they would be the last

one.

That was pretty much the end of it for me. As I said, the treaty was signed in New York in September of 1996. I came and did the usual springtime disarmament stuff in New York in 1997 and was preparing to retire. I had already passed the regular Foreign Service retirement age of 65 and was staying on only until the treaty was finished. I wanted to retire. During my last two years of Foreign Service the Clinton Administration wouldn't let me retire until the treaty was put away, so I was two years overdue. I stayed and did the springtime New York business and then packed up my bags and said, "Goodbye" and left the Foreign Service on May 31, 1997.

Q: Great. I want to thank you very much. Fascinating.

End of interview