The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR KARL F. INDERFURTH

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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is April 27, 2001. This is an interview with Ambassador Karl F. Inderfurth. We're going to start at the beginning. When and where were you born? Tell me a bit about your family.

INDERFURTH: First of all, although formally Karl F. for "Frederick," I'm known as "Rick." People say there is a Rick Inderfurth, but they don't know Karl. I'm actually both.

I was born in Charlotte, North Carolina in September 1946 and grew up there. My father was Karl Henry Inderfurth from Mystic, Connecticut. My mother, Sarah Frances Seawell, was from Rockingham, North Carolina. My father's parents had both immigrated from Germany in the early 1900s. Grandfather was from Breyell. That was in the northwest part of the country toward Belgium. My grandmother came from a small town in that vicinity, Lubberich. They did not know each other when they came to this country. They met in Connecticut, in Mystic, where Grandfather had come to be a superintendent at a textile plant, Rossie Velvet, which is now just across the street from the Mystic Seaport Museum. There was a German-American community there. He met his wife, Anna, and got married. She was very pleased to be the wife of a successful manager at this textile plant. Then my grandfather decided that he wanted to be a farmer, so she had to quickly adjust herself to becoming a farmer's wife. They bought a farm outside of Mystic, where my father was born and raised and lived until it was time for him to go to college. He decided he would go into textiles, as my Grandfather had originally come to America to do. But textiles was moving south, so Dad went to Clemson College, which was then a military school in Clemson, South Carolina, to get his degree in textile engineering. That's how he made his way south where he met my mother. She was at the Women's College at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. They got married after Dad graduated from Clemson and they later moved to Charlotte, where I was born.

Q: Did you have brothers or sisters?

INDERFURTH: One sister, Pamela, who was born in Philadelphia in 1943. My father at that point was in the service. He was eventually a major in the Army in the Quartermaster Corps. He was stationed in Philadelphia at that time, where my sister was born.

Q: Did you grow up in Charlotte?

INDERFURTH: I did.

Q: Did you sit around the table at night and talk about things or was this a workaholic family where everybody went their own way?

INDERFURTH: I think at that time families got together more for dinner than today. I remember we ate dinner every night at 6:00 on the dot. Dad, being a textile representative, did a lot of traveling. So, during the week, he was often on the road traveling to various textile plants in North and South Carolina, Georgia, Virginia. At that time he was a vice president of Collins Brothers Machinery Company in Pawtucket, Rhode Island. At one point early in my life, we lived in Rhode Island for a couple of years while he was working with Collins Brothers. Eventually, he branched out to return to his parents' roots, Germany, to expand his business in textiles. My Dad spoke German in his home in Mystic until World War I and the U.S. entry into the war in 1917. At that point his parents said, "We will not speak German any longer in the home. We're going to become Americanized." Obviously there was strong anti-German feeling in Connecticut and elsewhere because of the war. Later when Dad decided to do business in Germany, his German came back almost fluently. He tried to convince my sister and myself to learn German from him. Unfortunately, we had no clue why we would ever need a foreign language. We had no international exposure in Charlotte. That is one of the regrets of my life that I didn't take up my Dad's offer. I could have certainly used it in what for me became a very international life.

Q: My mother spoke German before she spoke English, but it didn't pass on.

INDERFURTH: Well, it is a regret that I have that I didn't do that. Interestingly enough, I've been to Germany many times and most recently just a few weeks ago when I was in Berlin for a Track II diplomatic meeting sponsored by the UN on Afghanistan. I looked in the phone book and once again found several Inderfurths. The only place that I've ever traveled where I can find my namesake in a phone book is in Berlin. There was a Werner Inderfurth, a Klaus Inderfurth and a Karl Inderfurth among others. I am connected with some of them. But, for me, the fact that Dad started making trips to Europe opened up a little bit of the world that I had not seen as a Charlottean. Some of Dad's business contacts from Germany started coming to Charlotte. Dad also traveled to Latin America, to Colombia. We started on occasion having red wine with dinner, which was sort of a European thing to do. All this was the beginning of a little more international flavor in my life.

Q: For yourself, what about reading? Did this grab you early on?

INDERFURTH: No, it actually didn't. I regret to say that I did not become a real reader until college. Maybe that's good. By the time I got the bug, I never let go of it. I still am a very avid reader. But in high school - I went to Myers Park High in Charlotte - I think I was more interested in athletics. I was captain of the swimming team and we were state champions and I played football my senior year and we were ranked very high in the state. I was a very average student, but good enough to get into the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. As an in-state student, it was far easier than being an out of state student.

Q: But still, it's one of our premier educational institutions.

INDERFURTH: I did not fully appreciate that at the time. I later learned after I left Chapel Hill and came to Washington what an excellent reputation Chapel Hill had. Of course, it is one of the premier state universities in the country. And while I was there lightbulbs started to go off for me, especially with a few professors like Bernard Boyd in religion, Herbert Bodman in history, and Joel Schwartz in Soviet studies. Also, I began to read "The New York Times" when I was in Chapel Hill, and the columns of James Reston and Tom Wicker. This was at the time that the Vietnam War was becoming quite prominent in the news. Walter Cronkite was on every night on CBS and watching him became a rather permanent fixture of my university existence.

Q: You were the class of what?

INDERFURTH: I graduated in '68. So, I was '64-'68. Of course, that was the major part of the Vietnam buildup and the beginning of the anti-war protests.

Q: While you were in college, did you have a major?

INDERFURTH: Well, I went there to major in business. My father was in business and therefore I simply assumed that I would go off to get my education and get a business degree. Now my Dad never tried to persuade me to go into business but I assumed that that's what I would do. But I also had a roommate from Charlotte by the name of Bart Mauldin. We had agreed to room together our freshman year. He also had a father in business in Charlotte. I think he was oriented in that direction. After the first semester, Bart came back from class one day and said that he had decided that he was going to switch his focus and major in French. I said, "What are you going to do with French? Are you going to teach? Why are you doing this?" He said, "Well, because I like it and I'm interested in it." I think that was our first and only argument our freshman year. I told him that this was ridiculous and that he had to be more practical. By the end of my freshman year, I had switched my major to political science, which probably had as much practical sense! What do you do with political science?

I had had my first political science course my second semester, a large lecture class. Professor William Geer taught it. It was introduction to American government. It really was fascinating, hearing how the government worked and about current events in Washington. Professor Geer said at his first lecture: "A requirement of this course is to read a newspaper and I do not mean 'The Hickory Chronicle.' I want you to read 'The New York Times.' It is available and I want you to be well informed." So, by the end of my freshman year, I went into political science and never looked back.

Q: With your father in the textile business, did you get any feeling for labor problems, integration, etc.?

INDERFURTH: Interesting question. I do not remember at lot of social or political

discussion at home. It's not that we avoided it. It just didn't come up at any length. When I was a high school junior, the first black student came to Myers Park High, which was considered one of the top four high schools in the state. There was no violence, nor was there a lot of discussion about this at my home. Later Charlotte got very involved in school desegregation and court-ordered busing.

My parents were Eisenhower Republicans. We had a very long-time serving member of Congress, Charles R. Jonas, a moderate Republican. My father had some dealings with him. Dad was very involved in the service clubs in Charlotte. He was president of the Lions Club and was a Scout leader. Later he became a "Knight of the Queen City," which is what Charlotte was called, for his work. Mother was involved in a number of social and charitable activities, a lot of them revolving around the country club, which was a fixture of Charlotte life.

When I went to college and started coming home from this "liberal bastion" Chapel Hill, I started bringing home my thoughts and reactions to events – about Vietnam, about the civil rights movement. In this connection I have always found it fascinating that it was my father who first told me that Vietnam was a major mistake. He said he could not for the life of him understand what we were doing there and why we were sending all these young men to that part of the world. This was before the anti-war protests started building up steam. I don't think he said that simply because he had a son that would be of draft age. It wasn't, "Son, I don't want you to go." That wasn't part of his discussion. He just looked at the situation and asked why are we spilling our blood and treasure there, what U.S. interests are being served. He arrived at the conclusion, earlier than most, that we were making a big mistake.

Q: When you were taking political science, did you find yourself moving towards state affairs, national affairs, international affairs or was it the whole thing?

INDERFURTH: It was a little bit of the whole thing, but there is no doubt that the courses that I remember most were in the international affairs arena. I took a course on the Soviet system by Joel Schwartz. I think he was a graduate student at that point, soon to become a Ph.D. and have a long career at Chapel Hill. I took a course from a Dr. Andrew Scott, who had been a former U.S. government official. I think he served in State, maybe Policy Planning. He was a very distinguished man. I took a course on China and had a chance during a symposium to sit next to Edgar Snow, the author of the classic account of the revolution "Red Star Over China." He was one of the speakers. Also, because of the Vietnam War, we were all reading "The Ugly American," Bernard Fall's works on the nature of this conflict, and newspaper articles by those covering the war, like David Halberstam of "The New York Times." A bit later we had "The Pentagon Papers" to read. So I was moving in an international direction, although I was quite interested in American government, including the presidency and Congress and how they worked.

While political science was my major, I also had what in effect was a minor in religion. We had a very strong religion department at UNC and an excellent professor by the name

of Bernard Boyd, who taught Old and New Testament. His classes were literally sold out, with over 200 students. In high school, I had been part of Young Life, a youth religious group led by a very dynamic leader, Mal McSwain. The religion courses at Chapel Hill were a continuation of that interest of mine, including those that went into ethics. People were becoming more politically active and searching for answers and social values. It was a very fascinating time to be a student studying both politics and religion.

Q: I would think so. North Carolina has always been somewhat the maverick of the South.

INDERFURTH: When I was growing up there, many considered it the most progressive state of the South.

Q: But at the same time, there is a strong military tradition there. So, I would have thought that... Could you talk about your observation of the protest movement while you were there?

INDERFURTH: One of the strongest memories I have was going to see a demonstration where students and people from Chapel Hill were protesting a Speakers Ban which the legislature in Raleigh had imposed in '65 to prohibit communists or communist-affiliated people from speaking on state university grounds. There was a protest against this and for free speech. The university campus and the town come together on Franklin Street, and there is a small stonewall there. One of the two "communist" labeled speakers that day was Herbert Aptheker.

Q: He was at the University of San Diego, sort of the guru of the... I'm not even sure he was communist.

INDERFURTH: People thought he was. I remember standing on the campus side of this stonewall and these two speakers were on the other side on the sidewalk, the town side, and they were speaking to a group of 20-30 people. I'm not even sure if I went there intentionally or just ran into it. But I said, "Now, this is really interesting. What could these people be saying that could be so detrimental to people hearing it when we do believe in free speech in this country?" That didn't make me into a campus activist, which I was not, but it certainly caused me to think about this. There were also beginning to be some anti-war protests, quiet vigils, at the post office at Chapel Hill every Saturday. Often, these were townspeople as well as students, not large numbers. This was in '65 and early '66.

I also became aware during this time about the view of Chapel Hill being a "liberal oasis" in the state of North Carolina. In fact, I heard it directly from a radio broadcaster in Raleigh who often took to the airways to condemn what was taking place in Chapel Hill. His name was Jesse Helms, who later became chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a leader of the conservative wing of the Republican party.

I also learned about Chapel Hill's traditions and its great leaders, including Frank Porter

Graham, who served in the late 1940s as president of the university and later a U.S. senator and who worked for the United Nations. Later, I learned that he was one of the first UN mediators for the Kashmir conflict. In my later professional experience at State, I was very much involved in Kashmir, so I read a lot about Frank Graham. He was and still is considered one of the greatest of UNC's presidents. He was strong willed, politically courageous, and refused to play the 'race card' in his Senate campaign and lost. He is a key part of that North Carolina progressive tradition that we discussed earlier, which also includes former governor and U.S. senator Terry Stanford and, more recently, Gov. Jim Hunt. So, North Carolina has a strong progressive streak, which I consider myself a part of, but it has also had some far more conservative political figures like Jesse Helms.

Q: You graduated in '68. This was the peak of American commitment there. How did that play by the time of your senior year, the protest movement? What were you doing?

INDERFURTH: By '67/'68, the war was dominating the news. Everybody would make time to watch the CBS News with Walter Cronkite. Chapel Hill, despite being criticized as a 'liberal oasis,' was still relatively quiet. But here was beginning to be a lot of discussion about the war. For me, the moment when I started to "take a stand" came in the '68 presidential campaign. That's when the war, and President Johnson's handling of it, became THE national political issue. I remember the first time that I ever politically committed myself was when I volunteered to be an organizer for Eugene McCarthy, who had gone into New Hampshire primary to take on Lyndon Johnson. I put a McCarthy bumper sticker on the back of my Mustang. I was a member of a fraternity, Beta Theta Pi. There weren't that many at that time. But certainly a lot of my fraternity brothers and classmates were becoming more politically active. The hair was getting longer. More people were smoking marijuana. Not a lot of protests on campus, but some. People were beginning to realize that this was a BIG issue.

Q: Was there much feedback at that time from guys who had graduated the year or two before and ended up in the military?

INDERFURTH: Not much. A number of them continued to go to graduate school, where deferments were possible. No one that I was aware of had gone off to war and come back in a body bag.

Q: That's one of the ironies of that war, that Johnson had made almost a deal that the small town kids, farm kids, and the black kids... and the more educated...

INDERFURTH: That's right. Some people began to go into reserve units, which I did later. But the war itself was becoming the dominant issue. Of course, when Johnson withdrew from the presidential race, that was a major event. Nobody had expected him to pull out. Robert Kennedy then got involved, but I stayed with McCarthy since he had come in first. I didn't take part in the so-called "Children's Crusade" that went off to New Hampshire and later to the Chicago convention. Before that convention, of course, there was the tragedy of Robert Kennedy being killed, and Martin Luther King. It seemed

to be a great unraveling of our national unity, with the war and assassinations. All of this had a very powerful impact on me and many in my generation.

Q: What were you pointed towards in the summer of '68?

INDERFURTH: At that point, I was becoming more politically active. I was still very involved in my studies. My last two years, my grades went up considerably, As and Bs. I was looking toward continuing my studies. The opportunity came up to go to Duke Divinity School. I was also getting married that summer. The curriculum at Duke was one that was very interesting to me because it combined social theology, modern ethics, world religion, and a focus on theologians such as Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Reinhold Niebuhr and Walter Rauschenbusch.
At Duke, my political interests intervened. There was an internship offered at the Divinity School for students to go into the "real world" - business, political work at the state or national level for a year. They offered a program in Washington to work in the U.S. Senate. I went up and interviewed and was chosen for the program. I was assigned to Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin. So, after that first year at Duke, I came to Washington to do a year internship. I did that, got totally involved in my work and interested in everything that was happening in Washington and decided to withdraw from Duke at the end of the year and stay. That's how I made the transition from there to here.

Q: What were you doing as an intern?

INDERFURTH: Well, first, Senator Proxmire was a remarkable man - hardworking, honest and he had a thing about the taxpayer's money. There should be no government waste and he would uncover it if there were. Later, he became known for his Golden Fleece awards in which he called attention to $200 toilet seats for the Pentagon and other procurement misuses of the taxpayer's money. He was also very focused on the "Military- Industrial Complex," which President Eisenhower had called attention to in his Farewell Address. While I was there, Senator Proxmire had a book published on that subject, "Report from Wasteland." He had been very influenced by another senator, a great senator, Paul Douglas of Illinois, who was a steward of fiscal responsibility.

Proxmire also was opposed to the war in Vietnam and he had me work on some legislation. His office was very good about this because it would give interns right out of college a chance to work on legislation. We also had to the run the mimeograph machine and do all the things that interns do – like opening the mail. He also allowed us to write speeches. He gave a speech a day on the UN Human Rights Conventions and the need to ratify the Genocide Convention among others. That kept us junior staff members busy. He also proposed legislation to stop sending draftees to Vietnam. It was defeated but it was something that I got to work on. All of this was a way for me to channel my concern about the war into political activity at a very high level. There were also demonstrations at that time, marches around the White House with candles, that I took part in.

Q: Did you get any feel for the staff structure at that time in the Senate? It's become almost a fourth branch of government.

INDERFURTH: I certainly realized for the first time the importance of Senate staff. A lot of networking goes on. I've kept in touch with many of the people I first met when I worked for Senator Proxmire. John Holum was Senator McGovern's staff person on defense and foreign policy. John later introduced me to the McGovern presidential campaign and one of its managers, Gary Hart, who hired me as an advance man. Later, John worked with me at the State Department under President Clinton as Under Secretary for Security and Arms Control. There were others I first met at that time, like Bill Miller with Senator Mathias. I later worked with Bill on the Senate Intelligence Committee when he was Staff Director. Later he became our first ambassador to Ukraine after the Soviet Union broke up. So, certainly there was a recognition on my part that staff to members of Congress have enormous responsibilities themselves. But again, for me as an intern, it was a chance to start meeting people and working with them on a variety of issues and it is one that, in many respects, has quite literally carried through to this day.

Q: I would think that Senator Proxmire going for waste, fraud, and abuse sounds great, but when you think about it, one person's waste to another person is their patronage. I would think that this wouldn't make him terribly popular in the Senate.

INDERFURTH: No, not always in Washington, but it made him popular in Wisconsin, where citizens felt he was protecting their interests. Certainly when he took on defense contractors – for instance, Lockheed and the large overruns on the C-5As – there were a few members of the Senate who did not see eye to eye with Bill Proxmire!

Q: It's still going on.

INDERFURTH: Yes. He had a lot of whistle blowers who would come to see him. Ernest Fitzgerald was a key figure in his book on the military-industrial complex. But Proxmire was respected because he got his facts right. He also got a lot of publicity. We ran a press release off almost every day. Proxmire also had a protégé in a House member from Wisconsin by the name of Les Aspin. Aspin copied the Proxmire approach in the House. He later became Armed Services Committee chairman and later Defense Secretary under President Clinton. Proxmire had a lot of influence on a lot of people, including myself.

Q: After you finished this year, were you looking at where to go and what to do?

INDERFURTH: I had to make a decision about whether or not to return to Duke and continue my degree there, which would have been a Master's in Divinity, or stay in Washington. Quite frankly, the interest and the excitement of Washington led me to write a letter to Duke and say that I would not be coming back and I asked Senator Proxmire if it would be possible to continue working for him. He hired me as a staff assistant. I stayed on for another year.

Q: By this time, your wife had graduate from UNC?

INDERFURTH: She had.

Q: What did she think about this?

INDERFURTH: She liked Washington. She was working for the Census Bureau. After a time, we started moving apart in terms of our interests and we later divorced. A few years after that I remarried and have had a wonderful 24 years with my wife Merrie and our two daughters, Ashley and Alison. I also have a daughter from my previous marriage, Jeannie, whom I am very proud of and is now living in the Washington area, married and with children, and doing very well.

When I came to Washington, I really did get quite involved in events taking place here. I learned that, even at a young age, you can become very involved and can actually do a lot of work on issues of concern to you. If you work hard, spend long hours and show a measure of ability, there are a lot of things you can do in Washington. Working in the Senate at a young age is a fantastic experience. Our high school junior daughter, Alison, is going to be working as an intern for Senator Leahy. Our daughter in college, Ashley, she's a freshman at Bowdoin College, is interested in government and Russia, where we lived for two years as family.

Q: You were with Senator Proxmire for how long?

INDERFURTH: A little over two years. Then I went into the Army Reserves, to fulfill my military obligation.

Q: Those two years, what were you doing? Were you concentrated?

INDERFURTH: To a certain degree, one did all things, but I did have a focus on defense and foreign policy. As a junior staff member, you did what you were asked to do - drafting floor statements, drafting press releases, occasionally getting involved in some legislative activities. It was a good entry level position.

Q: Did you get a feel about politics in Wisconsin?

INDERFURTH: Some, but I think the focus in Washington was on national politics. The Vietnam War was continuing and Richard Nixon was president and Henry Kissinger was the National Security Advisor. So this was a very interesting time.

Q: Within the staff, what was the impression that you developed and maybe your colleagues did or maybe didn't toward the Nixon administration? You were there when things came down.

INDERFURTH: Proxmire had a number of battles that he fought with the Nixon administration, including on whether to develop an SST, a supersonic transport. He was opposed. He took on the military industrial complex. He was opposed to the war in Vietnam. He worked very closely with Senator Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin and others on environmental issues, including Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine. So there were

plenty of fights with the administration on a number of issues, but it was not cutthroat. It was respectful and almost always with a constructive alternative attached to it.

Q: What committees was Proxmire on?

INDERFURTH: He was on the Joint Economic Committee and Banking (he did a lot of serious work on banking reform). The JEC is where he did his work on waste, fraud, and abuse and the military. He was vice chairman.

Q: You went into the Army Reserve for how long?

INDERFURTH: Six months active duty, including basic training and advanced individual training, and then a five and a half year commitment. A lot of my friends and colleagues were trying to figure out what to do about the draft. A number of us joined the Reserves. Many of us were strongly opposed to our involvement in Vietnam, but we did not want to go to Canada and we were not Conscientious Objectors. We wanted to find the right way to fulfill our military obligation.

Q: So, after you completed your full-time commitment to the Reserves in '71, you came back. You had gone on as part of the congressional staff. Then you came back to join a presidential campaign. How did that come about?

INDERFURTH: One gets on the phone to see if one can find a position. Fortunately, those Senate contacts that I mentioned earlier included people who put me in touch with the two campaigns that I wanted to speak to. One was the Muskie campaign – he was the frontrunner on the Democratic side, and also the McGovern campaign. I saw the Muskie people first and came away less than impressed because they seemed to be taking the nomination for granted and were already talking about how they would wage the campaign against Nixon. There wasn't any sense of passion about the issues, including the war. It seemed more a "matter of a fact" campaign than a campaign of some commitment. Then I went to see the people in the McGovern campaign. John Holum had called one of the campaign directors to see me. I went to the McGovern for President office, which was on the House side of the Congress at First Street, SE. The person I wanted to see actually had to leave to go see McGovern, so the receptionist asked if I would see Gary Hart, his campaign manager. We sat down and in about 30 minutes Gary sketched out how McGovern would win because he was going to take the primaries and he was going to wage an aggressive campaign and he was going to end the war, that this was a campaign about ideas and purpose. Here was the passion I was looking for. Then he introduced me to Frank Mankiewitz, who was the co-campaign manager with Hart and was Robert Kennedy's former press secretary. They asked if I wanted to join the staff to do advance work. I immediately signed on and for the next year and a half worked on that campaign.

Q: What did you do?

INDERFURTH: Advance work was just that. I would travel to places in advance of

Senator McGovern, set up the events, make sure the press was notified, worked with the local coordinators. I did this in Florida, Illinois, and California. Sometimes these were just routine political events. Sometimes, like in California, they were a little different. McGovern went to see the Washington Redskins play the Los Angeles Rams on Monday Night Football. He had a number of backers from Hollywood so, as it turned out, we went to that game with Warren Beatty and Julie Christie, two very well known movie actors. She had just starred in 'Dr. Zhivago' as Lara. So these were not always your routine political events that I was advancing!

More importantly, you did have a sense that this was a campaign with a mission. McGovern was absolutely committed to seeing an end to American involvement in Vietnam and spoke eloquently about it and rallied so many people to his cause. Later in the campaign I did some political organizing. Once the primaries started, I worked in New Hampshire and other states, and at the end of the campaign, once McGovern had won the nomination and we had completed our work at the Democratic Convention in Miami, we moved our headquarters to K. St. to a larger building in Washington. I was asked to work there under Gary Hart and Rick Stearns, who later became a federal judge in Massachusetts, and to be in charge of the Southwest Region for McGovern. The region stretched from Texas to California. We needed state coordinators, so Stearns invited one of his Rhodes Scholar classmates at Oxford to take on the job of being the McGovern co-coordinator for Texas. That was Bill Clinton. The other director was a college classmate of mine at UNC, Taylor Branch, who later wrote this wonderful biography of Martin Luther King, "Parting the Waters," which won the Pulitzer Prize. Bill Clinton came to the Washington headquarters before heading to Texas and I met him for the first time. He was enormously personable. During the next three months of the general campaign, he was one of the people I was most in touch with because Texas had a ton of electoral votes. Unfortunately, McGovern did not win Texas, nor did he win anywhere else except the District of Columbia and Massachusetts!

But a lot of us got to know each other then. A lot of people in that campaign stayed involved in politics or government, including Bill Clinton himself.

Q: Did you feel any part of the Nixon dirty tricks campaign?

INDERFURTH: There were reports about that. I did a montage of newspaper headlines and photographs after the election. I still have it in my basement. It traced the beginning of McGovern's campaign and his starting to win primaries and building up momentum for the Democratic convention and then the general election against Nixon. At the very end of that campaign, the Watergate reports in the Washington Post were beginning to come out. The ITT scandal was also beginning to surface. I had down at the bottom of this montage a small little clipping that said of McGovern: "premature morality." We all felt that we were against a strong opponent and that there were probably some dirty tricks, but none of the people I worked with had any sense of the extent of this, like the "plumbers" operation. All that took a while to unfold, with thanks to Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein of the Post.

Q: Did you have much contact with the Nixon campaigners?

INDERFURTH: No.

Q: You were both two ships going on parallel places?

INDERFURTH: Their course was headed back for the White House with the Committee to Reelect the President. Ours was basically to fight another day. But it was very interesting. A lot of the people that were involved in that campaign continued their commitment to and interest in public policy and issues. I think there were two defining moments for many of us in my generation. There was the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963. We were old enough to have it impact us - this young, idealistic president, the promise that he had, his role during the Cuban Missile Crisis. That left a very strong impression, including on Bill Clinton who has a famous photograph of himself as a teenager shaking hands with President Kennedy in the Rose Garden when he was in Washington for Boys State. A second defining moment was Vietnam and all the debate and protest that surrounded it. That led many of us into the McGovern campaign and political organizing and working on the national level, including people like Sandy Berger, Tony Lake, John Podesta, John Holum, all of whom I later worked with in the Clinton Administration.

Q: Was there any concern on your part about McGovern as far as being opposed to the war but what would be the end game if he became President?

INDERFURTH: He gave an acceptance speech in Miami at the Democratic Convention which was a case study of how not to make your case to the American people. That convention was chaotic. There was a lot of opposition to McGovern, even though he had the delegates to get the nomination. There were a lot of floor fights. It's not like conventions today, where things are scripted and run basically to have the winning candidate appear on prime time television at 9:00 or 10:00 to deliver an acceptance speech. McGovern's acceptance speech was given at 3:00 am. Basically nobody watched that except the people at the convention itself. In that speech, he kept referring to a theme that was used by his speechwriters, which was "Come home, America." The Nixon people took that and ran with it to say that he was an isolationist. But McGovern meant "Come home, America" to return to the nation's basic values and our involvement in Vietnam was contrary, in his view, to those values and contrary to our interests. So "Come home, America" was not to bring Americans back to a fortress America, but to reconnect with those values which this country stood for and that were being put to the test by the war in Vietnam. How he would have been able to do that I cannot say, but I have no doubt that the war would not have continued for another three years, with so many more lives lost. How it would have been done, one can only speculate.

Q: What was your impression of people who you'd meet in various localities?

INDERFURTH: A positive impression. People were committed. People that were attempting to do something with their lives and trying to express themselves through

political action with a moral commitment. That doesn't mean that everybody was a knight on a white horse. But what you did feel was a common sense of purpose, of people concerned about the direction of the country and willing spend their personal time to do something about it. And that's good.

Q: After an election where your man loses, there must be people caught in a cloudburst, running around, trying to look for something to do.

INDERFURTH: Gary Hart said that, the day after the election, he came back to the McGovern headquarters on K St. and had a meeting in his office. At one point he leaned over to use the phone and he looked at it and said, "The line's dead." The phone company had already cut it off. He had to go out on the street and use a pay phone. The day before he had been the campaign manager for the Democratic nominee for President. Had that election gone well, he would have been moving to the White House. It didn't and he was out in the street searching for the 25 cents to make a phone call.

During the campaign, I had applied for a Fulbright scholarship and had been accepted. I postponed it because McGovern won the nomination. Even though we were committed, we weren't all convinced that he would win! So, in January, I was off to Scotland on a one year Fulbright. So, even though the cloudburst had occurred, there were always other places to go.

Q: You went to Scotland with your family?

INDERFURTH: Right. To Glasgow and the University of Strathclyde, which was one of Britain's 'new universities.'

Q: What directed you there?

INDERFURTH: Number one, I had wanted to continue my graduate studies. Number two, the Fulbright program is well known and has a great reputation. Not having learned German as my father had urged me to, I was still without a foreign language. When you apply, you apply to the country – in this case, the UK. I envisioned I would find myself at Oxford or Cambridge if I was accepted. Instead, I found myself in Glasgow, which turned out to be a great experience.

Q: What did you study there?

INDERFURTH: Again, political science, specifically comparative politics. I did a lot of reading about the British system. I traveled to London for research. I attended classes. It was a good year for me. This was my first trip out of the country, except for a few excursions to Canada when I worked at a summer resort in Vermont. But this was my first time to get on a plane and fly across the Atlantic to London, and take a train to Glasgow. This was great.

Q: Was there a difference in how one was taught between there and North Carolina?

INDERFURTH: Certainly the accent was different! The British accent is so intimidating. I never had a full southern accent. I think my father's Connecticut Yankee background influenced my North Carolina roots. The British, of course, speak the language so perfectly that you are a little bit intimidated by the precision with which they address you.

Q: At the end of this, was there a game plan?
INDERFURTH: Continue my studies. While in Glasgow, I applied to Princeton and went there after we returned to the U.S. for the purpose of getting my Ph.D. I was accepted in the Department of Politics.

Q: Your Ph.D. was in political science. I assume that each individual had a breakdown of what they wanted to do.

INDERFURTH: You mean within the discipline itself?

Q: Yes.

INDERFURTH: No, not necessarily. I was still taking a number of courses in American government. In fact, when I was at Princeton, I was a preceptor, their term for a graduate instructor. I worked with Professor Fred I. Greenstein, who is one of the country's leading experts on the American presidency. He would give the lecture and then break his class down into smaller seminars with graduate instructors.

I also found myself spending a great deal of time at the Woodrow Wilson School, which is directly adjacent to the Department of Politics at Princeton. Again, I took courses in international affairs, including under Dr. Richard Ullman, and public policy analysis. My plan was to get my Master's, and then start writing the dissertation for my Ph.D. However, politics in Washington intervened again. Gary Hart had gone back to his home state of Colorado and run for the Senate and won. I called to congratulate him and he asked me what I was doing. I said I was at Princeton. He said, "Why don't you come down to Washington and let's talk about things?" So, I came down to meet him. The conversation led to my decision to leave Princeton with my Master's in hand, but no Ph.D., and return to Washington to work on the Senate staff.

Q: How did you find Gary Hart? I talked to somebody who was a Foreign Service officer who worked with Gary Hart on one of these six months here, six months there. He said that he was really looking forward to it and when he got there, he hardly saw him at all and he seemed to be pretty aloof. How did you find him?

INDERFURTH: Again, I had worked with him on the McGovern campaign, so I had gotten to know him very well, and liked him. As I mentioned earlier, he hired me for the campaign and had made a very strong and convincing presentation about not only why George McGovern had a chance to win the presidency, but that there was a purpose to be served, and why it was so important for the country.

I think in many ways - philosophically, politically, and in one personal way – Gary Hart laid the groundwork for Bill Clinton. Hart saw himself as a new Democrat. At one point during his campaign for the Senate, Gary was interviewed by either the Post of the Times and the reporter said, "But you're a liberal Democrat." Hart said, "Yes, but we're not a bunch of little Hubert Humphreys." That was not meant to be disrespectful to Hubert Humphrey, who was an beloved figure of the Party, but that the New Deal and the Fair Deal days were over and that Democrats had to find a new way to express themselves in terms of being activists in favor of government but not trying to throw government programs at every problem. That same theme found its voice in Bill Clinton's presidential campaign many years later. Clinton called it his "Third Way." Gary Hart established the foundation for Democrats redefining themselves in a way that would be not seen as big spenders and big government. I think that he did an important service for his Party.

Also, Gary Hart is a very intelligent man. He was a founder of the Military Reform Caucus when he served in the Senate, along with Republican Bill Cohen of Maine who would later become Defense Secretary under Bill Clinton. That, too, was a new way of looking at military issues, where Democrats would not be seen as against military programs, but advocating ways to reform the armed forces and work with the defense establishment to do so.

Unfortunately, Gary Hart also had his own personal problems that led to his withdrawal from the presidential race in 1988, over reports about his sexual relationships. Hart went through the media mill. A "feeding frenzy" they called it. Of course he had his own responsibility in this. He basically challenged the press, saying, "If you think I'm doing something, why don't you follow me?" They did. It was too bad. It appeared self-destructive. I found Gary Hart to be very personable and extraordinarily able, politically smart, but unfortunately he had something about his own personality which led to the premature end to his presidential aspirations. Many years later when Bill Clinton was confronted in the New Hampshire primary with charges of extramarital affairs, I believe he was able to navigate through that because of the sheer force of his own personality, never giving up, but also because Gary Hart had taken the first media blow on reports of this kind.

Q: Things happened to these people, so it wasn't quite the shock.

INDERFURTH: Exactly.

Q: Obviously this isn't the focus of our interview, but I think it's interesting to examine the sociology of this. In your observation, is there something about some candidates that... It's not so much attracting women, but how they deal with it. It's the damnedest thing.

INDERFURTH: This really isn't part of the interview and one that I don't really want to speak to. These are things about the personal lives of public people. I think that as long as a politician's personal life does not impinge on his or her public responsibilities, their personal lives should remain private.

Q: Fair enough. One of our problems in our country is that these things can often have a life of their own. We're not that loyalistic a country in many ways except when it gets into public. Then it becomes a political matter.
What were you doing with Hart?

INDERFURTH: Initially, I graduated from being a Staff Assistant to Senator Proxmire to being a Legislative Assistant for Senator Hart. But almost immediately upon taking that position, he was appointed to the Church Intelligence Committee. That committee was established in response to allegations that our intelligence agencies were involved in illegal or improper activities. There were reports that the CIA had been involved in assassination plots against foreign leaders, trying to overthrow a democratically elected government in Chile, of FBI files on innocent American citizens, and military intelligence spying on protestors. This was in '75. The Senate and the House established committees to investigate these charges and allegations.

Gary Hart was appointed to that committee. It was a major assignment. The committee included some of the giants of the Senate at that time, like Frank Church, Barry Goldwater, Howard Baker, Philip Hart from Michigan, John Tower of Texas, Walter Mondale of Minnesota. It was a high powered, extraordinary committee. Hart was one of the few freshmen Senators on the committee. He asked me if I would like to join the committee staff and be his representative. I said, "Absolutely." This was going to be a fascinating encounter, the first ever committee established by the Senate to look into the workings of our intelligence community.

Q: You must have been involved with Frank Church.

INDERFURTH: No, I had not had any contact with him, but I had watched his Senate career closely when I worked in the Senate for Proxmire and knew some of his staff.

Q: What did you do as a staff?

INDERFURTH: They organized the investigating committee into four task forces. One was called Command and Control, which was really a White House oriented task force. One was on foreign intelligence, which was CIA. One was on domestic intelligence, which was mainly the FBI. One was on military intelligence, which was NSA and DIA. I was assigned to the Command and Control task force and worked with Senator Mondale's principal assistant, David Aaron, and one of Senator Church's key aides, Loch Johnson. Loch is now a professor of political science at Georgia and is one of our nation's leading experts on the intelligence community. He is also a very good friend.

In addition to the task forces, a smaller group was set up to look into the illegal assassination plots against foreign leaders. Hart was asked to join and I took part as well. We did a report on plots against Castro, Lumumba of the Congo, General Rene Schneider in Chile, Diem of South Vietnam. Of course, this was getting a great deal of public attention, including in the "New York Times," "Washington Post," and the evening news on television.

The Committee spent several months delving into the workings of the CIA. I spent many hours out at the Agency going through files, reports that they had done by their Inspector Generals. In many ways I actually gained an appreciation for the professionalism of these agencies. As we found out, the CIA had done its own internal review of these allegations, which was then turned over to President Ford and an executive commission he had established, the Rockefeller Commission. These files were turned over to the Senate Intelligence Committee. Eventually all of this work, all of this intensive inquiry, resulted in what I consider the most important outcome, namely the establishment of Senate and House permanent intelligence committees. It was clear that the Congress had not exercised adequate oversight of intelligence activities in the past and that needed to change. Those committees are still operating today. They have brought a great deal of accountability to the work of intelligence and indeed support. There is no question that this country needs a strong intelligence community, but it also needs it to be run lawfully and respecting civil liberties. I think Congress has played an important role, as well as the agencies themselves, in establishing watchdogs to ensure that those kinds of activities that we saw during the Church Committee investigation do not occur again.

Q: What was your impression of the press coverage of this? This was hot news? There is a tendency not to put things into the context and to put it into the most garish light possible.

INDERFURTH: Often on Capitol Hill, those who work on the Senate side feel slightly superior to those on the House side. It's not only Members but staff. So, I don't want what I am about to say to be seen in that light. But I felt that the Church Committee handled itself much more responsibly than the House Committee, which was led by Congressman Pike. They had a lot of leaks, a lot of battles on declassifying material. When those battles took place, a lot of the material they were debating internally made its way the press. We felt very strongly on the Church Committee that it was terribly important to make certain that only that information that was authorized by the committee would be released, that leaking a story would undermine the credibility of the committee and call into question the ability of Congress to handled sensitive, highly classified material. By and large, that was the way the committee operated.

Now, the press wanted to see James Bond around every corner. Sometimes, the committee and its chairman would play to that. William Colby, who was then the CIA director, was asked to come to the first public hearing with a poison dart gun, which some scientist at the CIA had developed. Of course, the thing had never been used, but it looked pretty good for the cameras. But on the whole, the committee hearings were serious and thorough. I worked on the report on the CIA's covert action program in Chile and, along with three other staff members, testified before the committee in open session on our findings. The Ford Administration had refused to send any official to take part in the hearing. In recent years even more information about the extent of U.S. involvement in the coup against Allende has come to light but, basically, I think we got the story right at the time.

Q: What was your basic committee reading on Chile?

INDERFURTH: At one point, Church said the CIA was a "rogue elephant" out of control. I respectfully disagree with that assessment. I think if there was a "rogue elephant," it was operating in this case out of the Oval Office. On Chile, the Agency conducted a number of activities to undermine support for Salvador Allende, who was a socialist but had been elected in a free, constitutional vote. But those activities were undertaken not independently by the CIA but at the direction of President Nixon and the National Security Council committee overseeing the CIA and covert activities, which included Secretary of State Kissinger. Richard Helms, the CIA director, said that he went into the Oval Office and President Nixon was adamant that something had to be done about Allende. Helms said, "If I ever left the Oval Office with a field marshall's baton in my hand, it was that day."

Q: Did you get into the missing problem? I'm talking about the book, "The Missing."

INDERFURTH: Sure. That as well as the assassination of Orlando Letelier, the former Chilean foreign minister. I had interviewed Letelier just days before he was killed by that car bomb here in Washington. We did get into these things. Charles Harmon was the missing person that you're referring to, the American citizen...

Q: There was a movie made.

INDERFURTH: The movie, I thought, was somewhat unfair in the way it portrayed the American ambassador, Nathaniel Davis. But there is no question, as we have subsequently learned, that there was more information about Harmon that should have been pursued at the time.

I think that, for me, the committee investigation reinforced the view that all parts of out government must be accountable and that, no matter how difficult, the oversight function must be performed. That is the only way to do it. Members of the Congress must have access to information to be able to perform that oversight function. Some alleged later that the investigations themselves had set back our intelligence collection capabilities around the world. I do not think that that was accurate. It may have had some minimal impact, but the strength that was gained by insuring that these activities are authorized and understood and compatible with our values far outweighed whatever temporary loss had occurred. This makes us the country we are.

Q: I agree. I must say that covert actions in the long run are essentially counterproductive.

INDERFURTH: I think they can be. We had to address the issue of whether or not there should be a ban on covert action. The committee did not support that, nor did I. There are times when a covert operation designed to disguise the official hand of the U.S. could be helpful. At the same time, we did see during the Committee's investigation an Executive Order issued by President Ford, and endorsed by the committee, declaring a flat

prohibition on the assassination of foreign leaders, undertaken by U.S. officials directly or indirectly. That Executive Order is still in effect today. President Ford was right to issue it and every president has maintained it. Now, that is a covert action which is very dangerous and totally counterproductive. When you start engaging in official assassination, then all leaders become fair game.

Q: I agree. You were with the Church Committee and then what did you do? Was Hart running for President?

INDERFURTH: No. This was 1976. The new committee established by the investigating committee was led by Senator Inouye. That was set up in '76 after the Church Committee completed its work. Gary Hart became a member of the permanent Committee. I stayed on. Then something very interesting happened in terms of the next presidential election, 1976. Each of these elections – '68, '72, and '76 - and the following election in '80 - had something to say about my own personal and professional life.

I was working on the White House Command and Control Task Force with David Aaron, who was Senator Mondale's representative. Mondale was chosen by Jimmy Carter to be his running mate. It was a close election between Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford, which Carter won. Gary Hart and I had gone on an oversight trip to about five countries in November. It was the first oversight trip by a member of the new Senate Intelligence Committee. We went to Israel and Greece, which has had an interesting relationship to intelligence over the years, Italy, Iran (the Shah was still in power). We were in Iran staying at the home of Ambassador Richard Helms, the former CIA director, when a call came for me from David Aaron asking whether, when I returned to Washington, I would join the Carter-Mondale transition team and work with him. He had been assigned by soon-to-be Vice President Mondale to do the transition work for the NSC and the CIA. I went down and talked to Gary. He said, "I'd hate to see you go. If you go on a transition team, I'm sure you're going to be asked to join the administration, but I can't stand in your way on that. Do it." When I got back, I went to work on the transition team.

Q: What part of the transition team did you have?

INDERFURTH: Again, it was for the NSC and the CIA. A transition team prepares briefing books for the people that are appointed to those positions. So, in this case, we went to the Old Executive Office Building next to the White House. We were given offices. We first spoke with General Brent Scowcroft, who was Ford's National Security Advisor. We also went out to the CIA and met with the CIA Director, George Bush, and started pulling together information about organizational structure, personnel, current directives, issues of interest, problem areas, etc. It's a major undertaking and you have a limited amount of time to do it.

As it turned out, Zbigniew Brzezinski became President Carter's National Security Advisor and so David and I, when Brzezinski was appointed, started working with him. We also worked at a slightly more distant fashion with the nominee to be the CIA director, President Kennedy's former counsel, Ted Sorensen. Unfortunately, he did not

make it through the nomination process.

David and I worked very closely with Brzezinski. I had never met him before. I knew of him, of course, because he was a very well known academic and foreign policy adviser. After three weeks of working together, Brzezinski asked David to stay on to be the Deputy National Security Advisor and asked me to stay on to be his Special Assistant and work at the White House with him.

Q: You had Brent Scowcroft, who was a professional military officer who later kept coming back with George Bush. He was National Security Advisor. Having gone through almost the trauma of the Kissinger National Security Advisor, were Scowcroft or others saying, "Maybe you ought to tone this thing down?"

INDERFURTH: Actually, Scowcroft had already toned it down. Later, I wrote a book on the National Security Council with Loch Johnson entitled "Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National Security Council." Scowcroft became for those of us who have studied the National Security Council the model of a National Security Advisor – low key, a coordinator (not a policy maker). By that time, Kissinger had become Secretary of State, which was a whole new dimension to the Kissinger persona, but I think that it was agreed that the National Security Council under Kissinger had become too dominant and had caused problems in the policy making process by moving State out of the center and, to a certain degree, the Defense Department as well. Scowcroft came in and became what is called an "honest broker" at the NSC. He was the person who saw the President most often, but he was always seen as one who accurately and fairly presented the views of departments and agencies. If asked his views, I'm sure he provided those to the President, but he ran the NSC as an "honest broker." He stayed out of the limelight. He didn't appear on television. He wasn't competing to be chief foreign policy spokesman. The Scowcroft model has continued to be the one that most people look to as the best example of how the NSC system should run. Of course, along came a new National Security Advisor in Zbigniew Brzezinski. As we know, during his four years, there was an enormous struggle at times between Brzezinski and the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance. They had some fundamental differences, which have been spelled out in books and articles since then, on issues of great importance, including our approach to the Soviet Union.

Clearly I was delighted at the age of 29 to be asked to work in the West Wing of the White House, jut around the corner from the Oval Office. This was a fantastic experience. At that point, I was seeing my soon-to-be wife, Merrie Roosa. We went to the Inauguration together, which was conducted at the West Front of the Capitol. We sat there and watched President Carter be sworn in. Then I went to the White House and started working on January 20th.

Q: Did you find empty file cabinets?

INDERFURTH: Yes. Things were empty in the sense that people hadn't left things on their desks. But it was a very smooth transition. General Scowcroft is a class act and a

great gentleman. My counterpart for the transition was his special assistant, Robert (Bud) McFarland, who later became National Security Advisor to President Reagan. The transition went very well. Brzezinski put togther quite a stellar National Security Council staff. I was Brzezinski's special assistant. The staff assistant was Robert Gates, who later became CIA Director under the first President Bush. The military assistant was Colonel Bill Odom, who later was promoted to General and became head of the National Security Agency under President Reagan. After about six or eight months, Brzezinski brought in a legislative director for congressional relations, Madeleine Albright, who we all know later became Secretary of State. You can go down the list of people. David Aaron would later be our Ambassador to the OSCE in Paris and Under Secretary of Commerce under President Clinton. We had people like William Hyland and Reg Bartholomew and Mike Oksenberg, Mike Armacost, who later became Ambassador to Japan and an Under Secretary of State. Jessica Matthews, who is now President of the Carnegie Endowment, was in charge of the Global Affairs Office. Zbig really did pull together an excellent team of academics and professionals and people that were detailed from other departments like State to the National Security Council. Brzezinski himself was extraordinarily fascinating to work with and learn from. He was very loyal to his staff. He worked very hard. He was probably one of the smartest people that I've ever known. And at the age of 29, despite the vast discrepancy in his background experiences and mine, he always gave me the sense that he truly wanted to know my views. This was a great experience. We also played tennis together on the White House court, which was a heady thing to do.

Q: Oh, yes. Was it true that Jimmy Carter...

INDERFURTH: Yes, he did. The President on occasion went down to the tennis court and discovered that somebody was already there, so he told his secretary, Susan Clough, "I want to see who's going to be on the court and when." It wasn't as if that was his highest priority, but indeed, he did want to know if the court was being used. So Zbig was very careful! Not only was he extraordinarily smart and an academic of great acclaim, he was a very savvy bureaucrat.

Q: Did you get the feeling that early on... There was some talk that Brzezinski was trying to outkissinger Kissinger, emulate Kissinger, or keep the power at the NSC. Rather than low key, it was going to be high key.

INDERFURTH: Brzezinski is not only bright, he is also very aggressive, including in a policy-making sense. There was no question that the National Security Council staff he put together were intended to be a high-powered NSC. You do not bring in people like Bill Quandt on the Mideast and Oksenberg and Armacost on Asia and experienced policy hands like Hyland, Bartholomew and Aaron without recognizing that you have got a bunch thoroughbreds and they're going to want to run. I have no doubt at all that in his discussions with President Carter, Brzezinski was very up-front, "I want to bring in the best possible National Security Council staff to serve you." The NSC staff is meant to be the President's in-house foreign policy team to represent his interests, not any particular departmental point of view, and to protect the President's interests. State will have a point of view. Defense will have a point of view. Treasury will on economic issues. You've got

all these players. Coordination has to come from somewhere.

Coordination was the purpose of the 1947 National Security Council Act which established the NSC. Increasingly since McGeorge Bundy under President Kennedy, the National Security Advisor brings things together to make sure the President has all the information he needs and that options are available and that unpleasant facts are not covered up, etc. Clearly Dr. Brzezinski was well aware of the forceful role that Dr. Kissinger had played as National Security Advisor. They had known each other for many years academically and often were mentioned as being the leading candidates for high government positions coming out of academia.

So I think that Brzezinski wanted to be an activist, he wanted to have the very best possible NSC staff. But, at the end of the day, the one truism about the National Security Council is that it is a reflection of the President's desires and style and needs, not a creature of the National Security Advisor. If President Carter had not wanted an activist policy-oriented National Security Advisor, then he would not have chosen Brzezinski. I also believe that Brzezinski was very attentive to the need to perform the "honest broker" role, although not in a low key fashion as Scowcroft did. All the papers flowing from the NSC staff to Brzezinski came first to David Aaron and then to me for making sure that all views were there and that things were organized. Even though a lot of these subjects were not ones that I was nearly as knowledgeable about as the experts on the NSC staff, I would read through and point out what I thought were deficiencies and sometimes send things back to the staff. Then the papers would go to Brzezinski. On top of these papers, there would be a cover memo from him to the President saying, "Mr. President, these are the issues. This is, in summary, what is being recommended by your advisers. At tab A is Secretary Vance's view; at tab B is Secretary Brown's view." He did perform that role of ensuring that all options and views were expressed. He also had his own views and he was never reluctant to express them. But he did perform the "honest broker"role of insuring that the President had the information he needed from all his advisers.

The National Security Advisor also briefs the President in the morning. Proximity is enormously important in government and the National Security Advisor is the most proximate security official to the President. Phones are great things, but seeing somebody in your office at 7:00 or 7:30 every morning, there are advantages to that. Right now in the new administration, Condoleeza Rice has that role. She will see more of President Bush than Colin Powell or Donald Rumsfeld, but the key thing is to make sure that their views are given a full airing before the President.

With the NSC under President Carter, there did develop over time sharp differences of view about how to pursue our policy toward the Soviet Union, and the role of arms control, and China. Brzezinski was very involved in normalizing relations with China. In fact, he went there on a special mission in May 1978 to establish a path toward full diplomatic relations with Chinese officials. Of course, Secretary Vance was well aware of that and the President directed it. Even so, there were disagreements between Vance and Brzezinski about timing and substance. But there is a truism here. If a president sees strong differences arising that threaten the success and coherence of his foreign policy,

then it is up to him to act to resolve them. Many presidents want competing views. FDR wanted that. But you've got to be able to manage them. I think it is clear that President Carter, despite the best of intentions, was not able to manage the differences within his own administration on a number of key issues. He also had some very bad luck, including the Iranian hostage crisis.

Q: Which had nothing to do with him.

INDERFURTH: Which had nothing to do with him, but the way he handled it, I'm afraid, had everything to do with him. There were perhaps 40 hostages. Jimmy Carter became the 41st hostage. His handling of the hostage situation and the crisis itself was probably the fatal undermining of his presidency and led to Ronald Reagan becoming the next President of the United States.

Q: You were there four years?

INDERFURTH: No, I was there for two and a half years. Then I was asked by a former colleague on the Senate Intelligence Committee, Bill Bader, to join him as the Deputy Staff Director, the number two job, at the Foreign Relations Committee. Frank Church had recently become chairman of the committee. Bill Bader was asked by Church to be chief of staff. It was a great offer. It was hard to leave the White House, but as a special assistant there's only so much you can do. You are working directly with the National Security Advisor, but while you are involved in everything, you are in charge of nothing. You're not the expert on Western Europe or arms control. So this was an opportunity. The SALT II treaty was making its way to the Senate. Bill Bader asked me to come help oversee the Committee's examination of that very important arms control agreement. I made the decision to go. It was hard. I did not want to leave Dr. Brzezinski. Fortunately, the staff assistant I mentioned earlier, Bob Gates, took over my job, so Zbig was well served.

Before I departed, Dr. Brzezinski took me to the Oval Office, quite unexpectedly, on my last day for a farewell meeting with President Carter. Unfortunately, I had not gotten a haircut recently. I look at the photographs of that meeting today and say, "Wait a minute." It wasn't that long, by the standards then, but it was certainly longer than it is today. But I really appreciated Zbig's thoughtfulness, and the President's.

I also remember coming back from playing tennis one day with Brzezinski. We were walking up the driveway that leads past the Oval Office and to the West Wing. He looked at me and said, "You know, you only get one chance in life to do this. It is the greatest thing to be able to work at the White House with the President. This only comes around once." I thought, "Well, maybe it's once for you, but I hope it's not just once for me!" He was well into his career, with an established reputation, but I was still relatively young and I hoped that there would be another opportunity to serve. Fortunately, there was.

Q: You were there for a year and a half?

INDERFURTH: A year and a half on the Foreign Relations Committee. The SALT treaty was the dominant piece of business. But when I first got there, it was the Taiwan Relations Act, which is interesting because right now because we're in another standoff with China over the U.S. spy plane they forced down, making this the first foreign policy crisis of the George W. Bush administration. The Taiwan Relations Act was passed at the time that I joined the Committee in '79. In '80, I went to Taiwan with two other staff members to do a report for the Committee on Taiwan one year after the Taiwan Relations Act went into effect.

But the big issue facing the Committee when I was there was the SALT II treaty. It was going to be a difficult sell because of hardline opposition from Senator Scoop Jackson of Washington and others. The Administration was committed but there were a lot of difficult issues. This was still very much during the Cold War and, and a little over a year later, when the Soviets went into Afghanistan, that was the end of the SALT treaty.

Q: That was December of '79.

INDERFURTH: Yes. The Committee's consideration of SALT II stopped and it was over. The Iranian hostage crisis was also taking place at that time. Then the '80 election got going in full swing and Ronald Reagan was nominated. When I was working in the Senate, I got a call from David Aaron at the White House asking if I could assist in preparing President Carter's briefing book for the televised debates against Governor Reagan. Because of certain Executive Branch restrictions, specifically the Hatch Act, the NSC staff could not engage in any political activities. I was in the Senate, so I could, if it was after hours. So, for about three weeks, along with a couple of colleagues in the Senate, we went over to the Old Executive Office Building to pull together briefing papers on all the foreign policy issues likely to come up in the debate. We finished the job and turned the briefing book over to David Aaron. I got a nice note from Dr. Brzezinski saying how much he appreciated it. The material then went to the President, although I'm sure with some changes. Then I watched the Carter-Reagan debates very carefully with the team I had organized to help. Even though President Carter was on top of the issues, Governor Reagan's personality captivated and dominated. He was clearly much more at ease than President Carter. At one point, the President was asked what was the major issue he was concerned about? He said that he had recently asked his daughter, Amy, and she said, "Nuclear proliferation." We looked at ourselves and said, "That wasn't in our briefing book."

On election night, Madeleine Albright asked us to her home in Georgetown to watch the returns. Merrie and I got there around 7:30. I had a clipboard with all the states and the electoral count and I was ready for a long evening. Zbig Brzezinski was already there and he looked at me and asked, "What's the clipboard for?" I said, "When the election returns start coming in..." He said, "We've lost." I said, "Zbig, it's 7:30." Some of the first returns had come in, but clearly Zbig was aware of the polling the White House had done and that this election was over.

Q: I think the President was told the day before. They said, "You've lost."

INDERFURTH: Yes. He was told by his pollster, Pat Caddell, that the numbers were running against him and there was no turning it around. So, this National Security Council and White House group went from Albright's Georgetown home to the downtown hotel where Carter conceded. Unfortunately he did this too early in the evening and that had an impact on several races out West, including some that I'll speak about in a moment. But, of course, I was then working in the Senate. The Senate was not expected to be lost to the Republicans. Merrie and I then went to a Senate gathering. That took much longer, but around 1:30 am, the results started coming in, including Frank Church being defeated. Then the reports came in that the Senate was going to go to the Republicans. I quickly realized that this had certain profound implications for what I was doing because I was working on the Democratic staff of the Foreign Relations Committee for the Democratic chairman and that was going to change.

The changeover in the White House and the Senate – from Democratic to Republican control - would clearly have major implications for the direction of the country and U.S. foreign policy. But it also that meant something for me on a more personal level. It was time - as you euphemistically say in Washington – to start looking for "other opportunities." In other words, another job.

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Q: Today is May 11, 2001. You left the Senate staff and went to ABC News. That was when?

INDERFURTH: It was early in '81. I think there was about a four to five month period after the 1980 election before I joined ABC. This was truly 'out of the blue.' I had been thinking of what I wanted to do next, and at one point while I was on the Foreign Relations Committee I had been interviewed by "60 Minutes" for a report that they were doing. Unfortunately, my contribution was left on the cutting room floor, but I got to know the producer for CBS. When I left, I thought one thing that would be of interest would be documentary making. Unfortunately, documentaries for networks were already becoming a thing of the past, but I did make some contacts and saw people at CBS, NBC, and ABC. The person at ABC, the deputy bureau chief, Bob Zelnick, said, "We don't really have anything there, but would you like to be a correspondent?" I said, "You must have the wrong person. I'm not a journalist. I've never done television." He said, "Well, we're looking for people with substantive experience. You've had a lot of experience in government. You've been focusing on arms control and national security. We now have lawyers that cover the justice beat. We have medical doctors that do medical reports like Dr. Tim Johnson at ABC. You look presentable. Why don't you do an audition?" I said, "Well, let me get back to you." I really didn't take it that seriously. I went off and started looking at other things, including some opportunities in New York. I saw Bob Zelnick again about two months later. He said, "Why haven't you come to do the audition?" I said, "Okay, I'll do it." He said, "Write up a script. We will put it on a teleprompter. We'll send the tape to New York and see what headquarters thinks of it." It went up on a Friday. On Monday, I got a phone call.

Q: Did you have any particular thing to report on?

INDERFURTH: Well, Zelnick had said, "Whatever is of interest to you." At that point, there was a lot of discussion about the Reagan defense budget, how large it would be. Reagan was coming in to build up America's military. So, I did that. On Monday, I got an urgent call from Zelnick's office saying, "Please send us another copy of your resume. New York is interested, but Bob has lost it." The next day, I got a call from Zelnick saying that they were sending down an ABC News vice president to talk to me. George Watson was his name. Apparently, the tape had gone up to New York where they were screening it and Roone Arledge, the legendary head of ABC, walked by. He said, "He looks interesting. Why don't we try to get him?" Within a week, I had signed a three year contract to be a correspondent at ABC and to focus on national security-State Department-Defense Department affairs and arms control. Of course, this was what I was already most focused on at that point, having come from the Senate and the debate there on the SALT II treaty. So, there I was at ABC, brand new.

Q: The view the media has on issues has a profound effect on how American policy works? Tell me about your experiences and some of the issues you were dealing with and how the system used those.

INDERFURTH: Those are good questions. The media and how it covers important issues does have a major impact on society today. I actually took that responsibility very seriously. Most of the time a report on the evening or morning news would last 90 seconds. If you had over a two minute piece, that was long. So those reports were brief and you're dealing with complicated issues – arms control was certainly complicated. But how these issues are presented is also very important – in other words, what is new about the story, is it balanced, are you providing enough solid information to the public so that they can have an informed opinion.

Interestingly, in some ways I felt all this was quite consistent with my previous involvement in government. Yes, I was now in the private sector because ABC News is a private company, but I was still involved in public issues. Sometimes people would ask me, "How could you go to the media after being in government?" I said, "Well, I'm dealing with the same issues, only from a different vantage point. I'm still going to the State Department, to the Defense Department, to Capitol Hill."

Now in '80/'81, the three networks – ABC, CBS, and NBC – were still dominating the news. CNN was in its earliest days. Cable was just starting. So most people were getting their broadcast news from the networks. That has dropped significantly today because of CNN, of FOX, because cable in general. But at that time, the evening news was the place to watch – as I had with Walter Cronkite during the Vietnam War - you went to the networks to hear the news at the 6:30/7:00 hour.

At times I found my new profession a rather humbling experience. I knew the subjects, but I had to learn television. I had to learn how to appear before the camera, how not be

too stiff. I often felt sympathy for Al Gore during his past campaign, during the times when he was considered to be a little bit too "wooden." But what I did certainly enjoy was the opportunity to report the news, speak with interesting 'newsmakers,' and report from lots of different locations. By 1985, I was focusing more and more on arms control. President Reagan had started negotiations with the Soviets. Mikhail Gorbachev was soon to come to power in the Soviet Union. Summits, including the first one between Reagan and Gorbachev in Geneva, were taking place. I covered some of these. The on-going strategic nuclear arms talks in Geneva had me spending about two months out of every year there. I would go for about a week at a time. When the next round began or ended, I would go back to do updates.

It was also during this time, much to my surprise, that I had an opportunity to take part in a ten part series on ABC's 'World News Tonight" with Peter Jennings entitled "The USSR: A Balance of Powers," looking at all the dimensions of the relationship. I was given the arms control report to do. We had six minutes pieces on the evening news, which was basically unheard of. That series won an Emmy and I received a call saying, "Rick, you've won an Emmy." Along with my wife Merrie and my parents, I couldn't believe it. I was very fortunate to be covering what was a very important period for arms control and U.S.-Soviet relations. To watch the way that President Reagan came into office as a staunch anti-communist and later respond in such a positive fashion to Mikhail Gorbachev as a new Soviet leader was fascinating- (end of tape)

All of this led to my increasing interest in being assigned to Moscow. My wife's parents had focused on the Soviet Union for a number of years. Her mother, Ruth Roosa, was a professor of Russian history, had done a lot of research in the Soviet archives in Leningrad. Her father, Robert Roosa, had served as Undersecretary of the Treasury in the Kennedy administration and later, when he was with Brown Brothers & Harriman on Wall Street and Chairman of the Brookings Institution, he was on the U.S.-Soviet Trade and Economic Council. They had traveled to Russia on several occasions, including as a family with Merrie and her sister Sunny, and had many contacts. Then came the opportunity in 1989 for me to be assigned there with Merrie and Ashley and Alison, who were then seven and five years old. It proved to be a fascinating experience. I wish that I could say that I was prescient enough to say that I had a hunch that I was going there to witness the demise of the Soviet empire, but I can't. But I did know that Gorbachev would prove a remarkable new Soviet leader as he tried to put into effect glasnost, or openness, and perestroika, restructuring. To have a ringside seat for that was a once in a lifetime opportunity.

Q: Let's go back a bit. While you were reporting on military matters, how did you find the news operation, the guys who sit in the glassed in cages behind you... When they'd say, "Go after this," did you feel there was a strong hand directing or was this off to one side so unless you got too far away, they let you alone?
INDERFURTH: In the TV news business, producers are the equivalent of editors in print journalism. You have executive producers of various broadcasts and senior producers. They're the ones you speak to about assignments. Certain things are simply required. Congressional hearings, such as when the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense

appear, you cover those. But a lot of the gathering of the news is left to the initiative and resourcefulness of the reporters themselves. You're constantly "pitching a story" to the evening news or the morning news or "Nightline," with Ted Koppel. My first "Nightline" piece was on the MX missile, which was just becoming a big issue. There were lots of big defense issues to cover because of the Reagan military buildup. We also hit something of a lowpoint with the Soviet Union in the early 1980s, arms control talks broke off, then President Reagan put on the table his so-called Strategic Defense Initiative, which the media started calling Star Wars. The President said this would be a shield to protect Americans from missile attack. We're now hearing echos of that with President Bush's missile defense plans. There were a lot other activities during the Reagan years, including Lebanon, where we had Marines killed in Beirut, and then the invasion of Grenada, then the arms control talks with Reagan and Gorbachev. This was a very active time for coverage of international affairs and defense matters. It was a great time to be reporting from Washington. But that didn't hold a candle to the opportunity of doing this from Moscow.

Q: All of this was the State Department, the military... Did you find that you were put in an adversarial way?

INDERFURTH: No, I actually did not. I had come out of government and I had been part of the Senate majority, then Democratic. But the positions that I had held up until that time had not been of such a high visibility that I was seen as a prominent official of a Democratic persuasion. I found that my contacts in government, the way I was dealt with at the Pentagon, the professional relationships that I had, the friendships I made, were not influenced by the fact that I had been a participant in that process, whether in the Senate on the Foreign Relations Committee and the Intelligence Committee, or at the National Security Council. In some ways, it was helpful. I was able to view the work of government officials with a certain insight into how they went about their jobs unlike some of my colleagues in the media who did not have that perspective. But I never had a sense that there was a concern that I was going to color my reporting based on previous affiliations. I will be quite honest in saying that sometimes I found it difficult to ask government officials questions that I knew they should not be answering, especially if it involved sensitive intelligence matters. There were times that I did not ask those questions.

Q: When you got out to Geneva, all of these arms control talks have been going on for 20 years. Sometimes the progress is glacial. It really was picking up by the time you were getting there. Let's say you go to Geneva at a particular time. What could you say?

INDERFURTH: It was a set piece. You would film (actually tape) the negotiators entering into the room, shaking hands, and then maybe get a comment or two from some of the participants. In preparation for these trips, I would sit down with government officials in Washington and ask, on background, "What are you expecting from this negotiation," not asking for their negotiating instructions. They weren't going to give me those. But I would say, "Generally, where are we? What issues are the ones that are most important during this round? What do you expect to hear? Do you expect there may be

some movement on the Soviet side?" I would do that with officials in the State Department, Defense Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, sometimes speaking to their press officers, sometimes speaking to the officials themselves. Then I would go and talk with people outside of government, former officials who were following these talks very closely, like former directors of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or former State Department officials, often interviewing them on camera, asking them in general terms what the stakes were, how important was this round of talks. I would also speak to people at the 'think tanks' like Brookings or Carnegie to get their views, [all of which] I would take to Geneva.

Once there I would see how the talks unfolded. I would try to get an interview with, for example, the chief U.S. negotiator, Ambassador Max Kampleman. He was quite gracious with his time both on background and on camera. He had the clearest sense of where this story was heading. That is a very important point for government officials. The press should not always be seen as an adversary or a threat. The press can be extremely important and indeed useful in getting a message out about the stakes involved in negotiations, where they're heading, what problems there may be. None of this breaches the confidentiality of the negotiations, but it keeps the American people informed about what is taking place. Some officials like Ambassador Kampleman performed a great service by viewing the press in those terms.

I did one report while I was covering these talks entitled "Geneva Behind the Scenes." Kampleman allowed us to sit in on one of his sessions with his own delegation before going to see the Soviet delegation. We did some taping of their discussion, clearly of a general nature, but it gave the sense of 'behind the scenes.' I did a lot of other work associated with that report, including traveling to the Jura mountains outside of Geneva where Paul Nitze and his Soviet counterpart took their so-called "walk in the woods." We did my on-camera part of the report walking down that path. ABC gave me a liberal amount of time – I think it was about four and a half minutes – for that report and we received an Emmy nomination.

Q: I take it the news was taken to be more important than being entertainment, which is more the thrust on at least the major channels now.

INDERFURTH: I think that that is a fair observation. I think that if you look at the history of TV news, it has increasingly gone from straight reporting, no frills, to information with some entertainment wrappings, to what is now a magazine format like "Dateline NBC" or "Primetime" for ABC. Most of the people dealing with the news today are still striving to get the news out, to inform, while trying to avoid what Ted Koppel once told me to avoid, namely "the MEGO factor." I said, "What's that?" He said, "It stands for Mine Eyes Glaze Over." Don't get so into the details that the viewer is going to get lost. Unfortunately today less and less hard information is making its way on the air, replaced by what some call "infotainment."

Q: Did you have any contact in Geneva with the Soviet side?

INDERFURTH: Very little. The Soviet mission in Geneva was beginning to open up a bit. This was the era of glasnost. The Soviet negotiators were pretty savvy about the media. We would go to the Soviet mission when the talks were being held there and would almost always be brought into the waiting room, where the Soviet head of delegation, Viktor Karpov, would be waiting for Ambassador Kampleman to arrive. He would usually have a few comments that we could use in our television reports. He was very good with his English and he was able to express himself very well in "sound bites." But in terms of any sources, news sources, the Soviets hadn't arrived at that point in their openness campaign.

Q: Did you run across from the military and also from the Richard Perles and others that the Soviets were out to get us?

INDERFURTH: There was a battle of epic proportions being played out during the Reagan years, most vividly captured in a book that Strobe Talbott of Time magazine did called "Deadly Gambits." It was a story of the two Richards, Richard Perle, the hardliner and so-called Prince of Darkness, and Richard Burt, who was at that point the head of Politico-Military Affairs at State, and later head of our strategic negotiations. The "two Richards" battle was about how we would approach the Soviet Union in the arms control arena. We were aware that this battle was being fought, but at the end of the day, the government had to make decisions, issue instructions for the negotiators, and then head off for Geneva or wherever they were negotiating at that time, and that's where we would catch up with the story. But there was no doubt that there was a battle royal playing itself out.

Q: Was somebody ever tugging on your sleeve and saying, "You hear what they're doing? Maybe you might be interested in this?" In other words, trying to steer you off to something which was out of the spectrum.

INDERFURTH: There was some of that, but quite frankly, those that would be tugging on the sleeve would more often than not tug on the sleeves of reporters at The Washington Post or The New York Times, knowing that they could put into print a much fuller report than a television correspondent can do in a minute and a half. That's why, for instance, Strobe Talbott was able to piece together this story that became a book. We would get some of that. But quite frankly, to do a television news report on the "two Richards" and the battle they were fighting was a little difficult. Most people out in the country would say, "Wait a minute. I thought we were dealing with the Soviet Union. What is this two Richards story?" I would occasionally make reference to the divisions within the administration and would interview those who would talk on camera about this battle. Often those who were outside the administration would be more free to talk about that. But the real insider story more often appeared on the pages of the Post and the Times than on TV.

Q: What was the culture between what you were dealing with and the Times and the Post? Did you talk to each other? You had more people... They had more words...

INDERFURTH: I think that by and large there was a professional respect for those reporters covering a beat. We knew the job they were doing and certainly respected that. I think that they recognized that even within the limitations of television, we were doing our job of reporting the news as best we could in a small amount of time. We had some very strong reporters like Jack McWethy at ABC, who covered the Pentagon and is still doing national security. He came out of the print side, with U.S. News and World Report. So, some of those people that were now in the TV side of news did their initial reporting on the print side and were as good as anybody that the newspapers could offer. I think where there was a bit of print disdain was when special correspondents, like a Diane Sawyer, would come in to do a story but didn't do any reporting and simply stood in front of the camera and read a script that somebody else had written. That was not from their standpoint, or indeed from mine, what a reporter is about.

Q: Who was the preeminent ABC man?

INDERFURTH: It was Peter Jennings.

Q: Still is. These people were sometimes being brought to the scene of something. They may have brought great intelligence and had been around the block a long time, but at the same time, they didn't have a great background.

INDERFURTH: Let me do a segue on Jennings. Jennings was and is a reporter at heart. He is a person that came up in the business as a newsman. He puts in the hours. He develops his own contacts. Now that he's an anchor, he has less time to walk the corridors, but I have a high regard for him as a reporter. He's a good writer, a good editor. So is Dan Rather and so is Tom Brokaw. But I think that what is of concern is the trend toward getting people that are good on television but haven't had any real reporting experience. That's what we are seeing with these news magazine shows. There is a fear in the profession that we are moving further and further from the real reporters, away from the era of Edward R. Murrow and the "CBS boys." With the demand for greater news entertainment, with the competition of 100 channels, all of these could, and is, diluting hard news content. I think that the current crop of anchors like Jennings are still holding on to their reporting standards as best they can, but, in the future, who knows?

Q: Okay, I didn't want to get too far into that. When did you go to Moscow? How long were you there?

INDERFURTH: My family arrived in September of '89. But I had gone over earlier for various reporting assignments, including one that I didn't realize would become so important to me when I became Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia - namely the final Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. I flew to Tashkent, Uzbekistan, and then to the city of Termez, which is along the Uzbek-Afghan border. There the last Soviet troops came across the Friendship Bridge, which spans the Amu Darya River, in their armored personnel carriers. The Soviet commander, General Boris Gromov, walked the last 200 yards across the bridge. Those of us covering this story were very surprised when a woman with flowers ran up to General Gromov. We thought it must be his wife. It turns

out she was a Soviet journalist. She gave him the flowers and started doing an interview on the spot! The new Soviet press in action.

The troops moved from the bridge up a hill to an outdoor stadium where they all came to attention. There were a few speeches by Soviet officials, with these big banners of Lenin in the background. Then all the departing soldiers were handed a watch face – without the watchband – and then they drove off, some with flowers in the barrels of their guns. That was the end of the Soviet military decade and debacle in Afghanistan.

But this was a moment of hope for Afghanistan. The Soviet era had come to an end. Unfortunately, there was to be no peace for the Afghan people. The Afghan warlords turned their guns on each other. The international community, including the U.S., packed their bags and ten years later, they were still fighting and the Taliban were largely in control.
The world would pay a very big price for this.

Q: You were there from '89 to?

INDERFURTH: '91. That was the period in which Gorbachev tried with a herculean effort to reform the Soviet communist system and found that the rot had simply gone too far and that it was unreformable. Remember that Gorbachev was not trying to overthrow the system. He never turned in his Communist Party card as Yeltsin did. He thought it could be reformed by opening up the political system and perestroika. In the end, he found that it could not be.

This was also the time of Andrei Sakharov. Gorbachev took the decision to allow him to come back from internal exile in Gorky. Sakharov was so impressive, the moral compass and conscience of the reform movement. I attended meetings where he spoke, where the democrats and the reformers were debating ways to try to open up the system. At the same time, the winds of reform and the possibility, just the glimmer, of breaking free of Moscow were beginning to spread, especially to the Baltic republics. They saw this as their "window of opportunity." If that window cracked open, they were going to get out as quick as they could.

Q: When you arrived there in summer of '89, you were the new boy on the block. What were you getting from within the diplomatic corps and the newspaper corps and from important contacts in the State Department? Where was it going at that time?

INDERFURTH: Interestingly, the Soviet press had become a new source of information. Again, glasnost was allowing stories to be told that the Soviet people had not heard before. There was a magazine called Ogonyok that was rushing stories into print because the editor, Vitaly Korotich, told me no one really knew how long this was going to last.

Q: Ogonyuk goes back to the Stalinist time.

INDERFURTH: It does. Now the magazine was reporting on many of the horror stories

of that time, like what happened at Katyn Forest where the Polish soldiers had been murdered by the Soviet NKVD. I had the chance to go there and see that place for myself.
But, again, Ogonyok and others were getting the material, printing it and getting it out. They remembered the press thaw that took place under Khrushchev and how it quickly closed off.

Q: It was Prague Spring.

INDERFURTH: Prague Spring was another example, under Alexander Ducek. But going back to my news "sources" and what they were saying, the Soviet government itself was not exactly filled with a lot of people you could go to. They did have more loquacious and more informative press spokesmen like Gennady Gerasimov, the spokesperson for the Soviet foreign ministry. I remember he came up with the great one-liner "From Yalta to Malta" when President Bush and Gorbachev were about to meet there.

Also, the Russian people could now talk on a more open basis, not just the "think-tank" types like at the USA-Canada Institute, but people literally 'on-the-street.' You also had contact with other American and Western journalists, often at the American embassy's cafeteria where we would swap stories over lunch. Ambassador Jack Matlock, who was an excellent ambassador, was also very informative. He had a weekly background briefing for the press, which was quite helpful.

We also had the ability to do something which journalists in the past could not do: travel on our own. We did not have to be accompanied by a Soviet 'handler.' You did have to get permission to travel. During the time I was there, I was only denied permission twice. In both cases, it was because something was taking place in one of the republics where they said, "Your safety is at risk." Of course, it also meant that's why we wanted to go there because that would be a story.

But we were able to travel. I was able to get to 12 of the 15 Soviet republics, flying on Aeroflot at all hours of the day or night. I would take a camera crew with me and a producer and would often have an interpreter/translator as well. I had tried to learn some Russian before leaving. I had three months of Russian language training, which was more than any ABC reporter had ever been given prior to leaving for Moscow. But that was certainly not enough to become anywhere close to fluent. However, I did learn some useful Russian phrases to use, like "I am a journalist, I must be there!"

We were able to travel far and wide within the Soviet Union – to Siberia, Kazakhstan (to see an underground nuclear test), to Ukraine for a miners' strike, to the Crimean for a story on the return of the Tatars, to Soviet missile silos in the countryside (they were aimed at us) and, especially for me, to the Baltic republics, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. They started expressing themselves through marches, through actions taken in their parliaments, calling for a return to sovereignty. Eventually all three Baltic states voted to break with Moscow, in one way or another. I was able to be in each of the three parliaments when those votes were taken. It was a remarkable and emotional and

inspirational time seeing these people assert their national aspirations, reclaim their past. The original flags of these countries were flown. Moscow could not do anything about it, although some tried to change things in Lithuania, in Vilnius.

Q: There was that fight around the TV station.

INDERFURTH: Yes. I spent a great deal of time in Vilnius during those very tense months. At one point, I got a call at my Moscow apartment to come to the office, immediately. ABC London said, "We need you to go to Vilnius tonight." I said, "Why tonight?" They said, "There is a report that the Soviet army (which had surrounded the parliament building) was going to try to take over the parliament." They wanted me and a camera crew to get there and get inside the building and report on it. I said, "Wait a minute. Let me get this straight. You think that there may be an assault by the Soviet military to come in. I'd be in that building. They all have guns." They said, "Yes, but that's the story." So, off I went and found my way inside the building, the Lithuanian security guards let us pass. Fortunately, the Soviet army did not attack! But I got an interview that night, about 2:00 o'clock in the morning, with the President of Lithuanian, Vytautas Landsbergis, who was also a music professor. I did a long interview with him on the possibility that something could happen.

Several years later my wife Merrie and I went to the Meridian House ball, which is held every year here in Washington. We happened to be speaking to the Lithuanian ambassador. I told him what I had done at ABC. He just stopped for a moment and said, "Thank you for all the media did. Thank you for reporting on the independence movement and being there when the Soviets were using their bullying tactics and threatening to use their military force. We're convinced that it was the media and its attention that stopped Moscow from crushing us."

Q: That's a pretty solid analysis.

INDERFURTH: I believe we made a contribution. But I also believe that for Mikhail Gorbachev and Edouard Shevardnadze, his Foreign Minister, the idea that they would crush the Baltic states with force, as the Soviets had done to Hungary or Poland or Czechoslovakia, I think that was anathema to the two of them, and they would not do it. Gorbachev, of course, went to Vilnius to try to talk them out of their demands for independence.

Q: I remember seeing those pictures of him arguing...

INDERFURTH: He tried to convince them. He thought that with his force of personality, that if he could just talk to them long enough, that they would finally see that it would be better to stay in the Soviet Union than to leave. He kept saying something to the effect, "This isn't just about sausage. It's not just about a better life. We're trying to reform the Soviet Union. We are a powerful nation. You are a part of this." Of course, they never accepted that they were a part of it. And Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, to their eternal credit, were determined that they would not use brute force to make them comply, not in

the Baltics or in Eastern Europe or in other places that began to assert themselves. Sometimes, as with that TV station in Vilnius, some people were killed. I did not believe that Gorbachev ordered those Soviet troops to fire, but I'm sure that somewhere along the line, it came down the chain of command "Do what you have to do." But Gorbachev was not going to use Soviet military might to crush these people. That's my own view.

Q: The Berlin Wall came down. Czechoslovakia and that whole thing. Was the attitude that this was really the end of the world as we knew it?

INDERFURTH: It was certainly moving us closer to the end of the Cold War. I had covered Gorbachev's first trip to West Germany, to Bonn, to visit Chancellor Kohl. The reception he received was unbelievable. He was like a rock star. There were giant crowds yelling, "Gorby, Gorby!" Here was an entirely new Soviet leader, and the Germans recognized it. In a press conference I attended at the end of his three day stay, Gorbachev was asked about the Berlin Wall. He said a lot, he always did, but sort of ended with, "Nothing lasts forever." He didn't say he would tear it down. He didn't say that was his game plan. He simply said, "Nothing lasts forever. We'll have to see." He basically left open the possibility that history could turn in new and more interesting directions. But the end the Cold War still required the next step, which was the end of the Soviet Union. That played itself out in ways that very few people anticipated, including, I am sure, Gorbachev himself.

Q: There was always the possibility there, but this was way off in the future. What were you getting from Soviets that you were talking to about Gorbachev? Were you getting a mixed feeling? Were you able to get a different sounding?

INDERFURTH: Gorbachev started to fall into a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" situation. On one hand, the liberals, the reformers, wanted him to go faster and to make a break. Therefore, they were increasingly aligning themselves with Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin had turned in his Communist Party card. He was quickly becoming the champion of the democrats, the reformers, the liberals. Gorbachev was losing them because he wasn't moving fast enough. But he was also losing the support of those who wanted to retain the system – because they had certain advantages - the elite within the Soviet Union did pretty well – the so-called apparatchiks – and Gorbachev was beginning to lose them because they thought he couldn't control this process. That included elements of the military and the KGB.

So Gorbachev was increasingly seen as somebody that was satisfying neither the liberals and the democrats and reformers on the one hand, nor the hardliners, military, KGB, and the apparatchiks on the other hand. You would hear complaints about him a lot more than you would hear praise.

Q: Did you pass this on through your reporting – maybe not with names, but saying that this was a confused time?

INDERFURTH: I did lots of reporting, more than 400 reports while I was there. And that

was just television. I also filed hundreds of radio spots. You did not have a problem getting your pieces on the air. There was an insatiable appetite at ABC in New York and London. We had two correspondents in Moscow, myself and Jim Laurie, who was a longtime ABC correspondent and very able. Just the two of us, and those working in the bureau, were covering this unfolding, gigantic story for ABC - the meetings and speeches, people in the streets, flags of republics flying that hadn't flown in 50 years, mine workers on strike demanding change in Ukraine. I went down into the coal mines to see the conditions they worked in. Virtually every day there was something to report. There were also some very able Soviet reporters, Russian reporters like Artyom Boravik, who I met on my very first visit to the Soviet Union and later died covering a story. I started making that mental transition from saying Soviet to Russian because so many people there were beginning to shed their Soviet identify and were returning to their Russian roots.

Unfortunately, in all the time I was there, including all the events I covered where Gorbachev was present, I never had an opportunity to actually speak with him and shake his hand. Several years later I went to Moscow as a government official for consultations on the continuing turmoil in Afghanistan and what to do about the Taliban. I had told my daughter Ashley, who was nine when we left Moscow in '91, that I would take her back. She was a little older than Alison and really into the experience and had done a good job of learning some Russian. Both Ashley and Alison had also enjoyed the Anglo-American school, which included kids from many countries. A sign in one of Alison's classes said it best: "Our differences make us special."

Anyway, I had promised Ashley a return visit to Moscow and in May, 2000, she was just about to graduate from her high school. So for a graduation present, I had her meet me there. Ashley arrived first – I was in Turkey before coming to Moscow – and she stayed for the first couple of days with Irena Rachkovskaya and her family. Irena was the long-time office manager for ABC in Moscow and a good friend. She also had a very handsome and talented son, Alyosha, who happened to be a Bolshoi dancer.
After I arrived, Ashley and I stayed as Spaso House at the kind invitation of our Ambassador, Jim Collins. We had three great days in and around Moscow, including driving with Irena to visit Leo Tolstoy's country home near Tula at Yasnaya Ployana. But the highpoint was something I asked Irena to see if she could arrange - a courtesy call on Gorbachev at his foundation. Irena had stayed in close contact with Gorbachev and he was most gracious to see us. What I envisioned would be a 15 minute courtesy call remarkably turned into an hour and a half conversation with this man who had changed the world and will be one of the historic figures of our time! I kept trying to tell him "Thank you for all you did to see the Cold War come to a peaceful end" and how much the world and the United States admired and appreciated the role in had played. He accepted this expression of appreciation, but basically he wanted to talk about what Ashley was interested in – he told her it was a lot more interesting to be a young person in Russia today than in the U.S. because of all that was taking place there - and about U.S.-Russian relations and where they were heading. He made it very clear that he thought the U.S. was not paying adequate attention to Russia, and that Washington was being dismissive of many legitimate Russian concerns. It was vintage Gorbachev – persuasive, expressed with conviction, and, as I had observed on so many occasions as a

reporter, he did most of the talking! What a wonderful, wonderful opportunity this was to meet this man with my daughter. I should also mention that I only observed one large picture in his office – a lovely oil painting of his beloved wife Raisa, his partner in life who had passed away the year before.

Q: What about Boris Yeltsin? At one point, when Gorbachev was coming to the U.S., Yeltsin came and he was at that time president. There seemed to be efforts on the part of the American NSC to put him down. It seemed as though you couldn't have two power centers, so Gorbachev was the man and Yeltsin was sort of a fool or a drunk. Did you sense that?

INDERFURTH: There was a clear focus on Gorbachev. At that point, Yeltsin had taken a number of important steps like resigning from the Communist Party, but there were also these stories about his sometimes erratic behavior, including one bizarre story when we were in Moscow that had Yeltsin showing up at a police station during the dead of winter, dripping wet with some flowers and saying that he had fallen off a bridge (or something to this effect).

When Yelstin came to the U.S., there was a speech he gave at Johns Hopkins in Baltimore. The tape suggests that it either was a bad tape or he was inebriated. The Yeltsin people said he was suffering jetlag and had had some medication. Who knows? But it's clear that the Administration's focus was on Gorbachev, and that Yeltsin and Gorbachev had a very bitter relationship. The Administration therefore kept Yelstin at arms length to not risk offending Gorbachev. Later, Yeltsin returned the favor. During the Yeltsin years, Gorbachev was never welcomed in Washington at the White House. Yeltsin would have taken that very badly if he had been. This had more to do with them than anything else, but it also impacted on how U.S. administrations and presidents would treat them when they were here.

Q: You left there in '91. The Soviet Union hadn't completely come apart at that point, had it?

INDERFURTH: It was in its final days, but being the insightful reporter that I was, I didn't have a clue! Or much of one, anyway.

President Bush came to Moscow for a summit with Gorbachev in July of '91. Merrie and I had decided, along with ABC of course, that I would stay for the summit and then return to Washington. The summit went well. I remember being asked on "Good Morning, America" was Gorbachev in charge? "Absolutely," I said, "He's going to be here for some time." The next month there was the coup attempt to overthrow him.

Gorbachev was in the Crimea, on vacation with his family. Some Soviet generals, the head of the KGB, and a few disgruntled politicians in the Politburo seized power. I was already back in the States. I had left Merrie and the girls and the two Russian additions to our family – Nickie (for Nikolai) our great dog and Marieka our cat – with Merrie's family outside of New York in Harrison. I had gone to see my Mother who was in the

hospital in Charlotte. On Sunday night, around 11:30, I turned on the news and heard a brief report on how Gorbachev had stepped down for medical reasons and that Gennady Yenayev, the Vice President, had assumed the position of acting president. I thought for a moment, "Well, they do want to show that they have rules and laws and that they can follow their constitutional order." And then I said to myself, "No way, that's not what's happening." I called ABC in New York. They had no more information than I did but said, "Stay in touch." I then called a friend at the Voice of America, Paul Westpheling, who was a broadcaster on the overnight desk. I said, "Paul, here's where I am. Call me if you hear anything." About 3:30 am the phone rang. Paul said that Gorbachev was under house arrest. I could not get back to sleep. I called ABC again and was told, "You've got to go back to Moscow." I said I had to check on my Mother's condition and then I would have to go through New York to pick up my passport. The next morning I arrived at London Heathrow. Planes coming out of Moscow were carrying businessmen; the planes going into Moscow were carrying journalists. Every journalist wanted to get in, even though we didn't know if the Soviets would let us stay once we arrived.

I arrived on the second day of the coup, in the early afternoon, and went directly to ABC. Remarkably there had been no problems going through passport control or customs. When I reached the bureau I bumped into Andrei Kozyrev, who was then Yeltsin's top foreign policy adviser and would later become Russia's Foreign Minister. Andrei had just done a live, 2-way interview with Good Morning America. I'm saying to myself, "What kind of coup is this? Why are they allowing the world to see what's taking place here and hear one denunciation after another of their actions?"

That night everyone expected an assault on the Russian White House where Yeltsin was staying. We were located just across the Moscow River at the Ukraine Hotel with our cameras ready and a phone line open to New York. During the night, there were several people killed nearby, along the Garden Ring Road, but an assault never took place at the White House. The building was ringed by several thousand brave Russian defenders and a few tanks of some of the Soviet troops who had defected to the other side. Earlier Yeltsin had stood atop one of those tanks. That photograph was on the front of every major newspaper around the world. It showed Yeltsin as a courageous leader defending democracy in Russia and would forever define him.

The next day, the third day, the coup fell apart. The coup plotters, most of whom had been drinking heavily, gave up. The Soviet tanks retraced their route, up Kutusovsky Prospect, right past ABC. Gorbachev returned to Moscow, with a clearly shaken Raisa, on a special plane. The following day, there was a rally at the Russian White House. Yeltsin spoke. People spilled out on the streets and marched to Red Square, unfurling banners of the Russian Federation, not the Soviet Union. I was covering that live via a telephone hookup for "Good Morning, America." It was like the second Russian revolution.

The Soviet Union was soon gone. The last day of the Soviet Union was December 25, 1991. The hammer and sickle flag came down over the Kremlin and the Russian flag went up. Just a year earlier, at Christmas in 1990, an enormous Christmas tree had been

put up at GUM, the huge department store on Red Square. Christmas had certainly not been observed there for a very, very long time. Instead the Soviets would celebrate New Year's with Father Frost and the Snow Princess. But this was Christmas, 1990. Russians were celebrating again. In what can only be described as a surreal experience, here we were – Merrie, Ashley, Alison and I – in Red Square on a very cold but clear night, looking up at this Christmas tree and listening to the Soviet Navy Band playing traditional Christmas carols, although in a somewhat dirge-like fashion. Guess they hadn't had a whole lot of practice! Then the band and the crowd (including us) marched down Red Square to a religious ceremony right in front of St. Basil's Cathedral, right past Lenin's mausoleum. The band was playing "Oh, Little Town of Bethlehem" and "Silent Night." I couldn't believe it! Reagan's 'Evil Empire' was certainly changing. What an experience this was for all of us.

Q: Absolutely. "John Reed and Ten Days That Shook the World."

INDERFURTH: Many of us covering these events thought a lot about the reporters that were there for the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and John Reed and his "Ten Days That Shook the World." Reed and the others certainly got the first chapter in that story – but we were there to witness the last, and with a remarkable ending. David Remnick, who was working for The Washington Post in Moscow, wrote a great account of this time, entitled "Lenin's Tomb." It later won the Pulitzer Price. David said in his book: "The last generation of foreign reporters in the Soviet Union was the luckiest." I was one of those lucky ones.

Q: We're talking about '92 then. So you came back and what happened?

INDERFURTH: Before leaving I had had a very important conversation with Peter Jennings. He came fairly frequently to anchor from Moscow given all that was happening and he was there for the Bush-Gorbachev summit. At that point we already knew I would be returning to Washington. I wanted to get Peter's advice. We went outside in the stairwell at the bureau. Peter said, "Well, you ought to know one very important thing. We're going domestic." I said, "And that means?" He said, "Domestic coverage. The Cold War is over. There are a lot of problems in the U.S. – education, the economy, etc. We're going to start giving more attention to these. That's going to make it even more difficult for those of you focusing on foreign affairs to get on the air." Of course I had been focusing for some time on issues like strategic arms control and superpower summits and relations, and now that story was becoming less interesting. Peter's advice was very helpful, even if disappointing for me, and I realized that once I got back it was probably time to start thinking about what I would do after ABC.

Q: Did you think of internalizing yourself, going domestic?

INDERFURTH: No, if there is one straight line in my career, it has been a focus on international affairs and foreign policy. I did not want to become a "hurricane chaser." I did not want to start reporting on the budget battles on Capitol Hill. There were others already doing that far better than I could. I had brought a particular area of expertise and

interest to ABC. I had been able to do it for 10 years. But it would soon be time to go.

Q: What does a guy who has broadcast experience go from here?

INDERFURTH: What I wanted to do was to see if I could continue my interest in the unfolding of the Russian drama. Even though the Soviet Union was no more, the transition of Russia to a form of democracy and a market economy was a major story. I wanted to see if there could be some way for me to stay involved, but in a public policy sense. So, after I left ABC, I started doing some consulting work for the Citizens Democracy Corps, which had several programs underway in Russia, and the Eurasia Foundation, which was just starting up. But most importantly, certainly for the purposes of this discussion, I also got back in touch with Madeleine Albright, who was then the President of the Center for National Policy, a Democratic 'think tank' on Capitol Hill. We had stayed in touch on and off after we worked in the Carter Administration. I spoke to her about the possibility of doing some projects at the Center. One thing we thought was needed was to look at the 1947 National Security Act, which set up the NSC, and examine whether any changes were needed in light of the end of the Cold War.

So, we started working together again. Madeleine had been very active the previous 10 years in Democratic Party politics, as a foreign policy advisor to Vice President Mondale when he ran for President against Reagan and to Geraldine Ferraro when she was running for Vice President in '84, and to Michael Dukakis in '88. Of course, Democrats had not been very successful in making a run at the White House. But '92 was beginning to look a little different with Bill Clinton. Although Madeleine knew him, she was not able to be directly engaged in that campaign because the Center was a 501c non-profit. But she was certainly one of the prominent Democrats that would be called upon if a Democrat won office and Bill Clinton did.

After the election, Madeleine was asked by the new President-elect and his team, including Tony Lake and Sandy Berger, if she would join the transition team. She knew of my previous transition team experience for the Carter-Mondale transition in '76 and asked if I would be willing to join her in this new assignment. It took about a nanosecond to say, "Yes." So we went back to the White House, where we had both worked several years earlier. One of the Secret Service guards at the Northwest Gate even recognized us. Interestingly, our first meeting was with Brent Scowcroft, who was once again the National Security Advisor, this time to President Bush. Sixteen years earlier when I was on the NSC transition team for Jimmy Carter, my first meeting had been with Brent who was then National Security Advisor to Gerald Ford. I'm not sure he wanted to see me again!

Q: How did it work?

INDERFURTH: Basically during the transition, as I've mentioned earlier, and this is regardless of whether you are doing the NSC, the State Department or the Defense Department, you put together briefing books on policy, on personnel, on structure. In this case, we found the structure of the Bush NSC system was a good one. We did not suggest

any major changes. There would continue to be the National Security Council supported by a Principals Committee, under that a Deputies Committee, and interagency working groups. We did propose – and this was without knowing who would get the position – that the U.S. Ambassador to the UN be made a member of the NSC and the Principals Committee, with Cabinet rank. This was intended to be a strong statement and signal of the new Administration's commitment to the UN system and multilateral affairs. All of this became even more significant later when Madeleine was nominated by the President to assume that position, which meant she was going to be one of the key players in U.S. foreign policy during the President's term. Had she not served on the NSC, her job would have been largely in New York. As it was, she split her time between New York and Washington, clearly a factor that allowed her to gain both the experience and the stature to be later tapped to be Secretary of State. So, these initial decisions had longer term consequences certainly for her, and, for that matter, for me. I'll explain that in a moment.

Tony Lake and Sandy Berger were appointed by the President-elect to be the new National Security Advisor and Deputy National Security Advisor, basically bringing our work on the NSC transition to a close. At that same time, Clinton announced in Little Rock that Madeleine Albright would be his nominee to be the U.S. Ambassador to the UN. Of course, I had been working with her every day. One day I came into our office in the Old EOB and she was not there. There was a lot of speculation that she would get an important position, but no one knew what, including Madeleine. She never really wanted to dwell on that. Around 10:00 that morning the phone rang and it was Madeleine. She said, "I'm in Little Rock. There are going to be some announcements shortly. I just wanted to let you know where I am, that I'm okay." I said, "Good. I won't tell anyone, but I hope you get what you want." She said, "I'm very excited."

She returned and soon moved over to the State Department to begin her own transition as the new UN ambassador. She asked if I would join her in New York. I said, "I'll certainly help you," although we had no idea in what role. As we later learned during the transition, the U.S. has five ambassadors at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, not just one. The chief U.S. ambassador is known as the Permanent Representative; but you also have the Deputy Permanent Representative, who is usually a career Foreign Service officer; then you have a U.S. Representative for Special Political Affairs; you have a U.S. Representative for the Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC]; and you have a fifth U.S. representative to handle budget and management responsibilities. All five ambassadors are confirmed by the Senate. Madeleine asked me to take on the task of U.S. Representative for Special Political Affairs, which would also serve as a Deputy U.S. Representative on the UN Security Council. In addition, I would be directly responsible for handling peacekeeping activities, which was going to be a major responsibility, and dealing with disarmament matters in the U.N. General Assembly's First Committee. Other things also came up that I would handle, including the question of expansion of the Security Council, which unfortunately did not take place during the four years I was there. So, Madeleine gave me an excellent portfolio and a great office just down from hers, overlooking the United Nations and the East River. This was my first presidential appointment. My confirmation went smoothly. Claiborne Pell, the Senator from Rhode Island, chaired the hearing on my nomination. He has a big supporter of the United

Nations. He had attended the San Francisco Conference that founded the UN in June 1945 and carried around a copy of the UN Charter in his pocket ever since. A few weeks later the Senate voted to confirm my nomination and Ambassador Albright presided over my swearing in at her office at the Mission in New York.

Q: This was a new role for you. This is 1993. How did you see the position of the United States there and what your job was and how people went about it?

INDERFURTH: This was a time when there were great hopes for the UN and for peacekeeping. The Cold War was over. Peacekeepers had just a few years earlier been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. President Bush had given a speech at the General Assembly in September of '92 which focused on enhancing UN peacekeeping and was very supportive in terms of the U.S. role. I remember, during the transition, we looked at the fact that the U.S. was behind in paying its dues to the UN. President Bush had proposed a three year payback for those arrears. We thought, "Why should it take that long? Let's pay this off right away. We should be paying our dues on time and in full." A certain naivete there. Congress would prove to be a big obstacle in this regard. Ambassador Albright also referred at this time to a policy of "assertive multilateralism," meaning that while the United States would continue to play the leading role in the post-Cold War world, we also intended to work multilaterally with others, and to be assertive about it. In other words, we were not going to be the 'Lone Ranger' in foreign policy; we wanted to work with others to achieve our common aims and goals, including with the UN. So, it was a very positive approach that we took to New York.

But there were also two looming problems. The immediate issue was what was happening in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia and, specifically, what to do about Milosevic and the attempt by the Serbs to "ethnically cleanse" Bosnia. Everyone was reading these horror stories in the press about the Balkans. The Balkans were at war. What would happen to Kosovo and Macedonia and Croatia? This was part of the breakup, the fallout if you will, of the end of the Cold War and the end of the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia was disintegrating. At the request of the UN Secretary-General, former Secretary Cyrus Vance and former British Foreign Secretary David Owen had pulled together the Vance-Owen Plan to deal with it.

The very first meeting that I attended with Madeleine in New York was one for the P5 [Permanent Five] members of the Security Council – the U.S., Russia, China, the France, and Britain. We met at the French mission, which was located on the 54th floor of a building near the UN and had a spectacular view of all of Manhattan and beyond. At the meeting were Cyrus Vance and David Owen to brief the P5 members on where things stood. I must admit that I was pretty awed by this – I had until just recently been working on the transition team in Washington and not too long before that at ABC News and all of a sudden I was in this diplomatic setting with the Ambassadors from Russia, China, France, and the UK, all very senior, seasoned diplomats. I remember thinking to myself: "I've got a lot of learning to do, quick, and a lot of listening."

At the same time, Ambassador Albright was also new to diplomacy and she knew that

she had a lot of work to do to take on her new responsibilities. She was inexhaustible in doing so. That meeting was also very interesting because throughout her four-year stay in New York, Madeleine Albright took this issue head-on - Bosnia, Serbia, Milosevic, Croatia, Tudjman, UNPROFOR, setting up the War Crimes Tribunals, and the hours and hours of debate and resolutions in the Security Council trying to find some way to end the conflict, calling on Belgrade to stop its aggressive action. I think more than any other single issue, this defined her role at the UN and later as Secretary of State. She was determined to see America use its influence in whatever way it could, initially through diplomacy and dropping in food supplies to those who were being starved by Milosevic's thugs, and later by military force through NATO action. This is a story she will need to tell in her own words. But I think that her major policy legacy, the one that will most define her eight years in government in the Clinton Administration, will be the advise she gave and the actions she initiated with respect to sorting out the tragedy in the Balkans.

In addition to Bosnia, there was another looming issue that we confronted upon arriving in New York. Prior to leaving office, President Bush had dispatched a U.S. humanitarian mission to Somalia. CNN had shown the world the terrible scenes of starving Somalis and the warlords that were not letting the food get through. President Bush and his Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, were right in my view to undertake that mission. Once the humanitarian situation had stabilized and the new Administration had come to office, the question was, what next for Somalia? Decisions were taken, in Washington and the United Nations, to broaden that humanitarian mission to help Somalia try to re-build itself - some termed it "nation building." There was the feeling that if more was not done for Somalia, then in a couple of years if not sooner the international community would be back again with another humanitarian crisis on its hands. Something had to be done to help the Somalis reconstitute an effective government. Unfortunately, that effort moved in ways that had unforeseen and tragic consequences. Toward the end of the U.S. involvement, there was the death of the American Army Rangers. That incident was later captured in the book and movie "Black Hawk Down." It was a sad final chapter to what had begun as a truly humanitarian effort – and one for which we are still trying to learn the appropriate lessons. The biggest loser in all this was the Somali people. I went there with Madeleine on a mission in the summer of '93. I had never seen such a desperate place – Mogadishu was basically a destroyed city. For a moment the international community and the U.S. were there to help but, for many, many reasons that effort failed. And Somalia is still, many years later, a desperate place, and a failed state.

But the fact is that all these things were taking place when we arrived at the UN. They were front and center in terms of U.S. foreign policy. So, working at the U.S. Mission in New York was not going to be a backwater. And because of my peacekeeping assignment, I also had the advantage of working closely with the UN official who was then the head of the Peacekeeping Department. His name was Kofi Annan. He was an Under Secretary General. I spent hours with him and grew to admire him enormously and also to like him as a friend. Therefore, I was delighted that he later became Secretary General of the UN and I hope will soon have a second term.

Q: You were there from when to when?

INDERFURTH: It would have been January 1993 to August 1997, at which time I assumed my position as Assistant Secretary for South Asia. I initially went to New York thinking it would be for two years. I was commuting from our home in Arlington, flying up every Monday morning on the shuttle and returning Friday night. We had thought about moving there, but Merrie and our girls had just recently returned from Russia and we all thought it was best to say in our home in Arlington with our friends and not try another major re-adjustment at that time. My older daughter, Jeannie, was living in the area as well. So, for family reasons and also because my wife was working on Capitol Hill as a legislative consultant, I became a frequent flyer. Actually, it worked out quite well and what we thought would be two years turned into a third year and then a fourth. So we came to see New York as a second home, and one we really enjoyed.

Q: You've talked about the '93-'97 period when you were ambassador to the UN for Special Political Affairs.

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Today is June 1, 2001. Why don't we talk about how you saw the U.S. and the UN at that time? What were the problems? How did the Clinton administration, Madeleine Albright, and Congress deal with this situation?

INDERFURTH: I think we saw the UN as being an important component of U.S. policy, now and for the future. We were coming out of the end of the Cold War and the end of the East-West division. Both had enormous implications for the UN.

The UN had been a Cold War battlefield. The Soviet Union was there with its veto. Whenever things got difficult around the world, these things were brought to the UN and the U.S. and the Soviet Union would battle it out in the Security Council. The end of the Cold War meant something remarkable happened. Russia became a potential partner of the U.S. in the Security Council. Indeed, one of the important things that Madeleine Albright did after taking over as the Permanent Representative was to institute a monthly breakfast or luncheon meeting with the Russian and U.S. delegations, first when Yuli Voronstov was the Russian Ambassador and then with Ambassador Sergei Lavrov when he took over. We would meet "five on five," the five top officials of each mission. That certainly did not happen during the Cold War! We were now working with the Russians in the Security Council in ways that would have been impossible just a few short years before.

There was also the feeling that the international community could do more to meet urgent needs around the world. UN peacekeepers had received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989 for the work they were doing, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali had issued an important report entitled "An Agenda for Peace" that spelled out new opportunities for the United Nations in conflict resolution. There was an increasing recognition that a great deal of the conflict taking place in the world was no longer interstate but intrastate, taking place

within borders, and that for humanitarian or other reasons some international response was required. That response could range from simply calling international attention to the problems or imposing sanctions or sending in peacekeepers under so-called Chapter 6 or Chapter 7 conditions.

As I think I mentioned earlier, just before the 1992 presidential election, President Bush had delivered his annual address to the UN General Assembly and had laid out a very full agenda for how the U.S. could assist with UN peacekeeping. We wanted to build on that. It was a good statement and we felt that it should be possible to find other ways in which the U.S. could assist in peacekeeping requirements around the world. When I say that, I should also add that it was not the view of the new Administration that the U.S. should take on all causes and settle all conflicts. Clearly, there would be restrictions on U.S. activities. Clearly U.S. national interests had to be identified and taken into account. But, again, the view was that the UN could do things around the world that the U.S. and other nations could and should support in this new post-Cold War environment. Quite frankly, that would lessen the burden or expectation that the United States would always have to respond to the international 911 call, as Ambassador Albright used to put it. And that is why the UN continues to be an important instrument for the U.S. and other countries. The reality of the UN, however, was also that this was a large institution that, over time, had become one that was clearly in need of significant reform in its practices. It was receiving a great deal of criticism that it was filled with patronage, that it was inefficient, that there was a lot of waste and, in some cases, corruption. The UN was in need of a healthy dose of reform. The Clinton Administration, and Madeleine Albright, recognized that. But the feeling on Capitol Hill was that unless there were certain steps taken to reform, then the U.S. would not meet its financial obligations, which was putting us further and further into debt. So, we really did get into a Catch 22, which was unless the UN reformed, it would not get full U.S. financial support, but we would not provide that support unless we saw the reform.

Q: Was it really "Reform these or we'll hold our money back" or was there another agenda which was those who were really opposed to the UN?

INDERFURTH: I think underlying this is a fundamental issue, especially for some conservatives like Senator Jesse Helms, of whether the U.S. should in fact be a part of the UN system. Does it infringe upon our sovereignty? Is this a step toward so-called "world government?" Of course, concerns about "entangling alliances" go back to our founding fathers and George Washington and his Farewell Address. That strain of American political thought has a long history. But in the modern era in which we live, in the aftermath of World War II, the creation of the UN was meant to be a forum and a mechanism to allow us to address difficult issues together. Remember, to end the "scourge of war" was a central part of the UN Charter. But a lot of American conservatives have simply never accepted the view that we should be a part of that international system. Indeed during the Reagan administration, one U.S. representative said very proudly that if the UN wished to leave New York, he would be on the pier to gladly wave it goodbye.

Q: That was early Reagan.

INDERFURTH: Yes, under the tenure of Ambassador Kirkpatrick. She was not the one to make that statement, but I do not believe she refuted it. The fact is that, yes, there are occasions when the U.S. will have to act in its own interest and unilaterally if necessary. But in the view of myself and others, that does not mean that we should not work multilaterally on problems where it serves U.S. interests.
Q: When you went there early on right at the beginning of the Clinton administration, the Clinton administration was elected on the economy. Foreign affairs was considered to be a secondary thing. At least this seemed to be where the focus of the campaign was. How did you feel? You were the new boy on the block watching his team get together. How did you feel... Was the commitment from Clinton and within the White House NSC to Secretary of State Christopher... Did you feel there was support for the UN, enthusiastic or just support?

INDERFURTH: I think that there was certainly support from the President and from the new Secretary of State, Warren Christopher. The fact that Madeleine Albright, as the UN ambassador, was included on the National Security Council and given Cabinet rank insured that she would be a key player in the Clinton administration and in the foreign policy making process. The current Bush administration has downgraded the role of the UN ambassador, not including that position on the NSC, or giving it Cabinet status. Each administration makes its own determination, and sends its own signals about how it views the UN and multilateralism in general.

Now, you're also right – the Clinton Administration was elected on the economy, and for good reason. The Cold War had ended and there was a feeling that as with the end of any war, hot or cold, now was the time to address unmet domestic needs. There were concerns about the economy, about education, about infrastructure, about the competition in the world economy with Japan and Europe. There were books saying the U.S. was falling behind and could not compete. So, this is where President Clinton intended to devote his primary attention.

There was also the hope that without the adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union, the U.S. could do more with the international community and the United Nations could play a greater role, whether in dealing with Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War and UN inspections for weapons of mass destruction, or the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, or the ongoing tragedy that was taking place in the former Yugoslavia.

Q: How did Madeleine Albright deal with the professional staff within the UN with the U.S. UN Mission? I'm talking about initially as you started taking charge?

INDERFURTH: Even though the U.S. mission in New York is on American soil, it is, in effect, an embassy. Under the Ambassador, who serves as Chief of Mission, you have a DCM, a political counselor and a political section and an economic section. You probably do more diplomacy there than in virtually any other U.S. embassy around the world because you're dealing with over 180 countries and with the world's preeminent

international organization, the UN and its specialized agencies like UNICEF. Madeleine Albright came to this assignment with some government experience but clearly this was her highest office. As it turned out, and this was one of the most interesting things, it was the perfect training for her subsequent appointment to be Secretary of State. She dealt with representatives from all over the world in New York; traveled extensively to Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America; and developed a set of contacts with officials from other governments who had been or would soon become their nation's Foreign Ministers.

It's interesting that while the U.S. has had a long line of high level, distinguished appointments to the UN, that has not always been a stepping stone to higher positions. Earlier it was sort of seen as a capstone to a career. That may be changing. Of course the first President Bush was UN ambassador earlier in his career. Senator Moynihan was a former U.S. ambassador. Madeleine became the Secretary of State. Richard Holbooke, who followed Madeleine, and then Bill Richardson at the UN under President Clinton, was likely to be tapped to be Secretary of State if Al Gore had won the 2000 election.

We had an excellent U.S. Mission staff. Madeleine was very pleased with her DCM, Ned Walker, who would later become our Ambassador to Egypt and Israel and then Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs when she came to Washington as Secretary. Ned was replaced by another outstanding career officer, Ambassador Skip Gnehm. Robert Gray was her political counselor, who later went to Geneva as the U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament. Cameron Hume took his place and later became our Ambassador to Algeria. Both Bob and Cameron was nominated for their ambassador posts by Madeleine. We had very good career professionals at the Mission in New York, although it was sometimes difficult to get them. New York is an expensive place for people to live, especially if you are on a government salary.

But, again, the assignment in New York proved to be an excellent training ground for Madeleine Albright and, I should add, for me as well in terms of exposure to international diplomacy. That experience would serve me very well when I moved on to my next assignment as an assistant secretary of State.

Q: How did you find the relationship between the U.S. UN Mission and the IO [International Organizations] Bureau?

INDERFURTH: Over the years that relationship has gone through various permutations. Ambassador Albright's immediate predecessor was Ambassador Perkins, who was not a part of the NSC process or a member of the first President Bush's cabinet. Therefore, he operated as most Ambassadors do abroad, receiving instructions from the State Department and the Secretary of State and responding to and working through the appropriate bureau and assistant secretary, in this case IO, International Organizations. With the new administration, IO had to adjust to the fact that Ambassador Albright had additional responsibilities and authority. While working closely with the bureau, she would not be answering, as it were, to the bureau. She would be operating under the Secretary of State, in this case Warren Christopher, and dealing directly with him. She and Christopher got along very well. I am not aware of a single policy statement of

importance that she made without first checking with "Chris," as she called him, or his office. They had a good working relationship. But IO initially thought – and not surprisingly – that the U.S. mission under the new administration would fall into the same pattern of working through IO on all matters and receive instructions. It did require a couple of phone calls to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations, George Ward, to make sure they understood that some adjustments would be required. I'm trying to say this diplomatically. The IO Bureau and its new Assistant Secretary, Doug Bennet – who was an old friend and former colleague of Madeleine's - adjusted.

Q: Turf battles.

INDERFURTH: Fortunately, to use the nuclear metaphor, there was very little fallout. After a several week period of getting adjusted to each other, things went fine from there.

Q: One of the issues that landed in the Clinton lap was the Somalia thing. Did you get involved in that?

INDERFURTH: I did and have some very strong views on that. It is an important case study in post-Cold War diplomacy, and can be seen in the category of the "the hell of good intentions."

The Bush Administration took the correct decision to go into Somalia and it was for the right reasons. It was a humanitarian emergency. I also think the Clinton Administration's intentions were right to see this turned over to the UN and to see what could be done to "fix" Somalia so that there would not be a repeat occurrence. Clearly, the humanitarian intervention saved hundreds of thousands of lives. In that sense, Somalia was a success. But, as we learned, the cause of the crisis was as much political as anything else - the fighting among the Somali warlords and clans had put the people of Somalia at great risk. So, the new Administration came in and there was a handoff to a UN-led mission, and then the question was how to assist Somalia.
There were many unintended consequences that flowed from the U.S. and UN decision to become more directly involved in Somali affairs, including the reaction of one of the strongest warlords, General Aideed. He saw this as an effort to squeeze him out of the political process, to marginalize him. Aideed hit back and he hit back hard. Initially Pakistani peacekeepers paid the price – 24 were killed in an ambush. Later American lives we lost, in the "Black Hawk Down" episode I mentioned earlier.

Q: Did the fact that we had these losses and it was considered to be irrespective of the real humanitarian benefit... The impression was that we got into something bigger than we could deal with. Did that leave a real mark on our view? Did you all have Somalia engraved in your hearts when they would talk about other crises such as Bosnia and Rwanda? Was this pretty much almost in the foreground of your thinking?

INDERFURTH: It certainly was part of our thinking. But we did not have such a strong over-reaction to say, "Well, the U.S. is closing up shop in terms of support for

multilateral intervention." We simply had to learn how to do this the right way in the future.

I also want to mention one other thing here. One of the proudest moments I had during this whole tragic period came after the decision was taken by President Clinton to withdraw U.S. forces from Somalia. The Congress and public opinion were very much in favor of us getting out. The UN tried to keep the operation going, but it wasn't working. So, the UN decided to leave as well. I was part of a Security Council mission of seven Ambassadors to travel to Mogadishu to meet with General Aideed, who had successfully eluded capture by the Rangers and others after he had ordered the attack on the Pakistanis, which had really started the most intense cycle of violence. We went to see General Aideed at his headquarters, which was surrounded by his militia forces, to say that the UN was leaving and to make it clear that the international community expected that the remaining UN personnel would be allowed to leave peacefully and not under attack. We asked for his assurance, which he gave. Fortunately, that's what took place. But the UN wasn't going to let matters solely rest in Aideed's hands. Kofi Annan, who was then the head of the peacekeeping department, asked me to see him at one point and said that it was essential that the U.S. provide some "over the horizon" military support for the withdrawal of UN troops because, if it turned ugly, they needed the most professional force available to assist. He fully recognized that the U.S. had already made a determination that U.S. forces were out of Somalia, and that any return would be politically difficult for the President. Madeleine Albright took that request back to Washington. There were several high level meetings. Her argument, and it was the right one, was that we had a responsibility to assist in the withdrawal of these UN troops since we had encouraged many countries, including Pakistan and India and others, to put troops there for peacekeeping purposes in the first place. The decision was made by President Clinton that the U.S. would send U.S. forces – Marines led by General Tony Zinni - to assist with that withdrawal and to be available if needed. The Pakistani ambassador at that time was Ambassador Jamsheed Marker. Pakistan had suffered even greater losses in Somalia than the U.S. Marker called me to say how much he appreciated hearing the news that the U.S. would return to Somalia for the purposes of protecting the withdrawal and then he added, "But I never doubted that the U.S. would." It was exactly the right kind of decision that a Great Power takes.

However, there was a further consequence of Somalia. In a short period of time, Rwanda, that terrible conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis, took place. It quickly became a genocide costing hundreds of thousands of lives. We can't go into the long history of that conflict here. But there is no doubt that the Somali experience did have a profound influence on the degree to which the U.S. would become actively involved in what was happening in Rwanda. The instructions we received in New York once the fighting erupted was to basically see the UN pull out its small peacekeeping force. We argued against that, saying there had to be some international presence there, but the question of actually going in with a large intervention force a la Somalia was never, to my knowledge, given active consideration in Washington. How would you do it? Who does it? What is the best way to proceed? With Rwanda coming so quickly after what had happened in Somalia, U.S. forces were not going to take the lead in a military expedition. Several

years later President Clinton traveled to Kigali, to Rwanda, and said the international community – and the U.S. - should have done more and that we must never let such a thing happen again. I have often wondered how the U.S. and the UN would respond to such a crisis today.

Q: Did you see any reflection in the early Clinton years... A good number of the Clinton people who came in with the campaign were coming out of the anti-Vietnam generation. There were reports of not being very appreciative of the military. Did you see some reflections of this?

INDERFURTH: There were reports in "The Washington Post" early on about some disrespect shown by a couple of White House staff to the military. I can honestly say I saw no evidence of that, certainly from my vantage point working in New York that never occurred. In fact, we had a very good relationship with the military at the U.S. Mission. We had a military attache assigned there, Colonel Bill Clontz, who was very helpful. And the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General John Shalikashvili, who took over from Colin Powell, came to New York as one of his first appointments to meet with Ambassador Albright. He told her that he wanted to assign one of his senior officers on the Joint Chiefs staff, General Barry McCaffrey, to be his point of contact with her. Later, General Wesley Clark was given that responsibility. That relationship with Clark would become especially valuable after Madeleine became Secretary of State and Wes became NATO Commander. Together they played a very important role in the Kosovo war.

But going back to your question, the fact that many of us in the Clinton Administration had opposed the Vietnam War, including the President himself, did not, in my view, color our view of the military. Indeed some have argued that had our military leaders been listened to more carefully during Vietnam, perhaps we would not have made as many mistakes as we did. They were the ones who were actually seeing what was happening on the ground, a lot more than the civilian leadership.

Q: On the reverse side, how did you find the military looking upon peacekeeping operations? We had developed under Colin Powell and others that you almost have to have almost absolutely everything assured you committed any troops, which doesn't make any sense in peacekeeping. Did you find sort of an anti-peacekeeping attitude?

INDERFURTH: I wouldn't call it an anti-peacekeeping attitude. But it was clear the military itself, again in this post-Cold War world, was attempting to determine its role and mission in a new environment in which we did not have the Soviet Red Army facing us across Europe and the Iron Curtain. Now we were beginning to see a lot of conflicts taking place, many of which had been submerged or simmering during the Cold War period. The former Yugoslavia is the best example. Tito held it together, but after he was gone and the Cold War was history, this country just broke apart. Then the question was, how do we respond to that? The military has one primary mission above and beyond all others, which is to be prepared to defend the U.S. and fight a war if necessary. It's very simple. That's the mission. But in today's world, where the U.S. is the leading international actor, what role does the U.S. play in trying to see that other conflicts do not

take place or spread in ways that could endanger U.S. interests? How much can and should we do, while not detracting from the military's primary purpose? This is still playing itself out, including with the new Administration. Secretary Rumsfeld is asking whether we should be in the Sinai, or in the Balkans peacekeeping force with NATO. Secretary Powell says to our allies, "We went into the Balkans together. We will come out together." So, there is already tension there.

I think many in the military recognize that today's world will require new missions, new training and new skills. Soldiers will need to be trained for what is a very difficult task of peacekeeper, particularly when you're not in a benign environment. Peacekeeping is no longer going to be confined to the old observer missions, as in the earlier days of the UN. Peacekeeping now is very complex and at times very dangerous. It is civil-military relations, it is psychological; it is often humanitarian; it is training others to do landmine removal. I do not believe our military has a reluctance to take on these additional tasks as long as they do not impair their ability to perform their most important function should the need arise. There are also quality of life concerns about servicemen and women being away from home for long periods of time and under difficult circumstances. Those issues must be addressed. But I do not find the military to be an opponent of taking on the new challenges that we face.

Q: After the Somali problem developed and we pulled out, was there a time of reflection, of the UN staff and some American military sitting together and figuring out what we had done right and wrong?

INDERFURTH: There were a number of efforts made to learn the lessons of Somalia – conferences, meetings, seminars, books have been written on the subject. Work along these lines was undertaken by Kofi Annan in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO]. There have also been several examinations about Rwanda and what went wrong there. The learning curve on peacekeeping has not flattened out.

Q: On Rwanda, were there within the USUN Mission conflicting opinions or was it generally said that, "We've got to stay out of this. Africa is..."

INDERFURTH: No, I think the U.S. Mission knew we had to do something. We were in day-to-day contact with the very strong views being expressed by members of the Security Council that the UN had to be doing more, that it couldn't just stand by and pull out when the Hutu hate radio was calling for the killing of the Tutsis. It was becoming clear a genocide was underway. Many members of the Security Council were demanding that a resolution be passed authorizing a UN Chapter 7 intervention, meaning the use of force was authorized. The U.S. was the country in the Security Council – I sat in the chair for a large part of this when Ambassador Albright was not in New York – that kept asking questions about how we would do this, who would do it, and under what conditions. Washington made it clear that we would not pass a resolution without those questions answered.

Some other countries supported that position, but many countries did not, including New

Zealand whose Ambassador, Colin Keating, was absolutely adamant that this was an abdication of international responsibility, thousands of people were being killed, and that the UN had to go in. But the U.S. had recently completed an internal review of peacekeeping – known as Presidential Decision Directive [PDD] 25 – and it required the U.S. to be clear about the proposed peacekeeping mission, how it would be accomplished, how much it would cost, whether U.S. forces would be required, what would be the exit strategy, whether any U.S. forces would be under UN Command (many Members of Congress were strongly opposed to this on sovereignty grounds). The questions we posed in the Security Council were not ones that some countries wanted to hear. They simply wanted something to be done. They also knew that the only country capable of doing it was the U.S.

Q: Wasn't Canada involved?

INDERFURTH: Yes, they have a very strong peacekeeping tradition, but I don't believe Canada was on the Security Council at that point. After some time, the French came forward with Operation Turqoise to provide sanctuary in a part of Rwanda. The U.S. and others supported the French taking that role, with UN Security Council blessing. Later, the U.S. military did get involved in terms of providing humanitarian assistance to the thousands and thousands of people displaced by the conflict. But that was after a large part of the killing had ceased.

Q: Our position was that we have to meet certain points and understand, which makes absolute sense, but the problem is that in a lot of crises by the time you get around to doing something, it's over and the damage is done.

INDERFURTH: That's right. As I mentioned earlier, at the beginning of the crisis we received instructions from Washington to call for the UN to pull out its entire peacekeeping contingent, which was small, from Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. Those of us at the U.S. Mission felt that this simply should not be done, including Ambassador Albright. The peacekeepers did not appear to be in danger and perhaps they could help in some fashion. That Washington instruction was turned around after several very heated phone calls. The small UN presence was able to maintain itself there and did so usefully and then expanded over a period of time. But it was a very difficult. This was almost certainly the most difficult time for any of us at the U.S. Mission during that first term.

Q: Did you find a change in how we approached these things? Over a period of time, the NGOs have become quite adept at dealing with refugees, dealing with food, health, etc. There has been a tendency prior to particularly Rwanda of the NGOs will come in later on but not be in at the beginning. Did you find that the U.S. and the UN was really making the NGOs part of any operation?

INDERFURTH: I think that NGOs were beginning – at least from my own observations – to be the one constant in many of these countries in conflict. They were often there before the crises erupted, would stay as best they could while they were going on, and would stay behind after the international community had come and gone. For instance, in

Somalia, they stayed after everyone left. Increasingly, NGOs like Doctors Without Borders, CARE, Mercy Corps, and so many others are playing critical roles in these conflict areas, providing desperately needed humanitarian and social assistance. This, too, is a further by product of the world we live in today, in the post-Cold War world. NGOs see that governments cannot or will not respond to all crises and that there is a need for a constant presence by them. It's dangerous work. They ought to be commended for what they do.

Q: In your position as ambassador for Special Political Affairs, what else was on your plate when you took over?

INDERFURTH: One thing that became a major focus of my work at the UN was the humanitarian crisis around the world posed by land mines. When Ambassador Albright and I went to Somalia and Cambodia in July of 1993 to see two peacekeeping operations, we received briefing materials that referred to the large number of landmine victims. One number continues to stick in my mind. In Cambodia, one out of every 236 Cambodians is a landmine victim. Once we got to Somalia, we received more information, but because of the security situation there we were not able to get out beyond the UN compound, except by helicopter. So we really didn't get to see the people there, only the destruction that the continued fighting had caused. Admiral Jonathan Howe, who was the UN special representative, thought it was just too dangerous although we were able to fly to Kismayu in the southern part of Somalia to see an effort being made to establish a local government council.

But when we got to Cambodia, we saw the reality of the landmine crisis. Coming in from the airport in Phnom Penh, you could see the amputees virtually everywhere you looked. Charlie Twining, the U.S. Ambassador there, briefed us on the work that was being done on demining and efforts to try to restore the lives of those who had survived these land mines. Millions had been laid over the many years of conflict, especially during the Khmer Rouge period and Pol Pot. When we departed Cambodia, Ambassador Albright said to me, "When we get back to New York, let's see what can be done about this from our vantage point."
Once back at the U.S. Mission, I started looking into this and quickly learned that there was a U.S. senator from Vermont, Patrick Leahy, who was very involved with this. He was pushing a ban on the export of anti-personnel land mines, and had gotten that through Congress. We decided that we would try to have a resolution adopted by the General Assembly that would call for an international ban on the export of land mines. That was the first of four resolutions we wrote and sponsored during my stay in New York. Every year we tried to strengthen the resolution. The second year – and this required a great deal of work in Washington within the NSC system - we were able to call for the "eventual elimination" of landmines. President Clinton included that call in his annual speech to the General Assembly. It was a real breakthrough – the first time a president had gone on record that these weapons should be eliminated worldwide. A lot of people didn't think that this was a realistic objective because landmines are cheap to make and very hard to detect. But because of the estimated 26,000 people a year killed and injured by land mines - most of them civilians - and because landmines are left to

explode for years and years after the war or conflict is over, there was the strong view that these indiscriminate killers should be banned for all time, like poison gas was after World War I. By the end of 1996, our resolution called for a binding international agreement to ban land mines – including their production, stockpiling, export and use. We were able to get more than 100 countries to co-sponsor that resolution. Over 150 voted in favor of it, with a few abstaining.

Also at this time the International Campaign to Ban Landmines was picking up speed, led by Bobby Muller of the Vietnam Veterans Foundation and Jody Williams. That campaign and Jody, who I got to know well, later won the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts. The Canadian government also got very involved. Unfortunately, once the point was reached that an international agreement to ban landmines was actually being drafted, the U.S. was unable to go along with it because of U.S. military reservations about the use of land mines, especially along the DMZ separating the two Koreas. President Clinton determined that we could not sign the treaty until those military concerns were met. So, we actually got ahead of ourselves on this – what we were saying about an international treaty and what we could actually do. But our efforts, including at the UN, did have the effect of prompting other countries, including all of out NATO allies, to start looking at this very seriously. I remember the first time I mentioned to the British Committee on Disarmament Ambassador in New York, this was in '93, that we were going to call for the "eventual elimination" of landmines, he said it was a "gimmick." I said, no, we are serious. Later the UK became one of the strongest backers of the treaty, with a big push from Princess Diana who became a very visible spokesperson for banning landmines.

But, with the U.S. stepping back from the idea of a treaty, the Canadians took the lead. They called for a conference in Ottawa. The treaty was signed. It gained a great deal of international attention and support. Even though we could not sign it, there were lots of other landmine related activities we could be pushing. The U.S. already was the leading contributor to clearing landmines, with a great deal of money devoted to this. Madeleine and I got involved in a landmine awareness effort, teaming Warner Brothers and DC Comics and the folk singer Judy Collins up with the Pentagon, to produce a mine awareness comic book for children in Bosnia and then Latin America. Superman was used for the first comic – Superman and Wonder Woman for the second, which was a suggestion Madeleine made! All these comics were printed in their own languages to try to warn children – and their parents - about the dangers they were facing from land mines and how to avoid them.

Q: I was an election observer in Bosnia a couple of times. I remember being lectured once by a lady who said, "You gentlemen, if you have to relieve yourself, don't step off the side of the road. Stay on the pavement." You could see what it does. You'd see pastureland with tape around it saying not to go on there. It's terrible. Then you'd see people who had amputated limbs.

INDERFURTH: Madeleine took a trip to Angola as UN ambassador and she came back telling a story of going out into the countryside and seeing children tethered to trees by their mothers so that they would not wander out in the fields and step on land mines. This

became one of her 'talking points' in Washington arguing for more action by the U.S.

All of this attention led, as I said earlier, to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines receiving the Nobel Prize in 1997. I hope the U.S. will take steps over the next few years to end the use of land mines. The Clinton Administration directed the Pentagon to search for alternatives and be prepared to sign the treaty by 2006. Of course, the U.S., and this is an important point, does not use what are called "dumb land mines," those that do not self-destruct over a period of time. And if the U.S. does use landmines, anti-personnel and anti-tank, they are mapped and then cleared afterwards. But the fact is that if we're going to see all nations of the world end the use of land mines, the U.S. will have to end its use as well. We can't say, "Well, because we use sophisticated "smart" land mines, those are acceptable, but your dumb ones are not." That kind of exceptionalism will not work.

Q: Did you find a problem with the Canadians being quite aggressive and in a way sanctimonious about this? They didn't have any troops in the DMZ in Korea. There is a dangerous situation and you have to use every means you can.

INDERFURTH: There was certainly some tension associated with our dealings with Canada over this issue. We would make the point that our international responsibilities and obligations exceeded theirs and other nations, including with respect to South Korea, where 37,000 American troops are standing guard. The Canadians had a very activist foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, who had taken up this cause and very skillfully. He worked with others, including the Norwegians. They basically took the language from the resolutions we had proposed in New York and put them into treaty language and then called on the international community to sign it. At a meeting in Oslo, there were efforts made to see if certain American exceptions could be made to the treaty. The Canadians and others were adamant that there could not be exceptions, that this was a universal treaty and that if the U.S. had its Korean exception, Russia would have its Chechnya exception, and China would have its exceptions, etc. I'm sure Madeleine Albright, who by this time had become Secretary of State, had many conversations with Axworthy on this, and not always ones where they agreed!

But I will say that I believe the Canadians deserve a great deal of credit for picking up the leadership on this issue when it became clear that the U.S. was not going to be able to reconcile our military and humanitarian imperatives and sign the treaty. This wasn't cost free in a military sense for the Canadians either. As a member of NATO and as an important UN peacekeeping nation, they had to make certain adjustments as well, although certainly not of the magnitude of dealing with the Korean problem as we had. But still, I think that they exercised very important leadership and I commend them for it.

Q: How did you work on this? Did you spend a lot of time in the delegates' lounge?

INDERFURTH: Absolutely. This was an issue taken up in the UN's First Committee, the Disarmament Committee, so that's where we would introduce our landmine resolutions. The First Committee will convene in the fall, at the start of the General Assembly. Before

that I would call a meeting of landmine affected countries like Cambodia, Angola, Bosnia, Ethiopia, Vietnam, El Salvador – about 30 in all. I would meet with their representatives and make sure they knew exactly what we were doing. Their support was especially important since they were the ones that were living with the problem most immediately. Then we would meet with the various UN regional groupings - the Europeans, the Asians, the Latin America. From Washington we would send out cables to our embassies in all capitals from the Secretary of State saying that this resolution would be coming up and that we would hope for that countries support and laying out the arguments in favor of the resolution. This was a full court diplomatic initiative by the U.S.
President Clinton, when he came to New York each year at the beginning of the General Assembly, was a key part of this effort. Each year that I was at the U.S. Mission, he had something to say about the scourge of landmines. As I said earlier, he was the first world leader to call for the eventual elimination of anti-personnel land mine. It had not been done before by a world leader. We also met with the NGOs to inform them of our plans and get them involved.

So we were very successful in raising the visibility of this issue in New York, with plenty of meetings in the delegate's lounge. I do believe that eventually the U.S. will sign the treaty. I was the head of the U.S. delegation that went to Ottawa in 1997 to attend the signing conference. Secretary Albright asked me to take on the job of Special Representative for Global Humanitarian Demining, in addition to my work as Assistant Secretary for South Asia. It was in the former capacity that I was asked to head the delegation to the Ottawa conference. I told the delegates that, while the U.S. could not sign the Ottawa treaty, we felt very much a part of the Ottawa process, which was to move toward the elimination of landmines around the world and that we would keep working on this issue in very practical terms, with demining, assistance to landmine survivors, and landmine awareness efforts. That was appreciated, but there was still a lot of disappointment that the U.S. was not 'on the dotted line.'

Q: How about something that later came under your bailiwick? How about India and Pakistan? How did they deal with the mining problem?

INDERFURTH: They continue to use landmines and they have not signed the treaty, nor did they vote in favor of our resolutions. They abstained. As we have Korea, they have their exception, which is each other and the Kashmir dispute. But, again, we are working on this. The Pentagon is working to find alternatives to landmines and hopefully the new Administration will stick to the 'road map' laid out by the Clinton Administration to be in a position to sign the treaty in 2006. Once the U.S. has signed, I believe that will have impact. Just recently, the last remaining NATO members agreed to sign the treaty: Turkey and Greece. Now we're the only NATO country that has not signed. The only other country in the Western Hemisphere that has not signed, in addition to us, is Cuba. It's not very good company.

Q: During the time you were at the UN, were there producers of land mines exporting them?

INDERFURTH: There were some exporters, but a lot of the production had become home grown. Remember they are cheap and easy to make. Also, a lot of countries don't want to be stigmatized as landmine exporters. So, even if we do not have a universally agreed to treaty, the international norm has been set. Landmines are seen in the same category of weapons as poison gas, something that should be banned by the international community because the consequences of these weapons are far greater on civilians than military personnel. The only way to deal with that is to get rid of them.

Q: Moving on... What other elements were you dealing with?

INDERFURTH: Probably the most gratifying and rewarding activity that I undertook had to do with the release of prisoners that had been involved in the conflict in the Western Sahara. Like the land mine issue, I learned about this from some briefing materials I read prior to going on a Security Council mission to Morocco in 1995. During the time I was in New York, the Security Council authorized several fact finding missions. Because I was dealing with peacekeeping and I was our deputy representative in the Security Council, and because it was difficult for Ambassador Albright to take the time to be away from New York and Washington for long stretches, I was the one asked to represent the U.S. We had Council missions to Mozambique, Burundi, Somalia, Angola, Rwanda, and the Western Sahara. That trip to the Western Sahara turned out to be one of the most meaningful for me.
In our briefing papers for the trip there was a reference to a group of prisoners from the fighting that took place in the mid-'70s between Morocco and the Polisario, the group that wanted to establish an independent state in the Western Sahara. Twenty five years later they were still there, getting older and many of them in poor health. The briefing papers referred to a specific group of prisoners being held in the desert at a place called Camp Serfaty, about 200 old Moroccan prisoners. The International Committee of the Red Cross had been allowed to visit them and appeals had been made to both parties to allow them to go. The Polisario had agreed. But the Moroccans would not accept their own prisoners back because, by doing so, it would suggest that they were recognizing the Polisario. Diplomatically I guess you can sort of see their point, but what you were really talking about were a bunch old soldiers wasting away in the desert. It was clearly a humanitarian issue. The UN asked the Council mission if, during its talks with both parties, we could make some references to this situation.

We went to Rabat first. I told the Argentine ambassador, Emilio Cardenas, that I intended to raise this issue. He agreed. Of course our main purpose there was to try to get the UN referendum back on track so that the two sides could settle their long-standing dispute once and for all, peacefully.

So we raised the issue of prisoners in our talks with Moroccan officials in Rabat. We did not get any firm response, one way or the other. Then we went to see the Polisario at their headquarters inside Algeria near Tindouf, way out there in the desert. We stayed overnight. As things transpired, dinner was about 2:00 am. I spoke to one Polisario official during the dinner and raised this prisoner issue. I asked, "Where is Camp Serfaty?" He said, "Oh, it's about an hour away from here." I said, "Can I go there?" He

said, “You want to go there?” I said, “Yes.” He said, “We’ll see.” I mentioned this to Ambassador Cardenas. He said, “I’ll go.” He is a man of great enthusiasm.

The next morning, they had a jeep waiting for Emilio and me and took us to see the prisoners. It was a unbelievable. I couldn’t believe that we were actually there. They were in this sort of camp enclosure, in huts. Where could they go? They were in the middle of the desert. They raised chickens. As we walked from hut to hut, some of the prisoners started writing things down. They asked if we would take letters back and give them to the ICRC to get to their families. Of course we said yes.

When Emilio and I got back to New York we starting thinking about what we could do about “those guys,” as Emilio called them. So we started meeting with the Polisario representative in New York and the Moroccan ambassador, separately. We got the representative of the ICRC, Peter Kung, involved. Over a period of several weeks, we were able to gain agreement from the Moroccans to allow us to bring their prisoners home, but only, according to Moroccan government, if the U.S. and Argentina – and especially the U.S. – would do it. That meant getting some help with airlift.

Ambassador Albright spoke to our JSC contact in Washington and asked, “Can we get some C-130s [medium transport planes] out of Europe to come in and help move these people out of the desert?” Cardenas spoke to his government and they got a plane to fly from Buenos Aires. Suffice is to say that in December of ’95, we rendezvoused in Tindouf, just after sunrise. I came in on a C-130 that the Air Force had flown from Germany They picked me up at a base near Marrakesh. Cardenas came in from Buenos Aires on his government’s 707. Pursuant to our agreement, the ICRC had gone to the camp before we arrived to help with the repatriation, and brought the prisoners to the airfield in Tindouf where we were waiting with the planes. They boarded and we were off to a camp the Moroccans had set up for their arrival, with a lot of medical personnel standing by to examine and help the old soldiers. In the end, the Moroccans had done the right thing. The men were then reunited with the families some time later.

Now we had agreed to do this whole operation in confidence; other than acknowledging the mission had taken place we were not going to comment. The Moroccans did not want any press. This was politically sensitive for them. A small item appeared, I think in Reuters. I never spoke to any reporter about this. But the New York Times got the story and its reporter contacted Emilio. He figured the cat was already out of the bag, so he spoke. The next day the story appeared in the Times - “Two Diplomats Rescue 185 Imprisoned In Sahara.” It started, and this is a quote, by saying that “two swashbuckling ambassadors commanding two military transport planes swooped down on an airstrip just over the border from Algeria, cut through some red tape, and took the old soldiers home.” A little literary license there. But the fact is that this whole experience was enormously meaningful to us – we actually got to see the results of our diplomatic effort, in human terms. Knowing that these prisoners were returned and that they could be reunited with their families was one of the most important things I’ve ever been able to work on.

I should also mention that this mission was followed by another one a few months later.

This time I worked with a German member of the Security Council, Ambassador Henze. Argentina had rotated off the Council in January so Emilio was no longer available for this.

Once again we joined up with the Moroccans, the Polisario and the ICRC – this time to work out an agreement to allow the return home of 66 Polisario prisoners held by the Moroccans. At one point the King of Morocco wrote President Clinton saying that he had agreed to do this because this was obviously so important to the U.S.! This time we needed only one plane so Gerhard Henze was able to provide a German commercial charter. We flew them from Agadir in Morocco back to Tindouf and then we took buses and jeeps into the desert for a reunion with families. Guns were fired in the air...people were crying and singing. Absolutely amazing. So we were able to see a two-way exchange. Unfortunately, there are 1,500 Moroccan prisoners still out there. Time ran out for me to continue working with the Moroccans and the Polisario to let all these people go home. But it was an experience I will never forget.

Q: Did you run across the problem that seems to permeate anything we do and that is with Israel? Did that impact on your work?

INDERFURTH: Not directly. In the Security Council, Ambassador Albright was the leader of our delegation. We had two deputy representatives in the Council, who would sit in the chair when she was not there. I was one. The other was initially Ambassador Ned Walker, and then he was replaced by Ambassador Skip Gnehm, both of whom are career FSOs with a lot of experience in the Middle East. Skip had been our ambassador to Kuwait during the Gulf War experience; Ned had been our ambassador to the UAE and would later serve as chief of mission in both Egypt and Israel. So they handled the Mideast issues in the Council when Madeleine was not there. I did not. I had my hands full elsewhere. I wished them the best of luck!

Q: How about Iraq?

INDERFURTH: They did Iraq as well.

Q: You had enough. Let's go to Bosnia.

INDERFURTH: Madeleine Albright did Bosnia, which was a major preoccupation from the day she arrived to the day she left to become Secretary of State. She was in the U.S. chair in the Security Council for this almost without exception. She was really our desk officer at the U.S. Mission for Bosnia, although we did have a great desk officer by the name of Stuart Seldowitz, a young foreign service officer. He worked on all the Security Council resolutions dealing with Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia. There were about 100 during our stay there, an enormous number. But when Bosnia came up, whether it be in the Security Council or with the P5 or with the Secretary General, Madeleine handled it. This was a major focus of hers, not only in New York but also in Washington in the NSC and with the President.
Q: You were part of the team.

INDERFURTH: Yes, but this was probably the biggest foreign policy issue from the standpoint of the U.S. government in the UN. For U.S. foreign policy, our relations with Russia, with China, and with the Middle East, those issues were Washington-dominant and largely bilateral in nature. But Bosnia was the multilateral issue of highest importance, hence Albright's focus on that in New York.

Q: Genocide.

INDERFURTH: That's right. I believe Madeleine, with her very strong personal and academic background in European affairs and Central Europe, understood the implications of what was happening in Bosnia better than many others. She wanted to see the U.S. exert influence in whatever would be the best to put that war out. When we first got to New York in '93, the peace plan of the moment was the Vance-Owen Plan. It never got off the ground, in part because the U.S. did not see it as workable. There were a great number of UN resolutions condemning what was happening in Bosnia. There was a UN peacekeeping presence there, known as UNPROFOR, that was not keeping peace and was barely a presence. The fighting continued and the horror stories of ethnic cleansing, of genocide, continued. Madeleine Albright saw earlier than most of her colleagues that at some point the threat of force would be required to back down Milosevic and those Bosnian Serb leaders that were intent on imposing their bloody will throughout the region. She took this on as a primary responsibility for herself at the UN and later as Secretary of State. I think to her great credit, that war was put out and today Milosevic is in jail, at the Hague, and standing before the International War Crimes Tribunal. Without a doubt, Madeleine Albright had as much to do as anyone to put him there.

Q: Were all of you enlisted in this effort in trying to do something about Bosnia?

INDERFURTH: We all had parts that we would play. There would be so many meetings Ambassador Albright could not attend them all – informal Security Council meetings, P5 and Contact Group meetings. Certainly when she was traveling we filled in on this issue. She took several trips to Bosnia and the region during this time. But the focus of her attention was on Washington and getting the principals of the NSC to at least be open to the possibility of greater and more direct U.S. involvement, including military involvement if that were necessary.

Q: There was a considerable amount of bluster... I've interviewed our former ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman, and made that point that air strikes could have probably taken care of particularly some of the Serb aggression.

INDERFURTH: Warren Zimmerman has written on this subject and knows it far better than I. But it is absolutely true that air strikes played an important role once they were used. And the threat of military force was an important factor and was used to great advantage by Richard Holbrooke, who was then the Assistant Secretary of State. He had the task of organizing the Dayton Conference. Dick is very determined, experienced, hard headed, and a tough negotiator. He spent a lot of time in that region trying to find a path

toward a settlement. On one of those occasions his small party was traveling just outside Sarajevo when one of the armored personnel carriers carrying several members of the U.S. team went off the side of the road down a mountain. Three Americans died, one of whom I knew, Joe Kruzel, a contemporary of mine who was working at the Defense Department. It was very sad, a real tragedy.

In the end, Holbrooke was successful at Dayton. An agreement was reached and he played a very important role. But I also think Madeleine Albright had laid the groundwork for giving this issue greater attention and moving the President in the direction that he eventually took. I think she also had an ally in the National Security Adviser, Tony Lake, but this is a story that I imagine she is going to tell at much greater length than I can and with far greater authority and insight.

Q: What about the relationship of Madeleine Albright and Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary General?

INDERFURTH: That has received a great deal of attention since she was the one that cast the veto on the Security Council to deny him a second term. It was a lonely veto. We were the only negative vote. She had a cordial, correct relationship with the SYG [Secretary General]. This was not something personal. In fact, I know she was offended by some of the derogatory statements and offensive remarks made by some U.S. politicians about Boutros-Ghali, that these were uncalled for and unbecoming for the U.S. Many Republican leaders said that he was "running U.S. foreign policy," that the Clinton Administration had put him in charge. Well, those statements were clearly political. But then there were the constant references to his full name – Boutros Boutros-Ghali – said in almost a sneering fashion, putting down his 'foreign-ness.' I think Madeleine felt that crossed the line.

At the same time, she had – the Administration had – a number of concerns about his performance as Secretary General. He had not taken up the cause of UN reform. He ran the UN more as a personal fiefdom than as a hands-on manager. Ambassador Albright recognized that the UN risked losing the U.S. if reform steps were not taken; she knew in her dealings with Capitol Hill that there was a growing opposition to the UN because of all of these reports of waste, fraud, and abuse, and that we would never pay our dues on time or pay back our arrears as long as these things were not addressed in a serious, systematic fashion. Boutros did not appear the man for that job. U.S.- UN relations were becoming increasingly strained, for this and other reasons including his handling of Bosnia and the so-called "dual-key" controversy. So, the decision was taken that we would not support him for re-election. Many countries quietly agreed but they basically let us cast the veto and take the heat for doing what had not been done before, which was to deny an incumbent Secretary General a second term. He was representing the continent of Africa and there is an informal agreement about regions having two terms, then rotating. Our veto was of Boutros-Ghali, not Boutros-Ghali the African candidate. So we made it clear very early that we would be willing to consider another African candidate for that second term. Fortunately there already was one person from Africa that many believed could step into that position, a person that knew the UN very well, and that had

a great deal of respect - and that was Kofi Annan of Ghana. So, after the veto of Boutros-Ghali, the African countries said, "We do want to continue to the practice of two terms" for each region. We said, "We can support that." Very quickly, it became clear that Kofi Annan would be the consensus choice for Secretary General, and he has done a great job, including on the reform issue.

Q: Did you get involved with Jesse Helms at the election of '94 when Congress reverted back to the Republicans?

INDERFURTH: I did not. Ambassador Albright appeared before his Committee, and later made a big effort to develop good relations with Chairman Helms when she became Secretary of State. She even gave him a t-shirt that said "Somebody at the State Department Loves Me." I appeared before some committees while I was at the UN - usually about peacekeeping activities - including Armed Services and Intelligence - but never appeared before Senator Helms.

Q: Were there any other issues that we should cover?

INDERFURTH: There are two other things that I would like to mention. Both took place after Madeleine had moved on to Washington to prepare for her new position as Secretary of State and Bill Richardson had come to New York to assume her job as the U.S. Permanent Representative. I had known Bill for some years, so I was very pleased that he had been selected by the President and had agreed to give up his seat in Congress to take that job.

As I was winding up my own activities in New York, I started thinking about the increasing number of people that were dying in UN peacekeeping operations – not just peacekeepers but other UN personnel that were involved. A helicopter had recently crashed killing a number of peacekeepers. I asked one of the people in the peacekeeping department, "What is the procedure for those who have died? How are the families notified? Do they receive a medal? Do they receive any kind of commendation?" I was told they got a letter of notification and some financial compensation for the family. But there was nothing to really express the appreciation of the UN and the international community for their loss. So, in the final days I was there, and working with my military colleagues at the U.S. Mission, we worked on a resolution to establish a medal for those who had given their lives for UN peacekeeping. Washington agreed with the proposal. The resolution was introduced in the Security Council and was adopted by all 15 members with the strong support of Kofi Annan. It was named the Dag Hammarskjold Medal for the UN Secretary General who died on a peacekeeping mission in the Congo many years before. The person that designed the medal itself was someone my wife Merrie and I have known for many years, Louis Nelson, who is the husband of singer Judy Collins. Judy is very involved with the land mine issue. Both are very committed to working with the UN.

The other thing I wanted to mention had to do with the farewell dinners you usually have when you are leaving the UN after an assignment. Bill Richardson said that he wanted to

have such an event for me and Skip Gnehm since we were both leaving to take new positions in Washington with Secretary Albright. I was asked if I would like to have a lunch or a dinner. I said, "Why don't we do something different? Let's have hot dogs and beer." The person handling this for Ambassador Richardson said, "What do you mean by that?" I said, "Why don't we take the Security Council to Yankee Stadium? That would be the event!" Well, Bill Richardson had played semi-pro baseball so he thought it was a great idea. It turns out that the Yankees were playing the New York Mets in an intra-league series – a real crosstown rivalry. The members of the Security Council were excited. We arranged for two small buses to take us out to the game from the UN. We offered each of the ambassadors either a Yankees or Mets cap as they boarded the bus. I knew we were in trouble when the Egyptian ambassador got on the bus and said he wanted a Redskins [a football team] hat. But some of the ambassadors were very attuned to baseball including the Japanese ambassador, Ambassador Owada, who knows baseball better than most of the Americans because of Japan's great love of the game. It was a wonderful occasion. The Russian ambassador, Sergei Lavrov, got into the game; so did the British Ambassador, Sir John Weston. It went into extra innings. Not one of the 57,000 Yankees and Mets fans left. At the very end, I never thought I would see the very formal and dignified Japanese ambassador giving a high five to the Kenyan ambassador when the Yankees won! Since I am a lifelong Yankees fan - my father took me to the '57 World Series to see the Yankees and Braves play - I was still looking for Mickey Mantle, who was not playing that day. Still, it was a great experience. I also think that it was a diplomatic success!

New York was such a rewarding experience for me and I was especially pleased that my friend and boss, Madeleine Albright, had now been chosen by the President to take over the State Department. She was ready for the job because of her UN experience. I think President Clinton's decision to appoint her was the right one for so many reasons, including a personal one for me. As a father of three daughters, I understood the great importance of seeing a woman finally ascend to the highest appointive position in the U.S. government, a position first held by Thomas Jefferson. I was delighted to see Madeleine Albright achieve that honor. She has broken through many barriers in her life, but this was the most important.

Q: You moved over to the State Department as Assistant Secretary when?

INDERFURTH: The swearing in was in August of 1997. I had come down from New York just a little before that to prepare for the confirmation hearing. I served from August '97 to January 2001 in that position.

Q: We'll pick it up at that point.

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Today is June 22, 2001. How did the offer and all come about?

INDERFURTH: Well, having worked very closely with Madeleine the previous four

years at the UN, it was my hope and indeed expectation that she would ask me to join her in some capacity in Washington. The question was in what capacity. Once she was nominated, she left the mission in New York and was totally involved in her transition to become Secretary of State. Her chief of staff, Elaine Shocus, and I stayed in touch. Elaine let me know early on that they would want me to come work at the Department. After four years of commuting between Washington and New York, I was ready to return home with my family!

Several weeks after Madeleine was nominated, I received a call from Strobe Talbott, the Deputy Secretary, who was working with her in Washington to put her new team together. Strobe said he would be in New York and could I see him at the Waldorf, where he was staying. Strobe and I have known each other for many years, going back to when he was a correspondent for Time magazine, and major columnist, and I was at ABC. We had a strong mutual interest in arms control issues. Strobe came into government because of his very close connection to President Clinton – they were Rhodes Scholars together in England – and the President wanted him to handle the Russia account, which was Strobe's major interest and specialty. After about a year, Secretary Christopher asked him to be Deputy Secretary of State and Madeleine asked him to continue in this capacity once she got the job.

Strobe said that he and Madeleine had been talking about what might be possible and where my background and skills would best fit. He suggested that I give serious consideration to the South Asia Bureau. That came as something of a surprise. I am not a South Asian specialist by training and had traveled there only twice – the first time with President Carter on his 1978 trip to India. I was then working on the NSC staff as Zbigniew Brzezinski's special assistant. The second time was when I was working for ABC in Moscow as a correspondent. In 1990 I flew to Kabul on a Soviet cargo transport plane to cover the latest coup attempt against the then Afghan leader Najibullah. Of course, over the previous four years I had worked in New York at the UN with various South Asian delegations, especially the Pakistani delegation because they had served on the Security Council when I first arrived and then the Indian delegation because they are omnipresent in New York, a major player. I mentioned all this to Strobe and he said: "Well, we're not looking for a South Asian expert. We're looking for someone that 1) has the trust and confidence of the new Secretary of State, 2) knows the policymaking process and how Washington works, and 3) has demonstrated an ability to learn a new portfolio quickly, as you did when you came to the UN. Madeleine wants you to give this serious consideration and she'll be in touch." Strobe also said there might be other positions for me to consider. As it turned out, two other possibilities were explored: to be the Press Spokesman for the Secretary (because of my experience with ABC). Madeleine and I occasionally discussed this in the past and I had always said I would rather not be doing the press full time, that I really liked the substantive assignments I had. The other possibility was Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research [INR], which would have drawn on my earlier experience on the Senate Intelligence Committee and as a 'consumer' of the intelligence product in government - at the NSC, on the Hill and more recently at the UN.

I decided to ask for some advice from Skip Gnehm, who was at that point still in New York as our Deputy Permanent Representative (the number two job) and a good friend and a career Foreign Service officer. I said to Skip, "Strobe has suggested South Asia." Skip said, "Take it." I said, "Why?" He said, "The best job in the Foreign Service is to be a regional assistant secretary of State. You have a region. You're responsible for it. You're working directly with the Secretary and the 7th Floor. You're going to be involved with the NSC and the White House. It's the best job." I then had a good discussion with the new Secretary of State-designate. Shortly thereafter Strobe called me at home and asked, "Have you decided?" I said, "South Asia." He said, "Great."

Q: The South Asia Bureau is quite new. How did it peel off from the Near Eastern Bureau and why? What was the composition of the Bureau?

INDERFURTH: Once I thanked Madeleine and Strobe, I should have picked up the phone to call Senator Moynihan and former Congressman Steve Solarz to thank them. They were the two in Congress that pushed through legislation requiring the State Department to establish the South Asia Bureau, over the Department's objections, in 1992. The Executive Branch does not like to be told how to organize itself by Congress, so, on principle, there was an objection. But Congress in its wisdom – and this was a wise thing to do! – determined that South Asia, as part the Bureau for Near East and South Asian Affairs, was simply not getting the attention it needed – that it could never compete with Middle East issues.

Q: And on the Israeli situation.

INDERFURTH: That's right. The way it worked in the past was a Deputy Assistant Secretary would be handed the South Asia portfolio, with the Assistant Secretary only becoming occasionally involved, mainly during a crisis. Solarz and Moynihan, and he was a former U.S. ambassador to New Delhi, both felt that South Asia and especially India was getting shortchanged, that U.S.-Indian relations had never achieved the potential that our two democracies should naturally have, for a closer, stronger relationship. One reason for this was that the relationship wasn't constantly on the radar screen in Washington at senior levels. So, they legislated the establishment of a separate South Asia Bureau. This was at the beginning of the Clinton Administration. Robin Raphel, who was the political counselor in New Delhi, was chosen to be the first Assistant Secretary.

So, that was the genesis of the Bureau. Clearly the region has gotten more attention. At times it has even been a central focus within the Executive Branch, which we'll discuss as part of this interview. And particularly in the last year, the year 2000, there was a significant breakthrough in relations with India and, hopefully, putting all of South Asia more on the map. Tom Pickering, who I was so fortunate to work with when he was Under Secretary of State and who is a former ambassador to India, said in '97 that South Asia has been on the "backside of every U.S. diplomatic globe" for far too long and he hoped to see that change during President Clinton's second term. I believe that happened, as we'll discuss.

Q: Before we move to the substance of what you were doing, could you talk a bit about the staffing of the Bureau? Had there developed a cadre of South Asian experts?

INDERFURTH: Since South Asia had not gotten a lot of U.S. attention over the years, except during times of crisis, it really hadn't attracted as much foreign service interest as some other regions. It certainly didn't have the pull of U.S.-Soviet relations, or East-West relations, that had developed a cadre of experts like Kennan and Bohlen and Thompson over the years. Nor had it approached the status of having Middle East 'hands' or China 'hands.' But there is no doubt that I inherited a group of people that had served in the region, that knew it and cared about it - FSOs like Al Eastham, Bob Boggs, John Holzman, Don Camp, young officers like Brad Hanson and Joe Novak, Mike Malinowski, who is soon to be our ambassador to Nepal; Bill Milam, now serving as our ambassador in Pakistan (who also served as ambassador to Bangladesh earlier). Most recently Bill had been in Liberia, which seems to be part of the career pattern for South Asia specialists at State. Many young FSOs get some experience in the region, move up in the ranks, and often get a higher posting, including their first ambassadorial post, in Africa. There are a lot more countries there to place people – 50 or so compared to the eight in South Asia. An example is Nancy Powell, who has great experience South Asia, then when off to be our ambassador in Uganda. I kept trying to get back, including into the ambassador's post in Pakistan, as I was leaving the department.

But the fact is that South Asia is a region that is extraordinarily diverse and fascinating in terms of people, culture, geography, history, religion. That's why there are some really good career officers who have found this a particularly interesting place to spent much of their careers. I had the good fortune of having a number of them work for me while I was head of the South Asia Bureau.

Q: Which countries are there?

INDERFURTH: India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Maldives. We don't have direct diplomatic relations with Maldives, the island nation in the Indian Ocean. We are accredited there through Sri Lanka. Afghanistan is a country that we do not have a diplomatic presence in because of the continuing civil war. Bhutan is another country we do not have formal diplomatic relations with, but we do work with them through their mission in New York at the UN. In fact, my last visit as Assistant Secretary to the region included a stop in Thimpu, Bhutan's capital, to work on a refugee issue with the King. What a beautiful country, which the King is just beginning to open up to the world, but very slowly.

So, the South Asia region has the smallest number of countries of any of the other regional bureaus, which also means we are the smallest in terms of personnel. We only had 30-40 people in the bureau in Washington. But that allowed us to do something the bigger bureaus could not - really get to know those that you're working with, avoid too much compartmentalization. It also meant there could be much more contact from the desk officer with the Assistant Secretary. That's an advantage. It helps morale. I do think

that over time the Bureau should expand. I think one expansion makes more sense than others, which is to incorporate Central Asia, have the Bureau of South Asia and Central Asian Affairs as opposed to the Central Asian former Soviet republics being associated with the European Bureau, which is where they are now.

Q: Cultural ties, religion, etc. belongs more in there.

INDERFURTH: It does.

Q: But there you're talking about one of the great turf battles.

INDERFURTH: Yes. There are great turf battles. I was very happy with my turf. It proved to be just a fascinating assignment.

Q: How did you find yourself received by the professional corps of Foreign Service in your job?

INDERFURTH: As a political appointee, as a non-careerist, there were probably a few questions about why Ambassador Inderfurth from the U.S. Mission to New York was being given the South Asia job. In terms of presenting myself to my new colleagues, I wanted to play to my strength. The strength that I had above all others was my close association with the new Secretary of State. That would be very useful in getting our South Asia business to her on the 7th floor and past the gatekeepers if necessary. I also called attention to my recent diplomatic experience with India and Pakistan at the UN – and the contacts I had made. My experience on Capitol Hill and at the NSC was a big plus – knowing how the Congress and the White House works from the inside. Also my work on nuclear arms control and disarmament issues was useful, given that the U.S. government continued to have big concerns about both India and Pakistan and their nuclear and missile programs. Then there was my press background, which turned out to be enormously valuable in dealing with the South Asian press corps – and the Washington reporters covering the State Department. I made it clear that I saw dealing with the press as an opportunity, not as a threat or something to be avoided, and that I would want to be proactive with the press, to get information to them so that they could better understand what we were trying to accomplish in terms of our South Asia policy. So I would have meetings with the South Asian reporters fairly frequently, and be as responsive as I could by phone when they needed to speak with me. I think all this was a big plus for what we were trying to do in raising the visibility of the region and interest level.

Now, going back to my reception by the professional corps, as you put it. Career Foreign Service officers are diplomats, so they were very diplomatic about not calling attention to my lack of South Asia credentials. They wanted to see how I would perform. I'm sure they had their fingers crossed. I also got some very good advice from Skip Gnehm, whom Madeleine had asked to take on the job of Director General for the department. Skip not only gave me good advice about taking the South Asia position, but also how, as assistant secretary, I would need to pay attention to, and help in any way I could, advance the

careers of those working in the bureau from the most junior officer to those who were reaching a point in their career when they could be considered for an ambassadorial post. I tried to do that. I was very pleased while I was there that one of our senior officers, Steve Mann, received an ambassadorial assignment to Turkmenistan and Mike Malinowski was tapped for Nepal. Both did great work for me in the South Asia Bureau and I was very pleased to put their names forward for these jobs.

One final point. I think political appointees do bring certain attributes to their positions that careerists sometimes do not, including a close relationship with the incoming Secretary of State. Appointees will clearly be very attentive to the direction and objectives that the Secretary and the administration want to pursue. But the best combination – when the department works at its best -is when the political appointee works closely with the career foreign service officers and draws on their background and expertise to make policy that will work.

Q: When you arrived, what were you hit with? What was the issue in August '97?

INDERFURTH: I'm glad you asked. August was my swearing in, but I had my confirmation hearing several weeks before that. In May of that year, something important had occurred which I called attention to during my confirmation hearing. Prime Minister Inder K. Gujral of India, someone that I came to admire and today consider a friend, had met with the Pakistani Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, who had recently been elected for the second time to that office. They met at a SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] summit in the Maldives, in Mail. They met, had a handshake and a photograph together, and they said it was very important to move beyond the tragic past of the two countries. India and Pakistan had already had three wars. It was a very hopeful sign. In The Washington Post, there was an editorial that appeared just as I was going up for my confirmation hearings entitled "South Asian Ripple." The first line of that editorial said, "A little ripple of promise of better relations between India and Pakistan has spread across South Asia." It focused on the meeting between Sharif and Gujral. When I appeared for my confirmation hearing I wanted to say something like, "I would like to see that little ripple of promise become a tidal wave of hope." I didn't say that, but I certainly was encouraging and upbeat. I also tried during my tenure as Assistant Secretary not to allow events, no matter how discouraging, to keep me from sounding some positive note, to hang onto something that would move us in a more positive direction.

Q: The Clinton administration had been in for four years. Had they developed an approach to India and Pakistan? In four years, an administration kind of begins to feel comfortable with their approach. Or had they?

INDERFURTH: I think the answer is, they had not. The first four years, President Clinton was focused on other areas. First, as we know from the '92 campaign, it was the economy and domestic affairs. Then he started getting more involved in international foreign affairs. Bosnia placed itself up at the top of that list. And relations with Russia. South Asia was not near the top of his list. It remained, to a large degree, on the

"backside of the diplomatic globe." There was an attempt in Clinton's first four years to try to rationalize our policy towards Pakistan and to deal with the so-called Pressler sanctions which had been imposed on Pakistan in 1990 because Pakistan had acquired a nuclear capability. My predecessor, Robin Raphel, worked hard on this. A Congressional amendment, the Brown amendment, did allow some of the restrictions on Pakistan to be loosened.

An important event happened in 1995. The First Lady, Hillary Clinton, went to South Asia. She traveled to India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Her daughter, Chelsea, was with her. She was clearly impressed by the region, and what she had seen and heard. She came back from that trip and, from what I later heard, let the President know that this was a part of the world he ought to pay more attention to, that it was an area of the world with great promise, economic potential, and increasingly democratic.

When I arrived in '97, a National Security Council review of our policy towards South Asia was underway. It resulted in a directive approved by the President to establish a policy of "greater engagement" with South Asia. There were several 'baskets' of issues that would be pursued – economic, political, military - but the main point was that the U.S. would be more involved with the region and that would include high level visits by U.S. officials, including the President, something that had not happened for a very long time. I came in just as this policy was in its final stages and being agreed to. I would be, as the regional assistant secretary, the beneficiary of this.

One other thing, about high level visits. President Clinton wanted to go to India and Pakistan for their 50th anniversary of independence, which took place in 1947. The last presidential visit to the region had been Jimmy Carter's in 1978, to India. I knew because I was on that trip, probably the only person in the Clinton administration that had been. The last visit of a secretary of state was George Shultz in 1983. This was a neglected region! A new team had come in. We were given our marching orders.

Q: From Madeleine Albright, how did she deal with you and what was she telling you she wanted?

INDERFURTH: We had developed a very good working relationship in New York - one that was based on a high degree of confidence that she had in me to do my job. We did not need to communicate on a daily basis to ensure that was being done. We continued to work on this basis once she took up 'residence' on the 7th floor at State.

One of our first talks was the need to pursue this policy of "greater engagement" with South Asia. Madeleine said that she was prepared to travel to the region as soon as I thought it was appropriate and needed. I started thinking about at the end of 1997. Remember we had hoped the President would be going there for the 50th Independence Day celebrations in August, but the Indian government fell, so the President decided to hold off until a new government was formed. This wasn't the last time his intention to travel there was interrupted by events, including the nuclear tests in May of 1998 and, later, another Indian national election. You'll see a pattern here. He kept wanting to go,

but some event or another prevented that. He finally made it to the region in March 2000.

I took my first trip there as assistant secretary in September of '97. It was meant to send a signal to the region – and especially the Indian government – that we were going to be a lot more active in President Clinton's second term. The President wanted this, so did the new Secretary of State and her team which included Tom Pickering as Under Secretary and me. That message came through. Of all the headlines during my many trips to the region, the one I am most pleased with was one in "The Hindu," one of India's major national newspapers. The front page article had the headline "Inderfurth projects new approach to South Asia," and showed a smiling photograph of me and Foreign Secretary Raghunath emerging from our first meeting at South Block. The article reported that some of my "utterances" during our exchange had included "A new basis" for U.S.-Indian relations, "looking into the future" and "sustained interaction." There were other similar headlines, including one that said, "New U.S. official leaves positive image in Delhi."

Basically my message on that first trip to New Delhi was, "Look, we realize that our two countries have not had the best of relations over the years. We have been – as Dennis Kux has said in his excellent book on the history of U.S.-India relations – 'Estranged Democracies.' President Clinton is determined to put our relations on a sounder footing. The world is changing. So should our relations." That message was well received. Over the next two and a half years, we had a number of problems to deal with – including the nuclear tests and the imposition of sanctions – but I think we were able to hang onto that basis message - that we were serious about trying to establish a new relationship, one that would be sustainable, that would be in both of our interests, and one that would be characterized by mutual respect rather than the lecturing and moralizing that had unfortunately been the nature of our relationship for a very long time.

Q: When you think of the Americans and the Indians. We're moralizing both people.

INDERFURTH: We are. It was important to try to start listening to each other as opposed to simply speaking at each other. I think we did that. Indeed I tried to be more respectful in all my meetings in South Asia, not just with the Indians.
After I finished my meetings in Delhi, I went to Pakistan and met with Prime Minister Sharif, who was just returning to office. I told him I was encouraged about the meeting that he had recently had with his Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Gujral. We – mainly he - also spoke about the need to resolve a longstanding irritant in U.S.-Pakistani relations relating to F-16 fighter planes. The Pakistani government had purchased about 30 of these for around $500 million just at the time the U.S. imposed nuclear-related sanctions on Pakistan – the so-called Pressler amendment – in 1990. So, by law, we could not deliver the F-16s to Pakistan. Nor did we return their money, since we had already sent it on to the aircraft manufacturer. Rightly, the Pakistanis were a little upset about this!

Q: I've never understood this. This has happened a number of times.

INDERFURTH: It is because it's a legal requirement that once you have imposed sanctions, nothing is then delivered or returned to the country you have imposed sanctions on. But this was in 1990 and they were not happy about this. They were out their planes and almost half a billion dollars. President Clinton, much to his credit, said in his very first meeting with Sharif's predecessor, Benazir Bhutto, that "This isn't fair." We were able to get it resolved before we left office.

After Pakistan on that first trip I went to Bangladesh, another country in the region that we wanted to try to build our relations. It is certainly not the "international basket case" that Henry Kissinger said it was in 1971, and for which they have never forgiven him!

Q: It's a term that comes up in the Foreign Service.

INDERFURTH: But it's no "basket case," even though it has lots of problems. Bangladesh is now a country that is struggling to establish its democracy. But it has also found that it has economic resources, including natural gas, which has the potential for bringing Bangladesh into the middle income nations. It is also a country that has a very commendable record on family planning. It's dealing with issues such as child labor in ways that others in the region are not. So, we determined early on that Bangladesh would be a country that we would try to include and highlight in our new policy of engagement policy toward the region. When the President traveled to South Asia in March of 2000, we included a brief visit to Dacca. It was the first ever visit by an American president there. But that first trip for me in September, '97, which also included Nepal and Sri Lanka, just underscored the fact that this was going to be a great assignment.

Upon getting back, I met with Secretary Albright, reported on the trip, and said, "Now it's time for you to go." She said, "When?" We scheduled her trip for November.

Q: There are a few longrunning disputes – Northern Ireland, Israel-Palestine, China-Taiwan, Greece-Turkey. Did we see any role for us in this other major issue, Kashmir?

INDERFURTH: During that same initial period, in the fall of 1997, President Clinton agreed to meet both Prime Minister Gujral and Prime Minister Sharif at the opening of the UN General Assembly in New York. This was another major signal of a new policy of engagement. He had not done that with Indian or Pakistani leaders in his previous four trips to New York. In the meeting with PM Gujral, he made it very clear that we had missed too many opportunities in the past to develop a better relationship with India. He did not want to see any such opportunities pass by again. As we were waiting for PM Sharif to arrive at the U.S. Mission for our next meeting, the President was sort of musing and said, "There are some intractable problems around the world" and he mentioned Northern Ireland, Greece and Turkey, the Balkans, the Middle East, and India and Pakistan and Kashmir. "In almost all of these," he said, "there's been some movement, but not with India and Pakistan and their dispute over Kashmir. I really would like to see what I can do."

Clinton also recognized that the U.S. could not simply step in and mediate. The Indian

Government had always been very opposed to outside intervention. Indeed, the two countries themselves had agreed in the 1972 Simla accord, as well as at Lahore in 1999, that they had to work out their differences bilaterally. Of course, the Pakistanis always wanted to get the international community involved, especially the U.S., to 'even the sides' with their much larger neighbor. The President was very attentive to the nuances here, but he did say that he would try to do what he could quietly in meetings like we had in New York to encourage the process to go forward. That continued throughout his second term including when he took his trip in March of 2000 and he said very openly in both India and in Pakistan that the U.S. would play whatever role it could to help the parties resolve their differences peacefully.

Q: What was your impression both when you arrived and later about the effectiveness of the Indian embassy to operate within our system and with the Pakistani embassy to operate within our system? Some embassies understand about the importance of Congress and how to walk the halls of Congress, how to play the media. Others go to the State Department and think that's going to take care of things.

INDERFURTH: Of the two, the Indian embassy had certain advantages in working on Capitol Hill, beginning with the India Caucus on the House side. It now has about 120 members. That size, which is one of the biggest caucuses in the House, very much relates to the fact that the Indian-American community in this country is now 1.5 million and growing. That community is very successful - and increasingly politically active. Indian-Americans are now making their views known on Capitol Hill and members are listening and responding. This is a longstanding American tradition. Ethnic communities start making their voices heard.

The Pakistani-American community is smaller and less organized. But that does not mean Pakistan itself has not been a factor on Capitol Hill. During the period of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, when Pakistan was a frontline state, it got almost everything it wanted on the Hill. Pakistan had a lot of powerful friends there, like Congressman Charlie Wilson of Texas. But once that war was over, the U.S. stopping thinking about Afghanistan and Pakistan was left holding the bag with a lot of problems – millions of refugees, drugs, guns. At that same time, this was around 1990, we also imposed sanctions on Pakistan for its nuclear activities. So our relations cooled considerably. During the Cold War, Pakistan had often been a close ally. Now the Cold War was over, and our relations changed.

The end of the Cold War also resulted in changes in our relations with India. Now it was no longer an erstwhile ally of Moscow. India was opening up its economy. India was identified as one of the 10 "big emerging markets." American companies were becoming interested. All of this made India more attractive as a partner for the United States. It was also a country with a strong democratic tradition. This had an impact on Capitol Hill.

Both countries, by the way, had very able representatives in Washington. Riaz Khokhar was the Pakistani ambassador when I took office. We were able to work closely on getting the F-16 issue resolved. The Indian embassy had Naresh Chandra, who was a very

experienced Indian official and worked hard on Capitol Hill and in the Executive Branch to see a new page turned in relations between our two countries. He was also able to see a long-standing goal of the Indian community achieved at the end of his stay in Washington – the unveiling of a wonderful memorial to Gandhi just across from the Indian Embassy on Massachusetts Ave. President Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee took part in the dedication ceremony. I was there with Merrie. It is a great addition Washington. I also came to like Naresh very much.

Q: What happened about the F-16s?

INDERFURTH: Prime Minister Sharif came here for a visit at the end of 1998, an official working visit. The F-16 issue had not been resolved. The statute of limitations on resolving this was running. If Pakistan did not file a suit suing the U.S., it would lose its ability to take this matter to court. So, Ambassador Khokhar informed me that if this were not resolved soon in a satisfactory manner, Pakistan would have to consider legal action. That got the attention of the Justice Department, which started looking at this very seriously. Justice concluded we had a bad case. So they determined it would be best to go ahead and try to settle this, basically out of court. They turned to something called the Judgment Fund, which allows large sums of money to be paid to settle suits. That fund would cover only a portion of the amount we owed Pakistan – a big amount, about $325 million in cash - but we would need to find some way to make up the difference between that and what the Pakistanis had paid. The Pakistanis suggested that we do it in commodities – wheat, soybeans, etc. We were able to do that, over a 2-3 year period.

I believe the Pakistanis handled this whole episode very well. Their lawyers, a U.S. firm, had apparently advised them that they had a good case and could even get interest on the money they had paid and then didn't get back over an almost ten year period. But they didn't do that. They just wanted their money back. It got so bizarre that at one point we were even charging the Pakistanis storage fees for the planes we had refused to deliver to them! They just wanted it resolved. In the end, President Clinton's statement that this wasn't "fair" was the deciding factor. Khokhar and I signed the agreement on December 19, 1998, in my office. When Riaz left Washington for his next assignment to Beijing, I had a small farewell dinner for him and his wife Shahnaz. I gave him an airplane model of an F-16 aircraft. I said, "Now you can take at least one of these home." He loved it.

Q: Let's turn to another big issue: the nuclear issue.

INDERFURTH: That was a big issue. The new Indian government had been formed in March, 1998, with Atal Bihari Vajpayee as Prime Minister. I went to India with UN Ambassador Bill Richardson shortly after the new government took office. Bruce Reidel, my counterpart on the National Security Council staff, was with us. He was an invaluable partner throughout my time at State. We had good meetings, including with the new Prime Minister, and let the Indians know we wanted to move ahead in our relations.

We then went to Pakistan and met with Prime Minister Sharif. He expressed some concerns in his assessment of the new Indian government, said a government led by the

BJP party was likely to be more "aggressive." We then went to Afghanistan, the first trip by senior U.S. officials there in a very long time. We came back and reported to Secretary Albright and others. That was in April. A month later, the new Indian government went ahead with a series of five nuclear tests. We had not been given any advance warning.

Q: Had the subject been raised while you were there?

INDERFURTH: We had urged that the new government continue to exercise nuclear restraint. We received what we took to be expressions of assurances in this regard. Clearly what we had in mind was not exactly what they had in mind. The nuclear tests in May came as a surprise to the U.S. government.

That morning, May 18, 1998, I convened my senior staff meeting at its usual time, 8:40. At 9:00, my special assistant came into the room to say that there was a report on CNN that India had tested nuclear weapons. I asked if my secretary could get Ambassador Celeste on the line in New Delhi. He was not there, but the DCM, Ashley Wills, got on the phone. I said, "Have you heard the CNN report?" He said, "Yes, we've just been given a notice by the Indian government that they have successfully completed a series of nuclear tests." This was a seismic event in more ways than one! It set into motion a whole series of events and activities that dominated our attention for the next year and a half. One of my first efforts was to respond to Capitol Hill. I testified before both the Senate and the House. Sanctions were required under law, by the Glenn Amendment, and the President imposed them on India immediately after the tests. Economic assistance, any military activities, support for international loans for India were all turned off.

We also embarked very quickly to try to persuade Pakistan not to follow suit. President Clinton was on the phone with Prime Minister Sharif on five separate occasions making it very clear that he recognized that Pakistan would be under great pressure to test, but that Pakistan's interests would be better served not to and that if it did not, the U.S. was prepared to respond with a number of important steps in Pakistan, including lifting the Pressler sanctions, resuming economic assistance, and reviving our stagnant military relationship. So, a very attractive package was put together to try to dissuade Pakistan from following suit.

The President and the Secretary directed the Deputy Secretary, Strobe Talbott, to travel to Islamabad to meet with Sharif and try to persuade him not to take that fateful step. I traveled on that trip, as did Bruce. General Anthony Zinni, the CINC [Commander-in-Chief] of the Central Command which covered Pakistan, joined us and provided the transportation. We flew from Andrews to Tampa (Zinni's headquarters) and then flew on his aircraft for 17 hours straight, with two midair refuelings, to Islamabad. We met with PM Sharif and other officials, including the Army Chief of Staff, General Karamat. They listened to us. They did remind us that when Bruce and I had been in Pakistan recently with Bill Richardson they had said, "Don't be too enthusiastic about this government." We had to go to the 'woodshed' on that one. But we made the best case we could that Pakistan should not go ahead with testing, that that was exactly what

India wanted Pakistan to do, thereby imposing U.S. sanctions on both countries. I think there was one more phone call between the President and Sharif and then Pakistan conducted its own series of six nuclear tests. What one does, the other will follow suit. So, Glenn amendment sanctions were now imposed on Pakistan on top of their already existing Pressler sanctions, so they were now doubly sanctioned.

In response to this, the President and Secretary decided to designate Strobe as the U.S. interlocutor with Indian and Pakistan on non-proliferation and security issues, to see if there was some way to bridge our profound differences. A series of meetings were initiated – we called them dialogues – with the Indians, with Jaswant Singh, who became Foreign Minister while these talks were underway, and Shamshad Ahmad, the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan. We had more than ten rounds of these discussions in various locations trying to see if there was some way to sort through our respective concerns, ours about their nuclear and missile programs and non proliferation, theirs about their security 'compulsions.' For the next year and a half we met in Delhi, Islamabad, Washington, Frankfurt, Rome. We met with the Indians and Pakistanis separately.

This was a very intense discussion we had, especially with the Indians, and one that we should have had before. This was the first time that the U.S. government was willing to commit itself to that kind of comprehensive discussion. Our hope was to see both governments agree not to test any further and to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; to negotiate a fissile material cutoff treaty, which was already being discussed in Geneva; to put into place more stringent export controls so that there would be no possibility that their nuclear and missile technology would be exported or there would be any leakage to other countries; and finally to exercise maximum restraint not to deploy their nuclear capabilities. These became known as the "four benchmarks," which flowed from resolutions that had been passed by the UN Security Council after the May tests and the June G-8 meeting in London. A fifth benchmark was to encourage these two countries to address the issues that were dividing them, including Kashmir.

Q: What was the interpretation of our embassy in New Delhi of why this new government took this step?

INDERFURTH: The fact that we did not know of the test was seen by many as an intelligence failure. We spend a lot of money for satellites that are supposed to be watching for things like this. You don't conduct a nuclear test without substantial preparation. The Indians, however, were very skillful at deception, camouflage netting, not communicating about the upcoming test. All of these things were part of making sure that they had total secrecy and they achieved it.

But I will say that there was also a policy failure. The BJP government, in its election manifesto, had spoken about inducting the nuclear option. They never said in black and white, "If we form a government, we will test nuclear weapons," but there was enough in their manifesto, enough in their history of support for India's nuclear weapons program, that this should not have come as an out-of-the-blue surprise. Previous Indian governments had walked up to the decision to test and then backed off. Sometimes we

had known they were thinking of testing and, in at least one case, our ambassador went in and said, "We know what you are about to do and we really think that that would be a bad idea." We didn't have a chance to say that explicitly with the new government of Prime Minister Vajpayee. They made a quick decision as soon as they were in office to test and they did it, and Pakistan responded.

Fortunately, neither government has tested since. Both have said that they will not be the first to resume testing. Pakistan has said that it is prepared to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. India appeared to be on the verge of doing so just before the Clinton Administration left office. Now, the new Bush administration says it is opposed to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. So, I'm very concerned that this is going to unravel. We've reached the point where we may have seen an international ban on nuclear testing by all countries. We may now lose that accomplishment.

Q: Did you see during your time... There seem to be two trends which are rather discouraging. One is the growing fundamentalism in Pakistan and a growing nationalism in India.

INDERFURTH: The short answer is yes. Those are two very important developments, one in Pakistan, one in India. But I think that there are other influences there as well which are more encouraging.

On the Pakistan side, the growing influence of Islamic extremists is a concern. The Islamic parties have never shown well in Pakistani elections but they do have a strong voice and an active following. This has been of concern to Pakistani leaders, whether it be Nawaz Sharif or to General Musharraf, who overthrew Sharif's civilian government in October of 1999, another big event that occurred when I was Assistant Secretary.

On the Indian side, there has been a growing Hindu nationalist movement. That has been part of Indian politics from the very beginning. The BJP party of Prime Minister Vajpayee has its roots in organizations like the RSS, a militant Hindu group. One of its members assassinated Gandhi because he believed he was too pro-Muslim. There are clearly hardliners within the BJP who espouse a number of Hindu nationalist policies and practices. But I believe that the dominant political environment in India is still one that is secular, still one that is trying to have a country that is diverse, that is tolerant, that is democratic. But there are forces at work in both India and Pakistan that are of concern. At this point, the greatest concern is with Pakistan because of the instability that is there, the fact that democracy has never been firmly rooted in Pakistan, and the destabilizing impact events in Afghanistan are having on that country.

Q: What about this war going on in Kashmir, where the Pakistanis are saying they're not supporting the Kashmiri freedom fighters? Did the Indians put a lot of troops in there? Were we involved in this?

INDERFURTH: Kashmir will have to be resolved at some point if there is ever going to be any long-term stability in the region. Matters did get worse and very dangerous at one

point during the Clinton administration, during the second term, when a small war was fought in Kargil, a sector of Kashmir in the Himalayas.

Despite their denials, Pakistan is supporting what they call 'freedom fighters' in Kashmir and India calls 'terrorists.' India also has a very large and sometimes very heavy handed security presence in Kashmir. But this dispute is not just about territory. It is about their national identities and their respective visions of what they represent. India as a secular nation says that Kashmir is a part of India, even though it has a Muslim majority. India refuses as a nation to be defined by religion. Pakistan takes a diametrically opposed view. Because of the majority Muslim population, it says Kashmir should be a part of Pakistan. From the very beginning of this conflict, going back to 1947 and partition, Pakistan has done everything it can to see Kashmir become a part of Pakistan or to have a referendum, which the early UN Security Council resolutions called for. I believe those resolutions have now been overtaken as a result of the events of the past couple of decades, including the Simla agreement in 1972 and the Lahore Declaration in 1999. But, again, this isn't just about territory. It goes to the real essence of both countries and that's why it is so terribly difficult to resolve.

As I think I've mentioned, the U.S. has not been able to step in as a mediator because it has not been asked to by both sides, only by one – Pakistan. But President Clinton did take a real interest in this and wanted to be involved in whatever way he could. On his trip in March 2002 to India and Pakistan, he spoke very publicly about what he said were the "four Rs," restraint by both sides, respect for the Line of Control which divides the two parts of Kashmir, renunciation of violence (especially the terrorist attacks taking place in Kashmir), and a renewal of the Indo-Pakistan dialogue. The hope was that these "four Rs" would lead to a fifth – a resolution of the longstanding conflict.

In just a few days from now we will see, finally, another high level meeting between the two countries, with Prime Minister Vajpayee and General Musharraf, who has just recently become President Musharraf, in Agra. Maybe they will be able to regenerate that "small ripple of hope" that I mentioned took place when I came into office in 1997, when Prime Ministers Sharif and Gujral met in the Maldives and shook hands. Bold steps are needed.

Q: How did the Clinton trip go? What did Clinton come back with and what do you think the impact was?

INDERFURTH: Before discussing the trip, could I mention another important promising moment that occurred during the time I was Assistant Secretary?

This took place in February of '98. PM Vajpayee traveled by special bus to Lahore, Pakistan, to meet PM Sharif. They signed a very far reaching document, the Lahore Declaration, which committed them to address all the tough issues in their relationship, including Kashmir and nuclear confidence building measures. Again, this was another one of these moments where it looked like the two countries were beginning to look to the future and not to the past. But that was followed just a few months later, in May, by

this Kargil crisis when Pakistani-backed forces slipped across the Line of Control to seize some positions left my Indian forces during the winter. Serious fighting took place. Hundreds of insurgents, a lot of them Pakistani for sure, and Indian soldiers died. We went on record early on during the crisis to call for Pakistan to take steps to see those insurgents come back across the LOC. They didn't and the fighting grew worse and we were very concerned that through accident or miscalculation or intention they could be moving toward a full blown war. We were also very aware of the possibility that this could become a nuclear crisis as well.

In early July President Clinton took a phone call from Prime Minister Sharif saying he had to come to Washington to see him. The President said, "You can come, but if you do, you know what I'm going to ask you to do: to take those steps that will be necessary to bring this crisis to an end." Sharif and the President met on July 4 at Blair House, across the street from the White House. I was a part of the small U.S. team that was with the President, along with Sandy Berger, Strobe Talbott and Bruce Riedel. At the end of the day, Sharif agreed to go back to Pakistan and give the appropriate instructions, including to his Army Chief of Staff, General Musharraf, to get those insurgents back. Already the Indian forces were beginning to retake the positions they had lost, but the President's agreement with Sharif did accelerate that process, and certainly saved lives and prevented the possibility that the crisis would take a worse turn and escalate. What Sharif got in return was a commitment from President Clinton to take a "personal interest" in encouraging the parties to resume and intensify their efforts to address their differences, which also included the Kashmir issue.

Unfortunately, after the Kargil crisis was over, the domestic situation in Pakistan went downhill fast. Prime Minister Sharif had already been putting pressure on a number of sectors of society, including the Parliament and the press. In October he made a move against the Army, specifically General Musharraf as he was returning from a visit to Sri Lanka. The military moved in – Sharif was out and Musharraf took power. Once again the Army had stepped in to 'clean up the mess' of a civilian government. Half of Pakistan's fifty year plus history has been under military rule. India was not pleased to see the military leader who had been behind the Kargil crisis now in charge and, not surprisingly, relations between the two countries went into the deep freeze. That is basically where things have been until now, almost two years later. That's why the upcoming meeting between Vajpayee and Musharraf in Agra is important. The two sides will be on speaking terms again.

Now, going back to President Clinton's trip. Even after the takeover in Pakistan, he continued to say that he wanted to travel to the region. The decision was finally taken that he would go in early 2000, that he would go to India for an extended visit, he would go to Bangladesh for a first-ever presidential visit, and despite the very strong objection of the Secret Service because of security concerns, the President said that he would also travel for a brief meeting with General Musharraf in Islamabad.

Q: How did it go?

INDERFURTH: The trip to India was a smashing success and not just from the American perspective, but from the Indian perspective. We had several meetings with the President before we went there, including with a number of South Asian experts in the Cabinet Room. The President really wanted to get as much information as he could from the people that knew the region and the people the best – not just facts and figures but insights and a sense of the sensitivities of those that he was dealing with. Clinton had a great intellectual curiosity. He absorbed information. He also knew that we had, over many years, rubbed the Indians the wrong way because of the way we approached them.

When we got to Delhi in March, the President was very well received. He gave a major speech to a joint session of the Indian Parliament that I will never forget. Here was an American president talking respectfully to the Indian audience about not only all the great possibilities we now had to establish a strong relationship for the future, but also about the differences we had, including over nuclear matters. But he did all this in a positive way - he used all of his considerable charm and his ability to say difficult things in the right way. At the end of his speech to the parliament, which is known for being at times raucous and sometimes highly critical of the United States, there was this great ovation. Members were actually jumping over tables to have a chance to shake his hand. No one could quite believe it!

We spent a total of five days in India, traveling around the country, including to Hyderabad, which is one of their major IT [information technology] centers. He went to Jaipur. He went to Agra. Obviously, one would have to go there for the Taj Mahal, but he also used it to talk about environmental issues. The Indian press reviews were really extraordinary and the glow of that trip continued. The President invited Prime Minister Vajpayee to come to Washington, which he did just a few months later in September. There had been some question about whether to go ahead with this trip since we were already into our presidential campaign, but the Indian government decided wisely that it was very important to solidify this new relationship and do it with the President who had already demonstrated his commitment to making it work.

The visit to Pakistan was of a different order. It was only a five hour visit. Security was very tight and the Secret Service had decided some extraordinary measures to protect the President were in order. We were flying out of Bombay [Mumbai] to Islamabad. We did not take Air Force One, the President's big 747. Instead, we went out on the tarmac and the President headed first to a military transport plane and then he went to another one - an unmarked, small executive jet. A Secret Service agent that had his height and build and grey hair got on an identical plane next to it with the identification "United States of America." I was on the small plane with the President along with Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, Joe Lockhart, the press secretary, John Podesta, the chief of staff, and Bruce Riedel. We briefed him on the short flight, although part of the time he was asleep – clearly he was not too worried about all this! When the other plane marked "United States of America" arrived in Islamabad, it pulled up to a reviewing stand, stopped, and then taxied away. We then landed with the President. All of this was done to make certain that there was not something waiting for the President either in the air or on the ground.

But Clinton was determined to go to Pakistan, despite the security concerns, because he wanted to make it clear that we have had a longstanding relationship with that country, we have been allies, and we were not about to turn our back on Pakistan even through we had a number of fundamental concerns – like the recent military takeover, Pakistan's support for the Taliban in Afghanistan, the nuclear issues. The President met with General Musharraf and he gave a very important speech to the Pakistani people on nationwide television. Then we departed with the hope of maintaining a relationship and finding something to work with.

Q: What about trade with India? India is extremely protectionist? Were you able to pry open the doors?

INDERFURTH: That is going to be a long term effort. India is taking steps to open up its economy for direct foreign investment and trade. It has made substantial progress since the early 1990s. But the level of trade is still way below what it should be. Just compare this to where we are with China and you'll see how far India has to go. But it has recently announced the removal of further restrictions. Information technology is probably the most promising point of economic contact between the two countries. I'm convinced that this is an economic relationship that will find itself and fulfill its potential over time, but it's going to take more patience.

Q: Afghanistan?

INDERFURTH: Afghanistan continues to be one of the great tragedies of the world today. There's been over two decades of occupation and fighting, first with the Soviet invasion, then the civil war after the Soviets left in 1989, and now with the Taliban. There appeared to be a small chance for some progress to end the fighting in Afghanistan at the time I went there with UN Ambassador Bill Richardson in April 1998. Bruce Riedel was with us, so was Tom Simons, our Ambassador to Pakistan, and Andrea Mitchell of NBC News. We went to Kabul on a small UN jet. We met with the Taliban for several hours. Mullah Rabbani, the number two at that time in the Taliban, was their top person in the talks. We then flew to a city in the north, Sheberghan, to meet with the leaders of the Northern Alliance, including General Dostum and former Afghan President Rabbani. There was a Washington Post headline after that visit saying that "The U.S. Wins Promise of Peace Talks in Afghanistan." I think that promise lasted about a day! We were just one of many who tried and failed. At some point peace will prevail in Afghanistan, but it's going to take more time. Tragically, Afghanistan has become a focus for international terrorism with Osama Bin Laden there and one of the world's centers for the drug trade. It also continues to suffer from a humanitarian crisis because of a drought that's now in its third year and an economy that is not a functioning economy at all. These are all great concerns and it's one of the areas of South Asia which does require more attention from the U.S. government.

Q: During the time you were there, was there anything much we could do with Afghanistan?

INDERFURTH: What we could and did do was to provide humanitarian assistance - $100 million in each of the last two years I was in office, making us the largest international donor there for food and medical assistance and help with clearing landmines. We also worked with other countries, including the Russians (I traveled to Moscow on several occasions and Russian officials came to Washington), to coordinate our approach on Afghanistan. We went to the UN Security Council and obtained two resolutions demanding that the Taliban expel Bin Laden so that he could be brought to justice and to close down terrorist training camps in the country. Sanctions were imposed. They were targeted on the Taliban and every effort was made to see that these sanctions did not make matters worse for the Afghan people. But to date, Mullah Omar and his regime have not changed course. It's very hard to understand how to get through to such 'true believers.' The effort continues to be made and should be made to speak with them, but so far, we simply haven't gotten on the right frequency.

Q: What was the considered opinion of people both inside and outside government when looking at the Taliban? Did they see this as a temporary thing or as having longer lasting consequences?
INDERFURTH: I think that you could find several points of view on that. We have an excellent Afghan expert in the State Department, Professor Marvin Weinbaum, who has said – and I would like to believe that he is right – that the Taliban represents a transitional period in Afghanistan recent history, that the repressive regime they represent is not sustainable over time, that Afghans are too independent, and that eventually Afghans will remove the Taliban. The question is, how long will that take and what will follow? There, I think we have no answers.

Q: How about the teardrop, India, Sri Lanka? Did that raise much of a problem?

INDERFURTH: The one event that continues to define the country is the war between the government and the LTTE, the Tamil Tigers. The conflict there is now going on 17 years. Thousands of people have been killed, thousands more displaced. There have been horrific examples of terrorism, including suicide bombers. Secretary Albright designated the LTTE a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) soon after taking office so that there would be no mistaking our view on the nature of the Tamil Tigers and their tactics. At the same time, we tried to encourage the government and the main opposition party to establish some process to end this peacefully. I traveled to Colombo three times as Assistant Secretary and said that the U.S. would be willing to do what we could as one of many concerned nations, including India which has a strong interest in Sri Lanka because of its own Tamil population, to support a negotiated end to the conflict - one that would maintain Sri Lanka's territorial integrity. We don't support creating an independent Tamil state and dividing up the country.

So far, there has been no real movement toward ending that conflict, although the Norwegians have now undertaken a mediation effort that we support. The tragedy of Sri Lanka is that it is probably the most advanced of any South Asia country in terms of literacy and other social and economic indicators. It is a country with great potential, but it is being bled by this war. Hopefully one day this will come to an end and the U.S. can

help in this process.

Q: Madeleine Albright from the point of many and particularly of those in the Foreign Service came on board as Secretary of State with great... People really looked forward to it. When she left, it had not been a happy relationship. It was by some accounts the management. How did you find this?

INDERFURTH: Let me come at your question this way. One of her highest priorities when she took office was to try to reverse the downward trend in funding and resources for the Department. She felt very strongly that the Department and its embassies abroad are America's 'first line of defense,' and that we were being shortchanged by Congress. She launched a charm offensive with the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms. Something of an odd couple, you might say, but there you have it. She wanted to get him more on the side of the Foreign Service and the State Department, as opposed to being an obstructionist, "Senator No" as he was known. At a softball game between State and Helms' office, the secretary presented the senator with a t-shirt saying, "Someone at the State Department Loves Me." She traveled to Wingate College in North Carolina, Helms' alma mater, to speak with the senator at her side. She put an enormous of time into this effort, one that was so critically important to the building and to the Foreign Service. This was one area that she tried to make a real difference as head of the Department, and she got results. The downward slide in funding was stopped and a slight increase took its place. Not enough, but at least it was now moving in the right direction.

So that was an important contribution that I think Madeleine Albright made during her tenure at the Department. But I would like to return, again, to what I consider will be her greatest contribution as Secretary of State (and earlier as UN Ambassador), namely her determined, dogged effort to see the United States take a stand – and use force if necessary - about what was taking place in the former Yugoslavia, first in Bosnia and then later in Kosovo. This was a primary focus of hers throughout her eight years in the Clinton Administration. As much as being the first woman Secretary of State, I think this will be her lasting legacy. Recently I heard that she is considered to be the "Mother" of the UN War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which is now trying Milosevic at The Hague. That is a well deserved compliment!

Q: You haven't been out very long. What are you pointed towards?

INDERFURTH: There is no question that I am pointed towards a continuing involvement in international affairs, in whatever capacity is available to me. I must say that if the opportunity to serve in government again were there, I would love to do it. I think there is no finer calling than public service, and none more interesting. These four years as Assistant Secretary and the previous four at the UN were the high point of my professional career. I feel very privileged. I'm very pleased that I had these appointments and was able to be associated with so many people I liked and respected in the State Department, the National Security Council, the Washington policy community, and at the United Nations. Whether it be through teaching at the Elliott School at George Washington University, which I am doing; or working with the UN, which I'm now

doing on Afghanistan on Track II diplomacy; or working on nuclear threat reduction, which is a project that I've been involved in for several months; or serving on the board of the Landmine Survivors Network, which I recently joined, I'm keeping up my interest and focus on international affairs. You move in life through different phases and different incarnations and this is a new one for me. And I am enjoying it – and hopefully making some contribution.

Q: Great. Thank you very much.

End of interview