The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

F. ALLEN (TEX) HARRIS

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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INTERVIEW

Q: This is an interview with F. Allen Harris, known by all as Tex Harris, and the interview is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, and I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy. Tex, let's start off with when and where were you born, and tell me something about your family.

HARRIS: I was born in Glendale, California, on May 13, 1938. I am sixty-one years of age as we are recording this today and have retired from the Foreign Service eight weeks ago. I am pleased to note for the record that I was conceived in the great state of Texas, where my father was in the oil business in a place called Aransas Pass, which is just outside of Corpus Christi, and those were solid days. He was doing rather well, and he had a number of racehorses, and he took them to California for the racing season with my lovely, pregnant mother, Helen. My dad's name was Murray. By the way, my first name is Franklyn with a "y," not an "I" because that was the Democratic spelling and the "y" was a family name, more of a Republican spelling. I was born in California by an accident and did not spend any time [there]. I grew up most of my life in Dallas, Texas, where I went to public schools and became very much involved in basketball. I'm very tall. I'm about six feet, seven inches and was an all-state basketball player.

Q: Okay, let's go back again. Tell me about the background of your father.

HARRIS: My father was born in Russia in 1902. He came to the United States in about 1904. He was Jewish. He came from a small village in what was called Russia Poland, and there was a lot of persecution of the people. The family fled to Germany, and from Germany they came to the United States. His given name was Shlimka Simselowitz, and when he applied as a young man for papers to work in the Merchant Marine, they asked him what his name was and the fellow was very puzzled, and so he used the name that my grandfather had been called, which was Herr S, and that became the family name.

Q: H-E-R-R and then S-period.

HARRIS: Yes, capital S, Herr S., Mr. S., because his last name was so long, and that then became anglicized as Harris. That's how the name got here.

Q: What about your grandparents on your father's side? What did they do? It's very interesting the way they came in 1904 over to the States.

HARRIS: My grandfather was a carpenter, but not really a carpenter; he was a cabinetmaker, and he and his brother, who was a weaver of wrought iron bars, would make banks' and other enclosed areas' screens similar to what you have today only they're plexiglass and bulletproof. In those days they had a business in New York City in which, for banks and other places that wanted certain levels of security, they would put in high counters and then my uncle would put in these wire mesh screens to protect the cash or jewelry or other things that were behind the barriers.

Q: I refer anyone who's doing this to look at the movies of the 1930s, and they will see this type of construction very much involved in things involving bank robberies or movies around the financial business.

HARRIS: And my grandmother, Cecilia, was a very talented seamstress and made clothes for ladies.

Q: What was her background?

HARRIS: She was a dressmaker. I don't know. I know the uncles, but I really did not ever engage in conversations. They came from an artisan class of folks in the Jewish community, were very orthodox, prayed every day. My grandfather lived in Brooklyn, in an area of Brooklyn called Bensonhurst, and he would go to the synagogue each and every day and pray with great regularity, and this was a defining moment. He suffered very badly from asthma, which was aggravated because he built things not with nails but with glue, and so everything he built was done in the traditional cabinetmaker's style. He glued everything together, which was not good for his fragile lungs.

Q: How did your father get educated, and he moved into doing what?

HARRIS: My father, I think, left school at an early age, I think in the eighth grade or something like that, but absolutely had an incredible mind, had the ability to do numeric calculations in his head, large numbers, had a great recall, great memory, would remember everything that was told to him, but was very reserved and very quiet and very focused on outcomes. He was in a series of businesses throughout his life in different parts of the United States and always was an entrepreneur looking for new ventures and moved forward. Some of them were very successful; others were very unsuccessful. He had a kind of a boom-and-bust life.

Q: I was going to say, it sounds like an up-and-down type life.

HARRIS: It was, very much. He had businesses that were extraordinarily successful and he'd have closets filled with tailored suits, and then he'd have other times when he was very poor and had to go around and ask friends for loans of a few thousand dollars to get him through the month. It was a tough time, but he enjoyed his friends and his associates

in New York and across the United States and loved to yarn, loved to talk and listen to storytellers. This was the kind of tradition of his friends, sitting around and talking. Some of them were wonderful Damon Runyon New York characters who had very rich lives and experience, and it was an interesting life.

Q: How about your mother?

HARRIS: My mother was born in Clifton, New Jersey. Her family immigrated to the United States in the early part of the century, sometime around 1904, ’5, ’6, something in that period. They came from Hungary and were Roman Catholics, devout Catholics, and lived near the Czech border. My maternal grandfather died very early, and he was a blacksmith and a metal worker, but my grandmother, whom I do not remember—I was in her arms, but I don’t remember her—she was a linguist. Actually all the relatives spoke a number of languages, but she spoke six or seven languages, just part of growing up in that area and having lived in different areas of Eastern Europe. She spoke some of them better than others, but she was a gifted linguist.

Q: What about your mother’s education?

HARRIS: My mother graduated from high school and then went on to business school and began work as a secretary working in the garment business, the rag trade, in New York City. She was a very attractive lady and very vivacious, and then that led to modeling—very commercial modeling, not the high-fashion runway modeling that one envisions but more of the modeling for trade shows and other things, ready-to-wear kinds of things. Then she traveled around the United States as a sales representative for the first static-free slip, so her great adventure in America was these long trips on the train, traveling around and demonstrating the static-free slip.

Q: You might explain why static-free was considered quite an innovation.

HARRIS: Well, the earlier slips were made of silk or something and they produced a lot of static, which means your dress would cling to you. These new inventions of some new synthetic material reduced that, and it was an innovation in its time.

Q: Your father—I forgot to ask about his education.

HARRIS: My father just graduated from primary school and that was it—period. As he said, he was educated in the school of life.

Q: Well, now, with your parents, particularly your mother, being in the clothing trade, was your family at all involved, particularly your father coming out of the Jewish community, in the early ’30s and before that, in the socialist trade thing?

HARRIS: No, my parents were generally very apolitical. I cannot recall many conversations about politics in the family. They were not involved in politics. My dad was very interested in sports. My mother was very interested in fashion and was

interested in show business, the theater, and things like that. They were very dedicated to me as being a precocious child. My mother would read to me, not bedtime stories but the New York Times, when I was growing up as a young kid. So I'd sit there and listen to her read the New York Times aloud to me for my edification and her edification.

Q: Your father, with his mathematical ability and his taking chances, did he get into gambling? You mentioned horse racing.

HARRIS: Yes, he liked to gamble, and he liked to win, but he was extremely mathematical in terms of selecting odds and would lay out the various odds and find bargains, as it were. It wasn't as much, for him, gambling as it was looking at the various odds and things like that and laying those things out. He was also a great lover of spas. In my youth my parents divorced when I was fairly young, when I was six, and my mother remarried a fellow by the name of Sadler in Dallas, Texas, and moved to Texas and took me with her. The divorce settlement had me going to school for nine months with my mother and spending the summer with my dad. So I had a wonderful split life, as it were. In the school year I was a barefoot schoolboy in Dallas, Texas, growing up in a town of 300,000–400,000 people.

Q: You were saying you were going to spas. Where?

HARRIS: We would go to different spas. My father at an early age was once on a transcontinental train, and I think in Ogden, Utah, he got off the train—and those old steam locomotives, when they came to a stop sometimes they would shudder—and as he was getting off they put a big metal box, because at many stations the stairs did not match the platform so they had these large metal boxes that they'd place so that the passengers would step onto the metal box and then the next step would be down onto the platform. Well, as he was in the process of stepping between the train and metal box, the train shuddered, and he fell and broke his leg rather badly. So at the spas he would take the waters—his legs and his toes were paralyzed—and at the end of two weeks of taking the waters, he could move his toes and walk a little bit better and felt a lot better. We went to Hot Springs, Arkansas, a number of times and stayed at the old Arlington Hotel with the wonderful silver service and the wonderful food and great hikes. And then also we went to Saratoga, and we stayed I remember at the Grand Union Hotel, which had a spot in the bar where Ulysses S. Grant got drunk on many occasions, and they had wonderful steam elevators with ropes in them and very strong men running these elevators. When they would come to your floor, the men would grab the rope, which was really about the size of a three-inch pipe, and hold it, and sometimes they missed the floor by five or six inches and then they'd want to start the elevator up to move it up those six inches. We'd always say, "No, no, we'll walk up the step." But those were great joys, and we enjoyed Saratoga. We'd go for races many, many years and take baths, and I'd go to the track and it was great. When my dad was flush, he would always own a horse or two and enjoyed very much going out early in the morning and watching them exercise. I was just the smart little kid who could perform amazing feats of memory and other things like that to entertain my father and his pals.

Q: Well now, let's go to schooling. Your basic schooling was in Dallas. Is that right?

HARRIS: Yes.

Q: What schools were you going to?

HARRIS: We lived in a number of homes in Dallas. As the family became more successful, as the Sadler family became more successful, we kept moving up to larger and more comfortable abodes. The first house we had was in a place called Casa Linda in east Dallas, which was then—this is forty years ago, no, fifty years ago—a kind of growing area of east Dallas, and I went to Rhinehart Elementary School and was the founder and first editor of the Rhinehart Reader, which was a mimeographed newspaper. That was really my first venture. When I was involved in something, I always tried to do something extra. So I was the editor and I had reporters. We didn't have photographers, but we could sketch, we did little sketches and things like that. We published once every week and had great support, great fun, and great prestige because we had a newspaper. Mr. Allen, who was the principal and later went on to be the number-two person in the Dallas Independent School District, was a wonderful principal, and it was a great experience. Played football, played basketball, we played in the Weed Bowl. My mother insisted that I wear shoes to school, but as soon as I got out of sight of the house I would hide them under a bush and go to school barefooted like everybody else, because I did not want to be the funny kid.

Q: Was the area that poor, or they just didn't wear shoes?

HARRIS: Just didn't wear shoes. It was just, I guess, a fad. If we did wear shoes, we wore just tennis shoes and blue jeans and t-shirts. It was a school uniform. But in the summertime it was fashionable not to wear shoes, so we'd hide our shoes, and when I came home I'd dutifully put them on. I remember playing football—we lived fairly close to the school, within a ten- or fifteen-minute walk—and coming home and being so tired. I played tackle both ways, and this was pee-wee football . But playing for an hour or an hour and a half, I'd come home and just lie in the den under the fan and go to sleep in my full pads and cleats.

Q: Let's still talk about elementary school, reading, the academic side. What grabbed you?

HARRIS: Well, I was an avid reader. I just somehow got into the reading habit. I just enjoyed books, and I would identify an author and then I would read everything I could get my hands on by that particular author. I generally would read a book every day, and that was just my custom. At times it was tough because, especially in elementary school, the material was fairly easy, and if the teacher was teaching it wrong, I would sometimes prompt her, which did not make me a [favorite] of some of the teachers. That was a little tough. But if I was interested in something, I would just read about it and just read into it. I did that consistently through elementary school, through junior high school, until I started playing basketball in high school. We'll come to that later, but that really was a

change in my life, because a lot of those, that afternoon time coming back from school when I would in past years sit down in my wonderful easy chair that I had, which I finally just wore out, and read a book. I'd just sit down for two or two and a half hours and read a book. Then I would get up, have dinner, and then I'd do my homework in the evening, and that was my life.

Q: What about at home with your mother? Was there dinner table conversation? Was it the world around you, or was it Texas, or was it local stuff? What were you talking about?

HARRIS: Really just local stuff, things going on at the church, neighborhood things, family things, not really a discussion of the world or world affairs at all. Now, that was the Dallas world, that was nine months a year. Then all of a sudden I got on an airplane, a DC-3 in those days, and I flew. I remember once getting lost in the Washington airport. We had a long layover, about forty-five minutes, so I wandered back into the bowels of what was then National Airport and somehow got back there where the Weather Bureau was and the radars and everything like that. I just had a wonderful time, and all of a sudden on the public address system came, "Will Mr. Harris please report to his airplane." I had forgotten what time it was. But with my father, I was involved in an adult kind of—calling it a café society is too fancy. For example, my father would go one night a week or two nights a week and would take me along to restaurants like Lindy's or Gallagher's or other watering holes in New York City. I was just a little, smart, skinny kid who would sit there, and here were people talking about their experiences in World War I, about the politics, about sports, great stories, great fights and debates among these gentlemen, and it was an all-male group. Occasionally some wives or girlfriends would be brought along, but it was great, great fun and a very different environment and very urbane, sophisticated, New York thing with some real Damon Runyon kinds of characters thrown into the mix. I remember we'd stay out very late and my father would generally wait. For example, if we were out on a Saturday night at one of this kind of—it was like dinner in a restaurant with maybe ten people, and people would come and go—and then my father would wait until twelve o'clock or so, until the New York News, New York Mirror, and New York Times were delivered to the newsstand, and then he would go and pick those up, and then we would take those to his apartment, grab a cab and go back and read them until quite late and then sleep in late the next morning. Then I went to camp also. Every summer I would go to some camp, generally fairly nice camps, camps where I had my own quarters and things like that.

Q: I was wondering—were you living a Catholic life in one place and a Jewish life in the other, or did religion play much of a role?

HARRIS: It played an enormous role in my life later on, but it did not play very much of a role in either of my parents' lives. My mother—when she remarried Weldon Sadler, she joined his church, which was the Methodist Church, but down deep she was always a Catholic, so she really missed the ritual and missed the tradition, although she dutifully went to church maybe once a month with Weldon, but it didn't have the same kind of passion. As a youngster I would go almost every week to church with my mother. We

would not eat meat on Friday. The house was run on Catholic principles, whereas in my father's family it was strictly orthodox. There were meat plates and milk plates, and never the twain should meet, and it was very observant. There were candles and prayers and singing and the other kinds of rituals of Jewish life. When I was in Dallas—and I don't know exactly what year——Bailey Curren, who was my best friend, and his family were realtors and they lived in just a great barn of a house on Swiss Avenue in Dallas, which is a big—not an avenue, but an esplanade, it's so broad and so grand. I remember once getting trapped up in a tree. Bailey and I used to climb trees, and we were up in the top of a thirty- or forty-foot tree, so the firemen came and it was too tall for them, so they just talked me down. But a branch underneath me broke, and that meant that the foothold that I had going up I did not have going down, and I was very unhappy about that. But I would go with Bailey, as a sign of our friendship, to Baptist Training Youth, and so I became a Baptist, a very devout Baptist, and became baptized in the White Rock Baptist Church. Later on, through another friend and his family, I became very active in the Scofield Memorial Church, which is to the Bible Church fundamentalist movement in the United States what Saint Peter's is to the Catholics. Sunday services were intensive, deep periods of Bible study; it was a church that was founded on the rock of the book. Thanks for getting all of this stuff; I haven't thought about this stuff in a hundred years. These friends during high school, the Millets, Mr. and Mrs. Millet and David, they would come by and get me, and I would go with them to church, and then as a treat after church and after Sunday school, we would go out to the Highland Park Cafe or Lubey Cafe or Youngblood's. These were the dining spots of my youth in Dallas, these cafeterias. That was living.

Q: How did your mother feel about this? I mean moving to Methodist, but—I mean you're a smart kid—all of a sudden getting into—

HARRIS: She was delighted. It was the Lord's work, and it was good. She was happy.

Q: How about Mr. Sadler? What was he doing?

HARRIS: He was a buyer at the Sanger Department Store when my mother married him, and then that went sour. I don't know whether his relationship with Sanger Brothers went sour or what, but the store had some hard times and so he was let go. His career peaked as that buyer, and then he began to work as a manager in some less prestigious stores. He worked in Sears, ran the National Shirt Shop in Dallas, a big, commercial, low-cost outfit right in downtown Dallas, for many, many years and was a very nice, warm man who was in retail clothing sales. That's what he did.

Q: High school, where'd you go?

HARRIS: Well, junior high school I went to J. L. Long for one year, which was the junior high school, and then we moved, and we moved to Monticello Avenue—closer in to Dallas, not too far from Highland Park and Southern Methodist University—which is now famous because it is a turn off the central expressway in Dallas, so everybody knows Monticello Avenue, and I went to a different school district. So I went from there to Alex

Spence. I don't know who Alex Spence was, but I went to the school there. Then I began to grow. I always was tall, but then I really became tall. I was about six-four, six-five in those days, and I peaked out at exactly two meters, which was six feet six and three-quarter inches. I was just absolutely perfectly two meters, 200 centimeters. I have now shrunk. I'm only 199. But I then went out for the basketball team. Everybody said, "My God, you're so tall. You'd be a natural for it." And I was cut because I was so uncoordinated. I had never played any basketball. I had just spent my youth reading. That's all I did was read. And I was—I guess the parlance today would be—the nerd. I was the smart-ass kid who knew everything, and some kids liked to pick on me because I was Mister Know-It-All, and also I had Yankee roots. I had a number of fights, and I kept winning all these fights. That satiated people's appetite to pick on me. Those were transition years in junior high school, and I went out for the track team and I found out that I could high jump, so I finally made a sport, found a sport that I could do. I was the number two in the City of Dallas junior high school high jumpers. I forget what we jumped but it wasn't very high, maybe five-ten or something like that, not six feet. Six feet was the magic goal. Then I went to high school. I went to North Dallas High School, and I met an incredible guy by the name of John Roland. John Roland was an English teacher, a recent graduate from Southern Methodist University, where he was a track high hurdler and a Southwest Conference top finisher in the high hurdles. He played basketball but was not a starter at SMU, and was among other things one of the track coaches and also the basketball coach. So he took me on as a project, this tall skinny kid, and he said, "If I ever have somebody who can dunk the ball, I will win the state championships for this high school." At that time North Dallas was an inner-city school, which it is today, very much an inner-city high school today with a very diverse—I think it's called the international school because it has twenty-six or twenty-eight countries represented in its student body and very diverse elements. In those days Dallas had expanded housing-wise faster than it could build schools, so it had an enormous draw area, and so we had a lot of kids who came from quite far, were bussed in to go to North Dallas High School, who lived in these very affluent neighborhoods but were bussed in to North Dallas, and we brought in some really excellent athletic talent. My senior year we had a city championship, a regional championship, and we were the state finalists, which means we lost in the state finals for the AAA, the top-level, high school in Texas, and that was great fun. But I spent my three years in high school, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth grades, really playing basketball and doing a little bit of studying along the way. But I had all this background knowledge beforehand. I was number two in my class. I think I was tied for salutatorian. I would have had all A's except I got in a fight with the Spanish teacher, Mr. Tardy. I embarrassed him. He used to, when people would smart up, he would come and step on people's toes. That was his way of having corporal punishment. Of course, I knew that, and so when he came to me I just put my feet up on the railing under my chair, to his frustration and everybody in the class's overt amusement, and he was embarrassed, and so I got a B instead of an A. It was the only B I got in high school. I was crushed, and it meant that I was not the valedictorian, because Bob—and I've forgotten Bob's last name—had all A's. He was a wonderful guy. He actually had a little pocket protector in his pocket. He was a smart guy. Anyway, I was the salutatorian and president of the National Honor Society and an all-state basketball player.

Q: Was Texas in those days as much of a sports-crazy state, particularly at the high school level, as one hears about on the football side?

HARRIS: It absolutely was, but your question is very astute. It was football crazy; it was not basketball crazy at all.

Q: That's Indiana.

HARRIS: That was Indiana then, although now today in Texas—let me stand corrected; that's in the larger cities. In the smaller towns in Texas, basketball was the number-one sport. So I remember in our days of basketball touring when we'd go out to east Texas, and we would play high schools in these small towns who would have just an absolutely gorgeous field house, which the community had built, and the high school basketball stars got free haircuts and things. These towns were little towns like Tara, which is now much bigger, and others. Mount Vernon, we played Mount Vernon. Don Meredith, who was a famous quarterback and a sportscaster for many years and is known to some people—we played against his team. But those small towns, which were not big enough really to have competitive football teams, had very competitive basketball programs, and it was the major entertainment on those winter nights. Everybody in town would come to the football games, and then when the basketball season came, they supported that. In Dallas it was not, it was not as big, but it was growing, and, I guess, Texas basketball at the high school level today is much more on par with football than it was in the '50s.

Q: Social life?

HARRIS: Social life was nonexistent when I was in my read stage, although I was fairly young, and when I began to be a basketball player, we always had lots of girlfriends and everybody wanted to date the skinny center, and so I had some wonderful and great girlfriends and wonderful group of pals. The basketball team were friends, and we would go out. It was just idyllic, it was just idyllic. In order to earn money I got a paper route. My mother said she would not buy me a car, and my father said he would not buy me a car because it would interfere with my studies and would be a distraction. So I went out and got a paper route, and the first thing I did with my savings was go out and buy a car, which was a 1950 Ford Falcon coupe, the one with the little back window that didn't open up. That was a great joy to me and gave me mobility. Also it helped me throw my newspapers more easily. David Millet, who was on the basketball team—he was the back-up center and my best friend—we would get up in the morning in the wintertime, freezing cold, and we would bundle up and we would throw our newspaper routes together so we could talk across the street. We'd walk down the opposing sidewalks and then toss the papers, and then we'd go to the equivalent of a Toddle House and we'd have some coffee and some sweet buns. Then we'd go home, take showers, and go to school. Then at two o'clock in the afternoon school was over. I didn't have time to study. I really would literally study for tests reading the books walking between my classes, and at high school with a few exceptions, such as Mrs. Epperson's English course, it was not that demanding and it was fairly easy to do. I really was not pushed intellectually in high school. I had all this residual knowledge from my reading days.

Q: I've got you going there probably in what, about '50 to '54?

HARRIS: I graduated from high school in 1956.

Q: What about in Dallas, the black–white situation?

HARRIS: I remember when I first came to Dallas, I had a drink at a water fountain in a department store downtown, and my mother came up to me and she said, "Oh, you're not supposed to drink at this water fountain," and above it was a sign that said "For Coloreds" and across the way was another one "For Whites." The only place where I really saw it was in the buses, because in the buses on the seats they had a little sign "White/Colored" and you would turn it depending on what the row was, and as more white people came into the buses they would get the seats and push the black people to the back of the bus. But in my neighborhood there were no black kids. It was really an apartheid existence, and there was really no connectivity with the black community. With the Hispanic Mexican Americans we had a lot of friends, and I took Spanish, so I enjoyed talking to them in my fractured Spanish at that time. The Dallas that I grew up in as a kid was really an apartheid existence, a really idyllic existence. In my high school there were three kinds, well, maybe four kinds of people. There were the jocks, which I was. There were the nerds, which I also was. There were the average students, and then there were the greasers, who were the guys with long, greasy hair and generally hotrod cars and the fast babes. I guess there was another kind of elite in the school, which were the joiners. But I had respect from people because I was both a jock and a brain. If I had been just one or the other, I would not, but being both the head of the National Honor Society and an all-state basketball player meant that I was literally and figuratively a big man on campus. It was just grand and I just had a wonderful experience.

Q: What about attitudes toward the military? When one thinks of Texas, in the first place it's loaded with military posts, and the Korean War was not that far behind.

HARRIS: No—For a number of years my mother worked for a company called Petroleum Engineer, which is a publishing company that publishes a number of petroleum things. Through that and also through my school we knew a lot of people in the oil industry. There was a lot of discussion that I heard as a kid about the price of oil, about government, not about the military, but there was a major battle about Franklin D. Roosevelt, about the FDR legacy—that was still alive—a major battle about preserving Texas culture against the onslaught of Yankees and Yankee ideas and these modern ideas that were coming down. We had in our gym locker room—it seems unbelievable—we had bitter debates about whether you could be saved as a Christian by being sprinkled or did you have to be immersed in order to be saved. This was a different world. As a matter of fact, I once a saw a fight between two guys over this fundamental issue of theological doctrine. Those were the kinds of issues. This was idyllic. Everybody had enough money. We were comfortable. There were then the concerns about Depression stories and things like that, but everybody was just dead-center middle class, a few a little bit above it, a few a little bit below, but it was very middle class, not church-dominated but church-

going, which was very happy and very Eisenhower-y. I remember a story—I had a debate. I was a supporter of Adlai Stevenson in high school, and my drawing teacher was a strong supporter of Eisenhower. So my last term there, my last semester in the mechanical drawing class, instead of giving me a grade, an A or a B+ or something for drawing, he just put a check. So the last day, I came into class—I had gotten A's in the first two periods—he came out and started handing out report cards, which was very unusual because you only got your report cards in your homeroom. So he handed me my report card. It had my name on it, and it said "First Semester A, Second Semester A, Third Semester F. Course Average D. Fail the course." My heart stopped, then I turned it over and I realized that my mother's name wasn't on the back of the card. It was a phony one. He had made kind of a practical joke. But those were the debates. It was a debate between Adlai Stevenson and Eisenhower. It was a very, very easy time.

Q: Did the world beyond the bounds of Texas intrude at all?

HARRIS: The worlds beyond the bounds of our neighborhood in Dallas didn't intrude. Later on we'll come to the roots of how I came into the Foreign Service, but those roots did not extend. This was pretty infertile ground for someone who spent thirty-five years moving around the world trying to be of help. Again, in my other life, in the three months of the year that I was with my father, there was exposure. My father had a series of businesses at one time in Florida, so I spent a couple of summers in Florida. There I came into a lot of contact with Hispanics, Floridians, and other folks there. That was great. He was in the Saint Petersburg area, and that was a lovely time. I saw more kinds of things, Greek fishing things and other things in those neighborhoods, and then a very different, much more urbane, worldly composition. Dallas was a very limited, pleasant but narrow world.

Q: I assume the newspaper there was pretty poor for international news or regional news.

HARRIS: It was, and I threw it and I read it, at least the front page and the sports pages, but it didn't have much of an influence on me at all.

Q: Well then we come to '56. You graduated. Whither?

HARRIS: I had applied for university, and in those days I just said, well, what are the best schools in the country? Well, Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, and so I said I'll apply to those three. So I applied to those three and I got in all three. Clearly, having very good grades and being an all-state basketball player was kind of a winning ticket, and being from Texas. So I had these things. I then took a trip up to visit them, but there was at that time in the Scofield Church, which was affiliated to the Dallas Theological Seminary, a young student whose name I've now forgotten. I think it was Bill something. Anyway, Bill was a graduate of Princeton, and he'd been active, very active, in the Princeton Evangelical Society. Through his intercession, perhaps prayers, he was instrumental in creating a very favorable attitude in my head towards Princeton as being a much more collegiate, much more pleasant collegial experience than fighting the traffic in New

Haven and fighting the traffic in Cambridge. The weather was better, it was closer to New York, and it had all these other benefits to it. When I visited Princeton, the basketball coach came down and met me at the train station and took me out to lunch and recruited me. The Princeton recruiter, a fellow by the name of W. W. Wigley, was very adept in terms of putting the story on me. Although Harvard and Yale were very courteous, they didn't make that separate effort. So now looking back I can see that I was perhaps predestined by these stronger contacts. Princeton was more interested in me, and I then became more interested in Princeton, so I decided to go to Princeton. They also gave me a fairly good deal. My father died in 1956 of cancer of the bladder, which was caused by smoking, which is very strange. As you smoke you get the poisons in your system, which are filtered out in your liver and your kidneys and then are deposited in your bladder and they sit at the bottom of your bladder, and over years—my dad was a two-packs-of-Camels-straight smoker a day—and you get cancer. My father died at the incredibly early age of fifty-six, and that was my freshman year at Princeton. He was very sick, so financially I had worries, although my uncles said that they would support me through. But anyway, I had a good deal. I had a third scholarship, a third job, and a third loan to cover my expenses. In a sense it was like a Princeton basketball scholarship, but it had nothing to do with my sports. I also had a full athletic scholarship to Southern Methodist University. Doc Hayes, who was the coach there, was interested in me because he had a number of players who had a lot of basketball promise but they failed out at SMU and then he was left with no one. So he was very interested in the combination of a kid who was a good student and also could put the ball in the hole, so I had some very good offers, a full scholarship at SMU. Not only that, but for some reason there was a mistake and I was enrolled in the university and they thought I was a girl, so I was being rushed by all these sororities. What could be better? I had all these letters from these girls: "Dear Allen, when you get to campus, please look me up and let's have a Coke," and it was signed: "Look forward to seeing you. Jennifer." I had all these wonderful introductions on campus. The school was a fifteen-minute drive from my house, the athletic dormitory. You could eat steaks there, two meals a day every day. It was really paradise. You got fifteen dollars a month for laundry money and room and board and your books and tuition, the full ticket. All you had to do was put the ball in the hole. But I was worried—when I was going to break my leg, what happens if I don't make the team. I had much more confidence in my ability as a student than I did in my ability as a sports figure. Anyway, I got in my old 1950 Ford Falcon and I drove up east. Actually, I worked that summer. My dad was very ill—that was the summer of '56—so I stayed with him. He was staying at my grandmother's house in Brooklyn, very ill. Bladder was gone, so he had a bottle that plugged into his kidney. It was a tough time. So I spent the summer with Dad, and I rebuilt my car. I had time on my hands, so I took my whole car apart, took the engine apart, and cleaned it up, replaced a few parts inside, and put it back together again, with the exception of the three parts that were left over, which I could never figure out where they went, but the damn thing ran. Then I also got a job working as a laboratory assistant in New York City on Sixth Avenue and Forty-fifth Street in a really crummy commercial photographic [business] where I was in the darkroom all day long. My nails were brown at the end of the summer from all the chemicals deposited on them. I was living in this darkroom with red lights all day, and I would do such things as produce 1,000—our biggest order was 1,200—copies of a Revere teapot. I had to do a contact

print of an 8 by 10 print, and they needed it instantly for a trade show. It was the first teapot that had a trigger finger. Remember those? This was their new invention, and they needed it for a trade show.

Q: Revere Ware was quite well known.

HARRIS: So I produced them, and we did have some models would come in, but they would just hold a package of cigarettes and we would take pictures of the hand and the package of cigarettes with a screen camera, which is a camera that puts the dots into magazine and newspaper print. If you look at a newspaper or magazine photograph closely, you'll see it's made of a series of dots. Well, our job was to put the dots in things. That was an industrial summer, working in the city and being close to my dad, who was in his last days.

Q: When you got to Princeton—I vaguely know the Princeton system, the eating clubs and all—does one go right into those? How did you get into the Princeton system?

HARRIS: Well, that was a real shock. I went in as a basketball player playing freshman ball, so that was one fit there. The other problem, I also went into the Princeton Evangelical Society, so that was another group of Christian friends that I had there, and I was a very devout fundamentalist Christian there. I had come from Texas, so I did not have the Ivy League, Brooks Brothers, tweed syndrome. My dad gave me when I went to school a Sulka tie, which was very expensive. Sulka is a haberdashery, a very exclusive haberdashery, and it was a beautiful tie. It was all white and had a clock face on it with one hand red; it was a white tie with a red clock on it. And I wore that with my blue suit, and some guy came up to me and said, "Where did you come from?" I was just embarrassed, because I realized that I was really out of dress. I really looked like what I was. I had just a little bit of money, so I went down to Langrock's, which was a haberdashery across from the school, and I bought a green/brown Harris tweed, heavy, scratchy coat, which somehow fit me, and a pair of gray pants and one necktie, and that was my uniform. I just wore that everyplace. But at least it blended in with the other Ivy League natives. I had asked for a roommate from Texas, because I thought it would be better to have somebody from my background. It showed my provincialism. I had asked for a roommate from my state and roomed with a nice fellow by the name of Toby Worth, whose father ran a big string and twine company. Toby had a drawer just filled with different kinds of string and twine that he could provide to anybody who wanted it. I found for the first time—it was a real shock—that I was significantly undereducated. From being in a situation where I had always been smarter than anybody else and better prepared than everybody else, I was in a situation where I was the least prepared. That was really a shock. The guys all had calculus. The guys all had all these advanced classes. . They came from prep schools around the United States. And I clearly did not have the kind of backgrounds that these guys had had. I had stopped reading three years ago. I had been playing basketball. But basketball was a disappointment, because I was not sophisticated enough to understand that Princeton in those days played single-wing football.

Q: Charlie Caldwell's team, wasn't it, or was it still Charlie Caldwell?

HARRIS: I don't remember who the coach was, but anyway it was single-wing football, which was before the T-formation. It was an early form of power football. And they played five-man weave basketball. Well, I had spent my whole career playing basketball as a post, as a post man, with my back to the basket. My shots, which were skilled—I had spent hundreds of hours perfecting them—were hook shots. Well, there was no call in a five-man weave offense for my skills. So here I was in a school that had a very different brand of basketball than I was used to, so it was very disappointing for me because I didn't really get enjoyment out of playing the game, because it didn't match my kind of skill, the skills for a smaller person, not for a six-seven, very tricky center, which I was. I really would go to practice very dutifully. We'd practice at four, and we'd practice leaving just enough time so we could take a quick shower and run up to the commons and get a meal, and then I'd go back and was faced with the studies, and I would be up till one o'clock or two o'clock every night studying away. Finally I said, this doesn't make sense. I finished freshman ball, but I said I'm just not going to be able to play basketball, I've just got to spend the time on the books. I got my first D in my life—it was just absolutely a shock—on a history paper that I worked on my whole Christmas vacation. A guy across the way, Jeff Wolf, who's now a very famous writer, came in the night before, after I'd worked on this for weeks and weeks and weeks and written what I thought was really a brilliant paper. [He] asked to borrow the book because he hadn't purchased the book, which we were supposed to do, talked to me about it for ten minutes, went over, and wrote a six- or seven-page paper, and got an A+. I realized that I needed to do some work. That was freshman year, the kind of transition between things. I did have some very dear friends. Cam Avery, perhaps my best friend, was a fellow soldier in the evangelical fellowship. We were both freshmen and really good friends. I met a lot of people through the fellowship, and that was great, so I had good support, good mechanism. My uncles, who lived in New York, my father's brothers, were very supportive. They would come down and take me and my roommates out to dinner. If I needed money, I would get an envelope every month with, I think sixty dollars in it, three twenty-dollar bills; it just came through the mail, and that would be my spending money for the month. I worked in the commons. There was a choice in terms of waiting on tables or cleaning the tables up, what they called a busboy, and I decided it would be more time efficient to be a busboy because you go in, do your job, and you could leave. The other one, you were depending on people. I became one of the fastest because I was so big. I could put a towel across my arm and run down the table and then run down the other side and clean them. In twenty seconds I could wash a whole table. Then we'd clean the chairs and put the silverware on and set up for the next meal. So that paid for part of my tuition. I also needed more money so I got a job in the laundry, which I didn't like. The other one was kind of fun, because you could really work terribly hard and terribly focused, but at the laundry you could only work as fast as the dryers, and you were tied more to the machines and less to your own efforts. I'm delighted to get this all down.

Q: It grabs the period, and I think it's a good way to start out. When does one get into the eating clubs and all that, and what was the system at that time?

HARRIS: At that time there was something called the bicker. As a sophomore—I guess in the second half, after the Christmas break, I think—you bickered, and that meant that you put your name forward and you sat in your room in your tweediest outfits and people came around to call on you from the different clubs and visited with you and your other roommates that were in the bicker. Then they would sit in the entryway there—the dorms were vertical instead of horizontal—and you could hear them talking: "Well, I like this guy, and I thought the other guy was a loser. He had nothing interesting to say. I would hate to have to have dinner with him." They graded you. I got a number of bids and was very happy to take one to Quadrangle Club, which Cam also and a number of my friends went to, so it was great. I can't say how easy my life was. Everything went very easily, without enormous struggle. There was a lot of work, but there wasn't a lot of struggle.

Q: What about courses? What were you concentrating on or eventually majoring in?

HARRIS: My first year there I took an introductory course by Professor [James Ward] Smith, in the Philosophy Department, who was a brilliant teacher and a brilliant thinker, and that was very influential. I became very interested in something I never knew about, never occurred to me, the world of ideas and discussion of ideas in very abstract terms. I found that I was good at it and enjoyed it and was interested in essentially that particular kind of dialogue, and I became attracted to that because it was new. History, the study of history and English and other disciplines, I was also interested in, but those were old, so I became very interested in these introductory courses to philosophy, particularly political philosophy. I became very interested in terms of how we govern ourselves and what man's thinking was in terms of how we organize. The other thing that I should mention, Stu, as very influential, was the bull sessions in the dorms, which were just fabulous, very influential because here, from [my] fairly limited [background], I had guys who had spent many of their summers traveling in Europe and [had] a lot of experiences, so the kind of peer knowledge that I gained was really enormous. I realized the enormous gap, how far behind I was both educationally and in terms of sophistication, even though I was much more sophisticated than the other kids in my high school because of my three months that I spent out of Dallas every year. But there was a big gap when I came to Princeton, so it really was a stretching, intellectually, socially, culturally, coming from a very focused, Christian, Bible-centered environment, to be dealing with all these folks for whom religion was a decided thing. God was dead, and that was it; it was easy. This was a major challenge. I remember Cam and I going and praying to have the strength in terms of dealing with all these kinds of challenges that came along. Another thing was social life. In my year between my freshman and sophomore year, I was going to work as a waiter, but I was recruited by the chef at a big hotel called the Griswold Hotel in Groton, Connecticut. It's no longer there. It burned down and is now not too far from the electric boat company. And I met a lovely young lady who went to Douglas College, which is the sister school of Rutgers University thirty miles away. So that was great fortune. Her dad was one of the leading lawyers in town, and she was just a delightful young woman. I told her a lie that I was a senior. She was into her junior, so I guess I told her I was a junior or something like that, but anyway I had to 'fess up to her that I was just going into my sophomore year, which was a real shock, but our relationship somehow withstood

that, so we dated while I was in school. That was one of the real negative things of Princeton, the social life was so miserable, but I had not a townie, as they were called—girls who lived in town—but I had the next best thing, I had a next-townie, who was both a wonderful girl and also whose mother was a wonderful cook. I would go down there for Sunday or Saturday lunches or dinners, and it was really great. It was a normal feature. Again, this is part of the luck of the draw.

Q: While you were doing this during your '56 to '60 period, did the world of foreign affairs intrude?

HARRIS: I became interested in politics. When I became interested in politics, I took courses in history and politics, but on the politics side I was more interested in domestic politics. I was much more interested in political theory than in political practice. I wrote my senior thesis, which is a requirement of Princeton education, on the battle between private rights, private property rights, and the civil rights mandates for equal education as it applied in private schools, that whole debate, which were issues that were going on their way to the Supreme Court. I got an A on the thesis. It was very interesting. It was a timely subject, and it was very focused. My major was a bridge between politics and philosophy, so I deferred some courses in politics and instead took courses from Professor [Gregory] Vlastos in ancient Greek and Roman philosophers and things like that. It was a fairly abstract, classical education. I took Spanish, took the history courses, was interested in the world, but I was not fascinated with a region. In the summertime after my sophomore year and my junior year, I worked at Spring Lake Bath and Tennis Club, which is a very idyllic resort for rich people and not too far from Princeton. My big decision came when I graduated. When I graduated, my uncle offered me a new car; he thought that would be an appropriate thing. Well, the price of a new car at that time was around twenty-eight hundred dollars for a new Ford, two-door, basic-transportation model. He had made a deathbed promise to my father that he would support my education, not only through Princeton but also—my father always wanted me to be a lawyer—he gave a promise to my dad that he'd support me.

Also, when I was at Princeton, the other things that I did, I should mention those. My father had given me a camera, a Rolex, because I was interested in photography. He said, "This is your tool. If you ever need money and have a camera, you can make money." So what I did was, I opened up the Princeton Photographic Agency. I and the people that worked for me were the people at the dances. In my day there was hardly a piano in Princeton that, for people who had young children, didn't have a photo by Harris on it of the family under the elm tree in the backyard smiling. So I made a fair amount of money and was able early on, about halfway through my Princeton career, to give up the university-sponsored jobs and to have this private entrepreneurial endeavor, which paid very well—not big, big bucks but certainly for a student it was more than I could earn cleaning tables and working in the laundromat. Also, I could set the times, because you could work in the darkrooms late. You'd just have to go there, take the pictures, which took an hour, and the times could be flexible to work around my schedule. It was absolutely ideal. The dances, I couldn't go to. My dates would have to sit and watch me take the photos. My roommates would dance with them, but, you know, we'd make a

thousand dollar profit, which I would split with the guys who worked with me. Also, I was paying people five dollars an hour or so, and I was making a lot more per hour on their work than that, so I became an entrepreneur at that time and that was good.

Q: You were talking about your uncle offering you a car. So what happened?

HARRIS: Let me just add. There were a couple of other things I did at Princeton that we ought to just put in the record. One was I was the head of the James Madison Society, which is part of the Whig Cliosophic Society. It was a debate society and that was great fun, but it gave me an office, so I had my own little office there, which was great fun. Also, we organized speakers, and that was a way of seeing some of the leading figures in American politics and others who came through talking to the Whig Clio. The other thing I organized was the Texas Society, and we got all the Texans together, which was great fun, at the university.

Q: You were mentioning Fidel Castro.

HARRIS: Yes, one of the amusing stories during my senior year, Fidel Castro as the liberator of Cuba.

He came to Princeton to give a talk, and he came with [the] full entourage of Secret Service and FBI and all the other protective folks, and you couldn't get into the hall. There was a grad student who had a great big beard, and he went out and bought some fatigues and he had a big raincoat, so when all of Castro's guys were marching down—he had about a dozen guys with him—this guy just dropped his raincoat and walked in and sat on the stage to hear the speech. One of the FBI guys was there, and he was counting his beards, and all of a sudden he realized that he had one beard too many, so he went down and got one of the beards off the stage and he brought it back and said, "Look, we've got one beard too many." He said, "The third guy from the end, I've never seen him before in my life." So while Castro was talking in a two-and-a-half-hour speech, the FBI went up and they grabbed this guy off the stage, took him down and grilled him all night long at the Princeton police station because they thought it was an assassination attempt. What it really was, was a clever way for this guy to get in and get a good seat, which was great fun.

My uncle said very graciously that he would give me twenty-eight hundred dollars. That was Uncle Julie. My other uncle, Uncle Morris, said that he would give me carte blanche for the 1960 Rome Olympics. I said I would absolutely love that, so I set off to Ireland from Boston, which was the cheapest air flight across in those days, to Shannon Airport on a prop plane. There were no jets. I guess jets were just coming in. I flew to Shannon, and this was the beginning of a two-and-a-half-year adventure. This is where I became interested in the world. I had always made a commitment that I was going to law school, and I thought an ideal time was to take a year off between my university education and go out and see the world. This was part of the plan, and my goal was to travel around the

world in one year and visit firsthand all the major civilizations: Europe, particularly Italy and Greece but also the wonders of Western Europe, then the Middle East, Egypt, India, and Japan and Hong Kong, and see the world; and I set off. What I found was that I could live very cheaply. With youth hostels and [a] rucksack on my back and a sleeping bag, I could live very inexpensively. I went and bought a Royal Enfield motorcycle, and I traveled through Ireland and the United Kingdom, had a wonderful time, made a lot of friends. One of my roommates came over; Cam, one of my best friends in college, came over and joined me, and we traveled through Scotland together, then down to London, and had glorious times—including some glorious blowouts at high speeds, which we managed to walk away from. That was exciting. Then I went to the Rome Olympics. My uncle had sent me down the express, and I had very stupidly not understood about the dimensions of Olympic games, so my goal was to see every Olympic event, [and] that meant going to three events a day. So I'd carefully work it out. In the morning I would see fencing, ladies' fencing. In the afternoon I would see pistol shooting, and in the evening I would see basketball. And I would do that every day. What I didn't realize was that Rome is a huge place, and these things were scattered all over the horizon. I had my motorcycle and I was camping in a tent ground outside in the pines of Rome, Lido di Roma, kind of near the beach, and I had a long drive into the city and traveled around the town. It was a great experience. I fell in love with Italy and decided that I would spend some time studying Renaissance art, and I traveled about and visited all the major centers of the Italian Renaissance and other major art areas in the country and took about six months doing it. I got to speak pretty good Italian and learned to live on the land. The pope has a series of restaurants that are designated for the poor people. You could go in there and for two hundred lire, which in those days was about a quarter, thirty cents or so, you could get a pasta meal with tomato sauce on it—if you wanted a meatball, that was another fifty lire—a small little quartino of wine, and as much water as you wanted to drink. I could have two of those meals a day, and that kept me going. I would travel for long distances in order to go to a church and pay the guard twenty lire to let you into the sacristy to see some altar painting by Bellini. It was just wonderful. In those days—and it's all forgotten—I traveled with all the books of the Renaissance and just loved it, immersed myself in it, and that was grand. Then I decided, next stage, it was getting cold, it was getting wet, and Italy is not a nice place. So I said, well, it's time to head to Egypt. This was maybe February or so, and I got on a boat in Naples and sailed to Alexandria. Alexandria was an absolute epiphany. I got off the boat with my rucksack on my back, and within a block I had been offered a bottle of scotch for fifty cents, been offered a girl and offered a boy and jewels and watches, all within a block. This was a totally new experience, because this was the first introduction to the non-Western world, and I was just in shock. I spent two or three days wandering around the old quarter in Alexandria, the Souk and other places like that, just amazed at the incredible poverty and vitality of life in these areas. I just literally was knocked over. I would get up in the morning and I would just walk up and down the streets just to see how people lived and, as much as I could figure out, how they shopped, how they cooked, what they ate, what their lives were like. I had never seen anything like it in my life. It was absolutely an incredible, really defining moment. Then, after this shock of Alexandria, I went on to Cairo, where I stayed in a German old folks home in Fagala. When I tell my Egyptian friends that I used to live in Fagala, they're amazed because that is a true old part of town, which no

foreigners stay in. But there's an old German old folks home there, and they let beds out to clean hitchhikers, and I was a clean hitchhiker, so I could stay there. That was not as interesting. Alexandria was really a major mindset change in terms of an introduction to the non-Western world. Then I did all the traditional things in Egypt. I went down to Luxor and had this wonderful experience. I could not afford the bus trip because I was living on about twenty dollars a week and the bus trip was five or ten dollars to take the buses over to the Valley of the Kings, but on the map it wasn't far. A friend and I got up early in the morning. We paid ten cents to get a felucca across the river, and we set off before dawn, walking. We went to Queen Hatshepsut's tomb, and then we walked over the hill and then down into the Valley of the Kings, and we got there mid-morning. All the buses were there, all the people in the tombs, and we went around and saw all the tombs that these people had paid twenty bucks to go and see. We were down in this tomb, deep, deep in this tomb, and all of a sudden the lights went off and the steel doors, the bars, that closed it clanked, and we were locked in this tomb. Feeling our way on the walls, we went up and there was a little place where there was a false passage that drops down. We had to go across a little gangplank. We crawled across that, and we went in and got to the top and screamed for about two or three hours, and finally they came and saw us and scolded us. They said, "Why didn't you leave on the bus?" "Well, we didn't come on the bus." Anyway, we walked back. But that was the kind of life I was living, in very, very inexpensive Egyptian hotels, really living close to the people, living very poor. I was one of the very few Americans. I remember a lot of Germans and Australians and French and other nationalities traveling at my kind of hitchhiker's level, but all the Americans, I mean young Americans, were traveling at two or three levels above mine. I went back to Cairo, and then I met someone in Cairo who told me about this great adventure that one could take in terms of going through Sudan on the Nile and winding up, after an eleven-day trip on the Nile, in East Africa, which was still British-held. I said, "That sounds great. What a wonderful way to get an introduction of Africa." I got on the train and traveled down to Khartoum, spent a week or so in Khartoum seeing the sights there, again struck by the beginning of an African culture. This is really where the cultural lines crossed between the Islamic North and Africa. And then I set off on this great train and boat and speedboat and train and boat trek to Uganda, and that was great. My first pictures of animals—I was an avid photographer, of course—were elephants, and they were like little specks on the horizon. In the end I was up taking pictures of their eyeballs, and that was glorious. I got to East Africa, made friends there through connections, and then spent several months traveling around East Africa. I went to Queen Elizabeth Park, where you could see a million animals in a day. You can't do that anymore. It was just incredible, horizon to horizon animals, just magnificent, just magnificent.

Q: Was Kenya—I can't think what the uprising was called—

HARRIS: It was the Burning Sphere, yes, that was going on. They were very uptight about that. I spent most of my time in Uganda. I met a friend there, and we went up in the Karamoja region—fabulous, fabulous times in the Karamoja. We went down looking for gorillas, trekking in the mountains. We didn't have guides. We couldn't afford guides. We just went up into the mountains and walked, looking for and talking to local people,

asking them where the gorillas were, and we didn't see any. Those are very hard to find. If you don't have a high-priced guide, you're not going to find them. Went to Lake Kivu and went across into the Congo a little bit, but the Congo was just falling apart. So we went back to Kampala. Made friends throughout through people's suggestions, you know. Just had wonderful trips and saw wonderful things both in terms of the African, the British, and the Indian communities there, going from family friend to family friend, seeing things, traveling as a very junior, interested traveler who had more stories to go. Then I went down to what was then Tanganyika and climbed part of the way up Mount Kilimanjaro. Didn't have the clothes and the shoes and the tenting equipment to do it, but I did spend time among the coffee-colored people, the Chaga people. It was just wonderful. And then I went to Nairobi and spent some time in Nairobi and saw some of the game parks there. Then I went to Mombasa, and in Mombasa I caught a boat to India. The boat was deck class, ten days with a stop for a day in the Seychelles, where we loaded copra and other things on in the Seychelles, and we sailed to Bombay. Bombay was another massive shock, similar to Alexandria although a little bit muted now because I'd been living in the Third World. I began then to really wonder and question about how we in the North could live and share a planet with all the folks of the South. I began to believe that this must be one of the major challenges that our generation would face in terms of how we work on this planet to divide, somehow more equitably, the resources of the planet among all the people that are sharing it.

In Bombay I had my first encounter with the Foreign Service. I'm trying to think of her name, but she was the vice consul there. She's on my e-mail list. Anyway, she's a wonderful lady, consular official, who helped me get on a P&O (Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company) steamer, which was going to take me to. I missed the boat, and the boat was blown up with a loss of about 200 people. I decided that I would stay in India. When that boat went down, I said, well, maybe it's not such a good idea. Marguerite Cooper was her name. It was the first time I had ever been inside a consulate, the first time I knew that there was such a thing as a Foreign Service officer. So I went in, and here was Marguerite, who was helpful and smart and kind. I think she bought me a meal. Later, when we first came, I had just gotten married in Washington and Marguerite was going overseas, and I bought from her all her furniture, which was wicker furniture. We all were very poor. So Jeanie and I sprayed these blue cushions black. The only problem was if somebody sat on them with white pants, they'd have all these little black flakes on them. If anyone would come to the house and they were in light-colored clothing, we'd say, "Oh, don't sit on those seats. Sit on this chair over here, the wooden chair." A friend came in the house and looked at our decorations and said, "Oh, one of my favorite periods: early poverty." Also, I realized, my God, here are these jobs—living abroad, getting paid in U.S. dollars, doing useful and fun things; it's called the Foreign Service. So I talked to her about the Foreign Service, and the seed was planted in my mind that this might be a very interesting career choice for me down the line.

I spent a year in India. I won't go through all that, but anyway I became what is called a *sadak,* which is a seeker.

Q: This is Tape 2, Side 2 with Tex Harris.

HARRIS: We were talking about travels in India. I had gone to Rishikesh and was staying at the ashram of Sri Swami Sivananda and was very happy there learning Indian philosophy. The ashram had charitable programs. There were a number of Westerners from all over the world who were studying Indian religion and practice. The Swami was very smart and very kind. I remember this woman who came to him and said, "Swami, gee, I don't think I can have enlightenment because I can't sit in the lotus position. When I do, my legs fall asleep." So he looked at her and he said, "No problem, my dear. Just sit in a chair."

This German fellow and I would get up very early in the morning, about four a.m., and we would do our meditation and we would do our hatha yoga exercises, and the day was pretty well programmed through lunch. Then in the afternoon, most people would nap, but this German fellow and I would go and we would ride the logs down the Ganges River. We'd jump on these logs, and then we'd float down through these little small rapids and we'd jump off before the great big rapids at Rishikesh, and we would swim to shore. We were laughing on the log and just horsing around, and I got off the log too late and I could not get to shore before I got swept through the rapids. In the top end of the rapids there was this one huge rock, which had an area of about three square feet above water, and I positioned myself so that I was coming downstream and was going to hit that rock, and my thought was to climb on the rock. I tried to get on it, but the front of it was just slippery as could be and I fell off, and I said I'm just doomed, I'm going to die. The water rushed me around to the back of the rock and, of course, behind the rock was an area of quiet. I climbed up on the rock in the middle of the Ganges River, and within two hours there may have been a hundred thousand people there. People came from miles and miles and miles around. The shores were just black with people waiting to see if Mother Ganges was going to take this foreigner or whether she was going to preserve his life. My German friend took my air mattress, and they went and got every piece of rope in every shop in the villages all around there, and they tied them together, and he came out on the life raft with the rope tied around his waist and the rope tied around the raft to rescue me so we could float down together. The first time he came out t, I remember, he missed me because he didn't start early enough, and he floated probably twenty yards away from the rock, and he ran out of tether, and he swang back to shore. The next time he came down he overshot the rock so that the rope came across the rock, and I grabbed onto the rope and I pulled myself hand over hand, and I got on this air mattress with him and we started floating down the Ganges through this Class V or Class VI rapids, enormous rapids, on an air mattress. Well, the rope that was tied got stuck on something, and all of a sudden the air mattress became a fixed object and the water just boiled and it just absolutely popped me off, just threw me off, and sent me through the rapids. I just got the living crap beat out of me going through all these rapids. I had gone through a big chunk of them on the air mattress, so other than not being able to walk because my legs were so beaten from my hits in the rapids, I kept my head above water so I didn't hit anything there. I realized that was the most dangerous thing. My friend went under the water, but the rope was so rotted in some places that the pressure broke it and he went through very easily. So I then became kind of a semi-god, or a blessed of the god of the Ganges. So my life in Rishikesh, which was very quiet and peaceful, became celebrated. Everybody

wanted to touch me, wanted to give me something, wanted to talk to me, so it became really impossible. I had to leave. It just became too harried an existence. Anyway, it's an interesting story.

Then I went down and I stayed with the Mother's Ashram on the east coast of India. I traveled in all the states of India with the exception of two, Kerala—every tourist goes to Kerala but I never got there—and the northwest frontier province, but I traveled on third-class sleeping coach for a year. I spent a year. I stayed in a hotel twice. Someone treated me to a hotel two times. The rest of the time I stayed always in pilgrims' rest houses, for the Sikhs have a policy of offering hospitality. One of their mottoes is "with a sword and a hot meal we will conquer the world," so I took advantage of the hot meal. I really became fascinated with India, and I went to Ceylon before it was Sri Lanka and became very interested in Ceylonese politics and just had wonderful, wonderful experiences there for a year. Then I got on another boat and I went to Panang, to Malaysia, after spending a year in India. Malaysia was kind of a letdown in terms of interest and culture. After India, it was a pale imitation. Then I decided I would go to the farthest outpost of Hindu civilization, which was Bali, so I went down and talked to the people at Indonesian Air to give me a free ticket. I gave them some publicity; you know: "Indonesian Air helps American traveler reach his goal of Bali." So they flew me over. I had a friend that I had met in Malaysia, and through her family connections I had moved through the military elite in the government. I had all these wonderful opportunities to meet these families in Indonesia. Lived in Bali with the raja of Ubud, who was this famous leader. He charged me a dollar a day, because the military commander, who was my friend's brother, had asked him to help me. So when you can do a favor for the military commander of the island, you're happy to do so. Every day I would have tea or rice toddy or rice beer with the raja, and then every couple of days he'd say, "There's a tooth filing ceremony at this village. Would you like to go?" I said, "Yes, I'd be delighted." He said, "Well, I'll send a boy with a bicycle to get you at six a.m." The tooth filing ceremony was a coming of age type ceremony. So we'd leave, and sometimes it was a two-day trip and we'd go to places where no foreigners had been since the Japanese came to steal the rice during the Second World War. That was a fabulous month or so, six weeks, in Indonesia, a lot of it in Bali. Then I came back and went up to Thailand, had an accident in Thailand and cut my arm very badly, to recuperate. Taught school. Began to run out of money in Thailand, so I tutored a kidnapped Australian girl whose father had taken her. I decided then that I could not face another civilization. My next agenda had been to go to see the civilizations of China and Japan. I realized that I just couldn't handle another civilization, so I would go to Angkor Wat, which was the northern extremity of Hindu civilization. I went to Angkor and I spent two weeks or so photographing and seeing all the ruins there. Had a job offer in Vietnam. This was just when the war was getting started in Vietnam. I was going to travel there, but then they cut the ears off an American traveler the week before on the bus coming from Phnom Penh in Cambodia. The Viet Cong stopped the bus and cut the ears off the American on it. And since I liked my ears and I couldn't afford to fly—flying was forty dollars and I couldn't afford the forty dollars to fly. I had a job offer there, and had I gone, it probably would have changed my life. I probably would have spent the whole war working as a civilian in Saigon. But instead I came back, and to make a very long story short, I traveled back across, went to Burma, traveled all through Burma—it

was one of those rare windows when you could travel in Burma—to Inle Lake, to the Bagan, saw all the things, spent two weeks in there, and then I went to India. I did some of the things up in Calcutta and north of Calcutta, saw Orissa State, all of those places, then went back across to Delhi. It was in Delhi that I decided to apply for the Foreign Service. I saw this is what I like to do. So I applied for the Foreign Service from Delhi, for the exam. Then I traveled across the Middle East, more adventures, most of it on the ground across Afghanistan. Was in Herat on the fifteenth of Muharram, when the Shiites beat themselves for Ali, the lost children. I had a scruffy beard and I had Afghan clothes that I had had made because my clothes had worn out. Some guys took me in there and said—I have a big nose and was brown from the sun—"Don't talk. If you talk, you will die. But you will see something that you will know and very few people have ever seen who are not of this faith." So I went in and saw these people beating themselves, cutting their heads with swords. It was just incredible. I told the American consul there what I had done; he almost passed out. He said, "Your life was about two minutes if you'd been discovered as being an American there." It was great fun. Went to Tehran. The Shah was there. Traveled all through Iran, across Iraq. Had trouble getting out of Iraq, because Iraqis thought I was some sort of CIA operative and wouldn't give me an exit visa. Then finally got to Jordan, lived in Jordan for a while. Then I got across into Israel and had some friends in Israel. I went and worked there doing manual work, digging up water meters. Every drop of water in Israel is metered, so every field has a water meter on it, and those had to be serviced, so we dug them up and serviced them and reinstalled them. Then I proceeded back from Israel through Turkey and did things in Turkey, went across to Greece, went to Mount Athos, then across from Greece, the boat trip across to Italy, which I knew well, then went back to friends in Paris and London.

In Tel Aviv I took the Foreign Service exam in the embassy. I got the word that I had passed in London and made plans. Harvard was too expensive to go to as a law school, so I had made plans to go to the University of Texas Law School. I looked at the boat schedules to find out what was the slowest boat cruise, the longest boat cruise, across the Atlantic, because I was so thin, weighed 155 pounds. I was literally half of my present weight, which today is 311 pounds, down from 345 a month ago. I knew that my mother would die if she saw me in my present situation, so just like an animal being led to slaughter, I was fattening myself on this wonderful Masdam Line trip across to New York. Went back to Dallas and entered law school and graduated law school under an expedited program that Texas had, which allowed me to go through in twenty-seven months instead of three years. It was thirty-six or twenty-seven, so I just went right through the summers, and I felt that I really owed it. I had taken the time off and done all these things. That might be a good stopping place.

Q: Okay, so we'll pick this up the next time. I'll ask you about the oral exam of the Foreign Service and when you got out of law school. You got out of law school when?

HARRIS: We can do that now. Then we'll get into coming into the Foreign Service. I went up to have the oral exam, which is interesting—this is always a moment for all Foreign Service people, it's an important moment. I had written a book on wills and estates with a friend, Roland Cook, in law school, which was a little primer for people

who didn't take good notes, and they could buy it for some outrageous price and we got half the money from the printer. This was a little money-making adventure that Roland and I had. It used to give each of us seventy-five dollars a semester of spending money. When I came to Washington, Roland asked me to stay with him, and I stayed with him and there was a fellow there—Malcolm Butler. Malcolm Butler was there and he was a Foreign Service officer. So I had dinner with Malcolm and Roland, and Malcolm told me about all the tricks that were played on people during the oral exam. Being a wet-behind-the-ears kid from University of Texas Law School, I had no idea of what was going on. I hadn't been in the culture and hadn't spoken to people who had. So I went to the exam, and I forget the names of the examiners, but the first questions they asked me were similar to the questions you asked. Being from Texas, race relations was an issue. This was '63, I guess. How would I feel about being in a service that spent a lot of its time working overseas with people of other races, other colors, and what were my prejudices. So I gave the standard liberal line. The third person to speak had a deep, rich, Southern accent, and I realized then, because I had been briefed, that this was my antagonist, so it was good cop/bad cop, and I was in between. They just beat the living crap out of me. One of the questioners I had to answer said, "Mr. Harris, you are the American diplomatic representative to the government of either Egypt or Yugoslavia. You will speak to the president of either of those countries you choose and ask three specific questions." Well, I had lived in Egypt, so I said, "I will address my questions to President Nasser." I forget what the first question was. Anyway, the gentleman from the South banged his fist on the table and he said, "I said specific!" And I had asked what I thought was a very specific question, and he banged his fist on the table again and said, "Damn it, didn't you understand? I said specific." So I'm sitting there and I'm getting really fine tuned, so I said, "President Nasser, my government is extremely disappointed by reports we are receiving that in the Oasis Prison in Karta that Muslim guards are taking Christians and other prisoners and incarcerating them with the fundamental Muslim prisoners, during which time they are beaten within an inch of their lives, and we consider this to be an affront to—" This was before the days of human rights. The guy looked at me and said, "That's a little bit better," and that was it. They came back and said I passed. I then went back to the University of Texas, wanted to do the security things, to do my school of law. I received a phone message at the university to call Personnel, and there was someone there who said, "Mr. Harris, welcome. We're glad to welcome you into the Foreign Service, but for budgetary reasons we'd like to swear you in." I said, "Fine. How do I do that?" He said, "Well, we're going to swear you in on the telephone." So here I was on a pay phone at the University of Texas Law School. "Do you swear to uphold the Constitution of the United States?" "Yes, ma'am." And I became a Foreign Service officer, reserve. That was in 1963. I became a reserve officer, and then I graduated from law school in August of 1965. Then I took the bar examination in Texas. Then I got in that same car and I drove to Washington, DC, and in early December, December the sixth, Pearl Harbor Day, I guess—is that Pearl Harbor Day?

Q: The seventh.

HARRIS: I think it was the seventh. I and thirty-two other souls entered the Foreign Service in the basement garage in Rosslyn, Virginia, at the Foreign Service Institute, and

that begins my Foreign Service career.

Q: All right, we'll pick this up next time in '65, December '65, when you're entering the Foreign Service. We'll talk about your A-100 course and go on from there.

Q: Today is December 13, 1999. Tex, could you describe your A-100 course? That's the basic officers' course.

HARRIS: I came into the Foreign Service in early December—I think it was December seventh—1965 in an A-100 class, which was a very small class. We had about thirty-two students in the class, and it was a very diverse group. At that time we had not only Foreign Service officers but we also had Foreign Service staff officers in the group, we had USIA members, and that was it. It was a very good, interesting group of not young men and women. We had one student, Ralph Graner, who was just out of Dartmouth, but most everybody else in the class had had some previous business experience between graduating from university or some graduate school. There were a couple of lawyers in the class, myself and Dick Higgins, and others with advanced degrees or military service behind them.

Q: Is there any way of characterizing what was the general attitude of the class?

HARRIS: I would say there was enormous dedication at that time. This was for myself coming from Princeton. Princeton had a tradition, which was drummed into us, which was "Princeton in the Nation's Service" going back to Woodrow Wilson, and so this was the theme of the education, that one of the significant career opportunities for people in the world was to work for the government, and the Foreign Service was seen very clearly as being an elite if not the [most] elite institution of the U.S. government in which to serve. So I think there was a great deal of pride. Maybe that's one of the things we can talk about in terms of the A-100 class. It was a laborious process to get in there, and it was a tough test, and people who crossed the threshold were there. Despite that fact, I must say there was a bell-shaped curve of people in the class. There were some who were absolutely geniuses. Everybody was bright, but there were some who were really a lot faster and a lot better prepared than others. We had some people who spoke a number of languages. Chas Freeman was in the class. I think Chas brought in three or four languages with him.

Q: Chas is a class by himself.

HARRIS: He is a class by himself. And we had a number of people with different life experience. I greatly enjoyed the fellowship and the community in the class. Seton Shanley, I remember Seton, who was named after a relative who was Sister Seton, who became a saint recently, from Philadelphia, and I remember Seton who grew up in Washington in one of the grand houses in Kalorama Square and we went to his house. He had a little drawer that he showed us, which was the parts drawer, and as things fell off their antique furniture, they'd pick them off the rugs and they'd put them in the parts drawer, and then every couple of months he would have a gluing session when he would

carefully go around and glue the things back on his furniture. I, who grew up in a very solidly middle-class background, did not have any gluing drawers in our house, although perhaps we needed some. It was a great diversity of people, but I guess there were a lot more people from the East Coast than other areas.

Q: Were any of these women?

HARRIS: We had several women, but it was largely a white male incoming class. We had no black Americans or Hispanic Americans in the class—although we had some Yalies.

Q: Were you married at the time?

HARRIS: No, I got married as I left for my first tour, which was about a year later.

Q: Later I'd like to come back to that—

HARRIS: The introduction was interesting, because Alex Davit was the chairman of the [orientation] course and a fellow by the name of Jones was his number two, and they really were excellent. I must say that the introduction into the course was well done. We had a good introduction into the Foreign Service that was both inspiring in a sense but yet also realistic, and I think that there was a sense of service but also a sense that there was a lot of work that had to be done and some of it was not glamorous and it just had to get done and we were going to do it. There were particular biases. Again, it was very clear in the course that the pecking order, the cone system: political, economic, etc. pecking order, was well in place and that political officers receive the lion's share of the benefits of the system over the long run. That was always a shock, I think, because some people who came in in the other cones realized that they were not going to be in what was perceived as being the front of the pack, although a number of them had just absolutely outstanding careers and progressed very rapidly to the senior service in their careers.

Q: When you came in, you were told you will specialize in one of the—Would you mention which categories people would specialize in?

HARRIS: Yes, we were all coned on entry. I think it was determined on the basis of preferences and what our scores were in the exam. I came in as a political officer, which is what I was told was the best, and so I was happy to be a political officer, and I was interested in political things. I did not have economic training other than a few basic courses at university in economics, although I did get some training later on. I took the six-month economic course at FSI [the Foreign Service Institute]. I would say about a third of the class were married and maybe half of those had children, so it was a mature group. How old was I? I guess I was twenty-five or twenty-six when I came in, and that was probably pretty close to the median age, although we had some who had been in the military for a number of years. George Trail, who had a distinguished career and was an ambassador several places in Africa and served very well in some very difficult assignments, was older and had a couple of large kids at that time. Harry Blaney was a

good friend, and Lars Hydle and others that were there. There was a group of students who lived in Georgetown, and they had a house, a group house, and that was the center of social circles because we had a place where we could gather in Georgetown and meet for dinner, and that was good fun.

Q: Was there an organization called JFSOC (Junior Foreign Service Officers Club) going at that time?

HARRIS: There was, and I was at a later stage very active in JFSOC and was, I guess, president or chairman of it at one time. I remember when we had a lottery. Everybody put in a buck or two bucks to buy a bottle of good champagne for whoever got the toughest assignment. I remember that fateful day when the assignments came down and I was assigned to Caracas, Venezuela. Well, my heart stopped, because having grown up in Dallas and having spent some time with people in the oil industry, I had heard a lot of stories about how expensive Caracas was, and one of the joys that I had, after having been an impoverished student for the last two and a half years, was to go overseas, hopefully to someplace where it was relatively less expensive and I could live a little bit easier, and I was just petrified that I was going off to one of the most expensive places in the world to live. So that to me was kind of a hardship, because I had heard all these stories about buying a glass of orange juice for five American dollars, and in 1966 five dollars for a glass of orange juice was a hell of a lot of money, still is. The focus of the class turned to Seton Shanley, and he won the award—he went to Dhaka—and that was because we had a panel of officers who came in, and one of the officers who came in talked about what a great place Dhaka was, but one of the problems was that they had to send a bearer out before the children went out to play to sweep the grass with a long bamboo pole in order to pick up these very small, little, venomous, instantly poisonous snakes and to clear the garden so the children could play. So we thought that was great. Seton later reported back that his mother, upon learning he had been assigned to Dhaka, had given him a set of tea linens to take with him for his service. Seton served very nobly in the Phoenix Program [Chiến dịch Phụng Hoàng; a program designed to destroy the political system of the Viet Cong]and resigned from the service after that heavy duty. After Dhaka he went to Vietnam and did the Phoenix Program, which was very tough, heavy lifting. A number of my classmates were just at the beginning of the recruitment to Vietnam, and Lars Hydle and Seton Shanley and a number of classmates went and served in Vietnam during those beginning days of the significant U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the buildup. I went off to Caracas. I got married in 1966 on July 25 to Jeanie Roeder , a lovely lady from Carmel, California. We were married in the Church of the Wayfarer, which we felt was a most appropriate church. It was a Methodist church in Carmel where Jeanie's family belonged, and her family had a lovely home which overlooked the Pacific Ocean and had these enormous windows which opened up overlooking the mission and down to the coastline and the ocean beyond. It was just absolutely spectacular, and we had the wedding reception there. We went out, had a very brief honeymoon. I think the marriage was on Saturday, we honeymooned on Sunday, and flew back on a red-eye to Washington, and Jeanie got into her Spanish class on Monday morning a little bleary eyed and turned to some friends, Steve and Trina Ecton and looked at them, and they said, "My God, we're exhausted. We just got married in Greenwich on Saturday," and

Jeanie said, “Well, I just got married in Carmel. I’ve been flying all night.”

Q: What was Jeanie’s background?

HARRIS: Jeanie was a Californian, grew up in northern California in the Carmel area and lived before that in San Jose, California. She was a philosophy major, a graduate from Berkeley, but I had met her at the University of Texas when she took a year and went down to the University of Texas, and we dated and really liked each other a lot. One thing led to another and the sparks flew, and I was just delighted to have Jeanie. In my poverty I had planned our honeymoon. In those days you could take a ship, so we went to our first post, which was Caracas, Venezuela, via a ship. I forget the name of the line, but they were part freight and part passenger ship, and a lot of the ports in Latin America were very crowded, but if you had passengers aboard, of course, you had to dock, you had to keep a schedule, so that gave you priority in order to dock and then you could unload your freight. So this line had a great deal, because they could guarantee that the freight would get there on a certain day, whereas other ships, if the ports were stuck or there was a strike or something like that, might be tied up for a week or more outside the port. We landed after a wonderful trip down to Venezuela in La Guaira port in Venezuela. I remember a great tragedy aboard. We had a wonderful send-off party on the ship, and a number of my friends from New York and Jeanie’s friends from New York came and saw us off, and we had a lot of champagne, and one friend had given me a number of Reporter magazines. I dearly love to read news magazines, so I took a stack of about ten of them up and sat on the top deck and read them, and as I would finish them I would throw it up in the air and the wind would catch it and blow it off the bow. Well, I came down after two or three hours of sunning myself and reading these magazines. Jeanie had gone down much earlier. She looked me and said, “Oh, my God, you’re a lobster.” So my honeymoon was filled with the sounds of, “Dear God, don’t touch me, don’t touch me,” as I had second-degree burns all over my chest and legs. Every couple of hours I would go down to the medical officer’s cabin aboard ship, and he or the nurse would spray me with tannic acid to bring some sort of relief, but it was a very tender honeymoon.

Q: In ’65, this is the beginning of the youth movement and protests but hadn’t quite gotten going yet. Your group was a little too old for that, weren’t they?

HARRIS: I think we were what is defined as part of the silent generation. I think that we had all gone to school in the late '50s, and I think there was not the spirit of rebellion that swept the country. We were among the last. We were this little group, this small group, the silent generation group, that went forward.

Q: In going to Caracas, did you find out anything about Venezuela or what the situation was there?

HARRIS: Caracas, Venezuela, was in the throes of a major confrontation with communism, particularly Fidel Castro, and while I was there a number of raids were conducted. Rubber boats would be found along the coast, hidden away. People were

coming in. There were armed terrorists. Security was extremely tight. The embassy had been machine gunned some months before I arrived, and the deputy chief of mission (DCM), a fellow by the name of Max Catrell, had not had his office repaired, and he had a large map on the wall and one of the bullets came in—and they were machine gun bullets so they were fairly substantial—and hit the map on the diagonal, so instead of going through and just leaving a hole if it had hit straight, it went across it and so it left this great rip on it. When the inspectors came in, all the other offices had been patched up, but Max left his with all the circles on it and "bullet number 22" marked on it and "23" and "24" as the police had done their work. But there was a very deep sense of threat against the American Embassy, which was visualized, as any time an embassy is attacked and machine gunned. Now the machine gunning took place after hours. hours A car drove by and sprayed the embassy building with machine gun bullets. Jeanie got a job because a friend of ours, who was in the station, his name was found in a university hideaway with a number of guns but he was on a list of names of people who were identified for attack. The station had him out of the country, and his wife and his children, in twenty-four hours, so Jeannie called up the local American school and she said, "I'd like to apply for this teacher's job. You don't know this, but she has just gone to the United States." And they said, "Oh? Well, I guess the job is yours, so come in." So she began teaching kindergarten.

Q: What were you doing then?

HARRIS: I had two jobs. I worked as a special assistant to the ambassador and in the political section. It was a rotational job. I never had a consular rotation, which these days seems very strange, but I worked as special assistant for the ambassador for six to nine months. He was a wonderful man by the name of Ambassador Maurice Bernbaum, one of the real stars of the Latin American diplomatic service, a fellow from Chicago who spoke the most perfect Spanish, with full linguistic command and enormous vocabulary but in the most horrific Chicago accent that one could speak. It was almost like a caricature of Spanish, but he was absolutely precise and he understood everything that was going on, a very wise, thoughtful guy. We once had a party at our house, and I invited the DCM and everybody else down. We had had an earthquake in Caracas, and no one was killed but there were several people whose buildings had actually fallen down. I had a party scheduled the week after, and everybody was to come as their last post in costume. Anyway, I had a case of scotch. I forget how many people, like fifty or sixty people, but anyway we drank the whole case of scotch and I had to go in the middle of the party and get more scotch. People got drunk, so toward the end of the evening I wound up with the number-two guy in the Peace Corps duking it out with the number-two guy in the CIA in the basement of this apartment where the car park was. On Monday morning, as I got to work after this great party but with this unfortunate incident, there was a note from the ambassador, "See the ambassador immediately." So I went to see the ambassador. I walked in and he said, "Harris, I understand you had a party on Saturday night." I said, "Yes, sir." He said, "I've got two questions. First, why wasn't I invited? Secondly, what the hell happened with this fight between the Agency guy and the Peace Corps guy?"

I enjoyed my political work there. We had a program at that time called the Youth

Program. That meant that being young was an advantage, because there was a significant push by the U.S. government to identify the leaders of the future. So I spent a lot of time taking the heads of the youth wings of the various parties out to lunch and spent a lot of time reflecting about how venal and shortsighted and lack of vision of these guys who were really on the take. But anyway I did get to know this whole swath of young leaders. I also did the "Weeka" [weekly reports from the embassy to the Department] and all the standard reporting things in the embassy and also backed up the ambassador and took notes for his meetings, the usual kinds of things. It was a very well-run mission. Max Catrell was the DCM, a very experienced Latin American hand. I must say, this was before the Kissinger GLOP (Global Outlook Program), when Kissinger forced people to rotate. In those days if you signed on to a bureau, you were really with that bureau. You might have one excursion and perhaps that excursion was to Spain or to Portugal, but the rest of your career you would spend in the American republics area. That was fine with me. I spoke Spanish. I liked Spanish. I was from Texas. I had a sense of the importance of Latin America to the United States, and I was perfectly happy to do that. There were a number of threats, and I happened to wind up being identified in a couple of these threats, and so there was additional security placed on us. We had a couple of wonderful experiences that I recall. Senator Allen Ellender came.

Q: From Louisiana.

HARRIS: From Louisiana, who was the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, a very powerful guy, and he would take these famous trips around the world to do fact finding, and he would go by himself. He had complained about how well Americans were living overseas, so high on the hog, so they decided that they would bunk him up with a junior officer who would be his control officer, and they chose me. I went to see the DCM, Max Catrell, and Max looked at me. I had just gotten to post, and he said, "Harris, many in this post have had long and distinguished careers. You have no career. If something happens to our career, we have a lot to lose. If something happens to your career, you go back to Houston or Dallas and practice law. There's no cost. So you, dear sir, will be the control officer and the host for Senator Ellender." I said, "Sir, I would love to do that, but I do not have a guest bed." He took out a yellow pad and he wrote down, "Bed." I said, "I do not have a dining room table." He wrote down, "Dining room table." I kept telling him I had no couches, I had no furniture. All of a sudden, out of the AID warehouse came a bed, a chest of drawers, all the things that we needed, because we had no furniture. We had just gotten married and we were poor as church mice, and we had no furniture, no nothing. We had chairs that had cushions sprayed from a terrible blue into black. If you sat on them in a light-colored pair of pants, you had little black flecks of paint on your pants. So anyway, the AID warehouse came and furnished our whole apartment. Then Senator Ellender came, and he was very gracious. Jeanie was terribly ill. She had dengue fever, break bone fever. It was terrible. He was very solicitous. He had all these Dacron shirts and underwear, so every night he would wash his shirt and his underwear and his socks and his whole Dacron thing and hang them up. We did have an extra bath, the guest bath. He brought his own cereal with him and would fix his cereal in the morning. All he needed was a little hot water. He was a perfect house guest and a great gentleman. When he left, he opened up this great piece of felt and on it were maybe

thirty or forty large cut stones, because he had just been in Brazil and he had bought all these cut stones there. He said to Jeanie —

[*End Tape 2, Side 1*]

So the Senator opened up this big felt [cloth] , like a hand towel, and in it were laid out all these jewels for Jeanie to choose a jewel. He said, "You've been such a great hostess, I'd like you to have a little memento of me, so I want you to take one and take a big one, honey." So Jeanie took a rather modest one, which she now has in a very nice ring. I think it's a purple amethyst, which is a nice ring and has a nice story. That was a wonderful trip, because it was a wonderful introduction in the various aircraft with Senator Ellender. We flew all over the country. The oil companies were hosting, and I remember we went down to the Exxon operation—it was Humble Oil in those days—their operation in Maracaibo. They had a set of quintuplets, so they arranged for the senator to give the quintuplets bicycles. They took us out on the rigs, they took us to their refinery, they took us to all these places. We went out to the Texaco operations in the eastern part of Venezuela, and we saw the Mene Grande operations, and we flew in their company planes across the Angel Falls waterfalls, and we saw all these things. The national food in Venezuela is the arepa, which is a very hard, very solid piece of corn masa that's fried. I remember they gave him one and he looked at it—it was on the airplane—and he turned to me and said, "Son, you can't eat this, but if you've got an enemy, you could throw it and really hurt him." He was a very colorful guy. We put a country team briefing on for him headed by the ambassador, and the defense attaché came in civilian clothes, but the military assistance guy came in uniform. The senator kept asking all the pertinent questions that the defense attaché wanted to answer to the fellow in uniform, who didn't know the answers very well. So the defense attaché kept interrupting, and finally Ellender turned to him and said, "Son, I want you to shut up. I'll get to you eventually, but right now you keep your mouth shut. I'm saving you for dessert." He went around and he had facts and figures, because you had to fill out, almost like a mini-inspection, long forms in terms of your programs, results and things like that. And he studied those and actually asked people about their budgets and other kinds of questions. It was a very sophisticated thing. The major thing was he had a 16-mm camera with him and he took pictures everyplace he went. We all knew this, so everybody tried to go out of their way to bring him to places that would be of great photographic interest. So he took these films, and when he went back to Washington he edited them, and he would call people in, and many staffers and other people would go to see Ellender do a 16-mm film, which he narrated in one of the major conference rooms in the Senate. It was an incredible experience. For years afterwards we would receive every Christmas—Jeanie and I are both very fond of these sugar candies, pralines—and we received from the senator the molasses and the pecans and the other things from Louisiana in order to make these pralines, and his recipe for the pralines. That was wonderful. That was early on. We were called on to do all these things. One of my first jobs in the Foreign Service was as the uh-huh man. The ambassador's residence, as you came in, was on the top of the hill. Caracas is on very steep hills, and on top of one of these hills was the residence of the American ambassador. As people came in the residence and opened the door, they would look through this maybe fifty feet of plate glass window out into the valley below

and see all these sparkling lights. On a clear night it was just absolutely breathtaking. Well, there were two stairs between the level that you got in and the level of the living room, which was a vast expanse. You could probably get a hundred people in there. So my first job in the Foreign Service was to stand by those stairs as people came in and were just transfixed by this great view of the valley of Caracas, and I would say, "Uh-huh, watch your step." That was my job. It was wonderful. Those were serious parties. We would sit down. Kempton Jenkins was my first boss, and Kempton was a Soviet hand and a very smart and very focused political officer who taught me a lot. He was there because the Soviet guys did tours outside of Moscow in order to bring their expertise in terms of countries that were having problems, and he was a very sophisticated, very articulate representative who did very well as a political counselor. But in the political section, we would sit down there and we would go over it like a game list. Who was coming? We would identify people like a football play. Okay, Harris, you talk to X and Y and Z, and the next officer would have two or three people, so we would go over the questions we wanted to ask so that at the end of the evening we could sit down and debrief each other and see how much information we got. But it was a very focused collection effort. That was the only time I've really seen that done. It was a discipline that came over from the embassy in Moscow, where you didn't have a lot of opportunities to see these people and, when you did, you wanted to make sure that you asked them the right questions. At the end of the evening, because these things with the free booze and the good food could go on forever, the ambassador cut the food off, and then all the Americans made a big ring and we'd just scooch all the guests out the door and we'd just clean the room, and then we'd shake each other's hands and we'd all go home. In those days, it was the old days, my wife called on all the senior officers with the [calling] cards bent [to indicate that the card was delivered in person]. Mrs. Bernbaum was a weird and wonderful lady, and she was a ham radio operator. Her son I influenced because I had traveled a great deal and brought her son over to see my slides on India, and he is today one of the leading American scholars in Tibetan studies in the United States. He's very eminent. There were a number of articles in National Geographic and a number of published things. I think he's at Berkeley. But that was a very good experience in that embassy. We learned a lot. My next assignment, I worked for six or nine months in the commercial section, and there was a gap in the commercial section, so instead of going into consular affairs I went where I was needed, which was in the commercial section, and did studies and other things. I remember once I got caught in the local big grocery store and called by their security people because I was there doing a report on dog food—some American exporter of dog food wanted to know what the prices were, so I was in the market writing down the size of the cans, the prices, and the principal ingredients to include in my report, and they thought I was a spy from another chain, so they came up and accosted me. I explained to them that, no, I had a very special dog and I needed to make sure that he had the right ingredients, so I was comparing what the products were that I could give to my dog. We had a lovely apartment high on the hill, which was small but brand new and really quite lovely. We had a lot of friends, and we had a good time. I had an old car that I had had at the University of Texas Law School. I couldn't afford a new one, so we brought that one with us, and we drove that all over Venezuela, and we traveled throughout Venezuela, throughout Colombia, extensively, and then on one of our vacations we took a three-week trip by air all around Latin America—I had never been

there before—which was great. I had traveled in close to a hundred countries during my travels, and then I took this big trip seeing all the sights in the major countries in Latin America, a grand three-week trip.

Q: You were in Venezuela from '66 until when?

HARRIS: I was there for two years.

Q: '66 to '68. What was the political situation? You mentioned the communist problem, but what was the political situation?

HARRIS: Well, the political situation in Venezuela was a critical one, because of enormous U.S. investment and enormous U.S. connections. We did analysis of the embassy's budget at that time and where U.S. government monies were spent in Venezuela. I think around 63 percent of the U.S. government dollar relationships were spent on one goal and that was the military connection. It was a country that had enormous commercial [potential]. We pumped tens of thousands of barrels of oil a day in Venezuela, and they went to refineries in Aruba and then on to the United States. Also, some of the product we refined there and in Puerto Rico. It was a major connection to the United States and billions of dollars of U.S. investment, so there were enormous business links and others, but the real link in the embassy was the military. The real concern that we had was anticommunism. That was the real theme that really drove the embassy. There were two parties, the Adecos or AD Action Democratica and the COPEI or Copeyanosßß, and we cultivated the leadership in there. I also, as the junior person, had responsibility for dealing with all the smaller, left-out parties. I knew the leadership in those parties and would go around and call on them. I also did some work with the labor attaché and would go around and talk to some of the young labor leaders. It was good fun, but the theme and the focus was to make sure that Fidel did not do any end runs in there. There was an insurgency, a very low-level insurgency sparked by some left-wing terrorists there who would occasionally blow up something or take some shots at something. That, of course, had everybody on edge. There were physical threats, but by and large it was a very pleasant first post. We had a great time.

Q: Was there a rather distinct class system there, and how did the embassy, if they did, relate to that?

HARRIS: There was, and as a matter of fact, I took the White House assistant, the national security assistant for Latin America, there, [William] Bowdler, who later became an ambassador, a very distinguished guy. Because I had some friends who lived in one of these barrios, I took him up to one of the barrios, and he said, "Tex, you know I've been in ARA (Bureau of Inter-American Affairs) for twenty years. This is the first time I've ever been in a barrio." Went there and had a meal in a house that didn't have a flush toilet. I had gotten out just through my youth contacts, but by and large the embassy really dealt with the people who spoke some English. My wife tells a story about asking students in their class where they bought their clothes, and while the other kids were naming stores, one of the kids said, "Oh, I buy my clothes in Miami." So there was an

extraordinary wealthy class and this technocratic class and then the political class, which was very well moneyed in the country. This was Venezuela, this was a wealthy Venezuela. They had thrown off the dictatorship. They had a political system. They were anticommunists. The price of oil was high, and the price of goods there were extremely high.

Q: Were we leaning towards one party or the other?

HARRIS: No, the Adecos were in power, and we had an extremely good relationship, particularly Kempton Jenkins as the political counselor. The ambassador really dealt with the government at very high levels, but the guy who would have the long and tough and really insightful lunches was Jenkins. He would come back after a two-and-a-half-hour, two-bottle-of-wine lunch and turn out—that was a very good model—and would turn out just excellent reports in terms of some of the inner thinking and inner concerns of the political leadership of the major parties. That was important. I dealt with a lot of the junior parties, and I must say that their visions were unrealizable, were wish fulfillments, and also a lot of personal venality—people who were really looking forward to being successful in political life because they wanted on the gravy train. Those were the folks that I saw a lot of, unfortunately. It was a little dispiriting. We were not really allowed to go on [the university] campus. I was on campus a few times. The embassy was extremely nervous about that, because there was a fear that I'd be kidnapped or shot, so there were a number of no-go areas that we had, and the universities were one of them, because they were autonomous at that time and they were certainly the places where a lot of the cells were located.

Q: Was it the usual thing that the upper class would go through the university, be radical as all hell, and then come out and get a job and get on the other side?

HARRIS: I don't know. I never really looked at that. The radicals, in terms of the profiles, the impressions that I have now, clearly that was a phenomenon that you saw, but I think there were a lot of folks who went through and, because of the oil wealth there, there was a large focus in terms of being technocrats or being lawyers or being doctors, the usual things, a lot of ambition. People wanted to get skills so that they could join the gravy train such as their parents had been on, or they wanted to work their way up and get those skills. But the educational system in the country was in shambles. A lot of the infrastructure was either in great shape or it was just fantastic. I also traveled where no one else did. I traveled a lot in the deep, remote regions because one of the groups that I dealt with was the religious folks, so I got friendly with some of these people and they invited me down and I flew down to Amazonas on these little planes that landed on the river, and we visited the missionaries there and saw the peasants who were outside of the kind of swath that we had, which was really from Puerto La Cruz, where we had a consulate, which was the oil-rich area, all the way down to Maracaibo, but I was down in the southern part of the country with really abject poverty, really very close to subsistence farming.

Q: You were in the commercial section. Were we pushing American commerce there very

much?

HARRIS: Very much, and we had a very large and a very credible economic support team there who really provided surprisingly useful, no-cost or very low-cost assistance to American businesses. Now again, the big businesses didn't need it, but the small- to middle-sized businesses did. That was my introduction to commercial work, and that was very good. Also did some economic work there. I did a tour and did six months with the ambassador and six months with the political section, six months economic, and six months commercial in my two years there, so it was a very well-balanced rotation assignment. I was also the general services officer. I had forgotten about it. I was GSO for a number of months, and I was GSO when the earthquake happened, because I remember that I got a call from the ambassador's wife, and she said, "Tex, I know you've got a number of things—" The elevators were out at the mission and everything was destroyed. She said, "I know you've got a number of problems, but the buzzer under my table on the porch doesn't work to call the servants when we need something at the table. I wonder if you could send somebody up to fix it." And I said, "Well, I will tend to it." This was one of my first crises in the Foreign Service, because I had lots of things for my electrician to do. I said, "If I don't get that taken care of, I'm just going to have terrible pain and the ambassador is going to get nagged at, and it's just going to be easier to get it fixed." So I was faced with this moral decision, because the ambassador's wife had called me to fix the buzzer under her table to call the staff when she needed somebody to come and bring some water or another second helping to someone at the table, and I really needed the electrician someplace else. But I said, "If I don't do it, she'll complain bitterly to the ambassador and get him upset, and I don't need that." So I got a car and sent the guy up to the embassy. It took him five minutes to fix it, and it was done, and she was happy and was my fan throughout the rest of the tour. It was a lesson. But the ambassador, we had to relocate him on the ground floor because he couldn't walk up all the stairs, and the ambassador's office was on the top floor. I forget how many floors the embassy was, but the embassy elevator was out of commission. I also remember my first lesson in Foreign Service budgeting. I got a call about three o'clock in the afternoon of the day before the end of the fiscal year, and they said, "Harris, we've got sixty thousand dollars to spend. Spend it." So I looked around and I said, "What do I need done here? Well, the thing we need most, I guess, is the parking lot paved. So I called up and got three bids, and at seven o'clock that night the guys came in and started paving asphalt over the parking lot. We got it bright and shiny and the potholes filled in, and it was done. That was an interesting experience. The National Journal did a bio sketch of me. The title of it was "Tex Harris, the Forrest Gump of the Foreign Service," because I always seemed to be in the wrong place at the wrong time but came out okay. I was the duty officer when the earthquake hit, so I spent days going around to the various morgues, temporary morgues, which might be a school gymnasium, looking for Americans. We had very quickly developed list of a half dozen or so Americans who were missing and presumed killed in these buildings, but when a body was found, they could take it to three or four different morgues. I would go in and ask the head guy at the morgue if there were any people fitting this description, generally fair skinned, color of hair, things like that, and I would then, with a photograph in hand, go around, sometimes at night with a flashlight—really spooky kind of stuff. Of course I was on duty at night—

that was my beat. So I'd go around every day after the digging, when they closed down the digging, and go and look at all these bodies. Occasionally I found two or three; then I would call and arrange to have the funeral home come and pick the body up and take it to the funeral home for preparation to transport back to the States—pretty tough stuff, pretty tough stuff. We did a lot of things in Caracas if you think about it now, but I never stamped a visa. In my whole career I never really did that. Until I was consul general and had to sign a few visas, but I never did that consular work, which is very unusual for people in my time frame.

Q: What was your impression of how the oil people, particularly away from the top executives, handled themselves? Was it a problem?

HARRIS: There were really long-term professional expatriates, technicians. At that time a lot of the American investment was mature in Venezuela, so a lot of the middle- and junior-level jobs had all been nationalized. The Americans who were there were people who had been with Humble Oil Company or been with Mene Grande for many, many years and were very savvy, sophisticated, bilingual, and very well balanced. There was no "ugly American"-ism. These guys were really professionals, and they were, if not senior management, certainly upper middle management. They lived very well. They were paid all kinds of bonuses. The cost of living was high there, particularly if you wanted to live with some American products that had to be brought in and high duties paid to bring them in from Miami or Houston or New Orleans. They lived well. I thought they were, with very few exceptions—the exceptions were the roughnecks and the others who got in trouble from time to time—by and large the professional staff were in tune, understood the country, understood the problems of the country. A lot of them really were trying to help, in an eleemosynary way to move the country forward, taking on certain charity work, and were appalled by the corruption, appalled by the inefficiencies, lack of infrastructure, and always trying to find a way to make contributions. They were making billions of dollars out of Venezuela there.

Q: As a political officer, what was your impression of the press?

HARRIS: The press was very active, and I read the press because I did the Weeka and also did a daily—

Q: You might explain what the Weeka was.

HARRIS: The Weeka was a weekly report that we pouched to Washington every Friday afternoon. In those days it was before e-mail and even before faxes. We did it on a process which I've forgotten, but we typed it and then we'd print it off and it turned to blue. It was a cheap mimeograph thing, and it could only make about twenty copies, so if you had to do something [longer] you'd cut a mimeograph page and that would lead you to others. That reminds me of how we did our contact lists. I'll talk about that in a minute. Each week [I would] collect all the stories, and the economic section would give me their inputs, and the commercial section, and we'd put together this Weeka report, which would go about twenty-five copies to Washington in the pouch on Friday

afternoon. So Fridays were just hellish days, because I had to edit this thing and put it in there and get it cleared, and the DCM wanted to see it and everybody wanted to see it. It was like a little newspaper, weekly newspaper, that the embassy put together for its readership in Washington. In addition, I really didn't do too many telegrams. In those days we had a lot of other instruments. We did memorandums of conversations—and my boss loved memorandums of conversations—and when I had a lunch, I'd always have to produce one. Before he'd sign the voucher, he wanted to see the memorandum of conversation for the lunch, so we became very adept at churning these things out. Speed of drafting and a particular style of drafting, I was taught that, and use of short sentences. My lawyer, legal drafting, complicated prose had been beaten out of me into a more simple and more effective writing style with short sentences, a "mean what you say and say what you mean" kind of style.

Q: Was the press pretty much bought by a party, or was it personal?

HARRIS: It was all. There was a large number of newspapers. I had a big stack of papers that I went through every day, and I did a press summary every day. That was another one of my chores in the political section and the economic section, to read and prepare these so the ambassador would get a little cheat sheet on the press. Those would go up to INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research) and to the [regional] desk and a few other places, but would cover the major stories. A lot of the newspapers really took the line. They were political party papers or church papers or particular journalist controlled, so they were pretty set in terms of where they were coming from, and that was known and discounted. But you had to read them all, because there might be some very significant news in one of the little papers that you had to pick up, some little event that hadn't been picked up in the other papers.

Q: How about the church, Roman Catholic Church?

HARRIS: I spent a lot of time with the youth, and I did deal with a lot of religious youth and a lot of the missionaries. I spent time with a lot of the Protestant missionaries who were working there and got to know them. One of my other big beats was the Peace Corps. I found that the Peace Corps was an invaluable resource. There were programs there in which very bright, school of public administration master students were brought down to Venezuela in the Peace Corps to serve as assistants in the state governments and also in some of the leading municipalities. These people were experts in their regions, and they were very accessible. They were delighted to find somebody in the embassy who was interested in what the hell was going on in their region and what they had to say about it. I was the only one who would talk to them. I would go around, and every time I would go I would always have dinner and became friends and would invite these guys to stay with me when they came to town, so I had a whole network of Peace Corps folks who were my friends and whom I enjoyed and respected greatly the work that they were doing. The other thing that I did, I guess I did some tour in USIA (U.S. Information Agency). I must have spent three months in USIA, because one of the things that I remember so well is that we had a space rock. We had a little space rock about the size of a marble that was sent down, and we had all these miniature little space capsules. So as

the junior guy, one of my jobs in USIA was to go around to all these little state fairs with the space rock and a little prefab exhibit. I would go with a couple of the USIA locals, and we would set up this little booth in the thing and we'd have the space rock there and people could come up and see it, and we had tons of wonderful printed material about the U.S. space program, and we had a movie that we showed. That was also great fun, traveling around the country with the space paraphernalia. We'd go to these little fairs, and I'd stay in these little towns. They weren't little towns; they were San Cristóbal, which was the capital of this mountainous region. Here it is on the map right by the Colombian border. I would go to an affair in San Cristóbal and spend three or four days there for the fair but really to get to know the people and have a chance to see the country. It was really a terrific first tour.

Q: How did we view the communist insurgency and Fidel Castro at that time?

HARRIS: With great seriousness, with great seriousness. We had the military running around, military intelligence. If you look at the map, Venezuela is really an easy straight shot. It has a huge coastline, very easy to infiltrate. There was an active radical student population. It had a number of the indices that one expects that would be good for targeting by the guys in Havana, and they did. Now, was it a threat? No, but when you have that much at stake, your perception of a threat is very high. If you look at other countries along the coast, Colombia had very little U.S. investment. Venezuela was really a critically important country because of the U.S. petroleum industry and U.S. investment in bauxite and other things. It was a big operation. It was a big U.S. national interest post. It was significant, and it had a lot of future prosperity tied to it. Want to take a break?

Q: Yes, why don't we take a break now?

Q: Tex, in '68, whither?

HARRIS: In '68 I had been very friendly with the vice consul, Todd Stewart, in Puerto La Cruz, who was in his second tour. He had served in Germany before.

Q: I'm interviewing Todd right now.

HARRIS: You are? And Todd served in Puerto La Cruz and then had gone back to the Department and had been chosen to work as a staff assistant in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, which was then EB, run by a wonderful guy by the name of Tony Solomon. When Todd's tour came up, and they needed a replacement in the office, Todd said, "Well, Harris, who's a friend of mine from Venezuela, would be a good guy." So I went back to the Department in my first job to work as a staff assistant in the front office in the Economic Bureau, which was terrific.

Q: You were in EB from '68 to when, and the total?

HARRIS: I was in the EB Bureau from, I guess, '68—we'll have to get a bio sketch—let's say '68 to '70 here. I'll have to go down to Ruth's office or someplace like that to

get the disk. Do you have the disk? Okay, we'll look at the disk. That was an absolutely exciting time. In those days, the staff assistants monitored all of the assistant secretary's, Tony Solomon's, phone calls. I remember one day I picked up the phone—when a phone call would come in, a little light would go on—and he was on the line. Then we'd pick it up and we would take notes, and then one of our principal jobs was to call the people in the bureau and tell them what had taken place on the phone con. So if Solomon said, "I'll send you a paper on so-and-so" or "I'll have somebody draft it for you" or whatever, as soon as the phone hung up within five minutes of that phone being hung up, we had made the assignment, and we tracked the assignment in the system. So it was really an effective way, and he counted on us to do it. He didn't have to worry about it, because if he said it, it would happen. I remember once the phone light went on and, when we picked up the phone, it was silent, there was no voice. So I didn't have to put my hand over it; it was just silent. It was the president of the United States, and he said, "Tony, this is Lyndon. What are we going to do about Wilbur?" And then all of a sudden the secretary came running in waving her hands, "Get off the phone, you staff aides. This is the president of the United States." Well, dear friends, if you think about the level of phone calls that the assistant secretary of state of economic and business affairs gets today, the president of the United States does not call him to discuss how he's going to handle the head of the Ways and Means Committee.

Q: Wilbur Mills.

HARRIS: Wilbur Mills of Arkansas, who was a real power in wealth. The head of that committee is still a real power in terms of trade. And Solomon would talk on a daily basis to the head of the special trade representative, which is now USTR, U.S. Trade Representative, which is another little mini-cabinet department run out of the White House, and we were involved in monetary affairs. We talked to the secretary of the treasury regularly. It was absolutely incredible insight into how the building worked, how Washington worked, how the State Department worked. But the only sad thing was that Washington was at its zenith. That was when the State Department was really important and when its views were important. Solomon negotiated a restraint, voluntary restraint arrangement, with the Europeans' iron and steel community, because they were coming close to a trigger point of having retaliation, which would have been very costly. Solomon worked for weeks and weeks and weeks talking to all the senior people in Europe and put together a massive voluntary restraint agreement in terms of Solomon telling them what they had to do in order to meet the objectives. Then he had to go over it with Wilbur Mills and all the people on the Senate side. The coffee agreement, we made the coffee agreement; textile agreement, we made the textile agreement. In all these issues the State Department was the lead negotiator in terms of putting these things together. That no longer happens. It's very much less of a player, but with the resources and the growth of the other agencies, that leadership has now dissipated from the Department of State to other areas, with few exceptions. So it's that. But those were terrific days: aviation agreements, sugar agreements, all these things that came across. And here I was, sitting in a catbird's seat listening to this and had great access to the top leadership of the Bureau of Economic Affairs. Did Todd talk about this?

Q: Yes, he has, but I want to get it from your perspective. You talk about coffee agreements or steel agreements, and I would think very quickly that the conversation that you're monitoring and supposedly taking notes about sometimes could get over your head. Of course, the more you understand, the better you can perform your job. How did you bring yourself up to speed?

HARRIS: Well, we read everything. Our job was to sit there—and we'd just go there and we'd read from the minute we got in till the minute we got out. We had very few responsibilities in terms of writing things. We screened all the paper coming in to the assistant secretary, and then if something was very hot, we'd walk it in to him. But everything in the bureau came through us. So Todd was a particularly tough schoolmaster, because he knew if he sent the stuff up, S/S (the Executive Secretariat) would measure the margins. If something came and the margins were too small, he'd measure them and if they were an inch and a quarter and they were supposed to be an inch and a half, he'd send it down to have it retyped. Those were the days before computers. They had just begun to introduce IBM punch card machines, so we did have some machines that had memories in them.

Q: They were mag cards.

HARRIS: Mag cards, that's right.

Q: They were punch cards. But I'm not sure whether they had mag cards or not.

HARRIS: Some had mag cards in them, and others had punch cards, but in a lot of cases a page had to be retyped by hand with carbons, so it was old fashioned compared to the ease of things now. We reviewed the things, and if we knew that Solomon wanted somebody else to see a paper, we made sure that it had that clearance on it. So we were really a secretariat, we were a listener, we were an advisor, and also everything came through and so we read everything. It was just a wonderful learning experience. I was there for eighteen months, which is longer; it's normally a one-year job. But because of transitions, I worked for Tony Solomon for six months, and then Tony left the government and went to be the governor [president] of the Federal [Reserve] Bank in New York, which is a major job, a major, major job. Then I worked for Phil Trezise, one of the great men of Foreign Service economic officers, greatly experienced in Japan.

Q: By this time we were moving into the Nixon administration?

HARRIS: Yes, I guess so. Then Joe Greenwald, I worked for Joe Greenwald, so I worked for three different assistant secretaries. Trezise was a placeholder, and then Joe Greenwald came in. I think I have that right. I'll have to check that. I think that's the order. Tony Solomon left in January 1969, and I had arrived in June or July of '68 and had been with him those six months. Then Joe Greenwald was acting for six months or so, and Joe was the deputy assistant secretary for commodities, and he was the founder and real expert in the coffee agreement and a lot of the textile agreements there in terms of commodities. Then in July of '69 Phil Trezise came. I remember we had prepared all

these briefing books for Trezise, who had been in the bureau before and then had been in Japan for three or four years and had come back. He looked at the books and took one of them home with him that night, and he came in the next morning in the staff meeting and looked at all of us and he said, "What the hell have you guys been doing in three years? I left three years ago, and I came back and there are the same goddamn problems as when I left. I thought you guys were doing something while I was gone." But they were three really wonderful gentlemen and really knowledgeable in their areas, very different operating styles. Solomon was a brilliant operator, just absolutely near genius or genius, just had a photographic memory, very hard working, very focused, almost antisocial, liked to get things done, had lunch at his desk every day. The secretary went down and brought it up, and he would work terribly hard, would read things and just skim them at lightning speed and absorb them. Joe Greenwald was much more human, very competent, a bit slower—not slow at all but compared to the lightning speed of—

Q: This is Tape 3, Side 1 with Tex Harris.

HARRIS: Phil Trezise was a very wise and experienced bureaucrat, and there were some other wonderful people there. Howard Worthington was the real czar of trade. He went over to the Department of Commerce and had a heart attack several years later and died at his desk. Tom Enders was the deputy assistant secretary for monetary affairs, did a great deal with Treasury. Tom died of skin cancer very young. Frank Lloyd, who is now the under secretary for global issues in the Department, was then the deputy assistant secretary for transport telecommunication dealing with aviation negotiations and transport negotiations and other issues. It was really a first-class team, and the office directors were equally capable in the EB Bureau. Frances Wilson ran the place. It was well administered. We had money, we had influence. The bureau would identify officers early on, would cultivate them, would work to get their assignments, would take care of them.

Q: I understand in my interviews that Frances Wilson was in a way the mother hen.

HARRIS: The godmother.

Q: —The godmother of the Economic Bureau.

HARRIS: And the cone.

Q: So that in a way, for the next twenty years or so, they were her people that she had nurtured and brought along.

HARRIS: Very much so. I remember my first week on the job. I was walking down the hall, and Frances looked at me and stopped me and said, "Tex, come here. Whenever you're walking around the halls of State, carry a piece of paper with you so it will make people think you're doing something"—just a little coaching tip for this rookie kid who just came in from Venezuela. But Frances really cared and worked very hard for her people, and being an economic officer was part of being in a club, it was part of a spirit.

You had a particular kind of expertise. The Foreign Service needed that and recognized that it needed it and took care of you, so you had a feeling of belonging. I'm not sure that exists today, certainly not the same way it did. Frances was a bachelor lady. She had two passions. One was the Economic Bureau, and the other was duck pin bowling.

Q: Yes, I understand she was world class.

HARRIS: Well, I don't know if she was world class, but she was pretty good.

Q: Somebody said she was either runner-up or the American champion.

HARRIS: It could be, but she was a very avid duck pin bowler. I tried it several times, not with her, but duck pin is a tough game. But those three tours, those three six-month tours were great, because I went from being the rookie being trained by Todd Stewart to then training his successor, a fellow by the name of Joel Spiro, and I went through and I had a chance to work for three different bosses. When the two new ones came in, they relied a great deal on the staff aides, myself and my colleague, so that was a very good experience because I really had a lot to offer. I had an institutional memory. Certainly after Solomon left, I really knew where all the balls were buried and what the state of play was.

Q: One of things that's true of really any institution is the role of staff aide, where sometimes you were seen by the high and mighty, you get a reputation, if you do it well you keep going, but at the same time it's not line responsibility. It can go to your head or it can make you enemies. Did you have any problem with any of this?

HARRIS: No, I really had a lot of friends. Clearly people cultivated me, and I was very friendly, as I am, because not only did the deputy assistant secretaries want to be briefed, but also the office directors would put their arms around me because they wanted me to call them. They wanted to get the stuff firsthand or secondhand, not thirdhand, and I was happy to oblige, so I went the extra mile in terms of providing information to other people that I knew were working on the accounts. That made a lot of friends for me because "my pal Tex told me that Tony spoke to the under secretary of commerce today and this is what they said," and they got it from the horse's mouth. This practice, which was common throughout the Department, ended. There was a court case, and it was found to be illegal to do this.

Q: This is monitoring on the phone.

HARRIS: Monitoring on the phones, and so that stopped, which is very sad because it was a terribly efficient way to get the government's business done by these very busy guys, because now the assistant secretaries have got to remember what they said, brief people. We would take copious notes. I would sit there and use up one of these little books every two days, a little steno pad, and we would write like fiends. We would debrief in great depth and with great detail all the burps and bumps of the conversation. Of course, if someone was in a meeting, as soon as the meeting finished when the

secretary told him that one of the staff aides called, they would call immediately back because they would know there was something that they wanted to hear.

Q: When the Nixon administration came in, Nixon owed a great deal of his election, which was a very close one, to the South, particularly the textile-producing areas. Did you notice a ratcheting up of interest in textile agreements and all that when the Nixon people came in?

HARRIS: Not per se, but clearly textiles was always extremely hot, extremely political. Dealing with the members of Congress on it, we were involved in putting together—negotiating the framework agreements, so the generalized agreements on textiles were not the initial ones, but they were being worked on in a very real way. It wasn't just the individual deals but it was a lot of the framework negotiations. The coffee agreement and a lot of the framework agreements were being changed then, so they were very significant. Iron and steel were major issues, because we had major battles with labor similar to what they have today. The dynamics are still the same, only the State Department is not the center of action.

Q: Later you earned quite a reputation because of your involvement in various Foreign Service organizations. Did you begin that at this point?

HARRIS: A good question. I did. I had been, at the University of Texas, very much involved in due process issues. I had founded at the University of Texas a chapter of the Lawyers for Civil Rights. We sent students from the University of Texas to the South to work in legal affairs and issues there. I did not go because I was going through the straight course and didn't have a summer off to go, but I organized the chapter at the University of Texas and was its president and sent people there. I was very concerned in the Foreign Service about some of the due process issues that I saw and got involved in JFSOC.

Q: Could you explain what JFSOC was.

HARRIS: It was the Junior Foreign Service Officers Club, JFSOC. It was really social. It was a way for boys to meet girls and girls to meet boys. One of our major events of the year was, we threw the party on the eighth floor, in those wonderful rooms up there with that balcony, for the fireworks each year for junior officers. It was a great ticket.

Q: For the Fourth of July.

HARRIS: For the Fourth of July. That was fun, and we had a party every couple of months, so there was a real social side. I came in. Bob Maxim, I remember, was the head of it, I do believe, then I became active in it and I came on the board, and I began to work on the substantive issues that were involved there affecting junior officers and others in terms of due process. I got to know some of the members of the AFSA (American Foreign Service Association) board. Well, a vacancy turned up, so Charlie Bray was then the AFSA president on one of the "Young Turk Boards." Charlie Bray and Lannon

Walker were the presidents at that time, so they decided they wanted a junior officer on the board. Somebody had retired from the board, so he came to me and asked would I serve on the AFSA board, and I said yes, and that was the beginning of a thirty-year relationship with AFSA. I was on the board with some real stalwarts. This was the Young Turk Board: Charlie Bray, Lannon Walker, Hank Cohen, Bill Harrop, Tom Boyatt; these guys were all fellow members of the board and real activists in terms of the direction of the association. Now the Bray/Walker revolution was really to broaden the Foreign Service to put it into touch with the globalizing forces of American business—banking, unions— to put it in touch and to demonstrate to these organizations that the Foreign Service was needed and was worthy of support by interests in the United States. That was great fun. Hank Cohen was very important, because Hank was a labor officer and his mentoring and his contribution to the board was on one issue—he was very focused—members' interests, which means the bread-and-butter items. So Hank always had a focus, not on putting together some big foundation thing that Bray and Walker were intrigued with, but Hank was always, "What are we doing about layette allowances for newborn kids of the Foreign Service? What are we doing about improving the travel allowance? What are we doing about these other basic kinds of things for the Foreign Service?" So that was the answer.

Q: How would you describe the attitude of the Foreign Service towards its members? We're talking about '68/'70.

HARRIS: It was a transition. I think this was a period of a transition from a more elitist to a more egalitarian Foreign Service. A lot of the folks who had come into the Foreign Service in earlier days came there from rather successful families. They were bicoastal. They were much more urbane. The Foreign Service Act and some of its reforms and the change in recruitment meant that they were bringing in people from all over the United States much more. I'm sure the record is steeped with this kind of stuff. But there was a real change in terms of the demographics of recruitment and the demographics of people coming into the Foreign Service. But the senior guys then went up and most of them all got embassies. If you were a political officer and you were well connected, you moved forward and you got an embassy. Some of these guys that we saw were really not capable. They really did not have the right stuff, and it was a disappointment. They had the right connections and spoke beautifully and so forth, but they didn't have work discipline, they didn't have the mental capabilities of really doing outstanding work, and that was disappointing. But I think we saw that we were going to replace these guys and that they were moving out. I remember one of my epiphanies: There was a fellow who was a director of personnel by the name of Howard Mace, and if anybody had a problem, they would go and see Howard Mace. Now Howard Mace was certainly not a blue blood, but he was the fixer, he was the director of personnel, the number-two person to the director general, and he was the old-time civil servant who fixed all the problems. So people would go to see him in their Brooks Brothers suit with their penny loafers, and Howard would somehow make it right. Or if someone had broken the code and was somehow outside the pale, then it couldn't be fixed and their career was finished. You might appeal to the director general. If you knew one of the under secretaries or someone like that; you might appeal up through this old-boy system, but that really was it. It was a

very parochial, old-fashioned personnel system. Yes, I thought that was just wrong. It was a generational change. That was the major thing. It was a real generational change in terms of attitudes in the Foreign Service, and AFSA became one of the places where those change agents clustered. So I was in the forefront of that, and it just happened—again it was just luck—that my activity in JFSOC somehow caught the eye of Charlie Bray, and when somebody resigned from the AFSA board, some senior officer, they decided it would be a good thing to have a junior officer aboard, and how about this tall kid, Harris—tall, skinny kid Harris, if I can add—and consequently I was recruited and that was it.

Q: Why don't we stop at this point, Tex, and next time we're talking about—We've already talked about your time working in the Economic Bureau, your first go-round there, and we've talked about getting the change that was coming with AFSA and JFSOC and the attitude. What I would like to do the next time, though, is talk about some of the issues during this particular go-round, '68–'70—maybe it spills over somewhat—with AFSA and also with JFSOC, some of the issues that you had to deal with.

HARRIS: I'll think about that. I can't think of a lot of them right now.

Q: Well, if there isn't, we'll move on.—

January 2000. This is the first day in the new millennium. Tex, let's talk a bit about AFSA in these first years. We're talking about '68 to '70. How would you describe the state of AFSA at that time? What was it?

HARRIS: It was a period of resurgence. Lannon Walker and Charlie Bray had taken over the association, and I don't really have much of a fix on what it was before. They developed what was called the Young Turk Board, which was dedicated to expanding the role of the Foreign Service Association— The Young Turk Board headed by Lannon Walker and Charlie Bray in this period began to expand the role of the association in order to make connections between the Foreign Service and what was then the beginning of globalization, of multinational firms, and trying to make connections to gain support for the Foreign Service's agenda from American business, banking, non-governmental organizations, and began to hold a number of conferences and an outreach program. This was really a change from a Foreign Service association that looked inward to a Foreign Service association that began to look outward. On the board was one of my mentors, Hank Cohen, and Hank began to push, along with a few others, on a number of key issues dealing with employee benefits and feeling that these had been neglected. Hank was a labor officer and felt that this was a role that AFSA had that it should really fulfill. It was to push for it, making sure that its people were well cared for overseas. These were fairly

new currents in the association, and it created a lot of energy in the building, got the attention of the secretary and others. AFSA continued its prestigious awards program, which then were very prestigious. I remember once, I think it was Secretary Bill Rogers who introduced Averell Harriman, whom he did not place in high regard, and when he was forced to introduce Mr. Harriman, who was then going to present a check for a thousand dollars to someone who had won the Harriman Award, the junior officer, for outstanding work, he very brilliantly finessed the issue by saying, "To introduce Averell Harriman is easy. He is like Mickey Mantle and needs no introduction," and he sat down and put the two or three pages of glowing notes that his staff had prepared for him in the trash can. But it was a real renaissance in AFSA at that period, and I was very pleased to be associated with it.

Q: Did you feel that you were going for, let's say, benefits and all—There used to be the attitude that gentlemen don't ask for these things and this is a professional organization and you're trying to turn it into more of a union. Was there any opposition in that particular regard, or had that passed by?

HARRIS: No, no, that was very strong, but that really did not come to the fore at that time. That was later, when under the Harrop board, which I was the vice president of—Bill Harrop, Ambassador Bill Harrop, although he wasn't ambassador then—President Kennedy made a deal with the American labor movement that he would introduce a labor management system into the federal government. I don't have the dates on this. Forgive me, I'm not a good date person. I remember the details about many things but not the dates when they happened. This was something that was done prior to the election in order to get support from the U.S. labor movement for his presidential campaign. He then became elected president of the United States.

Q: 1961 he came in.

HARRIS: And he issued an executive order that set up a system to allow federal employees to organize and to bargain collectively with federal managers on the terms of employment. This, of course, applied to the Department of State and AID (Agency for International Development) and USIA and the other agencies. AFSA was then confronted with the beginning of American Federation of Government Employees chapters in these organizations, and their goal was to trigger elections and to run the labor management relations for those agencies. Well, I led a movement of the AFSA—this is in the Harrop board—that this really did not make sense.

Q: When was the Harrop board? Was this in the same period?

HARRIS: This was after the Bray board.

Q: We're still talking about approximately '68 to '70-ish.

HARRIS: Yes. I'll have to get the date of the executive order. That decision for AFSA to essentially organize itself as a union, in order to compete under the executive order to

represent the Foreign Service folks, created an enormous rift in the Foreign Service. There were many people, older officers, who were very antagonistic toward labor. They felt that they were professionals and under no circumstances had joined an association with the idea that that association would become a union. So it became very bitter. AFSA was hit with a number of resignations and a lot of bitterness, a lot of hard feelings. Now, what we projected was that we were going to have a dual system in which AFSA would be both a professional organization and a labor union, because under the rules of a union representation, people who were managers, which constituted a lot of our leadership, could not represent AFSA in bargaining with management because they were also management, they were managers. The definition of a manager in the federal service was essentially anyone who approved anyone else's leave, so if you were a deputy office director and you had two or three junior officers and a few secretaries and others coming to you to get their annual leave approved, you were [a manager] by definition of the Department. We disagreed with that, but the Department considered you to be a manager and consequently unfit, ineligible, to be in the collective bargaining unit as being represented by the unit and also could not sit across the table from management. So we lost a lot of our people that we needed to do this. It was a great spirit of volunteerism. Rick Melton, Jack Binns, myself, and thirty-seven other people met, and we constituted something called the Committee of Forty. Well, very quickly the Committee of Forty turned into being an actual committee of about nine or ten. But we did the drafting of the framework for AFSA to reconstitute itself and for the new type of labor–management relationships, which had to be different from those of the civil service, because you had this system, which had a commission that had all these bureaucratic structures in place, which had been developed during the Kennedy administration ready to impose a system onto the Foreign Service that didn't fit. This really meant that we had to have a separate executive order for the Foreign Service to take account of the rank in person, our nature of worldwide availability, the fact that we were transferred every three or four years around the world, and the other things that made service in the diplomatic service different from service in the civil service. So we put this together and this was done at that time. We put that forward to management. But the first thing that happened was that we had an election, so I decided that I would take leave without pay.—

Q: We haven't been able to put down the exact dates, but we're still talking about this time when we're dealing with AFSA, and the board was originally Lannon Walker and then it became Bill Harrop.

HARRIS: And I was his vice president, and I took leave without pay for a little over a year, about eighteen months, with the express purpose of serving as AFSA's point person in the election, representation election, in State, AID, and USIA. We decided to contest those three agencies, which had a very high number of Foreign Service people in them, probably under 10,000 but still—

Q: In State Department terms, more or less a significant number.

HARRIS: Absolutely. So we had an election campaign that was very spirited. AFGE (American Federation of Government Employees) brought in professional campaign

organizers, representation election organizers, clearly something they had a lot of experience in. We did not. We were learning all these rules and procedures for the first time. We had never as an organization or as individuals dealt with this. And we won handsomely. Bill Harrop went out, I remember, and he had the three letters. We had a letter from the three agencies' heads—I guess it was Kissinger; I'm not quite sure who the secretary was; I've got the letters around—

Q: It would have been Rogers.

HARRIS: —from Rogers, the head of USIA, and the head of AID certifying us as the official bargaining representative for the Foreign Service. Now that was, we thought, the hard part, but we were wrong. The hard part was that we had to reorganize the system, which was set up for the civil service, into a bargaining system that made sense for the Foreign Service.

Q: Before we get into that, I would think that a strong factor in making you win would have been just the union organizing activities of the professional unions, because for the most part what they would want would be not the sort of thing that would particularly connect with the Foreign Service.

HARRIS: I think your question indicates your bias, and I think that clearly was the pitch. But there were lots of people in the Foreign Service who felt that what AFSA really needed, or what they needed, was someone to stand up on the bread-and-butter issues and also on the due process issues, because the Department of State, AID, and USIA personnel systems were very arbitrary and, in fact, capricious. There were major concerns and misgivings and hard feelings among a lot of members in the Foreign Service that something needed to be done and they needed strong representatives. There was also always the feeling that AFSA leadership was made up of folks who would not stand up as tall perhaps as they needed to be because they did not want to screw up their chances of onward assignments and did not want to really put their finger into the eye of the secretary of state or the under secretary of state for management. So that was also a concern. About eight years later, as a matter of fact, USIA—maybe it was twelve years later—contested the election, with AFGE [American Federation of Government Employees] winning the representation of the Foreign Service people in USIA, and I think that was really more a sense that USIA officers were unhappy with AFSA because they felt it was overwhelmingly focused on State issues as opposed to USIA. They felt they could get a better deal and more concern and interest on their specific problems in their separate agency by having an AFGE union. But we developed a system of labor–management relations that were different from the civil service because they didn't have a contract. In the civil service they bargain like the American labor movement and they have a contract, so every two or three years they sit down and they bargain an agreement, and that contract lasts for two years. Then they bargain a new one, and it takes them nine months or a year to bargain a new one, and then they have a new contract that goes for two years and then runs on for another year while they're negotiating the new one. We didn't think that made sense, because there are so many things in the Foreign Service that come up periodically, precepts each year, new rules on—

Q: Precepts for?

HARRIS: Precepts for promotion, and new rules in terms of adjusting travel regulations. All these things were things that we had a right to bargain on. Now we couldn't bargain on some key things. We couldn't bargain on who was promoted, and one of the first major fights that we had was with AID, which mandated that the AID senior selection board, when choosing their highest-ranking officers, would not rank order people by merit but would essentially find the top ten and then give that list to the administrator of AID, who would in fact then choose from the list those people that he wanted to promote. This was absolutely outrageous, so we had major fights, and we went to the Hill. Bill Harrop led the fight on that one, which was absolutely a really terrible precedent had it stood, so we stood up for that. That was one of the very tough, early issues that we had. We had lots of issues in terms of due process, and these all came to the fore in the very tragic suicide of Charles Thomas. My God, when I think of the impact that his death had in the [Foreign] Service.

Q: Could you explain some of the background to that, please?

HARRIS: Yes. Charles Thomas was a very capable, bright political officer who served in the European Bureau, and he was a person who had extremely high expectations for himself in terms of his advancement, but he didn't quite make it. He had many languages, a lot of skills, a lot of pizzazz, and was a very effective officer working in German affairs and other central European issues there, which is very tough and a very competitive world. Under the system of up or out, he did not get promoted. In those days, I guess, it was beyond Class 3 in time and was identified for selection out, and a year or several years later he took his life, in large part stemming from his enormous disappointment in terms of not being advanced. He had significant difficulties in terms of getting his hearing. You should have Cynthia Thomas come in. Have you done that?

Q: His wife, I've talked to her and have asked her, but I'll try again.

HARRIS: Let me give her a call.

Q: Yes, give her a call.

HARRIS: She is in New York, but she's down from time to time.

Q: She's here now.

HARRIS: Oh, she is?

Q: Yes.

HARRIS: That's right. I guess she did move back to Washington. Clearly we're not in touch, but I do know her well. There were a number of significant procedural due process

irregularities in the handling of the Thomas case, and but for these things he should have had other considerations, should have had other reviews. These were issues that came to the fore. The AFL-CIO and AFGE and a number of people very critical of the Department of State, of the Foreign Service, used this case as a way of pointing out the real difficulties that were in due process in the personnel system in the Foreign Service, and it became a very effective block in the service pointing up these issues. I, as a lawyer and as someone who had worked in the civil rights movement and was committed, was really dedicated on these issues of due process. That was part of it. I led a group with Marion Nash, who was then a civil servant, the law librarian, two or three other lawyers—I was then at the Legal Adviser's office in the State Department—in the law library. We'd meet in the law library at lunchtime and after work, and we drafted a grievance legislation. Up until that time, if you had a problem with anything in your career, whether it was dealing with the personnel system or some allowance that wasn't paid to you, you essentially wrote a memo to the appropriate assistant secretary or the director general or the director of personnel, and he or she said yes or no or whatever. If there was a problem, you went in to see the director general or the director of personnel, and justice was done as they saw fit and there was no appeal. You could appeal to the secretary of state, of course, but that was really kind of a waste of time for people but it was the only recourse that people had. Howard Mace was with the director of personnel at that time, and he was nominated to be the American ambassador to Sierra Leone. The Thomas Group—and there was a fund that was put together, a Charles Thomas Fund—lobbied very hard and they found some supporters on the Hill. They blocked his appointment as the American ambassador to Sierra Leone, and then the administration appointed him as the American consul general to Istanbul. I remember once I had a friend who went to Sierra Leone and had a shirt made for me, one of these wonderful African shirts, and I went to a party and I was wearing the shirt, and someone said, "Great shirt, Harris. Where'd you get it?" I said, "A friend who was in the Peace Corps got it for me in Sierra Leone," and then the person quick as a wink came back and said, "Oh, yes, that was the shirt they made for Howard Mace." But we then gave the grievance draft legislation to Senator Bayh's office.

Q: Senator Bayh of Indiana.

HARRIS: Senator Bayh of Indiana, Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, who was very interested in foreign affairs and a real champion of due process and a very concerned person about the Foreign Service and someone who had been really touched by the Thomas case, felt it was wrong and there were problems in the State Department. Since he was on the Foreign Affairs Committee, he felt that he had a responsibility and went along with the committee to work towards remedying that. He then introduced that as a law, as a legal proposal, and it almost passed the Congress. Well, the Department of State went into absolute panic, because the Bayh Bill, which of course we had written, was very tough and it provided a very full amount of due process review and meant that the secretary of state, which is the ultimate manager in the Department of State, had papal infallibility. This issue meant that we had all these people in arms because the august authority of the secretary of state was being challenged by these AFSA upstarts by drafting this legislation and getting Senator Birch Bayh, and this was really a threat to the

republic. They then put forward legislation, which was mealy mouthed and terrible and weak and really did nothing to ameliorate the problems. What the Senate then did was, they said, "Okay, we will pass the Bayh Bill"—this is the Senate Foreign Relations Committee talking—"unless you and AFSA negotiate something." We then began a negotiation process, which lasted for four or five years. It was finished under Lars Hydle. I began the negotiations, and they went on and it was just intractable, because the Department would not allow anything in which the secretary of state was not the final arbiter, and we would not accept the fact that the secretary of state would do the bidding of the director general and the others. That was just unacceptable, and the Department could not accept the principle that anybody other than the secretary of state—which meant management, because he would do what management told him to do—could make these decisions. So it went on for years, and we finally negotiated it, and it came out that the AFSA board had authority, had plenary authority, to make these decisions and essentially to overrule the secretary on issues. We signed the bill upstairs on the eighth floor in one of the small little chambers. Larry Eagleburger was the under secretary of state for management, and I was there in the signing ceremony, although I at that time was not on the AFSA board. Eagleburger looked up, saw my head standing above everybody else, and put his hand across his chest with his middle digit extended and waved it at me. So it was a very fitting time.

Let me tell one other Eagleburger story while we're at it. I don't think I've shared this one. This is during the Boyatt administration, which followed the Harrop, and I was again the vice president.

Q: Tom Boyatt.

HARRIS: Tom Boyatt, Ambassador Tom Boyatt, who was the director of the center for a number of years. There was a group of senior officers who called on Eagleburger, who was the under secretary of state for management under Kissinger, and under the terms of labor–management relations, AFSA had to participate in any meetings to discuss personnel policy and issues, and this was a meeting that AFSA had not been notified of or invited to, so it was in our view clearly an unfair labor practice. So Boyatt called up Eagleburger and complained bitterly. And Eagleburger said, "Boyatt, that's a lot of crap. There is no way that you can limit my ability to meet with anybody in this building, any group of people who want to come and talk to me." Tom said, "That's right, but you've got to invite AFSA to be there, because we are the officially elected bargaining representative of people on the issues that they're talking to you about, so they can't have meetings with other groups. We are the sole bargaining agent. They can't come and meet with you and bargain on these issues and ask for things." Eagleburger said, "That's a lot of crap." Tom said, "If you don't agree to stop it, we will file an unfair labor practice against you." Eagleburger said, "Boyatt, you can file whatever unfair labor practices you want on this, and if you win, I will kiss your ass in Lafayette Park at high noon if you win." So they hung up the phones. We filed. Years went by. Boyatt was now the DCM in Santiago, Chile, and AFSA won the case. The notice comes out all over the world that the Department was found in fault of holding this meeting and agreed not to do so again, and this was posted around. So Boyatt sent a back-channel telegram to Eagleburger, who was

still in that under secretary job, and it said, "Lafayette Park event postponed. We management types have got to stick together." He, of course, had then moved from being the head of the union to a DCM, which is clearly a very important management job, in a fairly responsible embassy in Santiago. The issues that we had were just paramount, where the Department personnel system and the management system would make decisions that were based solely on their requirements and needs, without really taking into account the needs of the employees, and what the AFSA revolution did was to make the Department deal with the issues in the bargaining process, [although] there were a number of areas that we could not bargain on. We couldn't bargain on promotions other than the procedural aspects of promotions. We couldn't bargain on assignments other than some procedural aspects of assignments. So there were lots of reserve powers that management had, but on all the bread-and-butter issues they had to come to us—in terms of allowances, in terms of process and procedures—and we were able, to this day we are able, to impact and effect change, because the Department now has got to think about the employees, and what is the AFSA going to argue that the employees need or want in this regulation when what we need is something to make the wheels of the bureaucracy move more smoothly. It was a major change. This also began in the Thomas suit. Thomas sued the Department of State. The Thomas Fund brought some lawsuits, and then the Allison Palmer lawsuit for racial discrimination—

Q: Sexual discrimination.

HARRIS: —sexual discrimination, which she was successful in, and this began a new era in the Department's management and personnel system, in which it spent enormous energy and worry about defending itself from lawsuits, and it became almost unable to do things because of the lawsuits. Then there was a challenge to the Foreign Service exam in a federal court, which was successful, showing that the exam was not in fact a gender- and class- and bias-free examination, so the federal courts began to impose themselves in the administration, and AFSA was at the forefront of all these changes and all these events. It made the work of the director general [difficult], because when they had these cases, the fact finding could cost them two or three man-years of work in order to go back to their records and to pull together the information that was needed for the processing of these cases. That meant hundreds of thousands of dollars in terms of the prosecution of these cases, not in terms of the legal stuff but just in terms of the fact finding, in terms of developing the information that was needed both by the court and also by the Department and the Department of Justice to defend the cases, and the Department lost on many of these critical cases. It was clear that due process standards were nonexistent. They did not comport with the state of practice of the old-boy system in the foreign affairs agencies, because it's not just State, it's AID and USIA, that the administrator, the director of USIA, the administrator of AID, and the secretary of state could do no wrong and they would always do the right thing and they would be fair to people, and in fact they weren't and there were a number of abuses. Tom Tracy was a former senior administrative official. I don't know if you've done a bio on Tom, but his analogy was that the Department of State is not a venal operator, it really doesn't go after people, but it's like a dinosaur, part of whose brain is in its tail and part of its brain is in its head, and it's very slow in terms of connecting the pieces and it can do an enormous amount of damage

without knowing that it's doing the damage. It just is such a big, poorly constructed organization and its communication is so poor.

Q: Was there concern at the time—I'm talking about on your part and the board—that a rather major baby might be going out with the bath water, in that here we have a highly competitive service dealing with very important matters, and we have a pretty skillful group of people who are selected, and many of the things you were trying to do would be almost a leveling process; in other words, make sure that people who were marginal or average workers were hurting the brightest and best?

HARRIS: There was a lot of concern about that. And the concern really stemmed from a change that took place, I guess, during the Harrop board. They introduced the cone system in the personnel system, and everybody was appointed to a particular cone. I became a political officer. For the first time, you put people in various cones. Before, there was a great divide in the Foreign Service between officers and the staff corps, a two-tier system. Then you introduce among the officers four cones: admin, consular, political, and economic. And it was viewed and is still viewed today that the most prestigious cone was the political cone, and that more ambassadors would come from that cone. Every junior officer who came into the service aspired to be an ambassador, or most did, and consequently you had developed in the system a double pecking order. You had the old pecking order between officers and staff, and now you had a new cone system that divided up the officer corps. When we agreed to this in AFSA after negotiations about it, I remember Bill Harrop and Tom Boyatt and I sat back in Bill's office in the AFSA headquarters—that's one of the things we got, a year or two years of leave with pay for the AFSA president, which was a pattern in other places in government, to continue to work to head the union, so Bill Harrop was there—but we sat around and we said to ourselves, "What have we done? What have we agreed to in terms of introducing a cone system into the Foreign Service officer corps?" It was clearly needed as a way of managing the careers of individuals, the training of individuals, but that, not really the AFSA initiatives, was, I think, really what was significant.

Q: Where was the push coming from on this?

HARRIS: The push came from the personnel people who needed specializations and needed a way to promote and to identify people from the other cones into the senior service, because under the old system most of the people who got into the senior service were people who came from the political and economic cones, mostly political, who had the language skills and who generally had the better jobs in the past, [and who]were more competitive in the competitive system. So the cone system was a way that you could have individuals coming up, doing administrative and consular work, which are terribly important to the service, and reward them by having separate competitive areas in the promotion system, which allowed the right requisite number of officials to come forward and fill these jobs. It was a pattern adopted after the military. Where in the military you have armor and artillery and supply and logistics and all these other branches, which have their assigned number of one star and two stars, the Foreign Service went in that direction. So we had a service that was not only bifurcated in a pretty hard way, there was

a lot of rigidity and a lot of, I think, hard feelings among the staff officers towards the un-American, second-class status that they had as staff officers compared to regular Foreign Service officers, FSOs. There was enormous debate between the AID and USIA and State officers, with the other agencies having what Bill Harrop used to call "penis envy" that the State officers had better and more responsible jobs, whereas in the field it was always the USIA and the AID folks who had the bigger refrigerators and the nicer furniture. So there were all these bickerings and rivalries in the system, which AFSA came to have to deal with. We became a vehicle for the various subgroups of the service to put forward their agendas. Just last year something I worked on in the AFSA board was to get equal treatment for our diplomatic security agents as federal law enforcement officers, something they had not had before. And the mood changed in the personnel system as a response to the cone system from one of being an egalitarian, competitive, "the cream will rise to the top" and "we will find the best and the brightest and advance these individuals in the service of their nation" to a concern about, my God, if we don't do this right, we're going to get sued. Consequently they became forced to be egalitarian and to put some constraints and limits on these fast risers who shot up through the service. This has not been totally successful, because one of the problems of the service has been keeping these fast risers in the service, because they go through the service and are generally promoted so quickly that they leave in their mid-fifties and they go on to very successful careers in banking, in Wall Street, except for a few unusual ones, such as Tom Pickering or Frank Wisner, who get a series of ambassadorial assignments and are able to be kept and attracted into the service for many years. But now, with the salaries that are being offered on the outside for someone who has had a number of these senior positions, it's very difficult to keep these folks on board, and they can easily break out in their early fifties when they are absolutely of most service to the country. Meanwhile, young people coming in are faced with significant problems in terms of entering the service, which from the outside looking up doesn't have this fast-track, competitive nature but has many of these egalitarian hurdles and card punching, which make it difficult to attract the best and the brightest and most competitive people in American society.

Q: Back in the time when a lot of this structure was being set up, was there concern or looking at this and saying, "Okay, but how well is the nation going to be served if we don't allow good people, the best people, to get the right assignments and move up?" or, "In an effort to be fair, we're not going to send somebody who's really qualified to Saudi Arabia, we'll send somebody else because it's their turn?"

HARRIS: I think there was a lot of concern about that, and I think there was a lot of concern in AFSA about that. One of the other factors that contributed to this was Henry Kissinger's GLOP policy, which is the Global Outlook Program. Kissinger met, I believe in Mexico City, with all the ambassadors in Latin America. After two days of spending five or ten minutes with each of these ambassadors, he was absolutely shocked that they all had come out of the same ARA cookie cutter and they all had the same ideas and the same viewpoints, and he found this to be outrageous. So Kissinger made a personal policy decision, which was that people could not serve in the same area for more than, I think, two tours and then they had to be GLOPed or they had to be moved on to another

area of the world and develop expertise in another area, that he wasn't going to allow people to become inbred, as they had been in these various geographic clubs in the old Foreign Service. So you took out from the Foreign Service, which was really many foreign services, in his political and economic officer corps, people who had dedicated themselves to gaining great expertise, and you handicapped the service from developing that expertise. I think it was a major mistake. It meant that, unless someone was really dedicated, it was a question of how you played the game in order to get promoted and get to be the senior rank. In the past we had individuals who would spend their entire careers, many, many years, working in South American affairs or in Central American affairs or Caribbean affairs and became truly experts, so they could go on any podium around the United States dealing with academics or business people who had worked in that area for years, and they had worked in that area for years and they were very good people and had the knowledge. And that was replaced by a Foreign Service in which you had transferable skills but lacked the very deep, extensive regional expertise that had always been the strength of the Foreign Service, which meant that other agencies, such as the CIA, DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] and others and some civil servants in the Department and in Defense and in the intelligence community that expertise. —You had this very real disconnect, where the Foreign Service, which in the past had had individuals of great talent and great expertise—we still had the people of talent—but we did not, because the system would move people on, allow people to spend their whole careers in the same area of expertise. When I think of the people I served with on my first tours in Latin America, Maury Bernbaum, Frank Herron, others, who had spent their entire careers in the ARA area with maybe one tour to Spain or something like that in the early part of their careers, but their whole careers had been in ARA, and they were part of a club, and that was broken up. I don't think we really regained that, in terms of the kind of detailed expertise that we have, except if someone is extremely fast and extremely competent. We do have people like Chas Freeman, who can learn Arabic on the job. I think he took a few months' training, but he had never worked in the Middle East and went off to be the American ambassador in Saudi Arabia, and there just happened to be a Desert Storm war that took place on his watch out there, and he was able to do a brilliant job after spending most of his career focus on Chinese affairs and Southeast Asia.

Q: What about the issue of AFSA officers [who] serve a relatively short period of time, a couple years, and then they're back in a position where they're waiting for their assignments and becoming maybe ambassadors, because these are obviously people of talent who get elected? In crass union terms, this would seem like they're not completely loyal to their rank and file.

HARRIS: It is a problem, except I think that the system of effective operations means that if AFSA—and this is my view—becomes virulent—we had some of the AFGE unions that became really very virulent in USIA and would have protests every few weeks and would go out and try to get press attention, rushed the stage when Vice President Gore was talking—this was in the first Clinton Administration—and did other things that were terribly embarrassing to the agency, but they were not effective in terms of getting things done. Within the framework of effective advocacy we did a very good battle. I remember once having a meeting with Bill Macomber when I was a vice

president in the AFSA board, and I went up and met with Macomber, and we disagreed, and he started shouting at me and I started shouting back at him, and it was just rough. It was a very rough, tough meeting. I was a junior officer. I was an 0-5 at this time, and we were just slugging back and forth. When I came out, his special assistant came to me and he said, "We do not talk to the assistant secretary for legislative affairs like that." I said, "Screw you. He started it, and I wasn't going to take that crap from him or anybody else." The following day I was walking through the cafeteria, and along came Butts Macomber, and he saw me and said, "Tex!" and he came over and slapped me on the back and made a fist in the New York political style and he said, "Tex, that was a great meeting we had yesterday. It was really a good exchange. I can't wait to get together with you again soon," then he went on. So those are the kinds of battles that we had. The main thing that we had was access. If we did things as a union that really embarrassed or were overboard, we would lose access, so the main thing was to be as tough as you could be within the terms of the access that you had but not to lose that access. [assistant secretary for administrative affairs] Pat Kennedy thought up some scheme to save the Department some money by putting in more steps in terms of the overseas hardship allowances and to adjust the way that the system was paying. You'd do it by 5 percent increments and, of course, you'd move a lot of people down. We're at 15 percent and we'd go to 10. Meanwhile, they needed some end-of-the-year money, and so Dick Moose, [under secretary for management], bought this, and we fought like hell. So we would meet with Moose—this was Todd Stewart and myself—we would meet with Moose and we would do battle in a very tough way, and he would hear all the arguments and then he had to decide. Now we didn't win at all, but we got substantial changes over the system that the [Bureau of Administrative Affairs] had put forward. Were we happy? No, we wanted at least half a loaf. What did we get? We got about a third of a loaf. But it meant that some people who would have gotten screwed by $5,000 only got screwed by $3,000, so they were $2,000 ahead because Stewart and I had spent about a month or so lobbying on that effort on the Hill and also with the folks in the system.

Stu, while we are talking about things that AFSA did, one of the other areas that happened—and this was a little bit later when I was president of the AFSA board, in the early part of 1994—was to stand up and fight on ambassadorial nominations in which the president of the United States had nominated unqualified ambassadors. This was an important theme and something that went through the entire period. Let me start off with some history. Clearly the career Foreign Service has been concerned and angered by the fact that under the American political spoils system, ambassadorial appointments have been a major feature of American diplomacy. In the Civil War the military services allowed people to purchase officerships in the military service, and a number of the officers who purchased their positions served so poorly with such enormous loss of life that it was stopped. The American Civil Service Reform Act came forward, I guess, in the 1880s,1890s—

Q: Pendleton Act.

HARRIS: —Pendleton Act, which reformed how federal jobs were granted and which essentially took them out of the spoils system. Unfortunately, ambassadorships are still in

the spoils system in the United States, and it is especially tough in a country in which by our constitution there are no orders or ranks in our society. People could be a judge, you can be a judge for life, you can be a mayor or you can be a governor, elected officers, but in terms of appointed officials you really can only be a judge or an ambassador and get a title. It is one of the few areas of American public life where someone can gain an honorific title that they may carry with them forever.

Q: John Adams made reference to this, calling them the feathers of our society.

HARRIS: Could you give me a cite for that?

Q: I can't remember exactly.

HARRIS: It's in the Federalist Papers?

Q: I'm not sure if it's in the Federalist Papers, but there was some comment he made at one time talking about feathers.

HARRIS: Wonderful, thank you. I'd love that for the website I'm putting together on this thing. This has always been a debate in AFSA, and the policy that I've had over the years, which I think is the correct one, is that we welcome qualified American ambassadors coming from the entire society, and there should be competition for these positions, and the most qualified man or woman should receive the assignment, who is best able to do the job. You always have come to this debate in which the Foreign Service points up the real jackasses of political ambassadorships, and the political ambassadors and their political supporters and the political machinery point up those political ambassadors who were very, very distinguished and did great things for their county. Well, clearly, it's fairly easy to tell in the selection process who will be your winners and who will be your losers and also who will be the mediocre group, because most of them are neither winners nor losers. They neither do great things nor do they do venal things, but they're just there. They just kind of occupy the job and occupy the space without any great distinction. Firestone, one of the Firestone children was appointed to be the American ambassador to Brussels, and the AFSA board wrestled with this and agreed that he was patently not qualified. He was the least successful of the Firestone kids, had a very undistinguished career in the business world, was not highly regarded in the business community or by anyone. Brussels was a major position. So Tom Boyatt and I went up to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee against an ambassadorial assignment. Before that, we'd gone to call on Henry Kissinger. This was when Kissinger was in one of his heavy periods. He'd gained a lot of weight, so he was very round. We went in his office, and Larry Eagleburger was there sitting in the back of the room. Kissinger sat in his chair and looked at Boyatt and me—we were sitting on a couch at a 90-degree angle to him—and he said, "Mr. Boyatt, I hear you've come to give me advice. What is it?" And then he put his hands in a "spider doing push-ups on a mirror" position and flexed them and looked at Boyatt. So Boyatt went off into this wonderful pitch about how we supported qualified ambassadors and qualified political appointees such as himself, but that we really had to ask him to use his power with the

Nixon White House in order to ensure that they did not appoint any more turkeys to these positions or that the American Foreign Service Association would have to go to the Hill and testify against them. So Kissinger, without a smile, without a frown, without anything but still doing the push-ups above his chest over his rather round belly, looked at Boyatt and he said—it was a Friday, a late meeting, and he was tired—in kind of a thick Germanic accent, "Mr. Boyatt, I appreciate and respect your right to testify before the Congress of the United States against the president of the United States' nominees to serve him as ambassadors around the world." Then he looked Boyatt in the eye and he said, "And I also request that you respect my right to send you to Chad." So Boyatt—he's kind of an Irish guy—just turned beet red before he realized the joke. Larry Eagleburger was laughing so hard—there were these little, small chairs that were put in there by a decorator out of the eighteenth century—that he literally fell off the chair. Everybody realized that it was a joke, but there was about fifteen seconds or ten seconds, which seemed like an eternity, when Boyatt wasn't sure. Sure enough, as soon Tom left AFSA he went off to Ouagadougou. But as the American ambassador he did very well, and he got another good embassy at Colombia after that. After that Kissinger did not stop this Firestone appointee, and it went up to the Hill, and we went up and we testified. Boyatt was terribly nervous. I think he went to the john three times before we went into the hearing room. We sat up there and they finally called us. It was the end of the day and there were very few senators. These are not major events for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and this was the committee in its heyday. Hubert Humphrey, for some reason or other, stayed to listen to us. All of a sudden, as we were testifying against the weaknesses of Firestone—and he had run the Firestone Company—Humphrey remembered that he had been badly treated by Firestone in Liberia at some earlier stage in his career. So he began to think about that and to rant and rave, and he blocked the Firestone appointment for a certain period of time until the Firestone Company issued him a formal and very heartfelt apology for their mistreatment of Humphrey five or six years previously. Anyway, that was our first foray into that. The American—what is Bruce Laingen's group?

Q: American Institute of Diplomacy, I think it's called.

HARRIS: No, American Academy of Diplomacy.

They began a system of rating the ambassadors and nominees similar to the system that was used by the American Bar Association, but they were asked by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to make those ratings public. They refused to do that, and so they stopped doing it. So it really fell on us. When I became president of AFSA, I had a policy that we would go and interview the political ambassadors, just to talk to them at least, go through the process. Dennis Kux and I had a meeting—former American ambassador and expert in India and Pakistan—with a real estate developer magnate called Larry Lawrence, who also owned the Hotel del Coronado in San Diego and had been for many, many years a significant fund raiser. That's changed now: it's not fund giving; it's not the person who writes the checks. There are wonderful stories, which I think are true, that Ambassador—I think his name was—Davies, who was the American ambassador for Ronald Reagan in Switzerland, wanted to become an American ambassador so he asked

his accountant to go to Switzerland and to find out what the benefits were that an American ambassador had and to give him an itemized statement of what those benefits were, what the house was worth, what the servants were worth, what the car and driver was worth, what the telephone and all the operating expenses and other things were. So he got that amount—I think it was for several hundred thousand dollars—and he sat down and wrote a check to the Ronald Reagan Reelection Fund for that amount of money. Well, he got a double benefit because Reagan got reelected and reappointed him as the ambassador, so he doubled his money. But it was pretty much a selling of these positions that was taking place. Well, Larry Lawrence came and met with us for coffee at the AFSA Club. We put a pot of coffee on, and I think I asked for a few bits of pastry, and we sat down with him. Lawrence, who had begun as a worker in Chicago and had then gone to California and become a multi-multimillionaire, very successful guy, came and essentially said that he knew how to deal with labor, that he had dealt with labor all his life, dealt with the unions all his life, and he knew how to deal with them. There was a give and a take, and he would do that, and essentially he started on the tack that he was going to do some things for us: you know, what do we need, what could he do for us. When that got him no place, then he got angry, and he said he also knew how to deal with labor, and if that didn't work, he could play as rough as they could, and if they went after him, there would be knees that would be hurt and other things like that. Dennis Kux and I were just absolutely astounded, just astounded. We had gotten a lot of information about Larry Lawrence, because one of his partners had been indicted and had served federal time for money laundering for the Mafia. There had been a wire tap on his phone during this, and of course it was done with Swiss bankers in Zurich. So the ambassador designee was bragging to us about his wonderful connections with the banking community in Zurich and, of course, it was based on these connections that he had in his business with one of his partners in terms of money laundering for which his partner did federal time. He was investigated but not indicted for this case. The guy left the worst impression on us, so Dennis and I decided that we had to go to the AFSA board and recommend that we stand up once again. So we went to the board, and the board agreed to support us. Dennis went over to the Federal Election Commission and asked for the records about Larry Lawrence, and they pulled up these records and found out that he had made contributions that violated federal laws. So we collected this information and we passed this on to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and we went to see Senator Sarbanes and also Pat Moynihan because Dennis had worked for Moynihan when Moynihan was the American ambassador to India. We cost Lawrence big bucks, because all his lawyers had to go back in and do the research, they had to get the money back from the various committees that they had overfunded—multiple campaigns got too much money—and all the errors that he had made all had to be rectified. That caused delay. Meanwhile we heard at the White House that Larry Lawrence's Mrs. Lawrence was driving the White House crazy because she kept asking for all these favors. So the White House had told State Department, "Do whatever it takes, but get the Lawrences the hell out of Washington," that he was driving everybody crazy and they were just an enormous pain in the tail, particularly Mrs. Lawrence, who was driving the White House people just bonkers. She had been in the running for the chief of protocol job, a job that she was totally unqualified for, but they threw all these lavish parties in their corner Georgetown house that Ambassador [Richard Holbrooke] got in trouble for staying in and other things. Anyway, it was a long, sordid

tale. So we went and we testified against Lawrence, and we lobbied against him. We gathered a lot of information. A lot of information came to us in terms of his tough and shady dealings throughout his whole career, in Chicago, in San Francisco, in Los Angeles, and Orange County. This was clearly a guy that there were major, major problems about. We hadn't seen the FBI report or the other reports that were done, but there should have been many, many signals to this, but he was clearly not a guy who was qualified. In addition, the major job of the American ambassador in Switzerland is to deal with the Swiss on one issue, money laundering. That is one of the key issues that we have bilaterally with the Swiss, which is key to the fight against terrorism, the fight against crime. The ambassador said early on in his first policy briefing when they started to brief him on it, "I'm going to recuse myself from all dealing on this issue. It's something I do not want to be involved with." So here we had an ambassador who had recused himself from the major issue in his new portfolio. It was just absolutely horrific. So we testified against him, and that led to an attack. We were attacked in newspapers all around the country by a bunch of self-serving careerists as being witless and snobs. In one editorial we were called Foreign Service dorks. Senator Harlan Mathews, who had just been appointed to the Senate and was on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, became very exercised for AFSA's challenging the constitutional duty and responsibility of the president of the United States to nominate people to the Foreign Service—he meant as ambassadors—and even questioned our right to do so. Then in a random act of retaliation, Mathews put a hold on a list of twenty-seven senior AID officers for promotions, blocked their promotions, the Senate approval of their promotions, as a way of sending a signal that, unless we backed off on Lawrence, he was going to block the promotions of these AID guys who had absolutely nothing to do with Larry Lawrence. Well, [Daniel Patrick] Moynihan voted against Lawrence, which meant that the committee deadlocked, and it went to the floor without a recommendation from the committee—very, very unusual, very unusual—plus there were many delays, as all these issues that we brought up had to be dealt with. But in the end the White House went around and did the usual thing: "What do you need? We'll do deals and we need your help on Lawrence. By the way, I've got this problem, but we'll help you on that problem if you'll help us with Lawrence." And Lawrence got through. His major contribution while he was in Switzerland was to set up a fund for the house. He did a major fund-raising campaign to refurbish the house with corporate donations, because of course the Department of State had no money for this, FBO (Foreign Buildings Office) did not have money for this. He did it by setting up a charitable organization, so business people got letters from the American ambassador asking for contributions, which was highly successful. I think it's highly questionable for American ambassadors to go to the business community and ask for support for furnishings, not for his representations but for refurbishing the house to bring it up to the standards at which it should be. Then, of course, he became ill. Actually, he was ill. He had cancer at the time, although we did not know that. He died and was buried in Arlington Cemetery, and it was discovered after he had been interred that the military record upon which his burial in Arlington Cemetery had been based, which was his "heroic service" in the Merchant Marine, having been sunk and survived a run to Vladivostok, was a fabrication, so they dug him up.

Q: This is Tape 4, Side 1 with Tex Harris.

HARRIS: That's one case that we have. While we're on it, let's do more AFSA things.

Q: Yes, I'd like to. Why don't we stick to AFSA. Give the dates of when you're talking about so it won't be confusing for people.

HARRIS: Let's talk about the grievance system. Once the grievance legislation negotiations had taken place and Eagleburger signed them, then began the very serious negotiations in terms of negotiating the implementing regulations, and that system went into place. That made an enormous difference for people because it meant that every decision that was made by a manager or management in the foreign affairs agency was subject to third-party review, and it brought in a new avenue of responsibility on the part of the Department of State's managers. They had an opportunity to worry that their decisions were reviewable by outside parties, and they [not] only had to make sure that they were, as they always had been, consonant with what their bosses' wishes were or what the bureau's policies were, but [also] that they comported to a higher sense of justice. That was really a revolution, and AFSA hired attorneys and paralegals during the Boyatt board and afterwards and strengthened that section, so we began to be able to provide assistance to people who were being separated out or who lost allowances or the whole range of things from separation for cause to others. That has been a battle over the years in terms of disciplinary actions and how those were affected, but that was really a very important single contribution of the association and something that I was particularly involved in throughout—making sure that we had a system that worked.

Q: Did you have a certain review? There's a difference between seeing that there's due process or being the advocate of somebody. A normal lawyer will take on a case and doesn't give a damn whether they're guilty or innocent. I would think this would be a problem for you to look at a case. Is it difficult to be an advocate of somebody whom something is being done to, no matter what the merits of the case are.

HARRIS: Well, no, clearly that was the case. We essentially defended people, whether in effect it was something that we judged to be meritorious or not. People had a right to be heard, and so that went forward. There also developed a number of people in the outside bars who took these cases on and who worked diligently to defend or to represent people before the grievance board, but it meant that essentially there was accountability. There was accountability in the management of the foreign affairs agencies that there never had been, and that accountability was triggered not by the General Accounting Office, not by some congressman, but was triggered by an individual member of the Foreign Service complaining that something that had happened to them was not fair or was wrong, and that was important.

Q: But did you see a pattern, though, developing of professional complainers?

HARRIS: Yes.

Q: Could you talk about that?

HARRIS: This was always tough. We always had people who—and I think our society has this—who were litigious, who would have a sense that if something wrong had happened to them it must be somebody else's fault and not theirs, and would complain. We would try to advise people that this kind of case was not going to be successful and would give them the necessary help in terms of process and so forth. If a case came forward that had major implications to others in the Foreign Service, then AFSA would get behind it and put more resources into that particular case, because it would benefit not only the individual but would benefit others. Let me give you a case in point. The diplomatic security agents were told one day that they were all managers, and consequently under the overtime, the federal pay laws, anyone who is a manager has a very limited right to overtime. Well, the people who are responsible for the protection in the close personal security detail for the secretary of state may work 100 percent overtime a week. Their work weeks may be eighty or a hundred hours a week, and under this provision of law, as managers they would be precluded from claiming except a small portion of that overtime pay, so it saved the Department of State tens and tens of thousands of dollars every pay period by having these people classified as managers. Well, there was one very brave security officer, who had a shaved head—one of the first Foreign Service guys I ever saw with a shaved head—who said, this is wrong. He said, "The only thing I manage is my gun. I have to keep it clean. I have no other management responsibilities at all." So he filed a grievance and then went to the courts, and AFSA supported him in his claim, which was for about a hundred thousand dollars of back overtime because he had carefully kept a record of all the time he had worked on the secretary's detail in New York City, working literally sixteen- and seventeen-hour days during those periods.

Q: In the United Nations.

HARRIS United Nations, right, when the secretary's up there. Extremely long hours, and should be compensated for either time and a half or double time depending on what the federal law provided. But as a manager he couldn't claim that. He took a long time but finally he succeeded, which meant that everyone else, the other twenty or thirty people in the secretary's detail, or people who had been doing other close protective security work, also were eligible for compensation. This was a decision that the Department budgeted three million dollars for in terms of paying these back claimants. So that is a decision that Sharon Papp and myself and others in AFSA worked very hard at in terms of achieving.

Q: What period was this?

HARRIS: This was in '94–'95, something like that.

Q: What about discrimination rules, particularly racial discrimination? It's been sort of the word around the corridor that you don't want to say anything against somebody who is African American or minority status, because all they have to do is scream "Race" even if they're not producing. And, one, you, if you write a bad efficiency report, are in trouble, and two, nothing will happen because it will be put on— I know somebody who

says, "My God, I wrote an efficiency report on that woman that should have gotten her out"—she was African American I think—"ten years ago, and I just saw her here at the FSI. She's been trouble everywhere she went." This is the word in the corridor. I don't know the justification for this.

HARRIS: There are a number of cases, and there is a case now that is before the Equal Opportunity Commission, an affirmative action case in which an officer is claiming—this is David Pierce—

Q: Oh, yes, I've interviewed David.

HARRIS: He has documented a number of jobs that he has lost because the jobs were given particularly to women, perhaps minority but certainly women, female candidates, because of their sex; and if he had had those jobs, the expectation is that if he had the jobs he would have done well, as could be expected, and he would have been promoted. So I think that this kind of view in the corridors is now being tested in the affirmative action machinery in the United States on the basis of a male claimant that he has been reverse discriminated against because of his gender. It has been tough, and I think there are certainly some cases where people who were not as well qualified have been appointed because of their gender or their race. Who was the American ambassador in Iraq, a woman? April Glaspie, who was very well qualified for the Iraq job, an Arabic specialist, once commented in a meeting that the Department is moving too fast in giving too much responsibility to women officers—and this was important because it was coming from a woman—and we are finding women who are being appointed to jobs for which they are not yet qualified—I want to emphasize the word "yet"—and they're not doing as well as they could be expected to do if they had additional experience in order to fulfill those, and it will hurt women in the long run by moving with them too far. That's not just the word in the corridor, that's from a very astute observer.

Q: Well, there's a certain amount of force-feeding in order to get the statistics up.

HARRIS: But one of the other problems is that—for example, take the Clinton administration—the Clinton administration set forward that they would have a policy in terms of appointments in which the Clinton appointees would look like America, would have the same kind of racial balance and gender balance that reflected the society as a whole. When it came to making political appointees, what Clinton did was to appoint primarily white males to those positions. The White House Office of Personnel then turned to the State Department and they said, "Make the president look right." So the director general then was faced with having to find people who were female, minorities, in order to fill billets in the career slots in order to make the balance sheet of the appointments for the American ambassadorial representation corps look like America, which meant that there was a mandate from the White House to dig deeper into gender and minority in order to get the right kind of balances to make the president an honest man.

Q: Moving to a different subject here, I want to finish this AFSA thing. By the way, AFSA

stands for—.

HARRIS: American Foreign Service Association.

Q: What about the staff officers? You mentioned this when you started in the late '60s. They had felt disadvantage. What sort of steps were you able to take to deal with that?

HARRIS: We had a committee dealing with staff issues. A lot of the issues were fundamental issues of diplomatic practice in the Department—and this really galled. A lot of the staff people didn't care about the titles, but what they really did care about was the fact that they did not have access to tax-free gasoline, tax-free booze, and to other perks because of their non-diplomatic status overseas. We've worked very hard to ameliorate these kinds of issues. The other thing that has been worked on, from the early Mustang programs, was to make sure that we had an open-door policy in terms of allowing staff people to move up and to come into competition into the service for any and all jobs, which they have done. The DCM now at Lagos, a terrific lady, started off as a staff officer. There are so many examples of just absolutely outstanding [officers]. Brian Atwood, former head of AID, started off in the Foreign Service as a diplomatic security officer. So we have lots of examples of people who have done terribly well in their career. But it's a question of respect, and I think frankly in the old days there really wasn't, Stu, as you remember and I do, the respect towards them. They were seen as being flunkies and not the same. Perhaps there's a little edge. The service is much more egalitarian now, so that the high flyers don't have quite the shine on them that they had in the earlier days, when they saw themselves pretty much as God's chosen folks. When I first came in, I was impressed by the high flyers, but I also was impressed by the number of folks who saw themselves as high flyers but frankly were very mediocre in both their intellectual and personal qualifications—

Q: And interpersonal relationships.

HARRIS: —and interpersonal relationships and the view of managing up, kissing up and kicking down.

Q: The radfahrer*—that means a bicycle. He bends as a bicycle person when he's pumping, bends up and treads down below. The Germans used to call it the* radfahrer*, the bicycle.*

HARRIS: Yes, well, this is very much what happened, and it's been a problem.

Q: I just wanted to say we have just about finished your time with AFSA, and you've referred both to the period in the late '60s and also back when you were president in 1994. One question I'd like to ask the next time before we move on—

HARRIS: I was the president from '93 for four years till '97.

Q: So we might pick up some more of that—you've talked about the Lawrence case and a

couple of others—if there's anything else that occurs when we come to that period. But I would like to ask, particularly in this earlier period, the next time about your relations with Congress, staff, Congress and all that and how that worked.

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Q: This is January 12, 2000. Tex, your first period with AFSA was when to when?

HARRIS: I'll have to figure that out. It was in the Bray board, and that was in the late '60s, early '70s.

Q: Okay. You've already mentioned that. I want to talk about congressional relations. How much of a player was Congress in this? And would you talk about how AFSA dealt with Congress. When I use "Congress" I'm using the broader term, including staff as well as members.

HARRIS: Absolutely. I served on five AFSA boards, one as a board member for Charlie Bray, and I served as vice president to Bill Harrop and vice president Tom Boyatt. Then in July of '93 through June of '96 I was the president of AFSA.

Q: Let's talk about this early part.

HARRIS: When I came aboard in '93, the view of AFSA in terms of its professional activities, the most significant contribution that we in the association needed to make, was to add our voice in an effective way on the Hill in order to get the necessary resources that were needed for the proper pursuit of diplomacy. One of the things that I spent my time worrying about, thinking about, and working on was developing AFSA into an information and lobbying arm for the Foreign Service on the Hill. This was one of the goals that we had and one of the things that we achieved. We started a routine basis of calling on the staffs of the appropriation committees. Now in the past Congressional Affairs, the H Bureau, had held the appropriators off-limits to the rest of the Department of State. The geographic bureaus had full ease and confidence. They'd just notify Congressional Affairs, and then they could go up and they could see and meet with staffers in congressional offices or meet with people on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and talk to them about the substance of what we were saying and doing with government X, Y, and Z. But when it came to the really core issue, which was money, no one was permitted to see those people except H and the M area. In those days the appropriations work was something that was done by the under secretary of state for management in conjunction with Congressional Affairs. It was actually run out of the M office. That was later changed, and it was moved to the Congressional Affairs office. This didn't make sense, because the Department was constrained by OMB (Office of Management and Budget) in terms of what it could ask for and what it could say on the Hill. Dick Moose complained that Congressional Affairs wouldn't let him go up to the Hill and talk to appropriators without sending a spy along with him because they didn't want him to talk out of school. It meant that the State Department was toeing largely the OMB line and not the line that we felt was necessary

to represent the interests of the Foreign Service. I was the first person—this was in '94—who in the appropriations cycle went up for the first time and testified before the appropriators. It was that year that USIA was trying to develop funding for a separate Radio Asia, and they were going to take seven million dollars out of the Voice of America budget and move it. Among other things in my presentation to the Hill, I mentioned this didn't make sense, that Voice of America had done an excellent job in the Tiananmen Square events, that they had been credible and they had been effective and we did not need to have an exile radio patterned after Radio Liberty or Radio Free Europe. So I caught the attention of someone. You generally get five minutes, and you're squeezed in between tuna fishermen and recreation sports users, and you get five minutes to say your piece, they thank you very much and you go on, but it's important to do it, and it puts the association, it puts the Foreign Service, through the paces of saying what they really need the money for, and you have to do it in five minutes. Well, we made this one point, and one of the members there became interested in it, and so he engaged me in a colloquy for about another ten minutes back and forth on the issue, and we killed it. [Senator Joseph] Biden pushed it the following year, and it finally was created, but at least we stopped it for a year. But it gave us then an opportunity to meet with the appropriators and gave us an opportunity to go and tell the story of the Foreign Service people directly to the appropriators, because the appropriators and the views that they had were sometimes very astute but other times were very misinformed and biased on the basis of wrong information that had been given them. So it gave us a chance to set the record straight. Several of the congressional staffers had family members in the Foreign Service or working in the State Department at AID, and they had all kinds of sources of information, so it was a very important new dimension to the AFSA diplomacy. We then went out and we hired a professional staffer, Ken Nakamura, who had been a long-term staffer in the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the Republican side, a wonderful, effective, efficient, low-key operator on the Hill, who had great contacts there, and that expanded our contacts with members both on the House side and also on the Senate side, so we'd go around and see them. Previously in AFSA before this time—this is starting in '93 and early '94—we had really focused on the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees. Those two committees were the major things. I remember once we had gone to see [Representative] Wayne Hays. This is with Tom Boyatt. I don't think I've told this story. We went to see Wayne Hays with a little laundry list of things that we wanted for the Foreign Service, and we went into Hays's office. He was the head of the House Appropriations Subcommittee, which handled the State Department budget, and also was in charge of the housekeeping for the House of Representatives and that whole wing. We went in to see Hays, and his office was absolutely beautiful, one of the most beautiful offices I've ever been in. The furniture was gorgeous, the decoration, the paintings from the National Gallery, the color of the walls: it was just gorgeous, it was something in the ultimate taste. And he didn't look up. He just kept working, and we walked across the fairly large office, and he looked up with snakelike eyes, he was squinting so hard, and he looked up after letting us hang for a minute or two while he was finishing writing something, and he said, "What do you sons of bitches want today?" That was the opening. So Boyatt says, "We've come here for kindergarten allowances." So Hays leaned back and he said, "What do you mean kindergarten allowances? You guys get every goddamn thing in the world. You're just coddled," and he just berated us for about

three or four minutes. And Boyatt says, "When I'm in Virginia, my kids get to go to kindergarten free. It's part of the school system. Or if they're in Maryland or in DC, they get to go to a public school kindergarten, but when we're overseas the Department of State doesn't start paying for the allowances for education until kids get into the first grade." And Hays said, "That doesn't make any sense. I'll fix that." He said, "What else is on your list?" So we went through this list of a dozen things, and it was terrific. He called one of his henchmen in and the guy took notes. We'd say something and he'd say, "Hell will freeze over before you get that as long as I'm here. Don't ever ask me for that again, or I'll never see you again." Then we'd ask for something else that OMB had vetoed, something that OMB had not allowed the State Department to ask for, layette allowances or some other benefit, and Hays would say, "That makes sense. I'll give you that." It was like going to see the godfather. In twenty minutes of taking a lot of crap from Wayne Hays, we got all these wonderful benefits that the Department could not even ask for because OMB had not permitted it.

Q: Incidentally, to put it straight, you as AFSA did not feel constrained to follow OMB instructions?

HARRIS: No, as a matter of fact, we were very interested to learn when we could what OMB had prevented the Department from asking for, and that then gave us an idea of something that should go on our list to work for in terms of the Hill.

Q: Did OMB make any noises to try to shut you up?

HARRIS: They were very unhappy about this and accused the Department of State of working in cahoots with us, but there was really nothing they could do. We were an independent organization and later we were a union, so we had our own standing to talk. We also talked to OMB. We'd go over and argue with OMB against decisions that they made that we felt were shortsighted. So we became kind of a gadfly and an independent actor in the budget process. We needed champions. We needed to find champions either for or against something, but if we searched we could find here and there in congressional offices somebody who would say, "That's an issue that I wish to be associated with," and that member of Congress and that senator and his staff and office would work with us on it and often we got those things produced. We also began to popularize the understanding in the Foreign Service through another thing that I invented—didn't invent, but I put into use—which was the List Serve. List Serve is a multiple-address e-mail system that costs almost nothing to operate and allowed AFSA to use the e-mail to contact—and this was before the Department had open e-mail, so it went to people's homes and the few people who had Internet machines in their offices—but we developed a list of several thousand people that we sent information to. And as we had these budget closedowns, and when they were threatening to close the government and things like that, we were very well read. One of the major things that I did was that I had a big audience in the Foreign Service, because everybody could count on getting up-to-the-minute, corridor-quality information from me as the AFSA president in these little text grams, these AFSA text messages that I sent around the world. People greatly appreciated that because, dammit, they were paying their dues but here was somebody who was reporting to them and it

came right to their machine, right to their desktop and told them what was going on. If they had questions, they could ask and they could get the answers, and that continues today. So that was a major change in terms of trying to connect the Foreign Service together so that people would understand the issues. One of the issues that came out of this—and this was later, during the government shutdown which, I guess, was in '95—was when [House Speaker] Gingrich and [President] Clinton deadlocked and there was a government shutdown and the embassies were closed. Well, as this happened in the beginning of the fiscal year, Congress went out of session and there was congressional travel coming, so a lot of our members became very exercised about the fact that, although the government was closed, the Executive was closed, members of the Congress were going around and traveling, doing these great tourist trips around. There was one—I forget the member's name—who led a delegation through Machu Picchu and the Iguaçu Falls of Latin America, which was just an absolutely thrilling voyage around ARA, with almost no substance and days devoted to tourism and a few hours devoted to meeting with local officials. Well, we got a message from some of our posts that came in with this reporting because they had the information on the closedown, and then I went to Guy Gugliotta, who was or still is the one of the Post writers on the Hill. So Tom and I worked together, and we did a story about this great boondoggle. Al Kamen came and helped; Al had been very interested in this. And what we both thought was going to be a story on page A17 turned out to be a story on page one, and it was picked up on National Public Radio, on the Associated Press (AP). The New York Times had to do a follow-up story on it, and all the other major newspapers either ran the AP things or bits and pieces of it, and it became a front-page story all around the United States—here the U.S. government is caught. The second major thing that we were working on in AFSA was press relations. AFSA before had really worked at dealing with the building, and the judgment that I brought in terms of my leadership in AFSA was that we had to do that, but that the real decisions that really affected the lives and careers and the profession of the Foreign Service were not tied up in decisions that were made inside the top offices in State, AID, or USIA, but they were made in other places. They were made in the White House, at OMB, they were made on the Hill, they were made in press rooms around the country, so we had to change essentially the posture of AFSA. AFSA had to be externally driven and externally effective as well. So we developed outreach strategy with our retiree members. We set up chapters. Our chapters went and saw the local editors. They got editorials in the local newspapers. They went on talk radio. We did hour after hour of talk radio around the country on all the issues affecting the Foreign Service. We set up speakers' bureaus. We did all these things, which changed AFSA from being an internally focused AFSA talking to leaderships in the Foreign Affairs agencies into AFSA talking to decision makers outside the Department of State, USIA, and AID. Those were some of the major philosophical changes that took place.

Q: What about foreign policy?

HARRIS: We had a few issues on policy that came up, which various members raised and then we debated. We got involved in some of the Cuban issues at the board level, but the board decided not to pursue them. What we were concerned with was the resources, the wherewithal to conduct American diplomacy, and that wasn't there. The other issue

we were concerned about was the lack of professionalism among noncareer ambassadors to represent the United States effectively. I think I've told the Larry Lawrence story before, about how Dennis Kux and I worked on that issue to ensure that there was a sense of screening and somewhat of a hurdle, that people realized that they were going to be vetted by us. We did stand up and oppose the Lawrence nomination with great vigor and at least delayed him and probably cost him one or two hundred thousand dollars to deal with the issues that we dealt with, as all his lawyers had to go and redo his books and get money back from the organizations that he had overpaid. The other major thing that I was absolutely committed to do: We had lost USIA. In previous years, just before I came on the board, an election had taken place in which USIA had voted to again elect AFSA as their exclusive bargaining agent and to kick AFGE out, so we had to strengthen our USIA chapter. I spent a lot of time working on that, and we got some very good people who did just yeoman service. Bruce Byers was sensational and did a great job, and Raz Bazala.

Q: USIA had belonged to the Federal Government Employees Union.

HARRIS: Right, American Federation of Government Employees.

Q: What was the reason they decided, having had that for some time, to come over to AFSA?

HARRIS: They felt that they were not being well enough represented, and what we had feared initially was that the major interests of AFGE was on the Civil Service side and not on the Foreign Service side. So that was a long trial period. Bud Hensgenled the fight in the previous board in a very effective and very tough election campaign in USIA between AFGE and AFSA, and we won. Then Raz Bazala came in and did an excellent job, and that went well. The other thing that I was committed to was bringing in FCS, the Foreign Commercial Service, and the Foreign Agricultural Service into the association. Now the Department of Commerce had no unions, had no unions at all. There was not even an AFGE union in the Department of Commerce. I think the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and some of the subagencies had AFGE chapters, but in the main Department of Commerce there was absolutely none, so they were absolutely petrified when all of a sudden their Foreign Commercial Service, one of their golden operations, decided that it was going to stand up and seek a union. Then the Foreign Agricultural Service was exactly the same thing. They had some government unions, but in the Foreign Agricultural Service there were none, and so that was something that was new to them. So that was a very exciting time. We conducted elections in both Foreign Agricultural Service and the Foreign Commercial Service, and we won in both of those elections. We at that time had the Peace Corps, and because of the Peace Corps structure—although they're Foreign Service, they're only in for a maximum of five years, so they're really not a career service—most of the people there are volunteers and it really didn't fit. So at that time we completed the card. We had State, AID, USIA, Foreign Agricultural Service, and Foreign Commercial Service.

Q: Was your pitch the one that I remember in the early battles back in the '60s, that the federal government people are dealing with people who live in their hometown and

they're never going to move and they're not as concerned with issues of a foreign-based operation?

HARRIS: That was always an issue, and we found that when we sent, for example, retiree members to local town halls to the members of Congress, they asked foreign affairs questions. Here were people who had been on Foreign Affairs committees. At this time, or earlier, let's say in the '80s, serving on a Foreign Affairs Committee in the House or the Senate became unattractive, so you had people there who had very funny special interests in foreign affairs or had constituencies that had large ethnic groupings in them, but for the normal member of Congress, he or she wanted to be on the Commerce Committee, on the Agriculture Committee, wanted to be on some committee that really rained money and benefits in on their constituencies and also allowed them to raise funds to be on people's PAC (political action committee) lists, where the foreign affairs committees did not provide much in the way of support, so they worked very hard. The leadership had to go out and recruit people very actively to serve on those committees. We sent people to the committee members' town meetings to ask some foreign affairs questions so they could show off, and they loved it. It was just a question of, here are people spending let's say 20 percent of their time on the Hill in the foreign affairs area and there was some real interest out there. Now, some states are funny, some states like Iowa. In the state of Iowa, Iowa realizes that it sells overseas three-quarters of the farm produce that it produces, and consequently it needs to be concerned about what's going on in the world because it sells to it, the same way with the people in Germany or in Israel or in other places who have those kinds of concerns. But in most places in the United States, overseas is far away and has no relationship to prosperity or what's going on in their communities today.

Q: During the time of Bosnia there was some dispute within the Foreign Service about concern that we weren't doing the right thing in Bosnia—this was early on—and several officers resigned, and I remember somebody taking great exception to the fact that you had written something equivalent to an editorial supporting the people who had resigned, feeling that this on principle was fine but not a particularly good practice to do because it didn't go anywhere.

HARRIS: What we were concerned with was the process. When the Bosnia issue came up, there were several officers who resigned. I looked into it, and several other board members joined me and we looked into it, and we found that they had not been listened to and that there was in fact a hermetically sealed operation. This really began in the [James] Baker era during the Desert Storm, in which the Department of State professionals became cut out. A few were brought into the circle, and then that was hermetically sealed, and essentially the Department of State was left to run the day-to-day operations, and the big issues that the secretary wanted were pulled up and were dealt with by a group with no feedback from the secretariat. That was the same thing that happened in Bosnia. So because of the fuss that we started, all of a sudden the under secretary for political affairs began having big meetings with everybody dealing with Bosnian affairs. They made a commitment to read their memos. They made a commitment to talk to them. They had meetings. And we were speaking out not on the

issue of whether they were right or wrong but on the absolute certainty that they and their voices needed to be heard. At the Department of State—and that still is a problem today—in terms of policy levels, the exchange of ideas between the desk officer, as you go up every layer, generally people know less and less. With rare exceptions you find this dilution of knowledge and expertise about really what's going on on the ground, and so our policy becomes more and more disengaged from the reality of the ground truths that are there. It didn't make sense. We took a strong stand on the process, not on the substance. Thanks for bringing it up. That was a major tiff, and it was one of these things of battling through the board, because a lot of people felt we were stepping on quicksand and we shouldn't get involved in that, but we felt that we could limit it very carefully not to whether these guys' positions were right or wrong but the fact that they had not been heard, and that's what we did.

Q: As long as we're talking about the time you were on the board and president of the board back in the —'90s—and we'll have to arrange this chronologically when it comes time to edit this—what about the issue at that time of minorities and women? You know, there are two things. One is to be fair, and you've got court orders, but on the other hand, if you're not going to have discrimination, you can't have pro-discrimination. It's a square and a circle.

HARRIS: Todd Stewart, who was the very effective—Have you done Todd?

Q: I'm working with Todd. I'll see him on Friday.

HARRIS: Good. Give him my hello, and ask him about this, because he's really the expert on this particular area. Todd Stewart was the AFSA representative in terms of crafting the action program stemming from the women's and black officers' lawsuits. So here the Department of State had lost lawsuits, which had been found valid, that the Department discriminated against both officers on the basis of gender, women, and on the basis of race, blacks, and they put together a task group to do it. There was no one from the Foreign Service on the task group except Todd Stewart. So Todd had to make sure that what came up in terms of the many decisions made sense from a Foreign Service standpoint and not just from a civil service standpoint. He spent a lot of time on that, so that's a good subject to talk to Todd about. He was the point person on that, and we played a major role in crafting AFSA through Todd Stewart's skilled interventions.

Q: Do you recall any debates that went on about what do you do about, one, being proactive in helping groups that have been discriminated before but not at the same time to discriminate against white males?

HARRIS: No, I think that issue in those terms came later. There was grumbling, but I think the major mood in the building and on the AFSA board was, my God, we've really screwed up in terms of the treatment of women, we've really screwed up in terms of the treatment of blacks, we've got to make sure that we do this right. I think there were some individuals, officers, in the service who felt that this kind of reverse discrimination was afoot, and that turned out in fact to be the case. I think there were some appointments that

were made, but AFSA, *qua* AFSA, never took a position on it. In USAID and then in State and USIA, we did get the language in the hiring principles that the Department would be neutral in terms of sexual preference. So that, then, based on policy language that we put into the Foreign Affairs manual, became a standard, and the foreign affairs component of the State Department was the lead in that. We then came, the GLIFAA—this was later, probably in '95—pushed very hard because they wanted equal treatment of spouses of gay and lesbian partners, their partners, to be treated as spouses.

Q: GLIFAA stood for Gay and Lesbian—.

HARRIS: —In foreign affairs agencies. They pushed very hard, and the AFSA board. This is my position again. A lot of these things I fought for and the board eventually went along with, not always but most of the time. And we worked through them. It wasn't a dictatorship by any means. We battled these issues out, and they always came out, I thought, better than either my initial position or anybody else's initial position after a two-hour board meeting. We met every week; the AFSA board now meets once a month. We met every week, and we battled. We felt that the foreign affairs agencies should not lag behind what was common practice in the rest of American society or in the rest of the American government in terms of how spousal benefits or partnership benefits should be granted, but we didn't feel that the foreign affairs agencies should be in the lead. Now we didn't really focus at that time on the homophobia of Jesse Helms and others. We weren't that clever. Had we been, that might have been a good reason to back away from it. But it just seemed that we should be not fall behind the rest of the government in terms of these advances, in terms of reflecting where American society was, but that we shouldn't experiment with these things in a foreign affairs establishment that had some 249 posts around the world, that we ought to try it out first in the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Defense, civilians, and some other test beds.

Q: Also, you were up against another thing, and that is the legal relationship, because when you're talking about diplomatic immunity and all, if you have a lesbian partner, she per se is not the legal spouse of somebody and how can you give a diplomatic passport to somebody who is not legally part of it. It had nothing to do with the morals or who's sleeping with whom.

HARRIS: I think that, given the changes that are taking place today, where state and local governments and some federal agencies are treating partners as spouses, I think this is going to change and is changing now in terms of the benefits and the treatment that people get. Now whether they get a diplomatic passport, that really is defined, who's entitled to that, on the basis of treaty law, so there are some other strictures, but in terms of administrative action, I think today clearly getting additional housing allowance and so forth or additional weight shipment should be permitted. But that, I don't think, was the case when we were talking about these things in '94 and '95. I think in five or six years we'd move there, but we weren't there yet, so we're not following. We shouldn't lag. We should follow but not lag.

Let me just go through a few of the issues. Junior officer coning was a major battle. I

won't go through the whole coning discussion now, but because of the lawsuit, Ed Perkins made a horseback decision to do away with the coning-upon-entry system in order to deal with compliance and one of the issues that the judge focused on in one of the lawsuits. They found that women were coned more often in admin and consular and not in political or economic. So they abolished it and began to bring people in unconed and then cone them later. We had major negotiations with the Department over the coning, the precepts and the processes of coning. Those were very difficult, and we really brought the Department around, if not 180 degrees, at least 90 degrees on that, but that was a major push. I came over here to the Foreign Service Institute and we had huge meetings, and we had two hundred junior officers [JOs] here. They all poured in after class. We'd come over here and meet right at the end of the day, and we got all the reviews. We had a JO working committee, and this was again my sense of participatory democracy, the way AFSA ought to be, that AFSA held a lot of keys to the negotiating rooms, and we ought to hand the keys out to the people who were affected. We had a secretaries committee, we had communicators committees, we had other committees established under my board for the various people who had the same interest. We set one up for the B&F (budget and fiscal) officers who had very specialized interests and concerns and problems. The diplomatic security issues, we had scores of those. I talked last time about the gimmick that DS pulled on their officers to deny them several million dollars' worth of overtime, which we turned around. The meetings were so big, we held them in the Acheson Auditorium and we had almost half the auditorium filled with diplomatic security agents. I hadn't realized there were that many around, but they came. One of the things that I very much focused on in the Department of State was constituency building and empowering the various specialization groups to use AFSA as their tool to get management's attention. We also developed separate core precepts, the State Department's 1993 sexual orientation policy, which would follow the AID example, which was the first one we negotiated, that an employee's sexual orientation may not be a basis for denial of employment or a security clearance, and that was important. In USIA the major thing we did was we had to negotiate a new basic agreement—because we had just won an election and so we had to negotiate a new agreement—and that took months and months of bargaining to put that together. Then the Clinton administration began to develop what they called "partnership agreements," which were softer agreements than collective bargaining agreements and were really focused on a way of enhancing communication between the federal unionized work force and federal managers, so we worked very hard. USIA was much better than the other agencies in terms of partnership agreements. The State Department just thought it was a lot of crap, and their system worked pretty well, which I think it did. AID—we'll talk about that in a minute—was just happy with the dictatorial system that they had and they didn't want to hear anything from the union other than to bring them in and to harangue them. We also worked to strengthen our chapter representative overseas. That was important. We had to have chapters, and we worked hard in terms of getting people to head chapters. We had 147 chapters around overseas, mostly for getting information back and forth. We also energized the retirees to get them to lobby. Well, how many lobby? Maybe thirty or forty really wrote their members of Congress and went to see them in the offices, but that's thirty or forty more significant contacts, and the fact that they were sitting knee to knee with their congressman in Seattle or Sacramento or someplace

talking about the Foreign Service, using talking points that we had distributed over the AFSA net, were important things. AID is a separate chapter. This was during the regime of Brian Atwood, and he brought a fellow in by the name of Larry Byrne, who became the de facto czar and principal manager of the agency. We had just terrible problems in terms of AID. We just weren't communicating. We weren't getting input, we weren't being listened to, and they were just doing things and just running around us, running around AFGE. It was just horrible. The culmination happened—I was walking down the hall, and Larry Byrne, who was the assistant administrator for management, was walking down the hall, and we got in a conversation. I don't know how it began, but we began talking about the ninety-six-million-dollar program that AID was putting together to redevelop its computer system, which was going to be a model computer system for managing all of its operations worldwide, which would mean all the information would be in Washington and it could be micromanaged by headquarters. Well, it wasn't working. So I told that to Byrne, and then Byrne blew up in the hall. We almost had a fight. He was a little, tiny guy, but he almost slugged me. So he started screaming at me at the top of his voice in a public hallway in AID there. He essentially said, "You sons of bitches in AFSA don't know a goddamn thing about computers, and you're trying to tell us what's going on." I said, "Larry, we don't need to know the details of how the operating systems work. You've hired contractors to do that. You're paying them ninety-six million dollars. What I'm telling you is what our people are telling us in the field, that the goddamn thing is not working, that it is not working, they cannot do their work, the system is broken and it's not being fixed, and it's going to fall on its ass, and the Agency is going to pay a terrible cost in terms of doing it." He abused me. Then he began to threaten to take away benefits and to try to get the union membership cut by taking out senior members, started making threats against the bargaining unit and the way that the AFSA was organized, which is an unfair labor practice. So I went, as soon as this fight was over and people came out, to the AFSA office, which was about fifty feet away, and I outlined the conversation, took it home that night, dictated it into my machine. I had realized immediately that he had committed a major unfair labor practice by threatening to disembowel the unit and by taking retaliation against the Foreign Service in terms of cutting our benefits and things like that. He was a pretty rough guy, but he was doing in the hall what he did to everybody in the agency in private, and everybody was absolutely petrified of the guy. He was an absolute dictator and a very smart guy, he was not a dumb guy, and he felt that AID was just a bunch of old fossils and the only way he could do it was just to run over everybody and get stuff done. Well, I went back and wrote it up. We then filed an unfair labor practice. We published this debate, and all of a sudden people around the world said, "Godammit, we can stand up. You know, AFSA stood up to Larry Byrne. And we're not going to take this crap from him anymore." And that was the beginning of the end. You know, I just happened to be there. I don't know if I talked about the Gump— *National Review* did a piece on my career, and they talked about my career and all the funny things that had happened to me, as I was the Forrest Gump of the Foreign Service. I had always appeared at these times of crisis and somehow managed to come out of it unscathed but with all these bodies lying around me.

Q: Forrest Gump was a character in a movie called "Forrest Gump."

HARRIS: Starring Tom Hanks, which won, I think, an academy award. It was about a guy who had a very charmed life and who was a retard, which was not favorable, but anyway that was the image. In a certain sense it's a cute thing because a lot of these things did happen, and in fact I did get hurt in several of these things, but that's the fun of our career, which is standing up. But that was very significant, and we had absolute warfare with AID, and then Brian Atwood would try and intervene to bring us into his office to try to bring the two of us together. It would work for a little bit, then Byrne would go off on his tear because he couldn't accept being second guessed by anyone much less people from a union.

Q: Where did Byrne come from?

HARRIS: His wife was a member of Congress, Leslie Byrne, who is—

Q: She was my congresswoman here in northern Virginia.

HARRIS: That's right. And she lost an election, and she's now your congresswoman, your senator in Richmond. He had worked for a number of years as a consultant. He had been in the Department of Energy, where he hadn't worked out, and so the White House had to get him a job as a political appointment and so they sent him over to AID. So Brian Atwood took him on. Evidently he held some things that Brian Atwood couldn't have revealed, so Atwood had to take care of him, and he was Atwood's hatchet man throughout this period. It was a very tough time. One of the things that AFSA did was to hold conferences with the business community during this period, conferences on Vietnam, conferences on sanctions, and these were large, mega-events. This was part of a tradition that went back to the Young Turk Board, was strengthening the association between AFSA and American business, because we have a lot of the same interests. We held these very elaborate conferences with eighth-floor lunches, and everybody loved it. The Department loved it, because we brought the business community into the building talking about key policy issues, and it gave the Department a chance to host these things. The secretary or one of the under secretaries came to address the luncheon, and the secretary often came to the various meetings. They were very, very successful. We had a host of these things. There were all kinds of other issues. A lot of the issues we dealt with were small issues, for example, the Department wanting to charge posts for transporting people—In a lot of posts in the world, security was very difficult, and the Department provided little buses with armed guards to bring people back and forth. Then somebody said, you can't do this unless you charge them. So the Department said, "We'll charge them some exorbitant fee, one or two hundred dollars a month for the transport," which made no sense. So we went in and said, "Look, what it's got to be based on is what the cost would be, not the actual cost that you're paying for a driver and gasoline in Kabul, Afghanistan, but what the cost would be for providing that similar kind of service in Washington DC." So that was the principle that we adopted. The money guys said, "Well, we've got to pay these guys the actual cost, and the reason is that they're there in harm's way and the service is being provided not to facilitate their travel to and from work but because we didn't want them driving their own cars." So it was a security cost and the Department had to pay it. But we had all these kinds of battles as we went along.

One thing we haven't talked about, and it probably may not even be of interest, but it was the AFSA impeachment of John Hemenway, which is an earlier board. Let me just note that here. I may write something on that. But Howard—what was his name? wonderful, wonderful guy—and I led the campaign to impeach John Hemenway.

Q: This was when?

HARRIS: This was in the mid-'70s. Rick Williamson, who had worked with me on the AFSA board—I'd been vice president and he had been the executive officer on leave without pay from State—a very capable guy and a very capable negotiator, decided that he would run to replace Tom Boyatt. He was a brilliant writer, but he wrote the stuff that was real, and Hemenway wrote this political fiction. Of course, all these people overseas—those were the days before the *AFSA Net*—did not know what was going on, so they got these various platform statements, and if you looked at the platform statements, you certainly wouldn't want to vote for him anyway because he was promising you a chicken in every pot and Williamson was talking about making the incremental changes that needed to be made and which were possible to be made, so we just got out-politicked and Hemenway won. This was terrible because Hemenway just hated the Foreign Service, so we had a president of AFSA who hated the Foreign Service, his board hated him, it was just an absolute disaster for the Foreign Service and an absolute disaster for AFSA. Howard—I'll think of his name—and I engineered and did the work to impeach Mr. Hemenway from the AFSA presidency, which is something that has made him hostile to me personally over the years, and John Harter and a small group of other people who felt that the association was really controlled by a group of elitists, that we were not speaking for the people.

Q: Well, Hemenway, as I recall it, struck a bunch of us who weren't involved in the thing of being, let's say—

HARRIS: Right wing.

Q: Not only right wing but there was some concern about his stability, frankly his mental stability. And I'm told that when he testified before Congress, it was an embarrassment for everyone.

HARRIS: I don't know. I never had a sense of that. I really felt he was embittered and angry and really hated the Foreign Service, because the Foreign Service had rejected him, and the Foreign Service had found him not to be among the very best and the brightest of the people that they took in, and that was not the view that he held of himself. So it was very tough. The other thing that AFSA did, part of its tasks, was the plaque that memorializes those who lost their lives in heroic and tragic circumstances, not anyone losing their life overseas but those who lost their lives in tragic and heroic circumstances. And we had some tough issues dealing with the plaque. Barbara Schell, who was a

political advisor in northern Iraq, was shot down by the state because her helicopter did not have its particular homing device on, and that was tragic. And I remember Freddie Woodruff, in '93 was killed in Georgia, caught in an ambush. I remember being with the secretary in those days and how Christopher was so moved. He was not an emotional guy at all, but these things really touched him. And then we had the plane of Department of Commerce Secretary Ron Brown that went down. That became such a major problem for us in terms of the number of people, and some people in civil service and not Foreign Service, that we proposed to the Department to put a separate plaque up to commemorate, which we actually raised the money for and which contained the names of everybody on the plane, including the people from the private sector, and that's in the lobby of the main State today.

Q: Why didn't it go into the Department of Commerce?

HARRIS: That's what we wanted, but they felt that no one went to the Department of Commerce, it wasn't a hallowed hall. So it's right around the corner from the second of the plaques. But that was always a very difficult thing and a tough issue for the association to deal with, because a lot of people lost their lives in heroic circumstances. Another thing that I accomplished during this time with Harry Blaney, who's an old friend and came in the Foreign Service with me, is that we started something that I literally thought up in the shower one morning, which was the Coalition for American Leadership Abroad (COLEADCOALA), as I was sudsing myself up one morning literally. You know, it's very strange in this town that there is a coalition here to save the bald eagle, so all the environmental groups and other groups that are interested in environmental issues rally around saving the bald eagle, but we do not have a grouping of people who are dedicated to work together to save American diplomacy and to strengthen American diplomacy. So we created something—again something I thought of. Now, of course, in Washington it's not the name, it's the acronym, which is important, and that was COLEAD , and it's there today. What that has done very well—and again AFSA sponsors this, we provide the office, that started during my tenure in the AFSA presidency—every morning when the Congress is in session, the congressional affairs representatives from CARE, from World Vision, from the Arms Control Agency, from the Russian teaching associations, from all these groups who have an interest in the 150 Account, get together and talk about what's going on up on the Hill, what's going on in the agencies that affect the resource flows and viability of funding for the foreign affairs programs that they are all busy implementing. So that has worked out very well. It started off with about fifteen, and it's doubled in membership; it's about forty members now. That is now an AFSA outreach program and very effective because now when we have an issue we no longer go with just AFSA, we go along with Church World Services, we go along with the Quakers, we go along with CARE, we go along with others, so it's not just Foreign Service people going up there talking about, hey, we need more allowances or we need more per diem or other kinds of issues, but it becomes something that is much broader and much more significant in the eyes of the members.

Q: Did you tackle the problem of—I think the term is—"earmarking" funds? This is where Congress gives money for very specific projects, which often in foreign affairs are

pet projects that don't really advance the cause, at least in the view of professionals?

HARRIS: No, we really didn't go after that. We went after some earmarks before the earmark in the USIA legislation to start Radio Free Asia. We went after that. We got involved in broad-based things. For example, often what happens when the decisions are made in the major committees on a thing like cost-of-living adjustments, they forget the Foreign Service, so the Foreign Service people serving abroad do not get the location benefit, locality pay, each year, which is about 3 percent. If your salary rise is 5 percent, you may get 3 percent of it in a location benefit because it's taxed differently back here in the United States, and it makes it look as if their salary isn't going up but they're getting a cost-of-living differential, which is higher in Alaska than it is in Washington and lower in Tucson, Arizona. But people get left out overseas, so one of the things we had to worry about was making sure that civil service committees kept in mind that there were some tens of thousands of people who worked for the federal government who were not civil servants, who were under separate agency plans. Now the Agency somehow takes care of their people. The military starves them out, and we starve them out. Why don't we stop there with AFSA, then we'll go and get a cup of coffee.

Q: Okay. Tex, we've covered most of the AFSA thing. Something else may pop up. So let's talk about going back to around the late '60s/'70s when you went to economic training.

HARRIS: Yes, after I left the Bureau of Economic Affairs, I came back December '65. When I left the Economic Bureau working for Solomon, Greenwald, and Trezise—we talked about that—I then went to economics training. That was kind of a perk that I had gotten for working in that tough hot seat of a job for eighteen months. I came over in, I think, the first economics course that had been offered. John Sprott, who was one of the deans at FSI later on, was just a young economics professor who had been brought in to run the course. He later finished his career as an ambassador in Swaziland. That was very good. I enjoyed the course, made a lot of good friends. I remember sitting next to Tezie Schaffer, who has a photographic memory, and Tezie was great because I could turn to her in week twenty and I could ask her, "Tezie, what was that equation that was on the board in the first week? I remember the equation, but I don't remember all the elements of it." And she would think, and her little steel blue eyes would blink twice, and then she would write it out just as if it had come off the board. That was very good after having had a lot of discussion on the policy issues. I had had economics as an undergraduate in university but I hadn't majored in it, but it gave me really a full understanding of a lot of the monetary and trade policy issues. Also, I was very interested in trade policy, and I took courses from Stan Metzner and others at George Washington University on trade law and became very interested in trade policy questions at that time. When I got ready to go back into the Department—I'll have to check the timing of this, but I think it was sometime in early '70—Jack Stevenson had been brought in as the legal adviser to the Secretary of State heading up the Legal Department, L as it's called, in the Department of State, the Legal Adviser's office. He thought it would be good for him to have as a special assistant a Foreign Service officer. Since I had experience in the front office as a staff assistant to an assistant secretary and knew how the building worked and how to

move papers and things and also was a lawyer, I was named and surfaced for that position, and I was the first FSO to go to work in the Legal Adviser's office. Now as Vietnam heated up and the Legal Adviser's office needed a lot more bodies, they took a lot more FSOs, but I was the first one over the transom and was regarded as somewhat of a curiosity in this very special preserve of civil service, very rarified civil servants, in the Department of State. Jack Stevenson was an absolutely wonderful man. He was a senior partner in Solomon and Cromwell; was an official, later president, of the American Society of International Law; a very distinguished lawyer, skilled negotiator, and extremely intelligent and hard-working man. He had a few quirks, one of which is he was extremely hard of hearing. He had these very powerful hearing aids that were built into his eyeglasses, and when he was in his office he would turn the sound off of his hearing aids, which in those days were not good quality so it probably had a hum to it, and he would work away with great vigor. His office he kept very dark, and there was a great clock in the office which had a "tick tock tick tock tick tock" which drove everybody crazy. Of course, Stevenson couldn't hear it. The major thing was, you had to be very careful when you came into the room so as not to scare him, because he couldn't hear you coming, so you'd come and you'd stand at the end of the office waiting for minutes and minutes and minutes till he looked up because you didn't want to startle the poor guy. But he was really an inspiration in terms of hard work, skill, and finding and cutting through the absolute bullshit of the inner agency. Now if you can imagine the beginnings of a law-of-the-sea negotiation that involved resources; involved covers; involved the ability of moving our Navy and military forces around the world, which held the promise still unfulfilled of vast mineral deposits under the sea bed ready to be scooped up and mined, so mining interests; involved issues of territorial boundary lines—all the issues that had been developed in various regimes of the law of the sea and the sea bed in conventional law for thousands of years—were going to be put on the table in the United Nations and a new body of law developed. And Jack Stevenson had been chosen by the secretary and the president of the United States to head that up, and I as his special assistant was the executive director of it, so it was great fun. I was not involved in the substance of many of the battles, but I was involved superficially in the substance of all the battles, but I was the guy who was in charge of the process, of the procedures, putting it all together, and something that I really loved doing, and it was great fun. But the disputes between the U.S. Geological Survey and the Department of Defense and the Department of Navy having different positions than the secretary of defense: within the U.S. government the warfare was incredible. And that's the time when I was there. It was when the initial stages, in terms of what was first called the Sea Beds Committee in the United Nations and later became the Law of the Sea Conference, were being developed and we had all this diplomatic structure being devised and a process to establish the regime being put together. But inside the U.S. government we were setting together the policies and the positions the United States would follow, and it was just an absolute circus. Stevenson was tested and was a very effective focus of bringing things together and was extremely serious and wonderful. I spent a year and a half or almost two years doing that work, which was very satisfying and very intriguing and met hundreds of people in the U.S. government doing it. I left the Legal Adviser's office and I went back to the Economic Bureau, and I worked for six months in the Office of Trade Policy on various trade issues, which I enjoyed very much. Then an opening came in the White

House in the Office of the U.S. Special Trade Representative on the legal staff. They asked me if I would like to go over, and I did, and that was terrific. When I got there, I found that I was not just operating as a trade lawyer but in fact had major responsibilities over U.S. trade with Canada and particularly the U.S.–Canadian auto agreement. That was great fun because we had really tough issues in terms of compliance issues, in terms of the enforcement of this agreement; and in USTR I had the experience of bringing together again people from diverse agencies, this time not under State Department—State Department was one of the players but not the convener, which was USTR—but the people from Defense, the people from Commerce, the people from the auto industry, from all the automobile manufacturers, and I then for the first time really ran into big time the lobbying establishment in Washington and began to see how they operate and provide information to the government, also dealing with the auto workers and others, which was great fun.

Q: Did you deal with the Canadians at all?

HARRIS: Yes, we dealt with the Canadians. We had several trips to Ottawa for negotiations and worked with them.

Q: Could you talk a bit about dealing with the Canadians, because I'm told they're very professional, very tough, and they keep playing the "poor little us and big you" sort of thing, but you've got to keep you hand on your wallet?

HARRIS: Absolutely, they were extremely tough and very focused and really had a sense that, where you in the United States had many issues to deal with, this was the most important issue that they had, and if they lost this, there went the republic. So it was very tough. They're very effective. I spent a lot of time in the Canadian embassy across the street from Brookings on Massachusetts Avenue debating with these guys on trade issues and other statements. It was good, it was tough. The real problem that we had in dealing with Canada was that it was very difficult to keep the U.S. government apart, because the Canadians knew all the U.S. agency players, so as the coordinating agency the major concern that we had was that the Canadians would pick off sections of the Commerce Department and work them individually, they'd pick off the Defense Department folks, and they'd have all these other negotiations going around instead of one centralized negotiation, and then everybody would have friends in Ottawa and they'd just pick up the phone. You dial a phone number in Ottawa the same way you dial one in the United States, one three-digit area code and the number, and it rings on somebody's desk in Ottawa. So that was the difficult part of dealing with that.

Q: It was divide and conquer, in a way.

HARRIS: It was very much divide and conquer, and they were very good at it.

Q: How did you meet that?

HARRIS: Not very well. Clearly we had the authority, and when people would get out of

line, they had to pay a price, because they'd have to see themselves lose. But the Hill was very important, so this was a very good experience. That was the first job in which all the elements of Washington diplomacy came into play—

Q: This is Tape 5, Side 1 with Tex Harris. What was your impression of the automobile industry? I'm talking about management and then about the unions. Were they pretty much on the same wave length?

HARRIS: The differences between the automobile companies were incredible. Ford in those days seemed to be terribly weak. I remember once coming out of a meeting and one of the senior officials said, "My God, it's incredible"—this is after the Ford guys left, because they didn't understand the issues—"that the Ford Company makes any money, let alone millions of dollars a year." In those days I think General Motors seemed to be the preeminent American in terms of trade policy and other issues. Again, we were talking about a very specific agreement on automobile trade between the United States and Canada but one that affected literally tens of thousands of jobs in the United States and in Canada and was involved in millions of dollars' worth of cross-border trade. Of course, no one understands this, but Canada is America's number-one trading partner, for both countries. The trade between the United States and Canada is much larger than that with any other country in the world, and that is very, very significant, and the automobile industry is a major part of it. I think we'll stop.

Q: All right, why don't we stop at this point and we'll pick this up again. We're talking about 1970-something, and you're leaving the White House on the trade representative. Where did you go?

HARRIS: I'll have to look at the scenario.

Q: And I want to mention that we pretty well covered the AFSA both in the '60s and in the '90s.

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It's January 18, 2000. Let's talk about Argentina. You were in Argentina from when to when?

HARRIS: I was in Argentina from the summer of, I guess, '77 to '79. My son was born in '78. That would be right. And this was an interesting time. We haven't done the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency). I did the EPA stuff. Do you want to go back and do the EPA stuff?

Q: Why don't we do the EPA stuff.

HARRIS: I spent two years, '75 and '76, at the EPA as a special assistant to the administrator, Russell Train, and I was the coordinator of the U.S.–NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, or CCMS. This was a program that Pat Moynihan had

developed. It was his own international program, and it was done in order to give NATO a better face. NATO's major goal, of course, was to stop the Russians militarily in Europe, and Moynihan thought of an idea for President Nixon, and that was to launch, inside of NATO, a work called the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society to deal with those range of issues that all NATO countries were facing, air pollution, fuel efficiency, anything else that the NATO partners could think of and wanted to work on. And it was a very unusual international organization because it didn't have a secretariat, it had one person, and essentially it worked by having one of the countries volunteer to head a program and then they invited experts from all the other NATO nations to participate in the program. Well, it was started by a fellow by the name of Harry Blaney, who worked for Moynihan in the White House, a very energetic fellow, and with Moynihan's clout the program got off to a roaring start because it had very high political credentials and a lot of political chips. The U.S. domestic technical agencies had political reasons, as well as information exchange and program exchange reasons, to work with their NATO counterparts, and it worked well. I took the program over from Frank Hodsoll and worked for Russell Train, and the deputy head of the program was John Barnum, who was the number-two person as deputy [for] under secretary of transportation. We did wonderful things. We had a number of projects. This was the era of energy conservation, and we had a number of projects in energy conservation, and we ran groups both in the United States and also we sent technical groups abroad to work in these areas. We worked in air pollution, we worked in automobile safety, we worked in modular utility heat distribution, all these other technical front-end things. We had a major program in geothermal energy. We worked in solar energy. We had a large component—this was a period of very high funding—in the Department of Energy on alternative energy sources. When we had programs, for example, in geothermal, then we got folks invited in from New Zealand and other countries that had large geothermal resources as well. The program was very active. As a matter of fact, I myself and one secretary, Lynn Schoolfield, generated so many telegrams that we earned our own tag, CCMS, which was just the two of us, but based on the number of telegrams we sent out announcing all these meetings around the world. It was very good politically, because it meant that our embassies in the NATO countries could go in and offer something positive, not just beating up on countries to do something that they may or may not have an interest in doing, but this was an opportunity for them to share in American technology and in some cases for America to share in the technology of their countries. I remember we had a program on heating efficiency in the home, and the Danes had several national laboratories that were very, very sophisticated in terms of these programs, and our engineers from HUD went over and learned a great deal in terms of how to construct really leading-edge windows and doors and other kinds of systems. This was great fun, and it was terrific. I ran my own program and was an independent operator and worked the whole range of agencies in Washington, generally at fairly senior levels, the assistant secretary level and above. This was a great program in terms of building personal self-confidence and also getting a lot of things done and a lot of travel. I spent about a third of the time on the road in NATO capitals around Europe, working and strengthening and developing the program. It was going well when I took it over, and it was going gangbusters when I left it. That program happened at the beginning of the Carter administration, and I made friends with and worked for Doug Costle, who was the

administrator of EPA. I worked, I guess, about four or five months for Doug before I transferred in the new administration. That friendship proved valuable later, when Costle invited me back to EPA a couple of years later to run the international program in EPA as an associate administrator for international affairs, but that gets ahead of the story.

Q: Before we leave that, how committed did you feel the Europeans and even our industry were on these, because with many of these things they are there but really haven't taken root?

HARRIS: This was a very unusual program because it was not a regulatory program. This was a very pure information exchange program, and there was foreign travel involved. There was the ability to host conferences here in the United States to give exposure to your program, so generally the U.S. participants in the technical agencies, particularly at the working and staff levels, were absolutely enthusiastic, because this gave them an opportunity to travel to Europe and to spend time and to develop professional friendships with people who were their compadres, who worked in the same fields they did. It wasn't onerous, because unlike the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) or other organizations in which there was a regulatory outcome, most of these efforts were really information sharing and did not have regulatory outfit. Now there were a couple that we proposed which were very important and were regulatory initiatives that Russ Train and I put together, and I should mention those. First there was a work that was conducted in terms of development of standardized tests for chemicals. Before this time, every country had their own test for chemicals. In one country it might be the toxicity level as tested against six carp in a tank of so many gallons and at such-and-such a temperature. In another country it might be sixteen trout, so you had all these various standards, which meant that a chemical produced in one country, and tested and proved to be meeting toxicity requirements in that country, wasn't acceptable to move to another country, because it had been tested against carp and not against trout. These were the kinds of issues. So we brought all the experts together and we developed the initial protocols, which were then, because they became terribly important for trade, taken over by the OECD. That was one example. Another example that I worked on particularly hard was the issue of transport of hazardous waste across international boundaries. Now in the early days the easiest way to get rid of hazardous waste in the United States was to put it on a truck and send it to Mexico, where for a few dollars a barrel somebody was perfectly happy to take it and throw it on a landfill or dump it in somebody's stream bed and poison Mexico instead of poisoning the United States. So we established rules that were the beginning of rules to deal with hazardous waste movement internationally, and that also was picked up in the OECD. Perhaps the major thing we did in CCMS during my tenure, and I wrote the speech, was that Russ Train gave a speech before the CCMS plenary, I guess in '76, which called on the NATO countries to take a leadership role in restricting the production and use of chlorofluorocarbons in order to protect upper atmospheric ozone. This became a major theme for me and one that I worked on for a number of years in EPA later, which eventually led to the Montreal Protocol. This was the first public call for an international treaty to control chlorofluorocarbons, and Train and I had done this essentially from the basis of an EPA call and not on the basis of a U.S. government call. And when I got back

to Washington, Tom Pickering called me up and raised bloody hell because this had not been vetted with the OES Bureau (Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs), which he was then the head of. But it was something that Russ Train very much wanted to do. There were grave difficulties in terms of doing it at that time, because there was laboratory information developed by two guys by the name of Roland and Molina at Cal Tech that indicated that in a bubble chamber, which was the size of a snare drum, these chemical reactions were produced and chlorofluorocarbons did destroy ozone under conditions that were simulated to be in the upper atmosphere, but there had not been any direct observations of the atmosphere at that time. So what we were doing was really speculating from lab science inside this snare-drum-size contraption into indicating a major global environmental problem, which turned out to be true. So we initiated that call in CCMS. That was it.

Q; Was your next job in Buenos Aires?

From the CCMS NATO job I was recruited to go as a political officer to Buenos Aires. The story behind that was very interesting. The executive director of ARA had fought for me because he wanted somebody who would be tough. He had previously been in the M area and had been one of my counterparts on the management side in negotiations, and we had done a lot of negotiating across the table from each other. I am told that in the body-snatching meeting he said, "I want Harris for Buenos Aires because that son-of-a-bitch will keep them honest," and those were prophetic words. ARA, the American Republics Area, at that time had major problems. I remember a meeting that I went to on Uruguay, a country review meeting of Uruguay that was chaired by Luers, Bill Luers, who later became an ambassador to several countries and ran the Metropolitan Museum for a number of years. Ambassador Luers, then just Deputy Assistant Secretary Luers, complained, and this is almost the quote: "It's a sorry day for the Foreign Service when the reporting from the Methodist church is more accurate than from the American embassy." What had happened is that in Montevideo the embassy had decided to downplay and to under-report the human rights abuses that were taking place by the Uruguayan policy and security officials, and this had led to major difficulties where the Department of State's information was not the most relevant, and in order to find out what was going on, the policy makers in the State Department had to depend on human rights reports being generated from the Methodist church and other churches in Uruguay.

Q: What had happened? What caused this decision?

HARRIS: I think there was concern on the part of the embassies in ARA that, with the Carter administration's human rights policy, the relationships between their country and the United States could be soured if there was full disclosure of human rights abuses in the countries in which they were assigned. Human rights was not at all on the agenda of American diplomacy, and the Carter administration came in, he appointed Patt Derian with great fanfare to a new position as an assistant secretary for human rights, created a new bureau for the function, and that was at the same time that I was trained in Spanish and put on an airplane to go to Buenos Aires, Argentina. Now I was actually programmed into the external affairs political reporting job, which was the more senior job at the post.

There was a four-person political section there headed by Bill Hallman. His deputy was Tony Freeman, who was the labor officer. This was his second tour in Argentina. He had married a lovely Argentine woman on his first tour and had spent a lot of time in Argentina on vacations and been very close to the country and very knowledgeable about labor and political affairs in Argentina. I was the number-three person doing external affairs, and Yvonne Thayer was the fourth, who is someone you should interview. She's still in the Department. She was the person who did the Falklands. She was the major reporter on the Falklands War, a very interesting person. I got there, and there were a number of major issues such as the fight between the United Kingdom and Argentina on the Malvinas, or Falkland Islands as they were called, and major fights between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Islands, which had caused both militaries to go on high alert several times in the last several years and was a major issue. Plus we had major border problems and nuclear proliferation problems with Brazil, a lot of problems with Paraguay, and the Argentines played a key role in the international organization role in Latin America, and we needed to have a very effective dialogue with the Argentines on international programs. That was essentially my beat. After being there for a few weeks, the embassy moved from a set of very old, beat-up offices downtown into a brand-new, fortified building on a very stately avenue a block away from the ambassador's residence in Buenos Aires. The building backed onto the big fairground, which was used for the big agricultural fair each year in Buenos Aires and was a choice location. This was one of the first of the Inman-style buildings with enormous setbacks and strong walls and tankproof entries and things like this. [Named for Adm. Bobby Ray Inman (USN retired), the 1985 State Department's Inman report in response to the bombings of Marine Barracks and the embassy in Beirut resulted in a range of security improvements for Department buildings, existing and future. Another result was the creation of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Diplomatic Security Service.] After being there for a couple of weeks, Bill Hallman, the political counselor, approached me and asked if I would switch jobs with Yvonne Thayer. Yvonne Thayer had the responsibility for internal politics; I was doing external politics. I said I would be happy to do that on one condition, and that condition was that people who wanted to come to the embassy to report on human rights violations or disappearances would be able to enter the building and I would be able to meet with them. If I can't meet with the people and hear firsthand what's going on, then I don't want to do the job because I can't do the job well. Thayer had met with several people whose children had disappeared and had found it very emotionally stressful. She was a young mother. I said I'd be happy to do it, but those were my conditions. So Hallman went to the DCM, Max Chaplin, and to Ambassador Raul Castro and got their okay, so we agreed to swap jobs, and so we swapped jobs. I had a dark, inside office and just down the hall from me was the last survivor of the AID mission, a lovely, older woman by the name of Blanca Vollenweider, and she had about a two-hour-a-month or three-hour-a-month job but it was an important job. She was there as the AID mission person to receive checks for multi-multimillion-dollar housing programs that the Argentines were paying back to the U.S. AID program. She would receive these checks, do a certain amount of paperwork, and put them in the pouch and send them to Washington. She did this dutifully, and the rest of the time she read the newspaper and magazines. I went down and asked her if she would help me interview these various people who were coming to the embassy. Now, the embassy building had what was called a "cheese." It

was a small entry house in which the guards sat, and there were the magnetometers that people went through. As seen from the air it looked like one of these great huge cheese wheels. The building was about, I guess, fourteen feet in diameter. People went through there, showed their credentials, then went through the magnetometer. They went in one doorway—and there was a little slice out of the round building so it looked like a cheese that had been partially eaten—and they came out the other end, and then they were allowed into the building, and they went through the Marine security guard and then up to the second floor where I was. So we then began to interview these people. When I took the job, I was given one page, a yellow, legal-size, long-size, fourteen-inch page that had probably fifteen or twenty names on it of people who had been reported to the embassy as having been disappeared, and the dates of their disappearances and maybe a word or two after each one. That's all the information I had.

Q: Could you explain what the disappearances were?

HARRIS: Sure, I'll talk about the operations. Let me just finish this. So that was the beginning. It was during the so-called Dirty War, in which the Argentine government was battling two armed insurgencies in the country that were communist guerilla, one urban and one rural. The Montoneros were primarily an urban-based guerilla group, and the ERP was a rural-based group that looked more to Che Guevara for things, and they had had some spectacular successes in terms of killing policemen. They put a bomb under a general's bed. They had done a number of dreadful things to really strike fear and terror in the heart of the Argentine military and police. They had also killed an American USIA officer in Córdoba. I forget the gentleman's name but he was a—

Q: Mosconi or something like that?

HARRIS: It may have been, yes. He was a ham radio expert and had very large antennas on his house. The guerillas thought with those antennas certainly he must be a CIA agent, so they knocked at his door, he opened his door, and they shot him and killed him dead. This, of course, created an enormous sense of paranoia and fear among the people in the embassy, and they were heightened by the regional security officer, whose name I've forgotten. He told people not to play golf because you followed the same pattern. He said, "If you do play golf, then don't play the holes in order. Play one and then play six and then play seven and eight, and then play two and four and whatever, but change it around." He stationed Marines on the ambassador's residence, which is a block away, with .50-caliber machine guns so that, in case the building was attacked, he had another line of fire, and sandbags on the residence thing. He ordered enough weaponry to support a small army there in case the embassy was attacked. They even had automatic shotguns with not just three or four shells in them but had big magazines of fifteen or twenty shotgun shells, and enough tear gas to quell a hundred riots, just absolute over-reaction, but that was the kind of atmosphere that I went in. People were very concerned. A friend of mine told the story of—this is Ed Williams, who served before me—he invited a friend from the embassy over for dinner. It was a nice night, and as the friend left his apartment, Ed saw someone following him. He kept a military rifle, an M14, in his closet. He went in, chambered a round, and had in the sights the spine of the fellow who appeared to be

following his dinner guest, because he thought he was going to attack him. Had he attacked him, Ed would have shot him in the spine. So that's the kind of thing. The American School went down, and what really petrified people were the attacks and also the disappearances. People were arrested and then disappeared, or people were just abducted from the street, where just a car pulled up, generally a Ford Falcon, several people got out of the car, grabbed the person, put him in the back seat of the car, and they drove away, and the individual was never seen again. The embassy at that time had decided, the former officer whom I replaced, that it was too difficult to see individual cases, because if you see one, you have to see them all and there were just hundreds and hundreds, and he thought there were really thousands, but there were hundreds of people who would come into the embassy and he didn't have time to see them. The embassy line, in terms of the disappearances and the violence that was going on, was that there was a war between the Yahoos on the left and the Yahoos on the right and these were out-of-control elements in the military and police and right-wing militia groups against urban and rural communist guerillas. As someone told me when I got there, the only good Montonero is a dead Montonero, so let these guys just chew each other up and that was fine, and that was the line that the embassy promulgated during the Nixon administration. Then the new administration, new ambassador, and I was sent out, and a new human rights bureau and a new emphasis on human rights. Well, what I did was very straightforward. I opened the door to the embassy, and people started coming. Then we worked the operation like a high turn-over doctor's or dentist's office. We had two inside offices. Blanca Vollenweider put the people in the office, and she took down on a five-by-eight card—this was before computers—their name, their address, their telephone number, the name of their child or relative that had disappeared or friend who had disappeared, the date of the disappearance, and that was it. She did this basic information interview. If they had any papers, she took the papers from them, or any papers that they had filed with the police or other governments. Then she would go out, I would come, and I would interview the person, generally in Spanish, for ten minutes maximum, maybe five, getting the facts, writing the information down on the card, and then I would thank them and I would leave. I would go into the other office and get another card, which had the information, and I would interview. Meanwhile Blanca would go back, escort the first interviewee to the elevators, get them outside of the secure area, and bring in the next person who wanted to report the disappearance of a loved one, and take their information. Then I would come from office number two to office number one, and we did this ping-pong and we did it every afternoon. We did literally thousands of interviews. It was a really crazy life, because in the afternoon we would be there listening to stories about the disappearance of people, and generally in the morning, among my other responsibilities, was the navy. So I would be out doing normal business with the navy, and I would often be invited by the navy for lunches. So I'd be sitting and having a lunch with generals and captains who were actually running the squads that were killing the people whose parents I interviewed that afternoon. It was really crazy.

Q: Why were they coming to the embassy?

HARRIS: They were absolutely at their last end of the road. They went around to the police stations. They'd go around to the Ministry of Interior. There was a missing persons

office in the Ministry of Interior that went through a pro forma acceptance of these applications. And the word got around that the Americans might help. Now, there were some important breakthroughs. The Anti-Defamation League, Jewish Anti-Defamation League, their regional representative, Rabbi Mort Rosenthal, who now lives in Lawrenceville, New Jersey, was a great defender of human rights, so he made representations to me, to the ambassador and others. He said that the Anti-Defamation League would express a personal interest in any person of the Jewish faith in Argentina and that any cases of people who came in who were of Jewish descent should be reported to the Anti-Defamation League and that they would make representations on behalf of those people with the Argentine embassy and in the Congress. There was a very strong connection between the United States and Argentina through the Jewish population migration in the early part of the nineteenth century. People having fled from Russia and Poland in response to the pograms there went to three destinations. They went to the United States, they went to Canada, and they went to Argentina. So you had families who were divided. One brother would go to Canada, one brother and one sister would go to the United States, and another brother would go to Argentina. The family split, and as they found acceptance in these various migration programs, they went there and settled. So we had a number of true familial connections in terms of disappeared in Argentina but with relatives in the United States. One of the best cases, and it's a good example of the work we did, was the Alejandro Deutsch case, his family in Córdoba. Alejandro Deutsch was a very successful Jewish air conditioning and heating contractor in Córdoba, ran a very large and successful company in Córdoba and had two daughters and a son there. The story is that one of his sons, Alejandro named after him, as a young man, junior high school age, had joined a left-wing Trotskyite group and had been arrested I think at the age of thirteen, maybe four or five years before this, for pamphleting in a public place, a small charge, no fine, but anyway there was a police record. The Córdoba area, which was the fifth core, was a very brutal, particularly brutal, military district in which there was enormous repression. The police had evidently done their research and had found Alejandro Deutsch with an arrest record, and so they ran a raid against the Alejandro Deutsch house, but instead of getting Alejandro Deutsch Jr.'s house, they got Alejandro Deutsch Sr.'s house. Junior had married and had bought a smaller home, maybe a mile or so from his father's house, and the police or the security squad that raided the Deutsch home had put small explosives on the locks both in the front and the back of the house, and they had blown them off to get the locks blown so they could enter the house. When the explosions went off, Deutsch Sr. picked up the phone and he dialed his son and he said in Spanish, "Help, help! They are attacking. They are attacking!" So Junior got in his car and he drove a short distance to a hill that overlooked his father's house. He didn't go to his father's house but to a hill that overlooked it, and he saw the house surrounded by police-type vehicles, security things, and he saw there was a raid and he knew what was going on, so he went back, got his wife and his small baby, put them in his car, and grabbed his passport and what money he had, and he started driving to Uruguay. When he got to Uruguay, he called his aunt, who was married to a major Democratic fundraiser in Beverly Hills, California. This fundraiser called Alan Cranston, the senator from California who was either the whip or the deputy whip of the Senate at that time and a very senior person in the Democratic Party and a very influential politician in the United States. Cranston immediately called the White House, and we got a rocket from the

Department of State indicating that the White House and the president of the United States were very interested in the Alejandro Deutsch case. Now there were literally thirteen and a half thousand disappearance cases that came to our attention during the time that we were collecting information. We sent what was probably the largest airgram ever sent to the Department of State listing the names of the Disappeared. You had to send, I think, an original and one copy or an original and two copies—I forget—but each went up in its own box, and they were huge. When I visited Washington after coming back from Buenos Aires, on both the desk officer's desk and in the Human Rights Bureau, there was our airgram out there in piles A to F, G to M, and all the other parts of the alphabet with markers on them, so that when somebody called and they complained about information on a disappearance, they would go and look in the airgram and find the page where we had xeroxed two to a page our five-by-eight cards, so the airgram was about seven hundred pages in length. We went in to see the foreign ministry. We went in to see the internal affairs. We went in to see the army, because we knew the Fifth Command. I forget the general's name there, but just a brutal guy who was absolutely horrific, a real animal. And we got the runaround. The Argentine ambassador was called in in Washington, and all of a sudden the Argentines began to get the word that this was really a case that could have serious ramifications. Now the Argentines had had very, very difficult impacts of their disappearance policies in their bilateral relations, certainly with Spain and Italy, which were the major migration streams to Argentina. I had organized, as is my wont, a luncheon group of the first and second secretaries in the embassies around town who were involved in reporting and who had citizens who had disappeared, because a lot of the citizens who were disappeared were dual nationals. They had either Italian or Spanish fathers or grandfathers, and so they were nationals of Spain or of Italy. There were some French nuns who disappeared, which was a front-page story in every paper in France. So the French were seized. As a matter of fact, I recently had the joy of meeting an old colleague who was the Japanese second secretary at that time in Buenos Aires, who came as the consul general from Japan to Melbourne, so it was a wonderful reacquaintance there. We met in a Basque restaurant. I was a very good man for finding good, underground cheap restaurants, and this was just a splendid place. It was also in a very rough part of town, so it was generally deserted, so we could sit in the back of the restaurant and ten or twelve of us have a good meal. Of course, there's always a car parked out front, because the police knew what was going on. I have no doubt that our conversations were bugged. But we only had a few cases where there was an American citizen who disappeared, where the Italians and the Spanish had thousands and the Israelis had dozens and the French had scores as well as the English and others had scores. What had happened was that the Deutsch family had been taken. In Argentine parlance, this was a "left-handed" operation because it was a clandestine operation, which was the left hand. They'd been taken on the left hand, and they'd been put into secret detention facilities outside of Córdoba on military bases. Then they had gone in and they had taken as war booty everything in the house, everything in the house except an old, huge grand piano and an old refrigerator, the kind that had coils on the top. The house was stripped. It was as if a moving company had come in and moved the people out. They took all the furniture, they took all the clothing, they took all the tools, they took all the books, they took everything. The house was absolutely barren. They had confiscated, in military parlance, all the war booty of these war criminals, and everything was gone,

just totally gone. The only thing that was left was the house. The Deutsch girls told me later than they were absolutely shocked, because after they were in detention a week or so they began to see the trustees walking around wearing their old clothing. Their clothing began to surface in the clandestine detention facilities there. Deutsch was taken and was tortured. The girls were threatened. I don't know if there were any physical abuses. They never talked a lot about this case, about the treatment. What we did was, we raised holy hell. The Fifth Corps denied that they had anything to do with them, said that they would launch investigations. Of course, this was a lot of crap. We put pressure on, and so finally an ultimatum came down from Videla to the Fifth Corps to cough these people up, that the cost of their continued disappearance was too high to pay, so these people then were surfaced from the left hand to the right hand, and they reappeared. We then processed them and got them out of the country. That was one of the few cases in which we had absolutely early notification, because we had been notified within a day, or else the people would have been processed and eliminated. In this case we were able to intercede both in Washington and in Buenos Aires, and we saved the lives. I have over at my desk now a watercolor picture that Alejandro Deutsch painted of Jerusalem. He was a very talented artist and gave it to me in a ceremony sometime later, after he had immigrated to California and become a painter, where he still lives today. As a matter of fact, when I get out to LA, I'd like to look him up. It would be great fun. That's one case. Most of the cases that we saw were stale and there wasn't a U.S. connection. People came in, and the usual pattern was that their son or their daughter had belonged to some church group or some left-wing organization that was not at all revolutionary or militant. Well, it could have been militant in a verbal sense, but it was not a guerrilla group. In other words, it was not an action group, it was a group that maybe studied Marx or perhaps was a church group dealing with liberation theology. And these people were identified as being members of that group. One person was picked up. He or she was tortured. Their address books were taken, and they then went, like a chain, after those people. There were a number of people who happened to be tailors, of people who were in the left-wing movement who got picked up, and some of them got disappeared because the system, when they took them on the left, with the left hand, they were very reluctant to surface them to the right hand. Now sometimes it happened; the left-hand people would pick them up and they would handcuff them to a light post with their arms hugging a light post or behind them, and then the police would come and, lo and behold, the police would happen to have the keys for the handcuffs to release them. Then they would take them into custody for suspicion, keep them for a few days, and then finally release them. The people were so scared and intimidated that they were afraid to talk about their experiences. Journalists who wrote about this were beaten up. There was a famous case of several journalists who disappeared. There was one brutal case in which a fellow was hit with a set of brass knuckles as he was walking from his newspaper to his car. A car stopped, a man got out of the car, came up and slugged him in the face, broke his jawbone, and he has horrible scars across his face. Jacobo Timerman was another very famous case. He was the editor in chief and publisher of a paper called La Opinion, which was a very influential but not large-circulation daily, a very well written paper and very outspoken. He was disappeared. We made a fuss about it because of the Jewish connection and also because he was a famous publisher, and he then surfaced again and was held for a number of charges. We made numerous representations on his behalf, and

his family came to see me quite often. Timerman once said in an interview, “Harris was wonderful, because he had a terrific spirit of optimism. So when my family was down and really depressed, I told them, ‘Go and see the consul in the embassy.’ They would go and see Harris, and he would always give them something to fight for and good spirit.” He said this was the thing that he most appreciated about the U.S. government, was my telling them positive things that were going on and giving them some ray of hope that this long ordeal that they were going through would end, and it did. Timerman struck a deal, negotiated a deal, where he left the country and would keep his mouth shut. Of course, he left the country but he did not keep his mouth shut and wrote a very searing book Prisoner without a Name, Cell without a Number on his experiences and the tortures that he had gone through. What had happened was something that I began to piece together. As being the point person for human rights and for these cases, with literally thousands of people coming through the embassy over a two-year period to meet with me, I became kind of notorious or famous. The Argentine military would often come to the security officers and the military attachés. The army would come and say, the navy is going to kill Harris. Then the navy would come at other times and say, “Whoops! We’ve heard that Harris is at risk, that there are elements in the army that want to get Harris.” So I had a lot of special protection. I’m a huge guy, and I drove a very big Caprice station wagon. There were only two of them in the country. I had one, and the Australian embassy had one. So wherever I moved, it was very obvious that I was moving. I was the easiest guy to follow. I never tried to lose anybody. I didn’t play any games. I just did my job.

I became extremely close to a number of the Mothers of the Plaza deMayoMayo. They were in the beginning a very naive, angry group of mothers and grandmothers whose children who had been lost, who began a series of protests. Every Thursday afternoon they would gather in front of the Casa Rosada, the Pink House, and march around with signs. My wife in discussions with them came up with this idea of handkerchiefs, scarves, with the names of their children embroidered on them being given in Washington to women in Congress with mothers doing the giving. Those scarves became very popular symbol, so they would embroider the names and the date of disappearance of their child, and then they would give those to visitors. My wife to this day in her handbag still carries one of those handkerchiefs with the name of one the disappeared people with her. But I would go to the Plaza de Mayo, not every Thursday but I would go often, and I would go when they would have meetings in churches or they would have sessions, and it was McLuhanesque. There wasn’t anything that I could really do to bring their kids back. Here was this great big, huge guy—I’m six feet, six and three-quarters inches. In those days I wasn’t quite as heavy as I am now, a 250-pound, six-foot, two-meter fellow who pitches up and easy to spot, easy to point to, and, lo and behold, the United States of America is interested in the disappearance of their children. That meant a lot to them, and it meant a lot to me to be able to do that. It was a very emotional experience. I got to know a lot of the mothers and the supporters of the mothers and became friends with them. It was really tough, because these were people who were just going through not only the hell of losing your child but in Argentine culture there’s almost a cultural phenomenon of the worship of death. One of the major places to visit in Buenos Aires today is La Recoleta Cemetery, in which you can go and there are guides. Blanca Vollenweider, my assistant, was a registered guide. She could take people around through

the cemetery, and they could go through the history of Argentina by the people who were buried in the cemeteries. The ritual of going to the grave site was terribly important in the culture, that people had the body, they would bring flowers, they would cry, they would go through all these emotions, which somehow became even stronger than their Spanish and Italian roots in terms of this veneration of the dead. These people didn't have a body to bury. These people did not have any information as to how their children died or if their children were still alive or if they were being tortured or if they were in great pain, so the emotion and the suffering that these folks went through was absolutely horrific. The ambassador did not get involved in this nor did the political counselor nor did anybody else in the embassy. It was just myself.

Q: What was happening? Was it business as usual on the other side?

HARRIS: It was even worse than that. Let's start talking about policy now. Castro once told me, "Harris, this is the worst post that I've ever had." This was his third embassy. He had resigned as the governor of Arizona to take the job as the American ambassador to Argentina, which is absolutely unheard of. I know of no other case. Castro had worked during the Carter election campaign with Hispanic groups around the Southwest and in California and, I think, had certainly earned political credits, but to leave as a sitting governor—the state was in a lot of trouble financially. He had a lot of problems back in Arizona. His deputy, the lieutenant governor who took over for him, committed suicide a year or so later. I don't know what was going on, but anyway it was a bad scene. He was clearly running away from a lot of problems in Arizona. But he'd been ambassador before. He'd been, I believe, ambassador to Bolivia and someplace in Central America, I believe El Salvador but I'm not sure. But as he said, the Argentine job was the worst job that he ever had because he did not control the policy. He said, "When I was in Bolivia, I told the desk and the assistant secretary and the deputy assistant secretary what we ought to do, and they did it. If I went to a village and there was a key politician there, I'd shake hands, and if he came up to me and said, 'Mr. Ambassador, I need a bridge here,' I could do this. He said, 'By the way, we need your help on this particular thing,' and we did business. It was a great way to do business. That hasn't worked here, and the reason it didn't work was because of my reporting." It started off there was a flush of excitement about human rights. This was the buzz word in the Carter administration. So I began to write reports to Washington detailing information that I gleaned from the interviews. There was nothing in the press, unlike a lot of Foreign Service reporting, which was a combination of the stories in the newspaper and then you quickly get on the phone and call two or three contacts and flesh the stories out and rewrite the newspaper story and send it in. You were unable to do that because this was a clandestine operation. It wasn't in the press. The press was afraid to report it, so it was all done on the basis of our hundreds of interviews a month that took place, and we began to run temperature charts. This was before a computer, but we began to keep records of how many people disappeared on graph paper each day, and we began to aggregate these like a temperature chart at the foot of a patient's bed, and we began to be able to see what was taking place in terms of human rights violations, and then we began to tell the story and began to demonstrate through the interviews what was going on. So the old embassy line—that what was really going on was kind of a war between out-of-control elements on the left

and the right—didn't square with the facts. As we began to interview, we began to see that on January 15 the first person who had belonged to such-and-such a discussion group that met in such-and-such a church disappeared, and within two weeks' time sixteen of the twenty people who had belonged to that group all disappeared. So we had essentially the basic element of the doctrine, the operational doctrine, of what was taking place, and it was very clear that this was being done by the security services. So we began to report these cases to Washington, these groupings and all the information that we could get our hands on, and these reports were then absolutely dynamite in the hands of a new bureau. The bureaucracy in Washington had changed. It was no longer the American Republics Area, the ARA Bureau, that was making the decisions in terms of what our policy should be towards Argentina, but it was now a debate between the Latin American Bureau and the Human Rights Bureau. Well, we had enormous, mostly military and commercial, relationships with Argentina. Commercial wasn't that significant compared to Canada or Europe or other major trading countries, because the Argentine economy's trade links were more towards Europe and the United Kingdom. They'd been a commercial colony of the United Kingdom for many, many years. But the Argentines came to us and they needed parts for their navy aircraft, they needed helmets for their pilots, they needed spare parts for their ships, or they needed credits for certain potato imports from subsidized agricultural products, all these things. In each of these cases the Human Rights Bureau became very adept in terms of understanding the network of relationships between the United States and human rights violators, in this case Argentina. When a case would come up for an EXIM loan [from the Export–Import Bank of the United States] or a case would come up for a military spare part, they would intervene and in the State Department you would have this enormous battle between the Human Rights Bureau and the geographic bureau, in this case ARA. What was different in Argentina was that the doctrine in which things took place was one in which the things were open and they were public. It wasn't a human rights violation that was taking place somewhere beyond the pale of information. Given the fact that we had opened up the embassy, it meant that we very quickly learned about disappearances, because people came with less and less lag time to the embassy to report it. So we then reported that each week to Washington, and after a while Castro, the ambassador, and the ARA Bureau were losing many more decisions than they were winning in terms of doing things with Argentina. The problem was that this affected the morale of everybody else in the embassy. The New York Philharmonic was supposed to come, or some part of the New York Philharmonic was supposed to come, for a cultural tour. That got canceled. Military exchanges were canceled, like the ability to send Argentine soldiers to the United States for training. Of course, everybody in the embassy, I think correctly, blamed my reporting as being the culprit. "This never happened before Harris was here." Well, it was Harris, but it was also a change in circumstances back in Washington where my reporting became a significant element in the process of strengthening negative decisions against Argentina.

Q: I would think at the embassy that your general officers and all would be on board with you. This was a disgusting regime.

HARRIS: Not at all, not at all. Remember, I was the new boy, and I had arrived after the

killing in Córdoba, so you had an embassy, you had a diplomatic establishment, and you had an American establishment, an American community. The American School was on the verge of bankruptcy because all the Americans had left because of kidnaps that had taken place—of American executives for ransom—and all the Americans, Ford, General Motors, GE, all these folks had taken all their American executives out of the country because they were fearful that they would be kidnapped. The kids all went to school with bodyguards. It was an armed camp. So what happened was that the disappearances, the kidnappings, and the murder of the USIS branch chief in Córdoba had really solidified the embassy to support the government repression of what they saw were guerrillas. The fine distinctions that I was talking about, these were people who were just radicals in talk but they were not people with guns, with explosives, or kidnapping anybody. These were coffeehouse communists. They were people that, instead of kidnapping them, if you sent them a postcard and told them to be at a police station at a certain time, they would show up, because they had clean consciences and they hadn't done anything other than talk about Karl Marx over some bad wine or some bad beer long hours into the night each week. This was not understood. So the people in the embassy felt persecuted by these communists, had no sympathy towards them. As I mentioned before, one of them had said the only good Montonero is a dead Montonero, and that was very much the spirit, but also their programs were impacted. The programs that they had worked on all of a sudden were yanked. Deals in the agricultural section, in the military sales section, in the military exchange programs, every connective tissue of programs between the U.S. government and the Argentine government were being snipped off one at a time, and the ambassador and ARA were losing the battles, and I was the guy who through my reporting was providing the information. So a decision was made to cut back on the reporting and to muzzle Harris. That began the really difficult part. That was the warfare that got me identified for selection out from the Foreign Service.

Q: What about our military attachés? Were they in bed with the dictatorship, would you say?

HARRIS: No, that's really wrong. I really had two supporters—well, I guess I had three supporters—in the embassy: Tony Freeman, the labor attaché, was a positive support. Bill Hallman, my boss, was a neutral who saw things being wrong but he also saw, and believed as ARA did, that the military was going to run Argentina for the foreseeable future, and if we wanted to have good relations—this was in a period of communism—those were important elements and we needed to deal with the military government and we had to have good relationships, so we couldn't make all these hard decisions. So he was torn because he felt the reporting should be going up but that all the relationships should not be cut, as was in fact happening. The only few folks in other sections of the embassy who gave me support was someone in the station, the legal attaché, the FBI guy. They had inside information about what was going on, and they were the only people that I could substantively sit around and talk to. The defense attaché felt threatened that I was essentially pointing a finger of blame at their clients. There was a certain amount of clientitis that was involved, and they didn't like the results of the reporting, and they had other interests in terms of good relationships between the militaries that were being impacted by the reporting. They weren't supporters of the regime in a sense, but they

wanted the relationship to continue as they had been in the past with strong military. They wanted military supplies to come. Since the relationships that we had were so few, there were few areas that we really could attack. I then began to meet people and develop—I wouldn't call them friendships—relationships with strange and wonderful people who worked on the operational side of the clandestine security apparatus that was doing the disappearances, because I was known. There was a guy from the 601 intelligence unit, which was one of the major units, an army unit that was doing the intelligence work to support these disappearance operations, who came to see me, and I became friendly with him and I took him out for a number of lunches. We'd go out and we'd talk about operational doctrine. We talked about the operational doctrine that was developed based on the French activities and French success in the War of Algeria. These were the kind of patterns the Argentine military had used to develop their doctrine. This was thought out in military models, so you had doctrine and operational plans, and everything was executed in a military fashion, which is not a random fashion, it's a very controlled fashion. And we would talk about these. We would talk about this in veiled ways with my lunches with the navy. They would discuss with me the need to rid Argentina of the cancer of communism and that the unfortunate thing is that, when you cut out a cancer, sometimes as you're cutting out the bad tissue, you have to take out some of the good tissue in order to protect it. These were the kinds of analogies. Tracing it back, you began to see the roots of these medical analogies to a professor at the Army Military College who so thoroughly indoctrinated each generation of each succeeding class of officers going through the military school. Military school in Argentina takes people who at a young age go to military high schools, then go to military college, and then go to military where they live on a base. They generally marry the daughters of senior officers. They live in this little insular world, and their values and ideas, like a hothouse gone weird, produced a doctrine of killing people who had bad thoughts. It was done knowledgeably. They realized that the people that they were disappearing, interrogating, torturing, and then killing were not people who were going to shoot someone, but they were people who were infected with the bad ideas, and they thought that they were fighting World War III against communism and that the United States one day would wake up and realize that this was the first skirmishes of World War III and these were the battles that were being fought and they were being fought for the West, and that the United States, instead of censuring them for human rights violations, should in fact be applauding their bravery and their action.

Q: One can't help but think about how abysmally the Argentine army performed during the Falklands/Malvinas War, that the officer corps was as incredible as people in fancy uniforms who had left their men. In other words, it was a pretty cowardly, stupid way to fight a war.

HARRIS: They ran several operations against me while I was there. In the short end, the only people that I could really talk to were inside the political section, but they had very strict instructions not to send any reporting up. Occasionally they would have something, and they would come and bring it to me and ask me to report on it, but they wanted no human rights reporting in their channels.

Q: We are talking about the Carter administration. He put his own man, Stansfield Turner, at the head of the CIA.

HARRIS: This was not their job. They did not want any part of it. They would talk to me about the policies and the programs. I could talk on a collegial basis to several people in their section about what I'd seen, and they would sometimes give me tips, but that was very remote. That was kind of like a "deep throat." The FBI agent, who was the legal attaché—and I'm sorry, I cannot recall his name, but he was a brilliant fellow, blond, very effective, had wonderful relationships with the law enforcement people—he gave me real information. He knew—through his operatives and discussions that he had with these guys over a few bottles of wine—what was going on, and would essentially provide information. So I sent all these messages in, and then this began to upset Castro and so they decided to limit them. An order came down from the front office that I had to send in good news reports, so we scoured the papers, I dutifully scoured the papers, so every time that somebody would be tried and convicted and sentenced but not killed in an overt court for twenty years for communist conspiracy or something like that under the very draconian laws there, we would send that up as a major cable and major news, that the judicial works in Argentina. "Look, a Montonero was given twenty years for possession of communist literature and conspiracy against the government."

Q: When you're sitting on something like this and the embassy starts saying, "Don't talk. Let's start reporting good news," and all that, it's like trying to dam air. Official-informal letters were still a go. [Official-informal letters dealt with official business, but on an informal basis. They could be used to obtain or provide background information and personal views, to report on progress, or to develop preliminary thinking on matters that would later be reported through formal channels.] People come by and say, "What the hell is really happening?" In other words, blocking information never really works.

HARRIS: Well, it did work, and what happened was when I couldn't get the stuff out in the regular cables, Bill Hallman actually fought and lost on my behalf. What the DCM, Max Chaplin, wanted and what the ambassador wanted was a paragraph, a self-explanatory little add-on paragraph putting things in the proper context, so that if we'd report disappearances, somehow there would be a paragraph there that would say, "Look, these policy and security guys have gone through hell. Their officers have been killed. Policemen have been shot on the street corners, two or three hundred policemen." We kept track of every policeman who'd been shot or wounded or killed, and we dutifully reported that to Washington, trying to balance off the horrors that the guerrillas were perpetrating, which were horrible. So there was an element of warfare there, but it was really incredibly lopsided. Hallman finally said, "This is just stupid. It's like asking the American embassy in the late 1930s, in every message that they send back about Nazi atrocities, to put a paragraph, a set paragraph, in there about the unfairness of the Weimar Treaty." He said, "You know, you can only do so much. Washington knows this. We've told it to them." So I then started writing memoranda of conversation. I would produce these enormous memoranda of conversation. Of course, they didn't go in as telegrams, but they went in the pouch in distribution and went up to Washington. Well, I don't know exactly what was going on in Washington. You'll have to ask Patt Derian and Mark

Schneider and Terry Todman—I guess Todman has been tapped. But what took place is that something was developed called the "Christopher Committee." Warren Christopher, as the deputy secretary, decided that he would establish a committee, which he would chair, that would deal with all these human rights fights that came up on countries that were human rights violators, and they would decide whether to sell potatoes or military equipment to these countries, and he would essentially hold court—he's a lawyer, so he was in kind of a judicial role—and listen to the arguments from the geographic bureau, would listen to the arguments from the Human Rights Bureau and AID and the military and anybody else, and he would make a decision, and that would be the decision that would define what the U.S. government did in that particular case. So the Warren Christopher Committee, the Christopher Committee, became the decision nexus. For example, if I wrote a cable, the cable wouldn't get cleared; it would come back for a rewrite. I'd rewrite it and I'd send it up. It would come back again for a rewrite—something happened that day, and they would want to add that to the cable. Now these were the days before we had computers. We had mag card machines, so it was quite cumbersome. Everything had to be typed up on paper with carbons. There were the beginning of electric typewriters with some storage, but on mag cards, and it was quite cumbersome. I remember we had a wonderful Japanese-American secretary who would battle and have to redo these goddamn things over and over again as the front office kicked them back. Now, the reason why they were kicked back was because the front office knew that in Washington—I would do a cable, and let's say I do a cable on Tuesday—it would get kicked back and kicked back, but on Thursday afternoon at five o'clock in Washington there was a meeting on whether to approve the sale of helmets to the Argentine air force, and there would be a Christopher meeting on that. They wouldn't approve the cable, my cable, until Friday afternoon so that it would arrive over the weekend after everybody had made this decision, because they didn't want on a Wednesday or a Thursday a cable coming in that could be used in the meeting. So I eventually figured out why the games were being played with me, and it was because I did not have information about what the timing was, and, of course, the front office was on the telephone—telephone calls in those days were very expensive—so they were on the front office every day to Washington. We then heard that at a Christopher meeting he had decided on a major case against the embassy and the bureau's recommendation on the basis of a sheaf of memoranda of conservation that had been put forward in this meeting, and then some of the memorandum of conservation I gleaned on to the Secretary of State. Well, that meant that there was a push to slow down my production of memoranda of conversation, so I then went back to the only thing, as you suggested before, the official-informal letter. So I began to put all this information in official-informal letters. I would send these up to Washington. Then they sent a peace emissary down, which was Fred Rondon, who came down, and he was an office director for Southern Cone Affairs. I guess that was his job then. He came down and he negotiated an agreement with the ambassador and with myself and with Todd Menenderia that I would be free to report anything that I wouldn't, that I couldn't get in a cable or couldn't get into an airgram in official-informals, and the official-informals would go to Derian, would go to Todman, would go to the desk officer, would go to the Human Rights Bureau person, would go to the ambassador.

Maybe this is a good story to close on, and then I'll think of a few more things and we'll pick up and finish this up next time. Two stories come to mind. One is the E-Systems. There was in the spirit of the Department an openness in the Carter administration. There had been some urging for people to have use of dissent channels and also to have divisions in the reporting, so the embassy did not have to come in with one view but it could have a majority and minority viewpoint. There was an application that came to approve a computer system for police cars, which would hook every police car in Buenos Aires with a computer centrally run that would be installed, a multi-multimillion-dollar contract by a company called E-Systems from Dallas, Texas. They have a big building right down here on Route 50. The E-Systems account would have speeded up and made more effective the Argentine police activity, so I said I felt very strongly that we could not recommend this, that there was a minority view and that ought to be expressed. So they sent up a majority–minority view. The ambassador was out on the countryside. So this cable got to Washington. Chaplin signed off on it and it went to Washington, and the ARA Bureau hit the roof. They said, "Castro, what the hell's going on. Have you lost control of your goddamn embassy to Harris? All of a sudden you're sending in these messages that are divided." So Castro then sent in another message, which said, "I withdraw the earlier cable, and I strongly support selling the system to the military. This would prevent human rights abuses, because it will mean that they will not arrest the wrong person." So I set the stage and we set it up, and Derian prevailed in the Christopher Committee.

Q: This is Tape 6, Side 1 with Tex Harris. Tex, we're going to pick this up. You've already talked about your difficulties in our embassy in Argentina regarding disappearances, how you operated, the conflicts you had. A couple of questions to continue this: What about other embassies and the American news media? Could you talk about that next time, and what were other embassies doing on this subject, and also the American news media? And then I believe at one point Patt Derian came down with Fred Rondon. Could you talk about that visit? And then you mentioned another time that—

HARRIS: I need to talk about the Yacyretá Dam as well.

Q: All right. And you also mentioned that you nearly got selected out.

HARRIS: I'll talk about that, and also I nearly got kidnapped. So there are several good stories, at least the front side of this tape.

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Q: Today is March 3, 2000. Tex, let's talk first about other embassies. What were they up to?

HARRIS: In the other embassies there was a range, like everything else, of concern about human rights. Again, from the perspective now, the human rights issue was not a major issue at that time in the relationship between countries. This was early days in the Carter

administration, and although human rights had been talked about in the United Nations in terms of international law and in terms of conventions, in terms of being a parameter of operations between countries, it was not accepted, it was not part of the fabric of diplomatic relations. What you have always in all nations' relations is the protection of their citizens as being a primary focus for their diplomats. The migrant stream into Argentina, which was a destination for millions of migrants mostly from southern Europe, from Spain and from Italy, meant that the Spanish and the Italian embassies had not hundreds but thousands of claims of people who came to the embassy with a connection based on the reported citizenship of the disappeared individual whose mother or father may have been born in Italy or whose grandparents were born in Italy or Spain. Because there had been a certain amount of focus on left-wing Jewish intellectuals, the Israeli embassy became involved. The British. There had been a murder of two French nuns, so the French embassy became seized and the French media was absolutely seized with these issues. I put together a small group of second and first secretaries who were the working-level political officers or consular officers in the embassy on this issue, and we met monthly. I remember we met at a Basque restaurant, and I'm sure that our conversations were well wired and the intelligence services very quickly picked us up in such a public place, but part of my operating style was that I should not do anything in a clandestine way, everything I did should be very up-front and in the face of the authorities. So while we went to this place, which had excellent food but a small clientele, we could sit in the back and talk at least without people sitting next to us and hearing, although perhaps the sugar shakers broadcast what we were saying. Of course, everything we were talking about were operations the government's military clandestine services had conducted, so they knew what had happened and knew how little we knew at that time. So we cooperated, we shared information, we established connections, and I just recently had an opportunity of welcoming to Melbourne, Australia, my last post, the Japanese consul general, who had served as a junior officer in Buenos Aires and who was one of the people in these little luncheon groups. I want to phase into the issue of the news media. Again, I was the only person there whose job pretty much full time was the human rights concerns. The other individuals from the other embassies had these concerns, but maybe they were consuls or they were political or economic officers and did some consular work. They were doing five or six things, and I had a lot more time to spend on this issue. Also I was interviewing people from all bases, where they restricted the people who came to see them to people who were either nationals or had connections with their home countries. Now in the case of Spain and Italy, that was a lot of folks, but in terms of the other countries it was few. So I had a better view—I'm not sure a more accurate view, but I at least had a broader view than any of the other embassies. That meant that when their journalists came to town, they would always say, "Go by and see this tall guy at the American embassy, and get his view." So after being there for a year or so, I would see one or two foreign journalists every week. When I read articles from the Paris Match or the major publications in Italy or Germany, a lot of the spins and a lot of the phrases in the articles were pure luncheon conversation that had taken place. So one of the things that I was able to do was to influence and to paint a picture of what was going on in the human rights violations in Argentina through my openness and willingness to meet with the press at all times. I generally would meet these guys for lunch. They would take me out and we'd have a great lunch over a big rib-eye steak

where I would essentially go through what I knew and answer and be responsive to the particular cases that they had. Again, they got similar types of information from the human rights groups, but it was much more credible—I think I mentioned this before—much more credible having a first secretary, or I guess I was the second secretary then, at the American embassy in the political section relaying this information and putting it in a political context with a little bit more objectivity than talking to a parent whose only son or daughter had been disappeared and who was outraged and crushed by this event. I did the same with American journalists and American NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), human rights groups, and spent a lot of time working with both the media and the press. I also spent a fair amount of time with the Argentine press, but there was for the most part a significant amount of repression against journalists. Did I tell the Timerman story? I'm not sure.

Q: I think you did.

HARRIS: Yes, but there were some journalists from Clarín [Argentine newspaper]. One journalist was writing very outspokenly about the disappearances in a not subtle way, and walking home one night he was hit in the face by a man with a brass knuckle and broke his jaw. That was just kind of a message to the journalists to keep their mouths shut. There was supervision and there was censorship because of the terrorism threat in the country, and so papers were under the threat that they could be censored for whatever they printed, and there were certainly discussions by the Ministry of Interior and the Casa Rosada and the presidency's office with the various newspapers that they had gone too far in failing to abide by the spirit of the antiterrorism efforts that were underway, anticommunist efforts that were underway. That was as significant a role in my activities as was my reporting to Washington. Massera, who was the Junta member and the chief of the navy, took a trip to Italy. Everyplace he went in Italy there were riots, there were riots against him. When he came back, one of my duties, as I mentioned before, was a liaison with the navy, and one of my senior vice admirals in the navy told me that Massera's briefing when he came was, "They hate us everyplace because of what we have done in terms of human rights violations." That was Massera's phrase but because of their disappearances. A lot of that was because of the picture that was painted by the press. At one time the embassy got nervous about what I was telling to the press, so the ambassador asked the public affairs officer to have someone monitor all my conversations with the press. I was perfectly happy to do that, so the public affairs officer, whose name now escapes me—I think it was Schechter—had advised me to not ruin my career by being so outspoken and had counseled me, as a wise and very senior and experienced Foreign Service officer, to lie a little low, that I was causing too many waves and too many people's programs, including his, were being disrupted by my reporting at the embassy. His advice, while I think it was sincere, went off my back like water off a duck. He assigned someone who came along with me to a number of lunches, but after a while, having heard the same story several times, when I called him up and asked him if he wanted to go, he said, "No, I've heard this story before, Harris. I don't need to hear it again." And he would not travel as far for a steak as I would. But I felt this was really important work, and it was. I didn't realize it until later, and there were also

several books written. Of course, one of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo and several others and I spent a lot of time with journalists.

Q: You might explain what the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo was.

HARRIS: Yes, thank you. One of the strange things about the doctrine—well, two things—the doctrine of disappearing people in a clandestine fashion and eliminating them, is that the families did not have a body to mourn and did not have a way of expressing their grief. So a few mothers went to the Plaza de Mayo, which is the Lafayette Park equivalent in Buenos Aires, a large square in front of the Casa Rosada, the Pink House, the presidential palace, and would silently protest with pictures of their disappeared people every Wednesday or Thursday afternoon—I believe it was Thursday afternoon—for several hours. Then as other mothers learned that this was going on, they joined and then there were grandmothers who came, so it was a procession of women marching in silence. Then it became a picture, because both television and the media needed an image, and this was the image of the disappeared in Argentina, a very powerful image. My wife, in a conversation with some of the mothers, gave them the idea of giving out *pañuelos*, handkerchiefs, embroidered with the name and the date of the disappearance of their child. The mothers would embroider these and then they would give them to visiting people as kind of a token of their child's disappearance, similar to the copper bracelets a lot of people wore for missing in action. Then the mothers had white kerchiefs that they wore on their heads, and on the back of it was embroidered the name of their child, or children because some mothers had lost two or three children, and the dates of the disappearance of their kids. So I spent a considerable amount of time with the mothers. They saw me and the American embassy and the United States as being friends and supporters of justice. I would go not every week, but I would go maybe once a month to the Plaza de Mayo, or they also held special vigils in churches around town for particular days or particular events, and I would attend these. It was always very emotional. I'm a very tall person, about six-six, and was not quite as heavy then as I am now, but I was the kind of guy who stands out in a crowd, so when the mothers saw me, they all came up to say hello and to thank me, and I was there to say a few good words for them. It became a very emotional connection because I was the only—well, occasionally other embassy people came, but I generally was the only one, certainly the most frequent, who went. As Woody Allen said, showing up is 80 percent of the game. And I knew them, I knew their stories of their children, I knew the background, I had interviewed them all officially and established records in their files and knew if there had been any developments in their cases, or they informed me, which I then included in the record. So it was also fact collecting as well of the mothers. So that was an important connection for the embassy.

Q: Were there attempts by security forces to compromise you? You know, it's the usual thing, somebody coming and saying, "I've got a great story to tell you," or something like that, and handing you some documents which you shouldn't have. The Soviets did this to a fare-thee-well, and I would have thought that this was sort of standard technique.

HARRIS: Absolutely. I was never sure who, but sometime during my tour I developed a relationship with an intelligence officer from the 601 intelligence unit, and he in a lunch that I was paying for confided to me that the intelligence services knew what I was doing inside the embassy because they had sent a number of informants in to meet with me and they knew what my operation was. And that was fine. I always understood that that was something that would take place and had taken place, and I just assumed that anything that I said was subject to getting back to the government. That didn't worry me. And again, I had been targeted with these various stories. The navy would come and report to the security officer and say that the army is going to kill Harris. "We're really sorry to tell you this, but we've got some information that the army is going to kill him." So then the security would go up on me. Occasionally I would be told; often I wouldn't be told, because they did not know how reliable the information was. And then the army would come and say the navy has had enough of Harris and they're going to get him. I had three really rough incidents. One was, I was walking outside my house, which was a very modest house, a comfortable four-bedroom house in the northern suburb in Buenos Aires, and a car stopped and guys jumped out and pulled guns on me and asked me for my *cédula*. Fortunately at that time one of our escort vehicles came up and just parked and watched. So it changed the whole tenor of the thing, because I knew that I was being observed by the security guards hired by the embassy. These guys also saw them come up, and so they went back. Another time my wife and I had escorted a guest outside the house, maybe a house or two down the street, to their vehicle to say goodnight to them. After they drove away, men came up and accosted both my wife and me at gunpoint and demanded to see our identity cards. There was no security car or other car there, and we, of course, did not have identification. We just literally walked out of our house with our dinner guests and did not have a *cédula* or identification, so they really hassled us pretty hard. It was upsetting to my wife and upsetting to me. The worst one was, I was at a party quite late. The parties in Argentina start late and end later, so I think the party started at around ten o'clock and then the dinner was served around eleven or eleven-thirty, and it was a large, large party. There were a number of people there that I was interested in talking with. My wife got tired, and friends were leaving, so she said she wanted to leave, and I said, "Well, why don't you go back with some of our friends from the embassy," and so they drove her back. About one-thirty or two o'clock in the morning, I left at the end of the party, driving my great big Chevrolet Caprice station wagon. There were only two of them like it in the country, mine and the Australian embassy's. I was driving down a large thoroughfare in the middle of the night, and of course there was no one on the road, and a car came up behind me. We drove for a while, and then another car came in front of me. We came to a light, and as the car in front of me stopped, I stopped and the car behind me stopped, and as soon as we stopped, I swear to God it was a few seconds and there were six men jumping out of these cars with shotguns, pistols, and rifles all pointed at me from both front and back, and I was just absolutely surrounded. I had taken the CIA basic driving course, but I was just flat. So I put my hands high on the steering wheel to make sure that there was no pretext for them shooting me on the basis that I had gone for a weapon or something like that. I had electric windows, so I waited till they came up, and then when they started talking to me, I lowered the window a bit—I had locked the doors—and I said, "*Cuerpo diplomatico. Cuerpo diplomatico*," and explained to them in Spanish that I was an American diplomat. They wanted to see my *cédula* my

identification, so I got that out of my wallet and showed that to them through the little crack in the window. They said that I had run a stop sign and that I should be very careful late at night, that this was a dangerous place. And that was it. But it was very clear that what they were doing was sending a message that, if they wanted me, I was toast. That was a chilling experience because this was not a game, this was life and death, this was a serious intelligence and military operation.

Q: Did you have the feeling that the enforcement side of the police and all in a way were running on their own? I'm talking about you and I mean the whole embassy. Sometimes you can have a junta at the top where they don't have that much control over their people. They might have given general orders. Was this police out of control?

HARRIS: It was not. As we learned more and more, we learned how carefully controlled it was. From the information that I had, it was very obvious that there were operations that were conducted against particular groups of leftist intellectuals, leftist party, leftist movement people, and they'd go after a cadre of these individuals at the same time, because we from our records could document that people who had belonged to a church discussion group all disappeared within nine days of each other. So, as far as I was concerned, it was pretty clear that this was not out of control. In terms of my discussions with the military, I heard so often their view that what had to be done was removing the cancer of communism and their justification that they were fighting World War III, that it was very obvious to me. Now the embassy, before I got there, had a view, which had been the view of the embassy, that what was going on in Argentina was a bunch of out-of-control left-wing nuts on one side killing a lot of police and military, and a lot of out-of-control military and intelligence guys killing a lot of left-wingers, and there was this out-of-control element. I never subscribed to that, because it didn't resonate to me and didn't make sense, from both the information that I had that these were not random events but these were very carefully orchestrated events. Then fairly early on in the game I began to get contacts with people who were doing the operations, because the real thought from a policy perspective, which the Argentines did not understand, is they did not understand how the United States could betray them, because they were killing communists and they knew that we were the great enemies of communists and here they were doing the Lord's work, they were killing commies and the United States was censuring them and restricting the relationship between the United States and Argentina for their doing a good thing. Somehow they did not understand politically the shift in gears that had taken place between a Ford and a Carter White House and a Nixon White House. You've got to remember that Kissinger had just a few years before been through both Argentina and Chile, really encouraging them to take tough lines on the communists, and they thought that's where America was. So that for me was really a major change in the perception and a pertinent change for them.

This leads in nicely to a discussion of Patt Derian's two trips to Argentina. Derian came down. She was the assistant secretary of state for human rights, a new position created in the Carter administration. Her husband was Hodding Carter III, who was the Department's press spokesman.

Q: I don't think that they were married at that time. They were just good friends.

HARRIS: Oh, really? Okay. Really?

Q: I may be wrong, but—

HARRIS: I think they were married. They're both Mississippians anyway. But I'm not positive about that. But Derian came down and was a very charming, Southern, smart, well briefed, focused individual and someone who felt that she had a very special mandate from the president of the United States and that in a way the Derian human rights efforts are really a model of how you change a bureaucracy. There have been lots of people who have tried to change the State Department on behalf of the environment, on behalf of population issues, seizing on other issues they thought should become major polar determinants of American foreign policy, and they were unable to crack the bilateral regional bureau emphasis between governments and the United States as manifested in the geographic regional bureaus in the Department. Derian was successful, and her deputy, Mark Schneider, had lots of support on the Hill, lots of support in the White House, and the support of the secretary of state and also from the deputy secretary, Warren Christopher. This was a mission. So Derian came back down and talked to the Argentines about reports of torture. She used the torture word in polite diplomatic conversation, and she was a woman. I think had it been a man, the generals would have just told her to go goose herself and walked out and been very belligerent. But as it was, they adopted this position of convincing Derian. She came down armed with all the information that I had provided, the human rights groups had, about the navy mechanics school, about the various camps, about individual cases, and really had worked hard in terms of being briefed, met with the human rights groups, did all the hard, good work there, and was very effective. Again, the doctrine that the Argentine military followed, because they had this built-in deniability because these operations had been conducted in a clandestine way, was to deny all. They had deniability, and so for them to get on their high horse and tell Derian and the U.S. government and anybody else to go stuff it didn't fit in with the doctrine. The doctrine dictated that they adopt a diplomatic and public affairs posture of puzzlement, that this is terrible, we don't know why these people are gone, we're doing everything we can, and the reports of torture are just absolutely given out by enemies of the military without any foundation; and they just sat there and lied through their teeth. Derian knew that they were lying through their teeth, and they knew that she knew that they knew, and it was very, very strange. They, of course, made all their arguments in terms of the threat that the country was facing. This was done on another level. I'll never forget Derian's second trip there, after several days of really tough pounding at all levels. I did not go to all the meetings, the more senior meetings with the junta members and others. The ambassador went to those and took Derian. I then set up and made the arrangements for all the groups with the mothers and the human rights groups and individual cases, and worked those things and was the control officer for the visit, but I did not go to a number of the senior-level meetings. But Derian was incredible, because people did not talk about torture in diplomatic parlance, particularly with a sense of responsibility on behalf of "you guys are torturers." So Derian broke the code and created a new code. When she left, as she was driving away, a colonel who was

an aide to the president of the junta turned to me and he said, "Señor Harris, if we could only get Patt Derian back here just one more time, I am sure that we could convince her as to the correctness of our actions, of what we are having to do here to fight World War III." That was an epiphany and just was striking that we were facing an irreconcilable lack of understanding between the Argentine military and the administration senior policy leaders on this issue. It was irreconcilable, and it was just a disaster.

Q: You were not a "Latin American hand" per se. You'd been around, but obviously there were people who'd been around. Was the Argentine military different—I'm talking about this upper officer corps? You know, so many have gone through the U.S. training things or something, and I would think there would be more feeling for what was playing and what wasn't playing.

HARRIS: The problem was that, no, clearly the Argentine military had all gone to the schools. They had all been to Fort Benning. They spoke good English—or some of them had forgotten their English and it was kind of a mixed bag—but they all had very warm memories of "my days at Fort Bragg, Tex. Let me tell you how great you guys were and how much fun we had and all the good parties." There was a lot of goodwill that was built through the hard work of defense relationships, but when these guys were at Fort Bragg and the School of the Americas and all the other things, they were there during the Nixon years or before when anticommunism was key. The senior officers had been there as more junior officers, so their training in the United States was all based on Americans as being great friends and joining us in this very significant movement of anticommunism. So for them, they were puzzled because the messages that they had learned in both the classrooms and also in the officers' clubs were that Americans hated communists, that communists were the threat, they were the enemy, they were the devil incarnate. And now, when they were doing something about it, damn Americans stabbed them in the back. So it really was a disconnect. Similarly, if you look at failures of the military, look at the Falkland Islands. That was something I didn't deal with.

Q: I was going to ask that a little later. Well, go ahead. Let's talk about the Falklands.

HARRIS: The key point here is that the Argentine military, Argentine intelligence, Argentine junta political leadership with their civilian followers, and so forth so misread Margaret Thatcher that they thought that they could invade a piece of the British Empire, because in the negotiations the British diplomats didn't seem to be very interested in preserving this outpost in the far reaches of the cold, south Atlantic Ocean filled with sheep and were not going to mount a major effort to fight a war against it. Anyone who knew Thatcher would have certainly had a different reservation. So here is another colossal mistake of thought, of intelligence, of understanding, and a similar thought and a similar mistake to what they did vis-à-vis the United States.

Q: How was Patt Derian viewed by the embassy? Obviously you were both playing off the same sheet of music, but I was wondering about the ambassador and others. Was she considered a pain in the ass?

HARRIS: Oh, a double pain in the ass, and Mark Schneider, her deputy, was seen as the devil incarnate, because for the ambassador—

Q: Who?

HARRIS: Raul Castro. For Castro the issue was one of control. I think I mentioned this in an earlier tape. This was his third embassy. He'd been an ambassador in Central America and an ambassador in Bolivia, I believe, and had resigned as the governor of the state of Arizona to assume the position of the American ambassador in Buenos Aires because he had such terrible political problems in his own state and was not being successful in handling them. He controlled American policy in, I guess, El Salvador. The State Department did pretty much what the ambassador wanted them to do, and when he was in Bolivia the same thing was true, and now he was in a country that was a big country and an important country, one of the gems of the ARA account. He had the big house and the big statue and he had really made it, [but] he had lost control of the policy, because the policy was not made by him telling Washington what Washington ought to do, as had been his expectation and his previous practice, but by a dogfight and a pissing match up in Washington over these human rights issues, and he could not control them. He had trouble controlling the facts that I was producing, was at war with me, and thought that Derian did not understand that the future of Argentina and America's good relations with Argentina was dependent on its good relations with the military. So this was the view that he had, which was shared widely in the Latin American Bureau. Terry Todman was the assistant secretary, a very skillful bureaucrat, and Fred Rondon was the designated peacemaker. He came down. I think we talked about the official-informals and how he had negotiated an agreement that my reporting could come up in official-informal channels with a copy to the ambassador, copy to the ARA Bureau, and a copy to the Human Rights Bureau. David Newsom also came down.

Q: He was under secretary for political affairs.

HARRIS: He was under secretary for political affairs and came down on a very important trip again to solve and deal with the relationship between Argentina and the United States. You know, when you get the under secretary for political affairs coming down, you've got some real problems, because he is the troubleshooter. When the assistant secretary can't handle it, you get the under secretary. So he came down and met with the military, trying to take a more distanced view because he was seen as being a person of great balance, which I think he was, and a consummate, careful diplomat, and certainly someone who would not use the word "torture" without "allegations of" or "rumors" or something like that preceding it. So David came down as a broker to this. But there was a real fissure, so Derian was the enemy, Mark Schneider was the enemy, I was the enemy, the Carter human rights policy was the enemy. Really, it was difficult, because American foreign policy at this early stage was resisting, like a body resisting sending its white corpuscles to fight some new germ that had invaded. The new germ was this human rights idea that Carter and Derian had put forward, and this overzealous officer, Harris, was going back reporting things to Washington without putting them in the proper perspective. This was a problem endemic in the ARA Bureau, because these same

problems had taken place in terms of military repression in Brazil and in Uruguay and in Chile. In Chile, of course, Kissinger had told them to get it over with quickly, and all of a sudden there was a new change in policy, and the place where the policy happened was Argentina, and I, in my Forrest Gump fashion, just happened to be the guy who showed up when the tectonic policy plates made a dramatic shift.

[End Tape 6, Side 1]

Q: You said you had a—

HARRIS: Yes, the story of Yacyreta Dam. There was an officer in the embassy. This is an example of the bitterness, and also it's an example of the high-water mark of policy. The Yacyreta Dam was a major hydroelectric dam project between Argentina and Paraguay and Brazil. They were going to share the power and the expenses. It's a major thing. We just had gone on line recently. It's one of the largest hydroelectric projects in the world. I had somehow picked up that there was a U.S. company that was interested in bidding on this and that there might be the possibility of some EXIM financing for this. I went down to the commercial officer's office and asked to see the file. He was not there, and his secretary lent me the file, and it became very clear that what was taking place was a proposal by something called *Acieros Argentina*, which means "Shipbuilding Yards Argentina," and the major company is—I'll think of the name of the company in a moment—in Pennsylvania to build a turbine manufacturing facility in Argentina to manufacture the turbines, the multi-multi-multimillion-dollar pieces of equipment, the major part of the expense of the equipment. Instead of buying them abroad, they would be manufactured by this *Acieros Argentina*. What also was in the file was information that *Acieros Argentina* was a wholly owned subsidiary of the Argentine navy, which was [on] the top-branch enemies list because of the very obvious way in which the navy mechanical school had been fingered as being a major perpetrator of this torture. Now, the information had gone back to Washington in support of the—I'm drawing a blank in terms of the name of the company, I'll fill it in when I edit this— Allison Chalmers Company. The Allison Chalmers Company had a proposal for support and an insurance guarantee with the U.S. government, which was up for consideration. Well, I realized that this was something that could not happen and should not happen but that there was no way that I was going to be able to get a message out about this information, and so I wrote an official-informal letter, and under the Rondon theory I gave a copy of the letter to the ambassador and sent a copy of the letter to the HA Bureau, Human Rights Bureau, and a copy of the letter went to ARA, telling them of my concerns that this EXIM financing was going to go to this Pennsylvania outfit to build a turbine factory for essentially a wholly owned subsidiary of the military. Now, military ownership of industry was quite common in Argentina. A lot of the underwear and socks that people wore, the average guy in Argentina wore, were made in military-run factories. They were owned by the military, because they made socks for their soldiers and so they just started making more socks and selling them on the market. But this was a shipyard that wanted to build a turbine factory, [and] then they could build turbines for ships and other things like that and start a new industry in the country. The ambassador was not there, and so my letter, sealed to the ambassador, was opened by the DCM, who called the political

counselor in and instructed the political counselor to go into the pouch room and to retrieve the letters that I had sent out of the pouch and to bring them back to me and to have me withdraw the letters and not send them, because this would be very disruptive and this was something of such high policy import. It was a multi-multimillion-dollar, twenty-or-thirty-million-dollar deal, which would be submarined by my letter. This is a good story.

Q: Who was the DCM?

HARRIS: He was Max Chaplin, and Bill Hallman was the political counselor. The meeting was taking place in the EXIM Bank within days of the event. So Bill Hallman came into my little airless office, like an overgrown closet, and he sat down and he talked about responsibility and team play and all the other kinds of things that we had to understand in the Foreign Service, that there was a responsibility to doing things in a collective way and that, even though we may feel strongly about something as an individual, we had to put things into perspective and [accept] the judgment of senior people and other visions and other ideas, and blend in. We had this long philosophical discussion. Bill was a wonderful, very thoughtful and conscientious Catholic probably trained in a Jesuit school. He was very intelligent and a fine officer. So we had this very, very theoretical discussion about responsibility in the Foreign Service to be a member of the team and to fit your ideas into the fabric of an embassy's reporting. Then, like a bombshell, he pulled out my letters and said that the DCM and he had requested me to withdraw these letters and not to send them in the pouch, that they shouldn't go up as an official-informal with information that was as pertinent and as potentially disruptive to a major multimillion-dollar arrangement. It should be done in a considered way by the embassy. Well, I don't get angry, I really don't get angry, but I was really upset. I didn't lose it, but I was really upset, and I told Bill absolutely not, I had considered this, and if the embassy wanted to send up a detailed telegram, it would get there certainly before the classified pouch got there. These were marked "confidential," and these official-informal letters would come after the fact, and the embassy would send a telegram out in the next day or so, next day or two, and still put its considered view, and I refused to withdraw the letters and they should go in the pouch. So we talked for another half an hour, and then when it was all over, Bill then said to me, "I guess I've done one thing. At least we've missed the closing of the pouch for this day," which meant the next pouch was—I don't remember if it was a semiweek pouch, twice-a-week pouch, or weekly pouch to Washington—but anyway it bought him some more time. This was before e-mails. This was when telephone calls were big deals, and the main thing was either pouch or cable. So Hallman left. I felt I had just been hit with about a three-hundred-pound stone. I went down kind of reeling to the "cobra," to the pouch room, where you put your messages in the communications center. The guy was there and I said, "I've got to get these in the pouch. They were taken out by the DCM, but now I want to send them back." He said, "I'm sorry. I can't. We've closed the pouch." So probably my greatest negotiation as a diplomat was to convince the communicator to open the pouch. After some conversation about the importance of this, he decided that he would open the pouch, which meant he had to redo all the seals and redo all the paperwork. He did it and put these two letters back in the pouch and closed them up. I didn't say anything further to Hallman. I didn't

tell him that I had gotten them in the pouch. I just went back to my office with a feeling of satisfaction that I had overcome what had been a significantly bad event. These official-informals hit Washington like a bombshell, because it was a multi-tens-of-millions-of-dollars deal to build this turbine factory. It was to be a turn-key operation, which the major Allison Chalmers Company in Pennsylvania was going to build, and it would mean literally hundreds and hundreds of jobs in Pennsylvania, people building the equipment for export and a lot of money on site in Argentina to build this factory, an entire turbine factory, which is a major, major export sale. Of course, when this got to Washington, the Human Rights Bureau, Derian, and Mark Schneider moved very quickly to stop it. When it came up at the EXIM meeting, there were human rights issues posed that were pretty clear because there was a deal between this Allison Chalmers Company in Pennsylvania and the Argentine navy. It wasn't a private sector deal at all; it was a sale to the navy, and it was clearly against the thrust of the Carter human rights policy. And the deal was killed. Well, there are two lines, and the story continues. Let's talk about the policy line. The company went absolutely berserk, angry as hell, and they launched [a review], with the help of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other organizations and the Department of Commerce. This was to be a major feather in the Department of Commerce's hat for serving as the intermediary for this tens-of-millions-of-dollars sale of U.S. exports to Argentina, and now the deal had queered, because without the EXIM financing and the EXIM guarantees, the Pennsylvania company was unwilling to go ahead with the deal. They then went to the House and Senate Commerce Committees and the Department of Commerce and held hearings and instituted a worldwide review, which was conducted by the Department of Commerce, in terms of how much overseas business had been lost because of the Carter human rights policies. In other words, every embassy was asked to fill out this questionnaire and send it back to the Department of Commerce, and of course there was a lot of hostility to the policy, so everybody said, "We queered this deal and that deal," and the numbers were absolutely staggering. With that information in hand, the hearings were held in the House and, I believe, the Senate—I'm not sure, but certainly in the House—on the failure or the cost of the Carter human rights policy to American jobs. And this Yacyreta Dam turbine was the linchpin, it was the key issue, and this event marked the high-water mark of the Carter human rights policies. Up until then, Derian and Schneider and the others had been successful in winning all the battles bureaucratically in the Department of State, but [with] this business challenge, [the] U.S. Chamber, House and Senate Commerce Committees, and the Department of Commerce went on the warpath, and it really marked that as the high-water mark. From then on, the human rights policy lost issues because there were jobs at stake, and American exports were seen as a good that had to be very carefully weighed and considered in the balance. That was a pretty good story. Now the substory of this is that the officer, the Foreign Service officer who was the commercial officer there—I'll think of his name, I think it was Jones—was so angry that he wrote his members of Congress and he wrote many, many letters to the Hill and to American businesses, talking to them about the perfidy of the American human rights policy as applied in Argentina, which had prevented and was keeping six to seven hundred Pennsylvanian skilled craftsmen from doing their job in building these turbines for turbine factory equipment in Argentina. He then resigned from the Foreign Service and went to work for the turbine manufacturing company in Pennsylvania but as their representative in Paraguay, with the

goal in mind that, since the turbine deal had been screwed in terms of manufacturing them in Argentina, they would now manufacture them in Pennsylvania and ship the turbines to Paraguay. So he left the service and went to work for the turbine manufacturing company, which I always found to be a strange and wonderful footnote in terms of how these events have really great magnitude and great effect.

Q: What happened to you though? What were the repercussions on you?

HARRIS: Your questions are great. It feeds right in. I got what was probably the worst efficiency report ever written on any individual. It was absolutely incredible: "not a team player, his own sense of values and priorities," and so forth, and I got a fairly rigorous and tough but in a sense fair from his perspective [review] from the political counselor. There was a certain amount of negotiation involved in that. But the DCM, who was a very skillful writer, Max Chaplin, wrote a review that was absolutely an epitaph, just carved in stone. When this got back to Washington, I was identified for selection out. My tour was going to be a three-year tour, and the Argentine government had come to the ambassador, Castro, and said that they were going to PNG me [make me persona non grata], and Castro talked them out of that on the theory that the devil you know is better than the devil you don't know, and if you send Harris back, then Derian will send someone else down here who may be even taller and worse than Harris. So Castro talked them out of that, and they didn't PNG me, but things became so difficult in the embassy after this Yacyreta business. Then a job offer came open in Washington to go back and to head the SALT working group—

Q: Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.

HARRIS: —Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty working group, and I decided I would go back and take this good job after about two years there, to the great relief of the ambassador and everybody else, because I was clearly an enormous pain in the ass to the military junta and also to the embassy, because they always had to deal with Harris—"What the hell is Harris reporting on today?" I was identified for selection out and then went to the review panel. Mark Schneider, who was Patt Derian's deputy, had written a positive report but was quite clear that my career was in deep trouble with this efficiency report. I had sent a copy of it to Derian and to Mark and asked them if there was anything they could put in the file to balance it off, and he put a very good—I think Mark may have signed it, Patt may have been out—and it was a very well done praise of the work I had done and the contribution I had made to American foreign policy. So the review board—after having been low ranked, I went to the review board—essentially gave me a censure. It wasn't an official reprimand or anything where I lost pay or things like that, but essentially wrote me a letter of censure that I had to become a better team player, and of course I had been low ranked. Now, I was the guy who had invented the grievance system. I had been there at the beginning with other people, and here was an efficiency report that was absolutely defective, but I was so emotionally unable, psychologically unable, to deal with the ramifications of going through all this pain that was associated with the report and my being identified for selection out, and all these other painful moments, that I ran away from it, which is a very standard psychological behavior of

diverting from things that are difficult and hard and painful. It's the way the body protects itself. So for year after year after year I couldn't get promoted, because they'd open up the file and here was this low ranking, this selection-out procedure in the file, and this horrific report, and I was facing [the] time in class [deadline]. The story of what I had done—here was this guy who was viewed by the Human Rights Committee as being kind of a hero—came to a producer for Bill Moyers. Bill Moyers was doing on CBS a show that was kind of a "60 Minutes" look-alike but a summer replacement. So this producer called me up—

Q: "60 Minutes" is an investigative journal report, very popular on TV.

HARRIS: This was a popular show. Moyers and the fellow who did on-the-road shows, Charles Kuralt: Kuralt would do the lighter ones, and Moyers would do the heavier ones. So they did this story. Bill Moyers came to the house and interviewed me, and they interviewed other people, and it just happened that was the year that I had won the Rifkin Award by AFSA, so they were there to photograph my receiving the Rifkin Award. And my wonderful quote that I love, when I got the award I said, "This is a very special award the Foreign Service gives. It's a Purple Heart for self-inflicted wounds." So they filmed this and it ran, and the Department of State got mailbags full of mail to the secretary of state saying, "How can you fire this guy?" because the story ended in about ten minutes. They show it to all the junior officer classes as they come in now, as a model of what Foreign Service people can do. How can you fire a guy who's done such a great job for doing that great job, which was in a sense what was happening, but we then had the perspective of hindsight, because everybody knew that what I had been saying was in fact the truth. This was after the Falklands. So Hank Cohen—who is a guy that is truly courageous and thoughtful, understated, wonderful guy, was the director of personnel, the deputy DG, director general—pulled my file and sent it to the Office of the Legal Adviser (L), and said, "Is this a legal file?" Because under the regulations, the director of personnel and the director general have responsibility to ensure that the records in the personnel system are correct. They can make any additions or subtractions or changes into the records of the personnel system to ensure that they are correct. Well, L came back with kind of a pen drawn through with a little number that this is illegal because of this, this statement is wrong because of that, and so Hank then had the report amended on the basis of the judgment made by the L, and the old report was taken out, and the new edited report, pursuant to the legal adviser's and the director of personnel's authority, was entered into my file. I was then promoted the next year, but I went years and years and years without being promoted. Because of that, I've had the longest career in my class. That's the good news, and for the most part they've been just absolutely great years. The Moyers program ran, and it was a very touching program. They brought in one of the youth, young men, that I'd helped get out of prison, and I did not know he was coming. They had this as a surprise, and during the ceremony all of a sudden this guy came up and gave me a hug and said, "I am—" and said his name, and I was pretty overcome with this. It was great TV. That has been something that all JOs, when they arrive, they see that film, and it's been interesting because at least a little bit of this story has been part of the lore of the Foreign Service in terms of [how] one person can make a difference.

One last little footnote on this: About twenty years after all this took place, through the efforts of Ambassador Ed Peck and others, the Department of State gave me its Distinguished Honor Award for the things that I did in Argentina. Well, Distinguished Honor Award is perhaps the most, I think it is the senior-most, award that the Department can give. It gives them about once a year or once every two years. It's not a normal thing. Frank Wisner got one. There's just a handful of people who've gotten them. So they gave it to me. Now at the time I was the president of AFSA, and the director general felt—because normally this is done in a formal ceremony on the eighth floor—that because of my position as the president of AFSA, it would be wrong, it would be seen as a way of their trying to influence me, it looked wrong to give it to me, so she gave it to me at a Thai restaurant at the end of a lunch, which is Crystal Thai restaurant right up the street from FSI, so it was funny. Peck knew about it and had the Department come over and take some pictures and video it, but the video was just terrible. It was really funny, because it was the only time the Distinguished Honor Award has ever been given outside the Department of State, not only in the secretary's office or on the eighth floor in a major ceremony, but it was given in a Thai restaurant.

Q: Sounds like somebody was being very precious on that sort of thing.

HARRIS: It was clearly something the Department—and it also was kind of a "whoops" award, so it was a funny thing what happened. Also at that time I was very critical of some things the secretary of state was doing, so the relationship—

Q: Who was the Secretary?

HARRIS: Christopher. And even though he had been instrumental in human rights activities and had defended a lot of things that I had done, at various meetings and things when I stood up to ask a question, he [would say,] "Tex, why am I not surprised to see you at the microphone?" So we had a good relationship, but he really didn't want to meet with me, he really didn't want to talk about the personnel issues and due process issues. He wanted to deal with the policy and not with the management of the Department of State.

Q: This is one of the failings, I think, of most secretaries of state. It's one reason why, I think, George Shultz has been looked by many to be probably the strongest secretary of state across the board.

HARRIS: Well, the desk and the chair that we're sitting in are here as monuments to George Shultz. I hope, someday, I will lead a movement, and I hope it's a long time. He lost his wife, as you know. Has he done this program? He's written his books.

Q: I've written to Ruth Davis suggesting that one of the buildings here be named the George Shultz.

HARRIS: Well, we ought to name the whole center for him.

Q: I agree.

HARRIS: I think it's his center.

Q: Oh, absolutely.

HARRIS: He's the hero, because every year they'd come to him and they'd say, "We need to take the money for FSI and do X, Y, and Z," and he would say, "No, that's your future," and he had the vision to do that. Thank you, friend.

Q: We have now reached the [stopping] point. The next time we will pick this up when you have left Argentina and you're coming back to work with SALT.

HARRIS: SALT and then we'll go on from there to South Africa.

Q: Today is March 22, 2000. Tex, you've left Argentina, and where'd you go now?

HARRIS: I came back to be the director of the SALT working group, which was a strange political animal housed in the Department of State, which was responsible for developing public affairs programs to present information to the U.S. people and prevent the defeat of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty in the Senate. We were essentially providing information to the American public.

Q: Isn't that illegal?

HARRIS: It is not illegal to provide information. It is legal to lobby members of Congress.

Q: You were doing this, by the way, from when to when?

HARRIS: I was there in 1979, and December of '79 was the invasion of Afghanistan and that essentially killed the treaty, because the treaty was set to be voted on by the Senate in 1980. This was a major political issue in the United States at that time. There were huge coalitions that had developed on both sides. It was a real litmus test. The Department of State identifies, and the secretary of state signs off on them, five issues of public diplomacy, and those are issues for which the operators in the Department's public affairs program, the Department will in fact pay for a speaker to go out and talk on those topics. In those days SALT was one, the Middle East was another, South Africa was another issue. I forget what the others were, but anyway those were certainly three of the top five, and only the top five were paid, so if somebody wanted to come out and talk about relations between the United States and Mexico, they had to provide you an airplane ticket. If you sent and asked for a speaker, and you were a sufficiently large organization, on the SALT treaty, the Department of State would put somebody on an airplane and send them out to talk to you. I came into that job following Peter Johnson, who had been with a small group including Julia Moore, who was the brains, public affairs brains, behind it; and I can't think of the gentleman's name, but he was the one who's cowritten

some of these spy stories, the really famous spy author, also military—

Q: Was it Clancy?

HARRIS: Yes, Clancy. He has written several books with Tom Clancy. And this was a program that was designed to go out in major cities in the United States and we put on a debate and information, and we invited the leadership of that community to come in, and the Department of State or local community provided a lunch, and we brought really first-class speakers in to essentially talk about U.S. relations with the Soviets, what vision the Administration had in terms of how those relationships would be enhanced, by [Treaty] community's benefit. Paul Warnke was one of our premier horses, as we called them. We were the stablemasters and they were the horses. They did the running. We just set up the events for them and sent them forward. I remember a wonderful Warnke story, that he was testifying before the committee and there was a Southern senator who asked him about the question of megatonnage, because the Soviet weapons were much larger than ours, and Warnke said, "Senator, there are about fifteen factors in terms of discussing parity of nuclear weapons. Among those, the least important is megatonnage. If you have a five-megaton versus a two-megaton weapon, the only difference is how big is the hole in the ground where the junior high school used to be." Of course, there was an enormous amount of laughter, and the administration lost the vote for the SALT treaty. But Warnke was an absolute brilliant lawyer, a brilliant presenter, and he went out and was often the principal speaker, but we had Vance at some of them, we had a number of key people, Anne Wexler. We were closely working with political people in the White House in terms of who to invite to these events. They had names that they sent over, and we were delighted to add their folks to the list. And we put these events on. Often we had senators who would show up at the events, and in the first class of them the people got an autopen-signature letter of invitation from the secretary of state, and not every American has gotten letters directly addressed to them from the secretary of state saying that on Tuesday in five weeks we were going to have a conference and the secretary, Cy Vance, hoped that you would come. And the people came, and it was a hot ticket and a very impressive thing. I insisted that we had speakers of the opposition, so it turned out to be a debate. On principal topics we had a debate with someone from a group of concerned citizens who were fairly conservative, military types who did not want to negotiate with the Soviets because they didn't trust them and they felt that we were better off without an arms limitation treaty. That was a fantastic experience, because, first, we had a small group of people, we had a high-profile political issue, so if we needed money or we needed something, I could go—and Dick Vine was one of my bosses in EUR [Bureau of European Affairs], and Matt Nimetz was the other. He was the under secretary of state. I guess he was counselor of the Department at that time. And things happened, and we did great programs around the United States.

Q: You were doing this from when to when?

HARRIS: I got there early in '79. I did it for almost a year, maybe ten months, until about February when we disbanded the group, when it was clear that the SALT treaty was dead after the Afghan invasion and the administration was not going to propose a vote on the

treaty in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. For a Foreign Service officer it was a wonderful experience, because I was dealing with local politics, and we had major conferences in Portland, Maine, and Portland, Oregon—I love that, the two—we had conferences in all the major cities around the United States. We organized these, and I would go in, meet with the local political leadership, the city father groups. We'd get cosponsorship, and we'd organize that. I'd make the trips and do the basic spade work to get the thing set up, which was eased by having introductions from the political people in the State Department or in the White House who would suggest people to see, and we would orchestrate these things and put them on in the best hotels in a very good way. It shows you how things ought to be done in the public affairs area and how things happen both in the business sector and also in the political sector, and not the kind of shabby, second-hand operations that we were forced to do in the Department of State in the public affairs area. There were at that time some battles between the Public Affairs Bureau, which was run by Hodding Carter, and the SALT working group, which was housed in EUR. I was an office director in EUR as the director of the SALT working group. So someone on the seventh floor got the bright idea that the way to solve this problem was to make me the office director in both bureaus simultaneously, so there would be coordination, because I would be running the operations in public outreach program in PA for Hodding Carter and would be running the SALT working group for Matt Nimetz out of the EUR bureau. So I had two offices, and I don't know if anybody else has ever had the responsibility of being two office directors. It was great fun, and of course everything went well because there was one sheet of music and I was the conductor and we put it together. This was a priority goal for both programs, and my kind of cheerleading management style was very well suited for this, and I had a wonderful time and great people in both EUR, my SALT working group, and in public affairs. Those groups did not like each other because the PA folks felt that they should have been doing it and were resentful that the SALT working group had been created outside their bureau to do what was essentially their work, so there were some major turf disputes, which were unfortunate, [but] we were able to resolve them and get people working well together. That's one of the things that my kind of go-get-'em management style was good at.

Q: This is Tape 7, Side 1 with Tex Harris. Tex, just around Christmas time the Soviets surprised everybody, including a hell of a lot of Soviets too, by for some obscure reason invading Afghanistan. It never really made much political sense to anyone. When this happened, you were in the European bureau. Did you all realize at the time that, boy, this is the death knell of this whole thing.

HARRIS: We had the intelligence that this was in the works and that the deployments taking place pointed to a Soviet invasion. This had taken place. Even at our level we had information about it, which was very sobering because we were working our asses off on these programs, counting the votes, hoping that there would be a sufficient number of votes in the Senate to achieve passage of the SALT treaty but knowing that the whole thing would be queered by Soviet invasion, and it happened, so it was something that frankly we expected. We were saddened by it, but we continued, I must say, to do the work and to do the job in a very professional manner despite the overhang of this

intelligence information, which was clearly overwhelming that this was coming.

Q: Were you aware of any move on our part of people saying to the Soviets, "We know you're getting ready to do this. If you do this, a lot of other things are going to go"?

HARRIS: I did not have any inside information. We were told, briefed, on a very close-hold basis about this, and that was it. We were not privy to any information in terms of representations made by the U.S. government to the Soviets on it. And, of course, it had major impact on the Olympics, on grain embargo and everything else. It was a major blow to the relationship, which took years to overcome. What was very interesting was that the domestic political implications of the debate were really a high-water mark, that and South Africa were really a high-water mark in my career in terms of a subspecialty, which was dealing with the domestic implications of foreign affairs issues in the United States. I developed a certain amount of expertise in terms of these kinds of issues, which are not normally the forte of Foreign Service folks. Although increasingly not only important but the dominant factor in our foreign affairs decision-making process today is not what the State Department thinks and not what the foreign policy wizards think, but it's [how] the political operatives think many of the high-profile political issues will play, and these are made on the basis of the politics at hand and do not have a differing characteristic than decisions made on Medicare, Medicaid, or other domestic issues. That was a dramatic change from the Cold War. In the Cold War, those issues of national security and foreign affairs as they related to the struggle with godless communism were really exempt, and the debate on national security and foreign affairs issues really stopped at the water's edge. This was a very good introduction for me and good experience for me in my later career. It also introduced me—I did a lot of personal public speaking. When I would travel around organizing these conferences, I would often go in the communities and talk to the downtown Rotary Clubs and other organizations and give my SALT speech, so I had an opportunity to see a lot of my country and to meet a lot of people. It also impressed upon me the importance of the McNeil-Lehrer show, which is very interesting. So much of Washington was really focused on how did the New York Times and the Washington Post play a particular story, and what was fascinating to me in terms of public community leadership, the head of the Rotary Club, the president of the bank, the head of the big insurance agency in medium and fairly large towns in the United States, the major international news came to these leadership elites through their watching the evening report on PBS, Public Broadcasting. They got home, had a martini or a beer or a glass of iced tea with their wife, and they would sit down and watch the McNeil-Lehrer show and they would get their foreign affairs impressions from there—absolutely critical. I remember I was in South Africa spending a lot of time with the PBS correspondent there and encouraging both Bill Swing and Ed Perkins to do the same, because I said that they are the only outlet that will broadcast a story for five or seven minutes about South Africa in hundreds of thousands of homes across the United States.

Q: And also influential people too, I mean in the United States, the people who would likely be interested in foreign affairs will watch it, and they often don't get the Times or the Post because they're in Des Moines or someplace like that.

HARRIS: And they're expensive. Absolutely, absolutely critical.

Q: Now, the Soviets at the end of December invaded Afghanistan. You kept Kuwait until February. What would your—

HARRIS: No, no, we didn't have programs, but we kept the group together.

Q: But did you immediately stop the speeches?

HARRIS: Yes.

Q: Because there wasn't much you could say about you can trust these—

HARRIS: We had some tentative programs lined up, and we put those on hold as soon as the invasion took place, which was just around Christmas time, just before Christmas, in early December, and we were actually going into an end-of-year break so we didn't have any programs scheduled at that time, and we just folded the program.

Q: Were you getting—this is beyond your work but it impacted on you—anything from the European bureau talking about why the hell the Soviets did it?

HARRIS: There was enormous discussion and debate about that, but I don't remember anything as being an answer. This was clearly a debate. The EUR staff meetings, [since I had served] in a number of bureaus, were wonderful. They were run with a much [more] light-handed and elite [tone]; it was almost like a Harvard faculty meeting, and everybody wanted not only to be factually correct and informative but wanted to be bright and witty. So they were some of the better staff meetings that I had in terms of entertainment and intellectual value. We didn't have big debates in the staff meetings, but I'm sure the Russian hands, the Soviet hands, were busily delving into that issue. Then once that happened, fortunately having had two jobs, losing one of them meant that I only had one job, so it worked out well and I continued to work as the director of the State Department's office of public programs. The work there was essentially to continue efforts to computerize the program and to try to do more efficient programming. And I brought with me, of course, some of the resources and some of the skill banks and some of the new models for outreach and public programming. Looking back now, I'm really struck by the paucity of the Department's public affairs efforts. After I left, [Margaret] Tutwiler was the head of public affairs in the next administration, the Reagan administration, and she actually returned to the Congress money from the public affairs budget that they didn't spend. She had one of the big checks made up, and she with great pomp and ceremony had a picture taken with one of these checks, handing the taxpayer back eight hundred thousand dollars that they had not spent in terms of going around and telling the American public about what America's stake was in foreign affairs. That was pathetic, because it meant that [unlike] the people in the United States who have an insular view and really a low capacity of understanding and low interest in foreign affairs, those people who did have an interest and were willing to mount programs on foreign affairs issues did not have any resources, did not have speakers from the

Department of State to do it, and they had to fall back on other resources that probably were not as good. It meant that, in order to make a public relations stand, it was at the cost of some impact in terms of the importance of diplomacy in America's prosperity and American security. That exists to this day with a diminution of foreign affairs interest in the American public and with a consequent budget shift to the military intelligence functions of national security and underfunding of American diplomacy, which is really tragic.

Q: When Margaret Tutwiler took over the Bureau of Public Affairs from Hodding Carter, how did you feel besides that, the change in the way it operated?

HARRIS: Well, I had left. I left in '80 while Hodding Carter was still there, but I knew the people in the office. What happened is that they did not have money for programs, and so people would not call them because the only people who could get a Department of State speaker were folks who had the resources to provide a plane ticket, and of course only those people were Chicago or San Francisco World Affairs Council, and they wanted the secretary of state, whom we also programmed. We programmed the secretary and the under secretaries and assistant secretaries as well. But previous to that, on those five key issues, we were able to put the office directors and the desk officers out on the road, which were just terrific, and we also had a major focus during my time there based on the SALT experience, which was to insist that when the people went out they did television and radio. I would not approve programs unless there was some electronic media element to the event. If they made a trip out to make a speech, my staff people were instructed that they were to get them on talk radio, to get them on talk television programs, to set up an editorial backgrounder with the local newspaper. There were generally one or two people on the small, local newspaper, let's say Nashville or someplace like that, and they don't spend a lot of time in the editorial board talking about foreign affairs, but we would put them in those newsrooms with the editorial board members, generally not the whole board, talking about foreign affairs. Then we would get good editorials, and they would follow up wanting more information about things they wanted to write on, and we'd set up relationships. Under the Tutwiler regime, all that came to an end. So there was programming for Baker, for the secretary of state, and for a few other people, but generally the focus was not to have the Department of State doing the presentation of policy but to have Secretary Baker and one or two other people doing it and that's it. So from the Vance period, when we had really scores if not hundreds of spokespersons, in the Tutwiler administration we had Baker, Tutwiler, and a handful of other people speaking on foreign affairs, and that's the way they wanted it. It was a very different viewpoint, and if the secretary was traveling, even though he travels with twenty people, and you're not sending anybody else and encouraging them to talk, you can save money, but at a cost, long-term cost, to American diplomacy, and that's what happened. We'll play this back for Ms. Tutwiler and see what her reaction is.

Q: For the record, I'm interviewing Margaret Tutwiler too. Where'd you go then in the summer of 1980?

HARRIS: What I did—it was actually early in 1980—I got a call from Doug Costle, who

was the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and his deputy Barbara Blum, and they asked me to come over and to interview for the position of the associate administrator for international affairs at EPA. Now an associate administrator is one step up from an assistant administrator, so it was a major step. I forget what my grade was at that time, but because of my problems in Argentina, I had been identified for selection out. Did I talk about that?

Q: Yes.

HARRIS: And consequently couldn't get promoted, so I was an 03 at that time. I don't know what the SALT working group was, but it was clearly an 01 or OC (counselor rank] job, and then I went off to a very senior service job in the civil service system, a Schedule C job, for the Environmental Protection Agency administrator. I had worked for him and for Barbara Blum briefly before I had gone to Argentina. The person that they had there had not worked out, and they finally decided that they would cut their losses—this was close to the end of the administration—and they thought it would be a great idea to bring in Tex, who had a lot of ideas and a lot of enthusiasm and was very much on the same wave length that they were on. I spent a lot of time working on a couple of issues. First and foremost was the issue of international control of chlorofluorocarbons. The two guys, Roland and Molina, had done some experiments in a small bubble chamber at Caltech in which they showed that in a cold vacuum, similar to what we had in our upper atmosphere, chlorofluorocarbons destroyed ozone atoms at an alarming rate in a chemical reaction that took place. So this ozone shield around the United States was being destroyed by spray cans and other industrial solvents, which slowly wafted their way through the atmosphere and then, when they got to the upper atmosphere, they interacted chemically with ozone and destroyed it. Each molecule of chlorofluorocarbon took out one or two hundred ozone things before it dissipated, and there was enormous upper atmosphere chemical reserve reaction that depleted the greenhouse effect of the protective layer of the ozone layer, which serves as a shield for the planet. I spent about two million dollars while I was there. I brought Carol Bastian in as my deputy, and we put everybody to work with the usual cheerleading management vision style, and we went to work and we published brochures. We sent them out by the boxload around Europe to our embassies and to scientific organizations about this theory. This was not proven, because all we had then was a chemical experiment that had taken place in a laboratory in the foothills outside of Los Angeles at Caltech, but we did not have yet measurements in the upper atmosphere that actually showed the decline and the depletion of the upper atmosphere ozone. That then happened. We began to get some initial things. Now Dupont and a number of other major chemical manufacturers had a substantial part of their profit stream coming from the production of these chlorofluorocarbons, which were ubiquitous. They were everyplace. They were the agents that were used to blow these plastic cups, and everything came in a styrofoam cup, the hamburgers were in styrofoam. They now come in paper, but in those days everything came in one of these Styrofoam containers made with a blowing agent. They were in air conditioners. They were in materials to make cushions for your seats. They were in solvents that were used to wash things. They were just one of the most useful and popular chemicals that were produced, and years ago the equipment had been depreciated, so essentially they had no

capital cost. The only thing they had to pay for was the raw feedstock going into the processing plant, and they sold the product at a high price on the other end and made an enormous profit, probably ninety cents on the dollar in terms of manufacturing the product, and it was a major part of the revenue stream of big companies like Dupont. Well, they went absolutely crazy that a bunch of environmentalists were telling them their product was destroying the upper atmosphere ozone. It was just theory, and they were not going to take away this useful product on the basis of some tieless scientist doing experiments and postulating this information. Even when the upper atmospheric data came in, they challenged the data. As in many areas of science, when you have some new developments, there are skeptics and different levels of scientific proof required before things come forward. So there was a major battle, and I and EPA entered into that battle, I on the international side and EPA on the domestic side. Reagan won the election. I had gotten a job offer from the State Department to go back and to be the deputy director for regional affairs in the African bureau. Princeton Lyman called me up with the chance of moving up to be the director of that office shortly after. I was very interested in that job and liked Princeton a lot, thought very highly of him, and sent word out to Anne Gorsuch, who was the incoming administrator at EPA, and she said no, she had heard so many good things about me and the good work that I was doing that she wanted me to stay and to please stay and don't go back to the State Department. So, all right, I would stay, and I turned down the job. Then Gorsuch came, and all hell broke loose at EPA because she had been given a mandate to gut the agency by the Reagan political operatives, and she and her small group of folks came in. The first day they came in, I got a call from her office saying there will be a number of lawyers from the outside who will come down, and under the Freedom of Information Act they are to have the right to go through your files. Now these are government files, and outside lawyers [would] come through our files to look at all the chlorofluorocarbon things that were not classified. They could not see anything that was classified, but anything LOU (limited official use) and below were to be opened, and most of the documents at EPA were not classified. So they came down and rifled the files, made a lot of copies, took the stuff away, and two weeks later a friend of mine who was Jim Baker's right-hand guy at the White House—Baker was chief of staff in the White House—called me up and said, "Tex, I saw your job on a list of jobs that the administration is seeking to fill at EPA." I said, "My God, they're going after me." The chemical manufacturing association who had hired the lawyers who'd come in and done the Freedom of Information search—which was normally never done by outside agents but normally done by federal employees and then the results of that are turned over to them—they had essentially fingered me as being one of the activists in terms of the chlorofluorocarbon ban and identified me as someone who should be replaced in the agency. So being a Foreign Service officer in another personnel system, I was the first person fired by Administrator Gorsuch at EPA. I remember she called me up to her office. I went up to her office and I was walking across the floor. She had a large office and it took a minute or two to walk across it because there was a seating area on one side and it was long; half of the floor was her office. When I got within somewhat close speaking distance to her, maybe fifteen feet from her desk, I said, "Anne, I understand you're going to fire me, you're going to find a replacement for me." She stood up and her face fell and she said, "Oh, Tex, you know. I wanted to tell you." She was a disaster.

Q: She had real problems too, didn't she?

HARRIS: She had real problems, and competency was one of her major problems. I'll never forget the German minister of the interior came through, because there were some EPA pollution requirements for diesel engines that affected Mercedes trucks and cars and things like this, and this was big-time, multimillion-dollar sales. He came through and he wanted to meet with Gorsuch. The minister of the interior in Germany is very different than the secretary of the interior in the United States. He has the border police and police responsibility, security responsibility, as well as the environment, so it's a very different portfolio and a very senior, very experienced person. We had prepared a varied series of talking points and a briefing book for Gorsuch on these issues. We overnighted this out through DHL or something to her in Colorado so she could read the material on the plane on the way back. I got a call just before we were to meet with the German ambassador and the minister of the interior, and I went up to her office and she said, "Tex, I didn't have a chance to read the stuff on the plane. Tell me what I need to know." This was five minutes, five minutes before the minister of the interior was coming in on something that affected millions of dollars' worth of American trade and also was of significant impact in terms of particulates and other emissions in the environment. So I gave her a thumbnail sketch. I don't remember his name, but she had one of her staffers there. This guy always wore a tie but he wore it loose. She turned to him and she said, "Jim," or whatever his name was, "do you have a jacket?" He said, "Yes, Anne, I do." She said, "Well, dammit, go put your jacket on and tighten your tie. This is a foreign minister coming to see us." She was absolutely disastrous. It was clear that she didn't know what she was talking about in the meeting. The ambassador had a reception at his home, which was not the new home but the old home then on German Hill in Northwest Washington, and this was a really experienced guy. Gorsuch didn't go, but I went, and he came up to me during the thing and he just looked at me and said, "As one professional to another, Harris, you've got a tough job. I only hope that Administrator Gorsuch's performance improves over time and she becomes more conversant with her responsibilities." For an ambassador to state that was really an indication of how poorly the meeting had gone.

Q: Well, the Reagan administration came and saw a bunch of nonsense, the whole environment thing. Of course, they came around, as they had to.

HARRIS: Well, it took them a long while and caused a lot of damage to EPA because they had a very different thing. My successor, a fellow by the name of Funkhouser, was fired because he got nailed, because he essentially let industry representatives not only come to the briefings and to brief the delegation on policies in terms of negotiations they were conducting, he brought them into the meeting and allowed them to do the negotiations, which is a violation of U.S. law. So he was fired. Anyway, it was just a debacle and a very sad moment. There were a couple of other issues we worked on while I was at EPA in this period, and we really had a great team and great success and got a lot done during the year and a half that I was there. We worked very hard with the labs and policy people at EPA to define in the OECD—and this was work that was started in the CCMS, the NATO Committee on Challenges of Modern Society, and had been passed

over to the OECD because it had major trade implications—a uniform set of standards for the testing of toxicity for chemicals. It sounds a little boring. But prior to this the Japanese test for toxicity was to see the impact of certain levels, maybe one part in a million, of toxicity on six carp in such-and-such temperature water and kept in the water with this level of toxicity for sixty days. The Europeans used a different kind of fish and a different level of toxicity. So you had a chemical regime internationally that had a very different series of toxicity tests, which impeded the commercial sales of these products across international boundaries, because something might pass the EUR test but would not pass the U.S. or the Japanese test in terms of meeting the toxicity standard that it had. So if a chemical manufacturer wanted to sell their product in all of them, it had to do four or five different toxicity tests using different fish, different amounts, and all this was terribly expensive. What we did—and spent a lot of time and a lot of effort and a lot of EPA money—was to design internationally through the OECD a set of common tests that were agreeable to all the countries and really facilitated sale of chemical products and competition in the chemical area.

Another major area that I spent a lot of time on was the export regimes for hazardous waste. One of the things that I learned at EPA—and my experience with the SALT working group was beneficial—was that a lot of the problems that we dealt with in the foreign affairs area were issues from Texas and Arizona and California and the border states with Canada, because EPA rules really impacted our border relations. These were really tough issues, because they were local issues and all of a sudden you didn't have somebody talking about theoretically what the United States ought to do to enhance its national security and prosperity, you had somebody who was getting screwed because the price of diesel was higher or other impacts of environmental regulations controlled by the EPA were having disparate impacts economically on manufacturers on the American side as opposed to the Canadian side of the border. This was seen as being unfair, and [we] had the members of congressional delegations on our back big time. One of the issues that we had, a very tough issue, was the export of hazardous waste, particularly in terms of Mexico. There were a lot of fly-by-night outfits who would, for a very low price, take hazardous waste from the United States, put it in barrels, put in on trucks, take it across the border into Mexico, and throw it into ravines. They backed the truck up, pushed the barrels out the back end, and that was their disposal. Where the efficient, approved disposal of those wastes in the United States would cost hundreds of dollars a barrel, they could do it for fifty or seventy-five dollars a barrel. Of course, they would pocket most of the money, and all they paid for was a truck driver, a truck, and some friendly landowner who didn't know what the hell was in the barrels, and this was horrific stuff that polluted the water streams and the water tables in these areas in Mexico. A lot of the areas were dry, but it still was an environmental nightmare. So we worked with the Mexican and Canadian authorities and we developed, later then a through the OECD, regimes for the notification and approval of the importation of toxic wastes into your country. There were also a number of schemes in which people were prepared to buy waste at very low prices for export to Africa—Mauritania and some of these other terribly dry places. They'd convince somebody in the government of Mauritania they could make a lot of money and could serve as kind of a repository for these toxic wastes that were too terrible and too expensive to deal with in Western countries, and they could turn their country into a great

desert wasteland. So we set and developed the international rules for that. These are things I'm really very proud of.

Q: I would have thought that the waste industry people, particularly early on during the Reagan administration—the whole idea was get government out of this and let business do its thing—I would have thought you'd run across a lot of opposition.

HARRIS: Not among the waste regulatory people. The waste regulatory people wanted people to come to them to burn the products, so we had a lot of innovative practices where cement makers—the cement is cooked at enormous heat.—A lot of these toxic waste products had a certain fuel value to them, so if configured [with] your cement kiln, you could burn the waste in this fiery pit of manufacturing cement under enormous heat, which dried the limestone and turned it into Portland cement. At the same time, you would get a heat element and you would destroy the toxicity of the chemicals. There were other people who just did this on a straight detox plan, and they wanted the business. They did not want the business to go across the border to Mexico.

Q: What about acid rain? This was quite a thing between Canada and the United States, and Reagan came in essentially pooh-poohing the whole thing.

HARRIS: As far as EPA was concerned, the acid rain question was an issue of mitigation, an issue of control, and that was really something that was very far advanced. As a matter of fact, the research in terms of the plumes of acid rain, particularly the smokestack technology that had been developed in Europe, where the British built these monstrous smokestacks. Literally smokestacks were a quarter of a mile high in the air, [they] deposited their sulfuric acid in the forests in Norway and Finland because the winds were predominantly across that way. As a matter of fact, in Leningrad you could pick up particulate matter that you could trace to power plants in the UK. So that was a major issue. We had a lot of problems with the Canadians, and I spent a lot of time in Canada and at the Canadian embassy dealing with these environmental issues. The watershed issues were very tough. All these small issues, which became very difficult problems among neighbors, occupied a lot of my time. It was a great, great tour. I really enjoyed it, and I got summarily fired. I was quite surprised and didn't have a job. Any other questions on this?

Q: Can you talk a bit about dealing with Canadian officials and dealing with Mexican officials.

HARRIS: The Canadians were extremely tough and aggressive and very well-schooled. The Canadian EPA and our EPA got along very well, and we worked together on a number of programs. I had a number of friends in Canada, colleagues, through my work in the environmental area in EPA, and that was very helpful. The kinds of issues that we dealt with were issues that were so highly political. And again, the Canadians beat up on us rather badly because they had, as a sovereign country, demands to make from us, and we had to deal on the back side of it with all the political issues of domestic polluters in the United States, and they were very tough issues. We would constantly go to the

Canadian embassy, and they would have delegations coming down and would beat the hell out of us, and we'd organize meetings for them. But on the whole, our scientists at EPA had great rapport with their fellow scientists, because we did a lot of cooperative work together, and those relationships were very good.

There was one other trip that I failed to mention, which I should talk about. This was a Mondale initiative.

Q: He was vice president.

HARRIS: Vice President Mondale launched an initiative to provide U.S. governmental consultancies to dollar-rich countries, particularly OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Countries), to try to get back some of the dollars that we were spending in those countries. I was directed by the vice president's office to lead a mission to Nigeria with the point of view of trying to put some EPA scientists on contracts as consultants to the Nigerian government working on environmental issues. I took with me a fellow who was the number-two person from our regional office in New York and was one of the funniest human beings I've ever run across. I can't recall his name now; I'll think of it. Anyway, he was a laugh a minute and a terribly smart guy. He was a poor kid who had gone to one of the state schools in New Jersey and had studied sanitation engineering. He told a lot of stories about his first job in New York City, where one night he got a phone call and a guy said, "I just flushed my teeth down the toilet. I live on Eighty-fourth Street and Sixth Avenue." So he went to his map and he saw where the pipes were. "Well," he said—this was at ten o'clock at night—"they should be here about three a.m. in the morning. Why don't you get here at two-thirty." They had these big graters, these big shakers. The guy showed up toothless at two-thirty and he watched the graters, and lo and behold, along came his teeth down on the thing. He picked his teeth up, went over to a tap, ran the water over them briefly, put them back in his mouth, and said, "Thank you very much," and walked out. He was filled with good stories. We got [to Nigeria], and the Nigerians took us on this incredible tour of environmental hell, which was Lagos and some of the surrounding areas and the big lakes around Lagos, so we saw all these disasters that they wanted help on. Who was our ambassador? Steve Low was the ambassador. [When] we had seen these things and we determined what we could do, we went to see Ambassador Low. We went in to see him, and we said, "Look, these guys can do it. We have the resources in terms of doing this, and we'd be happy to set up connections between the EPA laboratories and the environmental protection agency of Nigeria, some of the state agencies, and we think this is a very useful thing and they would pay us this kind of money and this is what it would cost. But we need to be on the embassy umbilical cord, because there is no way that we can send EPA staff members here from the labs in Las Vegas or the labs in Bayonne, New Jersey, here, to send them into Nigeria if twice a week the embassy water truck is not going to pull up and top off their well, or if the generator breaks the embassy guy will come and fix it." And Low hit the roof. He said, "They cannot. We are stretched too far. We cannot support these guys." I said, "Steve, if you cannot support them, I cannot in any kind of good conscience recommend to the administrator of EPA that we put EPA senior scientists and policy people out here in the field. They will just crumble. They're not Foreign Service folks, and they will have a

tough enough time coping under the conditions here. I can't do it unless you will put them on the embassy umbilical cord and provide them at least with the kinds of things that you would provide to a communicator or a staff member here. I'm not asking for perks, but I'm asking for the same thing that a secretary or a communicator would get in terms of just basic living." "Dammit," he said, "Mondale said to make this happen." And we had a fight, we had a roaring fight. We came out, and my colleague from the EPA turned to me with his eyes wide open and he said, "Harris, is that how you talk to ambassadors?" I said, "It is when they're trying to screw you." So it didn't happen, and it was a shame, but there was just no way. From Steve Low's, the ambassador's, viewpoint, his water truck was strained and he knew that, and he knew he couldn't add another two or three people to it, but if he wasn't prepared to expand the infrastructure, then we could not in any kind of good conscience bring out families from the United States to work in Lagos. It was just an impossible situation. Those were great years.

One other story: Doug Costle took a trip to China. I did not go with him, but he went on one of his trips to China and he came back with a gift—

[*End of Tape 7, Side A*]

Q: You were saying it gave him a statue.

HARRIS: —and it came in a box, and the box itself was a work of art. It was just incredible. He called me up to his office and said, "Tex, they've given me this. If this is really a valuable artifact"—and it was gorgeous, it was just incredible—"I will have a stand built for it and I will inscribe it, 'From the Men and Women of the Environmental Protection Agency in the People's Republic of China to the Men and Women of the U.S. EPA.'" I said, "All right, I'll do it, and get it authenticated but I want your car and your driver, and I will come and get it, but I want him downstairs. I don't want to have to bundle this thing in and out of taxicabs. And take me over to the Freer Art Gallery. I've got a buddy over there, and we'll get it appraised." A friend of mine was over there, and he called me up, and we spoke to the director, so the director said, "Have Harris come over for lunch." So I went over and I had lunch, a wonderful lunch, down in their cafeteria. Then we went down to their specimen rooms. The carpet's this thick—

Q: You're talking about a four-inch carpet, yes.

HARRIS: In case anything drops, it won't break, it will bounce. So we opened this box up, and he looked at it and he said it was lovely, and he looked at it and he looked at it, and he said, "You know, the Chinese are really excellent. This is a first-class copy. It is a great copy." So I told the story behind it, and he said, "Well, it's under the gift limit. I think that the cost for this in China would be under the gift limit. You go back and tell Administrator Costle that he has a nice present." So I went back, walked into his room with the statue casually under my arm, and I said, "Doug, I've got some good news and some bad news." He said, "What's the bad news?" I said, "The statue's not genuine. The good news is you can take it home." So that was good fun. We had some wonderful trips, diplomatic trips, serious business because the environmental issues impact on trade, so

when we traveled with the administrator, we were very well received overseas, serious discussions, wonderful hospitality. Again, when they came to Washington, we had no kind of resources. We're talking state house dinners and other kinds of things that were put on for us when we would travel, and what we did is we took people to one of the local restaurants, and we all chipped in to pay for the thing. It was just sad the way the U.S. Congress does not provide resources for representation.

Q: I remember asking Senator [Claiborne] Pell, head of the Foreign Relations Committee, and he said, "All I can do, I'd get these wonderful receptions abroad, and I can take them to the Senate and offer them bean soup."

HARRIS: That's right, exactly. It was really tragic, it was really tragic. Those were really fine years and years of accomplishment. I think that the work that we did on the chlorofluorocarbon ban really led to the Montreal Convention. I don't know if you've got some people on that, but that's a wonderful story that you should bring some people in. There have been several books written on it, but we should get the Foreign Service perspective on it. It was one of the most important and most successful environmental conventions in terms of protecting upper atmosphere ozone. There's now a huge smuggling trade of smuggling CFCs (chlorofluorocarbons) into the United States because the profit on these CFCs to keep the old automobile air conditioners going is as high as profit is in terms of drugs.

Q: I'm told that it's a major industry in Tijuana, for example. People drive down across the border and get their air conditioning fixed. But you talked about the Canadians. What about dealing with the Mexicans?

HARRIS: The Mexican issues we had were really easier in a way, because, frankly, they did not have the environmental sensitivity at that time to pollution. On the U.S. [side] we had more problems, and those were handled in the border dispute resolution mechanisms, not so much at the national headquarters level in EPA, and handled more by the regional office in Dallas than at headquarters. But what we dealt with, [with the Mexicans,] was on the very tough issues of the export of hazardous waste. That was the major thing, and we were exactly on the same wave length. We thought this was horrific and it should be stopped, and that people should be forced to dispose of their hazardous toxic materials in an appropriate, environmentally safe way, so no major fights. I was on the border, spent some time on the border meeting with the regional people, and I spent some time in Mexico City meeting with the EPA equivalent there. But Canadians were, in terms of ratio, about nine to one. We had lots of problems with Canadians, and also we had lots of community problems, with folks in Minnesota and Montana and other places being angry. The restriction in terms of diesel fuel was one—different standards of diesel fuel. The Canadian fuel didn't have the same kind of problems in terms of environmental standards. It was a lot cheaper, so people couldn't sell U.S.-produced diesel fuel in the border areas, because everybody would just drive across the border and fill up their cars in Canada. So there was an area of no sale there.

Q: When did you leave the EPA?

HARRIS: Well, I was fired. When did the Reagan administration come in?

Q: '81, January of '81.

HARRIS: They came in January 20 of '81, so maybe six weeks later.

Q: Okay. Then whither?

HARRIS: This is a wonderful story, and maybe we'll have this one as the last one today. Should we stop and just get a drink of water?

Q: What happened after you left EPA?

HARRIS: After I left EPA, I went to Colorado for a trip. I went for hiking. It was in the springtime. I went out and it was beautiful, and I went hiking and camping there. I had some dear friends, and they lent me some tents, and I just kind of gathered myself together, and it was terrific. Then I was walking down the hall—I guess it was March—in the State Department, and I ran into Dick Vine, who had been the deputy assistant secretary in EUR and a really brilliant, great, irascible, smart character on European policy and arms control and anything else. He was just a brilliant guy. He said, "Tex, how are you?" I said, "Fine, Dick." He said, "What are you doing?" I said, "I'm looking for work. I just got fired by Anne Gorsuch at EPA." And he slapped his arm and he said, "Great! Tex, I'm looking for people. I just got appointed to be the new assistant secretary"—or the new director, it wasn't a full bureau then—"the new director of the Refugee Program. Come by and see me tomorrow morning at eight a.m." I said, "Dick, I will be there." So the next morning at eight a.m. I show up, and I said, "I'm here to see Ambassador Vine." She points to his door, and I walk in and look around the office, and there's no one there, there's no one there. So I called out, "Dick," so behind the desk—his office was kind of like this one, there was a lot of stuff being moved in, boxes—so from behind the desk came a voice that said with a bit of strain in the voice, "I'll be with you in a minute." And I looked behind the desk, and there was Dick Vine curled up in the fetal position on the floor, stretching out his back muscles, which had cramped. He had a back problem, so he'd lie on his back and he'd hug his legs and stretch the muscles out. He finally stretched them out, got up, and we sat at his coffee table, and he brought out his game plan for the refugee program, new bureau, like offering puppies. He said, "I've got all these jobs, three or four job openings in various office directorships. Which one would you like?" There was Europe and Latin America and Africa, and there was a new [one] called Emergency Response. I said, "Dick, all the others are kind of set pieces. Here's one that's brand new. I get to design it and figure out how to do it. That would be just wonderful. I'll take it." He said, "It's yours. Come to work tomorrow." I said, "Okay, I'm here." So I came to work, had no staff, nothing. I had about three or four positions and some offices in what is now the State Annex in Columbia Plaza, and we went to work. Now, at that time AID had a major operation in OFDA, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, which had, I don't know, thirty or forty people in it and a budget of hundreds of millions of dollars, which they were responsible for organizing and

distributing in response to disasters that were caused by nature. So AID's mandate was to provide humanitarian assistance, either through bilateral or through international mechanisms, and to set up the structures and the techniques for doing it, to deal with tornadoes, typhoons, floods, earthquakes, forest fires, any other kind of natural catastrophe, where the State Department had in its humanitarian charter the responsibility to provide the same kind of humanitarian relief for manmade emergencies. So that was my charter, and I had no money and no people. There was a fine young man at EPA by the name of Don Krumm, whom I liked very much. He had worked for me there. So I called Don up and I said, "Don, I've got a job for you, a civil service job. Why don't you come over and talk about it." We talked and he said he'd come onboard, and he came over. Then I ran into Sheppy Abramowitz, Mort Abramowitz's wife. Have you ever interviewed Sheppy?

Q: No.

HARRIS: Oh, you should do that. Put that down on your list. She's terrific. Lots of stories. You've done Mort, I'm sure.

Q: No, he's been elusive. Tom Stern has been chasing him around.

HARRIS: You ought to get Sheppy, then get Mort.

Q: Is she still working?

HARRIS: Yes.

Q: Because I can't get her while she's still working.

HARRIS: But she works part time, not full time.

Q: Well, would you ask her?

HARRIS: I will ask her. So I hired Sheppy, and that was the corps. We then began to set up programs, and one of the major problems that we had was that the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR, did not have doctrine or practices that were really sufficient to deal with international humanitarian manmade emergencies. They were clearly the major organization that we interfaced with, but in terms of the emergency response, they had very rudimentary and very unskilled people, untrained people, in order to provide these kinds of services. Mark Malloch Brown was chosen to be the head of the emergency unit—he's now the head of UNDP (UN Development Programme)—and was developing a guidebook and standards and practices based on experiences that he had in terms of establishing and running refugee camps for tens and tens of thousands of people in Thailand on the Cambodian border, where they had this massive refugee influx of people who had fled from the Pol Pot regime into Thailand to keep themselves from being killed. All of a sudden the international community had this major problem in terms of having to provide fifteen hundred calories a day, clean drinking water, some way

to get rid of the sewage, health care, shelter for tens and tens and tens of thousands of people, up and down the Thai–Cambodian border, and to do it in an efficient way without losing too many lives. There were a lot of lessons learned there, and what Mark wanted to do was incorporate those into operating systems and standard procedures that the UNHCR would use around the world. Then into my life came a great guy and great influence, a fellow by the name of Fred Cooney. Fred Cooney is in a number of books, and he was a MacArthur genius grantee, and he was killed in Chechnya—that's another story—by the Chechens in a very clever operation in which the Russians fingered Cooney as being a Russian agent, which he wasn't, but this led the Chechens to do the work for the Russians. The Russians wanted to get rid of him because he'd written a story in the New York Review of Books and had been very highly critical of their repression in Chechnya. But Cooney had started this small company in Dallas, Texas, called Intertech, and he'd begun to gather a group of people in the U.S. government, in academics, and in Oxfam and in other relationships around, people who saw the relief activities as being a division of the engineering science and that there were more optimum ways of developing refugee housing, refugee toilets, refugee water systems, purification systems, seeding programs, and so forth, and they needed to develop the lessons learned and a system—when you look at my stuff, I've really done a lot of different things—and to develop better systems. Every time the international community went through an operation run by the UNHCR or run by the NGOs such as CARE or World Vision or the hundreds of others, the Médecins Sans Frontières, that they looked at the operation and tried to figure out, as you would in building a bridge or building a road or anything else that you would do in terms of a civil engineering model, what worked and what didn't work and how to improve it. That was the model that Cooney worked on, so he intellectually captured Don Krumm and myself as being people inside the government. He'd worked for OFDA for a number of years, but he was a very strong-minded guy and he had some difficulties with some of the OFDA people there. Julia Taft was the head of OFDA at that time, and he tended sometimes to be a little too dictatorial, and the OFDA people wanted to do it their way and not the Cooney way, although he could demonstrate to them that the Cooney way was better, which they did not appreciate. What we then did was, we hired Cooney and turned Cooney on to UNHCR in order to ensure that the UNHCR practices improved. So you had internally a reform effort led by Mark Malloch Brown and several other wonderfully gifted UNHCR international civil servants in the UN system, trying to improve their ability to deal with these mass humanitarian emergencies, and you had the United States, the major funder of the UNHCR, pushing for the same thing along with a specific agenda of best practices, which we then turned to Fred Cooney to provide. Those were very exciting times in terms of trying to get the UNHCR system, and that all culminated in the publishing of a little blue plastic-covered handbook by the UNHCR, which became a bible and saved literally tens of thousands of lives of people. I In the past, the UNHCR had been established by having some fellow in a tattered suit, with a beat-up gold watch and chain, coming and talking to a guy in a freshly laundered shirt, and a freshly pressed suit with a bright, shiny watch and a gold chain, about where he should resettle after a terrible time in Nazi Europe as a refugee and where he could go trying to settle these refugees in Europe. Now they were faced with tens of thousands of people a day streaming across the borders in Asia and Africa and in Latin America and not having the wherewithal to do it.

We also dealt with other problems during this time. They were political issues and tough issues that I was sent out to deal with. One of them was in terms of the disparate protection and assistance treatment provided to refugees in Central America. Central America was a major, major hot spot of U.S. policy in those days, and the refugees moved into Guatemala, the refugees who were fleeing from Nicaragua, were given a very short shrift, but the refugees who fled into Nicaragua were treated very handsomely by the UNHCR. In the anticommunist days that were going on, this was seen by people in the State Department as being a left-wing bias, communist bias, by some of the UNHCR officials, and I was sent on my horse to go down and to get UNHCR programs back on the right path. It was interesting. I went to Nicaragua, and at that time this was in the depths of the relationship between the United States and Nicaragua under the Sandinista regime, but because I came with the refugee program and they knew that I was the major funder, that my office was the major funder of the UNHCR program, which benefited them, all the doors flew open for me in terms of meetings in the foreign ministry and in other social ministries and throughout, and I had very open and very productive discussions in Managua as compared to the cold shoulder and the difficulties the embassy had in terms of getting people appointments there. So that was hard work. I think it was really expressing our concerns about the treatment of people, particularly Miskito Indians and other people who were being forced out of Nicaragua, both north into Honduras and south into Costa Rica. So we did some major events in terms of Miskito Indian flight. We had some pandemics there. I flew down with some CDC (Centers for Disease Control) doctors on two occasions, because there were major outbreaks of mysterious diseases in the refugee camps and Miskito Indians in a place called Mocaron, which was this great, huge B-52 escape Air Force emergency runway for World War III in the middle of the jungle, an incredible place. We went down there pushing the UNHCR and the other agencies to provide better care for the Miskito Indian refugees there, who were being treated really rather shabbily and in a second-hand way, and there was a real question of whether they were entitled to UNHCR assistance because of the bias that the UNHCR officials had. Then I went down to Costa Rica looking at refugees there, just horrible examples of people who'd been tortured and mutilated by the Sandinistas and they'd fled across. One of the epiphanies I had was when I tried to get some publicity—and again, I had all these skills and all these connections in the press. We could not get stories about Sandinista atrocities in the American press. It was not a story they were interested in running. So the Miskito Indian issues got no play. In some right-wing publications, we could get front-page stuff in those, but in terms of the Washington Post and New York Times it was just a story that fell below their interest level.

Afghanistan: I was the deputy head of a team that went to Afghanistan, or rather went to Pakistan, looking at the ways in which we could decrease the flow of refugees from Afghanistan into Pakistan, which were millions of people. Our mandate was to come back with a series of options for the administration to consider and recommendations in terms of proactive things that we could do to hold more people in Afghanistan and not have them crossing the border into Pakistan and exacerbating an already difficult refugee situation in Pakistan. Well, our principal recommendation when we came back was to send people with gold coins across the border into Afghanistan and distribute the gold to

the people there, which they could then use to buy goods and services, which would draw food, medicine, and other things that they needed to maintain their existence inside of Afghanistan. Well, when the AID officials and the State Department officials and the CIA people heard our recommendations, they thought that we were absolutely cuckoo, but our determination was that there were not sufficient mules and pack animals, camels and mules and other things like that, to bring the required amount of products, foodstuffs and oil and other products that were not available in Afghanistan. Plus, it was very dangerous, and you had to bring them through all these back routes, through little valleys, and the Russians and their supporters were trying to police these valleys to keep out the people who had to smuggle the stuff across. It was a hell of a lot easier to send a guy with a couple of webs of gold coins strapped to his waist across the border than it was to send a guy with fifty pack mules filled with grain or wheat.

Q: They could buy the stuff?

HARRIS: Sure. They could buy the stuff, and the market would, if there was gold there, bring the things to them. What we wanted to do was to give them money, and if we gave them money, let somebody else bring the things across the border to them, as opposed to shipping the product into Afghanistan. Well, the decision was made that this would be done as a clandestine effort by the CIA and that they would in fact buy in the United States mules and asses and donkeys and so forth, and they sent planeloads after planeloads after planeloads of animals. The United States was stripped of all its draft animals to go to Pakistan to cross the border, and they set up this massive, multi-multiyear, multi-multimillion-dollar program to feed the folks in Afghanistan as a way of stemming the tide of these people coming across. So that was a great failure but a very interesting project and a very interesting effort. Fred—I forget Fred's last name, I'll have to find it—from AID—a German name, a very good operator—was the director and I was the deputy director of that mission, and we had a number of people who were on the mission. That was fascinating, because the corruption in Pakistan was absolutely obvious. In Quetta the houses of the military officers, especially the senior military officers, were palaces, and there was really a lot of conspicuous consumption there. All this refugee money and clandestine intelligence money had sifted its way through the system, and these people were taking their cuts off the top and living in palaces with satellite dishes and satellite telephones and everything else. It was a fabulous experience.

The other memorable experience that we had was in Ethiopia and Sudan. The terrible civil war in Ethiopia led in—I don't know the year, I think it was '83—to a major famine in Tigre in particular but also in—Asmara is the capital of—

Q: Eritrea.

HARRIS: —of Eritrea, and you had literally tens and tens of thousands of women and children and old people who had no food in the villages, and they walked out across the mountains from Tigre and from Eritrea into refugee camps in Sudan. As usual the UN system was behind the curve, so I went out there and sent people out there to spearhead that relief effort. Actually, I sent Cooney, and I actually went down and put his airplane

inside an American military plane, and we flew his plane across. It was probably one of the most brilliant things that I did during that time, because by having an airplane he was not only able to move around but they were able to get a view of what was going on. So for just intelligence and logistics planning and things like that, it gave Cooney an advantage, that he became a de facto coordinator in the area, not because he had the authority but because he knew what was going on and could see things that no one else could see. It was an incredible experience putting together. I was out there. It was tragic—people dying, water catastrophes, cholera epidemics, it was just incredible. I remember once I hired a plane—actually I hired several planes—to bring—Vice President Bush who was going to stop off in the eastern Sudan, and there was an old British Air Force base in eastern Sudan, and he was going to land his plane there. I had the idea that we would fly in and have the vice president give a gift of medicines and foodstuffs and other things for the refugees as a symbol of American support. We had the vice president and a wonderful film opportunity again. This is my public affairs training. I was always looking for the opportunity. The White House bought it. We had done something very much like this in Pakistan. When the vice president visited Pakistan, I organized something there, and we flew in a lot of donated medical supplies worth millions of dollars, but the stuff was close dated, or just slightly postdated the expiration, so they couldn't sell it, but they certainly could give it away, and certainly the penicillin and other drugs were just godsends for the refugees in the Sudan and the refugees in Pakistan. I decided I was going to fly over for this, and I decided, why should I spend two days flying through Europe and then down to the Sudan when I could just jump on this jet that I'd rented. And when I got on the plane, I was absolutely pissed off because I had told them to fill the plane up with food. There was a huge area, maybe a little bit bigger than half this office, about two-thirds of this office, in the nose of the plane that was absolutely empty. I had bought the whole plane, so I was absolutely furious. So I sent a message we were going to stop in two places. We were going to stop in the Azores, and then we were going to stop at an Italian NATO Air Force base in Sicily.

Q: Sigonella?

HARRIS: Sigonella, which is, I believe, in Sicily.

Q: It is.

HARRIS: So I sent a very tough message to the military guys. I said I wanted to fill the plane up, and I said I wanted a high-dollar commodity such as oil—I would pay for it, I gave them a fund site—but I wanted the plane to be absolutely topped off with supplies for these starving, dying people. When we got to Azores, they did not have time to organize anything, and the decision was made that the requisition would go forward and would be done in Sicily. But they passed the word around and they said if there were any foodstuffs or anything there, put it on the plane going to the refugees. And we took crates of oranges and apples and Twinkies on the plane. I said, "Jesus Christ, what am I going to do? I've got maybe eighty, ninety, one hundred thousand refugees, and I've got two crates of oranges and two crates of apples and a couple, four or five, cases of Twinkies. I'll have a riot." So I said, "All right, when we get there, I'll take this stuff, and we'll

distribute the other stuff to the non-governmental organizations, the NGOs, on the other end who were handling it. We got to Sicily and they had huge drums of olive oil, low-end olive oil, which was just perfect, and we filled the rest of the plane up, and I was very happy. I loved the flight, because I just took my sleeping bag and put it on the sacks of wheat. I had an air mattress, so I blew it up—I'm a real big guy—and I just stayed in the back there and slept most of the way on a very comfortable air mattress while we slowly flew across the Atlantic and the Mediterranean into Sudan, and we landed. When I got there, they sent a truck for me, and I put this stuff in the truck, these apples and oranges and Twinkies. When I came to the camps, all the camps that I visited, I would give to the relief workers an orange and an apple and a Twinkie. So I gave all the relief workers an orange, an apple and a Twinkie, and I became famous as the Twinkie man, because no one had ever come and plopped down anything, and here are these guys, for them to have a piece of fresh fruit was like a miracle. They had food, but the food was pretty boring and there was no fresh fruit at all, and this was just a miracle. Well, the French nurses in the Médecins Sans Frontières went absolutely crazy over the Twinkies, and so they were trading their apples and their oranges for Twinkies with the doctors, who thought they were just disgusting. It was wonderful. I was invited over to the Médecins Sans Frontières tent for dinner one night, and I was sitting there watching all these French people eat their Twinkies with knives and forks. It was great. We organized with Oxfam, who had some very, very appropriate, smart technologists in terms of water supply systems. They came in, and I paid the bills. It was a very high cost, but it saved a lot of lives, and that was really terrific.

The other leg [where] we spent a lot of time was in terms of Lebanon. This was a very tragic experience. I loved this job. I told somebody as I set off with my sleeping bag and my canteen and my water purification pills that I had joined the Foreign Service to become an American diplomat and go abroad and stay at the Georges Cinq Hotel, but meanwhile I was flying around with a backpack and a sleeping bag and an air mattress and a canteen and just having a wonderful time. Lebanon—the Israelis invaded Lebanon in, I guess, '84—we'll have to check that date.

Q: I think it's around '82 or '83.

HARRIS: This was just before the American embassy was blown up. They invaded and they just destroyed everything in their path. Beirut was just literally in rubble. They had these huge, 150-millimeter mortars, and they would sit in the inside of a halftrack and they would fire those things twenty-four hours a day, because a mortar tube is a very simple thing. You just drop it in and it goes off. They'd just sit there and they would fire it and they'd click the dial a couple of notches and they'd send the next one in. So it just methodically went down the street and just destroyed every house on that street, just incredible. [Then] I went to Israel. I remember meeting the person who'd been put in charge. He was the minister of housing, but he'd been put in charge of relief efforts in Lebanon, because the civilian infrastructure had been significantly damaged by the Israeli military offensive that went up right through to Beirut and into Beirut in order to knock the PLO out. The PLO negotiated their withdrawal from Beirut. And this was also the time of the terrible massacre in the refugee camps there.

Q: Shatila and Thoberon.

HARRIS: Yes, just terrible, and I was there for that. I made a number of trips there at that time. Malcolm Butler, have you ever gotten Malcolm Butler? You ought to get Malcolm over here. He was the AID director in Lebanon at that time, very interesting guy. He'll have a lot of good stories to tell. I went to Israel because I brought a team with me from CDC and AID and others, and I was the head, but we were operating on essentially AID money, because the State Department didn't have money, but AID wanted to do something in terms of providing basic humanitarian infrastructure assistance to the Lebanese. I'll never forget, the minister looked at me and he thought I might be Jewish, so he said, "Harris, are you Jewish?" I said, "No, I'm not. I only speak three words of Hebrew." He said, "What are those?" I've now forgotten one of them, but I said, "One is *bechemoose* and the other is *hattiha*." He said, "Harris, you've hit it on the nail. Those are the two most important words in the language." Oh, the third word was *shalom*—*shalom, bechemoose,* and *hattiha*. *Shalom* is, of course, is "hello," a greeting, *bechemoose* is "bathroom," and *hattiha* is a "cute chick," a cute babe. So anyway, he was very cooperative, and we got all the necessary passes to cross the border. So instead of going through Cyprus and into Beirut, we went across the lines in Israel. And, of course, the Israelis were trying—they were trying to get us to buy Israeli-made prefab houses to put the Lebanese into for the houses they destroyed, because the Lebanese as a matter of principle would not live in a house that had been made in Israel.

Q: That's known as "chutzpah," I think.

HARRIS: Big "chutzpah." A wonderful story—We had an MEU, a Marine expeditionary unit, floating off the coast at that time. There was a Marine officer. He was short and he went to a tee-shirt factory. He had this design. They had a competition between the various boats in the MEU for a tee-shirt design. He came ashore and he went to a tee-shirt factory in Beirut, and he said, "I want a tee-shirt made for the Marines," so the owner said, "You goddamn Americans, you've been destroying my country, and you want to come and have me make tee-shirts for you. You've got to be crazy." And the guy said, "Oh, my God, what am I going to do? I need three thousand." The guy said, "It's a deal." But [when] we went in, we discovered that the code chains for medicines had been broken, the water systems had been broken, and so we put together the necessary infrastructure and we arranged to bring it in, fly it into Israel, move it across the border, and bring it in to Lebanon and some of the other major population centers in southern Lebanon in order to build up basic kinds of health infrastructure, which would enable people to live and not get sick. That was our major goal. I don't know what the cost was. A couple stories came out of that. Greatest gift— Phil Habib was in Beirut then. I ran into him, and he said, "Tex, what are you doing?" I told him what I was doing, and he said, "I'm leaving in a couple days. I've got a satellite telephone which they arranged—"

Q: This is Tape 8, Side 1 with Tex Harris.

HARRIS: So every morning about nine-thirty Washington time I would call in on the

satellite phone using Navy satellite channels into the Op Center, into the S/S Operation Center in Washington and talk to my boss, and I would have my list of things and say, "Look, I need so many thousand units of this medicine, so many thousand units of this serum, and I need this number of refrigerators to run on this current." He would write them down, and then he would give it to the procurement people, and a week later they would be there. It was really, really an incredible experience. We really got things done. Peter McPherson, who was the AID administrator, came to Lebanon, so I went down to see the military attaché in the embassy, and I said, "Look, this is the most important thing that we are doing in terms of humanitarian supply. We've got the guy who's paying the bills coming." He was coming out with Gene Dewey, who was my boss, the guy that I spoke to every workday morning in Washington on the satellite phone. I said, "We need to get a chopper, because he's only going to be here for less than a day. We need a chopper to take these guys around and to show them the damage and exactly what's going and what's happening." So he said, "I'll try, but it's really tough because the Lebanese don't have a lot of planes and it's really a major thing." I said, "Do it." So he went through his military channels, and the Lebanese government agreed that they would put a couple choppers on to fly us around. I got out to the airport. The plane was supposed to come in from Frankfurt or someplace like that at eleven-thirty. I got out there at eleven and met the head of the squadron. They had given us three choppers—no, two choppers—and the plane that the AID administrator and Gene Dewey were coming in was delayed, of course. So I spent a couple hours out there, and meanwhile I got to talking with the officer who was the head of the helicopter unit that was based in the airport there and told him that my boss, Gene Dewey, had been, in fact, a helicopter pilot in Vietnam. He said, "Great. I'll put my copilot in the back, and he can sit up front with me and get a little stick time." I said, "That'll be great. He'll love that." I thought this would be great, my boss would love it, and it would be a big thrill for him to fly a chopper. This was the French Alouette, or something like that, which he'd never flown. He flew Hueys or something like that in Vietnam. So the plane lands, McPherson gets off, Gene Dewey, my boss, gets off, we put McPherson in the first chopper and sent him off, and Gene and I got in the second chopper and we take off, and we are flying over hell. You drove through Beirut then and you saw just rubble, but every block was just destroyed, then there would be a block that was fine, and then the next block would be destroyed, and then the next two would be fine, but it was absolutely incredible when you saw it from the air, because you could see the devastation that had taken place in the city. The only way to see it, of course, was by flying around in a chopper so you get a bird's eye view, so we spent about forty-five minutes or an hour flying around Beirut seeing it. The pilot officer told Gene that that's where we were going fly, so Gene flew very well, and so finally we're landing at the Defense Ministry—that was to be our touchdown place—and he turned to Dewey and he said, "Would you like to land the chopper?" I was perfectly happy to have Gene fly the plane around Beirut a thousand feet in the air, that was fine, but landing a chopper is a very, very tough and exacting exercise, and I was absolutely petrified, because he told me he had never flown a French helicopter before. But he landed it beautifully on the lawn, coming in over these huge Lebanese pine trees and putting it right down on the lawn. Well, McPherson came, saw the importance of it, and continued to fund it, so that was the good story. I went down and visited all the folks there. We met with the mayors and the local officials in Tyre, in Sidon, and a lot of the

other small communities. We made assessments of the problems that they were facing in terms of the needs that they had, and then we took action to try to fill the major humanitarian relief gaps there. I don't know what the dollar amount was, but it was in the millions of dollars that we spent in that period. Then I left, and when I came back for the next trip, it was just after the massacre in Shatila and Sabra camps. That was absolutely staggering, to walk through those camps. When we went there the blood wasn't wet, but it was still on the walls, in the streets, and everywhere the people had been killed, and it was just a horrific massacre. Some of the NGO people that I had worked with took me through, and we saw how the Christian terrorist commandos had gone through and systematically killed all the people in the community. Frightening things in the refugee camps—I visited all the refugee camps there, which were run by UNRWA (UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East). A little kid was the cluster bomb kid, who would go around and very carefully pick up unexploded cluster bombs, and he would take them and throw them on the other side of a wall and duck down while the cluster bombs would explode. If the things had ever opened up, he would have been dead in a second. We found live munitions, and we exploded them up. Several times there, artillery pieces were fired in on us. I don't know where they came from, but anyway it was absolutely frightening. I was only there for four or five rounds, but talk about disorientation and fear, when even in Nmairiyeh a half a mile away somebody is putting in 150-millimeter rounds, it is absolutely frightening as hell. We were traveling with some ordnance people who were there collecting ordnance, and they found some specimens that they hadn't seen of Russian munitions, so they collected them and put them in the back of the jeep. Where I was traveling, I had these things under my feet driving back and forth to Beirut. Wonderful story—Who was the president of Beirut, the mega-builder?

Q: The Gemayel brothers were—

HARRIS: This was the guy who was the president, a billionaire. Anyway, the mayor of Sidon told me that his wife wanted to see me and would I come and have tea with her. I said, "Sure," so I went up to their house, which had not been touched by the Israelis. They had a compound of these mansions there, and the elevator going up to see her was a Swiss elevator. It was like a Cadillac, the Rolls Royce of elevators. It was the most fantastic I've ever been on in my life. The children's playroom had a wall with cushioned holes in the wall to put the toys, a shelf with a cushion on it. It was just incredible. There was a huge tower in the center of the room, like a huge wedding cake that kids could climb up and down on. It was just incredible. Anyway, she came and she said, "I have a satellite phone. Would you like to call your family?" I hadn't spoken to my wife for maybe three weeks, so I was absolutely thrilled at a chance to call home, and I called home and she wasn't there, and I spoke to the maid. My phone, of course, was scrambled and fixed communication, so we could only talk to another scrambled phone and I couldn't call home with it. Then the mayor's wife said her problem was she wanted our help, which I did provide, in getting her bulldozer back. She had, I think it was, a D7 or D8 bulldozer, which is the huge caterpillar bulldozers, which are as big as half of this house. She had this gravel pit not too far from her house, and for recreation what she would go—and, again, this is a billionaire's wife—she would go—her husband built all

the airports and a lot of the cities and things like that in Saudi Arabia on a handshake and at-cost-plus-10-percent deal—so she would go and push piles of gravel around in this pit, which she did. She would run this bulldozer, and that was her enjoyment. But when the Israelis came through, they saw this gravel pit, they found this great caterpillar. I think it was D8. There were no D8s in Israel, so they called a tank transport, put the thing on it, and drove it back to Israel. And she wanted her caterpillar back—the Israelis finally got her caterpillar back for her. We put the problem before them, and I think they realized—Hererre, that was his name—that he was a guy that they did not want to be on the wrong side of for stealing his wife's caterpillar, plus it shouldn't have been done, and so they returned it. The devastation among the people, the refugees, these people had just suffered so much, and it was just terrible. I had worked with a lot of the people in AID, then I left, then I came back. After I had left just a few days, then the embassy was blown up. But for just less than a week, I might very well have been sitting in that cafeteria and killed. It just showed me how lucky you are. A number of the people I worked with in AID died or were badly injured in that devastating blow. I came back. I was traveling around in Beirut and then the U.S. Marines landed. I was actually on the beach when the Marines came down. I was thinking to myself afterward: What the hell am I doing, here I am as a diplomat and I'm sitting on the beach while the Marines land. The ambassador was down there on the beach with his dog, and I was just down there walking around, and the Marines came. They were very uptight, as you can understand, and young guys. When I came back, I went around to inspect the Marine positions with the colonel who was in charge. It was interesting. He came, and we went around with a congressman from Texas who was a famous womanizer. I can't think of the guy's name.

Q: Charlie Wilson?

HARRIS: Charlie Wilson. Charlie was great. I was from Dallas, and he was from east Texas, and he was just great. We'd be driving down the street, and I was with the commanding officer in the second Jeep, and Charlie was in the first Jeep with the public affairs guy. We'd drive down and there'd be a checkpoint, and Charlie would jump out of the Jeep and say, "Hey, boys, anybody here from Texas?" So some guy would say, "I'm from Amarillo." He'd go over and say, "How you doin'?" and he'd give him a big hello and he'd give them a pep talk. It was just wonderful, you know, politics. Then he'd get back in his Jeep. And the colonel would run around and just shake his head and say, "I told these guys to dig these foxholes really deep, and they haven't done it. They've increased the depth a bit, but they really are not sufficient. You just wait. First time they start taking some incoming fire on these positions, they will go way deep and be sufficient." Then I left and, of course, a week or so later was the bombing of the Marine barracks. That recovery was successful. We essentially put a lot of money into critical medical infrastructure and water purification. Those were our goals, and we achieved those and were able to get those programs up and going. I spent about four years, or three and half years from '81 to the middle of '85, doing this work and realized that for my own career, which now had been I guess broken free, because I had been promoted once, but that was the best job. I could have just stayed doing that job forever. It was so satisfying. The work was so great, and it was just one of the best jobs that I had in my life, really helping people. We had money, we had authority, we got things done, and

there was no bureaucracy. When you're out there with a satellite phone and a car from the embassy and a driver and a couple of other guys from CDC and sitting around the café and deciding what the hell you need to do, and then you go down and you pick up the phone on your balcony of your hotel room and you talk to your boss and say, "Look, this is the problem; this is what we need to solve it," and your boss says okay, and three days later the stuff's on an airplane flying in, and within a week or so it's there helping people. There was an enormous amount of satisfaction, just incredible.

Why don't we stop there—my voice is going—and that will bring us up to going into as the deputy director for the Office for Southern African Affairs and the major battles there. That's a good point to stop.

Q: That's 1985.

HARRIS: Yes, that's '85.

Q: Okay, good.

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Q: Today is March 31, 2000. Tex, we're in 1985 and you moved over to Southern African Affairs, is that it?

HARRIS: That's correct.

Q: And you were doing that from when to when?

HARRIS: I spent about nine years working on that African account, on South Africa. That and AFSA were the two longest focuses in my career. What happened was that my work in the Refugee Program, in Emergency Action, took me Africa.

Q: But you were there from '85, essentially in the African Bureau then, from when to when?

HARRIS: Yes, I was there from '85 till '90. I was there from '85 to '87, and then in 1987 I left and went to serve as the consul general in Durban.

Q: Okay, '85 to '87 you were in the African Bureau?

HARRIS: That's correct.

Q: Let's stick to that then.

HARRIS: Okay, let's do that.

Q: This was during the end of the—

HARRIS: This was the height of the anti-apartheid struggle in the United States, and I remember once I had gone to the job—and the reason I got hired was because Jim Bishop, who was then one of the deputies, had liked the work that I had done in Refugee Programs (RP) in response to the African refugee flows from Tigre and Eritrea, and they had offered me several opportunities to come to work in the bureau and I wasn't ready to leave RP. But finally they came up with a job, which was the deputy director in the Office of Southern African Affairs with responsibility for South Africa and some of the smaller states, which was just fascinating. The office really had two major accounts, two major issues. One was South Africa, and the other was the kind of difficult post-colonial experiences in Portuguese Africa in the south, Mozambique and Angola and Namibia, but they were really bifurcated, and I spent all my time working the South African account. With my experience and also predilection for dealing with the public affairs side, the outreach side, I spent more of my time on the domestic political aspects of the South African problem than I did in terms of operational details in the field and the policy formulations. I was the USA inside guy in the office and worked very carefully with the Sullivan Principle people, with American businesses who were still in South Africa, and with the sixth floor, who were very much involved, Chet Crocker in particular. Jeff Davidow was the office director, and then later Gib Lanpher, a great team. Ashley Wills was the desk officer for South Africa, and Susan Keogh-Fisher was his deputy desk officer. It was a great team, and we just worked our buns off.

Q: What was the state of affairs in South Africa in 1985?

HARRIS: We were moving into the end of the P. W. Botha hard-line, repressive, apartheid regime era. This was the full blossoming, as it were, of the American policy of constructive engagement. Ronald Reagan was in the White House. Pat Buchanan was his domestic advisor and very active and very involved [with] and close to the South African embassy. There was one story I remember, that we had prepared a top-secret list of sanctions against the South Africans, which had about ten or twelve things, things that were essentially at the request of the National Security Council and the White House, and we sent these over through the secretary of state. Chet Crocker would meet once a month or once every few weeks with Beukes, who was the South African ambassador. Crocker on his way home from work would leave a little early, and he'd stop off and have a glass of sherry with the ambassador and they would just talk, the two of them. We sent this document over Friday. We had worked on it pretty hard all week. It was a list of options for the administration to consider taking against the South Africans. Well, the following Monday or Tuesday, Crocker went and called on the South African ambassador, and the South African ambassador had the top-secret memo. He went through the memo with Crocker point by point, telling him what the down side was of doing all the steps that the State Department had listed, in rank order of possible U.S. government sanctions against South Africa. Crocker was furious. He came back and called Shultz. Shultz went through the roof, because what had happened is that the White House—we didn't see it happen, but probably through Buchanan and through the ties of the South African lawyers and through the conservative Republican Party folks—had got this memo from the White House and it got back to the embassy and, of course, to the South African government.

But that was the kind of world we lived in. I'll tell another story later about how the president's bill was vetoed and the president's decision to veto the anti-apartheid act of '86 came to be. But from a working standpoint it was very exciting. I remember once walking down the hall and one of my pals came up and he said, "Tex, what are you doing," and I said, "I'm working as deputy director in the Office of Southern African Affairs," and he said, "My God, Harris, you've lost your way. I always thought that you were a smart guy and could figure out the right places on the board to jump, but clearly you have chosen really a policy that is just abhorrent to the American people, and everybody associated with this policy is going to get hurt." That was very much the view of all my friends and others. We were in an era of constructive engagement, when almost every university in the United States had an apartheid village. Almost every organization in the United States that had a pension fund had enormous debates [about] whether they should have in their pension fund stocks like Johnson & Johnson or Mobil Oil, who did business in South Africa. There was a view around that, if you owned these stocks, somehow you were supporting the South African apartheid repression of the black citizens in South Africa and therefore you were supporting apartheid. This was clearly the number-one foreign affairs domestic political issue, and because of the skills in the anti-apartheid groups and the links through pensions that this issue became something that was debated in every school board, in every corporation office, and began a whole series of city, county, and state actions designed to prohibit the state from buying from any company that appeared to be doing business in South Africa. It was an incredible time. I spent a lot of time as a Department spokesperson going around to major meetings in the United States debating the South African issue, very tough debates. I remember one meeting I went to, which was the annual convention of state legislators. I think it was in Orlando, Florida, in the Disneyworld complex. Anyway, I was down there, and it was incredible. They had a room that had been assigned for this debate, and I went along with a gentleman by the name of Sal Marzullo, who was a vice president of Mobil Oil and was the executive director of the Sullivan Principles group, which was headed by the Reverend Leon Sullivan from Philadelphia. Sal was the corporate interface with Sullivan. Sullivan ran the group but with help and support from the Sullivan companies.

Q: What was Sullivan's role in this?

HARRIS: What Sullivan did was legitimatize the anti-apartheid activities of the American firms doing business in South Africa who subscribed to the Sullivan code, which was a series of specific, gradable steps that each of the companies was committed to, not only to end apartheid within their firm but also to have affirmative action programs to promote black and colored and, I guess, Indian, people of color in South Africa, to positions of responsibility in the firm and to support training and do all the other good-guy stuff that one could think of, and they had scores. There were auditors. I forget who the auditor was, but each year the companies were audited and they got a score. They got a Sullivan Principle audit score to show that they were not only good citizens but they were proactive citizens pushing against apartheid, and that by their being in South Africa they were making a difference in the struggle against the apartheid regime and the apartheid rule. But the Sullivan Principles were not accepted by the anti-apartheid folks and were denounced as kind of a cop-out way for American corporations

to continue to do business, profitable business, in South Africa, which they did. For example, Mobil had essentially provided through a cut-out corporation some of the critical catalytic technologies that allowed the South Africans to produce gasoline from coal. In part some of the products and processes involved were patented by Mobil, which they then had licensed, and in secret deals to the South Africans because the South Africans could not import legally under the UN restrictions strategic products such as armaments but also they couldn't import gasoline. So they had a major project, national security project, which essentially made gasoline from coal, which was, of course, in enormous abundance in South Africa, being one of the largest coal exporters in the world. There were a lot of close relations between American business, at least Mobil, and the government. The others were just down there making a good living, and South Africa provided for American business a wonderful infrastructure for doing business in the southern part of Africa, plus the ports. The major port in the southern half of Africa is Durban. It is the big port where the stuff goes in, the big bulk stuff goes in, so it made a lot of sense. The telephones worked, the roads worked, you could get a meal, you could drink the water, you had all the benefits of living in a country that operated. The problem was that it operated on the basis of an apartheid regime that exploited the majority of its citizens for the benefits of a white minority. Anyway, we went around and we talked about the need for change and the need to constructively engage the South Africans. But those days were very tough. This was a policy that was just soundly rejected throughout the United States. The culmination of this came in '86, when the Republican majority, I believe, in the Senate—I'm not sure if they were the majority or the minority, but anyway, when the Republicans in the Senate—decided that for political reasons they would break with the White House and would join with their Democratic colleagues in putting forward a list of sanctions by the U.S. government against the government of South Africa for its anti-apartheid policies. This was adamantly opposed by the White House and by the State Department. Shultz went up and testified against it. Crocker was up there testifying against it. We were working very hard, but it was clearly a political judgment of the Republican leadership that this did not make sense. There was a wonderful meeting in the White House, and I told the story a number of years later in Durban. I was telling the story, and when I finished one of the gentlemen at the dinner table who was a visitor—I think he was American, anyway he was with a major American company—he said, "Tex, the story you're relating is absolutely correct. I was there. I worked for Pat Buchanan and I was his note taker." What happened is that Dole—

Q: Senator from Kansas and leader of the Senate Republicans.

HARRIS: I'm not sure, I think he probably was the minority at that time. But anyway, Dole, Lugar—no, it was a Republican majority; Lugar was the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—and Nancy Katzenbaum, also a Republican from Kansas who had a very deep and abiding interest in Africa, came to the White House to see the president of the United States and to urge the president to, if not support, at least not veto the legislation that they were about to pass, the Anti-Apartheid Act of '86. Well, the President heard them out and in reply, instead of engaging them in substantive discussion, told them a number of Eddie Cantor—is that the guy's name?—a number of

Eddie Cantor stories.

Q: He's a Hollywood and Broadway comedian of the 1920s and '30s.

HARRIS: He told them a bunch of Eddie Cantor stories and amused them and just was very jovial, but didn't deal with the issues and didn't deal with them substantively. They went back, and in the limousine on the way back up to the Hill, they decided the president was just out of touch with the issues and the policies and they, the Senate Republican leadership, had to move forward and pass the bill. Well, they did. Who was the head of the National Security Council for Reagan?

Q: Well, he went through a number. It was Carlucci toward the end.

HARRIS: It wasn't Carlucci.

Q: Poindexter or—

HARRIS: Poindexter. So the legislation was passed with substantial votes for it in both houses, with Republicans and Democrats joining together in something that was kind of bipartisan. The president then held a meeting in terms of deciding whether to veto or not to veto it, and there was a very real possibility of having his veto overridden. It would have been the first time that a presidential veto was overridden since, I think, 1945, when Truman did something that Congress didn't like in the foreign affairs area, because generally foreign affairs was somewhat the reserve of the executive, and what the president wanted, the president got. Both Poindexter and Shultz urged the president to not sign it but not to veto it, and then Pat Buchanan spoke and made an impassioned plea to the president along the lines that, "You, Mr. President, are the executive, and you, Mr. President, are responsible for American foreign policy, and these are decisions, in terms of imposing or not imposing sanctions, that are really decisions that are yours to make. The Congress constitutionally has a role that is, basically put, to advise and consent in terms of your running a foreign policy. But if we allow the Congress to intervene in tying our hands and locking us into policies that we do not support, it will not end, and you will lose your authority as the president of the United States to run the foreign policy of this country and you will abdicate the job that you were elected to do." Well, that was just the argument that Ronald Reagan needed. Essentially Buchanan very cleverly took the argument from the nitty-gritty of South Africa and the Senate vote and moved it up two or three notches to an issue of presidential prerogative, and Reagan then decided to veto the bill. That was a fateful decision, and the bill was overridden. During the process, in terms of redoing the bill that was going to go back in, or in the process of doing the original bill, I guess, the administration through the back door had been asked to submit a number of ideas to the Congress in terms of things that they would like to see in the legislation. And I don't know how far up this back channel thing worked. That was great fun. I remember there was a week we didn't go home, we just stayed in the office and worked. But we drafted all this legislation, including—and this was in part a back channel, it was a bill of tough sanction measures against the South Africans. That now is coming back. This was in part the exercise that the South Africans intercepted. It was to

have a counter-sanctions bill, which was not as tough as the Lugar-Katzenbaum bill going forward, and in this proposal we proposed banning the sale, for example, of krugerrands in the United States and invented a new American gold coin, which the American gold bugs have been trying to get for fifty or sixty years since gold was demonetized back in the '30s. So we had a gold coin, which was in the legislation, in the administration-proposed sanctions legislation, which we called the Crockerrand, named after Chet Crocker. Have you done Crocker, by the way?

Q: No. He's written a book, though.

HARRIS: And Cohen's written a book. His book's coming out. Well, we then saw [that] a number of the ideas that had been put forward in the administration's counter-sanctions bill [had been] absorbed into the sanctions bill, and they became the law of the land. So it was kind of fun, although we were fighting it. The administration was faced with this major loss, and we were doing battle, and there was just hell to pay. There were editorials, and the domestic political battles were locked. There was not a lot of stomach. Shultz was wonderful, but he saw the issue in a very thoughtful, professorial kind of way. Shultz disliked the emotion and the extreme passion that were attached to the issue, and the lack of thinking. Crocker, on the other hand, felt as passionately that the policy of constructive engagement would work in the long run, and as a matter of policy was really willing to confront and engage, but I think he was advised not to get in the forefront of it, so they sent more junior people, such as myself and one or two others, out to do it.

Oh, one story I didn't finish. We were in Orlando at the state legislators meeting, and they had a small room. Well, the room was too small, so they moved it to a larger room, and this room just filled up. It was standing room only. It was packed. It was like a subway car in rush hour in New York City. It was just incredible. And Sal Marzullo and I were debating a couple of the state legislators and someone from the anti-apartheid movement on what America's policy should be in order to effect change in South Africa. I think Sal was talking, and this legislator from New Jersey—I don't remember his name, but I'll remember him forever; he looked like Mr. T, who was this figure on "the A-Team" who had all these gold chains on him. He was just covered with gold chains; a very strong, strong man—he essentially looked like a wrestler—black state legislator from New Jersey. He got excited and he charged the stage, grabbed the microphone out of Marzullo's hand and harangued the crowd for about ten minutes about the perfidy of American policy, and to great cheers. People came really to rally and express their support against the administration. They really didn't come to listen. And that was the atmosphere that we worked in. It was a very, very tough time.

Q: Personally, and with some of your fellow officers who were dealing with this at the professional level, what was the feeling? Was it the feeling that this constructive engagement really had a chance of working and that pure sanctions was sort of a feel-good thing but it really wouldn't have much effect?

HARRIS: The sense that people had was that the Afrikaners had to be led away from the failed policies of apartheid, that the way that we could ensure that apartheid continued

would be by confronting them in such a way that we boxed them into a corner, and what we had to do was to develop avenues and confidence-building measures, small steps to wean them away and show them that apartheid did not work and to offer a number of inducements for them to change their policies a step at a time. In fact, that process was going on and inside the Broederbond, and that was one of the very exciting things. As I mentioned, this was a period of very intense feelings—South Africa was not an assignment; it was a disease. You became so involved in the politics of South Africa, in the domestic politics, which were everyplace and very strident and affected congressional races. It was one of those few issues, which you no longer see, where people really would change their vote or be influenced in terms of how they voted because of a politician's stand on a foreign affairs issues, that is, South Africa.

Q: Where did the European countries stand on this?

HARRIS: The Europeans were split and were not in fact united on this. The British in particular had such enormous economic relationships, and the Italians and the Germans and some others, that they were constructive engagers as well, looking for steps that would force a transition over time. The other countries, the Benelux countries and some of the others, had a lot more stridents, except the Dutch, of course, who had a lot of economic ties with the diamond trade and other trades there. And the Swiss, of course, were not part of the boycott—

[*End Tape 8, Side A*]

The Swedes and Scandinavians and others were absolute purists as were Elena Robinson and Jesse Jackson and others. One of the major things that happened during this time was that Ed Perkins was nominated by the Department to go out as the American ambassador to South Africa. Jesse Jackson came out stridently against this nomination and publicly, with great fanfare, told Ed Perkins that he would be a traitor. Have you done Perkins?

Q: I've tried. He's out in Oklahoma.

You might explain who Ed Perkins is.

HARRIS: Ed Perkins was one of the most senior African American Foreign Service officers in the Department and had been U.S. ambassador, I believe, in Liberia—I'm not sure, but someplace in West Africa—and had spent years and was really an expert in West African affairs and in Liberian affairs, a real Africanist. Later, after his service in South Africa, he went on to be the U.S. representative in the United Nations for a number of years and now is a professor.

Q: He was also ambassador to Australia.

HARRIS: He was ambassador to Australia after he left the United Nations, and then he

went on to found the School of International Affairs at the University of Oklahoma with former Senator [David] Boren's sponsorship. So here we were faced with this major problem. Perkins was not a gifted public speaker and certainly someone who was not ready to mix it up with someone like Jesse Jackson. Perkins felt very strongly that as a Foreign Service officer, when the president of the United States asks you to take an assignment, you should, unless there's some major problem in terms of not being able to fulfill the responsibilities of the job, do it. So he said he would take the job. One of the things I was responsible for was his confirmation. That was a fascinating time, because it was a major issue for the black community whether a black American could represent the Reagan administration as an ambassador in South Africa. So we asked Jesse Jackson to come by the State Department and meet with Perkins head to head. So he came, and there was a huge gaggle of press down in the front. I had made the arrangements, and we had gotten the deputy secretary's conference room—it was Whitehead, his conference room at the time—and we were upstairs there and Jackson came in, and Perkins and he could hardly look at each other. Then Jackson let him have it, in just kind of a black brother to a black brother, rough, rough talk, just tore him up one side and down the other, really let him have it in terms of his view. And Ed, who was really unhappy—here's a guy who's one of the leaders of the black community just really letting him have it—in his very thoughtful, soft, slow-spoken manner explained to Jackson that he was not taking or rejecting this job as a black American but that he was a professional Foreign Service officer whose responsibility was to serve the president of the United States. Whatever that president's party was and whatever the policies of that particular administration was, it was not his job to essentially make those policies but really to implement the foreign policies of the president and the U.S. government. That was his responsibility and what he'd signed on to do and what he'd been doing for twenty-five or thirty years. At the end of this Jackson was impressed, I think, with the gravitas of the man, and although he never gave him any kind of blessing, he did ease up on his attacks. But there were days when Perkins was on the cover of Jet magazine, and this was a real hot-button issue. Then we went through the confirmation hearings, and I remember one day—I had organized these murder boards for Perkins—

Q: You might explain what a murder board is.

HARRIS: A murder board is before a senior administrative official goes up before some tough testimony on the Hill, bringing together a group of knowledgeable people who play the role of the various senators that would be there and ask the toughest questions they can in order to prepare the witness for the kind of confrontation that he may have. When we had a murder board, I'd pump these guys up, I'd call these guys up and I'd really lay it into them. I said, "You are critical to Ed Perkins doing well. I want you to come, and you're going to play this senator or that senator, and I want you to develop this line or that line or whatever lines you think. I really want no punches pulled. I really want to let Ed work hard here." We had a murder board, and these guys just beat the hell out of Ed. It was terrible. They really asked every hard question. Ed did well on some and on others he fumbled, but anyway he saw his strengths and he saw his weaknesses. Then he went up to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and it was all over, and when he walked out of meeting, he turned to me with a glare and said, "This is a hell of a lot easier than

your goddamn murder board." So that was great. That's exactly what you want. You want the murder board to be much tougher than the actual event. He did very well and was confirmed. After that, I took him home, and we went to the house, and I'll never forget it. This was a magic moment. We both remember it, and we kidded about it for some time after that. He was just exhausted on his feet, and for some reason we happened to have a couple of steaks in the house. Jeanie fixed Ed, because I don't think he'd had much of a lunch, at about four o'clock or five o'clock in the afternoon a great big steak, and we had a celebratory steak dinner early in the afternoon. Ed, who's not very much of a back-slapper, we became kind of friends through this period. He then asked me to join him as the American consul general in Durban, and I said with pleasure, I'd be very happy to go and to be his man in Durban. So when my two-year tour ended in the Office of Southern African Affairs, I then flew with my family my wife and children Scott, Julie and Clark to Durban, South Africa, to start a two-year tour, and that was in September 1987, which is the date in which the communal violence began in Natal and Zululand.

Q: Okay, but let's go back now. We're still dealing with this. What was your impression of Crocker? Where did he really fit in all of this, and how did he operate from your perspective?

HARRIS: Crocker was a consummate professional diplomat. First and foremost, Crocker had a vision, and Crocker always had a vision of what he wanted done. One of the keys of leadership in foreign policy or any other area is to have a clear vision and a goal of where you want to go, and then you can lead people there. Well, too often other assistant secretaries or deputy assistant secretaries do not have a vision. And Crocker was always adjusting his vision slightly around the edges. If he saw some things that became impossible, then he refined the vision, and he was a most gifted intellectual and most articulate spokesperson. He had problems in terms of not suffering fools easily, and the fools seemed to be people who disagreed with him or they could be people who did not have the intellectual fire power that he had. And he had a great deputy. Frank Wisner was his deputy. Those were in Frank's smoking days. I remember you'd go in his office and there's be ten different packages of tobacco products on his desk, including Indian Bibis and other strange and exotic Turkish cigarettes, perfumed cigarettes, and Frank, just kind of like an alcoholic, didn't smoke just one brand but smoked ten brands all at the same time. It was just a chimney in there—incredible. He had just excellent people around him. Jeff Davidow was the office director, and I've talked about the other team. It was a formidable team working on these policy issues. Crocker was successful. He was not successful in his terms and in his framework in bringing about change on his watch in South Africa. That happened later, when P. W. Botha left. I'm going to tell a few of the stories about this. But Crocker knew the area.

Q: What was his background?

HARRIS: He was an academic. He had written his PhD thesis on something to do with the security services in South Africa and their view of change, political change, and their role in the political process. And he saw in a very realistic, *realpolitik* way that the security services and the military really controlled the government. He had a right-hand

guy by the name of Robert Frasure, a fascinating guy. This guy was killed in a car accident in Bosnia. This was terrible. He went off the road.

Q: We'll fill this in.

HARRIS: Yes. And these guys had very good, long-standing connection with the South African intelligence and military intelligence and other military officer corps. Frasure would make a trip about twice a year to South Africa. Crocker depended very much on the system information. He mastered the information in the system. He mastered the journalists. He really was so well versed, similar to what Shultz is. These guys were real pros. They had been in it for a long time, they knew the area and they knew the people, they knew the issues, and they had a vision of how U.S. power and authority and resources and military could impact in the area. Now the real Crocker success came in terms of negotiating with the Cubans—this was the other area; I mentioned there were two areas in the office. There was the South African area that I worked in, and then there was the Mozambique/Angola/Namibia area, which was the other major issue in the office. That issue was enormously successful. Crocker—he's written a book on this—was able to mediate and produce a deal between the Angolans, the Cubans, the Russians, the Brits, tangentially the French and the Portuguese, and other parties with the intervention of the Holy See, this Order of the Holy See. They negotiated the Cuban withdrawal from Angola and also negotiated the South Africans' approving for the self-determination and statehood for Namibia. I remember seeing Crocker once in the hallway, and we were just catching up after I guess I'd been back from someplace. This was just after these diplomatic successes, and I said, "Chet, isn't it funny how this business is? Three years ago you were the bane of the Department. The policy of constructive engagement was the worst policy. And now you've had these successes and you're everybody's hero." I forget what it was, but he had some wonderful comment along the lines of "Yes, it's just wonderful to show all those sons-of-bitches that we were right." And that was the Crocker spirit, and the Crocker spirit was 'Goddamit, we're smart enough and we're hard working enough and we're going to get the resources.'" In the end he got Shultz, because a lot of these big deals in the end depend on the secretary of state going to the president and the National Security Council advisor and the others to get the resources, which were millions of dollars, in order to effect these mega-changes on the map. And these are the kinds of things that today the Department of State does not have the resources, and the people today tend to think in terms of the box, of the structure, that they're in. Crocker always had this vision of the possible based on his study as a social scientist and historian of the scope and the avenues and the possibilities that could happen and take place. So he was truly a leader and had enormous success not only there but in other places in West Africa. And he had a lot of detractors, because people hate arrogance, they hate people who don't suffer fools easily and who are basically often right, most often right. I enjoyed working with Crocker. I learned a lot from him. Although Hank Cohen, I guess, was more of a mentor, Crocker was not a guy who took care of his people. He wasn't in the system, where Cohen and some of the others were. Those were interesting days. There was a wonderful story: Crocker's wife's brother was an artist, and he painted this painting. His wife was from Zimbabwe, and the brother, I think, had committed suicide and he had painted this enormous picture, which was one entire wall in the ambassador's

dining room in the ambassador's residence in Harare, and it was a very, very somber picture. It was really depressing. But the ambassador felt at the time that he could not remove this picture from the residence as long as Crocker was the assistant secretary; he had to live with it. Every time Crocker came, he came and checked on the picture. But Crocker was a leader, and he had a vision, and he had knowledge, area knowledge, and has continued to display that leadership in the kind of graduate area of American diplomacy in terms of serving on commissions at Georgetown, at CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), and other places and has continued to make a mark on U.S. policy for many years after leaving. His failure was that the change inside South Africa came after his term. His joy was that he was the architect of—His book is something about high noon; the title of his book is *A Diplomat in Africa: Doing Business at High Noon*, or something like that, as kind of a shoot-out. Also, Crocker was a brilliant speaker and a brilliant writer. He had the ability to conceptualize and to articulate and to demonstrate his ideas in a very effective way.

Q: What were you getting there? You were new to this particular aspect in Africa. This is '85 to '87. What was your reading on the leadership both of the Nationalist Party and the ANC and all that? How did you feel they were going to be able to deal with what we were trying to push?

HARRIS: We had almost no relationships with the ANC.

Q: You'd better explain what the ANC was?

HARRIS: The African National Congress, which was founded by a number of people including Nelson Mandela back in the '30s as a movement for full civil rights in South Africa. Because this was the Reagan administration and clearly the ANC were characterized not as terrorists in the same strident terms as the South Africans, but they were certainly *personae non gratae* on that. We looked at the warfare between the South African intelligence and military services with the ANC as a bunch of thugs going after each other on both sides, and there was really very little blame calling. Crocker was not really interested and had great disdain for the human rights aspects because he felt that they were not helpful, but what was really key was to change opinions among the leadership in the Afrikaner community. The real contacts that the U.S. government had that were really important were, of course, with the anti-apartheid movement, which was ANC lined. Those were very rich, the United Democratic Front, and the embassy had intensive contact, and USAID was extraordinary in this regard, and another fellow by the name of Carl Beck. If you should ever get hold of Carl Beck, fascinating. Carl Beck was, I guess, in civil service working in the refugee program, and Carl had been a Peace Corps volunteer in Lesotho, so he spoke Sotho, and also had then served as the deputy director of the Peace Corps in Botswana, which also has a Sotho-related language. He was a fluent speaker, spoke Zulu, spoke several African languages with great fluency. He was really an incredible resource for the American embassy and for American reporting, because you had had all these people from the UDF (United Democratic Front) who would come to his house, eat his food, drink his wine, sleep on his guest bed, and talk their hearts out. So we really had an understanding of not the ANC, which was then a

terrorist organization as defined, but in terms of the UDF, the anti-apartheid struggle inside South Africa, and there was a lot of sympathy, I think, in the Department for their movements and their efforts, although less so for the ANC, which was a military terrorist organization as seen from the Department. Crocker relied mostly on others in terms of the change in attitudes inside the Afrikaner community as being the real markers of change in that society, and what he saw and what I saw and what I followed with great interest when I finally got to South Africa were these changes in Afrikaanerdom. And Durban was not a good place to do that, because it was really more of a British area of influence as opposed to an Afrikaner, but I had enough connections with people who were in the Broederoom and Broederbond and in other areas that that was a very fruitful area of discussion. As a matter of fact, I got my hands on some of the first documents in Afrikaans that really indicated there was a major philosophical, structural, conceptual change in the thinking of the Afrikaner community and that they began to accept internally that the vision of apartheid had failed and they had to find a replacement for it and the person to bring that replacement into effect and fruition was F. W. de Klerk. But let me tell one P. W. story, because this is the era that I was working in then, ’85 to ’87, that was really the era of P. W. Botha ascendency. Roger Smith, the chairman of General Motors, CEO of GM, and a major British company, they put together at a Sullivan committee session that was sponsored by the Brits at a castle—the meeting was the castle’s name—they put together an initiative that would have gathered close to a billion dollars, which in those days was big money, to support housing and other major infrastructure and loans. They were going to go as a private initiative—and this is private diplomacy—to propose this to P. W. Botha in return for a carefully crafted set of changes in the apartheid regime. So the deal was: State President P. W. Botha, you give us these changes, which were some key changes in terms of the apartheid regime, in terms of how you treat black and non-white South Africans, and we will give you this enormous fund to help in terms of housing and some of the other major infrastructure problems that you have in this country, plus we will work for you in terms of trying them. I trust this is interesting stuff.

Q: Oh, yes.

HARRIS: We stopped, and now we’re beginning with the story of Smith and Sir and Lord whatever his name was from the British side. So they had this offer. I believe the amount that I remember was a billion or in excess of a billion dollars in exchange for these major changes in the apartheid structure plus the good offices of the Sullivan group companies in order to try to ease up the sanctions against South Africa. This was a major initiative proposed. They flew down; several of the leading CEOs of this mega, Fortune 50, World 50 companies flew down to Pretoria and met with P. W. Botha, and they had a long, long, detailed session. In the end the old crocodile, as he is called, P. W., stood up and he said, “Gentlemen, I very much appreciate your coming, and I very much appreciate the offer and the careful thought and attention that you have given to this offer, and your willingness to propose this in the spirit in which it was given,” all the right things. It was the good P. W. Botha. I’ll tell the bad P. W. Botha in a minute. He said, “But I must reject it, because what you are asking us to do is to give up our control in exchange for living richer.” He said, “We Afrikaners have all been poor before and we

have survived, but we cannot survive if we lose control. Thank you very much, but there's no deal." And that was the spirit of the government at that time really encapsulated in this story, this incredible anecdote of American leadership. Now, there are other leadership elements, the Ford Foundation under Franklin Thomas. Franklin Thomas was a fascinating guy, a black American intellectual from the Virgin Islands who, I think, immigrated to New York and came up and made a real mark and became the president of the Ford Foundation. The foundation has such enormous resources, he himself focused on, among other things, projects in order to further the change in South Africa. He put together a Ford Foundation study that was the major player in educating, debating, refining, learning about the issues in South Africa. This is incredible, because you had enormous conferences being held, scholars being paid to produce papers, books being written, all these efforts funded by Ford Foundation and also the Carnegie Foundation and others who were joined into this effort. This was an incredible period. Going back to my—what's that guy's name, "life is like a box of chocolates"—Forrest Gump, the theory of Harris' career as being a Forrest Gump experience, where you just happen to be at the right place at the right time. Here I was involved yet again in one of the really critical issues facing the Department of State and U.S. foreign policy at that time. You had public boards, pension funds, universities, county boards, city councils, state legislatures, the U.S. Congress, the executive branch, the newspapers, the media, engaged academics, these serious philanthropic foundations, all working on the case of South Africa. Something in the nature of the apartheid repression just touched on a raw sympathetic nerve in the American body politic, which brought back vividly all the problems that we had had during the initial struggle against racial equality in this country. It wasn't a fit, it wasn't a good fit, but it was something that psychologically was close enough that it worked, and so it was a lot of powerful, political, psychological forces at work in this society. One of the things that the administration did in trying to head off the sanctions bill was to appoint a blue-ribbon commission headed by Franklin Thomas and by the head of IBM, whose name I now forget.

Q: It wasn't Watson was it?

HARRIS: No, it wasn't Watson; I think it was his successor. But I became the Department of State's liaison to this committee and was responsible for the substantive interfaces and also the arrangements for this committee, which was appointed, I think, by the secretary of state. It was a State Department committee, and the secretary met with the group, Crocker met with the group. I organized all these meetings for them. They had their own secretariat and executive director, but I was the liaison, so that probably took six months of work to do this. Then the committee gave their report and they published their report, which was somewhere between the sanctions, the hard-sanctions approach of the Lugar-Katzenbaum approach and the kind of soft Buchanan approach to support these guys because they're fighting godless communism. It was an area that Crocker stayed away from, and so I became very close to a number of leaders in U.S. society working on this commission, and that was a very interesting time as we went and held hearings and got these things done. I'm trying to think of the brilliant guy who was the executive director and did a lot of the writing. I'll add that later. I can see him; I just can't think of his name. That was another exciting time, and the Ford Foundation had its own series of

conferences running on, which brought South Africa, and also in the back door of what's called second-track diplomacy and had these initiatives where they would surreptitiously have meetings with South Africans. There were lot of South Africans in the liberal South African political mainstream of the democratic party and others who were often in these meetings. But then Ford and others went after trying to get people who were members and really active intellectuals in the Broederbond to begin to have meetings with the ANC and others who were seen as terrorists to the rest of their peer group. There were meetings in Dakar and other places, and these kinds of relationships began. So the sweep of policy then was again what we talked about earlier in the tape; it was not just what the State Department did, but it was the State Department's being in the middle of this vortex of other first-track and second-track diplomatic efforts, which were not only American based but also a number of them were European based or corporate-based international ones. It was a very, very exciting time and we just worked our hearts out, but it was very rewarding. The problem is that with the summer seasons being [reversed], when everybody is taking off, the August of '87, or '86, when the act passed, was probably the busiest time in my whole life. I probably slept about five hours a night through the month of August, because things were really popping down in South Africa and we had all these problems. And, of course, the South Africans were always massacring folks and [doing] other things, which were just disastrous in terms of trying to get changes and trying to get people to focus on long-term issues here because people were responding to the immediate situation and bombing raids in front-line countries and so forth. I remember we took one long trip through the region, which was great because I had been in the job long enough to really understand the issues and had a chance to go and see it. So I think that's some of the flavor.

Q: Did the name of Nelson Mandela surface at all? Of course, he was in prison at the time. Was he considered a factor or not?

HARRIS: Mandela was absolutely a factor, but it was Winnie Mandela, because Mandela wasn't a player, he was locked up. But what Winnie Mandela did was, she made Nelson Mandela a household word. Despite her sins of omission and commission, of which there are many, I think that the ANC and the people of South Africa owe her an enormous debt of gratitude for her skills as a public persona and her guts in terms of standing up to the South Africans in a skillful, gutsy way. It's not easy, and she's a tough lady. I met her a number of times when I was in South Africa. I wouldn't say we were friends, but we were certainly good acquaintances and it was always on a warm basis. I had a lot of regard for her based on her role that she played during these very dark, dark years. Mandela was a concept, but the scenario was played out in terms of the release of Mandela. I can tell this story now. It's a terrific story. I'll think of the names later. The Orange Free State in South Africa is the midwest but it's also very provincial. It's really kind of a back water intellectually. It's the real Afrikaner that lives in the Orange Free State. This is where, you know, better men and women are proud of it, and change happens very slowly. At that time the minister of prisons was a guy—let's call him Joey; that wasn't his name but he had some little name like that, some little Afrikaner name—and Joey was an Afrikaner's Afrikaner. He wasn't too smart, he wasn't too slow, he was from the Orange Free State, he was as conservative and as thoughtful and hardheaded and

commonsensical as you could find. And one of his responsibilities as the minister of prisons was to deal with the prisoners. He had this prisoner named Nelson Mandela on Robben Island, and as others began to explore these changes in apartheid, he was called on to begin a dialogue with Mandela. And he came back and told the leadership elements in the Afrikaner community that he thought that Nelson Mandela was a guy that the Afrikaner community could deal with and probably could trust. Now if this had come from some guy on the left wing or some minister, you know—but it didn't; it came from a good ol' [old] boy, Joey. Goddamit, Joey says we can deal with this guy, and Joey's no fool, he's a good judge of people. That probably had more impact, and just the magic of having him there, a guy that everyone respected, and knew the seriousness and the gravitas and the carefulness in which he would make decisions in the true Afrikaner way. He was a real Afrikaner, and he saw something very special in Mandela. Just incredible. In my speeches both in the United States and in South Africa, I always talked about the challenge that South Africa had, which was much harder than the United States. In the United States we needed one Abraham Lincoln to get us through the Civil War, but what I talked about was that in South Africa you needed two Abraham Lincolns to get them through avoiding a civil war, and that's what they found. They found F. W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela and a series of legions of brilliant people underneath them, hard-working people who made this bloodless transformation.

Q: Before we move over to Durban, you had mentioned you told about the good Botha. How about the bad Botha? Was there another?

HARRIS: This is a wonderful story. It is unbelievable but, believe me, it's absolutely true. Steve Solarz—we haven't talked about him but the role that the House played. We talked a lot about the Senate, but the House played an incredible role. Steve Solarz was a Democrat from Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn, a Jewish neighborhood, a very smart, effective guy, and he had a red-headed staff guy by the name of Howard something-or-other, and he was the chair in these days of the House African subcommittee [U.S. House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations]. And they held countless hearings and meetings and were very much involved with the anti-apartheid groups, with the ANC and with the UDF and with the Refort and elements in South Africa and in southern Africa. It was a real hot bed, and Solarz and Crocker truly hated each other for very different [reasons]. Solarz also, I think, had been an academic, and they had great personal and professional disdain for each other, which was vitriolic and very strong. Solarz was traveling in South Africa, and he was walking down the street of Johannesburg and he sees one of his constituents and he waves at him. The constituent comes up and says, "Congressman, how are you?" And he said, "Rabbi Elephant"—that was the guy's name, Rabbi Elephant— "how are you?" He said, "I am fine. How are you doing? What are you doing? blah blah blah blah." So Rabbi says, "How was your—"

Q: This is Tape 9, Side 1 with Tex Harris.

HARRIS: So he sees Rabbi Elephant on the streets of Johannesburg and explains to him that the State Department's not been able to arrange a meeting for him, for Congressman

Solarz, with the state president, P. W. Botha, and so the rabbi says, "Let me try. Let me try and do this for you. Where are you going to be?" So Solarz says, "Well, tomorrow I'm going to be in Harare. I'll be there for two days, and then after that I'm going to Botswana. David said he'd call me through the embassy at these places," and they shook hands and left. The following day in Harare, Rabbi Elephant called. He has gotten, through a diamond connection—Rabbi Elephant's a diamond dealer—through the diamond cartel, a connection for Solarz to see the state president at a certain time on Thursday. So Solarz has to scrap his trip to Botswana, [and] he flies in for the meeting. Perkins tells this story. They go in and meet the state president, and the state president starts on a line of defense of the apartheid regime in terms of survival based on drawing parallels between what the Afrikaners are having to do in South Africa in order to preserve themselves, in contrast to what the Jews did not do to preserve themselves in Europe during the Holocaust. Solarz goes crazy. Solarz loses it, and he is absolutely—indignant is too [mild] a word—he's berserko. He is out of his tree in anger at the state president drawing a connection between the apartheid regime and the Nazis' killing of six million Jews and gypsies and others in Europe, and that this is somehow a justification for preventing this, and he goes absolutely berserk. Well, he goes berserk, and the state president goes berserk. This is red faces and veins extended in the neck and people shouting at each other at the top of their voices. Perkins said in his whole diplomatic career this is the only time he ever wished that he had a magic potion to turn himself into a mouse. He wishes to be a small mouse and just run in a corner and hide. He said it was the worst; he said he's never seen a fight like it in his life, two guys just absolutely abusing. He said it just absolutely set back relations for the United States a year. That's the bad side of P. W. Botha. He was a dominant force. He was the big crocodile. Incredible stuff.

Q: Well, then in '87, it's September '87.

HARRIS: In September '87 I flew—What time is it?

Q: And you were in Durban from when to when?

HARRIS: I was there for three years.

Q: Okay, '87 to '90.

HARRIS: I arrived in Durban in September of '87, which was the date that historically is set as the beginning of the violence in Natal and in Zululand between the ANC supporters and the Inkatha supporters, a horrific time, and I was there for the beginning of it and most of it. It was just terrible, and I forecast that it would spread throughout South Africa, and no one believed me except the CIA and a few other folks, and it in fact happened and there was major violence similar to what we'd seen, communal violence, in Natal. I was in the DCM course, principal officer course, and played volleyball, and I had ruptured completely my Achilles tendon, and I arrived in Durban with my leg in a cast from my toes to just above my knee. They didn't have a jetway, and so they had to lower me and a little old lady and the leftover food on an elevator from the plane down to ground level,

where the assembled staff was dutifully lined up to say hello to the new boss on crutches with a walking stick. But anyway, we quickly got rid of that, and I got about my usual business of getting to know all the players there. It was a very exciting place. The residence there was a mediocre house but it was on a piece of property that was about two and a half acres on top of a hill overlooking the ocean—it was just great—with tiered, terraced gardens and we had a lot of parties and a lot of gatherings together. They weren't swell parties. I remember once we had—who's the—Harry Oppenheimer—we had Mrs. Oppenheimer. I forget her first name, but she was there, and she had a diamond on that was so big that if the sun caught the diamond in the wrong way, you'd be blinded for life. It was absolutely immense. She was there eating hot dogs with chili. I had flown the chili powder in from Texas for this occasion. It was the American Fourth of July, and everybody was out there drinking great quantities of beer and eating hot dogs and chili. She turned to me and said, "Tex, however do you Americans eat these things?" I said, "Darlin' we just start biting our way and we chew to the other." But that was very exciting. I went around and I met everyone. There were some ANC guys that had been released from prison, and I made friends with them. They were just astounded when I showed up in their townships. Archie Dimadi, who was a really hard-liner—I went by his house for the first time and he wasn't there, and I'd been fishing, so I left him a trout. I had a couple of nice trout, so I left him a trout, so I became his friend because I had not only come to his house but I had given him a fish, which he had dined on that night. He had some debilitative nerve disease and couldn't move his arms, which meant somebody had to dress him, take him to the toilet, and do all these other things, but from the neck up he was as tough and thoughtful a political strategist as you could find, and he was in Pia Valley, which was a scene of horrific violence, just a civil war going on there with scores of people killed every week and just frightening, frightening times. I would go around and see the military guys. No one spent the time cultivating the military commanders. I knew the military intelligence guys. Dick Clarke came through, once.

Q: The Senator.

HARRIS: No, this was the number-three guy in the NSC (National Security Council) now. He was then the deputy assistant secretary in INR and was dealing with intelligence matters, but I introduced him to the intelligence operatives who were there working in the field. And I had a chance to get to know everybody. One of the responsibilities I had was the linkages with the Inkatha movement and Buthelezi's government in Ulundi in KwaZulu. I went and called on a number of the ministers in their homes, went around to see them at their homes and villages. This was the first time any diplomat had ever done that. And it was terrific because I got out there and spent a day with these guys to understand the power that they had and the way the authority runs so strongly in terms of these tribal sentiments and the absolute hatreds that people have generation after generation, real Hatfield and McCoy feelings in terms of the Zulu tradition of returning the body. If you harm me, then I will harm you. If I can't get you, I'll get your sister or I'll get somebody in your family. Just horrific cultural roots there, which are set up to really further violence in KwaZulu areas. I knew the union guys, I knew the business guys, and again I did a lot of speaking. One of the issues that I dealt with there extensively—Paul Grundy was the U.S. medical doctor for the region, and Paul's region

covered from Zambia on down to Durban, down the coast, and so he was a very observant, very smart medical officer, a State Department doc, who saw the beginnings of the spread of the HIV pandemic in Africa. At several dinners and conversations I became convinced that this was a major issue, especially for Durban, because all the trucking routes came through Zululand and Natal and into Durban, and as all the studies show, the infections were spread by the truckers sleeping with the whores along the way, and the disease then spread. I began to go around in my talks before the Rotary and business clubs, which I've always done, talking about the HIV pandemic that was seen coming and [was] going to visit its wrath on South Africa as it had already visited its wrath further north in places like Zimbabwe, where probably a third of the people showing up at the ANC, the medical clinics, were essentially HIV positive. These were not sex workers. These were just mothers who had been infected by just normal sexual relations with their husbands, and it was just absolutely frightening, absolutely frightening.

That was a very exciting period. The kids, three kids, were there, all in the schools, which were pretty good. My son actually stayed on an extra half year in order to graduate from Northwood Beechwood High School, and he did well. My other son, my young lad, Clark, went to Clifton. It was fun to watch him out there. My wife was talking about it last night, that mostly the young Afrikaner kids and the British kids were fairly sturdy, strong, farmer stock, and my son and this friend, who was an Indian, at the swim meet and things like that were the kids who were just tall skinny guys and were in a pool full of these very sturdy little farmer boys. But it was great fun. My daughter went to the Durban Girls' College, where your underpants had to be the same dark green as your dress. She got in trouble for wearing nonconforming wristwatch bands. Her wristwatch bands were thought to be inappropriate. So it was quite an experience for the whole family. We had some great experiences.

On a policy I again worked, as I had done in Argentina, worked all the sides, and it was fascinating because there were so few places in that society where the ANC-leaning folks and the Inkatha folks talked. Mostly they spent their time demonizing each other. It was just horrific. Then in the context of the political differences, people took opportunities in terms of settling old scores, which among the Zulus was the tradition [that] if you have insulted my family a generation ago, I will not forget that. I realize that I owe you a body, I owe you some pain, so this uptick in violence led to a lot of other battles there that were not just political. The analysis that I put forward, which then became the accepted analysis, was that what was really going on was a struggle of different coping mechanisms among the African community in this part of Natal and KwaZulu. The Inkatha people felt much like traditional Muslims around the world, that in times of great stress and angst and threats to themselves and their survivability, the way to cope is through strict observance of tradition and strict observance of the knowledge and wisdom of the forebears. This was really the key factor in the way that they had their coping mechanisms built—it was in terms of veneration of Shaka Zulu and the proud traditions and language, art, culture that they had as Zulus. And this was a period of a resurgence, of a renaissance, that was fostered after the British had finally conquered the Zulus and subjugated them to a lot of pain and suffering after some brief Zulu victories, which

embarrassed the whole British Empire early in the latter part of the nineteenth century. This kind of Zulu renaissance was embedded in the figure of Buthelezi, whose mother had been a member of the Royal Court and who had from [her] youth been imbued in Buthelezi, a vision that he should be an advisor, and this was the vision that Buthelezi had. Butelezi's mother, was the person who everyone in the leadership said, as young men, she had taught them the old dances and the old songs and the old ways and the old traditions and the old values and that these things were Zulu. When the people were in trouble, they would sit down and someone would say in a serious way, "What would Shaka Zulu have done in this situation?" So it's something like a discussion in the United States when somebody would say, "What would George Washington have done?" But it was a serious issue and something that they thought of and led often to a lot of violence, because the kinds of things that Shaka Zulu would have done would have been to kick some ass.

Q: Send out an impi *[an armed body of men] to go out and wipe them out.*

HARRIS: Absolutely, so it was a frightening view that these people had in terms of maintaining their stability in a very unfriendly world, in which they saw their civilization, their language, their culture, their values under threat. The answer was to become closer and closer to those values and those traditions and their history. Against that was a view that the threats to the African lay in a revolution and lay in following a revolutionary path, as outlined by the ANC, which would conceptually change and alleviate the threats and the pressures that the African was under in South Africa. The only way that could happen was through force of arms, through revolution, through bloodletting, and through change, and it was a modern view that had to take place. In the middle was a group of people who were the pragmatists, and this was a small group. The majority was the traditionalists, the peasants and the people in the farms who believed in these old traditions. In the cities was the place where the real fights and the blows came, because that's where people's values were torn and people adopted either a pragmatist view, which was to get along, improve yourself, get some education, find a better job, just work at it day by day and get your kids' education, do the other kinds of things, and you will be all right and you will survive and maybe with a little luck you might even prosper; versus the radical who felt that the threats against the operatives were so severe they needed a revolution. That's the vision I had. That was the vision that informed my reporting as what was going on was a meta-cultural fight of fundamental values, of different visions, of clash of cultures almost in which, in the finest traditions of the Zulus, was something that was not engaged with words but with spears and gunshots and fighting, and people paid in blood for their differences. It was incredible. After a while I had just enormous entrée in terms of all the communities. There was always a certain amount of distance between the hard-line ANC, who of course saw Americans as being in league with the South Africans and had a great deal of concern because they correctly believed—I should tell the story about Nelson Mandela and the CIA, a little footnote that somebody ought to pull out of these records, and the CIA fingering Nelson Mandela for his capture. But in terms of starting on the right with the Inkatha, although I was very uncomfortable with some of the really militaristic warlords—and I really didn't spend a lot of time because I felt I didn't want to offer them any additional patina of acceptance. These were really

thugs. There were some just incredible thuggish folks in the Inkatha leadership who were both venal [and] thuggish, and who lived very much in a Hobbesian world. They created a Hobbesian world and they lived in that world. There were others who were balancers. Buthelezi was always trying to play one clan against the other and generally doing it very successfully, and then there were others who were really trying to make Inkatha into a more modern and more effective political movement that could deal with full regard to the traditions and culture of the Zulu people into a modern political movement. And on the right hand there were people whose bottom line was secessionism. They wanted a Zulu state, and fundamentally they saw the ANC as not being a communist conspiracy but being a Xhosa conspiracy against the Zulus. They were very, very concerned, because of the tribal supremacy of Xhosa leaders in the ANC movement, particularly Mandela and others who were royal, of royal blood, among the Xhosa, and they saw this as being an opportunity to really have domination and saw it very much in the most fundamental, simplistic tribal efforts. It's often said that the stories about Shaka Zulu as told in the tales of the Xhosa are very different than the stories of Shaka Zulu told in the tales of the Zulu. It was just fascinating.

Dealing in the consulate work there, the consulate did the usual protection. We had the case of a lady in a box, some woman who had herself—with a lot of little baggies for the waste and canned foods and canned water, mentally unstable—had herself locked into a lift van and sent to South Africa by ship for a free ride on her way to the Antarctic. She refused to deal with me. She said she would deal with the American ambassador to the Antarctic but not to anybody who was just in Durban, because her real destination was the Antarctic. She was very mentally unstable. This is a good war story of how good American medical people are. I was very fortunate, because when this American woman showed up in this lift van, they had heard the noises inside and they had cracked the lift van. [They] opened it up and found this strange woman inside who had lived weeks on the high seas trapped inside this lift van and a little bed and food and little baggies for her bodily wastes and everything. It was just horrific. So the South African authorities detained her and put her in a psychiatric institute, but they had some very difficult decisions. She was a foreigner and they couldn't just throw her out of the country. She didn't have a ticket. She didn't know where she was and so forth. We had a foreign service psychiatric doc, who was a regional doc but happened to be in the neighborhood, so I called him up and he came. From her passport we got information and we found that she had actually been in the Bay area, so we called some of his pals in the Bay area and got the name of some people in some public shelters.

Q: When you're speaking of the Bay area, you mean—

HARRIS: California, San Francisco area. So a description of this woman and her name and things like that evidenced at some of these shelters that dealt with people who were mentally unstable—"Oh, yes, that's old Betsy," or whatever her name was, and, "Yes, we know her." "Who was her doctor?" "Well, let me see now." So they figured out who her doctor was, and they found out what medication she was on and what the diagnosis was, through her being identified at a particular shelter in the Bay area, in Oakland or someplace like that. It was absolutely a stroke of good luck. So he came, and she

wouldn't talk to anybody. She just sat on the toilet and put a big sheet over her head, and so the doctor asked her, "I'm going to give you a shot that's going to make you feel a lot better. Is it okay? If you don't say anything, I'm going to accept that it's okay." She didn't say anything, so he gave her a shot in the butt and got her stabilized enough that we could actually put her on a plane with an attendant and flew her back to the States for medical treatment. Those are some of the little wonders of consular work. But most of the time I worked as a political officer, and I did just scores of reports on Inkatha and the fighting that was going on there and the violence that was going on, and there were just horrific wars. There were regional wars between warlords in various areas of Natal, and it was just a horrific time. Again, I managed somehow to have good relations with the Inkatha leadership and with the UDF leadership and with the church leadership and with everybody except the hard ANC.

We'll finish up the Durban part with a story about the general, Bantu Harrington Holomisa, next time. I think we've covered everything, but I need to tell the Holomisa story and how we established U.S. government relations with him.

Q: All right, and one other question I want to ask: You've talked about the Zulu and the other tribal conflicts, but what about the Afrikaners? Were they a complete blank as far as Durban was concerned? We'll talk about that and also the English-stock people.

HARRIS: And also we'll talk about rugby diplomacy.

Q: And also foreign manufacturing firms, American business and other business. Great.

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Today is April 5, 2000. Tex, you were going to tell me a story about a general?

HARRIS: One of the issues that we were very much involved with was establishing relationships with General Holomisa, who was the head of the Transkei, the president—I forget the exact office which he held, but he was the head of the apartheid regime that had been set up as an "independent state" by the South Africans in their grand apartheid vision. The Transkei was the home of the Xhosa and, most importantly, it was the home territory, home state, of Nelson Mandela and a lot of the leaders of the ANC. Starting after '86 or '87 or so, the ANC began to develop relationships with Holomisa and with some of the people, leadership in the Transkei. We had a situation in which the stated U.S. government policy and the policy of the United Nations and almost all the nations of the world was to totally ignore these Bantustans , these black independent states that the Afrikaners had set up. We had a firm policy of no relationships. The embassy had major heartburn if someone driving through the Transkei got stopped and the Transkei official asked them for their passport, and they would quickly put a stamp in it or try to give them a visa. Of course, this would be some sort of implied recognition, so in most cases the diplomats were told if they were traveling, certainly in a diplomat's car with a diplomatic *carnet* and a diplomatic passport, to drive around the Transkei, which was a big detour. Those who went through were to take very special precautions. We even discussed what

border crossings were lax so you could go through and not get a stamp in your passport or cause some small, tiny diplomatic incident. But now, because of the growing power of the ANC and the fact that our intelligence indicated that the ANC was developing relationships with Bantu Holomisa, the embassy wanted to have contacts with Holomisa. Now Holomisa came to Durban, which was the largest city, from the Transkei from time to time, and actually I went to the Transkei on one or two occasions just across the line. There was a golf course that had some golf championships on it, and I went to a couple of golf tournaments there. And they had a big resort there called the Wild Coast or something like that, which was one of these Sun City-type of arrangements with a lot of foreign investment and gambling in an otherwise gambling-free South Africa. So I put some feelers out through some friends and mentioned that I was interested in seeing Holomisa. He had an informal consul general in Durban, so an arrangement was made for me to see him. I indicated it could only be done if it were done on the QT. He stayed at the Maharani Hotel, which is one of the big resort hotels in Durban, when he was there, and so I was in the lobby and a couple of his bodyguards came up to me, and they took me in the back through the kitchen, and we went on a freight elevator up to the penthouse and I met Holomisa. We had very good, wide-ranging conversations about events and policies, things that were going on in South Africa, things that were going on in Natal, what was going on among the Zulus, and I got information from him on what was going on in the Transkei, what his views are, so there was a lot of good reporting there, and we established a relationship. After a couple of these meetings in the hotel, which were "clandestine," although I'm sure the South African intelligence had him pretty well wired and intercepted our phone calls, I invited him to the house for a dinner. So he showed up with two cars, a front car and a back car, of bodyguards and came to the house. We had a small dog by the name of King, and for some reason when Holomisa came in the house, our dog went after Holamisa and bit him like a bulldog—it's only a little terrier—with kind of a bulldog thing on the heel of his shoe, not his leg but on the heel of his shoe. And here was, you know, the state president of the Transkei at my door. And I had this fabulous wall in front of the house, which I'll talk about in a minute. Holomisa in his youth had been a champion soccer player, so he could have kicked my little dog across the two and a half acres of land that we had in the compound, but he was very nice, he just shook it off, but it really got things off to a terrible start. He comes into the American consul general's house and his dog nips at his heel. That was just a family secret, and so it's out now, it's in the archives. But this led to a good relationship, and then I began to have the ability to invite people from the embassy down, and we began to have other visitors when they came. So I was able to establish a diplomatic linkage with the Transkei, albeit in a very closed and surreptitious manner. That's a good little footnote.

Q: What were we trying to do?

HARRIS: We wanted to establish good relations with all the key players in the post-apartheid era, especially those who were working against the Afrikaner government. We wanted to have good relationships. So the policy before had been to shun the homeland leaders as being beyond the pale, but when Holomisa began to move away from his total connection with the government towards a more nonaligned position and began dealings with the ANC and with the UDF, United Democratic Front, which was the democratic

nonviolent front organization for the ANC, that meant that Holoamisa was a person that we needed to talk to and get to know.

Q: How about Buthelezi?

HARRIS: Buthelezi was one of the key figures in my account, and I need to spend some time about the chief minister. We talked about him a bit before. I spent a lot of time with the Zulus. Clearly the Zulus were the dominant group, tribal group, in the area [to] which I was assigned, and I even spoke a little Zulu. I've forgotten most of it now, but it was a very proud and a very great culture and civilization based on military exploits, and it had very, very keen traditions. I spent time going to a lot of the Inkatha meetings. Inkatha was both a political organization and also the cultural organization of the Zulu people. I went to their political conventions. There were three or four hundred Zulus and few diplomats who showed up. Sometimes I would go and I would be the only one. For example, I made a habit of going to the graduation ceremony of the KwaZulu Police Academy. It was a good chance to meet a lot of the ministers. I went a lot of places where I was the only diplomat who went, very similar to what I did in Australia. As Woody Allen says, showing up is 80 percent of the battle. They very much appreciated the fact that someone was interested enough to drive up that three-, three-and-a-half-hour drive from Durban to Ulundi and spend the night and join in, and it was always a good opportunity to talk to an awful lot of people and to get a lot of grassroot information. The relationship that I had with Buthelezi was a very good one, and what I did is, if I was going to meet him, let's say I had a meeting with him in a week or ten days , I would very carefully read the American press and the cables and would take notes and would essentially prepare for Buthelezi a briefing, giving him a balanced briefing from an American policy perspective of the events in the world, the events in Africa, the events in the United States, and the events in South Africa. We would go through a briefing for an hour and a half or two hours sometimes. He would always have other people there, but occasionally he would have many members of his cabinet there, and we would give them a briefing. Now the South Africans gave him briefings often. I don't know how often they were, but the intelligence people and the police and others briefed. He had lots of information that was fed to him by the South African government and its various arms. So one of the ways that I felt I could be useful both to the U.S. cause and also to help Buthelezi have other perspectives was to give him these detailed briefings. So I took notes, and I went up and briefed just as an INR briefer or a CIA briefer does for the president or anybody else and laid it out. He appreciated that, and then we would talk about the issues. He enjoyed the change of pace, because when I came, it was not talking about the very complex and zero-sum-gain problems that beset him. He was not only the chief minister, the head of the KwaZulu government, but he was also the head of the Inkatha political cultural organization, [and] he had major responsibilities as the head of the Buthelezi clan. So he was a tribal leader and then was called on with his tribal affiliations to solve and resolve many disputes over land or wives or inheritance or other matters of traditional law that he had to adjudicate. So he was a very busy guy. He was diabetic, and his assistant, whose name now escapes me, was a mystery man. That was another one of my small little steps forward. Gosh, I'll think of his name or I'll put it in when I see this in writing. He was a mystery man who people knew existed behind the scenes, but no official American had

ever met with him. His name is trying to push up through my mind. I made great efforts, and through persistence and whatever, I finally got him to accept an invitation to have lunch with me, and we hit it off. This was a professor of sociology, I believe, and he was a brilliant guy and was Buthelezi's principal staff. When I say staff, not staff member, but he was Buthelezi's principal staff. He did it all. His wife was a speed typist, and she was an incredible person, typed over 100 words per minute, and he would walk around, put himself in the voice of Buthelezi and would dictate a speech. So if a delegation from the German Rhine Westphalia Parliament and a group of businessmen came to call on him in Ulundi, he would have a set speech of maybe two or two and a half or three pages of small, typed, tightly packed text, which he would read. He would welcome them and give them tea, and they would sit in the wonderful cabinet room in the KwaZulu legislature there, adorned with photos of Buthelezi. Perkins, after seeing it, just shook his head and said it reminded him of the political leaders in Liberia and other places in West Africa with all this self-aggrandizement, because [around the wall] they had these huge, twenty-four-by-twenty blowups of Buthelezi with all these famous leaders and other personages from around the world, so it was a great monument to show people, his subjects, how important Buthelezi was. So I met with him, and it was very interesting because a lot of the policies that Buthelezi and Inkatha espoused were developed in the dialogue between the chief minister and his principal advisor, whose name is trying to come up in my mind. I was there on both sides of the conversation. I was well enough trusted that they would have really fights, not big fights but they would have, let's say, heated discussions over different policy issues, which were enshrined in these documents. So the government and the leadership of KwaZulu had an enormous historical record, and it was all in this gentleman's pen, and then he would send the things, he would fax the things, to Buthelezi. Buthelezi would mark them up, carefully go through them line by line himself, and would send them back, and then if there was some major issue with—Walter was his first name—with Walter, he would call him up and they would iron it out on the phone. Then Walter would change the text and send the final documents to Buthelezi. It was an incredible thing. For a long while Walter lived in a beautiful home on the coast in Natal, and then later he moved with his wife to Ulundi, and then they got a divorce and that was a mess. But anyway he continued to provide this role for him. Buthelezi also had other advisors. He had an American of Italian royal ancestry, and their real goal was a secessionist kind of goal, and they talked about that. So Buthelezi balanced all these forces. He was the minister of police. He had all the major portfolios. He was a guy who slept very little, one of these great geniuses. Also he had diabetes, so he had to be very careful. One of the things that Sal Marzullo, who was vice president of Mobil, had gotten to Buthelezi was one of the first of these new machines that now are quite obvious. You just put a drop of blood on it, and it tells you how much your insulin is. The South Africans had built him a very handsome government headquarters there. As you walked, there were always hymns playing. Buthelezi was very Christian, prudish. He loved Frank Sinatra; that was one of his passions. He often had a kind of a joke with just the slightest edge to it of being a naughty joke, not a dirty joke, just a little bit naughty joke, but it would bring howls of laughter. So I would often tell Buthelezi a joke, and then he would tell it to the cabinet and everybody would just laugh and laugh. It was "the boss is telling a joke" kind of syndrome. I never saw fights. Once, I think I saw a fight in the cabinet, and I think it may have been arranged for me to show that Buthelezi was not a dictator.

But the tradition in the Zulus was to listen to the boss and to do what the boss wanted. But when Ed Perkins came and made his official call on Buthelezi, Buthelezi put on an incredible show. We went to see the king, King Goodwill, and outside of King Goodwill's house in this large, double-car driveway where cars could pull up and unload out of the rain, protected from the rain. They had a small *impi*, a small group of Zulu bodyguards in their traditional dress, and they put on a show, showing that pain did not mean anything, by throwing themselves on the ground and doing these other things that were just incredible. As we left, both Perkins and I—I remember Ed turned to me and he said, "They were really showing us how tough they were and that they were really ready to withstand anything. That was a show that was put on for me, to show me how tough they were really were," and it was exactly the case. Perkins did not like Buthelezi, and I think that was reciprocated. I think there were too many of the trappings and the things of ego involved in the Buthelezi Inkatha regime that reminded Perkins of some of the dictators in West Africa, and he was never prepared to see Buthelezi in perhaps the complexity that he was. The DCM, Genta Hawkins Holmes, who was a very effective DCM and a very skillful, very attractive, personable diplomat, came down, and she and Buthelezi got along very well. I will never forget the entire Zulu cabinet singing along with our DCM, "I am a Zulu warrior." I forget the song, but anyway she—

Q: Chugalug chugalug. See him there, that Zulu warrior. See him there, that Zulu chieftain. I cumma zimba zimba ziya. I cumma zimba zimba zi. It's a drinking song.

HARRIS: —Genta knows a thousand songs. She was a great campfire Girl Scout, so she remembers all these songs from her Methodist youth. So here we were with the cabinet. I'm certainly not a stiff guy. We were having a great time, and we were in the cabinet room. This wasn't even at the luncheon. We were in the cabinet, and Genta was talking about how the Zulu—this was the time when some of the Zulu music, Black Mambazo, was the rage in the United States and Paul Simon had just recorded a mega double platinum, triple platinum record, which featured a lot of songs based on the influences of Zulu music and Black Mambazo—shows how the Zulu culture had penetrated. Of course, the KwaZulu cabinet was thrilled to hear this, and then Genta led them all singing this song, and Buthelezi and they all joined in. It was just wonderful. Anyway, it was great fun. But the luncheons were great, and Buthelezi would have a speech written at the lunch that Walter Felgate had written. See, nothing is lost. Everything is in the mind. It's just a little slow coming out. That name hasn't been on my lips for many, many years. So Buthelezi would have—not for my normal meetings, I came up too much—for example, for my first visit and my last visit, he had a speech written out. Then when the DCM came or the ambassador came, he would have a speech. I would often get a copy faxed through to me. If he gave a speech that was particularly important, he would send it around to a huge fax list, and those fax machines would just run. And his speeches were turgid. I'd have to skim through them and try to find the new meat and the new policy in order to report on that or at least to know it. Often what Felgate did is, he had an encyclopedic memory, he and his wife, so if a group came, he would dictate two or three paragraphs of a new introduction and talk about some new events, and then splice in a speech that had been given two years earlier to another group from Bavaria, to the guys from Rhine Westphalia about the importance of Germany and South Africa and the great

paths that they were on for friendship. So it was very, very impressive. It was a very complicated situation, because you had several things going on in terms of governmental structure. You had an overarching governmental policy run by the South Africans from Pretoria, and Buthelezi had an adviser, a white adviser, who was his chief of staff, and he provided the interface between Buthelezi and the South African government machine, and all the other ministries' connections and all that went through this gentleman, whose name I will also remember, a very astute, self-effacing, very smart and very thoughtful fellow who was also of considerable influence and considerable help to the chief minister and, I think, loyal to the chief minister after a while. The people around him really were not using him, because they saw that his basic goal, Buthelezi's basic goal, and instinct was really very sincere, very genuine in terms of the preservation of the Zulu people, their language, their culture, their civilization. Now the issue of means, like a lot of people who have very clear goals, sometimes the means get a little rough. I once went to Buthelezi, and I talked to him about— There was information that had come to me about guns that were being provided to Inkatha by the South African police or South African military. I forget the source, but anyway I told him that if this information now was so clear that even diplomats in Durban were learning about this in a credible way, that Buthelezi really should end this practice because it was going to cause him great embarrassment and great trouble. Because I knew the whole place was bugged, I asked him if we could walk while we discussed this, and so he went with me and we walked. He was really taken aback. I saw his expression when I first told him essentially that it was covered and I had a lot of the details and the information. I gave that to him, and he was kind of shocked. You could see he was a very clever guy. He decided there was nothing to be gained by the admission, and so he just stonewalled and denied everything, and butter would not melt in his mouth as he pleaded that this information was all wrong and it clearly was right. So I don't know what happened, but anyway we had a very good working relationship and helpful information if I needed information or somebody came and I needed some event organized or something done, he or his staff. And then he had this wonderful relationship with this woman by the name of Inka Mars. Inka Mars was married to a Dr. Paul Mars —an avid golfer. One of the great gifts I gave, with U.S. government [funds], I bought him a driver, one of the first titanium drivers in South Africa. I went on home leave, and I came into the country with this titanium driver. The customs guy saw this club in my hand, and he said, "Ah hah, that is a very good new driver. It must have cost you three hundred bucks. We will have enormous duty on this, of at least three hundred dollars." I said, "Sorry, diplomatic," and his face fell. This was something that couldn't be hidden. It was carried in my hand. Paul Mars was the doctor who had saved Buthelezi's mother and had cared for her very lovingly and with a great deal of care and consideration during her failing years, her last years. That developed a great friendship with the families, and then Inka became a confidante. You might even think of a mistress, except I'm absolutely positive there was no sex there. She was older than Buthelezi, attractive, but there was no sexual thing. She was a listener, so Buthelezi had someone that he could call up at two a.m. in the morning when he couldn't sleep and talk to Inka Mars for hours. Whether she was in Germany or whether she was in the United States or wherever he was and she was at home, he would call and she would discuss these things with him. I was good friends with Inka, and I enjoyed Inka's company. She was great fun. We almost had a car wreck. We slipped on some gravel

once on a road alongside the ocean that had a steep drop into this great creek that ran into the ocean. I remember I had a big Suburban truck. As a matter of fact, I've got it parked out here. I did a 360-degree circle, and we were both white as sheets. Really, we almost bought it. But that was an exceptional relationship, because Buthelezi had two people that he could really talk to and he had compartmentalized. So going back to Buthelezi, the government was after him, all the foreigners, all the dictators. He was part of the grand tour of South Africa. You went to Ulundi and you saw Buthelezi; that was one of the things to do. And he played the strange role of being both supportive and being critical of the government. He was never that friendly with the Afrikaners. He and his cabinet members each had their own horrific stories of insults that they had suffered under the apartheid. They abhorred the regime. They thought it was terrible, but for the overriding preservation of the Zulu people, they were prepared to work with the South Africans. They thought that that made sense.

Let me go over a couple of other things that we have on the list here. Oh, you were talking about Holomisa coming through the gate. I once was at a meeting, and a gentleman came up to me and he said that he was the city architect of Durban and he wanted to meet me because he said that I had in front of my house the greatest, most durable structure in the entire province and probably one of the greatest structures in all of South Africa. It was a wall built to the Inman specifications. The house had been the scene of a lot of demonstrations, not while I was there. There were a few small ones, but sometimes before there had been thousands of people outside, and so they built this Inman wall which, as the architect said, when the rest of Durban, all the skyscrapers and the other things were rubble, this wall would be standing, because he'd never seen anything like it. They brought the rebar in from the United States, which was rebar that was so thick—

Q: This was reinforcement bar.

HARRIS: —This wall would withstand a full charge from a tank head on. It was incredible. Of course, you could pick the gate with a credit card, but you couldn't drive a truck through it. It was just this monster wall. The wall was about fourteen feet tall and had broken shards of glass on the top and it was a magnificent structure. We lived behind the wall. It was a funny, funny thing. There were no real policy fights, but there were different views. It wasn't the battles that I had in Argentina, but living in the world that I occupied as a consul general in Durban was very different—and in the province of Natal and KwaZulu—was very different [from] the world that was occupied by the ambassador and by his staff in the reef, in Pretoria, and with some excursions down to Johannesburg. They had a very UDF-centric, United Democratic Front centric, view. Ed Perkins, his policies were great. Often I had a feeling that Herman Nickel, who was the ambassador who preceded him, who had been a former senior editor, I think, at Time magazine, and was married to Frank Wisner's sister. Herman was a great correspondent, a good writer, very dramatic, and was liked very much by the Afrikaners and by Buthelezi and others. He was very pro-constructive engagement policy and really went out of his way with a policy he was very comfortable with. Perkins was really less comfortable, much less comfortable, with the constructive engagement policy, and so he ran an embassy that was

trying to change the policy. When the decision came up, we had the feeling that Ed Perkins would say, "What would Herman Nickel do in a situation like this?" and he would do just the opposite. So Ed worked very hard, not at cultivating the relationship with the Afrikaners and the English but cultivating relationships with the black South Africans, and he was everyplace traveling around talking. In a way, having a black American representative was a wonderful signal of the change and support in policy in the United States, because here was a guy who, when he showed up, clearly was not a friend of the apartheid regime, and that was just understood, and he got to open his mouth. Perkins was very good, he was very thoughtful, and he [had] spent a lot of time in West Africa and a lot of time in the Far East. His wife was from Taiwan and, as a matter of fact, from a very distinguished family in Taiwan. Her uncle was one of the trade ministers. I think Taiwan has more than one trade minister, and he was one of the trade ministers of Taiwan. Perkins had trouble, because when they flew back to the United States, they often would go via Hong Kong and Taiwan, and when Perkins would be in Taiwan, he would be the most senior U.S. government official to have been in Taiwan for a long, long time. His uncle would invite them over for dinner, so the Department of State would have to make a decision: Could Perkins go and have dinner at his uncle's house, or his wife's uncle's house, his uncle-in-law's house, and if so, what could he eat, and, most importantly, what could he talk about? But Ed had this kind of nondirective policy. He was very inscrutable. We'd go in with some very interesting issue, and we'd come out with something like: "Go west. We're tilting toward the west." He wouldn't deal with the issue in its concrete terms, but he'd give us some abstract answer, and then we'd go out and have to debate what the hell the boss meant, what really was the policy. It was a very interesting style of leadership. He was terrific. He came down and worked very hard. He was succeeded by Bill Swing, Ambassador Bill Swing, and I had worked, of course, with Herman Nickel on the desk when I was the deputy director. I remember one phone call. I don't think it is on the tape, but Herman Nickel called me up right after the Anti-Apartheid Act was passed, and he said, "Tex, I just read the anti-apartheid legislation that was passed, and it prohibits all imports from South Africa into the United States." I said, "That's right, Herman." He said, "But I have this huge wine collection that I have been building up over the years." Herman would go to a house and he'd have a bottle of wine, and if he really liked it, he would call his wine merchant and he would order a couple of cases and he would put it in the cellar. So dinner party by dinner party, Herman built up a vast collection of wine, and he was going to have this shipped back to the United States at U.S. government expense, which is legal if it's declared and you paid the duty on it. Well, what happened was that Herman's wine could not come into the United States because you couldn't import anything from South Africa. He could bring his used furniture back and his clothes, but he certainly couldn't bring in a hundred cases of South Africa's finest wines. So I told him. I didn't want to give him the bad news, although once he raised the problem, I was sure that he had a real problem. I said I would have it checked out by the legal adviser's office, which I did. Of course, they delivered the bad news. Poor Herman. Have you done Herman Nickel?

Q: Somebody else did.

HARRIS: But the major difference I had was that I had a different view. I was working

much closer to the grassroots, to local disputes, whether they were in trade unions, whether they were—they were not issues of governmental policy, but they were issues of real people living together in an apartheid structure moving towards a new regime. So the view that I had was less optimistic and less sanguine than the kind of view which permeated a lot of people in both the State part of the embassy and also in USAID. The AID mission, by the way, was terrific. They did a lot of things that were very cutting edge in terms of supporting some of these UDF organizations. I hand-held these organizations through all the AID bureaucracy of having to have receipts and expenditures and things like that, all the other kinds of things, and very innovative programs throughout, a very credible and worthy effort by USAID, and it was all done very quickly by great people in a very short period of time. They really went from a mission of just one person to a very large mission with some very creative and very thoughtful and very innovative people. It was exciting to work with the AID guys. They didn't want to deal with State Department and actually had their own foreign policy, which drove Perkins and other people crazy, drove me a little nuts, too, and Chuck Baquet, who was the consul general in Cape Town. But I managed to corral them and build their confidence, so when they came to town, they did work with me and they took me along. I knew what they were doing. I knew what their problems were before they surfaced into something large. In the world in South Africa you had this complex structure. You had the Afrikaner government's policies, and you had a lot of "officially sanctioned," we'll call it, favoritism, but it was fairly close to corruption, where particular land deals and other things like that would be inside. But it was kind of like Chicago, like the Daly machine in Chicago. So this Afrikaner machine operated in Natal and to a certain extent in KwaZulu, so when there were government regulations and there were new zoning things or new tax regulations or things like that, the group that would benefit financially from those changes would be the Afrikaners. Somehow there was always an Afrikaner family who wound up owning a big chunk of the new road where the highway was going to go and had to be bought out. The mayor was Afrikaner, and a lot of the members of parliament, of course, were Afrikaners. There was also a very strong and vocal English majority in Natal. Natal was very much English, and they had their clubs and their traditions, the Royal Durban Golf Club, glorious place, which I was not allowed to belong to although my predecessor had belonged to it, because they did not have black members. I think that was crap. The English were the captains of industry. They were the sugar barons. They were the timber barons. They were the people who had developed Richards Bay, the largest coal exporting port in the world and minerals port in the world. The Anglo-Americans, Harry Oppenheimer's summer house, his "cottage" as he called it, was this monstrous mansion by the sea with pumped brooks running through it. They'd run all year long, and it was just a glorious Shangri-La place with security and a full staff. Everybody had their own waiter at dinner. You had one waiter to watch out for you. They were all white. There were no blacks on the staff that I knew. They were all white English and South Africans and others tending to people, and the huge sugar and land baronies that they had there. I had an occasion to do some diplomacy with these people. Once I had been working very hard—sports diplomacy—because I thought the South Africans, like Americans and Australians, were absolutely sports crazy. One of the real major costs of apartheid to the man in the street in South Africa was the fact that they could not play international rugby, because they felt they were the best in the world. They

couldn't play international cricket. They couldn't test their skills on an international stage to show how good or bad they were, and they thought they were the best. A fellow by the name of Tommy Bedford, who was a very dear friend of mine, had been the former captain, Springbok of the Springboks of the national rugby team. Bedford, despite having an English name, was an Afrikaner, but I think he had some English blood in him. He was a terrific young man. He had been a Rhodes scholar and a great athlete and a great scholar and an architect. He was very good friends with Bill Bradley. They were at Oxford together. He led this initiative, which I supported and worked on very hard, for the Natal rugby team to have a black player on its side, which wasn't done. There were no black players in the league. So I was invited to go to the Wednesday Group at the Durban Club, and I went into one of these inner rooms, which had no windows. It was absolutely sealed. A bountiful lunch was provided. And there were about a dozen of these captains of industry, the head of the newspaper, several heads of major county-like areas of land in KwaZulu and Natal that they owned, guys who were worth probably millions, in today's terms probably billions of dollars, and they debated the issue of whether they would support having a black player on the Natal side. So I was brought in to make the argument that internationally this was terribly important, which I did. Then, since they had a consul general at their luncheon table, they started talking about immigration, that if the flag went up, if things really got bad in South Africa, how the hell would they get out. Every person at that table had another passport. They talked about the best and easiest way of Dominican passport versus a Salvadorian passport versus a British passport versus Hong Kong documentation. All these guys, who of course had business interests everyplace and could put a million dollars in or hundreds of thousands of dollars in to become a certified citizen to get a passport, they and their family members all had passports. I was struck a few weeks later when I met some young people, who later became friends, and I said, "What do you guys really talk about when you've had the second bottle of wine and you're really talking about the serious stuff?" He said, "Immigration." That was a very big signal at that time. This was in '88 and things were tough, a lot of uncertainty, and things were hard.

U.S. business: The U.S. business in Natal was significant but not enormous. We had some big names there, Johnson & Johnson, Mobil, and others. There was not really a dynamite U.S. Chamber of Commerce activity. There was a Chamber of Commerce, of course, but it was not really a stand-out organization. It was really part of the British economic empire, and there were Americans around, but it wasn't as in Australia where there really is a very strong American presence. The guys there who were working were really working under the Sullivan Principles, and there was very little investment coming in from the United States at that time or even today. The risks were too hard. That's when a lot of the overseas investment that they had was from Taiwan. I remember one story. If you, from Taiwan, put in a factory to manufacture something, say knitwear, and brought the machines in, these Taiwanese guys would come in and they would put in these knitwear factories and they would get all kinds of tax benefits from the government. In addition, they would get a stipend of something like seven rand a day or five rand a day per employee. Well, one of these Taiwanese guys set his factory way back in the hinterland, and he employed the people and he paid them less than the daily stipend, which was supposedly a little bonus for the people that worked in his plant. When he was

confronted with this, he said, "They're not worth [it]. They work so slowly, and they're so stupid," because these people had never worked in a factory, they had none of these skills. He said, "They're not even worth the five rand that I pay them, and I keep a rand and a half." So there was just horrific exploitation of the African population who were in transit, and the sweat shops were put in there, many by the Taiwanese and also the Indians, and they came in and were really looking to get their money out in a year or two so that they didn't have to worry and they could run after that. There were some huge operations there that had American expertise or part American ownership or some American involvement, but they weren't really owned by Americans. Given the attitude and the problems with the United States, this was not a time for investment or concern in an apartheid South African regime.

Q: You mentioned the population, that some of the workers weren't very good. Was there a solid skilled labor work force? How did you find it in your area?

HARRIS: Well, it was very difficult, because the educational system was a shambles. Even before the violence started in '78, when there were enormous disruptions in which you went weeks and sometimes a month at a time with schools being shut down as a boycott for some political event that had taken place, and so the kids were called out of the schools. Sometimes the Inkatha would call the kids out and then two days later the ANC would call them out, and so the teachers were fearful of crossing the picket lines in either case and so they just shut the schools down. So there were all these disruptions and disruptions taking place just before the kids studied for their exams, and it was just terrible. Universities were always on strike. It was just horrific. So a very weak educational system was hit, plus you had all the violence, and a lot of kids dropped out to become a freedom fighter, and really they were gang members of these various gangs who went around and raided on each other. It meant that life in the townships was Hobbesian; it was short, nasty, and brutal, very, very tough and grim, grim places to be. In Natal you had a small group of both Indian and colored and a larger group of African skilled workers, and whites, and again every white worker had his black shadow. So when the plumber came to your house, the guy who did most of the work was the black helper. He had carried the tools and done all the work, [but] the white guy would tell him what to do and was his boss man. The labor system was just incredible, because you really had two people doing a job. It was terribly inefficient. But after a while you began to have these apprentices, who really understood and could do the job as well as their white former car mechanic or diesel mechanic or whatever. People were skilled once they had the training, but they lacked the training in many areas. The schools were terrible when they were working, and then on top of it they weren't working a lot of the time.

Q: Did you get involved at all in the nuclear issue? This is something we were concerned about between the Israelis and the South Africans, the white South Africans, having nuclear capabilities and all. Did that come up while you were there, and was that in your particular consular district?

HARRIS: No, it wasn't, but I did have some information. There was at that time some incredible intelligence reporting in the United States about the South African nuclear

program, and so we had a very clear picture of what was going on between the South Africans and other countries around the world as they built these nuclear programs. My understanding was that they had—I don't have this in any hard information, but this is just my understanding—the South Africans, at the time that the new government came in, had a number of nuclear weapons ready to go, and they dismantled them so they would not leave them for the Mandela government. They essentially unilaterally disarmed South Africa from its nuclear status.

The other story I will tell because I think it's important to have it on the record. I'll never forget when I first ran into this story. This is about the CIA complicity and the arrest of Nelson Mandela. Had this been in your oral history?

Q: No.

HARRIS: I forget the year. I think it was '86 or '87. The secretary of state was called on to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the House Foreign Affairs Committee, one or the other. So he dutifully got ready to go up. We prepared his testimony and went through all the changes and things to do with the policy planning staff (S/P) so the secretary's position would work. We had written the testimony. It had gone through a hundred different hands and cleared all around the building, and the secretary was ready to go up at ten o'clock that morning.

Q: Which Secretary was this?

HARRIS: This is Shultz. Crocker was going to go with him at his right-hand side, and that morning the New York Times ran a front-page story written by Seymour Hersh, one of the very tough investigative reporters, reporting that Nelson Mandela had been arrested in Natal early on and he was arrested by the South African police because of intelligence that had been provided to them by the CIA operatives operating from Natal, from my consulate general. So this, of course, was an enormous flap, and the hearing was delayed, and Shultz went around and saw both the head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—I think it was Lugar he went to see—and then he went and testified. One of the questions that came up very early on was whether this was true. I don't remember Shultz's complete answer, but essentially he denied the story. I don't know how he did that. So that left an impression in my head, and certainly being the consul general there, I was later—I don't want to talk about sources —but I later determined, after conversations, that the story that Hersh had come up with was in fact true. That was then verified, both by the South African intelligence folks and also by U.S. intelligence folks, that in fact the information which led to the arrest—it wasn't pointing it out by the fact that Mandela was traveling—had been based on intercepts and information that had been obtained by the CIA, and the mode of travel and time of travel, his disguise and everything like that were given to the South Africans, who then effected the arrest of Mandela. Now it sounds like a little, which it is, footnote to history, but in those very volatile times back in '86 or whenever Shultz testified, that was explosive, explosive that the United States was implicit in the arrest of Nelson Mandela. Anyway, that's a good footnote, and that might be a good way to end South Africa. Do you have any questions

on your part?

Q: No. You left there when, 1980?

HARRIS: I left there in 1990.

Q: 1990.

HARRIS: In the summertime, and I came back and enrolled as a member of the Thirty-Third Department of State Senior Seminar.

Q: All right. Let's just talk about that a bit.

HARRIS: Sure.

Q: How did the Senior Seminar strike you?

HARRIS: It was a very, very worthwhile experience, just a great learning experience, a great opportunity. I really enjoyed every minute of it. Surprisingly enough, one of the parts of it that I enjoyed the most was, we had the month of February, when we had a month to go around and do an independent project, and we had a small stipend to travel and also we could travel on U.S. government travel orders, so you could buy a ticket at a reasonable price. At that time my next job was lined up. I was going to be the director of regional affairs for the African Bureau, and human rights and democracy were going to be one of the major things that I was going to be dealing with in Africa, so I decided it would be very important and worthwhile for me to get an understanding of how democracy worked in the United States. So I set out this itinerary to go and see democracy in action in the United States. The first place I went was Salt Lake City, because I wanted to look at religious freedom and the challenges to religious freedom in Salt Lake City, where you had really the closest thing we have to a theocracy in the Mormon Church, and that was absolutely fascinating. I had a fabulous time there and, having some kind of credentials from the Foreign Service Institute Senior Seminar and being a diplomat, could walk in, chat with people, I called the head of various groups to see me, and had wonderful conversations with people, both senior in the Mormon Church, also the business community and others. I saw that the Mormon Church controlled, ultimately they decided, what happened in Salt Lake City and probably in the state, but that they did so very judiciously, that they realized that they couldn't control down to any kind of depth or precision, but on the major issues they decided. On a lot of other issues they essentially let the normal political process take place. I then went from there to San Jose, California. My wife's family are from San Jose, and we had good connections with the mayor's office and city councilors there, so I went around and met a lot of leaders there. This is a very interesting community, because it's a community made up of a number of elements but with a very significant Mexican American community, a very significant Vietnamese community, and many other immigrant communities in the Silicon Valley area. It gave me a chance to talk about how these communities were integrated and what their rights were and things like that, all the kind of problems that

they had. That then gave me leads to Los Angeles, so I went down and met with people from the county commissioners, who are the real central Los Angeles city government, the county commissioners really are the powerful people in Los Angeles. One of the commissioners took me under his wing and one of his right-hand guys took me to South Central. I said, "Is this Watts?" He said, "No, this is South Central, but for you white boys it's all Watts." This was fascinating. I was doing similar things to what I had done as a Foreign Service officer in my own country. He took me along with him to an incredible thing. It was the bimonthly meeting of the Southern Baptist ministers of southern California, the church, and they were going through all this church business. I sat inside and listened to the church business for about twenty minutes and that was pretty boring, so I went outside and the pastors, many of whom or most of them seemed to smoke. So I was sitting outside, and these guys would come out for a cigarette, and I'd talk to them for a cigarette or two, and talk about the problems of drugs in their community. The problems with drugs were just tearing their communities apart, and the violence—

Q: This is Tape 10, Side 1 with Tex Harris.

HARRIS: Dallas was the worst. My experience in South Africa really prepared me for Dallas because there was apartheid. I met with people in the black community there, and they really wanted the city tax collectors to come and leave large bags on money on the road, Martin Luther King Boulevard, that ran through their communities so that they could make the decisions in terms of when the swimming pool ran and what the hours were and what books were put in the library, and all the other decisions on what roads got fixed and so forth. They felt that the white government downtown did not have their interests at heart, and it was just incredible. I found with the white guys there was white flight, similar to what I had seen in LA and a lot of places, real racial and ethnic fear. In LA there is a lot of ethnic fear over the Hispanic migration.

Q: What did you do with the report that you put together?

HARRIS: I wrote a report, and it's someplace in the archives. I guess I still have one, and it's probably in my box. I brought you something. Here's a piece that ran in the—

Q: One of the purposes of the Senior Seminar, a major purpose, is to acquaint senior people dealing with foreign affairs with the workings of U.S. society, so this obviously stood you in good stead in later times.

HARRIS: It did, and also the other thing that was very useful for me was to expose me to the U.S. military, because in my career I had not served in the military. I had been born at a time when I was too young for Korea and too tall for Vietnam, so I had just gone through a period when many other people in my generation had served in the military and I had not. That was a very important experience for me, spending time both with my classmates, who were from all the military services and the Coast Guard, and also making major trips with the services. We were also the last class to make an international trip. We made a trip to the Soviet Union just after it had fallen. I remember we went to

Georgia. We got there, and we had gotten all the necessary permissions from the embassy, from the Georgian embassy in Moscow, to fly in, and when we landed, a guy came up. We had a military aircraft, U.S. Air Force plane, a National Guard aircraft with the stars and stripes on the tail. A guy came up and said, "You are most welcome. What are you here for?" The head of FSI told him, and he said, "Oh, the president is delighted that you're here. You'll all stay at the guest house." Well there wasn't room in the guest house, so we stayed at the hotel where we were booked in. They threw all these great banquets. I'll never forget they were trying to impress on us how the Georgians were a free spirit and were not communist, they hated the communists, and so on. And, of course, all these guys had been senior apparatchik in the communist government there. One of the companions there was a very fine Christian who, when he interviewed himself for the class, said, "There are two things you have to remember about me. First and foremost, I am Christian. I've dedicated my life to serve the Lord Jesus Christ as my Lord and Savior. Secondly," he said, "I'm a fighter pilot so for communists I will kill them." So he stood up in the middle of this thing about one in the morning and he said, "To the death of communism," and you watched all these guys drain their glasses down there. We had a wonderful time. We had a couple of great cartoonists in the class and great poker games, and it was very good. We developed different themes. We developed the themes we wanted. The other impression that I had, which sticks with me, was we did a unit on drugs in America and about how drugs were really impacting lives. The deputy czar from the White House of the drug regime came and spoke to us. This was, I think, one of the last classes in the old FSI, so we were sitting in the top of the FSI looking out over Key Bridge into Georgetown—one of the best views in Washington, maybe not the best building, but one of the best views. And he explained very carefully how they had been successful because the drug policy had convinced the suburban youth that drugs were bad for them and that sales, exports from the ghettos, to the suburbs had fallen off, and they had all these statistics to prove it, that they had contained the contagion of drugs to the ghetto, but they couldn't do anything about eradicating drugs from the ghetto. It was like a military battle plan in which you had essentially declared victory by sealing off these areas, which you were just going to allow to go crazy, and that's exactly what happened. I saw the results of that a few months later when I was in California and talked to all the ministers who lived in those ghettos, which were now filled with just terrible, terrible problems. It's just a frightening problem as we now have too many people housed in our jails in the United States, which is many times the OECD average for incarceration, and we saw the beginnings of that sad policy there. Of course, it was partly caused by American foreign policy, because the story was told to me by Tom Boyatt that his major role when he went to Colombia as ambassador was the eradication of the marijuana crops in Colombia, which were extensive and were seen as a major threat to the United States. He was successful in convincing the Colombians to take U.S. helicopters and also fight U.S. drugs—the drugs that were banned in the United States—-and they sprayed all these marijuana fields in the southern part of Colombia, and they just eradicated millions and millions of dollars and thousands of acres of marijuana that was being grown openly there. They flew over, and in a few days they sprayed and killed the whole crop. Well, of course, then these marijuana lords said, "We can't grow marijuana because it's out in the open and there's nothing we can do. We're going to go to something else higher priced." So they moved to cocaine. That's what had led to the cocaine epidemic in the United

States, because the success of the United States against marijuana changed the policies of the drug lords from marijuana lords into cocaine lords—sad, sad story.

Q: Now, '91 you went where, and how long did you serve in that?

HARRIS: In '91 I went and I served till 1993 as the director of the Office of Regional Affairs in the Bureau of African Affairs. I got there about August and worked for Hank Cohen, who was the assistant secretary, and Jeff Davidow, who was the principal deputy. I had worked for both guys before, and they were both good friends. We worked very hard, and it was great fun and great times. We had a number of issues that we worked on in AF/RA, as it is called. One of the issues that we worked on was trying to build some sort of regional peacekeeping facilities in Africa. So we worked with the Organization of African States. We worked with regional alliances and tried to send and expose their military commanders to ideas of structure and peace keeping training, and developed a protocol that they could use so they could work in interoperable groups in terms of peacekeepers on the ground. That was a major element. The other thing we worked on very hard was essentially the development and coalescing of the African diplomatic democracy program. That was a major component and a very exciting component. There was money from AID to do things, and I was kind of a salesman with the American ambassadors in Africa, trying to get them to institute these programs to promote democracy. We had a whole catalog of things, and menus and programs that they could get, and support that they could get from AID by trying to get people to adopt these new program elements that were involved in democratization and also in a new area, which was anti-corruption—which we called governance, which was under the rubric of governance. My main concern during this time, which was shared by Hank Cohen, the assistant secretary, and others, was that the corruption issue, the so-called governance, which was a little softer name, good governance, was the critical impediment to the problem of Africa. It wasn't the lack of knowledge of individual people, but it was the failure to make proper allocation of the resources that were available to the individuals in the proper way. The reason they didn't make appropriate allocation was because there were these corrupting influences in which somebody had to go to their region or to their family members or to their political party cronies or someone else, and all these noneconomic factors were influencing the decision in such a way that the outcomes didn't make good sense and were not good economic decisions. They were always making second- or third-order decisions instead of doing the very best. In a lot of places they had lots of resources, they had skilled people, they had all the necessary components to make proper economic decisions, but the system that they operated under was corrupt, and the corruption led to bad decisions. Africa was, and to a large extent still is, influenced by those individuals, companies, corporations, multinationals who have the ability to go in and make exploitative decisions in which they can get their money out with a return in a couple of years. You wind up with people putting investments in but generally for projects that are exploitative as opposed to things that are long-term and developmental in the operative sense. So that was a lot of work on trying to develop these governance principles and these democratization principles working with AID and others. The other thing we did, we worked on the Hill, and that was very good. I remember I set up and I worked with NGOs. One of the things that I instituted was developing—

Amnesty International and other NGOs had a number of countries that were problem areas for them, and so a couple times a year I would invite the Amnesty people to come in and we'd organize all the desk officers and the office directors to go down to the cafeteria. We'd meet around four o'clock and we'd have a cup of coffee. So there would be a little table on Sierra Leone, and you'd have the Sierra Leone desk officer and maybe somebody else from the West African office with half a dozen people from Amnesty and others, WOA, the Washington Office on Africa, WOA, and other NGO organizations, World Vision and others who were interested in that area sitting around having a little conference over coffee for an hour or an hour and a half on what the United States should be doing in Nigeria or in these other areas. It was very, very hard. In the bureau, Cohen was really excellent in terms of not only knowing the account but, because of the experience in the White House at the NSC coordinator for Africa, in keeping control of the account. So when the timing was right for a meeting to be called to change or look at or reevaluate American policy towards any particular region or problem in Africa, Cohen was the guy who called the meeting. He called the interagency meeting, and he invited the NSC coordinator to come over. In the past those meetings had been called by Cohen and the NSC. So essentially he used his same kind of skillful operational style, and that meant that the center of gravity for policymaking in Africa really resided with the assistant secretary. Now he had support from Arnie Kanter upstairs, who was the under secretary of state for political affairs, but frankly, other than a couple of countries, the seventh floor really had no interest in Africa. There were a few countries, Nigeria and others, that we'd get oil from and that are major countries, but all the other kinds of problems were involved.

Another issue that I spent a lot of time on and worked hard on was the HIV/AIDS pandemic. That was very tough and very grim. I remember one meeting I went to at CDC, Center for Disease Control in Atlanta. I went to their headquarters and I met with their international HIV team, talking about their work and the upcoming vaccine trials and all the other things that they were doing, because these were terribly sensitive issues for U.S. foreign policy, and I wanted to make sure that we were in the loop and knowledgeable about it. They went through the issue of addictions and how hard it was to change a habit, and this, of course, was sexual patterns that they were talking about, one of the prime, basic instincts. They talked about it in terms of cigarettes. Well, being fairly overweight at the time—much thinner today—I saw this in terms of my overeating and how hard it would be to change my patterns of overeating. It strengthened my experience in terms of talking to young men in South Africa, who said that a condom was a white man's trick to try to control African population so they could maintain control and also would take away pleasure from the sexual act. Yet I'm sure these guys, who were very promiscuous—some of these fellows would have seven, eight, nine partners a week—and had a very free-wheeling sexual period, would get exposed and had a good chance of being infected with the HIV virus. That office was a great one because we covered everything. There was really enormous responsibility because, although I knew really the account very well for South Africa and southern Africa, I did not know East Africa although I'd been in East Africa and I knew the East African account fairly well. We had a wonderful ambassador in East Africa. Have you spoken to him? He's the former editor of the Washington Times.

Q: He was in Kenya?

HARRIS: Yes.

Q: Harvey Hemps?

HARRIS: Smith.

Q: Smith Hempstone, yes, I have.

HARRIS: He must have been fabulous. I want to read his stuff. Is it around?

Q: I'm not sure if it's ready yet.

HARRIS: Oh, he was wonderful, he was just wonderful. He was the guy who came back and sent this cable, which he then leaked, saying about Somalia, "If you enjoyed Beirut, you really would enjoy Somalia." And that's the other issue that we worked on. I remember convening the working group talking about humanitarian assistance in Somalia, and pulled it together. Hank Cohen came to chair the meeting, and we were talking about all the problems. We were talking because they were beginning to see major flows of people out of Somalia, reports from NGOs and church groups of major starvation and other serious humanitarian problems developing there, with the lack of food, being moved, and the weather patterns and also the fighting disrupted the food supply, and other issues there. And the military sitting there said they absolutely couldn't operate in those air fields in Somalia because there were two major insurmountable problems. One was rocks and debris on the runways, which might get sucked up into their jet blade and cause the engines to be destroyed. They would land and could never take off again because they would suck up a pebble and it would break the rotors in the jet. The second was the goats and cows on the runway. If they didn't control the airstrips to make sure that the rocks and branches had been picked off of the landing strips, and they didn't have a fence around the airfield to keep the goats and cows off, they couldn't land, they couldn't bring in supplies. They could do air drops, but that was not a satisfactory way of operating. Then a week or two before the Republican National Convention, George Bush had a breakfast meeting with [Brent] Scowcroft and Shultz, and the Washington Post that morning had the most horrific picture above the fold of a starving mother and child in Somalia. So over the eggs benedict or the shirred eggs or whatever they were having that morning at the White House at breakfast, the president of the United States told the head of the NSC and Shultz that they had to do something to alleviate this humanitarian disaster in Somalia, and it had to be something that had the stars and the bars attached to it so it could be seen that American credit should be given for stepping in and trying to solve this dreadful humanitarian problem. All of a sudden the military, who couldn't land on those airstrips because they were covered with goats, were told to land on those airstrips, and they did it. So we went, and that was a very exciting period. We went into a full-blown operation in terms of Somalia, setting up a task force, doing all the other things in terms of bringing together information for

operations and starting up a whole new initiative. This was not the military intervention; we're talking about U.S. military support for humanitarian efforts at the time that I was there. I was very much involved in getting that initiative kicked off and lobbied very hard on that issue. That reminds me of when I was in the Refugee Program, Don Crumm and I. I remember I had the map, someplace in my things I had this old map, and would go around and brief on the Hill and in various agencies about the plight of the Eritreans and the Tigreans and how they were starving, and all the information I'd bring together and we'd give these briefings to raise the consciousness, because the problem in Africa is in so many places there are no press-qualified hotels. Beirut had press-qualified hotels, hotels where you could get a bottle of wine, a scotch and water at the bar with an ice cube that you could trust, and a safe dinner, so the press would go there in large numbers and report on what was going on there. That was part of the news. But in Africa you had terribly dangerous, risky, hard places to travel, and so these places were [like] the tree that makes no noise when it falls in the forest and no one is there, and that's what was happening in Africa. A lot of the job that I had in AF/RA was essentially trying to get the word out through the public affairs mechanism in the State Department, which wasn't easy, because it wasn't very good and wasn't very skillful, but we worked developing press contacts and other people so that we would have information available and be able to get stories into the press calling the American public's attention and policymaker's attention to events that were happening inside of Africa where there was no normal U.S. or Western press reporting and where we had the information from diplomatic sources or NGO sources through our diplomatic sources. Those were some of the issues that we dealt with in AF/RA.

Q: I would think, for example, it's all very nice to say governance, that is, corruption, is a major problem. We all know it is. It continues to be, and I think even the UN today came out with this for the first time saying that the major reason for poverty is poor government.

HARRIS: Today?

Q: Today, yes, in the New York Times. But we're the United States and this is Africa, and there's nothing in it for the leaders in the Cameroons or where have you of doing anything but the old ways of making your buck.

HARRIS: Well, there is, and what happens now—and again, it was wonderful because we had an opportunity to see some of the new leadership—is they realized that they wanted to get investment, they wanted to get new investment into their countries, but they had to compete and they had to give a reason for the American or British or European investor to go to Country X instead of going to Country Y or going to Southeast Asia. And so they realized very well and very early that they were in an international competition for resources across the globe, which they had to compete [for], and they had to show people that rule of law and correct decision-making were important, and those countries that were corrupt realized they couldn't get the investment. So they were continually spiraling down in a sinking pool, but they could not create wealth unless they had exploited minerals or something like, which they could get somebody in to exploit,

but once they were gone they had nothing. So these lessons were obvious.

Q: Do you want to stop at this point before we move on? In '93 where'd you go?

HARRIS: In 1993 I started a four-year term as the president of AFSA.

Q: Which we've already basically covered.

HARRIS: We did that.

Q: We've done that.

HARRIS: So when we meet next time, we'll pick up and do the last tape—that will be the last one—on the period from '97 to my retirement in '99 as the U.S. consul general in Melbourne, Australia.

Q: All right, very good.

Q: This is April 24, 2000. Tex, we're now getting towards the end. You were consul general in Melbourne from when to when?

HARRIS: From September of '97 until July, the end of July, of '99, so almost a two-year period.

Q: How did that assignment come about?

HARRIS: I was the president of AFSA prior to that, and the director general had called and asked if I were interested in being put forward for an embassy, and I said I was, but then I began to reflect on that, inasmuch as I had made a number of fairly vigorous enemies on the Hill during my AFSA presidency. The major issue dealt with criticism that the association had made over congressional travel. Some very significant boondoggles and a major event took place. There was almost a revolt within the [Foreign] Service during the government shutdown. All nonessential government employees were told to go home and not be paid. This happened during a congressional recess, and we had a number of congressional delegations who traveled, a number of which had really tourist, no substantive itineraries.

Q: Usually to Paris and London and that sort of thing.

HARRIS: Well, and also... One of the major ones that we pointed out was kind of a whirlwind, glorious trip through all the highlights of Latin America. It's hard really to do business in Machu Picchu when you have Sioux Falls, but they were going to try. Al Kamen, who was the writer of a column called "In the Loop" in the *Washington Post*, was interested in this, and we began to get a lot of information on these travelers, Congressional travelers, who were coming out, and I decided that the Association should be used as a platform for putting this information forward in the public domain. I worked

with Al Kamen and then through Guy Gugliotta,, who was a journalist who covered the Hill for the Washington Post who had also served as a junior foreign affairs reporter in Argentina many years ago, so all these old connections. So I worked with Gugliotta, and we put together a story on these boondoggles, and I thought it was going to be on page 17 or maybe wind up in the Style section, and lo and behold, it wound up on the first page of the Washington Post, big story. The Associate Press (AP) immediately said they had to have this story, so they called up and we gave them a slightly different spin and it ran on the AP wire. This story ran on the front page of every newspaper in the United States, even small-town papers that don't publish foreign affairs. This was a juicy story of the congressional guys with their boondoggling. So among the people we made enemies with was Arlen Specter, who is a very tough guy, and several others, and there were a number of threats made that we will not forget.

Q: By the way, just to get it straight, these are congressional delegations that were insisting on service?

HARRIS: They had itineraries that were absolutely nonsubstantive. They had in a week maybe four or five hours of meetings. Extensive travel provided by the Defense Department flying all over Latin America was one. Then there was the Specter trip to Africa, and then there were some old stories that we ran with. One was the story of a congressional delegation that went to Kenya on safari, and they were met at the airport by their safari group and they went out to the Serengeti Plains and they camped out in this luxurious tent. In order to cover their trip, they told the embassy that they wanted a briefing on Friday when they came back to town before they left the country the following Saturday morning. Then the delegation told them that they wanted to hold the briefing in the Carnivore Restaurant, which was this incredible restaurant in Kenya where the waiters walk around with old British army swords with a haunch of buffalo or warthog on it, and then with a big knife they slice off meat, huge gobs of meat, on your plate and allow you to eat different kinds of wild game. This is a very lively and noisy place. It certainly was not the kind of place where we could talk about any kind of substantive issue. So the embassy refused them. I think they wanted another briefing, but I think they mostly wound up giving them the briefing there. A number of these stories came out, and it was very difficult. And that was a tough issue, because a number of people in the Department felt that AFSA had discouraged foreign travel, which was necessary to get the members of Congress to see the important work that we were doing. This is certainly something that we wanted. There were a number of stories—I'm not sure if they were true—that less than 50 percent of the members of Congress actually had passports.

Q: I heard these stories, yes.

HARRIS: So there's a great demand by the Department to try to get people to travel. One of the problems that we have is that we do not script our people on the issues. When a congressional delegation goes to a military base, every person who has contact with the congressional delegation has a briefer that talks about issues of global interest to the Department of Defense and puts it in their perspective, why we need this equipment, why

we need this, what the shortfalls are, and so forth. The Department stays in its undisciplined way, depending on the brilliance of its officers, doesn't do that, and so people going overseas often hear nothing of the problems and of the foreign affairs. When they land, they are captured and information is given them about the host country, the power relationships, and all the other kinds of day-to-day information that the embassy is so good at. But the embassy doesn't step back and take advantage of briefing these folks on the plight of underfunding of the foreign affairs agencies. We had very few congressional folks in Melbourne, but one of the groups we had was the House Agricultural Committee that came through. On the committee were two members: one was the ranking member of what was the former Civil Service Committee, and another member who was a senior official on the Foreign Affairs Committee. They expressed an interest in coming to the consulate general, and so I was very pleased to spin off from the major grouping. We had a briefing in the MacArthur's war room, and the Australian Ministry of Defense flew their senior policy person down, who was a very excellent presenter and talked about even a briefing on Australia's views. I'm sorry; that was the wrong committee. This was a House defense committee, House National Security Committee, so two of the members came over, and while they were there, I walked them through. I took them first to my office, and I showed them the Wang, the green-screen Wang, which we still had.

Q: A computer.

HARRIS: A computer of 1970 technologies, and this was 1999. Then I took them down the hall to the Foreign Commercial Service, which is parented in the Department of Commerce, and there they could see a Windows operating system, Windows 95 operating system, the system that they had there. Then we went next door to the Defense Department Procurement Office there, and we saw there a Windows 98 with front-page overhead projectors and all the bells and whistles that one would expect to see in a modern office, plus new telephones as compared to the old telephones that we had, and all the other kinds of problems of different infrastructures. We were way behind. When they left, it was a very graphic demonstration of how retarded the Department of State was. But that was unusual. Most people, when they get the foreign visitors, want to impress them and provide them information about the local country, about U.S. relations with the local country, and not talk more broadly about the role of the Foreign Service.

Q: Going back, though, you sort of made your own determination that you weren't going to get Senate approval for an ambassadorship.

HARRIS: Yes, there was a high likelihood of problems, and I was worrying about it. I mean I was moving forward, talking with the Department about several embassies in Africa and several embassies in the Caribbean. Then I got a phone call from the former director general, Genta Hawkins Holmes, and she asked if I would like to go and be the consul general in Melbourne, Australia. Well, it took me about two seconds to say yes, and it was a great decision. Being the Texas extrovert, I was ideally suited to deal with the thousands of Australians who had dealings and interests in the United States in the center part of Australia. There are three consular districts in Australia, and of course the

embassy is in Canberra. One is in Sydney, and it deals with New South Wales and Queensland, so it was the whole east coast of Australia. It's a very big country, a country the size of the continental United States. I had the center of Australia, which ran from the northern territories, included south Australia, Victoria and Tasmania. This was a very, very interesting post for U.S. interests, as we had some major Australian facilities that were strongly supported by U.S. intelligence operations, and these are critical operations for the United States and for Australia. So this was a really significant overlay and was one of the real core links between Australia and the United States, particularly the site at Alice Springs but there were several others, although they were being rationalized over time. Then there was the third consular district, which was headquartered in Perth and which covered the state of western Australia, which is a major state with a lot of mining interests, although mining is on the wane in Australia because of the high cost of doing business there relative to working in the developing countries, but the petroleum play was still a major one due to the natural gas developments there. Australia, across its western and northern shelfs, has some very huge natural gas deposits, and of course they have enormous markets for the natural gas products in China and Japan and Southeast Asia. We need that form of energy, particularly because it's particularly clean. So I had the middle, which was this enormous stretch of territory. The consulate general was a medium-sized post. We had about thirty-seven employees at post. The USIA had left several years before, so we only had the Defense Logistics Agency, the Foreign Commercial Service, and the State Department. It was a very well-situated consulate on the top of a building downtown, and a lot of major work day to day was in the visa [section]. There were a lot of people coming from Australia to the United States, but we had recently introduced a visa waiver program, so that had reduced the workload. Before, the consulate had been an enormous factory, as everybody had to get a visa processed at the embassy. We introduced a reciprocal visa waiver program, and that worked very well and reduced the workload considerably. All the hard cases still had to be adjudicated, but easy cases of an Australian and a wife and two kids going to Disneyland—they could essentially do their visa formalities on the airplane by filling out the forms, and there was no problem on that. The major issue during my tenure there dealt with the war in Serbia. There was a very large Serb population in Melbourne, and we had more protests at our consulate general than anyplace else in the world due to the size of the Serbian population plus the laissez-faire attitude of the Victorian police and the Australian authorities to allow to a large degree free speech. This was in theory acceptable, but early on the demonstrations turned quite violent, and there was a considerable amount of property damage and there was some harassment of our employees. We had one major demonstration, and the demonstrations would go from five to seven thousand people. These were the major demonstrations. We had demonstrations every day, but those could range from a few dozen on a rainy day and on a nice day we might get one or two hundred, or some days like a school holiday we'd get five hundred. But we had demonstrations every afternoon, and they were out there showing their signs on the big boulevard that the consulate fronted. I don't have the date, but I'll find it. On this major date they had very well-orchestrated groups who came, and they had women and children, and they formed a little circle and inside they would have a couple of the Serb young toughs who had these enormous long pieces of lumber. They essentially made a slingshot—they had bolts, a number of bolts that were about half the size of your fist and

also screws, and they fired those at our building. Our building was entirely glass, so I think one of the rules is people who—

[*End Tape 10, Side A*]

The police really did not want to confront the protestors, particularly on a dark and rainy night, so they essentially backed away and did not try to intervene while the protestors were nut-and-bolting the embassy.

Q: What were you doing with the police down there?

HARRIS: We had liaison with the police, and we met with them on a regular basis. Then they threw a few Molotov cocktails, and then the police finally got energized at this time and started moving the crowd out when they started throwing Molotov cocktails at the building, and I think there was the fear that the police were going to get hurt. This was just totally unacceptable. I intervened with the police, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the Victorian government, and really did not get much satisfaction until a U.S. Navy warship [came], the USS Princeton, a ship that I really wanted very much to see and welcome to Melbourne and had been looking forward to their visit for a long time, as I was a Princeton graduate. But there were police intelligence reports on a number of soccer hooligans and other thugs in the Serb community. There was a football league among the immigrants in Melbourne, where the Italians had a couple of teams, the Serbs had a team, the Croatians had a team, and they all played each other, but it was like a little, mini World Cup to Victoria every weekend, with a lot of fighting and a lot of ethnic participation in the soccer leagues there. There was a lot of hostility, and the police kept talking to the Serbs about being good Australians, which [meant] protesting verbally and shouting and yelling and signs and things like that but not breaking things up. When we had the ship, I made a recommendation that the ship not come to Melbourne. We'll talk about ship visits in a minute. That's another important part of that work at the consulate there. I called the head of the state of Victoria, Jeff Kennett, and I told the premier that I was very concerned about the visit of the ship. Now, Melbourne was very nervous, because they had been working very hard to get a number of ships to call there, and if the word gets out that the U.S. Navy is skipping over Melbourne and going to Hobart in Tasmania—which is kind of a small town and has a fabulous deep-water port that can berth aircraft carriers with great ease and certainly had wonderful berthing facilities for destroyers such as the Princeton—that would be seen as a black eye and might have some commercial impact on the ship berthing business in Melbourne, which was a very competitive market and which they were working very hard to capture more ships. Melbourne is a port at the top of a large bay, so it's not as easy to get into. You have to go across a large bar and you have to go across at high tide if you're a large ship. We did send some big ships in, but we've never sent carriers in; primarily because of the tightness of the bay, we didn't want a traffic carrier in the bay, and also because the ship it can only exit at high tide, putting it in a mythical strategic place. Once the premier heard my concerns about the possibility of sailors being attacked, which was based on information that I had gotten from his police, well, he hit the roof and called his police chief up and chewed him out, called the foreign minister up and asked the foreign

minister to intervene with the ambassador, which he did, urging the United States to keep the vigil on in Melbourne and that the police would provide the fullest protection. The problem was that they could protect the ship and the access into the ship with lots of troops, but if you had a couple sailors drinking in a bar in one of the tougher areas of town, and they went outside and you had a gang of Serb kids who decided they were going to cut one of these guys or beat them up, they could do it, and that would be really a terrible incident. So I made a recommendation that the ship not come. Eventually, the navy decided that discretion was the better part of valor and sent the ship to Hobart. The ship's sailors had a good time, although they were disappointed that they didn't get to Melbourne because their wives were unhappy—they had to fly their wives another leg. So be it, but it was successful. Once that happened, then all of a sudden we got protection. The definition of permissible free expression did not include throwing half-pound pieces of metal with a huge slingshot and breaking windows in the building. The glass is such that it didn't break out the whole glass, it just punched a hole about the size of your fist in the window. Of course, you had to replace the window, and the windows were made overseas and they had to be brought into Germany, and it was a very expensive proposition.

Q: Obviously you had people working in there and there was considerable danger, wasn't there?

HARRIS: The attacks took place at night, so they did not have any of these big demonstrations in the day. They took place on the weekends and nights when we were not occupied. As a matter of fact, the embassy asked us not to have anybody in the premises. We did, in fact, on one occasion have someone there, because the police wanted a managed place to photograph and to see what was going on, and so we did permit that. But it was an interesting period in the rather laissez-faire attitudes of Australia, which don't have a lot of civil disobedience. They have a lot of workers' one-day strikes and things like that, and we had to scrutinize everybody that entered and screen a lot. The police would come up with their horses and then watch a protest and speeches for a couple hours, then they'd push them off, and then the protesters would break a window or so walking down the street, but that's about it. But this was a little bit tougher, and it was continual. It was a really tough period of morale, because as people left the building at night they had to walk through this gauntlet. That is something else we got straightened out, but we got the crowd moved back so the people would not be harassed. Some of the people were followed, and we had our military folks who under military agreement had right-hand-drive cars with their U.S. license plates on them as part of the Status of Forces Agreement, and we very quickly got them Australian licenses and we got a waiver so they didn't have to have right-hand-drive signs on the car, because that was like a big sticker saying, hey, an American is here. So you have somebody driving around town with a North Dakota license plate, and I could have been in the missile base before that, with a big sign on the back of the car saying "Right Hand Drive" and it's clearly an American soldier.

Q: When you're saying this, you're talking about a friendly country, but really this isn't very friendly. They were abrogating their responsibility. All the talk about [the] great

American–Australian friendship I would have thought would have had a certain bitter taste to it.

HARRIS: Well, it was at the time. I think it was a question that the police doctrine was to avoid confrontations, and so their goal was not to wind up with police having to go in and use truncheons on people. So that meant that the police commanders at the scene had a great deal of latitude in terms of backing out, backing down. When we demonstrated [that] there were some political consequences and some economic consequences to the Australian police behavior, then the premier's office got involved, Jeff Kennett, a very forceful person, and set a much higher standard for the police, and that then became the basis for the new doctrine, and the violence then seceded. I had a lot of protection. Everyplace I went I had security, which had changed the character of my—I had a wonderful tour. I really enjoyed public speaking and went and gave a couple of speeches a week around the community, not just in Melbourne, but as I traveled I always arranged speaking, so it was great fun and I got to meet a lot of people and had some great moments. My last week there I spoke at a large conference that was sponsored by the Age on Globalization, and they were trying to get Tom Friedman but couldn't get him, so I was asked to be the official American talking about globalization, which was great fun. We had a major lamb dispute going on with Australia, in which the Australian and New Zealand penetration of U.S. lamb market had reached 30 percent in a period of three or four years. They had gone from about 5 percent to about 30 percent of the U.S. fresh lamb market. At the same time the Congress under the Freedom to Farm Act had withdrawn subsidies from American lamb producers. Before that, everybody who had a little ranchette in Colorado or someplace in the West would put a couple hundred head of lamb on it and get these government subsidies, so it was a great boondoggle for these folks, generally well-to-do folks. I forget who it was but Tom Brokaw or one of the big anchors had a place, and it came to be seen as a scandal that these guys who were earning sixteen million dollars a year or so in salary, this list of the rich and famous, were all sheep farmers, so Congress cut that out, which meant that the prices of U.S. lamb went up and the Australians could undercut the market in price and also had a product that was excellent in quality and did very well.

Q: Was that subsidized in Australia?

HARRIS: No, it was not. What happened during this period, which is interesting, is that John Howard, who was the prime minister of Australia, called Bill Clinton on these various trade issues. This was in about May of '99. Howard had two issues that he wanted to talk to Clinton about. Well, there were actually three. One was the East Timor issue, in which Australia was taking the lead in providing leadership and a lot of manpower for the UN Navy force to bring some civility to East Timor. And the second and third issues were trade issues. One was the threat of the U.S. steel workers being successful in getting a piece of trade legislation through the Congress that would limit the import from Japan of iron and steel products into the United States. Japanese iron and steel is [processed] with Australian coal and iron ore, so the Japanese, of course, are the implementers and the benefactors of these raw materials, but the raw materials come from Australia. The second trade issue was the lamb. Everybody in Australia has a

brother or has some roots, a lot of people do, to the land, so they're very sensitive to rural issues. In a great country the infrastructure costs are just enormous to maintain decent infrastructure—in a country the size of the United States but without— The United States has 278,000,000 people; they have 19,000,000 people, just turned 19,000,000 people, and so it's a vast continent with no people on it, and consequently people are very sensitive to these hard issues, even in the city because their cousins have a tenth of a share in the family farm. We had enormous outrage from the Australian land farmers and from the farm community and from the general community that the United States was being unfair in restricting the lamb. Meanwhile, the Australians were wanting to impose tariffs on Canadian pork, because Canadian pork had approached 5 percent of the Australian market, and the pork farmers said that they were being driven out of business by these subsidized Canadian pig farmers, so meanwhile we had 30 percent. So at this speaking event I stood up and in my opening remarks I said I'd never met a lambchop that I didn't like. And after I left, the week that I left, that was the quote of the week in the Edge, which was great. So that was an indication, I think a good index, of the popularity, that I was well enough known and I was a big guy. At that time I had gained a lot of weight traveling around and eating all these chicken dinners and lambchop dinners. So I was up to about 345 pounds and at six-seven was an imposing figure. But it was great. I really enjoyed the representational work from the governors, the premiers of the states, the members of Parliament, the state legislatures, the farming groups and so on. I traveled extensively, and it was just an ideal situation.

Q: Well, in the areas where--what do they call them? Rands, provinces?

HARRIS: Provinces.

Q: What were the dominant parties in those provinces?

HARRIS: Well, there were really two. There was the Liberal Party, which was kind of a Republican but with a higher social program agenda based on their very socialist roots in Australia, but was very committed to privatization. Their privatization efforts in Victoria were one of the major features in my tour. And the other was the Labor government, which had been very successful in ruling Australia for a number of years and had lost power just a few years before, and so they were still licking their wounds. Both the national government and the Liberal government in Victoria, in Tasmania, in northern territories, and in south Australia were in power, but there was a sea change that was happening as people began to become tired of the provincial Liberal governments, and change took place while I was there. The only Liberal leader in the northern territory was replaced by a foreign candidate, but still a Liberal, based on a kind of arrogance. He was the arrogance factor. There was something the Australians called the "tall poppy syndrome," which is if someone grows too tall and too smart-ass, they'd cut them down. So in the whole society this is one of the problems that they had. Their culture is get along and to be one of the boys, be one of the girls. It's the socialist roots, and they don't like tall poppies. Jeff Kennett in Victoria was one of the tallest of the tall poppies, a very outspoken, very brilliant politician, and actually had a number of extremely able advisers around him. He instituted the privatization scheme, which had put on the market about

twenty-three billion dollars, Australian dollars, which is about seventy-five U.S. cents, of assets from the state of Victoria and sold those off. So the state of Victoria went from being almost bankrupt to being a Moody's AAA-bond-rated governmental institution during the Kennett regime, on the basis of selling, paying off debt, and making very investment-friendly infrastructure investments in the state of Victoria, which brought in a lot of IT and other businesses. Of this twenty-three billion dollars, about eighteen billion of that sale went to American investors, because when these goods went up for sale—and they were things like electric companies, train lines, tram lines, other major infrastructure components that the state of Victoria had owned, and under the British style these were government-owned entities in the past—the privatization brought an enormous amount of revenue and also a great number of Americans into Australia to run these companies, and also a lot of service industries came in behind the other companies who had worked for these companies in the United States. When the companies bought an electric utility in Australia, well, they decided they would come in and provide the same kinds of services that they had provided in the United States to this company overseas. So the American business community was really moving. The American companies were playing a very important role in the arts, a very important role in education and the sciences, sponsoring public events and sporting events. It was a heyday of American investment, in Victoria in particular. In Tasmania, which is a small state, a very green state, there was much less American involvement, although there were individual American investors. There was one wonderful gentleman who came there after leaving the Marine Corps, was a diver and was a fisherman for—I'm trying to think of the mollusk that he collected—abalone, but he was one of the largest abalone fishermen.

Q: It makes a very nice almost steak. It used to be in California. I think it sort of disappeared from there.

HARRIS: He set up canneries to can it and to sell it for the Asian market, where it brings in twenty or thirty dollars a pound, and did a very credible job in terms of producing the abalone.

Q: Didn't this American investment and appearance of American firms cause a lot of resentment in Australia?

HARRIS: It caused some, and it was really tied to the globalization phenomenon. Although in the most part these takeovers were skillfully handled by the Americans and by the Australians, so that the very top leadership of the firms were folks who came out from Kansas, came out from California, came out from Dallas and ran the company, but from the top two or three jobs and maybe the chief financial officer, all the Australians were kept in place. Now what did happen was there was a lot of rationalization inside these facilities. They took over a government facility, and they found they had twice as many people as they needed, and so they let maybe a quarter of the people go, but they generally gave a decent buyout. You have to, under Australian law, which is very protective of employees. So it was done fairly well. There were some major problems there, some environmental problems that they had. There was a major fire in an

American-owned refinery that caused a lot of pollution and caused the gas to be shut down for a week or so. That caused some major heartburn, because the argument was put forward but not really proven that the Americans had cut back on the safety standards in the plant and that had led to the plant having this explosion. It blew up not one but both of the input systems that led to the gas production cleaning. They had enormous gas reserves in the nearby straits, but then they'd process the gas and they'd bring it on shore to clean it before they put it in the pipes to deliver to your house or your business, and so a lot of businesses went down. So there were very difficult, very hard cases involved there. The issues in the most part were really incredible. There was a growing spirit of friendship, based on a lot of nostalgia over the Second World War. As an official American we participated in that, and even the White House each year sent out a presidential emissary to the Coral Sea events.

Q: It's a battle that most Americans have no idea about.

HARRIS: But it was a [critical] battle. Midway, of course, is the big battle that we know about, and the Coral Sea was the precursor battle to Midway. But the Battle of the Coral Sea was the battle that turned the Japanese around from pushing further south towards Australia and towards New Zealand and towards the islands north of it, and it was essentially using American aircraft carriers. It was the first, I think, battle fought exclusively by airplanes. I don't think there was gunfire. It was a naval aviator battle, and I think maybe tactically the Japanese won the battle in terms of inflicting slightly more damage, but American, Australian, and British elements damaged the Japanese enough that it turned them around. So strategically it was a victory for the Allies. Every Australian city is dominated by a huge war memorial. For us, these things are there but they're kind of part of history, and I'd say they're not really central, but in Australia they have events every year to commemorate Armistice Day, Coral Sea Day, Anzac Day. I marched with the men and women of a USS big destroyer in Adelaide in their Anzac Day parade. When we came by—I was with the first detachment of U.S. World War II veterans, I marched with them—we were complemented by about forty members from the ship, the U.S. ship that I had arranged to come to Adelaide at that time. Sea legs were just knocked over. They said they'd never seen such enthusiasm. They'd marched in a number of parades in the United States, and they said they'd never seen anything like it. When the American flag came over and the Americans came over the hill, the [Australians] were just genuinely pleased in terms of applauding and cheering and "Way to go, Yanks! So this enormous reservoir of goodwill is there. It is something that is very precious.

Q: Did you find that the Australian labor movement was, to use not the greatest term, infected by the British disease? Coming out of the more fundamental Laborites, guys had a red banner forever, which has a strong anti-American tendency towards it, did you find that there?

HARRIS: Yes, it was there, but it was a group that we did not frankly deal with that much, because they really didn't want to deal with us very much. I didn't really run around trying to convert them. I did on a number of occasions deal with these difficult

sentiments, and the problem is it's as expressed in globalization. It was genetically modified organisms, GMO, especially by Monsanto, an American device to change the seeds: enormous concerns in Australia about that, from the farmers who saw that they would have to buy eventually all their seeds from American company. These seeds were so designed that they don't reproduce themselves, so you can't use the new seeds to plant to get next year's crop; you've got to go out and buy new seeds, which protect them against disease and insects and other things like that. They're a wonderful product. Australia was one of the very few countries in the world that had a negative trade balance with the United States. I think it was about eighty billion dollars a year. Now, they had an enormous positive trade balance with Japan. We, of course, had an enormous negative trade balance with Japan, but essentially we bought lamb and beef and wine and very few manufactures, some Harley-Davidson wheels and other kinds of specialty items from the Australians, but they bought jet planes and they bought caterpillar mining equipment and they bought computers and computer software from the United States, and they're a very high-end user, and also a lot of the digital, cell phone, wireless technology from the United States. They had such a small market that they did not produce these things and did not have, for example, a chip manufacturing plant in the country, so all their computer chips had to be purchased overseas. The economies of scale in the Australian economy meant the market was too small for them, and the production costs were too high for them to really compete with Taiwan and some of the other producers, and they felt it was better to buy it there. That meant that they had a large threat of becoming like a large Hawaii, in which they would have great tourism and great eco-tourism and some very sophisticated agricultural production in wine and other high-end products, macadamia nuts and other things like Hawaii—pineapples and other kinds of fruits—and would then have to rely on exploitative ventures.

Another issue that I dealt a lot with was global warming. There was a major campaign very successfully run by the Australian mining companies, Western Mining, whose chief executive officer was a good friend of mine, Hugh Morgan. They were very dedicated to making sure that Australia did not follow American leadership in global warming, because they argued that Australia's was a major emitter of greenhouse gases because it was producing aluminum for the world, it was producing natural gas for the world, it was producing coal for the world, it was doing all these activities that essentially freed carbon or generated an enormous amount of electricity to make aluminum and did all these other things that other people would use. Since it was the producer of these things where the end user was getting the benefit of these things, it was unfair to tag them with the full burden of paying greenhouse taxes and taking the greenhouse abatement efforts on behalf of all these other products, and they needed some sort of a special deal. So the Australian analysis, economic analysis, and skills meant that they were able to provide a different voice to the EU and the United States and Japan among the OECD countries to the developing countries, India, China and the other developing countries, for kind of a third way. This meant that the developing countries had to give special concessions to the Australians, which they did at Kyoto, and that was a major point of friction between the United States and Australia. By and large, the relationship was a very, very sound and productive one both ways. I think the Australians would sit back and tot up the benefits that they got from the United States, [the] nuclear umbrella being the ultimate in the

strategic sense if Indonesia or China or any of these other countries decided to make a land grab at this huge, empty continent with a continent the size of the United States but with a population of Los Angeles in it. [They felt] that they would count on the United States to defend its interests from an invasion force. They felt that it was important for them to participate in those critical issues with peacekeeping forces and others, and that was very popular at a policy level in both political parties, who were very pro-American. But it was very unpopular among the troops, who saw themselves going to Somalia to get killed, put in harm's way for some American interests or getting sent to the Persian Gulf, particularly after Desert Storm. That one was, I think, seen as popular support, but the follow-up action in terms of the embargo on Iraq was seen as less popular. The U.S. Navy was a critical relationship between Australia and the United States after the intelligence relationship, which I can't discuss. But one of the major attractions of joining the U.S. Navy was a trip to Australia, and one of the reasons was the U.S. sailors were very friendly, and the sailors were always assured that of all their shore leaves, the best shore leave that they ever went on would be in Australia. I spoke to several old Navy noncommissioned officers who had stripes up and down their sleeves, who said that the two greatest shore leave places that they had were Halifax and Tasmania, Hobart, that those were just the best times. The people were friendly, they all spoke English, nobody tried to cheat you, you could buy the ladies a drink and go dancing with them and have a good time, and you could get a good steak. Nobody tried to take advantage of you, and everybody tried to be helpful.

Q: While you were there, did the New Zealand example of permitting the Navy to go there come up? Was this an issue?

HARRIS: Again, it was one of the things that I talked about. There are very few things—I generally am able to maintain a very good bit of diplomatic equilibrium in terms of dealing with very tough issues. In South Africa and in Argentina, I think one of my strengths as a diplomat was being able to discuss things with people [who had] very different views and values. One of the things that really angered me was the New Zealand ban on allowing U.S. ships to enter unless the U.S. ship made a statement that they did not have any nuclear weapons aboard, which by U.S. Navy and Coast Guard and other policies they are forbidden to make. The story that I told, which is true and outrageous—and I told this often when this question would come up during my speeches— the United States has two West Coast–based icebreakers based outside of Seattle. Each year, each fall, which is the spring in the Southern Hemisphere, one of these vessels steams to the Antarctic, and it cracks the ice so that the supply boats can get into our National Science Foundation Antarctic bases in Verdo Bay or whatever it is, and also the New Zealand base is just a little bit further down the coast. So the New Zealanders get a free ride in on the back of the broken ice of this U.S. flotilla that goes through every springtime, led by this enormously powerful icebreaker. These things are really impressive to behold. You really don't look at them, you behold them, they're so strong and so powerful. It happened—this was in fall of '98, which was the spring there of '98—that the New Zealand supply vessel broke down in the South Pacific Ocean. The seas there are the worst and most tumultuous in the world. It was very common to have thirty- and forty-foot seas there, and it was absolutely just a mariner's nightmare of traveling those waters,

just horrible. We gave the New Zealand vessel a tow for days in those rough waters. Now it's one thing to tow a boat across a lake; it's something else to tow a boat when you have ten-, fifteen-, twenty-, thirty-, forty-foot seas. It makes the ride very difficult and slows the progress enormously for the towing boat. So the American Coast Guard vessel, this icebreaker, brought this crippled New Zealand ship back to New Zealand, and it got to the twelve-mile point off the coast of New Zealand and a New Zealand boat came out and asked the captain, "Do you have nuclear weapons aboard?" The captain, of course, per instructions said, "I can neither confirm nor deny it," and the New Zealand immigration or coast guard or whatever said, "I'm terribly sorry but you'll have to cut the tow and we'll take it the other twelve miles from here. Thank you very much. Sorry that you can't come into New Zealand and have a cup of coffee and a glass of wine." And they cut it loose. The only exception to this was an American Navy sailing training ship—I think it was a Coast Guard ship—that came to New Zealand, and they came out and they asked the captain of this Coast Guard training vessel, "Do you have any nuclear weapon?" and the guy looked down and said, "Are you nuts?" So since that was interpreted as being a negative answer, they allowed the boat to come in, and that was the only official American boat that we've had there. There was a movement in Australia, in Melbourne, on the issue of prohibiting nuclear weapons or insisting on a prohibition similar to New Zealand's a number of years ago, but it has really faded, and I think the relationship is such now that no one is really interested politically. There's no mileage in that now. The relationship is seen to be one of necessary and good hospitality both ways. The American soldiers and sailors in Australia are treated extremely well. One of the major problems we have, though, is the advancing—and this is one of the issues that we don't [have] within our procurement operation in Melbourne from the Defense Logistics Agency—is that the United States has such a very high defense budget that it has the ability to buy all these new pieces of equipment for American operations, and the interoperability with the Australian military is a major problem in both countries. In the Persian Gulf where the Australians are operating, they do a couple critical missions. They provide some of the air rescue if an American pilot is shot down inside of Iraq. One of the options in certain areas is that an Australian reconnaissance team would go in and extract them. But they have older equipment, so the Americans have to carry around with them some additional pieces of equipment in order to allow them to communicate with the Australians, or we have to give them one of our pieces of equipment, so it is a problem.

Q: Did you have much dealing with the universities, the college generation? This is a new group coming up, and what was your impression?

Q: This is Tape 11, Side 1 with Tex Harris. We want to talk about the university, because it usually means there's a new generation and often things like the Coral Sea—I mean, generations come and generations go. Was there a change particularly with the influx of immigrants, including Serbs?

HARRIS: Yes, there was a change. Australia is going through major demographic changes, really heralded by the leadership of the Labor government, which essentially opened Australia up to the world and particularly saw Australia as being a part of Asia, with a very special heritage and unique contribution to make to its Asian neighbors. The

Australians are very sensitive to any slights that they receive from their Asian neighbors. There are some organizations among the Asian community which they are not invited to, and, of course, like everyone else, they want to get the benefits of both their British colonial heritage and their English-speaking skills and their expertise in science and their expertise in the common law and British-based institutions, and tie that with their proximity—not nearness because they're so far from mainland Asia, but they are certainly at least in the same time zone. And it's difficult because there is a tear in the fabric of Australia who does not accept these changes, very nervous about Asian migration, very concerned about losing the old values and the old standards that made Australia, very similar to attitudes that we had in the South during our civil rights days. These were manifested politically in Australia during my period there, although they were more in Queensland and in New South Wales than in Victoria or in south Australia or in Tasmania. But they did [manifest] and are evidenced in the northern territories in terms of dealing not with Asians but with the Aboriginals, who are a very, very large community in the northern territory and who have Aboriginal land claims to most of the land of the territory. So there are a lot of hard feelings there. The Australians are torn. There is not a clear national consensus, and people realize that on some days they are part of Asia and that their future is going to be manifested by how well they adapt and are able to integrate economically, politically, internationally with their Asian neighbors. They see China and their relationship with China as being very special and very important, as China will need enormous amounts of natural gas in the future in order to fuel its cities in environmentally clean ways and avoid the choking pollution that they now are saddled with. Australia can provide both the raw materials and also a considerable part of the technology but not the capital in order to do it. So the most aware Australian strategic thinkers see a marriage between Australian raw materials, Japanese technology and capital, and American technology and capital, and Australian skills blended in terms of providing major economic contributions in the region. And the Australians have, very carefully, a role to play in which they seek to differentiate themselves from the United States but do not want to alienate the United States because their major long-term interests there in the fundamental way are tied up with this relationship.

Q: How about your whole issue of human rights in China, which the United States has been pretty rough dealing on, where most European powers and all have pussyfooted away from?

HARRIS: Australians have been pussyfooting as well for the most part. It was interesting. One of the war stories that I was told—and I believe this is correct—was that John Howard, who is not a great traveler—I think his first trip was to the UK to see the Queen and do the [standard] things—but he also went there when the Australian cricket team was there, so that was very understandable that he would go over there and catch a little of the cricket at Lourdes, which is something that every cricket fan would want to do, kind of like the Mecca of cricketers. His other trip went to China, and when he was there, he raised—there is an Australian national but who was also born as Chinese, who was in jail in China for political activities in China—and he raised the issue with, I forget who the particular interlocutor was but it was one of the very senior officials of the

Chinese government. And there was a pause, and the answer came back, he said, "You know, if the Americans or the British had raised that issue, we would have not accepted the questions and would have berated them for 150 years of colonialism and oppression and all the other kinds of scars that their policies have left on the land in this country, but Australia is different. You were an oppressed country like we were, and so we have to accept your question with the respect it deserves as coming from a country which has been oppressed as we have." So they took the question, and about two weeks later the answer came back: "Nuts, nothing going on," and the guy stayed in jail. But it was interesting. I think it depicts the kind of relationship. Australian-English technical-skilled people have been in great demand in Asia. They're politically acceptable. They're socially acceptable. They're good blokes, good gals, and they don't pose a threat such as the United States or Japan or other countries, super powers pose. They're a middle-level power, and that makes them and their nationals and their efforts easier to accept. During the Asian economic meltdown in '98–'99, Australian accountancy firms, Australian law firms, Australian bank examiners, Australian tax collectors, Australian expertise were in great demand in the service industry, consulting business, in Asia, because they realized that they needed to modernize their systems in order to mitigate and repair some of the damages and mitigate against future problems that they feared were going to happen to them, and they looked to Australian expertise to provide that. Now, Australian engineers who build bridges and public works were out of business, because there was no longer money for these big projects, but the service industry internationally is a major one for Australians. The young Australians that I met, there was a stream of anti-Americanism. We had a small group on the left who were virulent, and the Internet had given them a lot of the arguments. Most of the students were deeply concerned about their—and this was a widespread concern and something I dealt with extensively in my speaking—the concerns that they had were about globalization and about privatization and about centralization, and they were no different from the same concerns of the same folks in the United States. So it was a nation that could be manifested as being an anti-American or have an American counterpart, but it really was no different from that of college students or high school students or workers in Kansas City who used to work for a company that was owned in Kansas City and now worked for a company that was owned in New York or in Frankfurt. These are the globalization concerns that people have. The other issue was the issue of values. I talked a great deal in my relationships about the relationship and the joint values that Americans and Australians share, and that I think is really important because we are very, very comfortable in each other's countries. That is a problem, because the comfort level is such at a superficial basis that we can feel that we're almost alike, and in some ways you can find in Australia and in the United States internally greater differences in values and outlook among, let's say, mainstream Australians and mainstream Americans between their own countrymen than with other mainstream folks from the other country. And the language is kind of fun. They get a kick out of listening to us, and we get a kick out of listening to them. But there are other issues of culture. Talking to Australians about how do you preserve a unique Australian culture—and this is very similar to what the Canadian problem is, although the Canadians have not been quite as skillful or adept in terms of coming up with cultural icons as the Australians have, with the outback mythology and the Aboriginal mythology. The Canadians have the north and—

Q: And they have a military history and all that, which the Canadians—

HARRIS: The Canadian culture is not as distinctive as the Australian culture, and the Australian climate is such a dry, harsh place. Mobil Oil sponsored a fabulous exhibit, which was both here in Washington and toured in Australia, comparing the landscape painters and landscape painting in Australia and the United States. It was interesting because a lot of the East Coast painters were very different from the Australians because the East Coast is wet. But if you went and looked at some of the Western painters in the United States and some of the Australian painters, here were people who were painting very harsh, hostile environments. So there are some very real differences. Again, there are parts of Australia that are very lush and tropical and waterlogged, so it's a big country and has all these things.

Q: We'll come back to that in a minute, but were you—talking about particularly the youth but others—were you finding—you were on the cusp of a real change with the Internet and all—people who were concerned with globalization can take advantage of the great globalization of the Internet and freely converse with people and tap in? It makes a completely different universe.

HARRIS: Those were mostly the people that I was dealing with, because I am one of those people. I am an Internet heavy user. I'm online two or three hours a day at a minimum, so I am very reliant on the Internet for information and communications. A lot of people saw the Internet and the communications technology as breaking the enormous intellectual, social isolation of Australia. It was the phrase that Blaney, one of the great historians and one of the people whom I got to know a little bit, Professor Blaney talked of dealing with the issue of the tyranny of distance, which has been a defining factor for Australians for many, many years. Now the Internet solves that, and it solves it in a way in which information and pictures and graphics and music and things like that are moving forward, and it means Australians can participate fully in the world. But they're nervous, and nervous in terms of are they good enough. Often people coming up and very genuinely wanting to know how we like Australia was really this sense of what are we really like compared to the rest of the world, because they're so far from the rest of the world. Many of them have traveled as young people and, of course, the business elite in the country travels extensively. These guys have got cast-iron bottoms. They get on a plane and fly from Melbourne to Sydney to San Francisco, have two days of meetings in San Francisco, go to Pittsburgh for meetings, then fly to London and then back in a period of a couple of weeks. It would just kill a normal person. It's just absolutely frightening, and they do it on a regular basis four or five times a year, and they do it on commercial aircraft. They may be flying business class or first class, but it's still pretty brutal, the time and travel, on one's body. But the Internet now means that they are very conversant, and people have all kinds of information that was not available to them, and they are not far away. Where for me, serving in Australia was a very nice capstone to a career that had been filled with difficult, rough assignments, and it was one of the issues that we Foreign Service professionals in the embassy and the consulates [discuss with] each other. It was too nice. The ambassador would tease me and I'd tease her, and then

we were just exhausted from having fun. Going out and giving talks and meeting all these people that were just basically friendly, we had very few really contentious issues, and the issues were issues of small magnitude, and they were not on fundamentals. On the fundamentals we were in agreement. It was really a very pleasant assignment. But as Foreign Service professionals, a number of us really missed the challenges, and going to places where the country was so different, where the things that they were doing were abhorrent to ourselves, abhorrent to our government, abhorrent to the American people, here we were in a place that was [just] great fun. And talking about relationships, my major set-piece talk was about relationships and about the continuity of good relationships and the values, the underlying values, in those relationships between the United States and Australia, and it was great, easy diplomacy. It was light lifting, no heavy lifting involved. But yet the importance is—and I think this is a problematic area—that for the United States, Australia is a country of enormous strategic importance, because of where it is. The military, the particular intelligence assets that we share with the Australians there are critical, not because it's Australia but because of where Australia is. NASA is the second largest U.S. government program there. They have a twenty-plus-million-dollar-a-year program in Australia, because that is where their arrays are, their communication arrays are for this end of the planet. We're on the other end of the planet. If you drill a hole in Melbourne directly through the earth, it would come out in Toronto. So we are absolutely reciprocally based with Australia, and that means that for NASA, for defense communications, intelligence and other things, Australia is really critical. Another area is a friendly port. We had a major operation in the [Persian] Gulf. We had this continual stream of deployments, which from the day the boat, the U.S. warship, left San Diego till the day it got back had to be under six months by Navy fiat, which meant these vessels would steam like hell and get across to their stations and then they would steam back and stop in Australia as a friendly port, generally on the way back because they were in a rush to get out there on the way out. There were hundreds of U.S. warships who came for refueling and liberty at Australian ports, and occasionally they would break down and they would be repaired, and that is a very vital asset. The U.S. Marines, the year before I got there, sent in hundreds of Marines and Marine vehicles to fight a mock invasion exercise in Australia. They were testing out the American resources. It turned out to be horrendously expensive for the Marines to put the vessels on the ships and sail them down to Australia and offload them and run them around and to bring them back, but it's an indication of the close military ties that we have.

Q: You know, we're talking about how vital it is for us to keep this tie, but you also early on said that when you got there we no longer had a USIA presence, which seems to be happening in Germany and other places. Somehow or another, we assume that these things can take care of themselves without having essentially professionals working on them down there.

HARRIS: It really is a grave mistake. I think the relationship between sophisticated, OECD, developed countries, and the public is one which the USIA folks believe to be essentially privatized. They're not privatizing; they're just ignoring it and leaving it to private media, hopefully, that the relationships will be conducted, but there are a number of issues, which the private media does not deal with, that are critical to the relationship.

As a senior official of the U.S. government, I found that I spent almost 50 or 60 percent of my time on representational issues, essentially talking and raising consciousness of people about the importance of the United States to Australia and the importance of Australia to the United States, this reciprocal friendship theme, and the ambassador did the same. It was a critical component.

Q: But did you have the feeling that you were dealing with somewhat the same situation we have with Canada, that you're assigned there and you're surrounded by Australians, but I doubt that the word "Australia" passes the lips of most senior American officials in the government in any one year?

HARRIS: It does not, and even in the Australia/New Zealand/Pacific Island desk I was struck by a visit from the office director. We were at lunch and I said, "How do you spend your time?" And he smiled and he said, "It's reciprocal. We spend the most time on the littlest places." Why? Because the State Department is in charge of these difficult, contentious negotiations with these island states in the Pacific. So those are real negotiations, which are ongoing with real stakes involved, and so we spent a lot of time on Micronesia, reversion and trusteeship, and other kinds of issues, and the Australian issues, the big issues there, are handled really by the U.S. military and intelligence services. If you look at the embassy list of visitors, the people who come across are principally military and intelligence folks. I was at a cocktail party in Melbourne during the Air Show, in which the United States heavily demonstrates its goods, and there were seven flag officers and several deputy-assistant-secretary-and- above-level people. It was in February and it's very nice down there in February and not so nice in Washington. But it's just an indication of the interest that we have. We have senior officials. Every year we have a joint consultation with the Australians, with the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, and the head of the CIA, and NSA people there, but I don't know at what level. And it's reciprocal between Australia and the United States. In the private sector there are other leadership forums of major business public opinion leadership that meet each year in both places, and the attraction, of course, is Americans are thrilled to go. Australians will go anyplace; they just love to go, they love to travel. But the Americans are really thrilled to get a chance to go down to Australia, because it has this wonderful mystique and everybody wants to go there at least once and see the Great Barrier Reef, see the Sydney Opera, see the wilds of the Outback, and many other kinds of issues, and the great ocean drive and the other features that are in Australia. So it's a good relationship, it's a solid relationship, but it's one that needs more tending and it's not a troubled relationship. The assistant secretary of state and the secretary of state spend more time on Burma by far than they do on Australia, because we've got major problems with the Burmese and the issues [with Australia] are left to the technical agencies to work with their technical agencies' counterparts, same as with Canada, where the Canadian EPA and the U.S. EPA deal with their issues, do their thing, without the need for the State Department to intervene and to get involved.

Q: Something I forget to ask before, before we conclude this: During the time you were there, although this would be more at the ambassadorial level, what were you getting and seeing from your particular point of view of the relationship and how people look

towards the future towards Indonesia?

HARRIS: That was more a Canberra issue, and it was a critical one. There was a very extensive day-to-day dialogue between both the diplomatic and intelligence and military communities in Canberra on Indonesia. Now, Australians had a great knowledge of Indonesia. They teach Bahasa Indonesia in the high schools in Australia; they don't do that in the United States. So there was a great amount of expertise in the United States, and that was benefiting U.S. policymakers and their staffs in preparing. Then again, during the recent troubles —there was an enormous balancing act and some differences in policy. I think that the United States was accused by the Australians of becoming politically over focused on the East Timor problems without—I don't know if this is true, I don't think it's true—without keeping a balance in terms of the importance of Indonesia, a country with two million people and really vast resources and probably one of the most strategic—not probably but the most strategically located country in the world along with a place like Turkey.

Q: Were the Indonesians seen by the sort of people who were thinking about this in your area, did they consider Indonesia a threat? You have this big, open country to the north.

HARRIS: Yes, there is a very real fear among the general Australian population that you will have in there some old Indonesian claims towards the north, based on settlements that were there from time immemorial, when fishermen would come down and make camps on their plains there, and there were some Indonesian civilization contacts going back hundreds of years. So, yes, I think that is a doomsday scenario that they see, and also a possible Chinese invasion, so I think a "yellow or brown peril" is certainly one of the themes that resides underneath the fabric of a lot of Australian sentiments and also under some Australian thinkers. Now this manifests itself in an enormous debate over population, what should be the population policy in Australia and what should be the immigration policy in particular. They want to encourage people to have children, but the major issue is over immigration and what their policy should be on immigration.

Q: I assume that Indonesian immigration was not encouraged, or was it?

HARRIS: No, it wasn't. The difficulty in Australia with immigration is that you get a lot of points for speaking English, so there are not many Indonesian potential immigrants who can meet the English requirement, so you get much higher immigration streams of people who have the educational background from Pakistan, Ceylon, Hong Kong, and other areas coming into Australia, because they need a hundred points to get in. I think speaking fluent English gives you twenty-five or thirty points, so you're a quarter of the way there before you go to job and age and all the other kinds of factors that you need to meet their immigration standards.

Q: When you went there in July '99, were you planning to retire then or how did this work out?

HARRIS: Time in class. The time in class clock caught up with me. My last event there, I

remember, was right in the middle of the lamb tariff dispute, and the Victorian Farmers Federation meeting took place. I knew the guys there, I knew everybody, so I called them up and I said, "I want to come down, and if you find a few minutes on your program, I'd like to come down and tell the American side of this lamb dispute that we're having." They said, "Are you crazy?" I said, "No, I think I ought to come down. Talk to your guys. Are you willing to hear me?" They said, "Of course, we'll make some time." So I went down. This talk—I gave hundreds of talks there—was one where I got the living crap beat out of me. I mean, the people were so angry. There was a woman who, I learned later, was a pig farmer. This was a really articulate woman who could probably call pigs from three counties away, three shires away. She was incredible. Anyway, she just let me have it. But I got my story out, and it was one of the diplomatic highlights, because when I left, there was a very genuine round of applause. No one in the audience agreed with me or agreed with anything I had to say, but as Australians they appreciated the hell out of the fact that the consul general had taken the time and had thought that they were important enough to come down and tell his side of the story, which they thought was full of crap, but anyway he had the guts enough to come down and meet with them. They beat up on me pretty good, and I took the punches and I threw a few back, and it was good. That in a way was very good, because it showed that it was a real test of the relationship. And I think it was important that Americans speak their mind, because the Australians are going to speak their mind, and we've got to deal. I think the worst problem with the relationship is the tendency of Americans to not think about or not engage the Australians, and that is important. And to take them for granted, that is deadly in the long term.

My friend, I have enjoyed this.

Q: I have, too.

HARRIS: It's been great. We look forward to seeing you again.-

End of interview