

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR THOMAS GRAHAM, JR.

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy

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Q: Today is May 15, 2001. This is an interview with Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy. Do you go by Tom?

GRAHAM: Yes.

Q: Let's start at the beginning. When and where were you born and tell me something about your family.

GRAHAM: I was born on October 9, 1933, in Louisville, Kentucky. I grew up in Louisville, Kentucky, which in those days was a charmed community, at least in today's terms. I grew up in the '40s and '50s. Drugs were unknown. Divorce was virtually unknown. Everybody knew everybody. My father was active in politics. He was an investment banker, but politics was his real love and was kind of his second profession. My mother was from Yonkers, New York, just outside of New York City. She married my father in 1931 and moved to Louisville. He was the son of a Presbyterian minister, the grandson of a Civil War officer and prominent businessman in Kentucky.

Q: I have to ask which side.

GRAHAM: Northern side. Going back one more generation, my father's great grandfather came from near Edinburgh, Scotland—for reasons unknown to me—to Madison, Indiana. But I'm told that he was drawn by some kind of community in Madison, perhaps Presbyterian or something like that. Hanover College in Madison, Indiana, was a prominent Presbyterian school in the 19th century and to some extent still is, but in those days perhaps more so. My great grandfather was with the First Indiana volunteers and was elected a major at the age of 19. He fought for three years with the North in the Civil War, was with Sherman in Atlanta and left the Army at Savannah after the march through Georgia.

Q: My grandfather was an officer with the 26th Wisconsin with Sherman.

GRAHAM: Isn't that interesting? A remarkable period of history. We have his diary of the first six months that he spent in the military, which included a major battle in Tennessee and then pages and pages of description of the vagaries of camp life and how everybody had dysentery or influenza or whatever. It did not paint a flattering or

romantic view of military service.

In any case, my father was more or less from southern Indiana, although my grandfather, being a Presbyterian minister, had churches around the Middle West. My father was actually born on an Indian reservation in Iowa, spent some years in Fargo, North Dakota, and then Richmond, Indiana. In 1920 my grandfather took over the 2nd Presbyterian Church in Louisville, Kentucky, a prominent church.

My grandmother's, and to some extent my grandfather's, side of the family were deeply Republican but progressive Republican. Her uncle was Governor La Follette's lieutenant governor and was chairman of the Republican Party in Wisconsin for 20 years. I remember once asking her, when she was about 90 and I was in some sort of temporary mental fog, how was she registered: Democrat or Republican? She told me with disdain that she was 40 before she saw a Democrat. But my father, in spite of coming from such a background, was very taken with Woodrow Wilson and decided to become a Democrat. In 1920 my grandfather took over the 2nd Presbyterian Church in Louisville, Kentucky, a prominent church.

My father was a very prominent Democrat in Louisville for many years. He was treasurer of the Party for 30 of those years. He was a candidate for mayor at one point in 1948 when the mayor died in office after a year's service and the board of aldermen elected his successor. My father lost that vote 6 to 5. My mother was violently against my father's becoming mayor, so she wasn't unhappy, but my father always regretted the loss. The outcome was truly a chance thing in that normally, the chairman of the board of aldermen, a neighbor of ours, wouldn't vote, but did since one of my father's supporters was sick. So it was a 5 to 5 tie and the chairman broke the tie against my father even though he lived two blocks away—maybe because he lived two blocks away. He lost the vote to a man named Charles Farnsley, who went on to serve 7 years as mayor and several terms in the Congress. My father was also chairman of the Sinking Fund—Louisville's oddly named fiscal organization. The Fund held the bonds that guaranteed city obligations and so forth. It was a political position, but part-time, which my father chaired for 15 years.

I went to four Democratic National Conventions. Our family lawyer, Wilson Wyatt, was Adlai Stevenson's campaign manager in 1952 and later lieutenant governor of Kentucky. I worked for his law firm for a summer. I was brought up in an atmosphere of neighborliness during peaceful times. Politics was fun, but there was in the atmosphere the notions that you were supposed to make something of yourself and do something with your life and contribute to the community and you were supposed to have certain principles that guided you. Such expectations permeated our society.

I might mention a couple of other things about my father just to give a little more background. He was very involved with Churchill Downs and the Kentucky Derby. He was on the board of directors there for 30 years. We had a very good box at the Derby, and still do. I've been to 41 Derbies myself. His cousin was chairman of the board, so he was very interested in Churchill Downs and the Derby. We never owned horses or

anything like that, but Churchill Downs was an institution that was important to my father. He was an investment banker who was very committed to local companies, local investments. He turned down a chance to have a seat on the New York Stock Exchange. He was very Kentucky/Midwest oriented. That was very good in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s; a lot less good in the 1960s.

Q: Where did he get his schooling?

GRAHAM: He went to Andover and to Princeton, but had to leave after two years because of family financial circumstances. Then he finished up at the University of Kentucky. He was always very hopeful that I would go to Princeton although he never said so. He just had Princeton memorabilia all over the house and you would have to be really stupid not to get the hint. When I was about to graduate from high school, I was accepted at both Princeton and Yale. Although all my friends were going to Yale and my father never said anything, I felt I just couldn't not go to Princeton.

Q: If you went to Princeton, it seemed to demand much more loyalty than Yale, which was a place you went to get educated. At Princeton, you got educated, but it was a club.

GRAHAM: It was very much a club and to a degree a southern-oriented club.

Q: Very much so. Of course, Kentucky was kind of South, wasn't it?

GRAHAM: We like to regard ourselves as the Switzerland of America, southern in culture but northern in politics.

Q: What about the background of your mother?

GRAHAM: My mother was from Yonkers, New York. Her distant relative several generations back was James Lawrence of "Don't-give-up-the-ship" fame during the battle of Lake Erie.

Q: The Chesapeake was attacked by the Shannon.

GRAHAM: That's right.

Q: I lived in Annapolis and one learns these things. This was during the War of 1812.

GRAHAM: Her grandmother was E.D.E.N. Southworth – Elizabeth D. E. Nevitt Southworth. I can't remember what all the initials represented. She was an interesting person. She lived here in Washington and was born just before the War of 1812 into good circumstances, but her father—in the shipping business—lost his money during the war of 1812. She grew up on Capitol Hill and married a man who took her to Wisconsin—in those years, it was a pretty wild place—and then disappeared leaving her with two small children in the late 1830s/early 1840s. She came back to Washington and got a job as a schoolteacher. To add to her family income, she wrote novels. She published 88 novels.

Several of them sold over a million copies. She became a friend of Whittier and several others. Ph.D. theses have been written about her. She was sort of a Danielle Steele of the 19th century. I have 40 of her books. They're all romances of sort: the bride's revenge, the mother-in-law's gambit, and things like that. She is buried in Georgetown Cemetery. Her daughter, Charlotte, married a man name Lawrence from Yonkers then named their daughter Valentine after her birth on St. Valentine's Day. Valentine married a naval officer named James Henniques, a career naval officer who saw service in the First World War and later retired as a captain. My mother is named Charlotte after her grandmother, the novelist's daughter.

Q: Where did she go to school?

GRAHAM: She went to what was then known as "finishing school" in the New York City area. She didn't go to what we could call "college."

Q: How did she meet your father?

GRAHAM: My father was an investment banker. Even though he didn't take a seat on the New York Stock Exchange, he was in New York a lot. He met my mother at a party in the 1920s in New York. I guess they were quite taken with one another and saw each other from time to time. Finally, in 1931, they eloped with my godmother, my mother's best friend, Gladys Freeman. All three went to Philadelphia where my parents were married by a justice of the peace, with Gladys serving as the witness. My grandmother was outraged and made them come back and get married again in a church in New York City—one called the Little Church around the Corner. So, they were married twice in a month's time. My father always gave my mother two anniversary presents, one for the first marriage and one for the second marriage. That practice lasted their entire married life. My mother lived to be almost 88. My father died at age 68. There is a history of heart disease in my family. My great-great-grandfather, who emigrated from Scotland, died at the age of 53, his son at 61, my grandfather at 76, and my father at 68, all from the same illness. Heart disease is much better understood today. But my mother lived about 20 years longer. I made the surprising discovery after her death, looking through an appraisal that was done of the objects in the house shortly after my father's death, that she never changed the location of anything after my father's death 20 years earlier. She was rarely sick. She had a sudden illness when she was almost 88 and died quickly. She smoked her entire adult life, for 71 years.

Q: Coming from Kentucky.

GRAHAM: Well, my father never smoked, though he drank a lot of bourbon. I should mention what was maybe the dark side of Louisville: where today there is Prozac, tranquilizers and other such mood adjusters, in Louisville and many other places alcohol was the chemical people used to help them live with anxiety and depression. As a result, there was a lot of alcoholism—some of it overt, some of it covert. For example, one of my father's best friends, who was a very successful, prominent businessman and a steady pillar of the community, drank 20 bourbon and waters a day. But he never showed it.

Q: Also, in those days, women would be often quiet drinkers at home.

GRAHAM: Right.

Q: It never really came out because they'd be sipping or sometimes maybe a little earlier, they'd be getting doses of laudanum, which is basically opium, equivalent to a tranquilizer.

GRAHAM: My father had a kind of up and down personality. He wasn't bipolar, but very Irish even though he was Scottish as well as Irish. My grandmother's name was Connor. I might mention here that my grandmother's sister was the grandmother of Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense, from Wisconsin. He was always a close family friend. I used to see a lot of him when he was in Congress, when he was Secretary, and subsequently. I haven't seen him much lately although I did have a professional interaction with him very recently. In October 1999 when the Senate voted down the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), I was on television, the Jim Lehrer News Hour, with Brent Scowcroft debating the merits of the CTBT. It was a half hour segment of the hour-long show. Mel saw the show and called me up afterward. He said I really looked like a member of the family on that show. He had signed the letter that the five former secretaries of defense signed questioning the validity and value of the CTBT, but he very much regretted what the Senate did. He arranged for me to meet with Senator John Warner who also regretted the Senate vote. He said that there were 20 Republican senators who would follow his lead as Chairman of the Senate Armed Service Committee. They would have voted for the CTBT but for that letter. Get that letter repudiated and replaced and he would deliver the 20 Senators for CTBT. We continued talking by phone. The next summer, the organization that I led held a roundtable discussion on the CTBT.

Q: You might mention what the organization is.

GRAHAM: It's the Lawyers Alliance for World Security, which is an arms control advocacy organization founded by lawyers 20 years ago in the early 1980s as a part of the nuclear freeze movement. Originally it was called the Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control and was founded in Boston. It became somewhat more centrist, moved to Washington and changed its name. It has a large board of directors comprised of former diplomats, members of Congress, military officers, and lawyers, the latter group making up about 2/3 of the membership. Hence, its name. We have partnered with Stanford University on a number of projects. Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation [CISAC] is probably the premier academic center of arms control and disarmament studies in the country and has been for a long time. It is our working partner. The summer after the Senate rejected the CTBT, the summer of 2000, we held a roundtable discussion at Stanford. The purpose was to develop a positive, supportive record for CTBT. In response to what we thought was a poor record in the Senate and an even worse record developed by Richard Perle's former assistant, Frank Gaffney, in a roundtable that his organization held in February of 2000. The Stanford roundtable would

be a response to those two poor records of CTBT. About 35 people participated. Ambassador Steve Ledogar, the negotiator, was one of them. Ambassador Jim Goodby was another. General Shalikashvili the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was another. Bill Perry, the former Defense Secretary, was still another. A number of prominent nuclear scientists participated and made varying but generally supportive statements about CTBT. We also had papers submitted for the record from people who couldn't or didn't want to come. We had one from President Jimmy Carter. We also had one from Mel Laird. Mel wrote a very constructive and positive paper on CTBT and what the U.S. should do about it. This then evolved into a joint op-ed article in early 2001 with former Defense Secretary Harold Brown, Bill Perry, and Mel Laird. Even recently, I still from time to time have contact with him. He's somebody that I've always admired. If our grandmothers were sisters, I don't know what that makes us, but some kind of cousin, second cousins, I guess. He's from this Republican Wisconsin part of the family.

So, that was the atmosphere in which I grew up. I was raised a Democrat. I went to four Democratic National Conventions, the first one with my father; the other three, thanks to his arrangements for my attendance. I went to the last one in 1968 not many months before my father died. I was outraged at Mayor Richard Daley and the Johnson-Humphrey forces because of their dictatorial actions at the Convention. Also by that time I was very disenchanted with the Johnson Administration's policy on Vietnam. I went with the Kentucky delegation, which was emotionally supportive of McCarthy. Five of our delegates were McCarthy delegates. I thought the party ran that Convention like the Soviet Politburo used to run things. I wrote to Mel afterwards and said, "I am disgusted with the Democrats. I want to work for Nixon." He got me a job in the '68 campaign working for Charlie Rhyne, who was Nixon's law school roommate. He headed an organization called United Citizens for Nixon/Agnew. He was later a pillar of the American Bar and was chairman of World Peace through World Law. A very fine man. John Warner, the senator, was his deputy. I saw Senator Warner a couple of years ago and mentioned that I worked in that organization, an organization he well remembered. As a result of that experience, I switched to the Republican Party and have been a Republican ever since (until 2010—40 years). I identify with the Wisconsin-type Republicans.

Q: You were really too young for it because you weren't seven by the time it was over, but what were you getting from your family about the Depression and how did it impact on your family during the 1930s?

GRAHAM: I didn't learn much from my father about the Depression and the stock market crash. I had the impression that the late '30s were a pretty good time for our family. My father in the crash of '29 did suffer a major financial loss, but he was then only in his late 20s and it didn't seem to faze him greatly. He told me once that when he married my mother in 1931 and when money was worth something, he was \$150,000 in debt with \$500,000 in contingent liabilities, but he paid it all off by 1933. His company was very successful in the '30s, '40s, and '50s. It fell on very hard times in the 1960s. My father had severe financial difficulties in the '60s when he was in his 60s. He believed he was too old to do much about them. The Depression never seemed to affect us that much.

Your question reminds me of one other thing I want to mention about my father having to do with race relations.

Q: Let's talk about race relations and your experiences coming from a relatively affluent, politically aware household in Louisville, Kentucky, which was southern culture.

GRAHAM: There was a black family that worked for us for many years, an older brother, younger brother, older sister, younger sister over many years. They worked for us at home and they worked for my father at his office. We developed a close relationship with them. Then there were other African Americans who worked for my mother at home over the years. I developed very close relationships with several of them. I have wonderful memories of all of them. I think they cared about me and I cared about them. That was the good southern way in those times. I wasn't aware of much racial antagonism in Louisville society in those days. I'm not saying there wasn't any, but I was not aware of any. But that began to change, of course, as we moved into the 1960s.

The one thing I wanted to mention about my father is that he was an unusual person in that he described himself as a Goldwater Democrat and in many ways was conservative, while being very progressive on the race issue. Jackie Robinson broke into organized baseball with Montreal in 1946. Montreal came to play Louisville in the Little World Series in 1946 and was booed by some of the Louisville fans. The more he was booed, the harder he hit, I'm told. My father was quite upset by that display of racism. In 1950 he arranged for Jackie to come to Louisville and receive a City of Louisville award. I have a picture of Jackie and my father sitting side-by-side at the Pendennis Club, an elite businessmen's club. In 1950, making such arrangements was a lot more difficult than it is today. In addition, my father financially supported the campaign of a man named Reverend Daniel Hughlett, pastor of the African Methodist Zion Church, for the school board for three successive campaigns. I used to help distribute the pamphlets for him. They said, "Vote American. Vote Reverend Daniel Hughlett." Of course, that really was voting American in my opinion. Each campaign he got more votes, but he never won. The incident with Jackie Robinson—I don't think anything my father ever did made me prouder than that. I was 16 then.

I went to a school called Louisville Male High School. It was an all-boys public school founded around 1810. It was academically very good for a public school. In the late 1940s/early 1950s the issue of making it coeducational resulted in a tremendous political battle, one of the roughest of that period. Friendships broke up over it and so forth. Eventually, the coeducation forces, who regarded the all-male character of the school as something out of the Dark Ages, won. The establishment opposed the change so vigorously because they feared their revered institution would just becoming another district school—which is precisely what happened. But, compared to that, racial integration of the schools was no problem. The Supreme Court ruling was in 1954. Full integration was achieved citywide by 1956. Louisville from time to time had racial problems thereafter. Martin Luther King came to Louisville in 1966 or 1967 to integrate lunch counters. That caused a stir for a while. But Kentucky was always southern in culture but not particularly hardline on the race issue.

Q: Let's look at the grammar and maybe junior high period. Were there any particular subjects or teachers that inspired you or you looked upon with some nostalgia?

GRAHAM: Yes. A letter about me from my Ninth grade teacher to my father hangs on the wall right over there. Mary Hodges Cox was her name. She taught Ninth grade English and had a very great impact on my life. In Seventh and Eighth grades, I wasn't very proud of myself. I just didn't have the moral standard . . . I would cut corners any way I could to get through class, borrow another student's notebook or whatever. I didn't get good grades. She turned me around. Not only did my grades become a lot better but, more importantly, I set out to make it on my own. She had a very significant impact on me.

Q: At home, were events discussed around the dinner table? By the way, did you have brothers or sisters?

GRAHAM: No, I was an only child.

Q: Did you find yourself in adult company as an only child?

GRAHAM: Yes and no. My father loved to argue about politics. Toward the end of high school and through college, I thought of myself as a great liberal and thought my father a far right-winger, knowing nothing, truly conservative. He would pose as such to add spice to our debates around the dining room table. My father and I would have political arguments all the time at dinner. My mother would be horrified. She didn't like politics. She was a very entertaining, interesting, wonderful person—a real character. But politics wasn't something that she related to. She used to say she had met a lot of politicians through my father and thought most of them were crooks. She always voted Republican, I think partly to cancel out my father's vote. She liked John Sherman Cooper, a very distinguished Kentucky senator who was a family friend. Thruston Morton, also a highly distinguished senator, was another family friend. She liked both of them a lot, as did my father. But she didn't like all of his Democratic friends. She thought they were sort of riff raff. My father and I used to vigorously discuss politics at dinner. One time—I was probably home for the summer after my sophomore year in college—my father and I got into a huge argument about Joe McCarthy. We had invited a friend of mine, a freshman at Princeton, for dinner. That didn't prevent my father and me from getting into it on Joe McCarthy. My mother was embarrassed and said to this boy, Ed Grider, "Eddie, I'm sorry about this." He said, "Oh, Mrs. Graham, that's okay, but do you mind if I get in it?"

Q: How about reading? Were you much of a reader?

GRAHAM: I used to read some. I have read much more in the last 30 years than I did then. But I did do some reading in high school, a lot more in college. I became very interested in history and read a lot of history in college. Most of my major courses were history courses, although I was in the Woodrow Wilson School, a public policy school within Princeton that was open to graduate students as well as juniors and seniors

completing their major field of study there. In those days, the Woodrow Wilson School had an international part and a domestic part. I was enrolled in the international part, interested, as I was, in diplomacy and history. I wrote my thesis in the Psychology Department. Students could choose to take a course or complete their thesis in any department. I wrote my thesis on American attitudes towards Soviet power. It was a survey of editorials in the Wall Street Journal for conservative policies, the Nation for liberal policies, and the Gallop Poll for the public view over the 10-year period, 1937 - 1947, set against the U.S.-Soviet politics of that era. My objective was to show how conservative, liberal and public attitudes toward the Soviet Union changed in response to events. That was my thesis. I was drawn to foreign policy, diplomacy, and history. I thought about going into the State Department when I was at Princeton, but the main reason I did not was McCarthy's attacks on the State Department. I was convinced that, from an institutional point of view, it wasn't a good place to be. I admired the way Allen Dulles stood up for the CIA against McCarthy, so I did interview with the CIA as a senior. The CIA in those days was kind of an Ivy League elitist organization.

Q: I went to Williams and graduated in 1950 and we were inundated by CIA types recruiting. A good number of my class ended up there.

GRAHAM: I nearly did. I was interviewed by them at Princeton encouraged by the dean, Dean Godolphin. In those years, the Dean was very pro-CIA and encouraged students to apply. I was persuaded by my parents that I should go to law school, but I wasn't eager to go. Nonetheless, they persuaded me to apply to Harvard and I was accepted. But I also arranged through Princeton to spend a year in Paris after graduation. I went to the Institute of Political Science in Paris, known colloquially as "Sciences".

Q: Let's go back. In what sort of activities were you involved in high school? Did you have any summer jobs?

GRAHAM: As an only child, I was very shy during seventh, eighth, and ninth grades. In those days, you went to grade school 1-6, junior high 7-9, senior high 10-12. In junior high, I had neighborhood friends, but I wasn't particularly outgoing and didn't have much self-confidence. When I went to high school, friends of mine helped me join a high school fraternity called the Atheneum Literary Association. It sounds like a book club, but it was really a fraternity that was quite significant in Louisville in those years. We had records of meetings going back to its founding in 1862. Many of Louisville's most notable men in those years went to Louisville Male High School and were in the Atheneum.

I wasn't asked to join at the beginning of tenth grade, which was the normal time, but rather, in the spring of the tenth grade year. The class for the fraternity usually was pledged in the fall, but a couple of friends were successful in having me join in the spring. I went out for the football team in the spring, much to my mother's dismay. The combination of those two developments sort of gave me more self-confidence and I ended up becoming President of the Atheneum in my senior year. That was an important activity. I played on the football team for two and a half years. I was on the track team for

two and a half years. And the tennis team for two and a half years. I loved tennis—by far my favorite sport. I spent the summers working for my father, which wasn't much work, and playing in tennis tournaments. I still play a lot of tennis. I still sometimes even play in tournaments.

And my grades were good enough to be accepted by both Princeton and Yale.

Q: You mentioned that your father was pushing you towards Princeton but you applied to Yale. What happened?

GRAHAM: I applied to Princeton, Yale, Dartmouth, and the University of Virginia. Many local boys went to the University of Virginia, which is why I applied there. I applied to Dartmouth because my mother told me she had a really good time there at a carnival. I applied to Yale because my best friends were planning to go to Yale, the same ones that got me into the high school fraternity. I applied to Princeton because of my father. I was accepted at all four and went to Princeton because of my father. It was a tough decision for me. I really wanted to go to Yale. Looking back, I think I made the right decision.

Q: You were at Princeton from when to when?

GRAHAM: 1951-'55.

Q: Talk about how you saw the life there, the studies there, during that period.

GRAHAM: Not being from prep school... I should also mention that I applied to Andover in high school, where my father went, a couple of times. I was accepted both times but I really was having such a wonderful time at Male High School that I didn't want to go. So, I made a pact with my father that I wouldn't have to go as long as my grades stayed up. But, then, actually going to Princeton, not being a prep school boy, I wasn't in the mainstream. I had friends but they tended to be friends from high school or from the Midwest region. Particularly during the first two years I was there, I was a bit out of the mainstream. I was on the track team for three years and made friends that way. I tried to make the tennis team, but I couldn't. Princeton was very strong in tennis in those years. But I did have a good time. I ran the high hurdles. I came to like Princeton more and more. It was a very rewarding experience.

Q: What about the eating clubs?

GRAHAM: They were a traumatic experience for me in that, when I was at Princeton, everybody had to join an eating club. There were no upper class eating facilities. Now it's perhaps a third of each class that joins. There was a very strict social hierarchy of clubs. To give you an example, Ivy Club was number one of the 17 eating clubs. It worked this way: you're interviewed in your dormitory room over a period of several weeks – it is called bicker – by various clubs and they decide who they're going to take. Then you go over to Prospect Street, where the clubs are, on Bicker Night. You walk into a club where you think you might be welcome and they either say "Come join" or they say "Get out."

Remember, 100% have to be accepted. But, of course, by Bicker Night you more or less know which clubs would accept you.

Q: Wasn't this kind of new?

GRAHAM: No. Woodrow Wilson that established the system around 1900. Woodrow Wilson banned fraternities from Princeton when he was President and the eating clubs were created as an alternative. They were just as bad, worse probably, than the fraternities were.

In my year, there were perhaps 25 boys whom no club would take. The dean intervened and said, "Okay. You take this one and you take that one." Humiliating. You enter a club and are told to come in or get out. But, as I said, you have a pretty good idea of which ones are going to be positive. The year before I was there, early in the evening, somebody put a chain across the entrance to the walkway leading to Ivy Club. So, students who thought they were going to be accepted there, came and saw the chain and said, "Well, I guess they've taken everybody they're going to take" and headed off to other clubs. Late in the evening, Ivy only had 8. Normally, each club took "sections" of about 35-40. Ivy only had 8. Somebody went out and found the chain. They sent people out to search and found 3 more boys they were willing to take. So, they ended up with a section of 11. The headline in the "Daily Princetonian" the next day was "Even Jesus Took 12." That's the way Ivy was looked upon. I was accepted in the club called Key and Seal. Of the 17, depending on your point of view, it was ranked 9th or 10th in desirability. But it was fine. I enjoyed it.

Q: What sort of courses were you taking there?

GRAHAM: I went to the Woodrow Wilson School. You had to compete to get in. They only took 50 a year. They had 5 required courses: 2 history, 2 politics, and 1 economics course. The economic course nearly killed me.

Q: Samuelson?

GRAHAM: Yes. It just seemed like ancient Greek.

Q: I never could get the lines to intersect.

GRAHAM: I couldn't understand it at all, but somehow I squeaked through that and I did well in the other four. So, I ended up taking as one of my major courses a course in diplomatic history taught by Professor Gordon Craig, who wrote a very interesting book about diplomacy from 1919 to 1939. I took a course in oriental history, Japan and China from the Middle Ages to the present. I took a course from a professor named Mommsen, whose father was a very famous German history professor, Theodor Mommsen. His course was in medieval history from 300 to 1000. I loved that course. It was wonderful. I'd take it again tomorrow if I could. I took a course in Greek and Roman intellectual history. I took a course in Roman military history. I liked that very much. I remember

writing my exam question on the history of the Roman army. That was one exam I really enjoyed taking. It was fun.

I'll tell one story that is a bit self-critical but that reveals a little of my attitude, which was serious with a free-spirited element to it as well. In the spring of my senior year, I knew I was going to graduate and knew I had pretty good grades, so I was in good shape. I took a course in European literature. There were 15 weeks in the course and 15 books assigned. I had five roommates, wonderful guys, all of them. One of my roommates took the course with me. He was very dedicated and read all 15 books and went to all the lectures. I went to all the lectures and took careful notes, but by the night before the exam, I had only read one of the 15. I had the other 14 books stacked on my desk. I thought I ought at least to read one more. So, I looked at the 14 books and picked up the thinnest one, which was "The Desert of Love" by François Mauriac. The one that I had read at the beginning of the course was "Nana" by Emile Zola. So, I read "Desert of Love" and went to the exam. Princeton exams in those years were usually essay exams. There were two questions on the exam, both required. The first was based on the lectures and the second was "Please compare the characters of Nana in Nana and Marie in The Desert of Love. So, I killed the exam and got a better grade than my roommate, who never forgave me.

Princeton had a way of—I'm trying to articulate the spirit of Princeton in those years—a way of encouraged seriousness on the one hand but a free-spirited attitude toward life on the other hand. Looking back, I really cherish that effect. Princeton didn't affect every student in that way, but for many it did.

Q: While you were there, 1951-1955, one of the things that was going just about the time you arrived was the impact of McCarthyism. How was that perceived at the time?

GRAHAM: It was anathema to the Princeton faculty and virtually all the students. Even though Princeton students in those years tended to be conservative and Republican and pro-Eisenhower in 1952, McCarthy was looked on as a fascist or worse. He was regarded as the worst kind of politician. Of course, Eisenhower didn't like him much either, but it took him a while to come to grips with him. But I don't recall that there was any support for McCarthy at Princeton in those years.

Q: How about the outside world? When you entered, the Korean War was still underway and it died down. What about internationally and the Soviet threat?

GRAHAM: The Korean War wasn't a particularly popular war. Most people didn't want to participate and so many joined the ROTC, as did I. But then, after the Korean War was over, a lot of people left the ROTC, as did I. But then people began to worry that they were going to be drafted and sent to Indochina. Dien Bien Phu was in 1954.

Q: I was in the Air Force as an enlisted man at that time and there was great fear that all of a sudden they wouldn't let us go. This was early 1954. There was real fear that we were going to get bombed.

GRAHAM: Likewise at Princeton. The Soviet Union was regarded as a serious threat, but I don't recall a central focus on the Soviet Union. I did write my thesis on an aspect of our relations with the Soviet Union. But, my recollection is that it wasn't the central focus it became in the 1960s and 1970s.

Q: I would assume you were reading the "New York Times" daily. Were you building up your database?

GRAHAM: Yes, definitely. But I didn't take many courses concerned with contemporary policy. I was more interested in those years in diplomatic history, history of Rome, 19th century English history, oriental history, and so on. However, I did follow domestic politics—Stevenson vs. Eisenhower.

Q: I take it you were for Stevenson?

GRAHAM: Oh, yes. He was a classmate of my father's at Princeton.

Q: He caught people. He connected with so many university people.

GRAHAM: Yes, he did. As I said, he was a classmate of my father's. In 1954 I was writing a junior paper on the rice problem in Southeast Asia and the problems with communists, famine and poverty. Stevenson had just made a trip there. At my father's encouragement, I wrote him a letter telling him what I was doing, mentioning my father and asking for any words of wisdom he might have. He wrote me back a letter in which he made some general comments about the issue. I have it framed at home. I'd been at the 1952 convention. I went with my father and with Wilson Wyatt, who became his campaign manager. His son, Adlai, who was a senator, married one of my high school girl friends, somebody I knew well. So, there was a kind of connection there. I really liked Stevenson a lot.

Q: You mentioned that the CIA had approached you and the State Department hadn't because of McCarthy and that sort of hovered over you like a dark cloud.

GRAHAM: I wouldn't say "dark cloud." I just wasn't tremendously enthusiastic about going to law school. When I graduated, I was accepted at Harvard Law School, but instead I went to the Institute of Political Science in Paris for a year. My mother wept when I left and went off to Paris for a year. I had a wonderful time there. I did not study very hard.

Q: Let's talk about it. What was Paris like? This would be 1955-1956?

GRAHAM: Yes. Well, the Algerian War had recently begun. Mendes-France was very much in the news. He had been premier at the time of Dien Bien Phu. Guy Mollet came in some years later. I lived in a boarding hotel right near the Place de la Sorbonne. There were riots every day at the Sorbonne, to the point where they were regarded as

entertainment, between pro- and anti-Algerian students. One day there was a violent march on the National Assembly of about 10,000 Algerians, which was turned away by the Paris police with only three deaths—an amazing feat given the potential for real violence. I became very accustomed to seeing policemen with submachine guns on street corners. Paris was wonderful. This was before De Gaulle gave it a facelift and Andre Malraux as Minister of Culture had all the buildings cleaned up.

Q: They sandblasted, which made them look a lot better.

GRAHAM: Light years better. I was there before that happened. I didn't study very hard. After about six months, I converted to lecture audits only. I traveled a lot. This sounds almost ridiculous, but I used to go out every night to nightclubs with friends and I'd often end up at a bar in Montparnasse at about 4:00 AM, not consorting with—but talking with—prostitutes, some of whom I found very interesting. I'd come home at 6:00 AM and get up at 1:00 PM. It was a really great time.

Q: That's what you're supposed to do.

GRAHAM: Well, that's what I did. I took a trip to Yugoslavia in the spring and a trip to the Middle East. I became interested in the Middle East at that time. Despite a continuing interest in the Middle East, a relatively smaller part of my professional career involved dealing with the Middle East countries, although from about 1994 on, I was a lot more involved. Nevertheless, I went to Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt in the spring of 1996. Dag Hammarskjöld was on one of his peace missions at that time. I actually saw him in a bar in Cairo in the Semiramis Hotel. The bar was called Joe's Long Bar, a Cairo fixture of many years. That was in April of 1956. The next war was in October of 1956.

Q: This was the Suez War.

GRAHAM: Right. It was tense then, but I figured it was probably okay because Hammarskjöld was out there and there wasn't going to be a war while he was there.

Q: This is a good place to stop. We'll pick this up. You're back from a period of "very serious" study in Paris. We'll pick this up in 1956. I guess you went to law school.

GRAHAM: No, I didn't. I was accepted again at Harvard but my father had a political enemy who was President of the draft board and I was drafted.

Q: We'll pick it up then.

Today is June 21, 2001. Didn't your father have the common courtesy not to make an enemy out of the draft board?

GRAHAM: As I recall, the head of the draft board in those days was either an elected position or one appointed by the mayor. So, whether the person was elected or chosen,

my father didn't have much control over the position. The person who held the position was a political enemy of his before being made the head of the draft board. I think that their antagonism went back some years. It wasn't that he made an enemy of the head of the draft board after he became head. They were enemies before. No one had been drafted from Louisville for 15 months. My year in Paris created a window of vulnerability. If I had gone straight to law school, they couldn't have touched me until after law school and then probably wouldn't have because I would have been 25. But I really wanted to spend that year in Paris and so the gap between school in Paris and law school became a vulnerable period and, lo and behold, during that three month period, even though no one had been drafted for 15 months—this was after the Korean War and before Vietnam—suddenly somehow Louisville had a draft contingent of 20-25 young men and I was among them.

Q: You were in the Army from when to when?

GRAHAM: From September 1956 until June 1958. I got out of the Army three months early. It was a 24-month draft commitment.

Q: What were you doing?

GRAHAM: Of course, I took basic training in Fort Carson, Colorado, which is what I liked best of the 21 months. I really felt like a soldier during basic training. We had a week in the field in bivouac. It was very cold and we got close to a foot of snow even though it was November. We were quite high up in the mountains and had to consume a tremendous amount of food to keep our bodies going. They fed us three meals a day from a mess tent. We had to eat outside as the mess tent was small and it was so cold that we literally had to eat our food in about 60 seconds or it would freeze. It was 8 or 10 below zero. A lot of the soldiers out there got frostbite, but nobody in our company did because our company officer kept us busy all the time. We were moving all the time. A vendor came out once a day to sell chocolate candy bars. We ate about 20 a day, it being that cold. We were compelled to consume them because of the cold weather.

Anyway, we did maneuvers the week we were out there on bivouac. There was one night that I thought was quite a thrill. It was guns flashing and the white snow and the soldiers moving back and forth. Basic training was the best part of the Army. We didn't get much sleep. We were kept busy until about 11:00 PM and awakened at 3:00 AM. Eight weeks of training; I was never in better shape. The Army did that very well.

Q: I've spent my 4 years as an enlisted man. Did you find, having come from the academic cloisters and there usually being a mixing, that all of a sudden you were moving with a real polyglot group of Americans?

GRAHAM: Oh, absolutely. Of the 40 men in my platoon, only one other guy had gone to college. The guy bunking above me had been a short order cook in Cincinnati. The guy across from me had been let out of jail to go into the Army. He had been in a knife fight or something. The guy across the way from my bunk was 23 years old and had never

been outside the city limits of Louisville, Kentucky. One third, maybe one half, were African-American. Definitely. And I think I was a better person for my military time, although I didn't want to do it.

Q: I know. This is one of those forced pleasures. Afterwards, you think it's great. There were times when I was doing KP that I wondered why I was doing it.

GRAHAM: KP was amazing. Hands in hot water 15 hours a day. I think I pulled KP three times during basic and developed tremendous cracks in my hands from the hot water. Then I'd go out the next day on the rifle range (or whatever) and they'd fill with dirt, so I had lines in my hands for about 6 months after Basic. Basic was definitely the highlight.

Q: It's a challenge.

GRAHAM: I was being a real soldier, too. I wasn't just being harassed.

From there I went to Fort Chafee, Arkansas, to study to be a radio operator. That wasn't very interesting, but it was all right. I went from there to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where I was put into an organization called the First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company of the First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Battalion. There were a lot of foreigners in this unit, people who had signed up for five years in the Army to get U.S. citizenship—a lot of Russians and Czechs and people like that. So, my job was to take one of these foreigners who spoke the relevant language, whatever it was, and a loudspeaker up to the frontlines and tell the other side to surrender. Of course, it would be about 2 minutes before mortar fire would be right on us. Also, we dropped leaflets on enemy lines. Interestingly, this unit, which had been around for a long time in the Army, was banned from any future participation in large exercises. Two years previously (in 1955) there had been a very large operation called Operation Sagebrush. It was something like 250,000 troops involved in a mock war down in the swamps of Louisiana at Fort Polk. The First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Company had been on one side. Naturally, they wanted to do their job properly, so the first thing they did was to look up the West Point records of generals on the other side and found a lot of deficiencies. They went ahead and broadcast, "You are being led by idiots. This fellow flunked that course" and so on. That was the first offense they committed. The second one was, they published a leaflet with a picture of the deadly coral snake on it, which their side dropped on the other side. It said, "Beware of the deadly coral snake. Louisiana is filled with them. Bite fatal within 30 seconds. Don't go outside your tent," and basically just immobilized the entire army on the other side. They were sent home after that. They did their job too well. I was in that unit for about six or eight months.

Then I was sent to Third Army Headquarters in Atlanta, Fort McPherson. It was good duty. There, I was in Strategic Intelligence. The Third Army was at peace in Georgia, so we really didn't have much intelligence to do. But, it was good to be in Atlanta. Finally, I spent my last 6 months with the Military District of Washington here at Fort McNair in an intelligence unit.

Although I was supposed to be in the Army for 24 months, I found out that it was possible to be released 3 months early if I could show that my education would be delayed for a year if not released. I was due to get out in September. I had applied for the third time to the Harvard law school and had been accepted the third time and was scheduled to start in September. I couldn't show that I would be delayed in my schooling, so I had to think of something for the summer. I found out that Harvard summer school was having a special summer session on the Middle Eastern languages, classical Arabic, Syrian, Egyptian, Maghreb, Urdu, and others. So, I told the Army that I wanted to be a lawyer for a Middle Eastern oil company and wanted to study Islamic law while I was at Harvard Law School (although they didn't have a course in that) and therefore I had to study Arabic in summer school before I went to law school. If I didn't get out, my education would be delayed for a year because I'd have to get Arabic the next summer. That's what the application said. The Army said, "Alright, we'll let you out 3 months early." Instead of being in the Army, I spent the summer of at Harvard summer school studying classical Arabic. I enjoyed it. There were three and a half hours of class in the morning. Then in the afternoon, we were supposed to listen to tapes all afternoon for 3 or 4 hours, and then do our bookwork at night. It was very intensive. It was supposed to be about a year and a half's worth of Arabic in eight weeks. In my class was a man named Hume Horan, who-

Q: He's a good friend of mine. I have a long interview with Hume. He's one of our preeminent Arabic's. He really absorbs languages.

GRAHAM: Yes. That was his start doing that. I didn't continue. He did. He was in my class. I remember him very well. I guess I saw him once or twice afterwards. Also, when I left the Army, I was able to get a direct commission in intelligence in the Reserves, as I still had three years of Reserve duty to do. So I was able to do that as a lieutenant. I spent two summers, two weeks each, at Fort Breckinridge in Kentucky and the third and last summer of my Reserve commitment I spent at Camp Drum in New York. Those were pleasant experiences. All in all, I wasn't thrilled to be drafted, but I have a very positive recollection of military service and think it was really worthwhile. It changed my life in a positive way.

Q: I agree with you completely. I think it gets complicated, but the fact that we don't call upon our young people to perform military or public service does really deprive them and the country of, one, a great experience for the most part and also of a contribution.

GRAHAM: I completely agree. Nobody wants to fight in a war, not even career military people. But putting that aside, I think military service is a wonderful experience. It definitely broadens you. As you say, it involves you in a cross section of the American people. You have to follow a certain discipline. It's different from anything you've ever experienced. You can take pride in the fact that you did it. Plus, you're serving your country. I regret very much that we don't do that anymore.

Q: Before we leave the military service, you were there during a time when the military

was learning how to live with integration, which had started about 1950. What was your impression of how it was working?

GRAHAM: Of course, I was from Kentucky and Kentucky was maybe not truly southern although culturally southern in many ways. Kentucky didn't secede in the Civil War but, it split right down the middle. Brother fought brother and all of that. So, there was quite a bit of southern culture in my background. I had traditional southern attitudes of a sort relevant to the race question. But—I think that I mentioned in the previous interview that my father referred to himself as a Goldwater Democrat. Nevertheless, as I have mentioned before he did a lot for African-Americans in Louisville of at least a symbolic—maybe more than that—nature. Jackie Robinson, when he played for Montreal in the Louisville World Series in 1946, was booed when he came to Louisville. Then in 1950 my father arranged for him to receive a special award from the city of Louisville. I was never as proud of my father as when he did that. Subsequent to that, he financially supported—with sums from his own pocket—a man named Reverend Daniel Hewlett for the school board, who was pastor of a church called the African Zion Methodist Episcopal Church. So, my father conditioned me somewhat to the view that improving race relations was an obligation even though I was raised in a southern culture. So, I went into the Army with that view. The commander of my basic training platoon, a career Army officer and second lieutenant, was an African American.

I spent a lot of time during my 21 months of military service in racially-mixed situations. I didn't see any (race) problems at all really. There must have been some, but I didn't see any. Off the post, in 1957, probably the situation wasn't very good. But within the Army, in the unit, I was very often in racially mixed situations and I didn't really see any real problems within the Army. As far as I could tell, everybody believed they were comrades in arms, more or less. I thought that integration in the Army went well.

Q: This is still relatively early days. But you get an organization like the Army, where the professional officer corps was probably heavily weighted toward Southerners, which it always has been, yet when given the order, by God, they do it. There are problems – one doesn't discount that – but basically, okay, we're just not going to mess around with this. Do what you're supposed to do.

GRAHAM: To some extent. I think the military resents this a little bit, but to some extent, we, the United States, have used the military as kind of a social laboratory, first for racial integration, then to improve the situation for women. And, the military always does a good job at it because they're ordered to do it. They do a much better job of it on a consistent basis than any other large organization in the country. Whereas I'm sure there are still problems with women in the military, the military were in the vanguard of improving the workplace situation for women. They sometimes feel a little bit like they're being taken advantage of because they are good at being an arena for social change.

Q: They're going through this now with the homosexuals.

GRAHAM: Right. That's a very tough one. They're doing their best.

Q: You were at Harvard Law School from 1958-1961. There was a movie, a TV show, and a book called "The Paper Chase." Is that representative of the first year at Harvard?

GRAHAM: It definitely is. It certainly was an unsettling experience. The method applied by Harvard Law School professors to first year students was the Socratic Method performed in an attempt to humiliate students in front of 120 of their peers. I remember classmates of mine who had spent the previous four years flying fighter bombers off of carriers shaking in their boots when their turn came to be called upon. There is the famous story about Professor Bull Warren, who was no longer there when I attended, but there were many professors who tried to teach as he did. He called on somebody in his class named Jones, let's say, and Jones fumbled the answer, so Professor Warren flips a dime over to him and says, "Mr. Jones, pick that dime up off the floor and get out of my class and go and call your mother and tell her that her dear little son is never going to be a lawyer." Student Jones picks up the dime and starts to walk out of the class. Then, he turns around and says, "You rotten son of a bitch!" Professor Warren says, "Come on back, Mr. Jones, you might make a lawyer after all."

Q: What was the purpose of breaking people down? I can understand with the military, you break people down so they'll move as one and take orders.

GRAHAM: I think the theory was to train people to get used to being attacked verbally in public and learn how to think creatively on their feet under pressure, sometimes under rather antagonistic pressure. I'm not sure that they're wrong about that. Maybe it does make you nervous and maybe it does unsettle you, but it's only really the first year that's bad and it certainly does keep you on your toes. It's a little bit like the Army. You sort of feel afterwards, "Well, if I got through that, I can get through anything." They had some of the smartest, most intelligent people in the legal profession trying to tear you apart in public. If you can get through that, you can handle most situations. But the study of law was such a shift in gears. Edmond Burke said two centuries ago that the study of law sharpens the mind by narrowing it. That's exactly what it does. You're trained to think very narrowly and focus in on fine points. The theory of contracts just went totally over my head. I had a professor named Dawson, who was a very excellent, very fine professor. I remember early in that first year he was talking about the 20 bishops and parole evidence and I had not the slightest idea what he was talking about. What he was talking about was the parole evidence rule, which is that if something is in writing, you can't verbally challenge it because writing, because it's more precise, is considered much more significant in law than what somebody says verbally. So, even if you have 20 bishops come in and say, "He didn't really mean what he says," a court's going to ignore the 20 bishops if the writing is clear.

Q: We're part of the same thinking process, but there are historians who discount oral history because it's not written. It's talk and so they say, "Well, let's go to the documents." The problem is that the documents are often, particularly diplomatic

writing, designed for something and it's not necessarily the absolute truth. But it's part of the thinking.

GRAHAM: Yes. Speaking of history, in many ways, oral history is probably more reliable than written because it's people's undoctored reactions. When you're talking about evidence in a murder trial, then it's a little bit different.

But more on law school. In a desperate attempt to try to understand Civil Procedure better, I audited a professor named Kaplan, who had been there a long time and was a wonderful teacher. This in addition to my original class. Kaplan was a very impressive figure in class and was considered a great authority. You're not graded at all on how you do in class. It's 100% how you do on the final exam. It was a yearlong course. It tends to be a little tense at the end of the year. Here it is—Kaplan's last class of the year and he's talking to the students about the final exam. He says, "Yes, this year, students, I've written one of my best final exams. It's so difficult I don't think I could pass it." I think "Paper Chase" captures what Harvard Law School was like very well. It was so competitive that you'd go to the library sometimes and, if there was a critical case that was really important for a particular course, you'd open that casebook and the relevant page would be ripped out. Your grade average was carried out to 4 decimal points. 67-69 was the median. Nobody got much above 75 and very few people got much below 63 or 64. My grade average would be 68.4216 and somebody else's might be 20 places below me in the class and be 68.4194. And yet after your three years, it was those grades that the law firms looked at in determining who got hired by the best law firms. The competition was cutthroat—it really was. It wasn't so pleasant at the time, but I'm not so sure it wasn't a good experience.

Q: After you finished your first year and had been cut to pieces, what were you pointed towards?

GRAHAM: Well, I said in the previous interview that when I was in college I was very interested in international affairs and wanted to have some kind of career in that field. At that time, the State Department didn't have too good an image on campus because of what McCarthy had done to it, the CIA had a better image because Allen Dulles defended the CIA against McCarthy, so I thought briefly about going into the CIA, which was very much encouraged at Princeton. The CIA was kind of an Ivy League institution for a long time. I thought, well, here I am at law school—my parents had persuaded me to go to law school—I still had these international interests . . . maybe I could have some kind of career in international law. That's what I was pointed towards. I couldn't do much about that interest during the first year—all courses were required. The second year, there were one or two electives and I was able to take a course given by Milton Katz on the law of international transactions—private commercial international law. I had had him for my course in torts the first year. He said, "Gentlemen, when the law is against you, argue the facts. When the facts are against you, argue the law. When both are against you, just pound the table like hell." So, I took this course with him the second year.

The third year, there is a lot of freedom to take different courses. In the fall term, I took Henry Kissinger's course in defense policy and analysis, which was actually a law school course. It had been started by a professor of property law who had served in the Pentagon in World War II on the theory that many lawyers end up having to deal with the Defense Department for clients, contracts, whatever. In college, many people learn what the State Department is. Most students don't learn much about the Defense Department. So, maybe Harvard Law School should have a course about the Defense Department. He started it and turned it over to Henry Kissinger. It was a seminar of 50 students, about 30 of whom were law students. The other 20 were from other places in the university. It was a very interesting course and I really enjoyed it. The seminar proper would meet one day a week for three hours. Kissinger would always have guests like Mendes-France, the former French prime minister; General Gavin, a famous military leader and then President of Arthur D. Little and then Ambassador to France; and Raymond Aron, the French defense intellectual. He would engage them in conversation for about an hour and then the remaining hour or two would be students and Kissinger talking about the subject of that week. Then there would be two classes a week with one of his assistants on the subject of the week.

In the spring, I took a course in public international law given by Louie Sohn, who at the age of 96 is still a board member of my organization and has been at George Washington University. He became professor emeritus last year at George Washington University School of Law at the age of 95. He taught international public law at Harvard Law School from sometime in his 20s until age 65 when he reached mandatory retirement. Then he went to the University of San Francisco and taught there for 10 years until he reached 75, mandatory retirement there. Then he went to the University Of Georgia School Of Law and taught there for 10 years until he reached 85, mandatory retirement. Then he came to George Washington to teach public international law. He embodies international public law in the United States. I took his course in the spring. I was in an organization, a Harvard Law School Club, called Lincoln's Inn Society. It had been a tradition that every Christmas we gave a musical show lampooning the professors. Most of the professors were there for our Christmas dinner my third year. The mainline professors like Archibald Cox, Milton Katz, Kaplan, and so on were always lampooned. But I noticed nobody ever took on Louie Sohn. Public international law was a little bit out of the mainstream. My roommate and I wrote the show that year, wrote all the songs. I decided to write a song about Louie Sohn. I sang it myself in the show, to the tune of "Home on the Range." Arleigh Burke mentioned in the song was the then current Navy Chief of Naval Operations. It went something like this:

"Oh, give me a Sohn where the missiles don't roam
And the fallout is far, far away
Where everyone snubs
Those nuclear subs
And the fallout is far, far away
Sohn, Sohn at the fore
Outlawing nuclear war
Where there's never a quirk

From old Arleigh Burke
And the fallout stays far, far away”

It was a smash hit, the song. Louie was very happy that he finally had been made fun of. The show was about some kind of a trial. Our closing song was to the tune of “It’s a Long Way to Tipperary.” [Certiorari is the writ that you use to get your case to the Supreme Court.]

“It’s a long way to Certiorari
It’s a long way to go
Climbing upward with Certiorari
To the highest court we know
So long, Second Circuit
Farewell, Learned Hand
It’s a long, long way to Certiorari

But we’ll see you on remand”

Learned Hand was a very famous Second Circuit judge and remand is when the Supreme Court sends the case back down for rehearing. We did a chorus line with a kick as we did it, all guys, of course. The women in the audience thought it was the most ridiculous thing they’d ever seen. One of the people in that show was Judge Lawrence Silberman, who has been for many years on the D.C. Circuit, and also was ambassador to Yugoslavia, deputy attorney general, and deputy labor secretary. Larry is a classmate of mine and was in that show and sang that song. That song still is kind of the song of my class, although other classes have taken it over as well. So, sometimes when we have reunions—we just had our 40th reunion—we still sing it. Tony Kennedy (Justice Anthony Kennedy) is also in my class. I just had a little program with him involving some Russian judges. Harvard Law School was a very positive experience.

Q: One of the things I’ve found as a consular officer serving abroad was that I never really had the Code Napoleon and how that was set up, which was much more precise and everything was stated and was much less interpreted. Did you get any exposure to that?

GRAHAM: I didn’t. It was entirely the British common law tradition taught at Harvard Law School and the Socratic tradition of dialogue between the professor and students. Most American law schools used the Socratic Method, but not all. Yale Law School doesn’t. It uses lectures and books and so forth. There must have been a few comparative law courses which taught the continental code. One of our states, Louisiana, does use the code so it is taught in Louisiana law schools. The legal system in Louisiana is different from that of the other 49 states.

Q: It’s a great asset. When I was in Vietnam, they had a team from the University of Louisiana Law School giving assistance. I think they do other places, too. It’s one institution we can tap.

GRAHAM: I might mention the exercise I did recently with Justice Kennedy that illustrates that point in Russia. The non-governmental organization (NGO) I was running (1997-2002) was doing a two-year study of the evolution of constitutionalism in Russia and the degree to which Russia is becoming a law-based state. As part of that program, we had a visit here by 5 judges of the constitutional court in Russia, which is the highest court in Russia. I spoke with Tony (Justice Kennedy – a classmate) and he agreed to have a lunch at the Supreme Court, which he organized. He and Justice O'Connor and Justice Rehnquist attended along with the 5 Russian judges and 2 or 3 from our organization. The Russian legal system as it's evolving, our guests said, is based on "Roman German," a particular variant of the continental code. There was a long discussion among Justice Kennedy, Justice O'Connor, and a couple of the Russian judges on the different approach to precedent in the English common law system that's applicable in most of our states and the continental system. Precedent doesn't have the strength in the continental code countries that it does in common law. The justices even took "precedent" into discussion of the checks and balances and the basis of American democracy. Justice Kennedy was saying that the Congress checks the Executive Branch and the Judiciary checks the Congress and its "precedent" that checks the Judiciary.

Q: In 1961, you were set free. What were you up to?

GRAHAM: I decided to take a clerkship. I had 2 possibilities. One was on the Sixth Circuit, which includes Kentucky for Judge Shackelford Miller. And then I had another opportunity, with Chief Judge Wilbur Miller of the D.C. Circuit. I decided to take the latter position, so I was a law clerk here in Washington for the year 1961/1962 for the Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit.

I might also briefly mention that in the summer of 1960, I went to the Democratic National Convention. This was the second that I went to. 1960 was the Kennedy convention. I had been to the one in 1952. I subsequently went in 1964 and 1968. It was the 1968 convention that convinced me to become a Republican, which I have been ever since.

I want to tell a brief story about Judge Shackelford Miller's brother, Neville Miller, who was mayor of Louisville in the 1930s. It had been the tradition for the American Association, an AAA league, to open its season in either Louisville or Indianapolis. It was also a tradition for the mayor of the relevant city to throw out the first ball. In those days, the mayor didn't sit in the stands and throw the ball out. The mayor went out to the pitcher's mound and threw the first ball across the plate and the batter was supposed to stand there. The ball goes by and the season starts. Happy Chandler was Governor of Kentucky then and he was again many years later. He had a very powerful ego and was a very interesting person. Among other things, he fancied himself a great athlete. He told the mayor that he wanted to throw the first ball instead of the mayor. The mayor couldn't deny the Governor, so he said, "Alright" and gave the honor to the Governor. But the night before the game, somehow Neville Miller, whom I also knew fairly well and one of the funniest people I've ever met, somehow got to the Indianapolis team and gave a little

money to the first batter and said, “Instead of standing there...” Happy Chandler pitched the ball and the batter hit it over the fence. Happy never spoke to Neville Miller again.

Q: What did you do as a law clerk?

GRAHAM: I researched cases for the Chief Judge. I sometimes did first drafts of opinions. I noticed that many of the judges on that court, what they liked to do was only glance over the briefs of the two sides of the case before them and then listen to the oral argument and decide the case more or less on the oral argument and then use the brief of the winner as a basis for their written opinion. It was quite a stellar court. Prettyman, a great judge, had just stepped down as Chief.

Q: The court building is named after him.

GRAHAM: Right. Judge Bazelon, a famous judge who later was chief judge for many years, was on the court, too. Warren Berger was on the court, too. He was later Chief Justice. Berger was one of the best friends of the judge that I worked for, so I saw a lot of him. Edward Bennett Williams argued a case before us. What I found remarkable about that case was that they didn’t ask him a single question although usually the judges, as with the Supreme Court, would pepper the lawyer with questions. He was, in my opinion, along with Clarence Darrow, the greatest American trial lawyer in the 20th century.

Another somewhat significant case we had involved an interpretation of the Compact Clause of the Constitution . . . whether or not Congress, having approved an interstate compact—in this case the New York-New Jersey compact, which set up the New York Port Authority—could revoke it? Emmanuel Celler, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, was a foe of the New York Port Authority. He was a longstanding New York congressman. He wanted to revoke this compact and called on the President of the Port Authority, Austin Tobin, to testify before his committee on the grounds that he wanted to consider revocation of the compact. The two governors, who were Meyner in New Jersey and Rockefeller in New York, ordered Tobin to refuse to testify. Cellers’ committee then cited him for contempt. He was convicted of contempt of court at the district court level and the case came to us. Former governor Thomas Dewey argued for the Port Authority and some beleaguered government lawyer defended the committee’s position. It was a constitutional case, whether or not Congress could revoke its consent, its consent having been given. It became the most famous case we had that year. My recollection is that the court was poised to say, “No, Congress can’t revoke its consent”, but they found some other grounds along the lines that the argument was too broad. It threw the case out on that basis and reversed the district court decision.

The 9 law clerks had a practice of inviting a guest for lunch once a month. At one of our lunches we had Justice Felix Frankfurter as a guest. I remember his saying, “Gentlemen, you shouldn’t be obsessed with achieving a particular position in life because you probably won’t achieve it and if you do, when you get there, having sacrificed everything to get there, you’ll find out it isn’t all that great.”

Q: Which is really true.

GRAHAM: It's very true. So, it was an interesting year.

At the end of that year, just as I was about to leave the clerkship, the chairman of the House Banking Committee, Brent Spence, a close friend of my father's, who was then 87 years old, had announced he was going to retire in January and lost his Committee Counsel and most of his senior staff. Knowing that time was limited, his Counsel was offered a position at the Federal Reserve as Chief Counsel of the Federal Reserve and he took it. Congressman Spence asked me if I would be Counsel of the House Banking Committee at age 28, having had one job, from May until he left January. I agreed to do that and that was my second job. It was very interesting—just for the experience. In October of that year, I was sitting in the Chairman's office, while I was there his secretary called him and said, "President Kennedy is on the telephone." So, he talked to Kennedy, who said that he was going to go to Cincinnati for a speech. The airport was right across from Cincinnati in his district in Kentucky and would he like to come? He said, yes, he would, but, being 87, he asked, "Could I bring my aide with me?" Kennedy said, "Certainly." So, I went with him on the trip on Air Force One with President Kennedy. After we landed at the airport in Cincinnati, it took about 20 minutes to get the reception ready. So, everybody else got off the plane except President Kennedy, the Chairman and me. Kennedy came back from his office on the plane and sat with us for about 20 minutes. I had a chance to talk two-on-one with President Kennedy. That was during his campaign to keep up appearances during the Cuban Missile Crisis. That was the only time I met him. What I remember most about him was that when you said something, he'd look you right in the eye and he gave the appearance of paying the closest attention to what you were saying. He was probably thinking of Cuba. But he created this impression of really listening to people.

Q: That brings me to something. You were at the law school during the Kennedy-Nixon campaign.

GRAHAM: Yes.

Q: That campaign, particularly President Kennedy, aroused an awful lot of enthusiasm among would-be professional people such as lawyers. Did you get involved in the campaign at all?

GRAHAM: I mentioned I went to the convention, but I didn't get involved in the campaign. Many Harvard law professors were. Professor John Kenneth Galbraith was at the university then. He came to a luncheon given by the Lincoln Inn Society and talked to us about the campaign. Archibald Cox was very involved in the campaign. He was a professor at the law school and one of my professors. So, I heard a bit about the campaign from him but, I wasn't involved and didn't know any student who was. My recollection is that students in those years—it was true at Princeton and true at Harvard Law School—tended to be conservative. Eisenhower was very popular at Princeton. In terms of Harvard law students, between Kennedy and Nixon, it was pretty evenly

divided.

Q: On the Banking Committee, did you feel the pressure of the banking community, people running banks coming in and saying, "My god, don't overregulate or do this or that?"

GRAHAM: Very much so. My first day of work as I was about to leave my house, I got my first call from a lobbyist. I hadn't even been to the office for the first day yet. There was a major war going on then between the Savings and Loans and the banks. That continued on into my next job. Banks wanted to throw off some of the shackles of the Glass-Steagall Act of the early '30s and get back into securities trading and things like that. The Savings and Loan industry bitterly opposed such changes. Wright Patman, the number two Democrat on the Committee behind Spence, succeeded to the Chairmanship after my boss retired. He was the avowed champion of the Savings and Loans. There were many tremendous battles in those days on the committee. The major players were the Chairman, Patman, Henry Royce, . . .

Q: Who is a distant cousin of mine?

GRAHAM: Really? He was very prominent, from Milwaukee. Fernand St. Germain from Rhode Island, who many years later was Chairman of that Committee, also played a key role. Those were the major players in this ongoing battle. I remember one senator telling Brent Spence at one of his many retirement celebrations, "Brent, the greatest service you have rendered your country is for 15 years keeping Wright Patman out of that chair." It was fairly intense.

Q: ...the infamous proviso that Savings and Loan would come under- (end of tape) -the insurance plan that allowed the Savings and Loan offices to go wild and we came into a horrible situation.

GRAHAM: Right, about 15 years later. I don't remember that, but I do remember that the Savings and Loans had tremendous political power and the banks were really on the defensive. My boss sided very much with the banks. Patman sided totally with the Savings and Loans. Most Democrats were on the defensive. There was a lot of lobbying.

Q: It probably came later when this protection was given to the Savings and Loan which caused maybe a trillion dollars to be wasted during the Reagan years. It was a horrible scandal which sort of passed by.

GRAHAM: It was one of the worst scandals in U.S. history. It never really has received the attention that it deserves.

One other incident I might mention. The big piece of legislation that year was the extension of the Export Control Act—a major effort by the Kennedy administration to extend that law. It was feared that the vote might be close in the House. It passed out of the Banking Committee. Chairman Spence was in the hospital for some kind of brief

flare-up and his vote was considered important, so we brought him back from the hospital to the floor of the House for the vote. I sat next to him on the floor during the vote. He sat one seat in from the aisle and I sat on the aisle. The clerk was calling the role. I remember this so well. It colored my opinion of Congress forever after. A congressman, a Democrat, rushes up to me and says, "What are we voting on?" This was the most important piece of legislation of the year. Just then the clerk calls his name and he turns around and says "Aye" and leaves.

Q: Here you had had a good look at a circuit higher court and then you had had a good look at Congress in action. I take it that your congressional career terminated.

GRAHAM: In January 1963 when Patman assumed the chair, I left that position. I was hired by the Comptroller of the Currency, Jim Saxon, who was part of the ongoing war between the banks and Savings and Loans. He was the champion of the national banks. As the Comptroller of the Currency, that's whom he regulated. He was totally committed to expanding their powers. Because he thought I could help him with the committee, he hired me as his legislative assistant. I was there from January 1963 until March 1964.

Q: By any chance, was this battle that you were part of the ongoing battle between the national bank and the local banks?

GRAHAM: It was a bit of that, yes. The big banks were often national banks and the Comptroller was on their side and the Federal Reserve was on their side as were elements of the Congress, and under Congressman Spence the chairman of the House Banking Committee. The Savings and Loans were more small and local, less-East-and-West-Coast establishment.

Q: What does a comptroller of the U.S. currency do?

GRAHAM: He is the regulator of national banks. All of the regulations governing national banks are developed by the Comptroller of the Currency, who is a Treasury Department official. There are three regulators of banks. There is the Comptroller of the Currency who regulates national banks, approves mergers, new banks, and things like that. The Federal Deposit Insurance Company regulates banks that aren't national banks that have insured deposits as virtually all do. The Federal Reserve regulates both on different questions. I don't remember exactly what the breakdown is. But a bank can either have a state charter or a national charter. The National Banking Act was passed during the Civil War. It, among other things, created the greenback, the dollar bill. Before that, currency had always been issued by state banks. The greenback was the first national currency. The National Banking Act created a system of national, federally chartered banks. So, ever since then, the Comptroller of the Currency regulated them, developed the regulations, approved new banks, approved mergers, and so forth for national banks with federal charters.

I remember an incident unrelated to the ongoing bank-vs-Savings-and-Loan war. When I worked for the Comptroller, he had before him an application for a new bank in Texas.

This was in 1964 after the Kennedy assassination. While considering this application, a “judge” who said he had a relationship with the White House asked to see him. He agreed to see this “judge.” It turned out the “judge” was one of the trustees of the Lyndon B. Johnson Blind Trust. He wanted the Comptroller to know that it wouldn’t be a good thing for the Lyndon B. Johnson Blind Trust if this bank was chartered because the trust owned a couple of banks in that area and that he shouldn’t charter that bank. That appeal impressed me as the kind of thing that shouldn’t go on.

Q: A blind trust being that whoever has the blind trust has completely washed his hands of it, but this was sort of on the side using the power of the President to influence.

GRAHAM: Also, the President is not supposed to influence other government officials to favor him financially and that’s what was being done. The Comptroller, Jim Saxon, was nearly fired as part of the battle with the Savings and Loans. I can’t remember exactly what the issue was, but there was a major issue before the Committee. He testified before the Committee. By this time, his champion... I’m sure Henry Royce was for the banks on this but, I don’t remember his being a significant participant in this battle. Ferdinand St. Germain became Saxon’s ally and helped him through this situation in which Patman, the Chairman, had developed a series of hearings to try to get him fired because he was trying to expand the powers of the national banks and was chartering new banks and so forth—all things that the Savings and Loans didn’t like. By putting pressure on Saxon in the hearings, they tried to persuade Douglas Dillon, Treasury Secretary, to fire Saxon. But, I remember Dillon came to his office one day and said, “I’m behind you all the way. Just hang in there and don’t lose your confidence.” In the end, it would have to be said that the Savings and Loans won that war and the banks were not allowed to expand significantly their powers. Many, many years later they were but, only after the Savings and Loan scandal.

Q: The banks are now merging. These things were forbidden before.

GRAHAM: Right. Exactly. There was a federal statute against a bank in one state, even a national bank, from having branches in another state.

Q: I started my account here in the State Department with American Security, which was then picked up by First National, a national bank, but they had a branch in Virginia. I couldn’t really deposit a check in Virginia even though I lived in Virginia.

GRAHAM: Riggs National Bank could have hardly any branches. It was confined to the District. That was a huge issue in the 1960s.

Q: Other than judges from Texas, did you have people coming at you all the time?

GRAHAM: When I was on the Committee, I did, yes. Not as much in the Treasury.

Q: What were you doing?

GRAHAM: I was helping Jim Saxon with many legislative problems with the Committee and trying to help him survive the attack by Patman and the Savings and Loans. I occasionally did a few other things. His merger decisions—he was very pro-merger as well because he wanted to see the national banks become larger and more influential—were a little bit like court decisions. He would write an explanation of why the merger was a good thing. I wrote 1 or 2 of those. But primarily I did the legislative work.

Q: Did this thing fall Republican-Democrat?

GRAHAM: A little bit. The Savings and Loans were almost entirely a Democratic-Party-backed business entity. I don't remember much Republican support for the Savings and Loans. The Democratic Party was split and the Republicans were—to the extent they took sides—more on the banking side. I don't remember any of them significantly supporting Savings and Loans.

Q: You left there in 1964. This is a good place to stop. Whither?

GRAHAM: I left the government in March of 1964 and with Jerry Stern, a friend from law school, who was then in the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department, I took a 6-month trip around the world with the money I'd saved and joined a law firm in Louisville, Kentucky, in September 1964.

Q: We'll pick it up then.

Today is August 17, 2001. Your trip.

GRAHAM: I have always been interested in foreign travel and international affairs and this trip was something that I very much looked forward to. We went west from California to Japan and down to Hong Kong and Southeast Asia, India, the Middle East, Europe, and the Soviet Union.

I'm trying to recall the strongest impressions that I had. I spent almost 3 weeks in India. I happened to arrive in Delhi the day that Nehru died. I went to his funeral, if that's what you would call it. It was a public cremation. His ashes were then separated and sent to many different parts of India. I subsequently took a train up in the direction of Kashmir and was informed that in my car at the back was an urn containing part of Nehru's ashes. I eventually found my way up to Kashmir, which then was peaceful. It's not peaceful now. It hasn't been for a long time. I found India at one and the same time fascinating and stimulating but also depressing for the obvious reasons. In Calcutta, there were so many people living in the streets that they would sleep 4 abreast in front of my hotel and you'd have to jump over a line of 4 sleeping people at the front door of the hotel, or step over them somehow. After 3 weeks there, I found that I was gradually losing what sympathy I had for my fellow human being and was becoming more and more personally and physically defensive with all those around me. That's not a good effect, but it does happen.

Then I went on to Iran from India. This was 15 years before the revolution. It wasn't entirely a happy place because of the Shah's policies, but it seemed like paradise after India. It was beautiful. Everything seemed to work properly. You'd walk down the street and see lots and lots of beautiful women with their faces not covered up. I was very favorably impressed with Iran and the Iranian people.

Then I moved on to the Middle East. That's an area that has always fascinated me and continues to today. I traveled from Teheran to Beirut. That was before its destruction. I stayed at the St. George Hotel on the Mediterranean. It was so beautiful—the Switzerland of the Middle East. I took a car over to Baalbek in Syria, was stopped once by armed men jumping out from behind a bush, but they didn't do anything except look at us. That was the only trace of violence that I encountered. Over to Damascus and then down to Amman. I stopped at Jerash, the famous Roman ruin. And then to Jerusalem. I went to Arab Jerusalem. This was before the '67 war, so Jerusalem was divided. To get from Arab Jerusalem to Jewish Jerusalem you had to walk through the Mandelbaum Gate, which I did. All the famous religious sites were in Arab Jerusalem, so one would tour on the Arab side and then go into Israel. I went on down to Tel Aviv and Haifa... I thought the Middle East at that time compared to recent times was reasonably peaceful. The arrangements that existed seemed to function reasonably well.

From there to southern Europe and the Soviet Union. This was my first trip to the Soviet Union. Now I've probably been to Moscow 70 times, but this was my first visit. While I tended to be more focused on cultural things, I did note that nobody followed me. I had a camera with me all the time and took lots of pictures including ships in the harbor at Leningrad. One event was notable for giving a sense of the dictatorship. I had acquired a beautiful hunting knife in Kashmir. When I was on the train going into the Soviet Union, the border guards came on, searched our bags, found this knife, and said, "You can't bring that into the Soviet Union. It's a weapon. But we'll give it to you when you come out. When are you leaving?" I explained I was going to take the train from Leningrad to Helsinki on a certain date. I thought, "That's the end of that knife." When I left Leningrad on the train, we came to the border with Finland and the border guard there jumped on the train and came to my compartment and handed me the knife. So, perhaps in that sense, the dictatorship worked.

I will share another incident that deeply impressed me. It is still very much in my mind. When I boarded the train at Leningrad to leave for Helsinki, I sat down in a compartment with a young Swedish man. We were talking. Then there came onto the train a touring group from Hungary. The Hungarian language and the Finnish language are very similar, so they can talk to one another. This was a group from Communist Hungary that was on a vacation trip. They had been to Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Soviet Union, and now they were going to Finland. They had a Party leader that headed the group of about 20 people and also the Hungarian equivalent of the KGB operative with them, both women. Those two women ended up in our compartment. The Party leader had a young daughter of about 17 or 18 who also sat with us. They were semi-friendly but also rather sarcastic. The KGB officer from Hungary kept referring to me as "Rockefeller" since I was an

American. We finally reached Helsinki. The first act of my Swedish companion and myself was to go immediately into the railway cafeteria and have a “good western meal.” The Hungarians went off to the hotel. But the next day before taking the overnight boat to Stockholm, we were touring around Helsinki and ran into the Hungarians again while standing in the main square conversing, I was taken aside by the woman party leader and the woman KGB officer. The 18-year old daughter was a few steps behind. The Party official said to me, “Take her. Please, take my daughter to the West.” I just thought that was unbelievable. Here I was—a person that she had met one time on a train. She was not only willing—she wanted to turn her daughter over to me just to get her out of Hungary. And she was a Party official and was saying this in front of the KGB official, who was apparently supportive. I declined because I had no idea what I would do with a very attractive 18-year old Hungarian woman who spoke no English. If I had had my wits about me, I could have just taken her to the American embassy. That’s probably what I should have done.

Q: You’re going to be dealing with the Soviet Union later. Did you get the feeling that despite its military prowess, it really wasn’t a very efficient system?

GRAHAM: I certainly did. I saw it those days as a tourist. But aside from the knife incident, . . . If you wanted to have dinner in a restaurant, you had to set aside 3 hours. The service was not just slow but *incredibly* slow. They didn’t care if you ever got your food. It was a place where—even I could see it as a tourist—the elite had access to Western goods and Western newspapers and so forth and they had special shops, but most people didn’t have access to them. Most people didn’t have access to anything. The ballet tickets were mostly taken up by Party officials and tourists. There weren’t many movie theaters. There was one television station. No wonder people found solace in vodka. What else was there to do? I didn’t think it was a very efficient place. I thought it was a very gloomy place. Russians tended to have gloomy looks on their face most of the time. But, to me, the incident with the Hungarians was astonishing.

Q: Looking back on this, all of us really somehow weren’t seeing things... You saw the Soviet Union as a great threat, not just a military threat, which it was, but also as maybe the wave of the future. And yet everybody who saw the thing could the bloody thing doesn’t work. Unless they’re going to take it over by military means or maybe by subversion, which gets very problematic, it just didn’t work. Probably the thing to do was what happened, just sit around and wait for it to collapse. But we didn’t see it that way.

GRAHAM: The Soviets were vastly overrated as a threat, certainly in the cultural area, even in the military area. They never were 10 feet tall. At best they were 2 feet tall. We highly overreacted to the threat—understandably, given the rhetoric and lack of information. But still, it’s true, we spent \$5.8 trillion through 1996, in 1996 dollars, on our nuclear weapons program and more since. We certainly didn’t need to do that.

Let me ask you a question. Could I have taken that young Hungarian woman to the U.S. embassy? Would they have accepted her if I had done that?

Q: Probably yes. If you had gotten her out of Finland, which I imagine you could have, and if you had escorted her there, but she would basically be on her own.

GRAHAM: If I could have taken her to Sweden.

Q: If you had gotten her into Sweden. I was a consular officer in Belgrade around that time. I would have sighed and thought, "Oh, God." I couldn't have done much in Yugoslavia, maybe a little, but once she's in Sweden, I think, yes.

GRAHAM: The embassy would have taken her?

Q: The embassy would have not taken her. The embassy would have directed her and made arrangements for her to go to the equivalent of a refugee place. I'm not sure what the Swedes were doing at that time. It's conceivable they wouldn't. But they might have passed her on.

GRAHAM: I looked at it from what I knew I could do and I didn't imagine what I could have done.

Q: You have to understand the system. I'm not sure how the Swedes would have reacted.

GRAHAM: And she had a Hungarian passport, but I don't know what visas would be required for where.

Q: If she could go for political asylum-

GRAHAM: She certainly could have gotten out of Finland. Then upon arrival in Sweden, she could say, "I'm seeking political asylum." Then the Swedes would have had to do something.

Q: But I'm not sure what. But normally, they would have done something. It's conceivable that they wouldn't.

Back to the '64... How long were you in private law practice?

GRAHAM: I was in private law practice in Louisville, Kentucky from September '64 until January 1966. Then I moved to New York City and joined a firm there, Shearman and Sterling of New York City, a big international firm. It was the largest law firm in New York at the time and among their clients were very prominent financial institutions. Their principal client was and still is Citibank and had been since like 1880.

Q: So there was a certain amount of confidence between the two.

GRAHAM: Yes. In fact, their Uptown office was in the Citibank building and there was a very close relationship. But also the firm represented a number of aircraft manufacturers in the United States like Boeing and a number of foreign airlines that were

buying Boeing aircraft. I did a deal for Olympic Airways of Greece. We represented both sides, Boeing, Olympic Airways, and we represented the bank that was financing the deal, Citibank. That's not what you're supposed to do, but it was not uncommon in that line of work in those years. I was there 3 years, January 1966 until August 1969. I was married to my first wife in August of 1968. My father became very ill at that time and subsequently died about half a year later from heart disease. We cut short our honeymoon in Portugal and returned to the U.S. so as to not be too far away from him in the hospital in Kentucky. We had some time available—he seemed to get better for a while—so we went to the Chicago Democratic Convention. I had been raised a Democrat, had been to 3 previous Democratic National Conventions, and I sort of attached myself to the Kentucky delegation there. Several friends of mine were delegates. I think we had something like 20 delegates. Five of them were pledged to Eugene McCarthy. Three of those 5 were good friends of mine. I was so horrified by the way the Democratic Party establishment treated McCarthy and the McCarthy delegates.

Q: This was 1968?

GRAHAM: This was the famous 1968 convention. I saw the violence, but what impressed me much more was my perception that the convention was run like the Soviet Politburo. Contrary to established practices, the McCarthy forces were not allowed to make their case on the floor of the convention, delegates had trouble getting into the convention hall, and so forth. I was so angry about all that and also, by this time (after the Tet Offensive and after reading a long "New Yorker" article in 1967 about the war and "free fire" zones), I was very much against the Vietnam War. Once I read that a free fire zone was a place where you could say that anything that moved was an enemy, I knew this war was not going to be won—that this wasn't the way wars are won. So, the combination of those events led me after the convention to write to my cousin, Melvin Laird, who as I said later became Nixon's Defense Secretary but who was in the Congress at the time representing Wisconsin and was a rather prominent Republican congressman. I said I wanted to work for Nixon. He found a job for me as the special assistant here in Washington to Charlie Rhyne, who had been Nixon's roommate in law school at Duke and was a very important international lawyer. He headed up an organization called United Citizens for Nixon-Agnew. I spent the last 8 weeks of the campaign working for him in his office in Washington. His deputy was John Warner, the Senator. Lucy Winchester was also on the staff. She became Mrs. Nixon's social secretary. And Lamar Alexander, the former governor of Tennessee, was also on his staff. The objective of this organization was to appeal to moderates, independents, and Democrats on behalf of the Republican ticket. I thought that Charlie Rhyne did a wonderful job, but after the campaign was over, there was some kind of a coup d'état up in New York organized by John Mitchell, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman, and they completely froze Charlie Rhyne out. He had expected all along to be attorney general. Not only was he not selected as attorney general but, he also was not given any position at all. The whole history of our country might have been different if he had been attorney general because he never would have tolerated that Watergate stuff.

Q: You are a lawyer and the lawyer is "a lawyer eats what he kills." In others words, you

have to generate business. How can a lawyer take solid time off? It happens all the time, but I'm curious about both the thinking and the financing.

GRAHAM: Shearman and Sterling was and is a very large law firm. It's not uncommon at all for even senior partners to leave the law firm for a year or two and work in government and then come back. Bob Carswell, a senior partner, was the Deputy Treasury Secretary, for instance. My work for the campaign was an 8-week leave of absence. I wasn't paid during that period. The firm is so large and clients were so institutionalized that they could operate that way.

Q: So you went back to them?

GRAHAM: I went back to them after the campaign, but the campaign ended in November and I left the firm in the spring. My father died in March and I went home to work on the estate and I pretty much left the firm then. But, I guess, I was technically on their rolls until August. I took a position at the Defense Department in August.

Q: Did you get a feel for the operation within the Nixon administration towards the end that there were powers within powers and this Ehrlichman-Mitchell-Haldeman coup? Was that apparent?

GRAHAM: It wasn't apparent immediately. I went to Defense, where Mel Laird was Secretary. I became friendly with his best friend from Wisconsin, Robert Froehlke, who initially was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and then later was Secretary of the Army. After leaving government, he was Chairman of Equitable Life Insurance for many years. He had always been an insurance man. Both he and Mel were wonderful guys. They are Gerry Ford-type Republicans. They don't have any of the bitter side that people on the right side of the Republican Party sometimes have and Nixon himself had. I gradually learned about it. I had a friend, Larry Silberman, who was the solicitor for the Labor Department and then was Deputy Labor Secretary during Nixon's first term. I had lunch with him in December of 1972 and he said he didn't think he would be continuing in the Nixon administration, that Charles Colson had called him and asked him if he wanted to continue and he had told him the only job he would take would be ambassador to Israel. But more seriously, he said that, when he was still either solicitor, the Justice Department was pursuing a criminal action against the Teamsters Union and there was a criminal case that was undergoing trial in a federal court in Pennsylvania. He was called by Colson that summer and was told that he should call the judge in his chambers and tell him that the Nixon administration did not want a conviction. They were trying to get the Teamsters to support them. He refused to do that. That put down a black mark against him. He said, "You know, the Nixon White House tends to like to hire young men who don't know enough to have a lot of judgment and I think they're going to get in a lot of trouble." That's what he said in December of 1972.

Then John Culver, a good law-school friend of mine, who had been Teddy Kennedy's roommate in college, a great football player and the only guy from Harvard at that time ever drafted by the NFL (although he didn't go), was in the House for several terms. In

1974 he was elected to the Senate. He and I were talking in 1973 several months after the 1972 Presidential election, by which time Mel Laird had left his position as Secretary of Defense. We were having lunch and he said, "Your cousin didn't really like Nixon all that much." I said, "Yeah, I got that impression." He said, "I saw him in '68 in an airport before the conventions. I said, 'Mel, it looks like you guys are going to nominate Nixon this time.' He said, 'We'd never nominate that son of a bitch.'" But then later, I saw him at a bar in December, just last month, a few weeks before he left as Defense Secretary, I sat down next to him and we had a couple of drinks and I said, 'Mel, you're leaving as Defense Secretary.' He said, 'Yes, I am.' I said, 'Mel, you ought to stay. I'm a Democrat, but you've done a great job there. You've been a very moderating influence on this administration.' He said, 'I can't, John. I couldn't stand that fucking Christmas bombing.'"

One other incident I might recount that was told to me by Paul Warnke some years later. Warnke was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the latter years of the Johnson administration. When Mel came in as Defense Secretary, he asked Paul to stay on for a while and he took him on his first trip to Vietnam. Paul told me that Mel talked to a number of soldiers over there, including a few boys from Wisconsin. He said you could just see the tears coming down his cheeks. On the way home, he wrote a long statement. "I don't know what was in that statement," said Paul. But he wrote a long statement and I suspect it was along the lines of, "This war is not winnable. We need to get out." He cabled it from Honolulu where the plane stopped for refueling before going to Washington and indicated he wanted to make this statement when he arrived. When the plane landed at Andrews, two or three fellows from the White House got on the plane and they had an argument with Mel for about 2 hours and he didn't get off the plane. Finally, he got off and issued no statement at all. Those kinds of events did, over time, give one an impression of the Nixon administration.

Q: You say you came to the Pentagon when?

GRAHAM: In August of 1969.

Q: What were you doing?

GRAHAM: I worked in the Office of the General Counsel of the Air Force as an attorney advisor for John Stedman, who was a holdover as General Counsel for a couple of years from the Johnson administration.

Q: What aspects did you find yourself dealing with?

GRAHAM: I worked on international negotiations involving some of the Air Force's facilities in other countries. In particular, there was a negotiation involving the air defense net in Canada. I did a lot of work on that.

Q: Is that North American Aerospace Defense Command NORAD?

GRAHAM: It's operated by NORAD, yes. I made one trip up to Ottawa and spent a lot of time working on that subject.

Q: Did we have any differences of opinions with the Canadians over this thing?

GRAHAM: I don't think so. It was more a financing discussion. What's the proper contribution of Canada financially? It was not a political issue.

Q: How long were you with the Department of Defense?

GRAHAM: A little over a year. I joined the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) on September 20, 1970.

Q: ACDA was out of the State Department?

GRAHAM: It was located in the State Department, an independent agency like the Agency for International Development (AID).

Q: What brought about this change?

GRAHAM: I had long been interested in international affairs and I heard from a couple of sources that there was an interesting agency located in the State Department that was independent and was working on interesting questions such as negotiating nuclear arms limitation agreements with the Soviet Union. Subsequently, I heard they were looking for an additional lawyer who had Hill experience for their General Counsel's Office. I thought, "This sounds pretty good." I made an appointment with their General Counsel and went over and spoke with him and said, "I'd be interested in working here." He said, "Well, based on your résumé we would be interested in your working here." He added, "We are only a six-man office, but two have just left. One has gone to be the special assistant to the director. We'll certainly consider you. But the job that we would have in mind would be assistant General Counsel for congressional relations." For many years, ACDA combined the legislative and the legal functions in one office. They were a small agency, so the congressional work was done by the General Counsel's Office; there was an assistant General Counsel for congressional relations who was the chief legislative liaison officer for the agency. He said, "To qualify for this job, you're going to have to show some support on the Hill. This a political job and this is a political Administration." I said, "Alright." It just so happened at the time that the two Kentucky Senators were both prominent Republicans and friends of my father. John Sherman Cooper, a very senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a wonderful man, was one of my father's closest friends; my father had helped finance Senator Cooper's first senatorial campaign in 1946. The other Senator was Thruston Morton, who was then Republican National Chairman. I grew up with his sons. He was from Louisville and they were good friends of mine. So, I went to both Senators and asked them for letters of support. They said, "Certainly." They both wrote to the director of ACDA saying I was a great fellow. That got me the job.

Q: Did you go in with a feeling that we'd better get some arms control? Or was this an

interesting job?

GRAHAM: An interesting job. I had no personal agenda at all. I didn't really know what the issues were.

Q: When you were leaving the Pentagon, did they look at you and say, "You're going over to the enemy camp" because ACDA was trying to draw the teeth of the Pentagon in a way.

GRAHAM: No. The senior people in the Office of the General Counsel of the Air Force said, "Sounds like a great job."

Q: How long were you at ACDA?

GRAHAM: 27 years.

Q: I think this would be a good time to stop. We're going to pick up in September 1970 and you're entering ACDA.

Today is August 23, 2001. Could you explain how you saw ACDA at the time?

GRAHAM: I have to first say that until a few months before I arrived, I had never heard of it and had no idea what it did. I learned that there was this small organization that managed international arms control negotiations particularly involving nuclear weapons and it sounded very interesting. That's all I knew about it really when I arrived. I had met with the General Counsel who hired me. Before I arrived, I think he was the only official there whom I had met. Bill Hancock was his name. He had formerly been Deputy General Counsel at the Defense Department and had come over to ACDA in 1969 when the new Director, Gerard Smith, came in under Richard Nixon. When I arrived, my impression was that this was an organization that was composed largely of experts and real professionals and that, even though it was small, it had quite a formal structure, not highly bureaucratic, but a formal structure. A certain distance was kept between levels within the organization. For example, when Director Gerard Smith came into the large staff meeting—we held them twice a week and as Assistant General Counsel I attended them—everybody stood up. That did not happen for any subsequent Director. Indeed with Gerard Smith it ceased after his public humiliation by Kissinger at the 1972 summit. I'm not sure why it did then, but by that time everyone knew that he had offered his resignation and was leaving within a few months.

Q: This standing up is not unusual. In a country team meeting, the staff meeting in an embassy, and other places within the State Department hierarchy, often you do stand up for the ranking person, if there is somebody who is kind of your boss.

GRAHAM: That's interesting. It was the only time in 27 years that I experienced that

phenomenon in any meeting in the government, including meetings involving the President. I believe that's correct. I've been to lots of meetings involving the Secretary of State, lots of his small and large staff meetings, and I don't remember people standing up.

Q: Maybe it's changed. I don't know. How did you see ACDA fitting into the State Department/Defense/White House culture?

GRAHAM: I had no idea how it fit. I didn't even understand the culture very well. I had worked at Defense and on the Hill and at Treasury. But I had never really worked in the national security policy structure before. My job at Defense was not really in that structure. It took me years to understand what the role was, what the role should be, of the various agencies – NSC (National Security Council), State, Defense, JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff), CIA, ACDA, Energy. Of course, they tended to change from time to time with the vicissitudes of politics. But, over time I came to see the following structure as the proper one involving ACDA. If I can use “right/left” as shorthand—I'm referring to arms control and disarmament issues, that part of the national security policy agenda—the State Department was slightly left of center, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) slightly right of center, ACDA to the left of State, JCS to the right of OSD, CIA an advisor, NSC the honest broker. That's the way I believe it was intended to operate and it worked best when it operated that way. But, obviously it didn't always operate that way. In some administrations, the Office of the Secretary of Defense was to the right of the Joint Chiefs—in more than one. In one or two administrations, the leadership of ACDA moved ACDA to the right, sometime further right than anybody, exposing State on the left. I remember Harold Brown telling Henry Kissinger in 1975—Harold told me about it—he said he had remonstrated with Kissinger about the 1973 downgrading of ACDA because, he said, “Henry, the Secretary of State needs ACDA on his left. If State is going to hold the far left position, you're going to be a lot less effective in the interagency.” On another occasion when director Fred Iklé was seen initially in the 1974/'75 timeframe to move ACDA to the right of the Pentagon, at least on some issues, I remember a senior JCS staff officer telling me, “That's not right. We're supposed to be on the far right. You guys are supposed to be on the far left. State and OSD are somewhere in the middle and we fight it out and that's how we get the best policy. You shouldn't upset this balance.” I tended to agree with that, but it took me some years to come to that view and understand the process well enough to have a view.

Q: Before we get into the substance, what piece of the action did you have as a lawyer?

GRAHAM: I was Assistant General Counsel for Congressional Relations. The person who had held that position since ACDA was founded in 1961 had moved up to the front office and was the executive assistant to the director. The Assistant General Counsel for Congressional Relations managed the day-to-day congressional liaison work for the agency, of which there was a lot because Congress was very interested in arms control and disarmament issues, negotiations, and very interested in ACDA and the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) negotiations which were going on at that time. I also did some substantive backstopping work on the SALT negotiations. I worked on a provision to extend the ban on nuclear weapons on the seabed, found in the Seabed Arms

Control Treaty, to the internal lakes and rivers of the U.S. and the Soviet Union as part of the SALT process. I crafted that position. It was proposed to the Soviets in 1970 but not included in SALT I. It eventually was included in SALT II. But that was a relatively small part of my work. By far the larger amount of time I spent on congressional liaison work. I would accompany the director to hearings and briefings. I would cover hearings for the agency. I attended all the ratification hearings in both Houses for the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms, which—being an international agreement as opposed to a treaty—was approved by both Houses of Congress. I attended all those hearings and wrote reports on them. I spent considerable time talking with individual Congressional staff members and Members of Congress representing the agency's view.

Q: When you came in 1970, where did negotiations on arms control stand?

GRAHAM: Well, the SALT negotiations began in November of 1969. President Lyndon Johnson tried to get them started in 1968, but then the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia to crush the Prague spring led by Dubcek, so they couldn't be started in the latter days of the Johnson administration and it was left to Nixon and Kissinger. They negotiated a November 1969 beginning. The first session was held in Helsinki. SALT I alternated between Helsinki and Vienna. When I arrived at ACDA, they were at the tail end of the second session of the SALT negotiations, which was roughly April to September 1970 and held in Vienna.

Q: What did you sense was the commitment from the White House, including the NSC (which would be Kissinger), from the State Department, and from the Defense Department?

GRAHAM: At that time, of course, you had Henry Kissinger as National Security Advisor and William Rogers as Secretary of State. Kissinger very much dominated that relationship between the NSC and State, particularly on national security issues. With respect to the national security process, you had a very powerful National Security Advisor who was personally committed to SALT, as was the President. Rogers, not having the same degree of influence, was less committed, so State did not play the role in those negotiations that it might otherwise have played. ACDA was involved as the negotiating agency. Gerard Smith very much had Nixon's ear. Kissinger saw him as a rival and tried to reduce his influence as much as he could. But having said that, Gerard Smith had 46 private meetings with Nixon, one-on-one, in 48 months. No other ACDA Director ever had more than three or four private meetings with the President during his term in office. The original management of the policy apparatus backing up the negotiations was chaired by ACDA, by Gerard Smith, who was also the chief negotiator. Kissinger, in order to get around Smith and subvert this arrangement, created something called the Verification Panel chaired by him which was supposed to only examine verification and monitoring issues but he gradually drew all power to it and undercut the traditional interagency.

The delegation itself was one of the most distinguished that the U.S. has ever put in the

field. Gerard Smith was the chairman. Phil Farley was the deputy chairman who also was the deputy ACDA director and spent most of his time in Washington. Paul Nitze a former Deputy Defense Secretary, represented the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Lt. General Royal Allison, a highly distinguished officer, represented the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Howard Stirtz, the national intelligence officer for the Soviet Union, represented the CIA. And Llewellyn Thompson, a former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, represented the State Department. Really an outstanding group of people.

The Defense Department, and particularly Secretary Laird himself, were very committed to these negotiations. Not only Laird himself personally but also his deputy, David Packard of Hewlett Packard. Certainly the Office of the Secretary of Defense was involved and committed to these negotiations. I'm not sure that the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs had the same degree of commitment. Admiral Moorer was the chairman in 1969. I don't think he shared the same degree of personal commitment. He wasn't against the process, but he was not personally involved in the way Laird was.

Q: When you're talking about strategic arms, you're talking about nuclear weapons for the most part.

GRAHAM: We're talking about nuclear weapons deliverable at intercontinental range.

Q: Was the feeling among your staff that this thing had gotten completely out of control?

GRAHAM: I don't think it was completely out of control, but the view very definitely was that we've got to work out some arrangement with the Soviets to moderate this competition or it would get out of control.

Q: Was there a component in this of confidence building, something to make sure that nobody was going to launch an accidental attack?

GRAHAM: The great fear of the Soviets was that the Chinese would somehow provoke a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. We were worried generally about an accidental launch, so we negotiated a separate agreement, the Accidents Agreement, to address that. This Agreement was signed before the SALT agreements themselves—in 1971. The Russians always referred to it as a “third country provocation,” never mentioning China, but China was what they meant.

Q: As you started sounding out Congress, what were you getting? Were you being told, “Don't let these leftists sell you down the river?”

GRAHAM: Most members of Congress were very supportive and wanted to see the talks succeed. Some were a bit skeptical. Congressman Hebert, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, was very strongly against any effort to limit the U.S. multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) program. But it was a tremendous mistake that we didn't do that in SALT I. And there were many other members of Congress who agreed with the Chairman on MIRVs. They thought, “We have the

advantage. We have the lead. We have MIRVs. The Soviets don't. Let's build them up like crazy." Of course, that overlooked the fact that the Soviets were going to get them, too, and then they would have a capability of threatening our land-based missiles, which they didn't have as long as they only had single warhead missiles. We ended up spending the next 20 years or more trying to negotiate agreements to eliminate Russian/Soviet land-based MIRVs, which we finally succeeded in doing in START II in 1993. Then there was Senator Scoop Jackson of Washington State and his chief staff person Richard Perle, who still . . .

Q: Known as the Prince of Darkness.

GRAHAM: Yes, although he says that it was inappropriately applied to him, that the British journalist who invented the phrase actually meant the journalist Bob Novak, not him. But it was applied to him. I can remember some years later at a diplomatic party walking in the door and Frank Gaffney, Perle's assistant at the Pentagon in the mid-'80s was standing there. It was a short receiving line and he said to the person there receiving guests, "The Prince of Darkness just walked by. Now I'd like to introduce you to one of the white princes."

There was also another very influential staff person on Jackson's staff, Dorothy Fosdick, who in some ways was one of Perle's mentors.

Scoop was very, very, very suspicious of the Soviet Union. I wouldn't say he was anti-arms control, but he was suspicious of it. What he wanted was a limitation only on Soviet offense. He did not want any limit on missile defense. He was one of the early advocates of missile defense. He was the person that led the fight for the Safeguard System in 1969 that passed the Senate by only one vote with Vice President Spiro Agnew breaking a tie. He was quite angry when Nixon agreed with Brezhnev in 1971 that the two sides would concentrate on an anti-ballistic missile treaty, limiting strategic defense, and a lesser agreement limiting strategic offense. I remember attending a closed session briefing with Ambassador Smith and the delegation, Jackson in the chair, of the appropriate subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee saying, "Well, I'm just a country lawyer, but it doesn't take much to understand that the problem is Soviet offense and we should be limiting that and not the means to protect ourselves, strategic defense." Ambassador Smith replied that he was a city lawyer and he could understand that the important thing was to limit defense because it was defense that created the action-reaction cycle and you have to limit defense first. That was in 1971. You might say we're still hearing that argument today.

Q: We're going through tremendous debate today on which you are leading an organization which is still fighting that battle.

GRAHAM: Yes. One of my first assignments at ACDA in 1970 was to work on national missile defense and I still am 31 years later and the issues are not that different.

Q: What was the background of Gerard Smith? What was his operating style?

GRAHAM: He came from a wealthy family. His father was a very senior official in General Motors when it was founded in 1920. He devoted his career to government service. He worked at the old Atomic Energy Agency in a senior position for a number of years. He was also close to John Foster Dulles and was one of his chief staff people for a number of years. He was a Republican, but an eastern establishment Republican, a Saltonstall, William Weld, Christie Todd Whitman type of Republican, a Gerald Ford.

Q: That is almost a disappearing breed right now.

GRAHAM: Melvin Laird was that kind of Republican, too.

Q: Jacob Javits.

GRAHAM: Right. That was Smith's background. Nixon picked him to be the head of ACDA and the chief negotiator for the SALT process. He was a superb negotiator, a superb agency head, and a great man.

Q: How did he operate within the organization?

GRAHAM: He tended to staff things out in a hierarchical way. He was very approachable, a very open person, but he liked process and hierarchy. He tried to get the best people he could. He did not want yes men around him. He had a superb personal staff and led one of the most distinguished delegations in U.S. diplomatic history.

Q: I think we all know that negotiations with a foreign power, that's the simple side of things. The real negotiations are between, in this case, the White House, the Pentagon, the State Department, and Congress.

GRAHAM: Correct.

Q: Did you get involved in this?

GRAHAM: I did not in those years expect—we're talking 1970-72—peace and quiet on the congressional side of it. I saw a lot of Scoop Jackson. I spent considerable time with Gerard Smith and other agency officials, with Senator Jackson, with Chairman Hébert, people like that. I remember that the General Counsel of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who I also spent some time with, was Jim Woolsey—still quite well known.

Q: Did you find yourself taking the temperature of Congress and then running back and saying, "Mr. Ambassador Smith, I think you better talk to so and so?" In other words, being the point man for seeing where there were problems?

GRAHAM: No, not so much that because the problems were so obvious. They were virtually public problems in the sense that the whole relevant part of the government knew where Jackson stood, and Hébert and Stennis and other people like that.

Q: What about the media? Were there people throwing bombs at you and other people giving you bouquets?

GRAHAM: The media was generally supportive. I remember that there was great concern at the Nixon White House with press leaks. I recall one occasion around 1971 in which the FBI came to my office three times in connection with a press leak. I don't remember what it was that had been leaked. I think it had to do with the U.S. ABM position at the time of the second round of SALT in Vienna. Or maybe it was shortly after that. Finally it was figured out that the leak came from the Pentagon. Of course, nothing ever happened, as it never did. Everyone knows now how obsessed the Nixon White House was with leaks. They had an organization called "The Plumbers." It was one of the things that led to their downfall in the end. Leaks are part of every administration that I've ever worked with.

Q: President Johnson used to go ballistic on leaks on the most minor things. I remember knowing of people who had been tapped to be ambassador to Jordan and being obsessed with the idea that, my God, if it leaks out, I won't get it. Who cares? There was something in the paper today about trying to do something about White House leaks.

GRAHAM: Yes, there are those that are advocating an official secrets act by the United States, which we've never had and I hope we never do.

Q: I hope we don't either. For one thing, it makes it a lot easier to conduct an oral history program. [Laughter]

When Smith and Company were negotiating, they were doing it where?

GRAHAM: The SALT I negotiations alternated between Helsinki and Vienna. SALT II settled in Geneva and ever thereafter that's where these negotiations were held. But in 1969-1972, they alternated between Helsinki and Vienna. The Soviets wanted Helsinki. We wanted Vienna. The compromise was both.

Q: When Ambassador Smith was sitting out there with his team, was he given general instructions?

GRAHAM: No, daily instructions. Constant battles were going on in the Washington bureaucracy, resulting in frequent changes of instructions. For example, Smith was instructed in the second round of SALT II in 1970 to propose to the Soviets that with respect to permitted anti-ballistic missile deployments, the U.S. could accept a ban, one deployment site on each side, or two deployment sites on each side in the emerging treaty. We could accept any of those outcomes and the Soviets should choose. The Soviets thought about it for a while and said, "Okay, we're for zero." Of course, the tides had shifted in Washington and we said, "Sorry, wrong option." They said, "Well, what about one for one?" We said, "Still the wrong option." "Well, two for two. We'll settle for that." "It's the wrong option still. We propose four for us, one for you." That was the

result of some battle back in Washington. The eventual outcome was two for two. That's typical.

Q: As these negotiations were going on, were people watching and saying, "They did it wrong?" Did you get the feeling that an awful lot of people were getting in on the act more to get in on the act?

GRAHAM: You mean people in Washington?

Q: Yes.

GRAHAM: Several things I might mention. First, there was a tendency that existed at the beginning of the negotiations that lasted until the end—that the sides would often end up adopting each other's position. The Soviets would be for banning ABMs, we'd be for allowing them, and then a couple of years later it would be the other way around. That was a well-known, frequent phenomenon. Second, and I've never known an exception to this, there was always an intense suspicion between the people on the delegation and the people in the Washington offices of the various agencies. The people on the delegation felt, "Those idiots back in Washington don't understand what's going on out here." The guys in Washington felt, "Those guys in Geneva are giving away the store." And that is always true. Then third, we had this process called "backchannels" whereby agency representatives on delegations reported privately to their home agencies. The chief of delegation reported directly to the White House. People were allowed to do that but over time only on condition that the chief negotiator, the ambassador, got to read their backchannel before it was sent. That reform only came in after a few years.

Q: I was think there were probably back backchannels, too.

GRAHAM: A lot of telephone discussions, yes. I was on my way back to the SALT II negotiations in the mid-1970s and a senior State Department official closely associated with Secretary Kissinger said that he would like for me personally to report to him as to what was going on and which agency was doing what in Geneva and how that process was going so he could keep Kissinger up to date. He said, "Don't use the secure line because the secure line goes through the Pentagon and they record everything over there. Call me on the open telephone. It's the only safe way of communicating."

Q: Did you get involved in theology? This was a period where people were saying, "Well, if we only lose 30 million people and they lose 16 million people we'll come out ahead." They were playing these horrible games.

GRAHAM: "Mr. President, I didn't say we wouldn't get our hair mussed a little bit, but 20 million dead, 30 million tops." That's from "Dr. Strangelove." Those statements were there, but at the delegation level, the conversations were a lot more practical than that.

Q: This was almost an academic exercise that was going on.

GRAHAM: They were serious and businesslike, professional, without exception.

Q: What about the Soviet delegation? How did you find that?

GRAHAM: Well, they were very capable, very professional, very serious people. The chief of delegation was a man named Semyonov who was an old Soviet bureaucrat. He was deputy foreign minister as well as ambassador so he was usually called “Minister” rather than “Ambassador.” He was an expert on Germany. He had been in Berlin in 1949 or 1950 with his chief military aide when a telegram came from Moscow: Return to Moscow immediately. When the telegram arrived, it was on Saturday and he was on an excursion to the country. His military aide promptly returned. He got back the next day, saw the telegram, knew what it meant, and went back out on a further country excursion. His military aide was shot as soon as he arrived in Moscow. The same thing would have happened to him if he had gone back. So, he had been through that sort of thing. He was around at the time of the purges and so on. He was affectionately known as Old Iron Pants because of his ability to sit in the chair for incredibly long periods of time. He gave one the impression of being hardline, immovable, and difficult. He was that, but he was also a professional. He wanted progress. He wanted the negotiations to succeed. His deputy, Victor Karpov, who died just a couple of years ago, was a brilliant, enormously capable individual who cared about arms control, had close connections with the military, drank liquor in unbelievable quantities, really knew the subject, and when he said the Soviet Union was going to do something if the U.S. did something else, you could always believe him; he always delivered. Very capable. He succeeded Semyonov as chief negotiator about one-third of the way through the SALT II negotiations. Semyonov was the chief negotiator from 1969 to 1978. Karpov was chief negotiator in 1978-1979 and then on through the START process in the 1980s. Ultimately he became the head of the arms control directorate in the Soviet foreign ministry.

Assisting him in SALT I and through SALT II was Victor Smolin, who I came to know very well but not as well as I thought as it turned out at the end. An expert with words. He was not a lawyer, but he almost was the Soviet lawyer. He was their great wordsmith. Both he and Karpov spoke superb English, Karpov especially. Semyonov did not. Semyonov used to say, “The Soviet Union will give the U.S. proposal the attention it deserves” until he was advised by Karpov that that had a special meaning in American slang. Just to give you an idea of Karpov’s English capability, during SALT II we were having a discussion one day of missile launch weight and how to define it. The senior State Department representative at the time, Boris Clausen, was in the chair of the subgroup meeting, six officials on each side. It was consecutive translation, English translated into Russian and back the other way. He was saying at one point, “Launch weight has to be measured free of anything attached to the missile at the time of launch. Launch weight must be measured free.” Karpov on the other side interrupted in English, skipping over the translations, and said, “But I thought in America there is no such thing as a free launch.” That’s how good he was. Their original chief military person was then General, later Marshall, Ogarkov, later chief of the Soviet general staff. Their chief scientist or their equivalent of OSD, the opposite number of Nitze, was a man named Alexander Shchukin. He was in his 70s then, one of three Soviet inventors, along with

Sakharov and Tamm, of the Soviet hydrogen bomb. He was a physicist. He was from an upper middle class St. Petersburg family. He joined the Red Army in 1917 at the age of 17. His first language was French, not Russian. Nitze's successor, Michael May, a former director of Livermore Laboratories, was born in France and came to this country at the age of 14. He and Shchukin used to talk in French after our plenary sessions. I had the opportunity to sit in—I have some French—and listen to them.

The structure of the negotiations—this began in SALT I and continued - in plenary sessions at which full delegations are present - was that first each side reads a statement. Then the delegations would break up into small groups, military with military, diplomats with diplomats, OSD with scientists, and so on. Those were called post-plenary discussions. They were supposed to be informal discussions, but every word was recorded in memoranda of conversation which each side prepared for itself. But there was not an agreed record. From time to time, subgroups were established. SALT II had a drafting group that lasted almost throughout the negotiations to prepare the text and so forth.

Q: You were talking about the culmination of this first series which ended up to be SALT I.

GRAHAM: The ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Strategic and Offensive Arms.

Q: You mentioned Henry Kissinger humiliating Ambassador Smith. Were you aware that Kissinger was trying to get into the action?

GRAHAM: It wasn't so much getting into the action as he was cutting his own deals and not always telling us about them. He was running his own separate negotiation which fed into the formal negotiations. I thought this was a terrible practice. It was not followed by any subsequent national security advisor. After SALT I was signed, it was discovered that Nixon and Kissinger had made an error in Moscow in not covering a particular matter. Kissinger made a secret side agreement with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin a couple of months after signature of SALT I and no one was ever told. The next year when we were developing implementing agreements for SALT I in Geneva, the Soviet side proposed a particular provision and the U.S. side said, "We'll have to think about that. We're not sure we can accept that." The Soviet side said, "But you already have." Whatever Dobrynin agreed on with Kissinger was shared with the Soviet delegation but it didn't work that way with us. I do not think it was a good practice.

Q: This was something that was condoned or fostered by the President?

GRAHAM: Yes, I guess so. I guess he condoned it. Maybe he fostered it. Nixon always was very suspicious of the State Department, as was Kissinger.

Q: We'll stop at this point. We have moved up to 1972.

Today is October 12, 2001. We're going back to the spring of 1972. We're talking about the end game of SALT I and the showdown between Smith and Kissinger.

GRAHAM: The SALT I negotiations came to an end on May 26, 1972. Just to indicate the relationship that had been forged in the process of these negotiations, the summit signing date for SALT I was set for May 26, 1972. Roughly in that timeframe, Soviet Premier Kosygin was visiting Hanoi and the U.S. conducted some major airstrikes while he was there. That did not deter the Soviets from holding the summit and signing SALT I. There was a successful effort beginning with SALT I and extending throughout the entire period of strategic negotiations from 1969 to 1994 of isolating those talks from any other political or military events involving the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. Remarkably that effort was successful.

Q: Did you have the feeling that from then the thinking on the use of nuclear weapons as a method of conducting war had really receded?

GRAHAM: It certainly had receded from the concepts of the leaders of the U.S. and the Soviet Union/Russia. There remained members of Congress and defense intellectuals who retained the concept of the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in war, but no President, no General Secretary or close advisors had the use of nuclear weapons for any conflict anywhere in their mind. That was made firm by the Cuban Missile Crisis. Part of the purpose of the strategic arms negotiations was to make anything like the Cuban Missile Crisis less likely in the future, as was the negotiation of the Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. Latin American states decided, under Mexico's lead, beginning in 1964 that they didn't want to have any more nuclear confrontations between the superpowers in their region. They negotiated a nuclear weapon free zone for Latin America, signed in 1967, and it gradually came into force. The answer to the basic question is "yes," although even today, there still are people who talk about using mini nukes against Afghan caves or whatever. General Powell in his memoirs says that Secretary Cheney just before the start of the Gulf War asked Powell to do a study on the utility of tactical nuclear weapons on the field of battle, particularly in the Middle East context. Powell did the study, he says, showed it to Cheney and then destroyed it. He said, "If I ever had any doubts about the usefulness of nukes on the field of battle, that study removed all doubt."

Q: Yesterday, I was talking to Bill Brown, our ambassador in Tel Aviv during the Gulf War—there is a threat of biological warfare in the air today over the war against Afghanistan—he was talking about the mood in Israel and everybody was panicking because of the fact that Saddam Hussein had threatened and had biological or chemical weapons. If one of those had lobbed into Tel Aviv, he had no doubt about it that Baghdad would be a nuclear waste site, the Israelis would not have hesitated to do that. It could have very easily happened.

GRAHAM: I have an opinion on that. If that had happened—had they done that—it

would have been a horrendous, morally reprehensible, outrageous act because there is no comparison between the effect of a nuclear weapon and the effect of a chemical or current-technology biological weapon. I do not believe the Israelis would have done such a thing. Such an attack would have been absolutely outrageous. Chemical weapons have a very limited sphere of lethality, and biological weapons are yet to be proven a threat. You only have to look at the anthrax cases down in Florida. Two people had anthrax in their system and weren't even sick. Anthrax is not a communicable disease. There is a vaccine for it. And for all of the other biological weapon agents, smallpox and so forth, there also are vaccines. To kill a million people in retaliation for a small scale attack or maybe even a completely ineffective attack would just have been absolutely morally reprehensible. It would not have happened.

Q: I'm thinking of the political climate at the time. I think it's very possible it could have happened. We're not talking about measured response, particularly when you're talking about small nations.

GRAHAM: I am not saying that it couldn't have happened, but I see no difference between that morally and what the terrorists did in Manhattan. In fact, it would have been far worse. But as I said I strongly believe it would not have happened.

Q: As a possibility, this was floating around.

GRAHAM: I'm not disputing that. I am just saying that it has been in the air for years that somehow nuclear weapons should be used to offset chemical and biological weapons and I am totally opposed to that. They are not comparable at all. It is just an excuse for keeping nuclear weapons. It ignores the overwhelming, devastating effect of nuclear weapons as compared to these other things. I don't think they should even be in the same graph. I am not saying that it wouldn't be dangerous to release nerve gas on the New York subway. You could kill thousands of people that way. Or maybe someday somebody will come up with an andromeda strain of a biological weapon that really would be lethal. But right now, in the times in which we live and in those times, there is absolutely no comparison between the destructive effect of chemical and biological weapons and the instantaneous, overwhelming destruction that is caused by nuclear weapons. We must recognize that they are a threat to civilization. I will go on to say, in this time in which we live right now, October 12, 2001, where we're responding to the horrific terrorist attacks in New York and Washington of September 11th by attacking Afghanistan, a policy I wholly support, you only have to look across the border at Pakistan. It is uncertain whether Pakistan will survive this war as a functional state. Hopefully it will. Musharraf fired four of his five Corps commanders because they are Taliban sympathizers. There are thirty-five nuclear weapons in Pakistan. If Bin Laden or people like him get them, they will take them to major cities and use them.

Q: What about Smith and Kissinger towards the end of this?

GRAHAM: Let me just talk a bit more about the context. In 1971, Nixon and Brezhnev made an agreement, over the objections of Senator Jackson, to have a fairly complete

agreement on defensive strategic systems and “certain measures” on offensive system limits. Jackson wanted just the opposite. We came to the spring of ’72 and the ABM Treaty negotiated by professional negotiators, was nearly complete and was quite a sound, well thought through, organized document. But the various limits on offensive systems that made up the Interim Agreement were poorly drafted and not very far along. So, much of the Interim Agreement was negotiated by Nixon and Kissinger at the summit directly with Brezhnev. As a result, it is full of errors, ambiguities, sloppy drafting, and poor concepts which gave rise to all kinds of compliance problems and uncertainties, and had to be, to some degree, corrected during SALT II. Nixon and Kissinger, because of their fear of leaks, didn’t even have an American interpreter present. They used the Russian interpreter, so there was nobody there to take notes. You only have to read the ABM treaty and read the Interim Agreement to be persuaded that politicians should not do strategic arms negotiation and that such negotiations should be kept in the hands of professional diplomats like Gerard Smith and Ambassador Semyonov on the Soviet side.

The delegation was brought to Moscow from Helsinki where the final SALT I negotiations took place and some of the last parts of the two agreements were typed up on the plane on the way to Moscow. A mistake was made in the typing. They were down to only one piece of treaty paper and a mistake was made on the Interim Agreement. Therefore, it had to be signed a second time in secret the next day by Nixon and Kissinger. Also someone’s typewriter had to be repaired with a paperclip and other things like that. So, it was a very hectic time. After the summit signing, there was a briefing of the press by Gerard Smith as to the contents of the agreements. The reporters asked Smith some questions about the systems limited by the agreements. Smith answered some of the questions, but he said as to some of the other questions that they involved classified material and he wasn’t authorized to answer those questions. Whereupon Kissinger, who had recently arrived at the briefing, sort of shouldered Smith aside and said that he wasn’t bound by the same constraints that Smith was and he could answer the questions and he would. It was very humiliating for Smith to have that happen in front of the press and it ensured that Smith would leave government by the end of the year. As I said before it had such an effect that although it had been the practice that whenever Smith came into the large staff meeting at ACDA everybody stood up, after May 26th, nobody did. So, psychologically, it was pretty hard on Ambassador Gerard Smith, who I think was a great man.

Of course, a lot of mistakes were made. Kissinger briefed the Congress on June 15th at the White House on the contents of the agreements and he made representations that just weren’t true. For example, he said that the combination of the freeze on heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) launchers and the ban on an increase in ICBM silo dimensions beyond 15% combined and the definition of a heavy missile, represented a firm and solid constraint on Soviet missile capability growth. That turned out to be totally untrue. First, with respect to the limit on silo dimensions, there was not agreement between the two sides as to what the 15% meant. We said that it meant that there could be a 15% increase in one or a combination of both dimensions, width and depth. There could be a 15% increase in depth of the silo or a 15% increase in the width or a combination. . But the Soviets’ view was it could be 15% in both dimensions. That

translated into a 32% increase in silo volume under the American definition and a 52% increase under the Russian definition. The Russians brought in their new missiles anyway within the 15% American definition and they were vastly superior in capability. The SS19 had 3 times the throw weight of the SS11 that it replaced. The heavy ICBM – the SS18 - had twice the throw weight of the SS9 that it replaced. These were the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) missile systems that came in. And the definition of a heavy missile that Kissinger also mentioned as being important had been explicitly rejected on the record by the Soviets as something they would not accept. It had no bearing at all on anything. But all this was represented to Congress as a valuable constraint. It was those kinds of things that led some people in the Congress to be rather cynical about the arms control process. Furthermore, the Interim Agreement was so sloppily negotiated that it was important to have a definition of what a modern submarine launched ballistic missile is because the interim agreement included in the agreed limitation of modern submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), all SLBMs on nuclear-powered submarines and any modern SLBM on a conventional powered submarine, that is, a diesel submarine. But a modern SLBM was not defined, so Kissinger and Dobrynin during the ratification process had initialed a secret agreement on the definition of a modern SLBM which was never disclosed to anybody, not the Congress, not even the people in the delegation. Nobody knew about it until a year later when procedures were being negotiated to implement SALT I and at the Standing Consultative Commission in Geneva there was discussion of how to define a modern SLBM. The Soviets said, “Well, we already have an agreement on this. Your man, Kissinger, and Dobrynin agreed on that a year ago.” That was the first time that the negotiators ever heard about it. I mentioned this earlier.

Senator Jackson was very upset with the outcome of SALT I. He accused some of the negotiators of negotiating an agreement that made US Minutemen ICBMs vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. This was steadily refuted and refuted correctly by General Allison of JCS because that wasn't true until the MIRVs came along. That cost him his job. Jackson and others worked to ensure that Allison did not continue on the SALT II delegation and arranged to put their own man in there for the future. Jackson had an amendment passed to the resolution of approval for the Interim Agreement. The ABM agreement was a treaty, so it went for advice and consent by the Senate. The Interim Agreement was an international agreement, not a treaty, so it was approved under the law by a resolution of both Houses of Congress. That resolution had attached to it a Jackson amendment which required that any future agreement provide for equal levels of strategic systems for the U.S. and the Soviets and limits on heavy ICBMs well beyond what had been negotiated in SALT I. This was achieved with SALT II. But the Interim Agreement was indeed very unbalanced. Because the U.S. had MIRVs and the Soviets didn't at that time, although anyone could have figured out they would have them in a few years, it permitted them roughly 1608 ICBMs to 1054 for the U.S. It also provided that older systems—of which the U.S. had 54 Titans and the Soviets had 210 SS7s and SS8s—could be exchanged for modern SLBMs. That permitted the Soviets to go up to 950 SLBMs from 740. The U.S. could have gone to from 656 to 710 SLBMs but Nixon gave Brezhnev a secret side letter, also not disclosed to the Congress, that the U.S. would not convert its 54 Titans. The submarine provisions were very confusing, but they worked out to be 44 nuclear

submarines for the U.S. to 62 for the Soviet Union. Thus the end result was 1401 ICBM launchers and 950 SLBM launchers in 62 submarines for the USSR and 1000 ICBM launchers (plus 54 older systems) and 656 SLBM launchers on 44 submarines for the U.S. Of course, heavy bombers were not limited and the U.S. had about 450 strategic bombers, the Russians about 150. That plus the fact that the U.S. had MIRVs in 1972, it was argued, permitted these unbalanced numbers. But of course, by 1975, before the interim agreement expired, the Soviets began deploying MIRVs. They would deploy many more MIRVs because their missiles were much bigger and carried more throw weight

Q: Everybody knew the Soviets had bigger missiles than we had, which meant they could load more things on them. Once you go into the multiple warheads, they can throw a lot more things into the trunk of these missiles. We must have been playing out these things.

GRAHAM: Some people did, but Kissinger and Nixon were determined to get that agreement quickly and so they did. It had been the case from the beginning of the missile age that the Soviets had gone in for big systems and we had gone in for smaller and more accurate weapons. Our weapons were much more accurate than theirs. In any concept of nuclear war, accuracy is more important than explosive yield. It also is the case that if you're attacking a city with nuclear weapons, if you put three smaller weapons on that city, they feed on one another and cause more destruction than one big weapon. So, there were offsetting advantages that we had. But nevertheless, it wasn't well done. SALT II was done much better.

Q: You're talking about the sloppiness of drafting. I've interviewed people who have been involved in the opening to China. One of the famous things about the sloppiness was when Kissinger and Zhao Enlai more or less got together with Kissinger's small team and they drafted the Shanghai Agreement and they excluded Marshall Green and others, who were the State Department experts. When they looked at the draft of the Shanghai Agreement just before, they discovered that we had left out Taiwan, which brought back any Asian hand a shudder because of Dean Acheson not mentioning South Korea just before the North Koreans talked. They had to go back and Kissinger was mad as hell at the experts for pointing out that this was terrible. It shows that beyond all this fancy talk of the Kissinger-Nixon period, it was sloppy.

GRAHAM: It was.

Q: You could almost see the Soviets and the Chinese sitting back and saying, "Let's dangle something."

GRAHAM: The Soviets always were more comfortable with ambiguous provisions for two reasons. One, they were not a legalistic nation. To them, somebody's intent was more important than what the agreement said. But second, if it was ambiguous, then, they could exploit it.

Q: What did your team do after SALT I?

GRAHAM: The team was reassembled under Gerard Smith to begin SALT II in November of 1972. It was decided to move the talks permanently to Geneva, not rotate them between Vienna and Helsinki. So, we had a session in November and December in Geneva but all that was done was to negotiate the charter for the Standing Consultative Commission so that it could go into business the next year to implement the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreements. Sid Graybeal, a close advisor to Gerard Smith, became the U.S. Commissioner at the Commission. For a time in 1973, the Soviet SALT I and SALT II negotiator was also their Commissioner, but then they brought in a general named Ustinov to take his place in mid-1973. But in January 1972, the U.S. SALT II delegation was completely revamped. Gerard Smith resigned on December 31st. U. Alexis Johnson was brought in as the SALT II negotiator, the most senior man in the State Department for many years. General Edward Rowney, very much a Senator Jackson man, was—at Senator Jackson’s insistence and over the objection of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—made the JCS representative at SALT II. The man that the Chairman wanted to be his representative at SALT II, Admiral Tom Davies, ended up as an ACDA assistant director for strategic policy. Then there were some other changes as well. In late 1974 I became the SALT II lawyer. John Rheinlander, a longtime friend of mine, was the SALT I lawyer. He had a direct hand in negotiating the ABM treaty. You can just look at that document and see that it was well done. He did not have much influence over the outcome of the Interim Agreement because, as I said, that was done by Nixon and Kissinger at the summit. In any case, the SALT II negotiations began sometime in the early part of 1973. For a long time, they got nowhere until the Vladivostok meeting of November 1974, between President Ford and Brezhnev. Early on there were various proposals made such as an agreed MIRV deployment rate. The Soviets were just beginning to deploy. We were already fully deployed. Similarly, a ban on MIRV deployments—we had full deployment and they had very little. A whole lot of one-sided ideas which the Soviets rejected. Meanwhile, in the aftermath of Jackson’s displeasure with SALT I, he and Kissinger (covering himself) and some of Kissinger’s aides attacked the Arms Control Agency as well. Smith resigned. Ron Ziegler, the press officer for Nixon, announced that ACDA’s budget would be cut 30% and it would be reduced to a research and staffing agency from a frontline negotiating agency. The State Department was put in charge of the negotiations. General Rowney was put on the delegation. And Fred Iklé was handpicked to be the new ACDA director with the idea in some quarters that he would dismantle the agency. That idea was never realized. He was successful in bringing the agency back from the woodshed, in having its money restored and eventually in restoring the agency to its proper place.

Q: What was the Nixon-Kissinger animosity toward ACDA at this point?

GRAHAM: It wasn’t Nixon. It was Kissinger. It had to do with his rivalry with Smith and his desire to curry favor with Senator Jackson. He didn’t want any competition anywhere. Reasons like that.

Q: One does get the feeling that the ego side of Kissinger played a very large role. This has to be considered not just for effectiveness by saying one person can be brilliant and

direct everything because it doesn't work out that way. But it's also "I'm number 1 and I don't want anybody else to share my limelight."

GRAHAM: Yes. Kissinger was extremely talented, but his ego and his penchant for secretiveness and harboring suspicion (much like Nixon) made him less effective.

Q: What was the attitude within ACDA when you heard all these things happening? Were people scurrying around looking for other jobs or did you feel that you could tough it out?

GRAHAM: Jim Malone, who had come over in 1971 to be assistant general counsel at the insistence of the White House, was made the new general counsel. He appointed me as his deputy. The two of us were determined, working with Fred Iklé, to try to revive the agency. He had very good ties with the White House and that helped. Eventually Kissinger's agent in the semi-destruction of ACDA in 1973 came over as Fred Iklé's deputy in 1975 when Kissinger had moved to the State Department. So, we were just determined we were going to come back from that and we did.

Q: Did you see Watergate as having an effect?

GRAHAM: I think it had an effect on Nixon's desire to try to get more agreements so as to strengthen his status a little bit. But I didn't see it as having an effect on SALT II, which was going nowhere at that time anyway, given the downgrading of ACDA.

Q: In a way, the SALT II was early days. What was SALT II going to do? Did you all have a vision of where the next step was?

GRAHAM: Gerard Smith made a statement at the end of SALT I on instructions that, if a more complete agreement was not reached limiting strategic offensive arms, this could be grounds for U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty. Then we had the Jackson Amendment and the JCS position was that what they wanted was equal aggregates, equal numbers, and the freedom to mix among those numbers of strategic systems: ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and heavy bombers. In other words with freedom to mix, you can reduce the number of ICBMs and increase the number of your SLBMs and so forth. And so, that basically was the objective. That was abundantly achieved by SALT II and far more but, that was how they started out. Initially, the U.S. just made a lot of one-sided proposals and nothing happened for a year and a half.

Q: Were you getting anything from the Soviet side saying, "We both kind of know where we're going, but how to get our masters to go along with this?"

GRAHAM: No, it was just basically a stagnation, propagandist position. The time wasn't ripe to move ahead. There were no serious attempts until Nixon left and Ford came in.

Q: What was Rowney's role as you saw it?

GRAHAM: He was Jackson's man. He reported privately and regularly to Jackson. He had a military assistant in Washington named Colonel Sam Watson. Rowney would participate in our discussions on the delegation in the secure conference room and then send whatever information he thought appropriate as to what the individual delegates were saying—he took extensive notes—what the Soviets were doing, what the evolving policy was leading toward, etc. He would forward that to Sam Watson, who was a friend of Richard Perle, who would forward it to Richard Perle, who would give it to Senator Jackson. That channel of communication remained in place until the very end of SALT II and it was used as a device to try to destroy SALT II.

Q: This was apparent right from the beginning?

GRAHAM: No. It was certainly known that Rowney was Jackson's man, but this channel wasn't really known about until years later.

Q: How did SALT II pick up?

GRAHAM: It picked up when Ford met Brezhnev at Vladivostok in November of 1974. He was intelligent enough to have a U.S. interpreter with him so notes were made of the discussions. I think it was a verbal agreement between Ford and Brezhnev that there would be 2400 strategic systems, 1320 MIRV systems, and a carryover of the silo dimension limits and the ban on new heavy ICBMs launchers from SALT I. Then this equal aggregate was to include ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, and air to surface missiles. The Soviets claimed that it included cruise missiles because they were air to surface. The U.S. claimed it only included air to surface ballistic missiles, which are a null set, although we did drop an ICBM out of a 707 and fire it off just to show it could be done, but nobody was interested in that. Also Kissinger went to Beijing shortly after the meeting and a reporter asked him on the airplane whether the large Soviet medium bomber, the Backfire Bomber, was included as a heavy bomber. He said, "No, because it's a medium bomber." This agreement was immediately attacked by Jackson and Perle. Richard was so clever. I remember him on television one night in late November. The reporter said, "Do you regard the Vladivostok understanding as a breakthrough?" He said, "Yes. It's like the German victory at Tobruk, a breakthrough in the wrong direction." The Soviet-claimed limit on cruise missiles and excluding Backfire was vigorously attacked by Jackson and some of his associates and they remained hot button issues to the very end of SALT II five and a half years later. Kissinger had "confidential" stamped on his press backgrounder so that people couldn't read that he said the Backfire was excluded. There was a memorandum of understanding negotiated between Dobrynin and Kissinger in late November of 1974, but it didn't solve anything. It just repeated the numbers from Vladivostok. That's how we moved into the serious days of SALT II in January of 1975.

Q: By this time, did you feel that you learned from the mistakes? Had Kissinger learned from the mistakes of trying to patch things up with Dobrynin? Or was Ford a different man?

GRAHAM: Ford was a different man. I don't think Kissinger learned from his mistakes. Some of us on SALT II tried to correct the mistakes, myself included. For example, we insisted on a proper definition of a heavy ICBM. We eventually achieve a settlement of the silo dimension issue. One of the first things I did was to regulate or standardize the use of agreed statements and common understandings—subsidiary or definitional commitments or definitions associated with treaty provisions—all of which were very confused in SALT I. Common understandings as presented to the Congress for SALT I were just excerpts from the negotiating record plucked out by White House people in an attempt to add strength to the Congressional approval process. Common understandings in SALT II became formal agreements as to interpretation. Agreed statements were formal, initialed agreements as to additional obligations. Also, much had been made by Jackson of the fact that the Soviets wouldn't disclose their numbers. This came out in the hearings. I came to know a man named Alexander Yereskovski, who is still here in Washington now. He was a rising star in the Soviet diplomatic service at the time on the staff of the embassy here. I met him first when he was covering the ratification hearings for the Soviet embassy and I was covering them for ACDA. We sat side-by-side. One day Mel Laird was testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, with Chairman Fulbright in the chair. One issue debated was whether or not the Defense Intelligence Agency doctored its estimates of Soviet military prowess to support acquisition of Pentagon weapon systems. Fulbright was saying they did and Mel Laird was saying they didn't. So, they were having this argument. Finally, Fulbright in exasperation threw up his hands and said, "Well, all I can say is that the only thing that saves us in all of this is that for every mistake that we make—and we make a lot—the Soviet Union makes a bigger one." Yereskovski leaned over and said, "That will be difficult to report to my government." We came to know each other that way. We were again sitting side-by-side at the hearing before Armed Services when Senator Jackson made a big issue of the fact that the Soviets would not formally agree on how many ICBMs they had, how many SLBMs they had, and so on, given the longstanding Russian penchant for secrecy. There had been an incident in 1970 when General Allison made a presentation to the Soviet delegation in Vienna explaining the comprehensive U.S. position and why we had fashioned our proposal that way. He said, "You have ICBMs here and have SLBMs here, so many here and so many there. That's why we have this and that limitation." Afterwards, then General, later Marshall, Ogarkov, approached Allison and said, "General, I would appreciate it if you wouldn't talk about those things in front of our civilians because they're not cleared for that information." So, they wouldn't reveal their numbers. Jackson made a huge issue of this. Smith was testifying. Smith said, "Well, we know how many they have. We have national technical means. It's not a question of not knowing." Jackson said, "Yes, but that's just like the Soviets. They won't admit how many they have." Perle was behind him and pointed Yereskovski out in the audience and said, "You know how many they have. I know how many they have. There is a representative from the Soviet embassy out there in the audience. He knows how many they have. But the American people don't know how many they have." As soon as the hearing ended, the press rushed up to Yereskovski. Of course, the last thing he wanted to do was talk to the press. The last I saw of him that day was his running full tilt down the hallway of the Dirksen Senate Office Building with about 20 reporters hot in pursuit. They didn't catch him, I guess, because there was nothing in the paper the next day.

Early on in SALT II, I was determined that there was going to be an agreement on numbers in SALT II. I talked to other people about it. I did the first draft of the U.S. draft SALT II treaty and included a requirement to have an agreed database. This became a major issue later on in SALT II. Eventually, the Soviets did agree. When they did agree on a simple list, there were 8 items on the list. The Soviet ambassador said to the U.S. ambassador—this was in 1978—“Today, we are repealing 400 years of Russian history.” Secrecy was important in Russian history because they were always so weak *vis-a-vis* their neighbors and they were trying to hide that fact. So, it’s part of their culture. It wasn’t just the communists and the Soviets; it was the Russians. Certainly the Soviets may have added to it, but it was originally Russian culture. That’s how SALT II began.

Alex Johnson called me up to his office in December of 1974. His personal assistant then was Jack Mendelsohn, who works here now and is a very capable guy. He invited me to become the legal advisor for SALT II and I accepted. Jack and I together did the first draft of SALT II. Maybe that would be a good place to stop.

Q: Okay. We’ll pick this up the next time.

Today is February 11, 2002. What did we want to get from SALT II?

GRAHAM: I began serving as legal advisor to SALT II after accepting Alex Johnson’s offer. I began formally working in Geneva as legal advisor to the SALT II delegation on January 30, 1975. That’s when the negotiations resumed after Vladivostok. What we were doing at that stage was converting the Vladivostok understanding of November 1974 into a treaty text to put on the table with the Soviets. The Joint Chiefs made it very clear at the beginning of SALT II that what they wanted was a treaty that provided for equal aggregate numbers of strategic weapons which redressed the imbalances established by the Interim Agreement where the Soviets had a huge advantage in ICBM and SLBMs codified in the agreement. They wanted an agreement that provided for equal aggregates and freedom to mix within those aggregate limits as I have said. Those were their fundamental objectives and they were achieved in the ultimate SALT II treaty, which was signed in June of 1979. In February of 1975, the delegation was busy in Geneva drafting the U.S. treaty text to put on the table with the Soviets. We hoped to get it on the table reasonably quickly as the Soviets promptly tabled their text upon resumption of the negotiations. I think they put it on the table the second day, February 1, 1975. It had some things in it that went against the U.S. understanding of Vladivostok and some other things that we considered just basically anathema. In particular, there was the dispute as to what “air-to-surface missiles” meant in the Vladivostok understanding. Air-to-surface missiles were included in the aggregate limit of 2400 established by the Vladivostok understanding. It was our position that air-to-surface missiles meant air-to-surface ballistic missiles. However, there was nothing in the record to support that definition. And that’s because the government quickly found out from reaction in Washington that limiting cruise missiles at this stage was not politically popular.

Q: Was there such a thing as an air to surface ballistic missile?

GRAHAM: In fact, there wasn't, but in order to bolster our position right before Vladivostok, the U.S. dropped a Minuteman ICBM out of a bomber and fired it off as I mentioned previously. The language was air-to-surface missiles over 600 kilometer range. There wasn't such a system then and there never was such a system after that. There never has been such a system and probably there never will be such a system. So, it was just a diplomatic effort to avoid limits on cruise missiles. The Soviets wanted to limit our strategic cruise missiles carried by bombers.

The Soviet draft text made it clear that air-to-surface missiles meant what it said, air-to-surface missiles of all types. But there were several other provisions in there that were really uncalled for. First, they had limits on sea-launched and ground-launched cruise missiles in their text, which had not been discussed at Vladivostok. But more importantly, they had limits on third country systems—in other words, the medium range systems and submarine systems of our European allies—the British and the French. Of course, they knew we could never accept such a thing, but it was an old Soviet ploy to try to drive a wedge between us and our NATO allies. It wasn't shockingly unexpected but, of course, there was no way we could ever or would ever accept such a proposal.

Since there were provisions like those in the Soviet text, we wanted to get our text on the table quickly to offset such provisions. So, the first couple of weeks in February, we were busily drafting our text within the delegation in Geneva, which was given first responsibility to do this. We began with the draft text that Mendelsohn and I had worked out in Washington in December and January. Also in the first couple of weeks, I spent a few days in Vienna at the request of Stan Resor, our ambassador to the MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations), the name of the conventional arms negotiations, who asked me to come over and brief the U.S. delegation there. In my visit there, it seemed to me rather obvious that progress in terms of reaching an agreement was unlikely at MBFR but, it was an excellent device for discussions about military problems between East and West. It served everyone well in that regard.

Q: While you were talking, Americans and Soviets, and you had military on both sides, were these talks ever used by somebody coming up and saying, "God, we just had a big problem of a near collision out in the Red Sea?" Was this ever an instrument for off the cuff settling of problems that arose between the collisions of forces?

GRAHAM: No, we didn't ever address operational problems at MBFR. There were other Warsaw Pact countries there and other NATO countries. I think there were 19 countries involved. The discussions that were held were theoretical and political, but even so, they were very useful over the years. A lot of acquaintances were made which subsequently proved useful as well. So, for a few days, I briefed the U.S. delegation and was invited to a number of dinners and private meetings involving Soviet delegation members and other countries. I accompanied Ambassador Resor to several very interesting meetings.

Q: There was an international disarmament group and this is another facet of this.

GRAHAM: MBFR was a negotiation that had been going on for two years and continued for another ten. There were a number of proposals put on the table by both sides; the focus was on limiting military personnel in Central Europe. Such a limitation was not really a practical objective in the sense that its scope was too narrow, limited to Central Europe, and the limits were not verifiable, especially in those days when onsite inspection was not a possibility. Many years later, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations did successfully reach agreement on limiting military forces in Europe, but those negotiations—to some extent inspired by the MBFR negotiations as well as by the Helsinki Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process—those negotiations focused on equipment limitations: tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles and combat helicopters, attack aircraft—rather than military personnel. Those limits are verifiable and there were two other differences. Since the CFE negotiations occurred in 1989-1990, the Cold War was virtually over and onsite inspection was very much a possibility. In fact, the CFE treaty has very extensive onsite inspection provisions but no limits on personnel, no treaty limits because these latter limits were part of the reason that MBFR hadn't work out. I think though as I said that MBFR was a useful forum, separate from the classical disarmament process. There were three disarmament processes in those days. There were the strategic negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. There were the NATO-Warsaw Pact negotiations, the MBFR negotiations. Then there were the multilateral negotiations in Geneva involving 35 countries. Those were the three avenues that existed at that time and which continued for many years.

Q: When you were drawing up the response to the Soviet proposal, is it best to slap your agenda on the table first or to have that means that your response could be more finely tuned? Did you build in a cushion of places where “Okay, the Soviets are asking for this, so we'll ask for this? We know we're not going to give that to the Soviets and we know that we're not going to insist on this?”

GRAHAM: The internal deliberations that led to our draft text or any draft text in a major disarmament negotiation in which the U.S. was involved in that 30 year period were never that rational. Unfortunately, we just never approached the negotiations that way. We always put extreme positions on the table in our draft texts, but that was because we really wanted them, not because we thought we would give them up in exchange for something else. We eventually did, but we didn't plan that in advance.

Q: How did you draft this? Were our allies in there?

GRAHAM: No. We didn't allow the allies to participate at all in the strategic negotiations with the Soviet Union. We briefed the North Atlantic Council fairly frequently, several times a year, on the progress of the negotiations. Of course, the allies were very interested in the negotiations and were anxious to see progress because that would enhance the cause of peace in Europe. But it was strictly U.S.-Soviet. But, as I said, there were three disarmament processes.

In most cases, the way it worked, at least in the negotiations that I was involved in, was, the legal advisor would do the first draft and try to craft a draft that reflected policy on the U.S. side as he understood it and with some other provisions that were there to buttress the basic substantive positions like review conferences, amendment provisions, some initial verification concepts and so forth. But, of course, that was to be just a first draft and then the delegation would go over and over and over the text and change it significantly. That would be sent to Washington and be changed even more and so forth. That's the way most of the negotiations worked. With the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations, the text had to be run through NATO as well. That negotiation did involve the allies because that was a NATO-Warsaw Pact negotiation.

But coming back to SALT, just at that time, my father-in-law died and his funeral was in the first couple of weeks of February and I was unable to return for the funeral. I had only been in Geneva 10 days or so and was supposed to go to Vienna to brief the MBFR delegation. I've always regretted that I didn't go back for the funeral because I think I should have. But I didn't. I have tried to be more responsive—to be there more for people subsequently. It was something that did affect me that way. I've long regretted that I didn't return for his funeral. I did visit him a couple of times before I left when he was dying of cancer. But, I still believe I should have returned.

Anyway, so the delegation was working hard on the draft text. General Rowney, representing the Joint Chiefs, kept introducing into the deliberations provisions to be added to the draft text that President Ford had explicitly rejected as part of the U.S. negotiating position at Vladivostok. One of them was to limit the rate of deployment of MIRVed strategic systems, to limit the rate at which MIRVs would be deployed. Well, that affected only the Soviets. As I said, in early 1975 the Soviets didn't have any MIRVed systems and we had completed our deployments. So, it was a totally one-sided provision. Ford had rejected that as a possibility for tabling at Vladivostok but Rowney kept pressing to include it in the draft text. The rest of the delegation was opposed. Some were more opposed than others. The Chairman of the delegation, Alex Johnson, in particular was opposed because he represented the President and the White House. Rowney refused to give way. This impasse continued for a couple of weeks. The few days I was in Vienna, it apparently got quite vituperative and when I returned there was complete stalemate. We just could not get agreement among the delegation on the draft text. We wanted to get it back to Washington so we could get Washington's approval and put it on the table to the Soviets. Most of the rest of the text was agreed upon within a week to ten days after I returned from Vienna except for the Rowney add-ons. There were five of them of the same nature as the MIRV deployment rate provision. All provisions had been explicitly rejected by the President of the United States for tabling in Vladivostok.

Q: Could Alex Johnson play the presidential card?

GRAHAM: At that time, you couldn't do that. Rowney represented the Chiefs and there was no consensus on the delegation. So, we thought and thought about it and Jack

Mendelsohn and I discussed it on the telephone several times with Roger Molander, the arms control person on the National Security Council staff in Washington. At one point, Roger said, “Why don’t we just put these Rowney proposals in a separate cable and send it to the SALT action officer in Calcutta, India?” So, Jack and I thought that was a great idea. We developed a slight variant of that idea. We actually implemented it. We asked the chairman, Ambassador Johnson, to propose to the delegation that the Rowney add-ons were so important that they should be in a separate cable sent back to Washington and then the pedestrian draft text be sent in the first cable. The delegation agreed to that unanimously. So, we sent out one cable to Washington with the draft text as agreed and then a second cable with the five proposed Rowney add-ons. That second cable was known forever afterwards as the Calcutta Cable.

Q: In other words, you’re sending it out into the blue.

GRAHAM: Into never-never land. There of course was no SALT action officer in Calcutta. In fact, there is no embassy in Calcutta. There is a consulate, but they only stamp passports and talk to proposed immigrants. That was the same as sending it into oblivion. But of course it was sent to Washington, but separately. So, the two cables were sent and Alex Johnson asked if I would return to Washington to help shepherd the draft text through the bureaucracy in Washington. I agreed to do that and returned to Washington a few days after the cables were sent. The first day I was back, I went to a very large meeting in the Old Executive Office Building chaired by Jan Lodal, the senior national security person on the National Security Council staff for whom Roger Molander and one or two other officials worked. He chaired the meeting. There must have been 40 people there. It was a large meeting. He said, summing up the meeting, “We have two cables. We have this pedestrian cable with the draft text and then we have this very important cable which has the General Rowney proposed add-ons which we have to consider very seriously. What I propose is that we have a senior group from the various agencies assembled today by late morning to address the second cable with the General Rowney proposals and then we have a low-level group to consider the first cable and work on those ordinary provisions.” In this large audience were many very conservative right-wing people from the Pentagon who pretty much agreed with General Rowney. One of them was Jim Wade, the senior international security person at the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He had, to a degree, a world view similar to that of General Rowney. He largely supported the proposals in the General Rowney cable. And there were others of similar view.

So, what Lodal suggested was promptly done. A meeting was organized with senior people, including Jim Wade and others from the Pentagon, to address the Rowney cable, which was chaired by Lodal. Then a second meeting was held in the Old Executive Office Building to go through the draft text. That was chaired by Molander and 6 others—1 from each agency. I was there as the legal advisor. Jim Timbie from the Arms Control Agency. A very practical general from the Joint Chiefs. I don’t remember who the OSD representative was. The second meeting probably started at 2:00 PM and the morning Lodal meeting probably at 10:00 AM. We promptly went to work for 3 hours and by 5:00 PM, our small meeting of 6 people had gone through the entire proposed text

and had agreed on every provision. The general from the Joint Chiefs suggested one small item be added and we all agreed to that—the only change. So, at 5:00 PM, we finished our deliberations on the draft text. Just about that time in the larger meeting nearby with the senior people addressing the Rowney add-ons, I guess Lodal was informed by messenger or somehow from Molander that we had finished our work. He then promptly declared that President Ford rejected the whole thing and that was the end of the meeting. So, all the people from the senior meeting came rushing over to our meeting saying that Lodal had just terminated their meeting saying that the President was opposed to all these provisions. “What’s going on in your meeting?” Molander replied, “Sorry, it’s over. We’re finished.” So, that was the first phase of how the draft text was handled and the problem of the General Rowney right-wing add-ons.

Q: There are obviously tactics in order to break them away. Did the Rowney adherents understand how it had been done?

GRAHAM: I will get to that. Naturally, OSD was not happy with that. They asked for a Verification Panel meeting, the equivalent of a cabinet meeting. The Verification Panel was invented by Kissinger to take the process away from the Director of ACDA during SALT I. The Verification Panel was chaired by Kissinger. The NSC process had been chaired by the ACDA director, Gerard Smith as I indicated earlier. During SALT I, Kissinger had wanted to bypass him, so he created the concept of a Verification Panel and gradually drew all power to it. By the time of SALT II, the Verification Panel was the equivalent of what’s now called the principals meeting of the National Security Council. The OSD asked for such a meeting. The Rowney initiative was largely an interest of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, not the Joint Chiefs really, although Rowney represented the Joint Chiefs in Geneva. The OSD representative on the delegation was in those days Michael May. He was not a Rowney ally by any means. In any case, Deputy Secretary Clements represented the hard right conservative elements in OSD and they were sort of aligned with a few such elements in the Joint Chiefs, of course, with direct ties to Senator Jackson, Richard Perle and others in the Senate. OSD asked for a Verification Panel meeting and a few days later that was duly scheduled and chaired by Kissinger. I went to it as the legal advisor. It was held in the Situation Room in the White House, which is quite a small room. There was a table where maybe 8 people could sit and then there were chairs for maybe 10 more behind. I was in one of those chairs behind. I don’t remember exactly what time of day it was. Let’s say it was at 3:00PM. Present were Deputy Secretary Clements for OSD, the Secretary of State, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Director of CIA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and Kissinger, and a few others that were sitting around in the back. Promptly at 3:00, in walks Kissinger and sits down. Kissinger was programmed in those days much the way Ronald Reagan was programmed when he was President—in other words, to the minute. Kissinger announced, “Well, we have 1 hour, gentlemen. Let’s begin our discussion. I understand that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has some concerns about the SALT II draft text.” He was in the chair and seated to his immediate left was Deputy Secretary Clements representing OSD. The Secretary of Defense was not present. It would have been Schlesinger in 1975. To his right was the

Secretary of State. The other officials that I mentioned were grouped around the table. Kissinger, after making an opening comment, also referred to the Backfire bomber, questioning whether it should be included. The Backfire bomber was a large medium bomber that the conservatives claimed was a strategic bomber but really wasn't. They wanted it included in the SALT aggregates as a heavy bomber and the Soviets were adamantly opposed. He said something about that as well. Essentially this meeting was a follow-on to the Lodal/Molander exercise that I mentioned earlier.

After those opening remarks, Kissinger then turned to Clements and said, "Now, Bill, I spoke last week in Houston." Bill Clements was very much a Texan—he subsequently was governor of Texas for two terms. He was very suspicious of ACDA. Later that year, in December, the Air Force had canceled the airplane that was normally scheduled to take the delegation back to Washington. It had been the practice since the beginning of the SALT negotiations for the delegation to travel to and from the negotiations site on an Air Force plane. This had been going on for 6 years. In December of 1975, later that year, the Air Force notified Ambassador Johnson that the plane was canceled. The delegation would have to go back on commercial flights. Johnson appealed that change to the front office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He received a letter from Deputy Secretary Clements which said, in effect, "Dear Ambassador Johnson, the cancellation of the Air Force airplane is confirmed. U.S. Air Force planes are only used for matters that are in the national security interest of the United States." That reflects Clements's world view, suggesting that the SALT II negotiations were contrary to the national security interests of the United States. So, Kissinger says, "Bill, last week I made a speech in Houston. Next week, I'm going to make a speech in Dallas. Are there differences between audiences in Houston and audiences in Dallas?" There followed a 59-minute discussion about the differences between audiences in Houston and audiences in Dallas. Then when the hour was up, Kissinger looked at his watch and said, "Well, 4:00, times up. I guess we're all agreed. Text goes as it is." He stood up and walked out. That was how that meeting was handled.

The next day, over at the State Department when we were putting the approval cable in final form, in walks Kissinger's deputy, Bill Hyland, with some kind of follow-on to the Verification Panel meeting, and he said, "You have to include this new provision in the draft text." He ordered us to include it on his authority, or the authority of the White House." He didn't order us to include any of the Rowney add-ons, but it was a new rather enormously one-sided provision on verification. I forget exactly what it provided, but it was something the Soviets could never accept and it was an extreme position on verification. It stayed in our draft text until quite a distance into the Carter administration several years later. But he insisted that we put that in on the authority of the White House, so we did. We sent the cable to Geneva. Johnson was outraged about this one addition. Nevertheless the White House had knocked out all of the add-ons. We did have a draft text to put on the table with the Soviets, which we did on about March 1st.

Q: Did you view this add-on on verification as saying, "This isn't going to fly, but it gives us something to give up at some point?"

GRAHAM: No, it wasn't that. It was understood it wouldn't fly. It was to appease the anger in Defense. That was the only reason. Hyland said something about, "We don't want to be attacked again by Senator Jackson so, we have to put this in."

Q: So the draft treaty, the standard treaty that you had all agreed to, went back to Geneva, plus this meat for the carnivores on the right.

GRAHAM: It was like a new article three.

Q: With that, you presented that to the Soviets?

GRAHAM: Yes. The way the negotiations were organized, we had twice a week plenary meetings with the full delegations on both sides and each ambassador made a speech. Then you broke up into post-plenary discussions, which were very scripted discussions. You had the generals together and you had the people from the defense departments together and some of the service people together. In those days, I, as I have mentioned, often sat with Mike May and his opposite number, Academician Shchukin. He was listed as being from the Academy of Sciences, but, in fact, he was a defense scientist. He, Andre Sakharov and Dr. Tamm were the three scientists who created the Soviet hydrogen bomb. But, he was a very cultured person. He was then in his mid to late 70s. When he was 17, he joined the Red Army in 1917 in Petrograd. He was from a bourgeois family. His family owned a department store in St. Petersburg; they were upper middle class. He told us that French was the first language he learned before he learned to speak Russian. So, Mike was a natural. He was born and grew up in southern France and then went to Vietnam right before World War II. His father was the designer and architect for the Bach Mai hospital in Hanoi, the famous one that was destroyed by U.S. B-52s during the Vietnam War. He was sent from Vietnam to the United States because of the impending war in about 1940 when he was 14 years old. French was his first language. He even spoke English after all those years to some degree with a French accent. He was a wonderful person whom I admire greatly. He's now long since retired but in the last decade or so he's been the co-Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. I've seen him during my teaching visits there.

So, that's the way the negotiations worked in those days. At one of these plenary meetings around March 1st, Ambassador Johnson made a speech and put our draft text on the table.

Q: Was there a Soviet counterpart where you could take the 2 texts and come up with the way it was going to come out anyway? Or were the negotiations a time to show... I'm thinking of labor negotiations where often the labor and management know exactly where they're going to come out but they have to go through and have an all-night session.

GRAHAM: Nothing like that. These were negotiations between two enormous bureaucracies. Every dotted "I" was gone over and over and over. What happened was, after the U.S. text was on the table, three working groups were established. One was called the Drafting Group. One was called the Military Subgroup. And I think there was a

Verification Subgroup. The latter two working groups only lasted a few months and then were disbanded as not being useful. The Drafting Group continued until the end of the negotiations and was regarded as a very important part of the negotiations, although it—after the passage of a year or two—became bureaucratized as well. For the last year of the negotiations, we established a small subgroup of the Drafting Group, which ended up solving the difficult textual problems at the end. I established that with the authority of the delegation chairman. I picked as innocuous a name as I could and called it the Conforming Subgroup, but it did a lot more than conforming the texts. Anyway, in 1975, the Drafting Group was established. It was chaired on the U.S. side by the State Department representative, Boris Klaussen. The deputy chair on our side was Ralph Earle, the ACDA representative. I was there as the legal advisor. There was a representative from the Joint Chiefs and from OSD. And of course each Member of the Delegation had several staff assistants. That was probably it.

On the Soviet side, the deputy head of delegation chaired. That was Karpov, who later on became the head of delegation. His right hand person was Victor Smolin, who was a senior advisor on the Soviet side but also kind of became my opposite number. He was their “lawyer,” although he wasn’t a lawyer. He was the man that worked the text. I worked very closely with him for over four years from March of 1975 until June of 1979. I remember, the first meeting of the Drafting Group was at the Soviet mission. Victor Smolin opened the door and as we were walking in said, “Well, gentlemen, are you ready to do strategic battle?” He was a very interesting person, very sharp, very smart, and really dedicated to the process. He was an important part of SALT I also. He did other things after SALT was over. I saw him in Moscow right before the CFE negotiations in 1989. Then he was sent to Colombia as the last Soviet ambassador to Colombia. Then roughly, at the time of the attempted coup in 1991, he committed suicide, as did several other senior Soviets. But he was a very interesting person, as was Karpov. That was how the real SALT II negotiations began in March of 1975. The delegations remained in session until the first week in May of 1975. Since they did, I was unable to attend the Kentucky Derby that year. One of two years that I’ve missed since 1964. I’ve been to 33 out of the last 35 derbies. What we did is, we formed the first joint draft text which meant we put the two texts together in the same document. In the English language, where there was conflict, we had U.S. proposal in brackets followed by the Soviet proposal in brackets. We had a “1” after the U.S. proposal and a “2” after the Soviet proposal. It was reversed in the Russian text. In those early months, virtually the entire text was in brackets, except we agreed on the title of the treaty, a couple of the preambler provisions, we agreed that the Treaty was to be verified by national technical means, and we agreed that there would be a supreme interest withdrawal cause. Those provisions were not in brackets. Everything else was in brackets. The first joint draft text appeared on May 5, 1975. That was blessed by the full delegations at the plenary. Then we recessed for about a month. On our way home in an Air Force plane, we stopped in Brussels and Ambassador Johnson gave a short briefing to the North Atlantic Council.

We returned to Geneva in late June, maybe early July 1975. My youngest daughter, Clover, was born on June 20, 1975. She became in the minds of some identified with the joint draft text. For example, two years later, Smolin would say, “How old is Baby

Clover now?" I would say, "Two years and two months." He says, "Oh, we've been working on this joint draft text for two years and two months and we still have so much to do." There was a direct relationship in many people's minds since she was born at about the time the joint draft text was born. For years, the SALT delegation referred to my youngest daughter not as "Clover" but as "Baby Clover." Many years later when she was about 21, at a funeral in Georgetown, Washington, I introduced her to Ralph Earle who hadn't met her before, who was the deputy head of the Drafting Group then and later became Chief Negotiator. I said, "Ralph, this is Baby Clover."

We began again in July. Essentially we stayed in session—the longest SALT II session—the longest arms control session I've ever participated in. We stayed in session from July until December in Geneva. I went home a couple of times, as did others just for R&R. A few more things were accomplished. A few more provisions were unbracketed, but there was not a great deal of progress the rest of 1975. There was a complete impasse on the subject of cruise missiles and Backfire bombers. Not much progress on verification either.

I should say here that in preparing the first draft of the U.S. draft text in December/January, 1974-75, I had several personal objectives. First was to regularize the use of "agreed statements" and "common understandings," which had been loosely used during SALT I. "Agreed statements" would be for substantive additions to the text. "Common understandings" would be for interpretive matters. But they would both be formal. Secondly, there had been great confusion created by Kissinger during the ratification of SALT I over the degree to which Soviet missile capability growth was limited by SALT I. As I earlier said he claimed that the provision restricting the growth in silo dimensions, ICBM missile silo dimensions—about which there was considerable interpretive difference—combined with the limitation on the number of missile launchers, the freeze on the number of launchers, which didn't accomplish that much in terms of limiting capability growth, and the definition of a heavy ICBM, were an effective limitation on the growth of Soviet missile capability. The definition of a heavy ICBM that was proposed during SALT I was "any missile larger in volume than the Soviet missile the SS11 is, a heavy ICBM." That was explicitly rejected by the Soviets because they knew they had something larger in volume coming along which they were not going to give up. The Interim Agreement froze the number of heavy ICBM launchers so they couldn't have any more than the 308 they already had. The interim agreement froze the number of heavy ICBM launchers as they were on May 26, 1972. That gave 308 to the Soviets and none to us. We never had a heavy ICBM as defined in any SALT proposal. About the silo dimension provision, that provision said that the dimensions of a silo launcher could not be increased by more than 15%. Kissinger said, and we said during the SALT I ratification proceedings, that this meant a total, that the depth could be increased, for example, by 7% and the width by 8%. The total couldn't be more than 15%. That would permit a volume increase of 32%. We subsequently found out the Soviet interpretation was you could increase by 15 percent in each dimension, which resulted in a 52% permitted increase in silo volume. Senator Jackson during the SALT I ratification proceedings pointed out that this hasn't been made clear, that it could be read as 52%, and therefore this is a very uncertain provision. Kissinger made all his arguments

at a White House presentation on SALT I in June of 1972 and then they subsequently came out and were criticized by Jackson during the SALT I ratification hearings. But, in effect, the Kissinger position was misleading. The silo dimension provision was agreed to by Kissinger and Nixon at the summit in 1972 and the White House had no idea how to interpret it. They just made up that combination of 8 and 7 or whatever. The limit on the number of heavy ICBM was real, but the definition of a heavy ICBM had been explicitly rejected by the Soviets. I tried to address those questions in the draft text by providing for a definition of a heavy ICBM that was more precise. Eventually, it evolved into something else. I tried to make that more precise and I tried to make the silo launcher dimensions provision more precise. Then lastly, Senator Jackson had criticized the SALT I agreement because the U.S. and the Soviets never agreed explicitly on numbers. The Soviets wouldn't even discuss the number of ICBMs and SLBMs that they had. He strongly criticized that. So, I had a provision in the draft text for an agreed database of the number of ICBMs on each side, the number of SLBMs, and so forth. In those first months, it was rather vague, but the concept was in there. So, those things were also in the draft text, but we didn't make any progress on them either in the balance of 1975. But, in 1976, on the question of the silo launcher limitation and the definition of the heavy ICBM, we did make progress. But all through 1975, whenever we had a chance, all of us on the delegation would say, "We've got to have a definition of a heavy ICBM." On our side, it evolved into being based on launch weight, the weight of the missile prior to launch, and throw weight, the weight of what can be delivered on target. Senator Jackson made much of the throw weight disparity between the U.S. and the Soviets in the SALT I ratification proceedings and subsequently. The Soviets tended to build very large, less accurate missiles. And we tended to build smaller missiles that were far more accurate. Ours were better than theirs. No one would ever suggest they would trade U.S. missiles for Soviet missiles. Nevertheless, this became a very big political issue, the throw weight disparity. It was a cloud that hung over the strategic negotiations for years. It was in part to address that question that it was so important to have a definition of a heavy ICBM. I don't remember exactly when it came into the draft text, but in addition to defining a heavy ICBM on the basis of launch weight and throw weight, we also proposed that there be an upper limit on the launch weight and throw weight of heavy ICBMs themselves so as to cap the Soviet heavy ICBM capability. Again, there was very little progress during the remainder of 1975. That took us to 1976.

Q: This is a good place to stop. We're going to pick this up in 1976.

Today is April 24, 2002.

GRAHAM: We're picking up again in 1976. 1976 was a presidential election year. But even more than that, it was a year when there was a vigorous primary battle as well within the Republican Party with Governor Reagan challenging President Ford and nearly beating him in the primaries. So, the White House was running scared all year. At the very beginning of January, Ford and Kissinger had decided they might want to make one more try with SALT II, but Fred Iklé, the Director of ACDA, along with the Chief of

Staff of the Army, went to see Ford and told him that they could not support a SALT II agreement on the basis that Kissinger had worked out. So, that shelved any possibility for a SALT II agreement in 1976. According to rumors at the time, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld gave President Ford two pieces of advice. One, he should shelve SALT II. Two, he should drop Nelson Rockefeller as Vice President. If he did so, Reagan would not challenge him in the primaries. Both pieces of advice turned out to be bad. Nelson Rockefeller was dropped. Reagan did challenge Ford. And the dropping of Rockefeller probably cost Ford the election as Rockefeller—if he had been on the ticket—would have carried New York and that would have been enough to win.

Q: Who did Ford put as the Vice President?

GRAHAM: Bob Dole.

The second bit of advice, Ham Jordon, the senior aide to President Jimmy Carter told Ford or somebody close to him after Carter had won the election, “The one thing that would have beaten us was a SALT II agreement.” So shelving SALT II was not wise either. Those were two consistent pieces of advice from Rumsfeld, both bad.

Q: Donald Rumsfeld is the Secretary of Defense again now.

GRAHAM: Correct.

So, Kissinger went to Moscow in January and worked out with Brezhnev an agreement on defining heavy ICBMs on the basis of launch weight and throw weight and an agreement that the various provisions of SALT II distinguishing between light and heavy ICBMs would be on that basis and secondly there would be a cap on the size of heavy ICBMs based on launch weight and throw weight. That was Kissinger’s last agreement on strategic arms. It was a useful one. The delegations in Geneva spent most of 1976 working this out. It seems simple on the surface, but it isn’t really. In the first place, the United States side had only a dim idea of what throw weight really was even though it had been part of our political lexicon ever since the end of SALT I and Senator Jackson’s attack on SALT I. The Soviets had no idea what it was. So, we conducted a seminar in Geneva in February and March for the two delegations on what is throw weight and what is launch weight. George Schneitter, a very capable officer at OSD, came over and led the seminar. During that two-month period, we concluded that launch weight was the weight of the missile prior to launch but free from any attachments to it. Throw weight we agreed was what was deliverable on the other side by the missile. That meant the exit shroud, which was dropped early in flight, did not count in throw weight. What comprised throw weight was the weight of the bus, (the dispensing mechanism,) and the reentry vehicle and the warheads. The weight of the dispensing mechanism and the reentry vehicle and warheads comprised throw weight. We used the term “bus” for the dispensing vehicle, but the Russians didn’t. So, we created a term that we could use in English and Russian that made sense.

Q: This sounds like it would be handy to have Russian experts sit in, too.

GRAHAM: I wasn't clear. Both the American and Russian Drafting Group delegations with some attached experts were part of this seminar. So, the phrase we invented for SALT / II was "self-contained dispensing mechanism." We had a little sub-agreement in the SALT II treaty that what that means for Americans is the "bus." That translated well into Russian. That's the term in the SALT II treaty referring to the vehicle that dispenses the reentry vehicles and warheads in MIRV systems. So, that took a long time to work out. Indeed, it took until about September or October 1976 to finally agree on the concept and to agree on the treaty language. What we ended up with was a definition of heavy ICBMs. We agreed that the distinguishing characteristics between light and heavy ICBMs would be based on launch weight and throw weight, defined concepts in the treaty. It was agreed that the Soviet SS-19 missile would be considered the largest light ICBM and anything heavier than that would be a heavy ICBM governed by the appropriate rules on light ICBMs and heavy ICBMs. That is, you couldn't convert light launchers for light ICBMs into light launchers for heavy ICBMs and so forth. That was a carryover from SALT I. We also agreed that the Soviet SS-18 missile would be considered the largest heavy ICBM. It was further agreed that there would be a prohibition on any missile larger than the SS-18. That was based on the cap of launch weight and throw weight. Any missile that was heavier in either launch weight or throw weight than the SS-18 would be prohibited. Any missile that was heavier than the SS-19 was to be considered a heavy ICBM and subject to the limitation on heavy ICBMs. Further, it was agreed that the limitation on increasing silo volume would be carried over from SALT I and it was defined in SALT II as a prohibition on volumetric increase rather than in dimensions. ICBM silo launchers would not be increased in volume by greater than 32%. We had the dispute in SALT I as to whether the prohibition on the increase in dimensions of ICBM silo launchers in either length or diameter not greater than 15% meant you could have 8% in one and 7% in another or 15% in both, which made a difference between a 32% volume increase in the U.S. understanding or a 52% volume increase in the Soviet. Thus, this issue was settled in SALT II in 1976 on the basis of the American interpretation of 32% volume increase and expressed in those terms. That was the sum total of progress in 1976, but it was important progress. Even though no SALT II treaty was concluded during the Ford years, there was important progress made beyond Vladivostok and Ambassador Johnson had all of this recorded in a memorandum to the President with the joint draft text of November 1976 attached to it explaining exactly what issues had been resolved and what issues remained.

Q: In the delegation, was there any sense of unease as you moved into an election year, the thought that, here we are, the people who know what the thing is, but the political might want to rush to an agreement?

GRAHAM: If anything, it was the opposite; politicians for their own interests were stalling on the agreement, so that SALT was—in this way—being sacrificed for political purposes. Over the years, delay was more a concern of the delegations than that there was a rush. We were moving slower than the professionals thought we should rather than faster in this process.

Q: When you talk about that seminar with the Russians and the Americans sitting down and discussing this, here are 2 groups of people very seriously looking at esoteric things of mutual self-destruction. How are we going to kill ourselves? Well, we don't want to kill ourselves with this or that. But when you get right down to it...

GRAHAM: That's right. And not only kill ourselves, but probably kill the whole world.

Q: I refer to "ourselves" as mankind. It really has a touch of the surreal about it, but I guess the whole nuclear issue has that surreal feel.

GRAHAM: The whole thing was absurd if you step back from it. Minister of Atomic Energy, Mikhaylov, of the Russian Federation in 1997 said the Soviet Union built 45,000 nuclear weapons and made enough nuclear explosive material for 90,000 more. The U.S. built over 70,000 nuclear weapons. That's 115,000 nuclear weapons, all of them much larger than the weapons that destroyed Hiroshima, some of them thousands of times more powerful. We had Titan II missiles deployed around the United States in the late 1950s/early 1960s. They each had one nine-megaton warhead on them. If you took one of those warheads, which you could probably fit in the back of a sports utility vehicle, and put it on at the Washington Monument and set it off, it would flatten Washington out to the Beltway in all directions, one bomb. And one megaton could be considered to be the equivalent of a freight train loaded with TNT that stretches from New York to Los Angeles. And we were carrying bombs in the 1960s on our bombers that were 25 megatons in yield. It was incredible. The Soviet Union ended up bankrupting itself and the U.S. certainly damaged its economy. We spent 5.8 trillion dollars on the nuclear arms race. If we had really tried to regulate it effectively early on, we could have spent 1/100 of that and still had the same balance of forces. We are very lucky we didn't destroy ourselves.

Q: 1976 ends the Ford administration and the Carter administration comes in. Was there a new dynamic?

GRAHAM: Oh, very much a new dynamic. President Carter was going to steer us to success in the strategic nuclear negotiations, among other things. Early on Zbigniew Brzezinski, his national security advisor, decided that the way to success was to get close to Senator Jackson and Richard Perle and work out a deal with them and then sell that to the Russians. That's what was done in February of 1977. Ambassador Johnson did submit a memorandum of outstanding issues with the attached final joint draft text to President Ford at the end of 1976. Early on in the Carter administration, or before inauguration, Walt Slocum, who became Assistant Secretary of Defense under Harold Brown and Under Secretary of Defense for 8 years under Clinton, came to see Ambassador Johnson and thanked him for the memorandum which had been passed on to the transition team under President Carter and told him that he was fired. So, that was his departure.

Coming back to President Carter, in February of 1977, Brzezinski made an effort to work

something out with Jackson and Perle to be submitted to the Soviets. President Carter publicly said that he was prepared for an agreement, which by-passed cruise missiles and Backfire. That was precisely what the Soviets had been telling us for years they didn't want. That was a non-starter. Carter also said something about banning mobile ICBMs. That was more achievable as neither side had land mobile ICBMs at that time. This was developed into a proposal, which essentially significantly reduced the Soviet capability in land-based ICBMs and while not significantly limiting the U.S. superiority in submarine launched ballistic missiles. This was very much what the START II Treaty—negotiated between Bush and Yeltsin and signed in early 1993—actually did accomplish, building on the START I treaty negotiated by Reagan and Bush with Gorbachev. This Treaty was signed but never ratified. But, in 1977 the Soviets were definitely not ready for such a radical departure, especially one that they saw as sharply tilted in favor of the United States. Secretary Vance took this proposal to Moscow in March, 1977 and Brzezinski saw fit to leak it to the press before Vance got there. The Soviets first learned about it not from Vance but from the New York Times. This did not make a favorable impression on the Soviet leadership. The Vance proposal was summarily rejected by the Soviets.

Q: Was the feeling that Brzezinski did this to start playing the Kissinger game or was this designed to sabotage?

GRAHAM: I think it was both. Brzezinski very much wanted to play the Kissinger game and did or tried to. There was a permanent rivalry between Vance and Brzezinski, which became very bitter.

The Soviets rejected the March proposal. Secretary Vance and Les Gelb—who was in this administration for the first couple of years as Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs—and a few other people reformulated the U.S. SALT II proposal into a quite creative framework which eventually was accepted as a framework by Gromyko at a May 1977 meeting between Vance and Gromyko and the two delegations in Geneva. Unlike Kissinger, Vance always worked in close coordination with the U.S. Geneva delegation, usually taking with him two or three senior members to his meetings with Gromyko whether they were in Geneva or in Moscow. So, there was a much better working relationship between the Secretary of State and the delegation than had been the case under Kissinger but there still was the problem with Brzezinski at the NSC.

Q: Where were you in this?

GRAHAM: During the Ford administration I was deputy General Counsel of ACDA and I was the SALT II legal advisor. I spent a lot of time with the delegation in Geneva drafting the treaty provisions and helping to negotiate it as part of the Drafting Group. When Carter came in, I was appointed the General Counsel of the agency but I continued as legal advisor. So, I spent a little less time in Geneva and had more responsibilities in Washington. I recruited my close colleague and longtime great friend, Jack McNeil, to be my deputy legal advisor in Geneva. We worked very closely on that until the conclusion of SALT II in June of 1979. So, I was going back and forth to Geneva a lot but not as

much as in the Ford administration.

Q: Had you shed your Republican identity? I mean, this wasn't a particular issue at this point?

GRAHAM: I was identified to Paul Warnke, who appointed me General Counsel, as a Republican. Ralph Earle, one of those who urged my appointment as General Counsel, said, "Some Republicans are good."

Q: But there wasn't a wholesale cleaning out of anybody who was tainted with Republicanism?

GRAHAM: There was some of that, but I escaped it. Certainly all the Republican politicals went. I was kind of borderline at that time. From 1977 to 1997, I was pretty much apolitical. Even though I was appointed to positions in the Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations, I was somewhat apolitical.

Q: Let's stick to the Carter period for now. Was there a political cast to being a Republican?

GRAHAM: I don't know if there ever was a Republican or a Democratic cast to this. Paul Nitze and Max Kampelman and others were great critics of the SALT II process, particularly as Carter managed it. But they were both Democrats. Richard Perle was a Democrat. By the same token, I was a Republican and John Rhinelander, who was outside the government then, was a great supporter of the SALT II process, and also a Republican. I think it was more ideological than political. Some people favored arms control. Some people didn't. Some people thought that restrictions on the United States only helped the Soviet Union. Other people thought that the way to peace and stability was to reach verifiable and sound agreements with the Soviet Union to regulate and control the arms race. It was more a difference in philosophy and ideology than politics, although in 1980 and during the presidential campaign, certainly at least elements of the Republican Party did take on an anti-arms control, anti-SALT position as a political matter. Howard Baker ran for President briefly in 1980 and based his campaign on his opposition to SALT II. Governor Reagan took a very anti-arms control position during the 1980 election although he changed after he was President. But in 1977, I remember fierce partisan battles over philosophy and ideology and policy but they weren't so much between Republicans and Democrats as between those who believed in arms control and those who didn't. For example, President Ford supported arms control. Senator Jackson opposed it. Secretary Rumsfeld even then opposed arms control. He was a Republican. And President Carter strongly supported it. You had Democrats and Republicans on both sides.

Q: During the Carter period, how did things move?

GRAHAM: I was talking about the Vance reformulation. It was really brilliant. What was proposed was that we convert Vladivostok into something a little bit different, that the

2400 limitation would include ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and strategic bombers as well as strategic bombers carrying cruise missiles. That was the overall aggregate. And it would be reduced to 2250 after something like 18 months. Then the 1320 limitation on MIRV systems would include MIRVed ICBM launchers, MIRVed SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers carrying cruise missiles, which would be considered MIRV systems within that 1320. Then there would be a new aggregate of 1200, which would cover ICBM and SLBM MIRVed launchers. Then there would be still a further limit of 820 on MIRVed ICBM launchers. So, it was kind of a compromise between the March proposal and the Vladivostok proposal brilliantly put together and, as a concept, it proved acceptable to the Soviet Union. On that basis, in the last two years of the SALT II negotiations, that was the basic form that the SALT II treaty finally took. It combined the Soviet desire to limit MIRVed systems and U.S. cruise missile carrying bombers and cruise missiles with the U.S. desire to put tighter limits on Soviet land-based missiles. It was very well done. We spent the last two years, May 1977 until June 1979, working out the SALT II treaty on that basis. A lot of progress was made in 1977. We were able to agree on that formulation and were able to agree on a number of subsidiary provisions. An agreement in 1978 became increasingly possible and we were working on solving the telemetry encryption problem.

As an aside, there was a brief diversion in early 1978 because of a memo prepared in November 1977. I probably need to back up still further to the confirmation proceedings of Paul Warnke because they are central to what happened in 1977 and 1979. The Warnke confirmation hearings briefly caused President Carter to abandon the treaty concept and go for an agreement to be approved by both Houses because of the vote on Warnke in the Senate, although that was short-lived. But also, the SALT negotiations by relatively early in 1978 were put on stall because of the desire to ratify the Panama Canal Treaty and also to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. SALT II was put off to 1979. If it had been concluded in 1978, it undoubtedly would have been ratified. But being concluded in June of 1979, it became vulnerable to the oncoming 1980 political campaign. But I need to talk a lot more about all of that.

Q: Today is the 14th of March, 2013 and after a really considerable hiatus, we are back again with Tom Graham.

We are talking about the 1970s and you correct me if I am wrong and before we get into more of the particulars, we have already looked at our transcript up to now, what would you say was the attitude of the Soviets you were dealing with? You mentioned the various people on our delegations. It seems to be a bit of trying to herd a bunch of kittens. There were people going all the way including Richard Perle as a Democrat but going off in his own way and various disarmament things became very political rather than I would say practical. Did you sense the same sort of thing going on in the Soviet delegation or in this 1970s period?

GRAHAM: The Soviets were considerably different from us. They followed very closely

what was going on in the United States and tried to understand it.

About that time—to give you an impression of the way they looked at things—it was actually a couple of years later, maybe 1981, I hosted in my office at the State Department a senior KGB general and we were talking about our respective societies and cultures and he said, “You know, we are really just the same. We don’t disclose anything so you don’t understand us. You disclose everything and we can’t figure out what’s true and what’s false so we don’t understand you. So it comes out the same.” I have always remembered that. They often were mystified by our politics and to some extent we are mystified ourselves about our own politics.

But in terms of the Soviet side, the Soviet government was very cautious. The Soviet delegation, reflecting the attitude of the Soviet government in the 1970s, would take one position and they would argue for it very logically and they would stay on that position for a long period of time. Then, if you could persuade them that it was wrong or that it was partly wrong or should be modified, they did listen to logical argument—unlike us. We listened less, I always thought, to logical argument and responded more to politics and emotion, not that logic is not in the picture at all but it was more important and more significant for them. If you could persuade them through argumentation that they should change, sometimes they did and would change very suddenly. They would be arguing one position on Monday and then the next day it would be completely different because their instructions had come in.

The Soviet delegation was definitely separate from the Soviet government just as ours was. We might persuade them of the value of something but, then, Moscow was in a different place. They would then try to persuade Moscow that the Americans on this one were right. That’s really the value of having delegations because capitals can always send cables back and forth but if you have two delegations or however many countries there are, but one delegation per country, their being together and the interaction between them can often lead to positive developments because of the dynamic I was just discussing. One delegation persuades another delegation its position should be modified. It then takes on the task of persuading its government. That was very, very true with the Soviets.

The best example of this that I can think of relates to negotiations with the Soviet Union and the two intercontinental ballistic missile sites in Ukraine—Derazhnya and Pervomaik, still part of the Soviet Union at that time. We had, through laborious negotiations, persuaded the Soviets that in order to make verification possible of a strategic arms limitation treaty, like SALT II, a very comprehensive one, we had to have tight rules. Otherwise, the satellites couldn’t do their job and verify the treaty. The two rules we agreed upon were once an ICBM launcher is associated, that is, has deployed in it a missile that is considered a missile with MIRVs, with multiple independent targetable reentry vehicles—in other words, a missile with multiple warheads, separately targetable—once the launcher is associated with a missile of that type, then all launchers of that type are considered to contain missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, whether they have missiles in them or not. They are all counted that way.

And likewise, missiles, a particular type, SS-18, SS-17, SS-16, Peacekeeper in the U.S. and so on—once a missile of a certain type is associated with multiple independently targetable warheads, that is, it is tested with them, then all missiles of that type are considered to have the same number of warheads as that missile was tested with, whether they do or not.

So these were called ‘the missile type rule ’and ‘the launcher type rule.’

It turned out there were 180 SS-11/ICBM launchers at these two sites, Derazhnya and Pervomaisk. It just happened that a - launcher of that type somewhere else, which was a test launcher, once had launched a missile with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. Our satellites had seen that and we said, “OK, Soviets. It happened one time somewhere else. All those launchers have to count as MIRVed launchers” and their plan had been to put in those launchers only single warhead missiles. Since the numbers that we were agreeing on in SALT II pertained, this circumstance just threw a huge monkey wrench into the Soviet ICBM deployment plans, a really big one. This remained un-agreed for about a year and a half. We insisted. We said, if you are going to have a missile type rule and you are going to have a launcher type rule, you can’t have any exceptions. Finally, toward the end of the negotiation the Soviets changed their position and agreed those 180 would count under the MIRVed launcher limit as well as the total launcher limit.

After the treaty was signed the Soviet ambassador, Victor Karpov, told the American ambassador who was then Ralph Earle, “You know, we agreed with you on Derazhnya and Pervomaisk” —we, the delegation, from the first day. You made a very powerful case why this had to be. It took us about a year to convince Moscow that you were right.” That’s how it happened.

Q: Did you get any feel for Moscow of power groups, political groups?

GRAHAM: The military versus the civilians, that sort of thing? Not so much. For a time the Soviet SALT II delegation had a very unpleasant KGB officer on their delegation and it was clear they didn’t like him and wanted him gone. His name was Finnegan (pronounced Finahgin) and his parents had been Irish revolutionaries who had immigrated to the Soviet Union. Finnegan was their name. We connived—the two sides connived to cook up a statement by the U.S. ambassador about the Irish and revolutions and that gave them an excuse to request that Moscow recall him. “The Americans already know all about him”. He was recalled but this incident was more personal than political.

There were military people, there were civilians but it was clear that the civilians on the Soviet SALT delegation and the military might have slightly different views but not that different. The big thing you did notice was there weren’t any non-Russians. There was one Ukrainian, once.

Q: I am trying to figure out why this would be. Ukrainians would seem to be, they were

part of the Soviet Union and they also, I guess it shows nationalistic currents were running.

GRAHAM: Even then, well, probably always. The Soviet Union and the Russian Empire before it was an empire run by Russians just like the British Empire was an empire run by the British. It wasn't any different really in that sense.

Q: I notice you came up with a figure of launchers or missile heads or I guess they were warheads. That became used as 2,000 and something and became used to include other groups. In other words, there was an agreed upon figure.

GRAHAM: Yes.

Q: And this opened up a whole new field of OK, we've got this. Now we'll throw everything in here. How did this come about?

GRAHAM: You mean throw in other limitations?

Q: I mean the argument for this. Was this seen by both sides as being a pretty good deal?

GRAHAM: SALT II?

Q: Yes.

GRAHAM: Well, yes, it was. The numbers were 2,400 ICBM launchers—submarine launched ballistic missile launchers and heavy bombers—and then there was a sub-limit of 1320 on MIRVed systems. Bombers with cruise missiles were eventually considered to be MIRVed systems. Then there was a 1200 limit on ballistic missiles with multiple independent warheads. Then there was an 820 limit on ICBM launchers with MIRVed missiles and that's what Derazhnya and Pervomaisk messed up with the Soviets. So you had all those sub-limits and, in addition, the 2400 were supposed to be reduced to 2250 and you could only have one new type of missile. So lots of things began to be added over the years of negotiations. Negotiations went on for seven years so more and more things were brought into SALT II.

On the U.S. side—it didn't seem to be so much true of the Soviet side as far as I could tell—but on the U.S. side particular agencies drove their own agendas into the U.S. position. For example, the way that the U.S. would monitor what the Soviets were doing with their missiles—say when a Soviet missile was tested at the test range in Central Asia, Tyuratam, one of the primary test ranges—but I am getting ahead of myself. When a missile was launched, it would broadcast signals to the ground.

Q: Telemetry.

GRAHAM: Telemetry. Telemetry signals, broadcast by test missiles in flight reporting on component functioning, originally were unencrypted. We had stations in northern Iran

that could pick up these signals and we knew as much about the Soviet missiles as they did. Then, of course, the Iranian revolution came along in 1979 and we lost those sites. That was one of the reasons SALT II was not approved by the Senate in 1979.

Ultimately, we developed a site in Western China. I won't say whether it is still there or not. But, then, after a few years, because of things we said and maybe other information, the Soviets figured out that we were reading their telemetry. So, they began to encode it or encrypt it. That really made CIA's job difficult. The CIA wanted a provision in SALT II prohibiting encrypted telemetry and that became one of the major issues in SALT II and on into the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) negotiations.

Eventually at the very, very end of the road when START I was approved, there was a provision saying that not only will neither side encrypt telemetry but that each side will exchange telemetry tapes for verification. But that was way down the road. During SALT II encrypted telemetry was a very big issue.

Q: The Soviets obviously must have been working on our missiles. Were they doing it by trawlers or?

GRAHAM: I am not sure. I assume they were. Our missile tests, of course, were over the ocean. It would have been easy to do and probably they did but I don't know. And, then, a lot of information about our missiles became public anyway.

Q: As you were working on the SALT agreement so much depended on satellites, I assume.

GRAHAM: It would have been impossible to have a SALT treaty without them.

Q: Were you seeing major progress in the ability of satellites to do things during this time or was it pretty much an in place?

GRAHAM: We first began using satellites about 1961 and the Soviets denounced them as a breach of international law until they got them. So the first SALT treaty signed by Nixon and Brezhnev in May of 1972 legalized the verification of those agreements using satellite technology except a different term was used—"national technical means of verification". As long as it doesn't violate international law—which means no aircraft-over flights—as long as they are out there in space, it's okay.

Q: One harkens back to Eisenhower's open skies proposal.

GRAHAM: Right. The satellites ended up producing far more information. Even if the Soviets had agreed to open skies, the satellites are there all the time. In the early days before the Soviets acquired them themselves, which was in the late 1960s, if I remember correctly, the Soviets knew when our satellites were passing overhead. They could see them perhaps with telescopes. We could see Sputnik. You could see that light in 1957. Some of the Soviet military would learn enough English to know some of our four letter epithets and they would write them in the snow next to their ICBM launchers. The one

beginning with 'f', they would write it in the snow next to the missile launcher so the satellite would see and record it.

Q: I would think one could put the equivalent to an umbrella over a site. I would think that were both sides particularly our side confident that the satellites would pretty well?

GRAHAM: I wrote a book about the subject with a colleague retired from the CIA. It's called Spy Satellites and Other Technologies That Changed the Course of history. There is a copy over there. Some professors use that book in their courses because we described those early days and the early satellites systems and so on. The CIA deserves a lot of credit for these technologies. They developed the technology that ended the necessity for worse casing the nuclear situation and thereby substantially reduced the risk of nuclear war.

Q: When you say 'worst casing', we had to assume unless we knew otherwise that all hell would break loose, whereas we knew exactly what the threat would be.

GRAHAM: We might assume and did assume that the Soviets had hundreds, thousands of nuclear missiles. We didn't know where they were before satellites. We couldn't see into the Soviet Union. We tried the U-2s for a while and they were helpful but then Gary Powers was shot down. Fortunately right at that time the satellites came along and gave us a lot more information than the U-2s ever did. We found out the truth with these and knew what the Soviets had and where it was. We knew—I wouldn't say precisely, but almost precisely—what they had and of course, eventually they knew what we had.

Q: I am not sure if it's in an earlier interview with you or another one but in one of my interviews we were sort of stating our position, our concern and the head of the Soviet delegation came and told our leader I wish you would stop giving all this missile information because a number of our people aren't cleared for this.

GRAHAM: I said that to you. Other people may have as well. That was in the very early days of SALT, the second session in 1970 in Vienna, I believe. The U.S. presented its comprehensive proposal on missile limitations with a map. It was our general, Royal Ellison, Air Force lieutenant general, who presented this to the Soviets. He said, "Okay, you have got so many missiles here and so many there and so many here and we think the total number should be this and then maybe have these adjustments and so on." We made this presentation to the Soviet side explaining our position and afterwards the Soviet chief military representative, Marshal Ogarkov who was later the chief of the Soviet general staff, approached General Ellison and said, "The leadership of the Soviet side would appreciate it if the U.S. wouldn't be so explicit to the Soviet delegation about precisely the deployments and the numbers of Soviet missile systems because most of our civilians are not cleared to know that." That's their system. On our side, that couldn't be true. We couldn't debate the issue if we weren't cleared.

Q: Was there provision made for taking a missile site and filling it in? In other words, was this part of the game or procedure at the time?

GRAHAM: You mean to be deceptive?

Q: To defang

GRAHAM: For example, in START II, not SALT II but START II, strategic arms reduction talks, we were negotiating the follow on to the first START agreement under President George H. W. Bush in 1992, his last year in office. This is a long and complicated issue but the first SALT treaty, SALT I, essentially froze the situation where it was.

U.S. technology was always superior to Soviet technology so we could do more with a smaller missile than the Soviets could so we didn't need gargantuan missiles to deliver tremendous nuclear force on the Soviet side. The largest solid fuel missile we ever developed was the MX or Peacekeeper and it ended up being—under SALT II—the largest of the light missiles. We limited the number of heavy missiles but the Soviets from the very beginning had these very big ones because they had less accuracy than we did. The Peacekeeper, the MX which came along later, was so accurate it could shoot warheads from 6,000 miles away into the courtyard of the Pentagon. It was accurate within a few hundred feet whereas the Soviets were never as accurate. So, they had bigger missiles and bigger warheads.

As a result of the SALT I freeze, the U.S. ended up with no heavy missiles. We didn't need them but weren't allowed to have any and the Soviets were allowed to have 308 which was the number of their heavy missiles and this was always a big political deal.

Q: It sounds like you're giving away.

GRAHAM: Yeah, the Soviets have these great big things and ours are just pop guns — that kind of stuff came out of the Congress. In every negotiation we had we tried to whittle down that advantage, although it wasn't really an advantage in terms of our capabilities. In SALT II we limited the throw weight, the lifting power of missiles but still the Soviets had that 300 or so heavy launcher so-called advantage. Then in START I they agreed to eliminate half of those but it was still 154 to zero. In START II, which never came into force because of U.S./Soviet politics, the Soviets agreed to eliminate the rest of the heavy ICBMs that they had but, they wanted to put single warheads in those launchers. We agreed to that and the verification arrangement that we made with them was that the silo would be left open, be filled halfway up with concrete and our satellites would come look at that. Then, they could put the light missiles in them. So that's an example, although not exactly what you are talking about

Q: It does show that basically one could micromanage this.

GRAHAM: Right. You asked if during the SALT I, SALT II periods there were improvements in capabilities of satellite photography and sensors. All I can say is that, at the very beginning, all the satellites had were cameras developed by Edwin Land who

also founded Polaroid Company and they could take pretty good pictures. For example, by the end of the 1960s Gary Powers had a camera on his U-2 that could see tennis balls on a tennis court from space. By the time SALT II was signed ten years later in 1979, the prevailing impression was that you could read newspapers from space pictures.

The system for retrieving pictures changed too. Originally with KH-9 and KH-7 systems, the pictures would be taken and dropped from the satellite like a reentry vehicle and a parachute would open. A U.S. Air Force plane would go and catch it before it fell in the ocean. Then the KH-11 was developed in the 1970s that broadcast simultaneously the pictures by electronic means back so you could get almost live pictures and they didn't have to jettison the pictures anymore. So that was a big difference. The cameras improved so much. The idea was you could read newspapers from space almost live. The capability was developed to do it in all weather and at night, using infrared. Developments are unbelievable. It's just remarkable what they could do.

Q: I assume on your delegation you had some very knowledgeable people and capabilities.

GRAHAM: Let me tell you a story about how knowledgeable they were. One of the members of the original SALT I delegation was a man named Howard Stoertz. He was said to be a second State Department representative. He was also the national intelligence officer for the Soviet Union for the CIA. He stayed all through SALT I and through SALT II until about 1978 so he was almost ten years on the SALT delegation and remained as the national intelligence officer (NIO). He knew more about the Soviet Union than just about anybody. Finally he decided that he had to get a life and decided not to continue. He was replaced by a man named John Whitman in the same position; allegedly a State Department representative but in reality the CIA's representative on the delegation. We had an executive secretary of the delegation named Colonel Norman Clyne in SALT II and his opposite number on the Soviet side was a man named Vadim Chulitsky. He was the executive secretary of the Soviet delegation. They would meet regularly to inform each other of developments and so forth. One morning they were meeting and Norm told Vadim, "Vadim, at next Tuesday's plenary there will be a new member of the U.S. delegation. His name is John Whitman." Chulitsky asked, "And what agency will he represent?" Norm replied, "The Department of State." Then Chulitsky asked, "And whom will he be replacing?" Norm said, "Mr. Howard Stoertz" to which Chulitsky responded, "Oh, that wing of the State Department."

Q: I am sure on so many of these things that we play these games. It becomes very quickly obvious who does what to whom.

GRAHAM: Of course.

Q: I know I had a CIA representative in my consular section in Belgrade and at one time our receptionist, ___ was obviously, she had to report to the Yugoslav authorities and she said, "I wonder if you could take somebody asking me because Mr. X, my CIA man says you know how he is when he gets people in there and starts talking to them and all. She

knew exactly what he did. She was just interested in moving the crop, you know.

GRAHAM: I said in an earlier interview that, at the very beginning of SALT I, the U.S. and the Soviet governments agreed that there would be no recruitment against each other. It would be okay for intelligence services to talk to either side but there would be no attempts at recruitment. The other thing they agreed was that whatever happened in the SALT negotiations, it would not be influenced by anything else that happened outside between the two countries. For example, SALT I was signed on May 26, 1972. In the last few days of that negotiation in mid-May of '72, the Soviet premier, Kosygin was visiting Hanoi and we were bombing it with B-52s. That was never mentioned at the negotiating site. That's why the SALT/START process was so successful and also why, for a time during some parts of the Cold War, it was the only real effective means we had of communicating with each other on a regular basis.

Q: Henry Kissinger was national security adviser at the time.

GRAHAM: Under Nixon, yes. Under part of Nixon and Ford, Secretary of State.

Q: Kissinger was renowned for wanting to control everything and be the center of things. Was he a pain in the neck?

GRAHAM: He wasn't a pain in the neck. He was a brilliant man but, he did do things with his counterpart, Dobrynin, that he didn't tell us about. So sometimes we got caught flatfooted by something that had already been agreed and we wouldn't know it.

Q: I have talked with people who served at that time and they were, Nixon was sort of negotiating what became the Helsinki Accords.

GRAHAM: Maybe Nixon started it but, it was Ford that completed it for the U.S.

Q: Ford signed it which turned out to be so fruitful later but at the time Kissinger was sort of trying to bypass and down playing them and all. The secrecy business doesn't work too well within a government.

GRAHAM: Well, yeah, but it's politics.

Q: When you talk about this, you've got the Backfire bomber, you've got a bunch of people, and I mean, the Soviets obviously know what the Backfire bomber will do and all that.

GRAHAM: Of course. But the U.S. position in the draft text remained that it be listed as a heavy bomber.

Q: Was there any proposal made, well, come and take a look at one of the damned things? Or was this?

GRAHAM: There was a discussion like that about a year later.

Q: A hard liner from the right.

GRAHAM: It was about a year later and I wasn't present but both Rowney and others told me about it. There was a foreign ministers' meeting in Moscow. This issue at the meeting principally featured General Rowney, JCS representative on the delegation, and also the political confederate of Senator Jackson and Richard Perle. President Ford had been defeated by Carter in 1976. But in 1978 we still had our position on Backfire. It hadn't changed from 1975 and although a lot of things had been agreed upon by 1978, Backfire hadn't changed. It was still there. It was very irritating to the Soviets. There was a foreign ministers' meeting in Moscow between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Gromyko. Some members of the U.S. SALT delegation were accompanying Vance, the chair of the delegation, their ambassador, General Rowney, and a few others. At that meeting the chief of the Soviet general staff said, "General Rowney, I will make a Backfire available to you, fully fueled and you can see if you can fly it to North America and I will also send flowers to the widow Rowney." His offer was not taken up.

I have to tell you another story to show you it wasn't automatons dealing with one another. Reginald Bartholomew was at that time Undersecretary of State for International Security—another outstanding officer. Remember, I wasn't present but this was the way I heard the story. I believe it was at this same meeting or, if it wasn't at this meeting, it was a subsequent one with the same characters present in the Kremlin at a meeting between the foreign ministers six months later or so. It would always happen in those years that whenever there was a meeting like that on one subject or another, it would recess halfway through. We would be meeting in one of the rooms in the Kremlin. There would be a green beige table between the two sides. There would be a pause and a recess would be called. Vance and one assistant and Gromyko and one assistant would go into a separate room for the purpose of discussing Jewish emigration. Vance would hand over a list and say we want the following Jews to be released to allow them to emigrate. Gromyko would say, we'll think about it and get back to you. So, there would be a recess. This particular time there was a big red button on the table between the two sides. Reg, always sort of a curious person, interested in things, perhaps wondered what would happen if he went over and pushed that button. Standing right next to him was a man named Kornienko who was the deputy foreign minister, very taciturn, never cracking a smile, just seemingly an automaton. Finally Reg's curiosity got the best of him and he went over and pushed the button and sirens went off seemingly everywhere making lots of noise. It made a big racket. Kornienko turned to Reg with a very sad look on his face, shook his head and said, "There goes Washington." It was a fire alarm. There are so many memorable stories like that.

Q: By the way you will get a copy of this transcript and I hope you know, put in any stories that come to mind because the more of these we have it gives more the flavor.

GRAHAM: With your encouragement, I'll tell you another little story about Kissinger. In the old days there was sort of a common table in the State Department dining room

upstairs. It was called the assistant secretary's table, or something like that. Before the renovation there was such a table. I was then an ACDA Assistant General Counsel. Kissinger had recently become Secretary of State. He became Secretary of State in late 1973. Anyway, I decided to go up and have lunch there. Since I didn't have anybody to have lunch with, I sat at the common table. There weren't many people there that day but, there were three people sitting at the end so I went down and sat next to the nearest one. The group turned out to be Joe Sisco, the Deputy Secretary, Phil Habib, Undersecretary and a third senior guy. They were talking and I was just sitting there eating my lunch and listening. Phil says to Joe, "Well, Joe, how you like working for Henry? What's it like working directly for him?" Joe Sisco says to Phil Habib, "Phil, it's just great, it's wonderful. Why, he lets me go to the bathroom three times a day."

There was this issue I mentioned earlier in SALT about silo limitation and how much increase in silo volume would be permitted so as to control the growth in missile capability. SALT I had said the limit would be a 15% increase in depth and diameter. So that was never resolved in SALT I and was a big political issue during ratification. Did it mean you could have an increase of 15% in either dimension which would be a 52% increase in volume or did the increase in those two dimensions have to total 15% in which case it would be a 32% increase in volume?

We were determined to get this cleared up in SALT II. When Kissinger accompanied President Ford to sign the Helsinki Accords in 1975, he had a side conversation with Gromyko there on this subject. Jan Lodal who was present for that conversation then came to Geneva to debrief, to report to the SALT delegation what Kissinger and Gromyko had said about the negotiations and, of course, the silo volume issue was one of the big issues at that time. Jan Lodal said it was abundantly clear in listening to this conversation that neither the Secretary of State of the United States nor the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union had any knowledge of high school geometry.

Q: You mentioned the Helsinki Accords which looking back on in retrospect turned out to be almost pivotal in our

GRAHAM: Oh, decisive.

Q: You had been dealing with the Soviets for a long time and all and sort of what emanations were you getting from the rest of the State Department and maybe from Kissinger about this?

GRAHAM: It wasn't so much from Kissinger but from the Congress and from talking heads. The reason the Soviets wanted this agreement was that it had a provision that borders henceforth will be changed only by agreement not by force so they saw it as ratifying the post-World War II arrangement and this was represented to be a big sell out and blah, blah, blah. But it also had those provisions in it about human rights and self-determination and that's what the various groups, such as the Václav Havel group in Prague, built their resistance to the Soviet Union on. So, as you say, it was pivotal, it was decisive. They used to call the resistance groups. "Helsinki watch committees".

Q: This was a development but at the time?

GRAHAM: At the time it was seen as a sellout by some.

Q: It was seen as you are just firming up the borders.

GRAHAM: Just allowing the Soviet Union to keep its ill-gotten gains, that's exactly right.

Q: The ratification, what happened to you after the ratification of the various treaties?

GRAHAM: Well, SALT II was never ratified. We had a tremendous struggle in the Senate and then first we had the troops-in-Cuba issue.

Q: The lost brigade

GRAHAM: In the summer of 1979 during the SALT II ratification process, it was revealed by somebody that there were 2,500 Soviet troops in Cuba left over from the Cuban missile crisis years and years before. This was 1979, 17 years afterward. Frank Church, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was in a do-or-die reelection race in 1980 against Steve Symms, which he lost in 1980 when Reagan was elected. Therefore, Church had a problem supporting SALT with the Russian troops in Cuba. The president, President Carter, way over dramatized the danger, talking about how American defenses are strong, able to resist any invasion. Invasion? With 2,500 troops? The Senator from Florida whose name was Stone, I think, he hyped it way out of proportion. It was really nothing. So, we somehow got past that.

Then the Iranian revolution came along and we lost our listening posts so, verification became a question. Could SALT II be verified? About that time it was reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and it just squeaked out, with 9 votes in favor and 6 against. Howard Baker was basing his presidential run in 1980 solely on opposition to SALT II. As I remember, John Glenn had problems with verification. Perhaps he eventually supported it, I don't remember. It was on the floor and the question was: would the full Senate approve it or not?

Then on Christmas night the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, our Christmas not Eastern Christmas, and that was it, that was the end. On January 3rd there was a meeting at the White House chaired by the president, attended by senior representatives of all the agencies to decide on retaliation for the invasion of Afghanistan. Item four was "put SALT II aside in the Senate" So, that was decided on—in my opinion and perhaps I am a minority here—unwisely but it was decided on. Later President Carter announced that we would observe SALT II as though it were in force but it would not be considered by the Senate. Then, when President Reagan took office, he continued that Carter policy until the spring of 1986. The SALT II treaty had been drafted to expire at the end of 1985. Thus, it was actually observed even though it was never ratified, which only meant a few things didn't happen like the reductions called for, the small amount of reductions, past

the expiration of its term.

The reason I think it was a mistake to put SALT aside on January 3rd is that about a week later I had a meeting with a friend who was a senior staff officer for Senator Nunn. He showed me a list of 19 members of the U.S. Senate who he said were prepared to support SALT II, even after the invasion of Afghanistan, if asked to by Senator Nunn. When I said this man worked for Senator Nunn, I misspoke, that is not correct; he worked for Senator Byrd, the majority leader, but it was Senator Nunn that he had been dealing with. The idea was that sometime in around mid-January Senators Nunn and Warner would announce that they would support the treaty and then the others 19 Senators on the list would follow their lead. It could have been ratified even after Afghanistan and it would have been better if it had been ratified. Failing to ratify did not penalize the Soviet Union. As in all of those negotiations, the U.S. always got the better in the negotiation, always.

Q: Is there a reason for this?

GRAHAM: We were better negotiators than the Soviets were. We were more agile. They had some very good, excellent, capable negotiators but, I thought, we were better. Let me tell you a story from SALT II days. President Carter tried to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test ban as Clinton did later but he never had the Chiefs on board so it never really got very far. But we did have negotiations among the three, the P-3 as it were; the U.S., the UK and the USSR—the three considered to be the principal nuclear weapon states at the time. These negotiations went on for two or three years and, in the end, were unsuccessful when Carter left office.

Paul Warnke, who was the Director of the Arms Control Agency for the first two years of the Carter administration, was also given the assignment of chief negotiator of SALT and chief negotiator of the test ban. So, he was there in Geneva representing the U.S. negotiating with the Soviets and the British on the test ban. He was a brilliant antitrust lawyer, a very capable, skilled person and very quick on the uptake. It is always a cardinal rule in these negotiations there were to be no surprises. If you are going to do something different or new, you have a little private conversation with the other side first so that when your counterpart hears you saying whatever it is you are going to say, he is prepared with an answer.

Q: You're not playing games.

GRAHAM: You're not playing games; you're serious but this time there was no advance consultation and the Soviets unveiled a new position on the duration of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, which was a big issue. Was it going to be a permanent treaty? Would it only last ten years? Five years? It was a big issue, an important issue. They came up with this new idea, probably forced on them by Moscow. The proposal introduced out of the blue by the Soviet ambassador was that the U.S., the UK and the USSR would complete the negotiations, sign the treaty and ratify the treaty and deposit our instruments with each other but the treaty would not come into force right away. If in the ensuing 18 months the French and the Chinese signed and ratified it and joined the

treaty, it would then come into force and if both of them did not do that, it would just go away. So Warnke sat there at the table listening to that and he responded right there without any instructions or advance consideration whatsoever. He told the Soviet ambassador that he considered the Soviet position to be “romantic,” that the treaty would just lie there like Sleeping Beauty, waiting for the French and Chinese princes to come along and kiss it and give it life. Well, of course, Sleeping Beauty is a great Russian national story and the Soviets never mentioned their proposal again.

Q: At the end of our last interview you said, “I really want to talk about the Warnke confirmation process because it was rather important.”

GRAHAM: President Carter, when he came into office in 1977, appointed his senior advisers as all presidents do. He didn’t make his decision on the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency right away. Thus, he did not send Paul Warnke’s name to the Senate along with his other senior officials such as Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Warnke came up two months later, kind of in isolation.

Then also he was nominated for two positions, which wasn’t really necessary. He was nominated to be Director of the Arms Control Agency and Ambassador and Chairman of the U.S. SALT delegation. The result of that was, in the first place, he became a big issue because he was by himself, others had already been confirmed, and secondly, his being nominated for two positions permitted senators to have it both ways. They could vote for him for the Directorship and against him as SALT negotiator, which is what a lot of them did.

He was General Counsel and then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, ISA, a very important position at the Pentagon during the Kennedy/Johnson years and became a very outspoken critic of Vietnam and then also a rather strident advocate of arms control progress and nuclear disarmament. He co-authored a famous article entitled Apes on a Treadmill with Les Gelb who had been in the Pentagon with him and later was managing editor of The New York Times. I probably don’t need to explain what the title means. If the Soviets did something, we did it as well whether we needed to do it or not and vice versa. The apes on the treadmill were driving up the number of nuclear weapons. Of course, in retrospect, it is just unbelievably preposterous what we did. The U.S. built over 70,000 nuclear weapons and the Soviets built 55,000 and at the peak, which was in the 1960s for the U.S., we had 32,500 nuclear weapons in our arsenal and the Soviets for many years had 45,000 in their arsenal, far more weapons than there ever possibly could have been missions for, even in the most all out of nuclear wars.

As you know, as everyone knows, there were some close calls during the Cold War during which nuclear war nearly happened. The Cuban missile crisis was the most famous and as is widely known all during the Cold War once a week there was an exercise involving senior officials of the government and the president, considering what we would do in a crisis. Even though the U.S. often said that we would only launch our nuclear weapons under attack, in fact, our policy was to launch on warning and probably

that was the Soviet policy as well. I am sure it was.

That meant we would launch an incredible nuclear strike force upon evidence of a Soviet attack, not the actual landing of bombs but when the radar said the missiles were coming. Once those things were launched, you couldn't recall them. That was it and so, in 30 minutes, they would be blowing up the Soviet Union and we would be blown up as well a few minutes later. The way the exercise would work is something like this—the Commander in Chief of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) would call the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and he would say, “Our radar systems detect 500 Soviet missiles on the way to strike the United States.” The chairman of the Joint Chiefs would then get the secretary of defense on the line and the national security adviser and they would discuss the situation.

If the Soviets actually had launched their missiles, there would be probably at least five minutes before our systems would detect them and they would arrive in another 20 or 25 minutes. If we were going to launch on warning, we had maybe 20 minutes from first detection. These conferees would have several conferences and then, with 10 to 15 minutes left, they would call the president wherever he was, whether he was asleep or fishing in Idaho—wherever he was—and tell him the U.S. is under Soviet nuclear missile attack. Here are the facts. You have got whatever, 10, 15 minutes to decide the U.S. response. It was once a week for 45 years that the U.S. rehearsed its response to nuclear attack and every single time that the president was asked what he would do, he always said, “Launch our missiles”—always. But this was highly dangerous, for example there was an incident in 1979 involving National Security Adviser Brzezinski in which he is awakened in the middle of the night and told 250 Soviet missiles were on their way to strike the United States. The Commander of the Strategic Air Command was on the line, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Undersecretary of Defense—the Secretary, and the deputy secretary being away. I am reciting this from memory.

So Brzezinski said he didn't wake his wife because he was confident that they would all be dead in 30 minutes. And he knew that soon he would have to wake President Carter and was quite sure what the order would be in the 10 minutes the President would have to decide. A few moments later it was reported to Brzezinski that there were 2,000 not 250, missiles on the way. But in the end he didn't have to wake President Carter as a further check disclosed that there was a computer malfunction causing a false alert to be issued. But if this scenario had continued another 5-10 minutes the result could have been unimaginable catastrophe.

It could have gone the other way. We could have launched and that would have been the end of everything. That wasn't the only time something like that happened and things like that happened on the Soviet side too.

Q: Sometimes radar would pick up the moon coming up.

GRAHAM: Right, or geese. It was really a dangerous situation so I don't think writing an article like that was out of line at all. But, the right wing did—along with other statements

that Paul Warnke made. They decided to make a huge case out of his not being selected as arms control director but rather as SALT negotiator. “He will cave into the Soviets. He’s weak; he only cares about nuclear disarmament. We can’t have a man like that negotiating with the Soviet Union.”

The Foreign Relations Committee was negative. I was very much involved in the response: I wrote Paul’s statement for him along with some people outside of government who were working with him. Then, the Armed Services Committee held a hearing as well and Jackson really got into it; he recruited Paul Nitze to testify against Paul Warnke, saying it would be dangerous to put him in charge of the SALT negotiations for the U.S. And they had been the closest of friends when they were at the Pentagon together. (Paul Nitze had ended up being Deputy Secretary of Defense under Johnson.) The two Pauls, Warnke and Nitze, fell out over Vietnam and by 1977 didn’t speak to one another. It was tragic from that point of view. I don’t think they ever made up again. So, it was a very tumultuous thing. The vote ended up being something like 80 to 10 in favor for Director and 58 to 40 in favor for SALT negotiator. Notably the SALT negotiator vote was less than the two-thirds required to ratify a treaty. That had a major effect on the White House—the fact that Paul Warnke, as negotiator, couldn’t get two-thirds of the Senate. If he couldn’t do that, maybe the treaty couldn’t either.

The SALT treaty was originally written as an international agreement under Ford, not a treaty, just an agreement because that was what the Interim Agreement was—an agreement that went to both Houses. I thought the agreement form in this case was just wrong. This was to be an agreement central to the national security of the United States and I believed that, under the Constitution, it had to be under the treaty-making process of the U.S. So, partly at my urging as a lawyer and because I persuaded my counterparts in the government, instructions were issued to change the word ‘agreement’ to ‘treaty’ throughout the SALT II agreement. This happened early in the Carter administration, around February of 1977.

Then, the White House proposed changing it back to agreement after the Warnke vote a couple of months later. Prominent senators heard about that and they objected so it didn’t happen. Who knows if the outcome would have been different if the agreement forum had been retained—the Democrats had majorities in both Houses. However, many Democrats were running scared and insisting the treaty form was the right thing to do.

Carter adopted the Jackson/Perle proposed agreement terms for Vance’s first meeting with Gromyko in spring of 1977. It was disaster. The Soviets rejected everything. Many of the provisions were provisions that actually became agreed upon years later in START, like eliminating all the heavy...

Q: Why the change in the Soviets? Were they seeing a weak administration?

GRAHAM: In 1977?

Q: Yes.

GRAHAM: No, they saw this as the right wing taking over the U.S. policy-making apparatus and they weren't about to eliminate all their heavy ICBMs, ICBM launchers and other things like that. Later on, 15 years later, those weapon systems became less significant. In any case, the meeting with Gromyko was a disaster and it was another six months before SALT was back on track—basically where Ford had left it—and then another two years before we finished the negotiations.

Q: This is probably a good place to stop. During the Reagan administration, were you still doing this?

GRAHAM: I did for in first year, eight or nine months or so, and then I was replaced as General Counsel by someone else selected by the new Director, Gene Rostow, or actually by his deputy. It was almost a year into the Reagan administration when that happened and they gave me the job of being in charge of public affairs and congressional relations. Also, I was on the Nitze Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) Delegation as the senior ACDA representative. Then, after Rostow left two years later, I came back as General Counsel under Ken Adelman and stayed there until I became acting director and ambassador.

Q: Shall we pick this up with the Reagan administration? I think that's a good place.

GRAHAM: Okay.

Q: Today is the 25th of March, 2013 with Tom Graham.

Ronald Reagan comes into office January 20, 1981. What happens with you?

GRAHAM: First, let me give just a little bit of last minute background on the Carter administration. In 1980 the Carter administration, while requesting that the SALT II treaty not be moved forward in the Senate and returned to Committee, nevertheless announced that the U.S. would observe the SALT II treaty as though it were in force which meant that they would respect all the ceilings and prohibitions but not undertake any reductions. If I remember correctly, there was only one significant reduction where the overall strategic arms limit, that is, land based missiles, sea based missiles and heavy bombers was set at 2400 and over a period of time was to be reduced to 2250. That was never done but everything else was observed.

Then, late in the year, the Carter administration began what they called “theater nuclear forces discussions” in Europe with the Soviets. The U.S. sat down with the Soviets, representing NATO not just the U.S. These discussions stemmed from a 1979 speech by the German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, in which he said in effect in an International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) speech in 1977, “Why are you only concerned about the strategic balance—what about the Euro strategic balance? What about all these SS-

20s, those theater missiles that the Soviets are building? You are ignoring this threat.”

The response to that was at the end of 1979. NATO, after long deliberation, decided in December of 1979 to engage in arms control discussions with the Soviet Union for four years. If during that four years, the SS-20 threat could be alleviated, that would be fine. But if it could not, then NATO would begin deploying a new round of missiles to Europe which we hadn't done since the Cuban missile crisis—17 years previously—when we withdrew our medium range missiles from Turkey as part of the settlement. Meanwhile, the Soviets had introduced a new nuclear weapon system, the SS-20 which looked like a nuclear war fighting missile as opposed to a deterrent force because it was land mobile and, highly accurate with solid fuel and lots of other modern additions. So that was the 1979 NATO agreement. In 1980 there had been the exploratory theater nuclear force discussions. Then the Reagan administration arrives.

Q: You mentioned something I don't think we covered and that is Schmidt and Carter on the bomb, the radiation bomb.

GRAHAM: Neutron bomb.

Q: The neutron bomb because I understand that Schmidt just couldn't stand Carter because he felt he had sold down, he went out on a limb and then Carter cut him off and changed his mind. Could you talk a bit about that?

GRAHAM: I am a little hazy on this but as I recall President Carter promoted to NATO the different concept of a so-called neutron bomb that theoretically killed people but not machines. And over time Helmut Schmidt was persuaded for Germany to accept this. Then Carter changed his mind after there were several significant domestic attacks on this weapon alleging that it was a "Republican bomb" because it left buildings and tanks intact while it killed people. It actually was an absurd weapon. The theory was if there was a huge Warsaw Pact tank attack, let's say 500 or so Warsaw Pact tanks sweeping into Western Europe, the neutron bomb would be ideal because it was an enhanced-radiation, suppressed-blast weapon and it would detonate with the force of one kiloton but have a 20-kiloton radiation effect. So, you could detonate a number of these bombs in front of the onrushing tanks, without too much damage to Germany where the battle would take place because the blast would only be one kiloton. But, you irradiate all the tank crews—the theory being that all that radiation would stop the tank crews. But, I would think most tank crews, knowing they had been given a fatal dose of radiation, would be all the more zealous in pressing their attack. It was a ridiculous weapon and the correct decision was to not pursue it even though not pursuing it did cause a considerable rift between Carter and Schmidt. It was an old concept; it wasn't new at all. When I say it was ridiculous, I mean it would have been ineffective as a deterrent because its basic concept would have been seen as irrational. It just wouldn't have worked and would have caused a lot of political problems.

So anyway, back to the Reagan administration in 1981, I remember John Lehman, who had been deputy director of ACDA during Nixon days, came in as the new Navy

Secretary. A couple of us were sitting in the State Department dining room in early 1981 and John stopped by our table and said to us, “Well, are you ready for the Reagan revolution?” In its early days, it certainly looked as though there would be a revolution but, of course, there wasn’t. The Reagan administration took the position that the Carter administration was all wrong in developing their strategic arms limitation agreements by focusing on the launchers because that’s what the satellites could see. Launchers don’t kill people. Missiles don’t kill people. Warheads kill people. So we, strapping young Reaganites, are going to limit the warheads only because that’s what kills people. This would happen in the next phase of strategic arms limitation, which we will call the strategic arms reduction talks or START.

I will mention a slightly humorous aside: The decision of what to call the new round of strategic arms talks, distinct from SALT, (strategic arms limitation talks), actually took place at ACDA and it involved Gene Rostow, who was the new Director, one or two others and me. We were discussing it and Rostow said, “I think we should just straight out call it strategic arms reduction talks, (SART), the SART talks instead of the SALT talks.” I said, “Well, I don’t know, Gene. You know how our media is. Suppose someone proposed the forward-based arms reduction talks? Would you take the same position? FART.” He got the idea right away so that’s why they put the extra ‘t’ in START—for fear it would be corrupted by the media. So it became the START negotiations.

Yes, it is true that it was recast as a limitation on warheads. But, how did you measure warheads? Well, by the number of missiles.

Q: And what it could carry.

GRAHAM: Yeah, you measured warheads by what each missile could carry. How did you measure missiles? By which launchers they fit it into so it came around to exactly the same thing—just in different words.

These negotiations began in 1982 and Senator Jackson’s confederate, General Ed Rowney, who had undermined or attempted to undermine the SALT negotiations as a member of the SALT II delegation and had actually resigned from the delegation shortly before the SALT negotiations were completed to testify against the treaty, he was made the chief negotiator to please the right wing in the Senate. Of course, under Rowney, they went absolutely nowhere. He was the Chief Negotiator for about a year and a half until the Reagan National Security Council realized he wasn’t really the man they wanted there anyway. One thing about the Reagan White House team, they were very practical, they might have sounded like ideologues but they really weren’t. They were very practical, intelligent, capable people who got the job done.

Q: Did you sense, being aware of all this going on of the almost visceral hatred of Reagan towards nuclear weapons? I have heard people talk about this in other contexts.

GRAHAM: That was not clear to most of the government at the time. Rather what was highlighted in the press in the early days of Reagan was his statement, made during the

campaign, what does nonproliferation matter? Then, after he was president for about a year, he was visiting the Strategic Air Command and he said jokingly, “I think I will just shoot a couple off to see what happens.” He was regarded, in the early years, as kind of reckless and his evil empire speech was regarded as one more example of that. What was not widely known until we got into the Reagan administration somewhat was his complete aversion to nuclear weapons and his view that they were “possibly destructive of life and civilization.” What he wanted to do initially was not so much negotiate but to develop a new weapon that would defend against strategic missiles. But, he was told that was impossible and then Edward Teller and others persuaded him to launch the strategic defense initiative in 1983—the so called Star Wars—which was his response to that.

Going back now a couple of years in describing my own role: as the SALT II treaty finished up in 1979 in Geneva, Senator Pell came over with a couple of other senators to visit us. The Soviets did a big presentation for him. I will never forget the expressions on their faces when he said, “I don’t care what’s in it. Just get it done. We just want to have peace between our countries. Whatever is in that thing, just get it done. You don’t have to brief me.”

We did finish it up. I was designated as the carrier of the treaty to Vienna for it to be signed. Our chief negotiator at the time, Ralph Earle, appealed to the Defense Department for a plane to take us, the treaty and four copies to Vienna from Geneva. It was denied as Defense had consistently denied such requests going back some years. The Defense Department had consistently denied air support for the delegation originally saying, back in the last months of the Ford administration, that the Defense Department only undertook missions that were in the national security interest of the United States, thereby implying that, what we doing, wasn’t. In any case, we couldn’t get a plane. So, Ralph Earle wrote a rather stinging message to the State Department saying okay, we will just book our trip to Vienna on a commercial flight. But, just remember, when it is high jacked, I hope the president and Brezhnev enjoy their trip to Tripoli to sign the treaty in front of Muammar al-Gaddafi.

We flew to Vienna and early on it was decided in Vienna that Brezhnev, being as old and slow moving as he was, would only be able to sign the treaty itself and four signatures for the four copies in any sort of reasonably paced ceremony. All the supporting documents would need to be signed in advance because, otherwise, he’d be up there for a long time signing. I was the designated officer to get all the other signatures on both the U.S. copies and the Soviet copies so I went to the Soviet embassy first and I asked for my opposite number—Victor Smolin—and he was there. He knew why I was there. Beyond the Treaty there were several protocols, the information declaration, and a list of definitions. There were about four supporting documents, each in four original copies. He quickly disappeared and came back about 40 minutes later and Brezhnev’s signature was on these documents.

So, then I had to get Carter’s signature and went back to the U.S. delegation location and asked, “Does anyone know where the President is?” I was told by somebody from the White House that he was staying at the house of the ambassador to Austria so you should

go there to find him. I felt a little strange traveling around Vienna with these treaty documents. So, I went to the U.S. ambassador's residence. When I got to the outside gate, I was told, yes, the President is here but he is playing tennis with the ambassador on the tennis court. So, I went to the front door, which was opened by a very beautiful blonde woman. I didn't know who she was and I never found out afterwards. I said, "I am here to get President Carter's signature on the SALT II treaty documents for tomorrow's signing ceremony and I was told he is playing tennis with the ambassador." She said, "Oh, well, that was several hours ago. He is taking a nap now." I said, "Well, this is sort of important. Do you think it would be possible if I went to see him and maybe you woke him up in advance or something?" She said, "No, no. I don't think we should do that. Just give them to me and I will get the signatures." I didn't know who she was. I thought to myself, well, she is at the U.S. ambassador's house so she probably is not a Soviet spy so I gave her the treaty documents. A long time passed. After about an hour she came back and said, "Here they are" and I looked at each one and there was the traditional felt pen signature on each one. I never found out who she was. I went back to the mission and turned over the documents. The treaty was signed the next day. In 1980, even though it wasn't ratified, the two sides agreed to abide by its terms.

When we got into 1981 and were unable to get the Reagan strategic arms negotiations underway for a year, the Reagan administration did the same thing. Secretary of State Haig and Foreign Minister Gromyko jointly declared that the two countries would continue to observe the SALT II treaty as though it were in force. The Treaty remained informally observed for some of the years it took to negotiate a START I treaty. This informal observance of SALT II was all we had. It lasted several months beyond the stated term of the SALT II treaty. The Treaty, by its terms, was due to expire on December 31, 1985. It was to be a ten-year treaty. This informal observance lasted until the spring of 1986 when Reagan terminated it.

Q: Okay, the Reagan administration comes in. What was your role?

GRAHAM: Initially it was the same. I was the General Counsel of the Arms Control Disarmament Agency and I was the chief lawyer, legal adviser for the arms negotiation, for the ongoing studies about what to do about strategic arms. The new negotiations had begun.

Q: Was there a body of law? You are a lawyer. You deal with law that pertained to this or was this sort of breaking new ground all the time?

GRAHAM: Breaking new ground all the time. There was no body of law that covered this. There wasn't even international humanitarian law that applied to it. Rostow kept me involved as General Counsel for a time. I was highly controversial to some of the bureaucrats in the Reagan White House because I was the worst of the worst in that I was both a Carter "holdover" and a Gerald Ford "retread" as they put it—a combination Ford retread, and Carter holdover. That was anathema to some.

Then Haig and Gromyko agreed that there would be negotiations on Euro strategic

nuclear weapons as was called for in the 1979 decision. The President himself made a speech in this regard and he put forth a proposal in that speech that the Soviets eliminate all of their Euro-strategic missiles, some 1400 of them and we wouldn't deploy ours. Furthermore, we wanted intrusive onsite inspection. Many people believed—and it probably was true—that this proposal was the brain child of Richard Perle who was then employed as Assistant Secretary of Defense by the new Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. Perle, with such extreme terms for the time—the Soviets to eliminate 1400 missiles to our zero and accept intrusive on-site inspection which they never had accepted—probably was trying to eliminate any possibility of an agreement by having the President propose something totally impossible for the Soviets to ever consider. As for so many things in life, be careful what you ask for—you might get it. In the end that's pretty much what happened but under Soviet leaders sometime later.

In any case, after the Secretary of State proposed the negotiations, the Soviets rejected the President's proposal but said they were prepared for negotiations. A date of November 30, 1981 was set. The U.S. needed a chief negotiator. Rostow suggested Paul Nitze who hadn't been in government since 1974 when he resigned as the Defense Department delegate on the SALT II delegation. So, Rostow asked me if I would go visit Paul at his summer home in Maine and try to persuade him to take this job. I agreed to do that. I knew him a little bit but, only a little bit. So I went to Maine and stayed two days with Paul and his family. His wife and one of his daughters were there—perhaps one of his sons. Most of the time was spent swimming in the ice cold water and playing tennis but I think it was over one of the lunches I said, "Paul, you really should think seriously about accepting this offer. It is the only game in town right now because the strategic negotiations haven't begun again. It is something that needs to be addressed. It would be a good opportunity, an interesting opportunity for you, I think." Paul, by that time was, I think, probably 73. So, he eventually said "Okay. I'll do it."

Q: Was Rowney playing any games?

GRAHAM: Rowney was going to be the chief negotiator for START so he was off in another place. He didn't mess with this negotiation and Paul would never have let him do it either. He was a very tough-minded guy. So, early fall Paul came to Washington to assemble his delegation and he asked for one senior person from each of the interested agencies; State, ACDA, Defense, Joint Chiefs, Energy and CIA. I was asked to be the ACDA representative. He may have even asked for me by name. But, by this time—by the end of the summer, early September—I was removed from the General Counsel's office, which was a political office called for in the legislation but not confirmable by the Senate, and was given the job of director of congressional and public relations. So, that meant that the new Deputy Director of ACDA could put in his person—with whom he drove to work every day—as General Counsel. He was considerably less than successful. In any case, he came into that job in September of 1981.

I kept the congressional/public relations job but I was also brevetted to the Nitze delegation. So, there were eight of us, including General Bill Burns, major general in the army who later became director of ACDA a few years down the line, John Woodward

representing OSD, really a first rate collection of senior officials. We began meeting and the first issue was what are we going to call these negotiations? Someone who spoke Russian, the CIA representative said, “Well, the Russians have named it the medium range missile negotiations.”

Oh, well, we can’t have the Russian name. Out of the question—must have something else. So, we argued about it and finally we settled on the intermediate range nuclear forces negotiations. Instead of “medium range” we chose “intermediate range”. The CIA representative pointed out that, “In Russian it is the same word.” Everyone else said, “Doesn’t matter. It’s our name.” The Russians were sort of dumbfounded by it all but they eventually accepted it and that’s why it became known, at least in the West, as the INF negotiations.

I eventually became close to Paul and greatly respected him. Nevertheless, in these first meetings with Paul, even though all of us were reasonably senior guys, we were in awe of the great man. Every time Paul would say something, the rest of us would say, that’s a great idea, Paul. Yes, you are right about that, Paul. Yes, Paul, yes. Good, very good. Paul had also brought on a retired Army colonel, Norman Clyne, who had been the executive director of ACDA during the Carter administration. He brought him on as his delegation executive director. After the first two delegation meetings, Paul asked Norm to call each one of us and say the following: “Ambassador Nitze wants me to tell you that if you are going to continue to just simply agree with everything he says, he wants you to get off the delegation. If you are not prepared to challenge his views, you are of no value to him. He does not want to be surrounded by ‘yes men’.” That galvanized all of us and to me that was the essence of leadership. You want to be surrounded by people who will intelligently and constructively challenge your views. But having said that, you didn’t take on Paul Nitze lightly. You had better know what you were talking about or he would cut you to pieces in front of everybody else. One always took on Paul carefully with plenty of preparation but we did take him on. We had quite lively and useful debates.

We began preparing for the negotiations to begin on November 30th and traveled to Geneva. I was sitting in my office in Geneva on November 29th, the day before the negotiations were to begin. One of the junior officers of the delegation rushed into my office holding an issue of one of the premier Swiss newspapers. It was in French, but easy to read. He said, “Tom, this paper here has a headline on the beginning of the INF negotiations tomorrow and it says here that the U.S. delegation is dominated by Communists and you’re named as one of the Communists.” I said, “Well, who are the others?” He says, “There are four of them. There’s Ambassador Nitze, Colonel Norman Clyne, and Jack McNeill.” I said, “Well, if they’re Communists, so am I.” That’s just an example of some of the absurdities.

Q: When something like that happens, there is usually something behind it. Did you ever figure out what was behind it?

GRAHAM: Never did. On the day negotiations began in Geneva there was a city council election. For years and years and years we had been having these negotiations in Geneva

and the Swiss had always basically ignored us—allowed us to do them but ignored us. At that particular moment, one slate running for the city council decided “Well, maybe we can make something of this” so they put big posters all over town announcing, “The important peace negotiations on intermediate nuclear forces will begin in our town today.” I thought that was truly amazing. I asked my colleague, Jack MacNeill, to try to get some of those posters. He went to the offices of the city council and asked if there were any copies remaining of the proclamations. They gave him the last three. He kept one himself, gave one to me and one to Paul Nitze. All of us treasured them for years; I still have mine.

I am concentrating right now on the INF negotiations because, in the early Reagan years, they were the only game in town. The strategic negotiations under Rowney quickly fell into a funk. They did finally start in February of 1982 with Victor Karpov, the last Soviet negotiator of SALT II, in the chair for the other side, but they never went anywhere. I might say about Karpov, he loved to drink and he particularly loved Jack Daniels. That was his favorite thing. Way back in 1976 we were negotiating the definition of throw weight for the SALT II negotiations. Unlike in the Soviet Union, it was a big political thing in the U.S. “The throw weight of the Soviet missiles is much greater than ours and, therefore, they have this great strategic advantage,” it was argued. The Soviets had no idea what we were talking about.

Q: For someone reading this, what does ‘throw weight’ mean?

GRAHAM: Let’s pretend this is a missile.

Q: You are holding up a book.

GRAHAM: The “throw weight” is what you put on end of the missile for the missile to deliver. You put the warhead; you put the protective cover around the warhead; you put any penetration aids and decoys and, if it is a multiple independent-targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV), you put a vehicle that travels around in space to drop the warheads in different places. We call it a “bus”. You put all those on the end of the missile and also an exit shroud to enable the missile to get out of the atmosphere. The throw weight is the weight of all of those - things that will be delivered to the other side except the exit shroud, which doesn’t get to the other side. That’s what throw weight is. It is the weight of the material that the missile can deliver on the other guy and that’s supposed to be a good measure of a missile’s capability—what it can deliver.

We spent the summer of 1976 negotiating this with the Soviets. We had the term “bus” for the vehicle that is launched into space and then flies on its own and can go here and drop a bomb on Moscow and go there and drop a bomb somewhere else. That’s what multiple independent-targetable reentry vehicle means. Of course, the footprint of any particular missile would not be so great as to include Moscow and, say, St. Petersburg. It would be Moscow and some nearer city. That’s how the bus works. The Soviets had some name for what we call the “bus,” but I don’t recall what it is. In any case, it was meaningless to us. So we had to negotiate a term for “bus” because we were going to say

it was part of the definition of throw weight in SALT II treaty in both languages. We had to negotiate a term that was intelligible to both sides so the term we ended up with, you can look it up in the SALT II treaty, is “self-contained dispensing mechanism.”

Q: Sounds like a soft drink dispenser.

GRAHAM: I wanted to mention Karpov again because he was heading the START negotiations for the Soviets in 1982. He was one incredibly talented person. He spoke English fluently. He understood the subject of the negotiations as well as anyone, and he did like Jack Daniels. During these throw weight negotiations, his birthday took place on October 9th. That is my birthday as well. We had a meeting scheduled that day and it was to have six on a side with consecutive translations, a very serious meeting. So I brought a fifth of Jack Daniels to give him as a present. I gave it to him before the meeting. He was so happy. He took a highball glass and the fifth of Jack Daniels and filled that highball glass up to the top with Jack Daniels. Then he drank it down like it was water and started the meeting. He ran a great, very successful meeting, lasting for three hours. At the end of the meeting, he took the same drink again and then left. There was about two inches left in the bottle.

The Soviets loved to say, “We are going to give your proposal extreme unction.” Like Americans they liked religious and dirty jokes. When Paul Warnke was Director of the Arms Control Agency and because the Verification Bureau in the eyes of some had been the locus of right wing agitation, he disbanded the Bureau and divided its responsibilities among the other bureaus in the Arms Control Agency. At the next meeting of the negotiations Ralph Earle, who was initially his deputy for the negotiations, was making some argument about verification provisions that needed to be in SALT II and Karpov said, “But Ralph. I thought your side had abolished verification.” So he kept up with what we were doing.

Karpov in the early 1980s was the opposite number to Rowney and Rowney was not really a match for Karpov. He never took the negotiations anywhere so the only game in town was the intermediate range negotiations led by Nitze. Early on it was clear that the stumbling block in INF was going to be the Soviet insistence about what the U.S. had to include in its total, if each side were to have equal totals: “the U.S. must include the British and French systems because they are aimed at us” they would say. We said that we could never do that. “This is strictly between you and us,” we argued. “The British and French have nothing to do with this.” That was a big issue, maybe the most important issue in negotiations.

About eight months into the negotiations Nitze took a walk in the woods above Geneva with the Soviet Ambassador, Yuli Kvitinsky, who was a NATO specialist for the Soviet Union and much younger than Paul. They took a walk in the woods. They sketched out a solution. They sat down on a log, just the two of them, in the forest above Geneva and sketched out a solution. It was really, for the time, quite brilliant.

Let me back up and describe the two types of intermediate range missiles that the U.S.

was going to deploy. The new ones in Europe were to be, on one hand, a Pershing II missile to replace the existing the single warhead Pershings that were in Germany and had been there for a long time. There were going to be 108 Pershing IIs. Pershing II, if I remember correctly, had three warheads. In any case, it was highly accurate, extremely accurate. It could put a warhead into the common area of the Pentagon from great distances, very accurately. The Soviets saw it as a decapitation weapon so they were very concerned about it being deployed. In terms of the cruise missiles, we were going to deploy 464 cruise missiles in five different NATO countries. Those U.S. cruise missiles were called ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and their official designation was BGM-109G. They flew very low under the radar and were very accurate but took much longer to arrive. The Soviets were less threatened by them.

The preliminary agreement that Paul and Ambassador Kvitinsky worked out was that the U.S. would not deploy the Pershing II, but would have a certain number of GLCMs. Maybe it was the full 464, maybe it was more—I don't remember. We would have a certain number of those. The Soviets would have S-20s in equal numbers to those cruise missiles and British and French systems would not count. That was the deal. For the time, it was a brilliant deal.

Q: Let's talk a minute about the British and French missiles. The French, of course, were kind of on their own at this time. They weren't part of NATO but what about the British? I would think, was it that we couldn't bring them into negotiations or were they standoffish or what was happening there?

GRAHAM: It was standard NATO policy that British and French systems belonged to independent countries. These negotiations were between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and nobody else and that's that. It was an article of faith.

Q: Were the British and French able and doing anything to show that they agreed with what we were doing?

GRAHAM: They definitely did not want their systems counted in these negotiations; neither of them did.

Q: Did they have much?

GRAHAM: The British had four Trident submarines. They had 64 submarine launched ballistic missiles. They had some bombers that were nuclear capable. The French had seven ballistic missile submarines. I don't know how they compared with the Trident systems but they had seven ballistic missile submarines. They had a number of medium range nuclear missiles. Pluton, I recall, was the name. The French also had a number of nuclear-capable bombers. If you count the bombers with the land based missiles and the submarines, the French had between 300 and 400 systems.

Q: We are a fair minded people and as you did this you realize the Soviets would have to take some sort of advantage or were we giving anything on the assumption to encourage

the Soviets to meet this treaty or what?

GRAHAM: In terms of dealing with the Soviet Union, the U.S. government fair-mindedness never crossed our minds.

Q: Fair enough but I would think this would be a sticking point for the Soviets.

GRAHAM: It was a big one, a very big one. But they were willing to accept Paul's formula because they wouldn't have to deal with Pershing II.

So this proposal from the Ambassadors went back to the capitals in 1982. The way the two ambassadors left it was that if they could get approval in their capitals, they would notify each other and resume on that basis. So the proposal went back to Washington and the Chiefs kind of liked it. At the first National Security Council meeting on the subject, Reagan expressed interest in it as well and the Secretary of Defense said, "Well, the Chiefs are pretty good about it too." After this meeting it looked as though the proposal had some traction. But Richard Perle was out of town. When he heard about the proposal, he contacted the Secretary of Defense and said, "I want you to ask for a second meeting that I can attend."

So they had a second meeting with Perle in attendance. In the ensuing debate Reagan was persuaded to reject it. Before the second meeting there had been an interagency meeting at a senior level to prepare all the agencies for the second National Security Council meeting. Both Perle and Nitze were at that meeting. Perle, in front of everyone else, levied the greatest criticism he could possibly muster against Paul, saying, "Paul, the problem with you is that you are just an inveterate problem solver." This was a problem that Perle didn't want resolved. Paul resolved a problem and Perle didn't want that. None of the rightwing wanted that. They didn't want an agreement. They wanted confrontation. So Reagan rejected it. We never heard from the Soviets so it passed into the mists of history and later, of course, became a play on Broadway, The Walk in the Woods. What happened? Clearly the Soviets were watching what happened in Washington and I am sure they learned through whatever sources that it had been rejected by the U.S. So they never responded.

For the next 18 months the INF negotiations atrophied. Nothing more happened and these negotiations fell into the same category as the new START negotiations where nothing ever happened. So we came to September, 1983, nearly four years after the NATO decision, and the arrival of the first ground launched cruise missiles at the Greenham Common outside of London. Then a more important thing happened in November, one month from the fourth anniversary of the NATO decision. The first Pershing IIs began to arrive in Germany. The very next day the Soviet ambassador asked for a meeting with Nitze and said, "The negotiations are over" and the day after that Karpov said the same thing to Rowney. That was the end of the INF negotiations and the START negotiations at that time.

During the next year, 1984, there were no negotiations at all although SALT II was still

being informally observed. In the middle of 1984 the Soviets shot down a Korean airliner with a U.S. congressman on board.

Q: Kamchatka Peninsula

GRAHAM: The Cold War sank to its nadir at that point. Meanwhile—I believe it was the previous year—there was an exercise that was underway in the U.S. government, an exercise on what would happen if there were a nuclear war. Reagan made a couple of public statements about it. Meanwhile, he was sending letters to the Soviet leadership along the lines of, “Can’t we settle all this somehow? Can’t we save our two countries?” The Soviets read the exercise as U.S. preparation for a first strike. I forget whether it was 1982 or 1983, but during one of those two years, the Soviets actually believed the U.S. was going to carry out a first strike. They had all their systems on high alert. So you had that—the collapse of the negotiations in 1983, then the shooting down of the airliner in 1984. It was a bad situation.

Q: What were you doing during this period?

GRAHAM: I was working on Nitze’s delegation and also doing congressional work for the Arms Control Agency. I participated in an interagency group in the White House to lift the restrictions on the MX missile so it could be deployed. At the last of our many meetings in the White House Roosevelt room, President Reagan came in to the room, congratulated each one of us, and gave us a picture of him shaking our hand—a nice touch for all of us. I was doing some public presentations on behalf of the government. And as I say, I was very much involved with Nitze, as well. I used to accompany him, whenever he was back in Washington, to all his congressional hearings.

Just about this time—I believe it was 1982—Rostow was fired by Reagan as the arms control Director because he kept giving advice on the Middle East at National Security Council meetings. This irritated the Secretary of State and one thing led to another. He was fired. The White House brought in to succeed him Ken Adelman, who was Jeane Kirkpatrick’s Deputy at the United Nations. Much younger—only 36 years old—his confirmation was highly controversial because he was seen by the Democrats as a far right ideologue, who would trash the negotiations. That was not what he was, but that was how he was perceived. At that moment Rowney took it upon himself to write a memorandum to Adelman about the personnel that were at the Agency, letting him know whom to fire. The memorandum became known as the “hit list.” What it said about me was that I was bright, quick, but I spent too much time with Howard Baker (who happened to be the Republican Senate majority leader and part of my job was Congress). Because I spent too much time with Howard Baker, I needed to be carefully watched. Rowney’s deputy, a career ambassador named Jim Goodby was described as “for agreement at any price.” A long list of denunciations of about 20 different people were included.

I guess that somebody in Rostow’s front office leaked the memorandum to Time magazine, which published it under the title of Memo Misfire. Howard Baker’s office sent their principal legislative aide, Cran Montgomery, to talk to me and get the full

background on it so he could brief the Senator. I briefed him in order to work with Howard Baker to do what I could to calm everything down. I was no friend of Rowney, but I was trying. I did not see it in anybody's interest to have an all-out struggle, and I wanted to protect everybody on the hit list. I thought, "If anybody can protect them, it is Senator Baker, the Republican majority leader." So that is why I got involved. Senator Baker was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, among other committees. The Foreign Relations Committee, learning that Rowney was back in town from Geneva—I don't remember if the negotiations had collapsed yet or not, I think maybe they had not—demanded that Rowney appear before them and explain himself. It had all the markings of a real inquisition because even the Republicans were not happy. Needless to say, the Democrats were strongly inclined the same way.

The chief of Senate relations on the White House staff, Pam Turner, telephoned me and asked me to accompany Rowney at this hearing and to prepare him for the hearing, even though he had attacked me in the memo. They knew I was working with Baker's aide, Cran Montgomery. He was the man on Baker's staff that I had worked with. (An outstanding man, he later became ambassador to Oman.) Anyway, he had briefed the White House that he was talking to me. Nevertheless, the White House asked me to not only to prepare Rowney for this hearing, but also to accompany him. Meanwhile, I was still accompanying Paul Nitze to all his Congressional meetings. We came to one of the hearings, it was the Senate Intelligence Committee, and Senator Moynihan was in the chair.

Q: Senator from New York.

GRAHAM: The Senator from New York and I am sitting with Nitze. At the end of the our classified hearing Moynihan says, "Well, Mr. Graham, we all know what's happening down there. We hope you keep your job." As I am walking out, Senator Chaffee, a Republican comes up to me and says, "I think the whole thing is the most outrageous thing I have ever heard. If you have any problems, contact me. Imagine! You are suspect to conservatives because you spend time with Howard Baker. Ho, ho, ho." At least in those days, senators were pretty sensible. So we had the Foreign Relations Committee hearing and basically it came around to Rowney's disavowing authorship and blaming the memorandum on one of his aides. The Committee let that go. "Okay, well, just tear it up and throw it away. Don't do that again."

Q: It does show some of the workings in Washington.

GRAHAM: Yes, and at the time ACDA personnel, particularly some of the young women at the agency, were wearing tee shirts that said "Hit List" with a bull's eye on it. So it became a cultural thing. Those of us on the hit list still regard ourselves as being members of an important club. The other day, I just saw Ambassador Goodby, with whom I am working on Secretary George Shultz's efforts toward zero nuclear weapons. He said something appreciative about meeting. I said, "Yeah, it's always good for fellow hit list members to get together." There it was—over 25 years later.

There was a lot of internal turmoil and then we went into 1984 when virtually nothing positive happened internationally.

Q: But what was happening in the weapons field? By this time we had our Pershing and Cruise missiles in place.

GRAHAM: Or being put in place.

Q: Were you involved in the negotiations which got quite tense in European countries?

GRAHAM: We were on the fringes of some of the national discussions—this big issue making the Cold War even worse. Since we had the NATO decision four years before and these weapon systems were mentioned, they weren't anything new in terms of European concepts. There were some major demonstrations in England at Greenham Commons and some big demonstrations in the Netherlands, which also received cruise missiles. There were some in Germany as well.

Three successive Soviet leaders had died between 1982 and early late 1984—Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko, the latter two each lasted less than a year. There were stories in the paper in early 1985 about a man named Gorbachev, who was going to be the next Soviet leader. Mrs. Thatcher, after she had met him the year before, was said to have informed Ronald Reagan that this is a man we can do business with. So there was a lot of interest in who he was, what he was like and so on. I believe it was in March of 1985 he was elected by the Politburo as General Secretary of the Party and, therefore, the ruler of the Soviet Union. He was a much younger man, obviously far more dynamic.

The first American to meet Gorbachev, at least on a politically substantive basis, was Senator Kennedy. Somehow Gorbachev invited Kennedy to come to Moscow to meet him, to make contact. So Kennedy asked for briefings before he went. He asked for a briefing on the Soviet economy; he asked for a briefing on Eastern Europe and he asked for a briefing on arms control. I went to his office and gave him the briefing on arms control, about a two-hour briefing. Then, he went and he met with Gorbachev and reported back to the President. After that, his staff contacted each of the three briefers. The three of us were invited to have a private dinner with Senator Kennedy at his house. He told us what happened in his discussions with Gorbachev, a follow-up I thought was singular. Not many Senators would have done that. It was clear from that that briefing something was going to change.

I need to back up to 1984, as an important effort to rectify the situation started then but actually took place in March of 1985. In March of 1985 there was a meeting between George Shultz, who was the new Secretary of State, and André Gromyko to try to set the negotiations back on course. It was a very large meeting. Richard Perle went, I went, and Ken Adelman went, Bud McFarlane, the National Security Advisor, went. Nitze was there. Schultz was our leader. I went as Shultz's personal arms control adviser and we created a new set of negotiations. The INF negotiations were resuscitated and they were put under two ambassadors, one on each side. The START negotiations were resuscitated

and they were put under two ambassadors, one on each side. Rowney was not continued. Senator John Tower, who was recently retired, was made the initial U.S. negotiator. The Soviets wanted a third negotiation on space because of Reagan's Star Wars speech. So there was a negotiation on space arms as well.

All three of these negotiations were put under the heading of one big negotiation on nuclear and space arms. Max Kampelman was the ambassador on our side. Karpov was the ambassador on the Soviet side. After this was established at Geneva and the first meeting of the nuclear and space arms talks was scheduled for May, we gave a press conference. There was a Newsweek picture from the press conference. In it are Bud McFarlane, Ken Adelman, Paul Nitze, Ed Rowney, Richard Perle and myself. It is hanging over there on the wall.

Q: This picture you are showing me that says "Shultz's Shaky Team. How many last once the bargaining begins?"

GRAHAM: The meeting with Gromyko was a little earlier than I just said—January 21, 1985, before Gorbachev was elected. The negotiations began in March. The result of this eventually was that the Space Arms negotiation, to the great disappointment of the Soviets, never went anywhere. The INF negotiation eventually ended up with the INF Treaty and the START negotiation—much later, toward the end of the George H.W. Bush administration—ended up with the START I Treaty. It was an important time.

Q: We will pick up with

GRAHAM: The ascent of Gorbachev...

Q: The ascent of Gorbachev and what happens then.

Q: Today is the 4th of April, 2013 with Tom Graham. We are going to deal with your work. You said you were really dealing with the rise of Gorbachev.

GRAHAM: Did we leave off last time with the advent of the Reagan administration?

Q: Yes.

GRAHAM: Let me just begin with that. Of course, my agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ACDA, was very much in the sights of the more right-wing-inclined members of the Reagan administration. Initially, the Reagan White House proposed General Rowney as the ACDA Director. As I have said previously, as Senator Jackson's man on the U.S. SALT II delegation, he had attempted to undermine the negotiations as the Joint Chiefs' representative. After SALT II was signed, he took his uniform off and testified publicly to the Congress against the treaty that he helped negotiate as a member of the delegation. He was, to put it mildly, the anti-arms control

figure of the day. The selection of him to be the Director of the Arms Control Agency in the Ronald Reagan administration was taken as a sign that the Reagan administration, at a minimum, would attempt to reverse arms control and maybe non-proliferation policy—maybe eliminating them all together. In 1980 I believe the Republicans took control of the Senate. Senator Charles Percy became the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Chairman Percy and the ranking Democratic member, Senator Pell, let the White House know that this nomination was not acceptable to the Senate.

Q: The ranking Republican

GRAHAM: The Senate had changed, so Percy, the Republican, had become the Chairman. He and the ranking Democrat on the Committee, let the White House know that there was no way that General Roney was going to be confirmed or even heard by the committee. His name thus was withdrawn and the White House chose Gene Rostow, who had been a senior figure in the Johnson administration—I believe, undersecretary of state, a very distinguished man and at the time Dean of Yale Law School. He of course, was approved by the Senate and became the director of the Arms Control Agency.

During the period allegedly before there was a confirmed Director, there was an acting Director, Jim Malone, who had been in the General Counsel's office and who has been a dear friend of mine for many years. He eventually ended up as Assistant Secretary of State for the environment and a man named Michael Pillsbury became the acting deputy. Michael Pillsbury was working with an aide to Senator Helms to disrupt the policy of the incoming Reagan administration and was very opposed to arms control. In particular he and the aide to Jesse Helms were trying to disrupt the sale of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft to Saudi Arabia allegedly by leaking classified information to the public, among other things. The White House finally decided we have to move Rostow in there soon. Jim Malone abruptly left and went to the State Department. If I recall correctly, Gene Rostow came in shortly thereafter. The Agency Administrative officer, Jim Hackett, was appointed acting Director for a few weeks until Rostow actually arrived. Under orders from the White House Hackett fired Pillsbury and two others associated with him. There was quite a bit of controversy over the opposition to the AWACS sale and the possibility of information from the intelligence agency being used improperly.

Q: The AWACS sale stirred up the Israeli lobby and it resulted basically in Senator Percy losing the next time up, 1982.

GRAHAM: Well, it played into that as did Senator Percy's public proposal to open direct negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization the PLO. The Israeli lobby was very opposed to that as was the Israeli government. It was those two things that caused his defeat. He was the chairman when he was defeated.

Gene Rostow came in. As far as my situation was concerned, he kept me for a while as General Counsel but, then, the man he brought in as his deputy, Bob Gray—a career State Department man who had worked with him when he had been Undersecretary in the State

Department and who had also been an aide to Senator Cranston—wanted to bring in a friend as general counsel. So I was given another job, director of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs.

At that same time it was decided that the theater nuclear negotiations, which had begun after the 1979 two-track decision at NATO—I believe I mentioned last time that NATO, as a result of the SS-20 threat, decided in December of 1979 that there would be a two-track policy. For four years arms control agreement would be pursued with the Soviet Union to see if this threat could be eliminated diplomatically. If not, by the fall of 1983, the advanced Pershing II missile would be brought in to replace the Pershing I missiles that were in Germany. In addition, ground launch cruise missiles (GLCMs) would be deployed in four other NATO countries. So there was kind of a deadline for arms control progress. In the fall of 1980 initial discussions took place. When President Reagan took office, his administration decided—it was already U.S. government policy obviously—that they were going to continue the negotiations. The question was in what forum.

The Secretary of State, Alexander Haig decided that Paul Nitze would be the best choice as U.S. negotiator. Meanwhile, President Reagan had made a speech at his alma mater, Eureka College in Eureka, Illinois. In that speech he proposed that the Soviet Union eliminate all of their 1200 SS-20s that, by this time, they had deployed as well as their other older theater range systems. The SS-20 was a modern system and it was seen by us and by the Europeans as a war-fighting nuclear system as opposed to a defensive system. It was mobile—that is, road mobile; had three warheads which were MIRVs; and was highly accurate. The SS-20 contrasted with their old SS-4s and 5s, which were still there and which were fixed land-based, used liquid fuel, inaccurate and perceived unquestionably as defensive systems. Thus the SS-20 was as a real change and perceived as an attempt an attempt to try to dominate Western Europe. In addition to a military issue, it became a major political issue.

President Reagan's proposal was that the Soviet Union should eliminate all these missiles that they had in the field, nearly 1200 SS-20s, several hundred 4s and 5s. In exchange for that, the U.S. would not deploy the ones it planned to deploy two years hence. So we were trading zero for whatever—1200, 1400. That proposal, the brainchild of Richard Perle and the Pentagon, was seen as impossible and ridiculous.

Q: Not attainable.

GRAHAM: Well, worse than that, it was seen as an attempt to sabotage the negotiations since there was no way the Soviets would ever accept anything close to that it was believed. You know, you just never know what history is going to do to you because, in the end, that is exactly what happened after Gorbachev arrived although, by then, we had begun deployment. But we ended up with zero. That is the INF treaty. Also, if I recall correctly, President Reagan said in a speech—and certainly it was the U.S. position later—that there had to be onsite inspection. The U.S. had never asked for that before in strategic negotiations with the Soviets. That also was thought at the time to be unattainable.

Secretary Haig decided that he would like to try to recruit Paul Nitze who had been out of government since 1974 when he resigned from the U.S. SALT II delegation. This was seven years later. He had been a very strong critic of SALT II as a member of the Committee for the Present Danger, as had been Gene Rostow. The thing about men like Paul Nitze and Gene Rostow—they might take strong conservative positions on certain issues that some supporters like myself have thought were in error and not the right course to pursue with regards to arms control, but they also were both brilliant, highly principled, practical men who, when given a problem to solve, tried to solve it. They were not ideologues; they were great American figures. Paul Nitze was the archetypical figure of the Cold War and one of America's greatest men of the era. In any case, after serving in the Kennedy-Johnson administration as (among other things) Deputy Secretary of Defense, under Nixon he became a member of the SALT II delegation but resigned in 1974 because he didn't like the direction it was going. When I said SALT II negotiations, I meant SALT negotiations. He was a member of SALT I delegation and, for a while, the SALT II delegation, but stayed the entire course on the SALT I delegation with one of the most distinguished negotiating delegations the U.S. has ever fielded.

In any case, recruiting Nitze was Secretary Haig's decision, which he communicated to Gene Rostow. Gene said to me, "You know Paul Nitze. Why don't you go visit him" this was summer time, "Why don't you go visit him at his summer place in Maine and see if you can recruit him for this job?" I said, "All right." Maine's a nice place in the summer. I went to Maine to visit Paul and his family. Although I sort of invited myself, Paul, as always, was gracious. I was there for two or three days—most of the time swimming in the ocean or playing tennis with his family—but we did put aside an hour here and there to talk about the negotiations. At the end of our discussions he agreed that he would come to Washington and accept the offer and take the job.

So he came to Washington in September, did some consultations and, in late September, began forming his delegation. He asked six or eight senior figures from the various agencies to be the nucleus of these negotiations: General Bill Burns, who later became ACDA director and who is the father of the current Deputy Secretary of State; along with senior figures from the National Security Council, Office of the Secretary of Defense, State and me, representing ACDA. He selected Colonel Norman Clyne as his executive secretary and chief of staff. Norm Clyne had held that same job for the three ACDA directors during the Carter administration and before that had been executive secretary for Alex Johnson, Chairman of the SALT II delegation under Nixon and Ford. Paul Nitze asked him to be his chief of staff.

We held our first meetings in October. The first debate was: "What should we call these negotiations?" Somebody said, "Well, the Soviets call it the medium range missile negotiations." We proposed and insisted on "the Intermediate Nuclear Force Negotiations" (INF)—different words in English, the same words in Russian. Eventually the Russians accepted. We had that initial debate and then we started talking substance.

All of us were in awe of the great man, Paul Nitze and at our first two meetings whenever

he posited—well —”What about the British and French? We can’t count the British and French systems,” [he heard] “Yes, Paul.” “You are absolutely right, Paul.” “Great idea, Paul.” “Brilliant thought, Paul.” After two meetings like that, Paul asked Colonel Norm Clyne to call each one of us with the message, “Ambassador Nitze asked me to call you and tell you that unless you begin challenging his positions in these intra-delegation discussions, he wants you to get off the delegation. He does not want to be surrounded by yes men.” Each one of us was told that and that, in my view, is real leadership.

It was just wonderful. I loved working for Paul Nitze and with Paul Nitze. Whenever he was back in Washington, since I had the congressional job as well, I went with him to all of the many, many congressional sessions that he had. He always would tell me a great story or two in the process. We’d ride up in the cab and ride back in the cab so I’d be in the taxi with him for a few minutes both ways and he would tell me a great story each way. One of my favorites is as follows. He said after Truman left office and Eisenhower came in, the Senator McCarthy campaign was in full blast. Dean Acheson had left his position as the Secretary of State in January. But even though McCarthy was attacking him (Nitze) as a Communist, he managed to stay on as director of Policy Planning for some months before Dulles replaced him. After about three months he called Dean Acheson on the telephone and invited him to have lunch with him. Paul said that Dean Acheson’s response was, “Paul, I’d love to have lunch with you. Thank you for calling me. You are the first person that has called me to invite me to lunch since I left office.” *Sic transit gloria mundi.*

So I began preparing for the INF negotiations. They were scheduled to begin on November 30, 1981. The Soviet negotiator was a man named Yuli Kvitinsky, a young man in his mid-40s but an experienced NATO policy Soviet diplomat. We went to Geneva. I was in my office the day before the negotiations were to open on November 30 and two interesting things happened that day. First, I learned that large posters had been placed all over Geneva which said in French that important negotiations are going to open in Geneva tomorrow and please elect your council of state that’s running for election today—or something like that. In all the years that we had been in negotiations in Switzerland, Geneva, we never attracted any local attention, ever—SALT I, SALT II, and so on. For the first, and I guess the only time, we made news in Geneva because there was an election. I said to my assistant and friend and colleague, “Jack McNeill, that’s a real prize. It has never happened before. You’ve got to get one for me and one for Ambassador Nitze” so Jack went to the offices of the city council and asked if there any copies of the poster left. They gave him the last three. He kept one for himself and gave one to Paul and me. I still have mine.

. (I had worked with Jack for years. He had been Assistant General Counsel when I was General Counsel of ACDA and subsequently moved to a similar position at Defense. A wonderful man, he tragically died young some years later.)

Then the second thing happened. A couple of hours later another one of our delegation officers came running into the office. He said, “Tom, the principal newspaper in Geneva today says that, the INF negotiations are to open tomorrow and the American delegation is led by Communists. You are named as one of the Communists.” I asked, “Who are the

others?” He said, “Paul Nitze, Norman Clyne and Jack McNeill.” I said, “I am happy to be whatever it is that Paul Nitze is.” Those kinds of things happened so often. If you didn’t like somebody during the Cold War—for whatever reason—or disagreed with him, you just called him a Communist and left it at that.

Q: Oh, yes.

GRAHAM: And so the negotiations opened in the fall of 1981 and immediately went nowhere. We had this “zero option” that I described earlier, which the Soviets rejected out of hand. Their proposal was, “Let’s have an equal number” but they counted in that number the British and French systems—a complete no-no for the U.S. “No, we will never count the British and French system, even though they had nuclear weapons targeted on Russia. No that could never happen.”

So those negotiations continued on into the next year, 1982. In the summer of 1982, Paul Nitze and Yuli Kvitinsky, took a very famous walk in the woods in the forest above Geneva. They sat down on a log and sketched out a solution. The solution was, that British and French systems would not count. The U.S. and Soviets would have equal number of missiles in Europe. The Soviets could keep a certain number—I forget what the number was—let’s say 500 SS-20s and we would have an equivalent number of cruise missiles, but we would not have the Pershing-II, which they particularly feared because they thought it was a decapitating weapon. That was the walk-in-the-woods deal. The only people that knew about it, were Bill Burns, representative for the Joint Chiefs and Gene Rostow in Washington. Then, the session of negotiations ended. Kvitinsky went back to Moscow and Nitze came to Washington and sought approval of what they had done. Of course, no American ambassador in an arms control negotiation had ever gone off on his own like that—never before and never since. It was a brilliant move. It would have settled the whole thing right then on very favorable terms to us.

There was a brief interagency discussion of it and then it went directly to a National Security Council meeting. The Chiefs who had been on board all along initially favored it and President Reagan, when he heard it for the first time, favored it as well. I won’t say, “favored” but was positively inclined toward it. Secretary of Defense Weinberger said little except to note that the Chiefs were for it. It just happened that Richard Perle had been out of town and unaware of what was going on. When he found out, he called Weinberger and said, “Ask for another meeting.” So another meeting was held at which Weinberger was primed to trash the proposal. Reagan said, “Well, okay. I won’t support it and you, Paul, tell the Soviets that I am one tough son of a bitch and I’m not going along with this.”

In between the NSC meetings there was a large interagency meeting. Nitze was there, I was there, Richard Perle was there and some 25 or 30 people in a State Department meeting room. At that meeting Richard Perle levied his supreme insult against Paul Nitze; he said, “Paul, the trouble with you is you are just an inveterate problem solver.” I mean, what could be worse than that? When Paul went back to Geneva, he didn’t bring up the walk in the woods deal. Neither did Kvitinsky and it just went away. In any case,

the walk in the woods went away except it became a play on Broadway, a very successful play.

Also in early 1982 the SALT negotiations began again, except now they were called the START negotiations. The Reagan administration made much of the fact that these weak-kneed Carterites and Ford followers wanted to limit missile launchers because that's what you could see by satellite. They—these red-blooded Reaganites—were going to limit warheads because that's what killed you. Of course, the way warheads are counted is to attribute a certain number to each missile and attribute a certain missile to each launcher so it amounted to exactly the same thing but much was made of that difference.

The negotiations began but, of course, promptly went nowhere. Then, the U.S. missiles began to be deployed in 1983. The first cruise missiles came to Greenham Common in Britain in September, 1983, but more importantly the Pershing IIs began to be deployed in Germany in November of 1983. As soon as the first Pershing IIs were deployed—as soon as the announcement was made, the very next day the Soviets walked out of the INF negotiations and brought them to an end and the day after that they did the same thing with respect to the START negotiations. That was the end of that phase of arms control negotiations.

Paul Nitze—in addition to being very interested in the negotiations—was very worried about the political reaction in Western Europe because the U.S. deployment of missiles was used by the left-wing opposition in many countries to stir up huge anti-American rallies with much chanting of the phrase 'better Red than dead'. I remember Paul Nitze commenting on that. He said, "That is the central purpose of American policy. The whole purpose of these negotiations is preventing that choice—either Red dead—from ever having to be made." I have always remembered that.

So those negotiations went away and by the end of 1983, things were not good with the Soviet Union. Subsequently, I found out that in 1982 the U.S. had been planning a strategic exercise which the Soviets for various reasons—perhaps signals some of their operatives picked up in the West—interpreted as the U.S. preparing for a first strike against the Soviet Union. So they were on high alert. The Cold War situation was very bad by the end of 1983. However at this same time, Reagan was sending private letters to Brezhnev and to Andropov asking, Can't we find a way to peace here? Can't we get rid of these nuclear weapons? "Can't we agree that all these weapons could destroy civilization? ." I think he sent two or three letters to that effect, but it's likely the Soviets dismissed them as propaganda.

1984 was a dangerous year, but also a "nothing year" in that very little happened except the U.S. finally eliminated the Congressional restrictions on the Peacekeeper or MX missile, opening the way to deployment of this new strategic missile. Fifty missiles were deployed in Minuteman silos in Wyoming. I was part of the task force that achieved the elimination of these congressional restrictions. I remember on our last day - we had met maybe 20 times in the Roosevelt Room in the White House. On the very last day as we were wrapping everything up it and it was clear that Congress was going to approve the

deployment; we were about to leave when the chairman of our group said, “Everybody just wait a minute. Just hold on.” So we sort of milled around and a minute or two later President Reagan walked into the room and he thanked each one of us individually and said something different to each one of us and then subsequently sent us each a picture with his signature. A little touch like that goes a long way—it really does.

Also, as you recall, 1984 was when the Korean airliner—K 007, I think—was shot down by Soviet air defense. It had strayed off course because of navigational failure and was flying near the Kamchatka Peninsula instead of being on a direct route to Seoul. The Soviets scrambled fighter planes to stop it. Either the pilots didn’t recognize the plane or didn’t understand what their mission was. One of them fired on the airliner, shooting it down. U.S. Congressman, Larry McDonald, was on board. That was the absolute bottom of U.S.-Soviet relations in the Cold War. That was almost comparable to the Cuban missile crisis in potential danger. We ground on through 1984 and among other things buried the third Soviet leader in three years; Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko, all three funerals attended by our vice president, George Bush.

In January of 1985 there was a meeting in Geneva between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Affairs Minister Gromyko to restart the arms control negotiations under the rubric of nuclear and space arms. This negotiation was to have three parts; START, INF and space because in 1983 President Reagan had made his famous strategic defense initiative, or Star Wars speech and the Soviets wanted to negotiate about space. There was a meeting in Geneva at which all this was agreed. I was there as the arms control adviser to Secretary Shultz. [Pointing] That picture on the wall is from Newsweek magazine, dated January 21, 1985. The article was entitled Shultz’s Shaky Team. That was his delegation that went with him, among other destinations, to Geneva to meet Foreign Minister Gromyko—National Security Adviser Bud McFarlane; Ken Adelman, the new Director of the Arms Control Agency who had replaced Gene Rostow when he was fired the previous year; Paul Nitze; General Rowney; myself and Richard Perle. We were all standing there side-by-side.

That discussion created a new arms control forum called the Nuclear and Space Arms Negotiation with the three-headed arrangement whereby we had an overall ambassador, Max Kampelman. For the Soviets it was Victor Karpov and then there were negotiating Ambassadors for each of the sub-negotiations. Originally it was former Senator John Tower, for START. Mike Glitman, who had been Nitze’s deputy at the INF negotiations, became Ambassador and the negotiator for INF under the new arrangement. We had a space arms delegation; Hank Cooper, who later was the Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Office, was the U.S. representative or ambassador. Karpov had a second job continuing as their START negotiator, for negotiations scheduled to begin in March. It was around that time that Gorbachev was selected as the succeeding general secretary of the Communist Party. Nothing changed right away.

Q: Was there any evaluation coming from your Soviet counterparts or anything about Gorbachev?

GRAHAM: Nothing, nothing. The only evaluation of him that any of us knew about was that Prime Minister Thatcher had said, “This is a man we can work with” the previous year when he was still just a senior member of the Politburo. As I said in an earlier session, the first American official to formally meet Gorbachev was Senator Edward Kennedy and he was invited to come to Moscow to meet Gorbachev. Before he went, he asked to be briefed on arms control, on Eastern Europe and East-West economics. I was asked to brief him on arms control. I spent about two hours in his office briefing him on that subject. He then went to Moscow, met with Gorbachev, came back, reported to the White House and then he invited the three of us (who had briefed him) to have dinner with him alone at his house where he told us essentially what had happened. He was very favorably impressed with Gorbachev. He too thought, “This is a man we can work with.”

To digress a little bit—back to Gene Rostow and Ken Adelman. Sometime in the fall of 1982 or early 1983 when Gene Rostow was essentially fired by Secretary of State Alexander Haig, but formally by the White House.

Q: Had you seen a problem with Haig and Rostow?

GRAHAM: Yes, Rostow kept offering advice in areas that were not his responsibility, particularly the Middle East. Haig got tired of hearing it. That was the main problem. So U.S. UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick’s deputy, Ken Adelman, was selected as his successor. Initially, Jeane Kirkpatrick was seen as a real right-wing bastion as was her deputy Ken, himself new to government and, in those days, a friend of Dick Cheney and others of similar persuasion. At that time, the UN ambassador was considered a cabinet member and invited to all National Security Council meetings. Also, in those days it really wasn’t good enough to participate by remote TV. You could, but being there personally was better. Jeane Kirkpatrick used to come to Washington for the meetings. On one occasion she couldn’t make it because of something in New York so she sent Ken in her place. When he got back she asked him how he liked it. He said, “Well, it was a very interesting discussion but, you know, it was amazing—everybody there looked just exhausted. Secretary of State Haig looked like a truck had run over him. Secretary Weinberger looked in terrible shape and several others—except for the President. He looked fresh as a daisy.” She said, “You would look that good too if you got as much sleep as he does.”

But then Ken’s selection was a cause célèbre in the arms control community. It was feared he was only hired to destroy arms control and so on. General Rowney, not atypically, submitted a secret memo to Ken Adelman listing the number of people who should be either fired or “watched” in the agency and why. It was sent to Rostow’s office—even though he had been fired and Ken Adelman was coming in. But Adelman hadn’t been confirmed yet so somebody in Rostow’s office picked it up and circulated it among the people listed on that paper. It became known as the “hit list.” Ambassador Jim Goodby, who was then the deputy at START negotiations, Rowney’s deputy in Geneva, was described as being for “progress at any price”. I was in charge of Congressional Relations as well as being on Nitze’s delegation. At the time, Senator Howard Baker was the Senate majority leader, Republican. Rowney said about me, smart, quick, spends

entirely too much time with Senator Baker, and needs to be carefully watched. I never did figure that one out.

The list finally got into the hands of Senator Baker, himself. He was none too thrilled with it. There was a dialogue that began between Senator Baker's assistant, Cran Montgomery (later ambassador to Oman) and Pam Turner, who was in charge of Senate relations for the Reagan White House. My understanding was the conversation was something like "this really is beyond normal limits. We have to contain it somehow." Articles started to appear. There was an article in Time magazine about the hit list written by Strobe Talbott and entitled Memo Misfire. So the Foreign Relations Committee decided to have an executive session hearing on it, a non-public hearing. Pam Turner called me and asked me, one of the people on the list, to prepare General Roney for this hearing and accompany him. I did that and basically spent two days with him helping him develop non-answers to questions. The hearing went okay, nothing bad happened.

The hit list gradually became an object of merriment. A couple of days later I was with Nitze briefing the Senate Intelligence Committee in private about the INF negotiations. Moynihan, the ranking Democrat, at the end of the hearing said just to the two of us, "Well, thank you very much, Ambassador Nitze. Mr. Graham, I hope you keep your job." As I was walking out, Senator Chafee, the Republican from Rhode Island, whom I knew fairly well, said, "Tom, this is great. You are a left-leaning, dangerous individual because you spend too much time with Howard Baker. I always suspected him. Ho, ho, ho." It all came to nothing, but it is just one more arms control story.

Ken had a very difficult time in his confirmation hearing. Understandably, I guess, as the managers of the confirmation were other than the ACDA General Counsel office. Instead, someone from the State Department managed it with the result that the senior Democrat, Senator Pell, asked a series of hostile questions. During the hearing he asked Ken on seven different occasions the same question in different forms, with clearly his support hanging in the balance. Overall it was a long, contentious hearing. If Ken could have gained Pell's support, then it wouldn't have been a serious problem because he was the ranking Democrat on the Committee. Each time, in effect, he asked Ken, "Ambassador Adelman, if you become ACDA director and you become convinced that President Reagan has permanently turned against arms control, will you resign?" Ken, on the advice of his handlers, kept giving these waffling answers: "Well, President Reagan would never turn his back on arms control" and so on. I kept passing this note forward: "Ken, just say yes. It won't matter later. Nobody will remember it. Just say yes." But he never did and although the majority of the committee voted against him, he was confirmed on the Senate floor anyway. It was 55-45 or something like that and he was confirmed.

Coming back to 1985, we had a triple-headed negotiation underway—INF, START and space. Space never went anywhere. The U.S. just totally stonewalled on that—much to the disappointment of the Soviets. They wanted to engage on it. Not much progress was made on START or INF either. Then, Senator Tower left as the negotiator and Ron Lehman, his deputy, became the negotiator. He was the ACDA Director during the first

Bush administration a few years later.

INF gradually began moving a bit faster than START. Then in October of 1985 a summit was scheduled in Geneva—the first one, between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. The delegations shut down not long before that but we were still in session during the preparations. The U.S., of course, had an advance team there and so did the Soviets. At one point there were two Soviet officials talking with two Swiss officials about Mrs. Gorbachev's schedule. They had a long list of things that they wanted her to do and they were ticking off the list and came to number six or seven. One of the Soviet officials said, "Mrs. Gorbachev would like to visit a poor Swiss farm family. The two Swiss officials looked at each other, astonished. One of them said, "I am sorry. We don't have one."

In any case, Reagan and Gorbachev met in Geneva. The world knows that story.

Q: Before they met, were you expecting anything or was this just another, what was sort of the attitude of the rest of your group?

GRAHAM: We didn't really have any expectations. We thought we knew President Reagan. It turned out we didn't know him as well as we thought; he was much more against nuclear weapons than we ever imagined. We certainly didn't know Gorbachev. He seemed to be another Soviet in a long line of Soviet leaders, but he was a lot younger, of course, than his three, four or five predecessors. We thought. "Well, maybe he will be a little more flexible."

At the Summit the two leaders adopted the principle "that a nuclear war can never be won and should never be fought." Reagan pulled a little theatrical trick on Gorbachev when they first met. Gorbachev showed up at the U.S. place first—the first meeting was at the chateau where Reagan was staying. It was cold in Geneva—down in the 30s. So Gorbachev naturally gets out of his car with an overcoat on and a hat. Reagan opens the door, comes out smiling to greet Gorbachev without a coat on—just totally upstaging Gorbachev. Gorbachev looked like a frumpy bureaucrat and Reagan looked like a great star. That's politics! I thought it was great.

They did get on after a while and gradually things began to change. I personally believe that Gorbachev will be remembered by historians as a great man who helped to save the world from nuclear confrontation and disaster. The Cold War would not have ended peaceably but for him. Not that Reagan wasn't important and George H.W. Bush and others. But he was the one who really made it possible. The Cold War ended with very, very little bloodshed and it could have been catastrophic. It is true that the results were disastrous for Russia but they need not have been. The disastrous impact on Russia was a result of decisions made early in the Clinton administration. I was a very strong supporter of Clinton and still am, but I do believe that if H.W. Bush had had another term, his policies toward Russia would have been long term more constructive. I don't believe he would have expanded NATO. I don't believe he would have essentially participated in grinding Russia to the ground. It would have been more like Germany and Japan after

World War II, which is the way it should have been but wasn't.

But that's jumping ahead. I think Gorbachev did the Russians and everyone a huge service by what he tried to do and by what he did accomplish. He tried to do three things at once, which were more than any one human being could do—he tried to democratize Russia, the Soviet Union; he tried to give it a modern economy and he tried to end the Cold War all at once. It was too much, too much but he was still a great force, a great man. Reagan and Gorbachev were sending messages back and forth about Gorbachev coming to Washington. They couldn't quite agree on the parameters of such a visit so Gorbachev said, "Let's do a preparatory meeting somewhere in between." They tried a couple of places and settled on Reykjavik, Iceland. This happened very quickly. The meeting was arranged.

I have read the transcript of what they said to each other. To this day it remains absolutely astonishing—astonishing that two world leaders could talk like that. I am short handed greatly but basically, the exchange went like this: Gorbachev would say, "Well, let's get rid of strategic missiles." Reagan would say, "Let's get rid of all ballistic missiles." Gorbachev would reply, "Let's limit the number of nuclear weapons" and Reagan would say, "Let's get rid of all the nuclear weapons" —that kind of discussion.

Shultz was sitting there and so was Shevardnadze. It is remarkable that it happened. Those two leaders were way ahead of their time, maybe even a century ahead of their time but they tried. They might have reached some kind of an agreement were it not that Richard Perle and one or two allies in the back room kept prompting Reagan to insist on the strategic defense initiative whereas Gorbachev's brief clearly was that it be limited to the laboratory. Reagan would say, "But we can't limit it to the laboratory; Congress would never fund it. I can't agree to that." Gorbachev would say, "The laboratory could be all of space." And Reagan, "No, we can't limit it to the laboratory."

Meanwhile, Nitze had negotiated with Marshal Akhromeyev all night about significant arms control progress so it might have been that some kind of framework agreement could have been reached but for the sabotage with the strategic defense initiative. Why couldn't we have agreed that the strategic defense initiative could have stayed for ten years in the laboratory—this was Gorbachev's instruction with the agreement that the laboratory could include space? Anyway, an agreement couldn't get done. You remember from the pictures that some of the Americans were almost in tears.

If there had been a really far-reaching agreement, as opposed to some kind of framework policy statement, it would have been immediately sabotaged by the bureaucracies in both capitals and it would not have survived anyway. Mrs. Thatcher immediately flew to Washington and was heard to say as she got on the airplane, "Nuclear weapons have kept the peace in Europe for 40 years and I am not about to give them up." George Shultz tells a wonderful story and I am broadly paraphrasing: "After we got back from fending off members of Congress who criticized the Reykjavik discussions, I was sitting at my desk and my secretary called me and said, 'Mrs. Thatcher is on the phone. She had come to Washington and is at the British Embassy. She would like to speak with you, Mr.

Secretary.’ ‘Very well,’ I said and picked up the phone. It was Maggie Thatcher. She said, ‘George, I want you to get over here to the embassy right away. You get over here right away and you explain this Reykjavik to me. I want to see you right now’—just like that! I said, ‘Okay,’ hung up the telephone and went over to the British embassy. When I got over to the British embassy, they said, ‘Oh, yes. The prime minister is waiting in this side room here.’ So I went into the side room and Maggie Thatcher was there. She said, ‘George,’ and she started hitting me with the big handbag she used to carry. She said, ‘George, what did you think you were doing over there? You were supposed to be the smart one in the room. What were you doing?’ I said, ‘But Maggie, I agreed with the President.’ She said, ‘It doesn’t matter.’”

It was a wonderful story. My recounting of it doesn’t do it justice, but I have heard it a couple of times from George. Great story! As I said, an agreement never would have survived.

Two things of great import happened at Reykjavik. In fact, Reykjavik was the watershed of arms control. The first thing was that Gorbachev agreed that the Soviet Union would release all data on its systems—there would be a total exchange of data, which was something we had been trying to get since the beginning, since 1969. Second, Gorbachev agreed that the INF treaty could be verified by intrusive onsite inspection. He agreed also that shorter-range systems, down to 500 kilometers range, could be included in an INF treaty so that everything from 500 to 5,000 kilometers was included. A few months later, after the Japanese complained about getting rid of all these missiles in Europe but not the ones out in Asia that could threaten them, the Soviets agreed to make it worldwide—everything in the Soviet Union, everything in the U.S. of these ranges. That meeting established intrusive, onsite inspection as the bedrock of arms control as well as the complete disclosure of information. It was a most important watershed.

The Reykjavik meeting was a watershed for arms control then. And today in the 21st century (for the last six years) that meeting has been an inspiration for the George Schulz-Henry Kissinger - Bill Perry-Sam Nunn effort to move the world in the direction of zero nuclear weapons. The first meeting of the group was held on the 20th anniversary of the Reykjavik meeting in 2006 and the first product—the first op-ed article that appeared in the Wall Street Journal—was in January, 2007. There was a second meeting in 2007 and a second op-ed article in the Wall Street Journal in 2008. Then two years ago in 2011 there was another meeting, on the 25th anniversary of Reykjavik.

The first op-ed article by the four statesmen, with the support of about 20 others (including myself) at the 2006 meeting and at subsequent meetings, referenced President Reagan’s statement in which he described nuclear weapons as “totally destructive, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing and possibly destructive of life and civilization.” The authors noted that President Reagan was strongly in favor of eliminating nuclear weapons from the face of the earth as was General Secretary Gorbachev. former General Secretary, former President Gorbachev.

Then in 1987 the INF negotiations were able to be brought to a conclusion late in the

year. The treaty was initialed in early December, 1987 by the U.S. and Soviet negotiators on a U.S. Air Force plane flying to Washington from Geneva. It was signed next day by Reagan and Gorbachev in Washington on December 8, 1987. In that Treaty an entire class of nuclear weapon systems was entirely eliminated. All U.S. and Soviet medium-range and shorter-range nuclear weapon systems, all systems, all ballistic missile systems and cruise missile systems of ranges between 500 kilometers and 5500 kilometers were eliminated. 5500 kilometers was the threshold of strategic nuclear missiles. Medium-range missiles were considered to be from 1,000 to 5500 kilometers in range and short-range missiles were considered to be 500 to 1,000. The shorter-range missiles included the Pershing I and Soviet SS-12 and SS-23 missiles. Not covered, of course, were the sea-based cruise missiles. Air-based long-range cruise missiles were limited by the subsequent START agreement.

This eliminated a complete class of nuclear weapon systems, not just in Europe, but worldwide, for the U.S. and the Soviet Union. There were some who argued at the time, "Why don't we make this treaty worldwide for every country?" Doing so was considered too difficult. People are still talking about a worldwide agreement today. There was an article that appeared on the subject not long ago, a few months ago. I commented on it.

Signing the INF treaty was a very important event. It was the step stone to the treaty that ended the Cold War under the first President Bush, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe treaty. The INF Treaty brought to an end the hostility between the Soviet Union and the United States. Near the final session of the treaty negotiations the parties exchanged the information on their systems. The Soviet colonel that provided this information on behalf of the Soviet delegation to the American delegation said something to the effect that, "If I had done this a week ago, I would have been shot."

The Soviets gave the U.S. almost more than we wanted because we weren't sure we wanted to disclose that much information. But very complete information and onsite inspection was memorialized in the INF treaty, intrusive onsite inspection. And it was agreed there would be permanent monitors at a missile production plant in Votkinsk, Russia. The reason was that that plant made both SS-20s, which were banned by the treaty, and SS-25s, which are strategic weapons and which were not banned. You can't tell the difference by overhead photography so onsite inspectors were permanently placed at the plant. The only concession the Soviets asked for that was they wanted to have something similar in the U.S. even though we didn't have a plant that made both medium-range and strategic missiles. So we designated a plant. It was the Hercules plant in Utah. The company whose plant it was only found out about their selection the night before it was announced. Secretary Shultz called them and told them, "You are going to have Russians at your plant for the next seven years or so." That very, very important principle made the START treaty possible and many other things, as well.

The Treaty was signed in December. As I indicated, I flew back with the delegation on a U.S. Air Force plane from Geneva. We did the initialing of the treaty on that airplane. The Soviet leadership of the delegation flew back with us on that plane. The next morning I discovered a mistake in the Treaty text, which I had to fix and take over to the

Soviet Embassy and get the Soviet ambassador negotiator to initial. Then, I took it to Ambassador Glitman to have him initial for the United States. The treaty was signed in the East Room of the White House by Reagan and Gorbachev. Then, Reagan took Gorbachev with him on the helicopter, Marine One, to Camp David. Gorbachev subsequently said, if I remember correctly, that was when he knew the Cold War was truly over. He and President Reagan got on the helicopter and sat next to each other and their aides, military officers that were with them carrying the footballs—the launch codes for each—sat quite near them and put the two launch code briefcases side-by-side. Gorbachev said that was when he knew the Cold War was really over. The Treaty had a few minor problems in the U.S. Senate, but eventually it was ratified in the spring of 1988. President Reagan traveled to Moscow to exchange the instruments of ratification with Gorbachev and bring the treaty into force June 1, 1988.

Many years before, in 1981 shortly after being elected, President Reagan had referred to the Soviet Union as an “Evil Empire” in a speech delivered somewhere in the United States. So in June of 1988 with the INF treaty in force, President Reagan made an important speech at Moscow University and later Gorbachev took him to some of the sights of Moscow. As they were strolling—the two Presidents, arm in arm across Red Square, one of the reporters with the news media covering the visit asked President Reagan, “President Reagan, do you still think this is the ‘Evil Empire’?” President Reagan said, “No, that was another time, another place.”

Q: We will pick this up, after the treaty was signed.

Today is the 10th of May, 2013 with Tom Graham. We left off with President Reagan and Chairman Gorbachev walking across Red Square and in response to a reporter Reagan, when asked if he still thought the Soviet Union was the ‘evil empire’ and he says, “That was another time, another place.” The quotation comes from the Jew of Malta by Ben Johnson. Another time another place and besides, the wench is dead. You wanted to talk about the post signing of the INF treaty.

GRAHAM: And the entry into force of the INF Treaty, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which was Reagan’s signature agreement. This was 1988 and we were right at the cusp—if that’s the right word—right at the point defining the end of the Cold War although few people, if anyone, realized it at the time. If they did, at least at that moment, they certainly didn’t articulate it.

Reagan left office. There was still a Soviet Union, but the world situation following the presidency of Ronald Reagan, which featured cooperation with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, had really brought a new era of peace to the world as a result of the improved relationship. In reality there was a truly good relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet Union was still regarded as the principal adversary of the United States. So President Reagan left office in January of 1989 and his Vice President, George H. W. Bush assumed office as President.

Just a word here on arms control non-proliferation treaties: virtually every President since President Eisenhower, since the ramping up of the Cold War, virtually every President—although later on I will argue that there was one President that didn't quite make the standard—every President concluded a major international arms control/ non-proliferation agreement. In fact, every President, including President Obama in 2010. For President Kennedy it was the Limited Test Ban Treaty. For President Johnson it was the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. For President Nixon it was the SALT I Treaty. For President Carter it was the SALT II Treaty. With Ronald Reagan, as I just said, it was the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which took the first step toward ending the Cold War. The meeting in Reykjavik, the INF treaty, followed by (under President H.W. Bush), the Conventional Arms Forces in Europe Treaty, which, in fact, did end the Cold War. These two treaties together represent, you might say, the peaceful conclusion of the Cold War.

I said earlier that virtually every President since President Eisenhower concluded a major international arms control/ non-proliferation agreement—other presidents that followed Reagan too: for President Clinton it was the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, for President Obama conclusion of the new START Treaty. The distinctive fact about President George W. Bush signed an agreement called the Strategic Operational Arms Reduction Agreement, which I guess you could say was a treaty, but really was only the formalization of an exchange of statements by President Putin and President Bush. It relied on other treaties for verification and all other administrative provisions. It was only a couple of paragraphs long.

Returning to George H. W. Bush, he didn't just conclude *one* important international arms control/non-proliferation treaty; he concluded *four*, four in four years, which is remarkable. There was the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty that ended the Cold War and ended the military confrontation in the heart of Europe, which was the essence of the Cold War. In addition, there were the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty, START I and also a START II Treaty, which—although a major step forward—was unfortunately never ratified because of the dispute over missile defense.. But signing four—three of which did, in fact, enter into force—is amazing. Those three treaties were very important ones. The START I Treaty ended the strategic arms competition, the Chemical Weapons Convention eliminated (banned) chemical weapons throughout the world. That's poison gas. And as I said, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty ended the Cold War.

President George H. W. Bush met General Secretary—I think then called President—Gorbachev. I will refer to him as “President” for the rest of this discussion because at some point he did assume the office of the president of the Soviet Union. Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met early on, in February or March in the first year of President H. W. Bush's term. That would have been February or March of 1989, in Malta. The meeting in Malta set the stage for the things that followed.

People were beginning to say in 1989—in the wake of the INF treaty, in the wake of

essentially the hatchet being buried between the United States and the Soviet Union—that maybe the Cold War, maybe, possibly one day will come to an end. Other people were saying, “No, no sign of that. The Soviet Union still represents a dangerous adversary.” There certainly remained elements in the Soviet government who were adversarial, not including President Gorbachev.

President H. W. Bush was initially focused on the concept of regulating armaments in Europe and, thereby, trying to end the Cold War. In the summer of 1989 he indicated he wanted a treaty negotiated on this subject. I should mention at this point for the reader that regulating European armaments came at the end of a long process that began with the Helsinki Act in 1975. In Helsinki in the summer of 1975, thirty-five nations of Europe agreed at the presidential/prime minister level in a non-binding declaration that the borders of European states would no longer be changed by force, essentially—in the eyes of the Soviet Union—ratifying the post-Cold War settlement.

But there was another part to it: the Soviet Union pledged its commitment to human rights and, under the Helsinki Final Act, the Parties were authorized to set up watch committees to ensure that human rights were observed by all member states. In a way, this provision in the Helsinki Final Act ultimately unraveled the Soviet Union. It led to Vaclav Havel and the Watch Committee in Czechoslovakia becoming well known. In the Helsinki Final Act there was a provision authorizing observers at maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops. That was considered a minor provision at the time—almost an afterthought. But the human rights part of the Final Act was expanded a bit at the agreement in Madrid, in 1980, which furthered the process. Then in the mid-1980s, there was a negotiation and agreement reached at Stockholm on confidence-building measures in Europe. It was signed in 1985. It provided for observers throughout Europe and the European part of the Soviet Union at virtually all significant maneuvers. Again, non-legally binding but relatively comprehensive.

Q: In diplomatic usage, what do you mean by ‘non legally binding’?

GRAHAM: If a treaty is non-legally binding, it does not create an international legal obligation and it has no force of domestic law. An international agreement, which is signed but not designed to be ratified, does create an international legal obligation but it has no force in domestic law. A treaty which is ratified by the states involved and comes into force creates not only international legal obligations, which can be the basis of UN sanctions, but it also has the force of domestic law. A treaty signed and ratified by the United States is on exactly the same basis within the United States as a statute. It can be enforced if it has self-executing provisions. If it bans certain things and people within the United States break those prohibitions, they are committing a crime.

Q: Looking at this, why would nations bother to create these non-legally binding agreements?

GRAHAM: There is another name for them, which I think will answer your question: they are sometimes called politically binding agreements. In other words, they carry

certain political significance. A country gets in trouble politically in the international arena if it doesn't observe these provisions. Another fact about politically binding agreements is that they bind only the head of state that signs them. They don't bind subsequent administrations—at least that is the official interpretation although, in practice, they usually continue on. International agreements are a bigger deal and treaties are a much bigger deal.

So the success of these three agreements—the Helsinki Final Act, the Madrid Agreement and the Stockholm Confidence Building Agreement—led people to conclude that now what was needed was a treaty regulating armaments, a legally binding treaty regulating armaments in Europe as a way to truly bring peace. There had been an attempt much earlier called the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations, which lasted from 1973 until 1985 and which had as their objective the limitation of military personnel in Central Europe—the reduction of the size of the armies facing each other. These discussions never went anywhere—never even came close to drafting an agreement. MBFR was a good place for East and West to talk to one another but that was about it—although it did have utility. There were many, many meetings. It became apparent that it was virtually impossible to limit personnel—the number of soldiers. How are you going to verify that? So the thought was to shift. Instead of limiting the size of armies within Europe in an attempt to bring peace, limit the major weapon systems, which can be verified—such as battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces and then (added later on) attack helicopters and fighter bomber aircraft.

What began in 1987—the Mandate Discussions—was a reflection of this desire to bring Europe together in this way. The objective was to establish the mandate for a treaty on the subject. Many of the major issues were at least partially resolved within the mandate talks, which lasted from 1987 to 1989. For example, the first issue was: what are the boundaries of Europe where the limitations could take effect?

I might back up briefly and say that, whereas the Stockholm Agreement, the Helsinki Final Act, the Madrid Agreement involved all of Europe including the neutrals, it was decided after much debate and over strong French objections, to make the Mandate talks, only between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, excluding the neutrals. That, of course, flowed into what the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty became.

Q: Was France in this? Was it in or out of NATO agreement wise?

GRAHAM: France was in NATO but thought that the discussion should involve neutral states such as Yugoslavia, Sweden, Switzerland and Finland, which had sizeable armies. But the decision was to make the negotiation strictly between the member countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The first issue was: what is Europe? It was agreed that Europe was the land territory that extended from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains and did not include Siberia. That raised the question—and I am going to bring it up now but it will come up again in this discussion—of okay, we've got this line of demarcation in the Soviet Union going down

the Ural Mountains, but then what happens to it? Turkey is a NATO state. They are in this discussion. How do they figure in this definition?

The various negotiating parties said, “Turkey is in a really bad neighborhood.” It has a border with Iraq and, of course, Saddam Hussein was in power then. It has a border with Iran and so the treaty limitation zone shouldn’t include all of Turkey. There should be an exclusion zone just like the Soviets have in Siberia. So this concept was agreed to. The line would go down the Ural Mountains and then over to the Black Sea and along the Black Sea coast and then proceed from this town to that town to this town to the Mediterranean. This definition of Europe evolved over a two-year period. Negotiators were just about to finish the Mandate talks on January 10, 1989 when the Greeks suddenly realized—I guess they had been asleep for six months or so—that the way the line was drawn through Turkey put the Port of Mersin, from which the invasion of Cyprus was launched by Turkey, in the exclusion zone—the “not limited” zone. This was a political no-no. Athens went crazy, stopped the clock, and held up the conclusion of the Mandate talks so the negotiation actually ended on January 18, although the agreement says January 10. It took eight days to resolve this one issue among all the states.

Perhaps I will tell the whole story now. The compromise in the Mandate talks was that the treaty would read that the line would go down from the Black Sea coast to this Turkish town and then to that town and that town to this town to this town until it came to a town that was about ten kilometers from the Mediterranean Coast. Then it reads, “and thence to the sea.” The Greeks interpreted as the language to mean, “continuing in the same direction as the line was going,” which meant that Mersin was in the treaty area of application. Everyone else interpreted the language to mean “the shortest distance to the Mediterranean,” which would put Mersin in the exclusionary zone. The difference of interpretation was never resolved; it was just left ambiguous. So that is how the Mandate talks resolved that issue. That was January, 1989.

Later in September of 1989 the treaty negotiations began and the same issue came up in the treaty negotiations in November of 1989 when NATO was attempting to table its draft treaty, which I had largely drafted. We had made it through Brussels. It was approved by NATO. It was drafted by the U.S., introduced into NATO, eventually approved by NATO with a few changes and then we hoped to table it in Vienna, which is where the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) negotiations were held. Athens went crazy again. This time it wasn’t eight days; it was six weeks that progress was held up. We had the U.S. Secretary of State flying to Athens. It was a huge deal. During that six-week period, I made a trip from Vienna to Paris. My position on the delegation at that time was the chief arms control adviser and chief legal adviser. I will come back later to the formulation of the negotiations.

Q: As a member of the delegation sitting in there, how did you find, what were the Turks doing? Were they sort of sitting there, letting their Greek cousins raise hell?

GRAHAM: No, they were saying, of course, Mersin should be in an exclusionary zone. That’s the way it was always intended. That’s what the Mandate agreement says and this

is appropriately reflected in the draft CFE Treaty provision. The Turks were very supportive of the whole process—they really were. One Turkish diplomat told me toward the end of it, “If the Cold War really does end, you Americans cannot leave Europe because you have got to keep us all from killing each other as we have been doing for the last 500 years.”

Q: This was part of that thing to keep the Soviets out and keeping the Americans in.

GRAHAM: As I was saying, during the second of the Mersin crises, I made a trip over to Paris and met with the number three person in the French foreign ministry who was responsible for this issue. He said, “You see? We French were right all along. We should have included the neutrals in this negotiation because the neutrals would include the Vatican. We wouldn’t have to worry about NATO tabling the treaty. The Vatican could table it for us and say it came from God.” Finally, after much, much political tumult, the arrangement was settled the same way it had been in the Mandate talks. The definition was described in the same way: “and thence to the sea.”

Well, there is one more piece to the story—the best piece of all. A number of months later after the negotiations were over and the U.S. was submitting the treaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification, a problem came up. It was 1991 by this time. The Senate said, “When you submit the treaty to us, we want a map showing how the definition works on a map.” What to do? What to do with Mersin? So we thought and we thought. This is what we did: on all U.S. maps of that period all the way back to the beginning of the Cold War there always was a legend in the upper right corner of the U.S. map which said, “The U.S. does not recognize the annexation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia by the Soviet Union.” It was always there on every map. So for this map we moved that declaration down to the right hand corner and it covered up Mersin. So you couldn’t tell whether Mersin was in or out and we sent that map to the Senate. Nobody ever raised an objection and there has never been a compliance issue involving Mersin or a complaint by anyone. The moral of that story is sometimes ambiguity is your friend. In that case, it was.

Back to the Mandate talks of 1987 – 1989—a number of other things were agreed in the Mandate talks. For example, what would be limited? As I said earlier, battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery pieces and that was that. But the Soviets wanted to include attack helicopters and combat aircraft that could deliver munitions to the ground. Those were considered the five weapon systems that formed the basic organizational setup of a blitzkrieg attack. No more blitzkriegs were we ever going to have in Europe because these systems were going to be limited. Then there were a few other cats and dogs that were added later, but those are the basic systems for which limitation was agreed in the Mandate talks and they are the basic systems limited in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty.

As 1989 went on, President H. W. Bush became very invested in this process. He made it clear he not only wanted an agreement on this but also wanted it done quickly. The time frame communicated from the White House was that they wanted to see a treaty in around 18 months. I remember talking to one of my principal Soviet counterparts from

the SALT days in Moscow and he said, “We both agree that’s impossible. You can’t negotiate an agreement like this. Our experience is it takes years.” I thought, “Well, we will see about that. When you have a President really pushing, it makes a big difference.” That summer I did an initial draft of what a CFE treaty would look like. We already had a delegation in place in Vienna, basically the Mandate delegation and the ambassador who was head of the Mandate talks stayed only for a few months into the actual CFE treaty negotiations. Jim Woolsey, who later became CIA director, was appointed by President Bush as the U.S. negotiator and Steve Ledogar, who had been the Mandate talk’s ambassador, was transferred to Geneva as the U.S. disarmament ambassador. He later negotiated the Chemical Weapons Convention for the U.S.

I went over to the delegation in the summer sort of on my own. Well, I invited myself. I came with the draft treaty and distributed it among the delegation and established the fact that I was going to be the legal adviser to the delegation. The delegation made a number of comments. I took them back and then I circulated them within the U.S. government. It was really a revelation to work on this treaty in a way so different from the strategic arms process, which was emotional and controversial with so many big fights about everything. There was no doubt that President really wanted this treaty and that the whole government wanted it. So we never had any major conflicts.

Q: What about the ‘prince of darkness’, Richard Perle and others? They just backed away?

GRAHAM: They weren’t interested. They never became involved in this for whatever reason. There was a different set of people in the Defense Department. The negotiations were not confrontational within the U.S. government. So that summer we developed a U.S. draft treaty on an interagency basis and then sent it to Brussels indicating that this was what we wanted. NATO used the draft treaty for the basis of discussion within NATO of a NATO draft treaty. Of course, the negotiation was, in theory, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It was the sixteen countries in NATO and the seven Warsaw Pact members; it was NATO and the Warsaw Pact. There were 23 countries involved, of course.

Q: As the negotiations were going on, were the Soviets the only people really doing anything?

GRAHAM: Oh, no, far from it. On the Warsaw Pact side you we had the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and East Germany—seven. So it was sixteen and seven. The negotiations formally began in Vienna in early September of 1989. For the U.S. delegation and other Western delegations it was a two-front negotiation because they were beginning discussions with the Warsaw Pact and also negotiating the treaty through NATO in Brussels and that took two or three months. It began maybe in August and was completed in November.

I had drafted the treaty as an agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, in October we had an epochal meeting with the Hungarian delegation. Steve Ledogar was

still there; Woolsey didn't arrive until November. So Steve Ledogar was still the ambassador there at the CFE negotiations. As we were talking about our treaty drafting and the fact we were working a draft through NATO and the fact that Warsaw Pact was getting close to tabling their draft, the Hungarians said to us flat out, "Think about it when you are drafting this treaty. We are not staying in the Warsaw Pact. Repeat—are not staying in the Warsaw Pact."

Hearing that I said, "We have to change the treaty." The next time I was in Brussels the draft was revised to say the negotiation was between two groups of states that just happened to match those in the Warsaw Pact and those in NATO. I originally drafted it on a Group basis reflecting the Group limits in the Mandate—for example, 20,000 tanks for each Group. The British and the French went ballistic over that. We had a huge intra-NATO fight. We didn't have the Washington fights but had them in NATO. We had a big fight within NATO because the British and French said they were not going to be obligated under a legally binding treaty, which makes them dependent on Turkey or someone else to be in compliance with the treaty. In other words, if the limit is 20,000 tanks for the group of states of which they were members and the Turks buy 5,000 tanks, they would be in violation as well as the Turks. They were not going to sit still for that.

So we had to get around that. It was set up so that there would be a total limit for each Group, but as far as the actual legal obligation of each member of the Group was concerned, each Group would, in an internal meeting, parcel out the obligations for each Group member. Germany would receive a limit of 4,000 tanks and France 3,000 tanks and so forth. The U.S. was only limited to the number of tanks it had in Europe, not worldwide.

At long last the draft treaty arrived from Brussels. Woolsey was in place by this time. He very much wanted to get the NATO treaty on the table before the Warsaw Pact treaty because he knew it was coming and he was frustrated because of the Mersin issue already described. I have said the following to many people. As an only child, I grew up without sibling controversy, but I married into a very large Irish Catholic family. When they are together, they call each other names. I can't believe the way they talk to each other, but to anybody else, they express love for each other. And they do love each other. They stand together against the world. But within the family, they really fight. NATO is the same way. When they're arguing over something, those NATO ambassadors call each other names that you wouldn't want to print. But when anybody threatens from the outside, they lock arms. That was kind of a revelation. Over the Mersin issue they would call each other liars.

Q: I would think talking about tanks, there are battle ready tanks and there are sort of hulk tanks sitting there that are used for parades. There have to be an awful lot of obsolete or obsolescent tanks that really aren't anything but are just around. Did this mean nations had to get rid of them?

GRAHAM: I'll answer that question and then I will say another thing about NATO. I have just given you the basic outlines of the treaty. The treaty had endless annexes and

sub-definitions and sub-limitations. Each country was allowed a certain number of each weapon system for martial display. These limits applied to operational tanks but the old run down tanks that were still tanks—those still had to be eliminated as part of the elimination process. A certain number of exceptions were allowed for static display.

Just a couple more stories about NATO. We had a NATO ambassadors' caucus, which met every Monday and Wednesday at 3 p.m. at the Canadian mission throughout the negotiations. During the first one of these, after the treaties were on the table from both sides, we were debating the meaning of an instruction from Brussels. In theory Brussels was calling the shots; we reported to Brussels as the NATO representatives. Brussels sent an instruction that some important step should be taken with respect to treaty-limited items. There was uncertainty among the NATO ambassadors as to whether the English term word "item" was limited to equipment or whether it could include personnel. So we had a big debate about the mean of that word within the NATO ambassador caucus. The French ambassador spoke up and lamented, "It is so sad that this negotiation is conducted in the English language with all its ambiguities. If this negotiation were in French, we wouldn't have a problem like this." The negotiations were entirely in English and at the very end of the negotiation the treaty was translated into the five other languages—Spanish, French, Russian, Italian and German. But the negotiation was entirely in English.

Another time toward the end of the negotiation there was another interesting incident. It took place right after the two plus four agreement was reached between the U.S., the USSR, East Germany and West Germany in which it was agreed East Germany would be merged into West Germany and remain a part of NATO. That was another important step in ending the Cold War. So during our negotiation one of the parties completely disappeared because it merged into another one—East Germany, the German Democratic Republic. But up until that happened—up until the two plus four treaty entered into force, the GDR had a separate delegation in Vienna. One day about two months before the two plus four treaty was to come into force—it had already been agreed about two months before it but had not yet come into force—the East German ambassador did something egregious. I don't remember what it was, but something that offended everybody on the Western side. In the NATO caucus the ambassadors were complaining about this. The German ambassador, Rudy Hartmann—a wonderful person, a great diplomat, a superb negotiator, a wonderful friend and, later, the Commissioner of disarmament for Germany—spoke up. He was right out of central casting. He had the perfect German accent in English. He talked like somebody Hollywood would have hired. After sitting there listening to all these complaints about the East German ambassador, with all good spirit he intervened and said, "Vy do ve worry about this country saying these things? This is a country that will soon be ours." All the other ambassadors started in their chairs; all they could think of were panzer divisions.

That day I had lunch with the German legal adviser, Hubertus Von Mohr, another outstanding person who knew the United States very well and had been Consul General in Houston. I was blathering on about unimportant things and saying, "You know Hubertus, this negotiation is so interesting." Not referring to the incident, which had just

happened, “all the national stereotypes are really there. The French love their language, and so on—all these national stereotypes that you read about and think aren’t true, are true and they are here.” He, thinking about what his ambassador had just said, replied, “Yes. They bring out your worst fears, don’t they?”

I just loved that negotiation. All our colleagues on the NATO side and the Warsaw Pact side as well as even the Soviets were interesting people.

Q: Were the Soviets different in these things? You have been up against them for a long time but things were changing in the soon to be the Russian nation. Was there a different atmosphere?

GRAHAM: Yes and no. There was very much a different atmosphere among the Hungarians as I mentioned. The other Eastern Europeans were somewhat like that. As for the Soviets—there was sort of a fatalistic air about them. I won’t go through all the ins and outs of the negotiation, but I will describe what ended up happening.

As we know, during the negotiation, the Warsaw Pact fell apart. On the NATO side, the sixteen NATO countries agreed in a memorandum who would have so many tanks, so many artillery pieces—thus, dividing up the allotted treaty equipment. On the Warsaw Pact side, since the Pact was falling apart, they had to negotiate a treaty among the six remaining countries of the Warsaw Pact, excluding East Germany, called the Treaty of Budapest in which they divided up the allotments for treaty-limited equipment, of which the Soviet Union received a third. As the negotiations ground on to the end, it became clear there were still some major issues to resolve that could only be resolved by the Soviets themselves. It essentially shifted into a negotiation of 22 countries, 16 NATO countries and six Warsaw Pact countries, but in reality a negotiation of 21 countries against one—the Soviet Union.

A small number from our delegation, Ambassador Woolsey and myself and one or two others, went to Moscow to negotiate the remaining difficult issues about certain types of helicopters and other things directly with the Soviet military. We were joined by a senior delegation from Washington headed by the Under Secretary of State, Reg Bartholomew. The delegation returned to Vienna with, in effect, a completed treaty. Thus, the U.S. delegation essentially completed the negotiation in Moscow. This was around the 10th of November, 1990. By this time the heads of government, chiefs of state, had agreed that this treaty would be signed in Paris on November 19. So we had a deadline—one week after the U.S. delegation returned from Russia.

We negotiated the Moscow changes first with the remaining East European countries, the five. They just said fine; they didn’t have any proposed changes and were just happy to see a completion near. We had some problems, a few of them, with the Germans and the French—not big ones, but they took a couple of days to settle. The U.S. delegation wanted to complete the negotiation on Wednesday, November 14th since the next Monday we were to meet in Paris and sign the treaty. The negotiations set a deadline for closing on noon Wednesday. Then, after that, we would have two and a half days to

translate the treaty into the five other languages, which was not going to be simple. There were a lot of big fights there. You can't use that Spanish word because it means something else, that kind of thing. Then on Saturday we planned for the first exchange of data on the weapon systems so we had to allow time for that. So Wednesday noon.

There our delegation was sitting in Vienna on Tuesday morning and a cable comes in. It was a cable from the government, a cleared cable sent by the State Department. It said, "Unless you settle the following eleven issues, Ambassador Woolsey is not authorized to initial the treaty and bring the negotiations to a close on Wednesday." Fortunately, we had anticipated all of those issues and settled them. We sent a message back to that effect. Wednesday morning, the last day, we get another cable from the government signed by the secretary of state, which said, "Unless you settle the following additional seven issues, Ambassador Woolsey is not authorized, etc."

Q: Did you have any idea who was behind this? It sounds like

GRAHAM: I don't know who was behind it. I never tried to find out. This second cable said, "Unless the following seven issues are settled, Ambassador Woolsey will not be authorized to initial the treaty and bring the negotiations to a close." They were all impossibly difficult, some of which had been rejected by the Soviets. Our morning staff meeting took place at 8AM in Jim's office. He said, "Well, I guess you have all seen the cable that came in this morning." "Yeah, we have, Jim." "Here's how I want you all to handle this issue." He picks up a piece of paper like that and goes, (noise of ripping paper), and we never mentioned it again.

Q: There must have been stories. Was somebody that sort of demand or something looks like somebody is trying to sabotage?

GRAHAM: Well, it does or it could just be the usual U.S. government chutzpah, I don't know. We never found out how it happened. So we never did anything about those seven issues, never said we would and we never heard anything more about it. That night Jim—Ambassador Woolsey sent a cable to the Secretary of State over the violent objections of the entire State Department group on the delegation. He sent the following message to the secretary of state: "The fat lady has sung. Ambassador Woolsey." They thought, "Oh, that's bad taste. The Secretary will hate that." He sent it. The next morning—and I had never seen this anywhere in anything I ever did in the government. The next morning we received a cable from the White House saying that Ambassador Woolsey is authorized to initial the treaty and close the negotiations. It wasn't signed by the Secretary of State; it was signed by George H. W. Bush the President. I had never seen that before and never saw it again.

Q: Did you have, I won't say spies but essentially agents of the State Department and of the White House on your delegation? Somebody who was reporting? It sounds like President Bush found out somebody was trying to stop this.

GRAHAM: Maybe. Well, we certainly did have those who reported back in every big

serious delegation, sure. That morning, Wednesday morning before we were to close the negotiations at noon, I was sitting in Jim's office about 10, with two hours to go and the last change in the CFE Treaty took place. The Bulgarian ambassador telephoned and said, "Ambassador Woolsey. We have to make a change in the Treaty. Last night my government voted to change the name of my country. The Treaty has to be changed. My country is going to be called just 'Bulgaria'. We are not going to be called 'the People's Republic of Bulgaria' anymore." That was a change everyone was happy to make, except maybe the Soviets.

The negotiations closed. This treaty ended the Cold War. It did because it ended the military confrontation in Europe, which was the essence of the Cold War. It limited two groups of states; it limited them to 20,000 tanks on each side. It had been 60,000 tanks for the Warsaw Pact and 20,000 for NATO, three to one. The same with armored combat vehicles. I think artillery pieces were limited to 30,000 a Group and so forth.

Q: Why the discrepancy? Why would the Soviets have three times as many?

GRAHAM: They spent all this money building up a huge force. That's what fueled the Cold War. There was a Cold War because everybody thought the Soviets intended to overrun Western Europe and the Treaty ended that.

We then had a two-and-a-half-day fight over language. It finally ended. Most delegations brought four or five people to do that work. We had only one; Prince Obolensky. He was born in Russia, raised in Paris and he spoke every one of these six languages perfectly. He was amazing and he was a prince. Then came the Saturday, November 17th, and the exchange of data took place. Right off the bat it was clear the Soviets were—I won't say cheating, but cutting the edges. We almost stopped everything right there because the Soviets were saying that they were moving a large number of tanks and armored combat vehicles (ACVs) over the Ural Mountains. They weren't there yet, but they would be there by the time the treaty came into force and therefore will not count. Second, the Soviets said that the equipment held by the naval infantry within the area of application, within the zone, didn't count either. The U.S. objected to both of those claims. But we decided to fight that another day and we all went to Paris and we signed the Treaty with the 21 other countries. Here in the picture is the President with the delegation.

Q: Oh, yes. You are showing a picture. How did you find the military delegates in your treaty? When you start talking about limiting these pieces of equipment, it is a little bit like telling a fire department they no longer need a special engine. These are objects of love on the part of military. This is true of all militaries.

GRAHAM: Yes, but they knew what they were getting out of it. They were getting an end to the Cold War. The only problem they created is they wanted the definitions of these systems to be so impossibly technical that they wouldn't mean anything to anybody except a military professional. So we had to have a second part of some of these delegations to put definitions into normal English so people could understand them. This was particularly true of the definitions of artillery. That was our only real problem. There

was a lot of interaction with the KGB on their side and the CIA on our side. The KGB had a general there. He was very helpful in working through the verification issues.

Just to continue on with the story a bit—the Treaty was signed in November of 1990 and various countries began to submit the treaty through 1991 to their legislatures for approval and entry into force. The U.S. and the Soviets still had the compliance issue involving naval infantry and the equipment over the Urals, so we began negotiating that issue. During this negotiation the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, General Moiseyev, came to Washington to resolve some of the major issues. We had an all-day meeting with him in the State Department—Reg Bartholomew, Woolsey and I and a few others, a couple of senior State Department people. The State Department took the position that this side agreement that we were going to reach on settling these two issues of over-the-Urals and naval infantry would be non-binding. It would be legally non-binding, unlike the rest of the treaty. This would just be a non-binding understanding.

I thought about how that position was going to look to the U.S. Senate when we send up a legally binding treaty and then a key verification agreement that is non-binding. That's going to cause us big trouble. It has to be legally binding. I mention this issue as an explanation of how Jim Baker worked as the secretary of state—extremely capably, I thought. I thought about it that night. The next day the general was supposed to visit the defense department and meet with Secretary Cheney and then go to the Oval Office, have a meeting with President Bush and fly home. Early the next morning I called the Director of the Arms Control Agency who was my immediate boss, Ron Lehman, and I said, "Ron, we can't have this. It must be legally binding." And I called Jim Woolsey and said the same thing to him. One or both of them called Jim Baker and made that argument to him, that morning. Early that afternoon when General Moiseyev walked into the Oval Office, the very first thing that George H. W. Bush said was, "It has to be legally binding." I have never encountered a Secretary of State that could do that—could get something up from the working level, in front of the President and resolved in about four hours. That's pretty good.

Jim Woolsey and I and four or five others eventually had to go to Moscow again after that to frame the agreement we were going to have. As I recall, the compromise was that the Soviets agreed to count the naval infantry in the area of application of the Treaty in the totals. We let the equipment going over the Ural Mountains go because it was going to rust in the Siberian winters anyway. They had to leave it in the open for verification purposes, ensuring it would rust. Thus, it would be useless. So that was how it was compromised. That was in June of 1991. Then, in early August of 1991 the coup attempt against Gorbachev took place. From then it was a gradual slide until the Soviet Union dissolved on December 25, 1991—Christmas Day in the West.

Now we still didn't have a CFE Treaty in force. What are we going to do? We don't have a Soviet Union in it anymore. Instead, we have 12 successor countries. Three of those were the Baltic States and we had already agreed in the immediate aftermath of the Treaty negotiation that the Baltic States would not be covered because it was not necessary for them to be in it as with some of the neutrals. Then there were one or two

states that are so far east that they are well over the Urals. We ended up with eight successor states to the Soviet Union for the purposes of the CFE Treaty. Unbelievably, they met in Tashkent in February, 1992 and reached an agreement allotting the equipment among the eight. So the second implementation agreement on that side was the Treaty of Tashkent. The CFE Treaty, however, was still not in force. First, there were eight more legislatures and then seven after the Soviets finally ratified, by June 1992, there were only two legislatures that still had to ratify the Treaty to bring it into force—Armenia and Belarus.

Then we began to get increasing intelligence that Czechoslovakia was going to split into two states—the Czech Republic and Slovakia—and nobody wanted to go through another one of those things. First, the Warsaw Pact and then, the Soviet Union and so we were despairing of the treaty. The split supposedly wasn't going to happen until January of 1993, but there was no guarantee.

There is a provision of the CFE Treaty stipulating that certain technical elements of the treaty can be brought into force before the treaty enters into force for administrative reasons—counting the number of equipment, technical things that were necessary and really didn't obligate anybody to anything, just made entry into force possible. As I recall, these technical provisions could be brought into force for a period of four months by action of the negotiating parties. I thought, "Well, somehow we have to do something about this delay. Under the provisional applications protocol, why don't we bring the whole treaty into force for four months, get it established and, once everybody joins, make it permanent? Then, if Czechoslovakia splits later, it is no big deal." I called Jim Timbie in the State Department, who I worked very closely with for many years, and ran the idea by him. He said, "It's not very beautiful, but it may be the only way we can do this." Everybody said we are going to have to get the Senate to sign off on it because this isn't your average kind of step. We are bypassing them, at least for a short time.

We were afraid we couldn't get all the ratifications before Czechoslovakia split. The Treaty could not come into force until everybody had ratified. When Russia ratified in June, we were only two short, but there was a Helsinki-type conference scheduled for July. So we could have a meeting of the provisional application protocol working group and they could bring the whole treaty into force as an administrative act for four months. That was the limit of their ability, but maybe that would give us enough time to get the other two ratifications. Otherwise, Czechoslovakia might split before we got them. But if the treaty were already in force, that would be okay. Then, after getting the last one, the Treaty would really be in force.

The reason we were so worried is that the Byelorussian legislature had scattered to the winds, and the leader of the legislature had made it clear that once they came back into session, their first act was going to be a vote of no confidence in the government and dissolving the government. So the government was trying to keep the legislature from coming back into session less from concern about ratifying the treaty than concern about remaining in power. The Armenian legislature couldn't even be found. We didn't even know where they were; they were in the mountains somewhere. It just looked, in the

short term, as though we could never ever get their ratification.

Timbie and I went to talk to Senator Pell, accompanied by his arms control staff assistant and Senator Lugar's chief of staff, and explained the situation. They both said, "Well, on a one time basis, we will agree to this." So we then suggested it to our various treaty partners, some of whom thought it was a good idea and some of whom were initially horrified but eventually went along. The Italian ambassador said that his international lawyers in Rome had to swallow "beach balls" over this, but he got their approval. So at the July technical meeting in Helsinki, the provisional application protocol in a working group session was addressed, called up and it was agreed in this working group session that the treaty was in force for four months, the whole treaty, even though there were two ratifications missing. During that four months first Belarus did ratify and then, right before the four months ended in November, the Armenian parliament ratified so the treaty was fully in force. In January of 1993, Czechoslovakia split.

This Treaty ended the Cold War but it had to go through of the Perils of Pauline to get there. Nowadays Europe is so different. We have had additional countries join NATO and there has been on-running compliance issues so the Treaty is not playing the role now that it did in 1992, but it doesn't need to.

Q: No, but it played a role in getting to where we are today.

GRAHAM: It ended the Cold War and was, in many ways, I think, the most important treaty the U.S. concluded in any field in the 20th century, certainly one of the most important. That's the story of CFE. I won't go into the subsequent application of it because there is so much else to talk about. Maybe I will touch on it later, but for now let's go on to other subjects.

Q: What were you up to after that?

GRAHAM: I wasn't doing only that while CFE was going on because sometimes there were times when not so much was happening there. I was involved in the START treaty and its completion under George H.W. Bush, whom I greatly admire. The START treaty negotiations had been going on since 1982. They began early in the Reagan administration—in 1991—and there were still lots of unresolved issues. In June of 1991 George H.W. Bush agreed with President Gorbachev—I think on the 15th—that he would come to Moscow and sign the treaty on July 31st. He said, "I want to get this signed before I go to Maine for my August vacation on the 5th." Thank goodness for summer vacations! If he hadn't done that, we never would have had the START treaty because the coup against Gorbachev happened just a week later and then the Soviet Union dissolved. That was the last chance.

Everyone said, "Oh, it is impossible; it can't happen. I decided I would take my entire legal entire staff that works on these issues in this area to Geneva and we would try to make it happen. I went myself and had five other lawyers there working on all aspects of the treaty. We were able to get it done. As we drove to the airport to take the plane to

Moscow for the signing, we stopped by the Soviet mission and handed them a couple of sheets of paper to initial since we hadn't had a chance to get their formal agreement to those pages to the treaty as yet. I went on to Moscow with all five of my lawyers. There were so many things that still had to be fixed that we worked on the treaty text all night without stopping. We did take a break at 3 a. m. to play a basketball game for about half an hour just to keep ourselves going. We essentially finished more or less everything and got it into reasonable shape for signing by Gorbachev and Bush on July 31st. One of my lawyers had to come back in August to attend to 170 corrections that had to be made—not substantive correction but typographical errors, technical corrections. The treaty was done and the Soviet Union was still there.

Later that year on December 25, the Soviet Union did pass into history. The treaty was not ratified yet although it had been submitted to the Senate. So what were we going to do about that? We had to negotiate a protocol which for treaty purposes converted the Soviet Union into four parties who would be the opposite treaty party to the United States. This was May of 1992. In preparation, in January of 1992, a 20-person U.S. delegation went to the four major successor states of the former Soviet Union—Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan—to discuss treaties, START and related matters. Secretary of State Jim Baker had gone the week before by himself. One thing that President Bush made very clear was that the U.S. would only recognize Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the others as independent states if they agreed to adhere to all the relevant arms control treaties. That was an absolute condition.

Remember, this was 1992. I have just described all the things that had been going on with the CFE Treaty. One of the treaty partners of the CFE Treaty was Kazakhstan. They had territory within the defined zone of Europe, but they had no treaty-limited equipment. They had to be a party because they had territory in the zone. The discussions we had with those countries were about the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and START and a little about the CFE Treaty—but not so much because CFE was running on a separate track. We didn't think we needed to talk about it as much. But START was a real crisis because, all of a sudden, these states that had never been independent came into possession of thousands of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. What were we going to do about this? What does the breakup of the Soviet Union do to the NPT?

It was agreed early on that Russia would be the successor state under the NPT to the Soviet Union and be recognized as a nuclear weapons state and the others had to join the treaty as non-nuclear weapon states and also be START parties as well. Thus began a long effort, which began with the Lisbon Protocol, an additional agreement effecting this change. It took some time after its negotiation for everybody to ratify its parts—START and the NPT. As we were traveling through the former Soviet Union that January, we didn't have any problems with the Russians. But they did say that they were only part of this arrangement if the other three were parties too. Belarus was totally with us but Ukraine, when we arrived, said, “Look, Ukraine is the France of the east and France has nuclear weapons and we want to keep these Russian nuclear weapons and we are going to.” So we knew we had a serious problem there.

We arrived in Kazakhstan when they had been independent for two weeks, having never been an independent state before. So we called the Foreign Ministry and said, “We are here from Washington, an interagency delegation. We are here to talk about arms control and non-proliferation treaties.” The response was, “Well, do you want to talk to the Foreign Minister or the Deputy Foreign Minister? They are the only people in the Ministry that know anything about that. Everybody else works on protocol.” Nazarbayev, the party boss suddenly the President of an independent Kazakhstan, said in a private meeting to the head of our group, Under Secretary of State Reg Bartholomew, “You know I taken of calls from Middle Eastern states expressing interest in the ICBMs that I have here with 500 KT nuclear weapons, ten of them on each one. They might be interested in purchasing a few they say, but I am not going to sell. I am eventually going to ship them all back to Russia, as you have requested.”

There was one little complication with Kazakhstan. They didn’t want us to use credit cards there because the credit card bills would go through Moscow banks and they’d knock off ten percent. We had the same complaint from the Ukrainians but, in the end, they let us use credit cards. But the Kazakhs notified us, “We are not going to give you any gas for your airplane unless you pay us \$20,000 in small, unmarked bills, otherwise no gas, and no credit cards will we accept.” We let Jim Baker give us a check, off of which Moscow raked ten percent but no more.

We planned a red-eye trip to Kazakhstan from Minsk, Belarus. While standing on the tarmac at ten o’clock at night next to Reg and next to our airplane onto which people were boarding, I saw a little small plane land nearby. A guy I recognize—one of our ambassadors wearing a trench coat—got out of it, he walked over, and handed a satchel in his hand to Reg. I wasn’t sure whether I was running drugs or doing arms control.

So that kinds of sets the stage for the Lisbon Protocol.

Q: We will pick up next time with the Lisbon Protocol.

Q: Today is the 12th of June, 2013 with Tom Graham. Tom, we left off and you wanted to talk about the Lisbon Protocol?

GRAHAM: That came toward the end of the first Bush administration. The Soviet Union passed into history on Christmas Day—at least Christmas Day in the West—December 25, 1991. That meant that the first START Treaty, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty, that the United States signed with the Soviet Union on July 31, 1991 was now under whatever succession arrangements were to be made. Now START was a treaty between the United States and several other countries, starting with Russia, but several others because the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union, the strategic nuclear weapons covered by the first START Treaty, were now located in four countries—Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. After initial discussions following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, with respect to START, it was concluded that the appropriate successor

states to the Soviet Union would be the four states—Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan. So the United States found itself having a START Treaty now with four other countries rather than one.

Arrangements had to be made to obligate these new countries in the same or, at least, comparable way the Soviet Union was obligated. What was developed was a protocol which came to be called the Lisbon Protocol, a protocol to the START Treaty, which would be signed by the five including the United States and which applied the obligations of the START Treaty to the four new states in a way that was practical and made sense. Also it was understood that the nuclear weapon successor to the Soviet Union, for international treaty purposes and for political purposes as well, would be Russia. In addition to signing the Lisbon Protocol, the Presidents of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan would be required to sign letters to the effect that they would be non-nuclear weapon states and would join the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty as such. To say that this was easy to work out would be untrue. It was very difficult, particularly with Ukraine. The Lisbon Protocol was signed on May 23, 1992, the Soviet Union having passed into history on December 25, 1991.

Early in 1992 the United States first sent Secretary of State Jim Baker to the four new states—Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine. A week later a delegation of about 20 U.S. officials, including a senior representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, followed. It was led by an Undersecretary of State and senior representatives of all other relevant agencies. I was on the delegation representing the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The Under Secretary of State was the Undersecretary of State for International Security, Reginald Bartholomew. General Shalikashvili was the Joint Chiefs' representative. In any case, there were about 20 of us and we went first to Moscow, then Kiev, then Minsk and then Alma-Ata, as it was still called then. The name of the then capital of Kazakhstan was later changed to Almaty and then some years later after that the capital was moved to a city created out of nothing, like Canberra and Brasilia (and Washington!), Astana. Astana is the current capital of Kazakhstan. Our visit to Russia was productive. The Russians supported the concept of the protocol, but as I said, only if the other three participated. Our stop in Minsk, Belarus was positive as well. Belarus unequivocally supported the idea of the Protocol.

Q: Belarus has become, not a pariah, but has been sort of odd man out as far as. How did it stand at that time? What were your impressions?

GRAHAM: The official that became the President of Belarus right after the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a very capable and highly principled individual. I want to say his name was Shoshkovich, but I am not sure of that. In any case, my impressions were very positive. Our meeting was held in what had formerly been Brezhnev's hunting lodge on the outskirts of Minsk—a very nice place to visit in January with snow everywhere. The officials from the Belarusian government were very cooperative and helpful. Some years later a rather unbalanced and unprincipled individual, named Lukashenko, became president of Belarus. He has been President—or rather dictator—ever since. He has converted Belarus at least to some degree into what we speak of as a pariah state, but it

definitely was not such for the first few years after the fall of the Soviet Union.

I am saving Ukraine for last. When we went to Kazakhstan, to Alma-Ata, I will note one thing. We had an advance man who was one city ahead of where we were. On this trip we traveled on an Air Force plane. Our advance man in Alma-Ata called back from there and said that the Kazakhs would not give us fuel for our aircraft to leave Alma-Ata after our visit there unless they were paid \$20,000 in small, unmarked bills. That was because of what was happening with credit cards—as we already knew from our stop in Kiev. Credit cards were settled in Moscow banks and they took ten percent off the top. So, the Kazakhs wanted to be paid in cash. They had taken a check from Jim Baker but they weren't going to do that with us.

So as we were leaving Minsk for Alma-Ata, we were at the airport in Minsk, planning to leave about 10 p.m. on a red eye trip to Alma-Ata. I was standing next to Undersecretary Bartholomew on the tarmac next to the plane before boarding. I noticed a small Piper Cub type aircraft land nearby and a person get out, wearing a dark suit, heavy coat, hat and carrying a briefcase. As he approached, I realized he was one of our ambassadors, whom I knew. He walked up to Undersecretary Bartholomew and handed him the briefcase and then left. That was our ticket out.

Q: The \$20,000

GRAHAM: The \$20,000 acquired from, shall we say, a company bank somewhere in Germany. In any case, our visit to Alma-Ata was also positive but a little bit “different.” When we arrived, we notified the foreign ministry that we were there to talk about the START Treaty, the CFE Treaty, the Non-proliferation Treaty and the adherence of Kazakhstan thereto. President George H. W. Bush had been very clear that U.S. recognition of the four successor states depended on their joining all the relevant arms control treaties. So we were there to talk about that. Having only been an independent country for two weeks, they said, “Well, the only people who can talk substance with you are the Foreign Minister or the Deputy Foreign Minister. Everybody else works on protocol so which one of the two do you want to meet with?”

We ended up meeting with the Deputy Foreign Minister. Reg Bartholomew went off to meet with the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister took him to meet with Nazarbayev who had become President of Kazakhstan and is still President of Kazakhstan. Nazarbayev was fully aware that there were 110 SS-18 missile launchers in Kazakhstan, each one with an SS-18 missile with ten 500-kiloton warheads on it. He had received a number of telephone calls from the “south,” meaning the Middle East, about acquiring some of those weapons, but he had declined. He said, as he had promised, and as he would be required to do by the Lisbon Protocol when negotiated, he would return those warheads to Russia, which he did, which Belarus did and which eventually Ukraine did under protest. So our visit to Kazakhstan was positive as well.

I cannot say that our visit to Kiev—the second stop on the trip—was positive. In a large meeting involving the Foreign Minister, the Deputy Foreign Minister and other experts, their spokesman said that Kiev wanted to be the France of the East; that was Ukraine's

objective. France had nuclear weapons so Ukraine should have nuclear weapons. They were not about to return the weapons to Russia and they wanted to be recognized as a nuclear weapons state. So that's how our relationship began with Ukraine. It took some real doing to persuade them to join the Lisbon Protocol and to submit that letter about non-nuclear weapon status for Ukraine, both of which eventually did happen. Secretary Baker and others worked very hard on that.

It was still quite a bit of time after that before Ukraine, pursuant to the Lisbon Protocol, ratified the START Treaty—not until January of 1994. They were the last to ratify. They didn't join the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, which was also required by the Lisbon protocol, as a non-nuclear weapons state until late October of 1994. This last step, under the Protocol permitted the START Treaty to be brought into force on December 5, 1994 by President Clinton on the margins of an Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe meeting in Budapest.

Back to the Lisbon Protocol itself. After we were able to get the relevant letters committing to a nuclear free status from the Presidents of the three countries and the draft of the Lisbon Protocol circulated among the states, a date was set—May 23, 1992—to sign the Lisbon Protocol in Lisbon, Portugal. I was sent there a few days ahead to make sure the Protocol text was in good condition and work out any last minute changes as needed as well as make arrangements for proper translation into the languages of all the countries. English and Russian were not a problem. Ukrainian and Belarusian were no problem either as they are very close to Russian. We did have people who were expert or who could manage those languages. What we didn't have was someone who could translate into the Kazakh language. So I asked the State Department before I left if they could find somebody in the United States to translate the English into the Kazakh language. A few days later they replied, saying they had found two in the entire United States—one the dean of a Turkic language program at a Midwestern university, I think it was Wisconsin. So I said, "I'll take him." They said, "Fine, here's his phone number." So I called him and he agreed to come and work with the Kazakh delegation. He did an excellent job translating the English into the Kazakh language.

I met with each delegation in advance to make sure that everyone was comfortable with the draft text that had been developed. I had no problem with the Russians, had no problem with the Kazakhstanis and no problem with the Belarusians but that was unsurprisingly not true with the Ukrainians. I didn't meet with them once; I met with them three times over two days and they essentially said they didn't think they were going to sign. May 23, 1992, as I recall, was a Saturday. I think it was late Friday that I called the delegation of the Secretary of State, in London. They were on their way to Lisbon but had stopped in London first and only planned to come in on Saturday for the signing of the Protocol. As I said earlier, the Lisbon Protocol was essential for the United States because the Senate said it was not even going to look at the START Treaty until its obligations were applied to the successor states.

So I had this problem with Ukraine, which was unresolved by the end of the day on Friday. So I called Jim Timbie, my longtime friend and colleague, who has been in the

State Department since 1986 (and ACDA for many years before) and is still there in a prominent position dealing with arms control, non-proliferation issues and other security issues. I told him what the situation was with the Ukrainians. The foreign minister of Ukraine was, I think, by then in Lisbon. The Foreign Ministers of the other states were there as well by Friday but the Secretary of State was not there; he was still in London. So Jim took notes on what I said and subsequently spoke with Secretary Baker. I didn't hear back that night but early the next morning Jim called me and said, "Well, Tom, Ukraine will sign and we on our way to Lisbon from London so we will see you soon." The signing ceremony, I believe, was in the afternoon. "The Secretary called the Ukrainian foreign minister and I will tell you later what Secretary Baker told the Ukrainian Foreign Minister. All I will say about the conversation at this point is that I have never heard one man talk to another man in quite that way."

So Baker came to Lisbon and we had the signing room all set up with flags and places for people to sit. I was asked to brief the four foreign ministers and Baker too as to the procedure. We were all in a fairly small room just off the room where the signing was to take place so we were all standing pretty close to one another. I said, "Ministers, here is what is going to happen. You will go in this room and you will each sit in the appropriate place, designated by your country's flag. Then, I will bring the Protocol text by each one of you to sign and there are a few supporting documents which you will also have to sign. I will indicate where you should sign and after the all of you have signed, I will see to it that every government gets the relevant original copy in English and an original copy in your language so all of you will have originals in both English and your own languages. So I will see that that happens and that will be the end of the ceremony." Then Secretary Baker said, "And then you all will leave." He didn't want anyone making speeches about nuclear weapons or anything like that.

Everything went off quite well. The Ministers signed the appropriate documents and everybody left with the correct original copies of the protocol. Later that year, the U.S. ratified the START Treaty, which entered into force, as I said, in 1994. The Treaty called for reductions over seven years and in 2001 Secretary of State Powell was able to declare that all of the reductions had been completed and the treaty was fully implemented. By its terms it was to last for 15 years, which it did, until 2009. A replacement treaty referred to as New START was negotiated by the Obama administration in 2009 and it entered into force in early 2011 so there was a gap of approximately a year when no treaty was in force. Now New START is in force and it will be in force for a number of years.

Q: I can understand Secretary Baker taking very decisive talks with the foreign minister but there has to be something behind that. What do you think brought Ukraine back into the fold?

GRAHAM: I can't say for sure but I can say what I said to the Ukrainians to persuade them to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty in October of 1994, about a year and a half later. I was asked to go to Ukraine because the other countries had all joined the NPT and ratified START and Ukraine had ratified START, but was still balking at joining the NPT. The National Security Council asked me to go and make a pitch to the Ukrainians

in October of 1994. I discussed with the State Department and the National Security Council in advance what I was going to say. What I said was, “You, Ukraine, want to be part of world civilization. You want to be a part of the community of nations. You are a new country and you want to be a part of the established society of nations. Well, we are happy to welcome you to that society, but there is a price and the price is that you join START, which you have done and that you join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state.” I suspect Baker said something like that to Zlenko only perhaps with considerably more vehemence as was his style. He was Secretary of State; I wasn’t.

Just to finish on that point, I went to Ukraine in October of 1994. I met first with the government, the same people that I met with in January of 1992 when we made our initial visit there—the same people but holding different jobs two years later. So first I met with them and went through the talking points I just mentioned. We had a discussion. It was clear they were more or less ready to join the Treaty NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. But the government said I needed to meet with the legislature as their consent was necessary.

I first went to meet the Chairman of the International Relations Committee. I had expected to meet with the whole committee, but just met with him. It was late afternoon and getting dark. I made my pitch to him and then I was prepared to meet with the Deputy Chair of the Rada, who was the floor manager for the NPT. Rada is the name of the Ukrainian legislature. The Deputy Chair was the Rada member who organized the Rada to address questions so I expected to meet with him alone or with one staff aide. Instead, I walked into a room, lights came on and I saw about 30 members of the Rada in an orchestra-like sitting area. Their seats were slightly elevated because, as I remember, while speaking to them, I could look at all of them. The Deputy Chairman said, “Well, I just brought a few of my friends so we could all hear what you have to say.” So I ended up making a speech to them, saying the same thing as other places—perhaps elaborating a bit more. They asked a few questions, but their response was reasonably positive.

The U.S. ambassador to the Ukraine at the time was a man named Bill Miller, whom I had known for many, many years. Formerly he had worked for the great Kentucky senator, John Sherman Cooper on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Q: I’ve had a long interview with Bill Miller.

GRAHAM: So I left Ukraine and the Defense Department sent a representative over there to do more or less the same thing that I did—Gloria Duffy, who had the job of dealing with the nuclear weapons left over after the Cold War and making sure they were dismantled or returned to Russia. Strobe Talbott led the effort from the State Department, but she was the Defense representative in that effort and went a week or two later after I did. About three weeks later the Rada approved the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the government ratified it, Ukraine joined it, thus permitting START to be brought into force on December 5, 1994.

That was not the end of arms control by any means in the first Bush administration. I am

fond of staying that every President since Eisenhower has been involved in arms control and non-proliferation and everyone has signed one major arms control/non-proliferation treaty during his tenure, except George H. W. Bush who signed four. He is indisputably number one in that area. He had signed START and he had signed the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, the treaty that ended the Cold War in 1991. Both of those were signed in 1991. In early 1993 he signed the START II Treaty, a follow-on to the original START Treaty, which never came into force because of the ABM issue. Bill Clinton didn't want to send it to the Senate because he was afraid it would set off a huge debate over anti-ballistic missile systems. When George W. Bush withdrew the United States in 2001 from the ABM Treaty, the Russians then withdrew their ratification of START II. START II was very favorable to the United States, although it was not bad for Russia. It eliminated all the remaining heavy ICBMs, all the SS-18s and it provided for even greater access to information than the original START Treaty had done.

As an example, START II contributed to the telemetry encryption issue, which first came up in SALT II. I believe that I mentioned that originally the CIA was reading Soviet telemetric communications between the ground and their missiles to learn about the capability of Soviet missiles. Then, the Soviets figured that out and began encrypting the telemetry so the U.S. couldn't read it. The SALT II Treaty provided for limited access to that telemetric information. Then, the START Treaty did away with all those kinds of provisions and provided that each side would exchange telemetric information with the other. There would be no encryption, but just to make sure that it was properly read, each side would exchange tapes.

So the START Treaty was really a cooperative reduction in nuclear weapons, whereas the SALT I and SALT II Treaties were treaties between enemies who, with stabilizing provisions, halted the arms race and took the first steps towards scaling back. Still they were treaties between enemies, whereas the START Treaty was signed when Russia had ceased to be an enemy of the United States. There were many cooperative verification provisions in the START I Treaty.

The START II Treaty, which was put together quickly in late 1992, just carried these concepts even further and also made a significant further step in reductions. START II reduced weapons from the 6,000 total on each side in START I another (nearly) fifty percent to 3,500. The permitted number could have been even lower; the Soviets were willing to go to 2,500 and so was most of the rest of the U.S. government but the Defense department wouldn't agree to that number. So the START II treaty ended up at 3,500 but it never came into force, as I explained. President Clinton did submit START II for ratification early in his administration and the U.S. had to be very careful about not saying too many positive things about it because we didn't want it to look one-sided to the Russians. The U.S. Senate approved it and the U.S. ratified it. Then, the Russians ratified but it was agreed between the U.S. and the Soviets there had to be some changes to the START II treaty, some amendments. Those were agreed to but never submitted. The START II Treaty never came into force.

We had the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, which essentially was just a few

sentences exchanged between President George W. Bush and President Putin. That was it until the Obama administration negotiated the New START Treaty, which is the governing treaty now. It reduces operational strategic nuclear weapons to 1550 and delivery vehicles to 700 deployed, 800 total—delivery vehicles being missiles and bombers.

Q: It's practical that we've gotten rid of a lot of the stuff there but the real effect of the missiles that are still around are enough capacity to destroy both countries?

GRAHAM: Quite easily. A hundred and fifty nuclear warheads would destroy both countries. Each side is allowed 1550 strategic weapons and there is no limit on reserve weapons, tactical weapons, and stored weapons. In fact, the U.S. declared at the 2010 NPT review conference [Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] that it possessed approximately 5,100 nuclear weapons. The Russians have not made such a declaration but it is estimated they probably have about 10,000. In today's world, in my opinion, there is really no conceivable need for more than about 300. I think that has been true for some years. For what are you going to use them?

Q: We are finding that you can have them but if you use them particularly in some of these smaller powers like Iran or Pakistan or India, what the hell are they going to do with them? It is a matter of prestige.

GRAHAM: The reason countries like Iran and North Korea want nuclear weapons is first, they accord prestige, as you say; second, they give them some regional prominence; and perhaps third, they figure it is insurance against being attacked. There is this organization called 'The Axis of Evil Club' that President George W. Bush announced in his State of the Union speech in 2002. The club members are Iran, North Korea and Iraq. The two that have active nuclear programs—Iran and North Korea—have noted that the one without was the one that was attacked. Iran has an additional motivation in that it is a Shia state and Pakistan is a Sunni state and Sunnis hate Shias in many parts of the world, certainly in the Middle East as we have seen from the near civil war in Iraq. They are concerned, and have said so, that someday a radical Sunni regime may come to power in Pakistan and direct those nuclear weapons against Iran. So they have an additional motivation.

I haven't quite finished with the George H. W. Bush administration because I should talk more about the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. I might also mention that the fourth treaty that George H. W. Bush signed was the Chemical Weapons Convention in January of 1993, shortly before he left office. The Convention has been a considerable success. It has eliminated chemical weapons from almost all of the world. For many years the Geneva Protocol had been in force prohibiting their use in war, but the Convention provides for complete elimination and that was an important contribution.

In some sense the INF Treaty, negotiated by President Reagan and President Gorbachev, permitting for onsite inspection for the first time and eliminating a whole class of nuclear

weapons, set the stage—to some degree—for the end of the Cold War. The Treaty that actually ended the Cold War was the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. It was conceived from the very beginning as a negotiation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact to eliminate the confrontation in Europe, which is what the Cold War was all about. So from the very beginning that was the objective.

This is a very, very complicated story. I will begin it by just briefly recounting the history leading up to the CFE treaty. The “grandfather” of the process was the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, addressing the long-time Soviet objective to ratify the borders of Europe post-Cold War. It did that but it also provided that civil rights be recognized and failure to recognize them could be challenged. This provision was the basis for all the resistance against the Soviet Union that came later—particularly from the eastern European countries. The Helsinki Watch Committees, which were set up in Prague and other places, were major factors leading to the end of the Soviet Union.

Then there were some follow-on negotiations. There was the Madrid negotiation in 1980 which was all about enhancing civil rights protections and then in 1985 there was the Stockholm Confidence Building Measures Agreement reached, which was not a legally binding treaty, but was a comprehensive agreement providing for observers at military movements larger than a certain size throughout East and West Europe. The Helsinki Final Act had had a very minor provision on this subject but it was hugely expanded in the 1985 agreement.

Many years earlier at the end of SALT I, a negotiation called the Mutual Balanced and Force Reductions talks (MBFR) between East and West—the governments in central Europe—continued on for about 14 years from 1973 to 1987 with no progress. It was a wonderful discussion forum but nothing was ever agreed and essentially it was NATO and the Warsaw Pact talking to one another. The objective was to reduce the military manpower in central Europe but it never got anywhere.

After the Stockholm Agreement it was decided that what was needed was a negotiation on military equipment that formed the basis for blitzkrieg-type attacks. From 1987 to 1989 there were what were called “mandate discussions.” Some of the early issues that were addressed were what would be limited. It was agreed that main battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery would be subject to limitations and later this was expanded under the H. W. Bush administration to include combat aircraft and attack helicopters. Those are the five basic types of weapons that would be eliminated. It was agreed in the mandate discussions that the area where the obligations would apply would be Europe. Europe was defined as being from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. Toward the end of the mandate discussions, a definition of Europe was negotiated. Everyone knew where the border of the Atlantic Ocean was and everyone knew where the Ural Mountains were. But it was also agreed at the beginning of the mandate talks that this would be a negotiation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact; neutrals would not be included—Yugoslavia, Sweden, Switzerland, the Vatican, Finland would not be included because they weren’t antagonists. That was the American argument. The French wanted to include the neutrals in the discussions, but their view did not prevail.

Since Turkey was involved and the Ural Mountains didn't go all the way south across the Soviet Union, it was necessary to develop "an eastern southern border of the area of application"—as the terms of the treaty had it. It was agreed that the line would extend down from the Arctic Ocean, down the Ural Mountains and then down south of the Ural Mountains and then over to the border of the Black Sea. It was agreed that only two thirds of Turkey would be included under the area of application because they had some unfriendly neighbors like Saddam Hussein in Iraq and also Iran. They had borders with those countries and so it was believed that the obligations, the limitations, should not apply to all of Turkey. This was to be an arbitrary line. From the Black Sea border the mandate, ultimately the treaty, stated that the line of demarcation would run along the southern coast of the Black Sea and then it would go inland at a certain town and would go from this town to that town to this town and then reach the Mediterranean just to the east of the town called Mersin. That was agreed.

By the end of the mandate talks and as the CFE negotiations proper were about to begin, when the parties were about to sign the mandate document, somebody woke up in Athens and remembered that Mersin was the town from which the Turks had deployed their forces to invade Cyprus. Did they want to have that town outside the area of limitations? No! Everything broke loose at that point. Scheduled to end on January 10, 1989, the clock had to be stopped for eight days while this was worked out. The mandate talks actually ended on January 18. It was very, very difficult, but finally what was agreed was that this line go down the along the Black Sea coast, turn inland at this town and then go from this town to this town to this town. Then it would get to a town about 10 kilometers from the Mediterranean coast and the Treaty would say "and thence to the sea." If you took the most direct route to the sea from that point, Mersin would be in the zone of exclusion, but if you follow the same undulating direction of the line was going in, it would strike the coast to the east of Mersin and Mersin would be in the area of application. The Greeks said the second was the correct interpretation. The Turks said the first was the correct interpretation. Everybody else was silent and that's how it was agreed.

I have discussed CFE before but just a few more words about it. The INF Treaty opened the door to ending the Cold War and the CFE Treaty that followed did end the Cold War. The CFE negotiations began, but very slowly at first. By the summer it was understood that the Bush administration really cared about this negotiation and so I decided that our agency should play an important role in it. We did a first draft of the CFE Treaty. I took it to Vienna and negotiated it around our delegation. Then, I returned to Washington and negotiated it among the agencies in Washington. Next I went to Brussels and introduced it there at NATO and then I joined the delegation as the chief arms control representative and legal adviser in September of 1989.

By this time the Warsaw Pact was working on their draft treaty, heavily influenced by the Soviet Union, of course. We had our draft treaty that I had introduced in Brussels. I wrote the treaty, which everyone agreed to, with the idea was that there would be a negotiation between NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Warsaw Pact. We

would reach the numbers for so many battle tanks, so many armored combat vehicles for each alliance and so on. In October of 1989, the U.S. delegation had a serious, substantive meeting with the Hungarian delegation and—for the first time—truly began to understand that the Cold War could be ended. The Cold War wasn't over yet but the Hungarians told us in that October meeting, "Look, we are not going to stay in the Warsaw Pact so you better take that into consideration when you draft your treaty. We are not going to stay in the Warsaw Pact very much longer."

We went back to our offices, saying to ourselves, "We have to change our whole draft treaty." There will be at least one country that will not be in the Warsaw Pact. Throughout CFE I worked closely with Bill Parsons, a brilliant young lawyer in my office and wonderful friend. We rewrote the U.S. draft that Brussels was considering to provide for two groups of states. The first group happened to be the same as the members of NATO and the second group just happened to be the then members of the Warsaw Pact. So that was the text we used to continue the discussions in Brussels at NATO. Under the group-of-states formula, we kept the overall limitations the same as the agreed alliance totals of 20,000 main battle tanks for each alliance as so forth. But the British and the French said, "We have more than that because we do not want to be pushed into violation if someone else, for example Turkey, acquires ten illegal tanks and pushes us all over 20,000.

It had been State Department ideology that the British and the French would never agree to specific limitations on their forces. There could only be an alliance limitation since they wouldn't accept national limits. The U.S. continued to argue for only group limits against the British and the French at NATO even though they were arguing they wanted national limits. "Oh, no, you don't want national limits." "Yes, we do want national limits." The way it was worked out was that each group was to meet and would divide up the 20,000 tanks and so on. Germany would get perhaps 4,000 and Britain 2,000 and France 2,500, etc. Those sub limits would become obligatory once the country agreed to them and they were then published. That's the way the treaty ended up.

Q: I think this is probably a good place to stop.

GRAHAM: Remind me we ended with the tabling of the U.S. CFE treaty.

Q: Okay, great.

Q: Today is the 12th of August, 2013. Tom, we left off, you were going to start the Clinton years but before we get into the Clinton years you said you wanted about ten minutes on the last treaty you were working on.

GRAHAM: I would just like, for the record, to say why many people consider the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty as the treaty that ended the Cold War. The Helsinki Final Act in 1975 was signed by all European and North American states. In the

view of the Soviet Union, it guaranteed that the existing borders of Europe would not be changed by force. There were other provisions. There were human rights provisions as well and authorization for countries to insist that human rights guarantees be observed. Ultimately it was that provision of the Helsinki Act that led to the creation of Helsinki watch organizations around Eastern Europe and some even in the Soviet Union. In the end they helped precipitate the end of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and ultimately the collapse of the Soviet Union. An example was the watch Committee in Czechoslovakia led by Václav Havel who became the first President of a free Czechoslovakia. There also was a very small provision that said that there could be observers at any troop exercise anywhere in Europe that involved more than 25,000 troops.

There were other agreements over the years and, in the mid-1980s, an agreement was negotiated at Stockholm, which expanded on the idea of observers at military movements and provided confidence-building measures throughout Europe of that nature. That led to a decision by members of NATO—the European states and North American states—to have a negotiation on armaments in Europe. These negotiations began in 1987 and continued until 1989. They began with a negotiation on the mandate for the negotiations: what would the negotiations be about? It was determined they should be negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact—nobody else. The states that were militarily opposed to one another in Europe, which was the heart of the Cold War. Thus, at the beginning, it was the 16 NATO countries and seven Warsaw Pact countries, including the Soviet Union.

The mandate discussions concluded that, what the term “Europe” meant was the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains. The armaments to be limited were those armaments that could form the nucleus of a blitzkrieg like Hitler employed in World War II and forcibly changed borders significantly and quickly. Main battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters—that was what would be limited between the two alliances. At that time the ratios were heavily on the side of the Warsaw Pact. For example, the Warsaw Pact, including the Soviet Union had some 60,000 tanks. NATO had around 20,000 tanks. Hitler, when he invaded Western Europe, conquered Western Europe with approximately 5,000 tanks, just to give you an idea of what those numbers mean. NATO offset this huge conventional imbalance on the side of the Warsaw pact with nuclear weapons, tactical nuclear weapons, which, of course, could have led to a full thermonuclear exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union if they had ever been used. Fortunately, they never were.

There was also a side issue on how to draw the map of Europe south of the Urals.

Q: We've talked about that.

GRAHAM: Yes, we have. The mandate talks ended in 1989 and the formal Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty negotiations began in 1989. The real negotiations got underway in September, 1989 and concluded in November of 1990 in 14 months. At the beginning, no one thought it could be done in ten years much less 14 months. The reason

it was so quickly done was that the timing was right. We had an American President who really believed in it, George H. W. Bush, and it was accomplished. The CFE negotiations coincided with the collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. At the end, the Soviet Union itself dissolved so that the negotiation had to cope with all the ensuing changes. The treaty itself is based on limiting those five types of armaments within each country. It began by trying to set a balance between the two military alliances, but that didn't work because one of the alliances fell apart. It ended up that, in NATO, each country would declare the number that they were allotted and that would be their obligation under the treaty. On the Warsaw Pact side as the Soviet Empire collapsed, there first had to be the Treaty at Budapest, which divided up the allotments among the Eastern Europe states and the Soviet Union, the latter ending up with a third of the allotments.

The Treaty of Budapest gave to the Soviet Union a large number of the total treaty-limited equipment, for example, in the range of 8,000 tanks. Other Eastern European countries got the rest. Then, after the Treaty was signed, the Soviet Union collapsed and so there had to be a Treaty of Tashkent, which divided up the 8,000 tanks and the other weapon allotments among the 12 successor states of the Soviet Union. However, in the CFE Treaty the allotments were only made to eight states because the Baltic States were considered out of it and neutral and Kazakhstan was in it, but it didn't have any weapons systems on its territory. So ultimately allotments involved just eight—Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia and Moldova. This treaty established a new and stable balance and, once you had that, the Cold War was over.

Q: While you were going through these negotiations, were you thinking about, you want to stop preparations for a major conflict and so you don't get your concentration of troops. But what about all of a sudden there is terrible unrest in Ukraine or something like that. The Balkans already had this but and it would be a good idea for the benefit of mankind, you might say, to go into Ukraine with a massive troop movement just to stop the people from massacring each other. Were you thinking about civil unrest?

GRAHAM: No. We were not thinking about those sorts of things at all. Indeed, we weren't even thinking about warfare between states. What we were trying to do was limit the level of heavy weapons that any country could have. It still would be possible under the CFE Treaty for—say—Russia and Belarus to attack Ukraine. It wouldn't even have to be unrest; it could be a war. Russia and Georgia did have a brief war. CFE didn't prevent war, but it established equal lower levels in East and West and individual levels for all the countries involved with a heavy emphasis on inspections; everybody could inspect everybody and so there could not be any surprises.

Interestingly enough, when we were negotiating the number of inspections that would be permitted, the West came into this—and the U.S. in particular—with very much of a Cold War mindset so we assumed the NATO countries would want to inspect the Warsaw Pact countries and the Warsaw Pact countries would want to inspect the NATO countries. Even after we were well into the negotiations and it was clear that the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe was dissolving, the Hungarians said in effect, “What are you guys smoking?” because we wanted to set up the inspection provisions and NATO would

get so many inspections of the Warsaw Pact and vice versa. They said, “The question of inspections has to be individual. We are going to use most of our inspections in Russia not in the West” and so a lot of thinking had to change.

During the negotiation itself five countries changed their names and one country completely disappeared—East Germany. After the negotiation, one of the two major parties disappeared and broke up into twelve new countries. All that had to be accommodated. We started out the negotiation with 16 NATO countries and seven Warsaw Pact countries. We ended up with a treaty with 30 parties with lots of different new names. After the treaty entered into force, the number of parties changed again because Czechoslovakia split into two, became two countries, so there are now 32 parties to the CFE Treaty.

I should mention as a result of the general deterioration of relations between Russia and the United States, partly as a result of the ongoing problems within the East, the CFE Treaty is still there, but has been amended significantly to reflect the new post-Cold War political situation in Europe and those amendments have never come into force. Russia, at least on paper, has ceased to observe the CFE Treaty because of the ongoing dispute over Soviet troops in Moldova and related issues. So the CFE Treaty right now is somewhat in limbo. That’s unfortunate but not disastrous. Its central function was to end the Cold War and it accomplished that.

Q: As you were doing this, there is an election in the States and all that means. How did you view the election of 1992?

GRAHAM: I thought George H.W. Bush was a superb President and I think history will be very kind to him and his administration. Even though President Reagan took this issue a long way toward resolution because of his relationship with President Gorbachev and because of the INF Treaty and other measures, the Cold War ended on H. W. Bush’s watch. This massive confrontation involving thousands and thousands of nuclear weapons, thousands of tanks and millions of armored personnel lasted for 45 years never erupting into major war and, at the end, ended largely peacefully. The ending of the Cold War was an incredible accomplishment for which I don’t think George H.W. Bush has ever really received the credit he should have received. The only violence was in Romania and it wasn’t widespread. The Romanian President was overthrown and executed along with some members of his government and the violence essentially was limited to that.

The end of the Cold War didn’t happen by accident. It happened because of good diplomatic work and imaginative policies. As a result, I was very positive about President Bush, although in the end I voted for Clinton. The reason I voted for Clinton was the far right was beginning to emerge within the Republican Party and some of the statements by the national committee were sounding much like the Tea Party today and I just gradually became turned off by that.

Q: Did you feel the cast of the Republicans was that they really didn’t understand what

had happened in a Cold War context or was this a matter of just plain political expediency, having a good cause and not letting it go?

GRAHAM: I think it was something else. I think that the Bush administration understood the role very well, a lot better than the Clinton administration did, at least in its early years. I don't think it was as much political expediency as an internal struggle that was beginning to come to the surface within the Republican Party where the extremists were gradually beginning to take over. They'd always been there but the Eisenhower, Rockefeller, Gerry Ford, H. W. Bush type of Republicans had always been able to contain them. The ability to do so, for some reason, and I'll leave it to social scientists, who understand such movements better than I, was breaking down. The establishment Republicans gradually lost their grip and it is gone now.

Ronald Reagan—there's no way he could be nominated for President in today's Republican Party and he was generally considered a pretty conservative guy. It was sort of an emergence of no nothing-ism, which, of course, is an old American phenomenon. That's where the Republican Party predominately is today and I left the Republican Party after 40 years as a result. The beginning of my disenchantment was during that election and some of the things that were being said. I thought Secretary Baker was superb. I thought George H.W. Bush was outstanding. I thought General Scowcroft was excellent as well as many other people in the first Bush administration. I thought it was great, but I was just worried about the domestic situation in the U.S. Clinton was a very good domestic President. I don't think he was quite as good an international President.

Q: What was your initial reading of Clinton as the campaign was developing?

GRAHAM: Well, pretty much what I just said. I thought he would be good for the country itself, the U.S., and I thought he would be ok on foreign policy. In the early years of the Clinton administration, I began to feel negative about Clinton's foreign policy, but that changed considerably over the next two or three years. For example, I believed, and still do believe, that the Clinton administration made a terrible mistake in how it dealt with Russia when they took over in 1993. I will talk about another mistake in a few minutes.

I will say right up front, The U.S. won the Cold War. This is true. We won the Cold War, which was as important a conflict in many ways as was World War II. After World War II, we did not trash Germany and Japan as countries. We tried to rebuild them with the Marshall Plan in Europe and, through managing Japan (through General Mac Arthur) for six years, we tried to lead them into the democratic column. Thereby, we could ensure that something like World War II would never happen again. We were not vindictive toward the Japanese and German peoples. We persecuted their former leadership at the Nuremburg trials and other such trials, but not the people.

We didn't do that with Russia; we behaved in a vindictive fashion toward not just Russia's rulers but also its people. The Clinton administration decided to expand NATO to the borders of the Soviet Union and maybe even beyond. There lately have been many

calling for Ukraine and Georgia to become members of NATO. All this made Russia terribly insecure and literally prevented any possibility of integrating Russia into the West and, over the long term, preventing a true partnership between Russia and the United States. That has been very costly to U.S. interests.

The reason it was done, in my opinion, is that some of the Clinton administration were of the view that Russia was down and so we should crush them. Also, expanding NATO was good domestic politics—the Polish-American vote and so forth. I thought so at the time and still believe it was a terrible mistake. I think, if we had embraced Russia in the way we did Germany and Japan at the World War II, we would be in a very different situation than we are today, which is tragic, in my opinion.

In February of 1997 (I left government the first of July) I was in Albuquerque, New Mexico to speak on international security and spoke to the Council on Foreign Relations there. Since I was the speaker, I was at the head table and I was seated next to a beautiful woman, 40 years old or something like that. She turned to me and said, “Do you know where I am from?” I looked at the name card in front of her and it said something like Obkhurova so I said, “You must be from Russia. Where in Russia?” She said, “You are right, I am from Russia, from Moscow and I was the first female graduate of the Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Union. André Kosygin”—the first foreign minister for Yeltsin— “was my classmate and he was of the view that if Russia just made enough concessions, Russia would be welcomed back into Europe like the prodigal son. But André was wrong, wasn’t he?” I have never forgotten her, and her observation. That’s what should have happened. Russia was a part of Europe. Tolstoy, Tchaikovsky—can you tell me they are not part of European culture? So look what we’ve got today—a really bad situation. I see no reason for it to improve any time soon.

In any case, that was my big problem with the Clinton foreign policy. Clinton came to office with a foreign policy staff—people who were going to take over the State Department—committed to the idea that the independent Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, established by President Kennedy in 1961 to give independent arms control, non-proliferation advice to the President and the National Security Council, should be eliminated and its personnel merged into the State Department. This was strictly a power grab. Some part of the State Department bureaucracy had seen for some years, ACDA, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, as a competitor to State’s interests and therefore they wanted to eliminate it and put it under their political military affairs bureau. That was a wrong view and it did happen only after some years. The change has been destructive to U.S. interests.

Merging ACDA staff with State Department staff is a bad idea because the imperatives of non-proliferation policy and arms control policy often conflict with the principal State Department mission to have better relations with other countries. You cannot denounce Pakistan for building nuclear weapons and you cannot propose cutting off aid to Pakistan because they are building nuclear weapons if you want good relations with that country. There are a number of other examples like that.

As an illustration, during the Reagan administration a law was passed called the Pressler Amendment which provided for the cutoff of all military aid to Pakistan if the President could not personally certify that Pakistan did not have a nuclear weapon and that the provision of the aid would not make it more likely that they would have a nuclear weapon. Well, as a matter of unmistakable fact, by 1986 or 1987 Pakistan did have more than one nuclear weapon. In fact, A. Q. Khan said so publicly. President Reagan kept making that certification because the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan was still going on, and he wanted the assistance of Pakistan so that we could continue to supply through Pakistan the resistance forces. The last time President Reagan gave that certification, his last year in office, he did so with reluctance. President Bush did give the certification his first year in office and said that he didn't think he could do it again. His second year in office, he did not do it and aid to Pakistan was cut off and remained cut off for many years. We had 60 F-16s we were about to deliver to Pakistan which never were delivered even though paid for. The difference was the Afghan war had ended. The Afghan war ended formally in 1989. It actually ended a year or two before, but it formally ended in 1989. So by 1990, the second year of Bush I, it was definitely over.

All during that period of certification, three agencies made recommendations to the President—the Department of Defense, the Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Did Pakistan have or not have a nuclear weapon? That was the advice that was requested by the White House pursuant to the statute. The advice was formally requested every year. Every year the Department of Defense and the Department of State said that Pakistan did not have a nuclear weapon and we should continue military aid. Every year the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency said Pakistan does have a nuclear weapon and we should not continue aid. At least when President Reagan and President Bush made those decisions, they had both sides in front of them.

If you don't have an ACDA, you don't have that perspective because, in the State Department, arms control, non-proliferation will always be trumped by the importance of bilateral relations with other countries. Non-proliferation and arms control policy officers would be down several layers in the bureaucracy, but under the former Arms Control and Disarmament Act, the director of the arms control agency had the right to communicate—the legal right—to communicate directly to the President, without checking with the Secretary of State. He also had a seat on the National Security Council when arms control and non-proliferation issues were before the National Security Council. That same year, 1993, as the ACDA acting director, I had a vote on the test ban as a result.

At the beginning of 1993 all the political appointees of ACDA resigned as is the custom but there are two levels of political appointees; there are those that are confirmed by the Senate and those that do not require Senate confirmation and only the first type have to resign by custom. I guess only the first type are direct Presidential appointees. So they resigned—the director, deputy director and the four assistant directors. Those were the six political offices we had then. We also had two political positions for special representative of the President for arms control and non-proliferation, but those were not

filled at the time. They had been created for Paul Nitze and for General Rowney many years previously. After the resignations, I asked my deputy General Counsel to create a succession regulation for ACDA (which didn't exist at the time) indicating who would run the agency if all the confirmable political officers are gone. A succession regulation in early January of 1993 was prepared and it provided that the General Counsel would become acting director, which was me. It made sense because I was the senior officer remaining. I was a political appointee but not directly by the President.

This was done in coordination with the transition team from the Clinton administration, headed by Rose Gottemoeller, and including Laura Holgate and several others. They were okay with this. Rose Gottemoeller is currently Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security at State and was the negotiator of the new START Treaty. Laura Holgate is assistant to the President for non-proliferation in the White House on the National Security Council staff. Rose in 1993 was scheduled for a job at the White House. Laura was going to go to work for Ash Carter at the Defense Department once he was confirmed. They were, with one or two others, the transition team. When January 20 came, I became the acting director by law. Initially, I kept my office in my General Counsel's suite, but after two or three weeks I moved over to the Director's office. The deputy General Counsel, Mary Elizabeth Hoinkes, became the acting General Counsel. Early on, I didn't know how long I would be acting director or even if the agency would survive.

Q: How did the competing groups there, the liberals versus the hardliners view you or was that game in play?

GRAHAM: This was not a liberal versus conservative issue. This was a power grab by bureaucrats at the State Department. To answer your question about how I was viewed: I think the conservatives viewed me as a liberal and I think the liberals probably saw me as slightly conservative liberal. I had really good relationships with many conservatives and many of them were friends and colleagues and, although we might fight over issues, we usually got along pretty well. Even at this time I wasn't really opposed by anybody except the people in the State Department who were trying to take over ACDA. So I decided even though I didn't know how long I would be acting director or whether the agency would survive, I was going to try to accomplish three things; first I was going to try to persuade the U.S. government to support the comprehensive test ban.

By way of background, in the fall of 1992 the Congress had passed a law which called for a nine-month moratorium on nuclear weapon tests and, after that nine months had passed, the President was authorized either to continue the moratorium indefinitely until there was a comprehensive test ban treaty or the President could authorize five tests a year for three years and, after that, there would be a moratorium on testing until there was a comprehensive test ban treaty in place. The President was to support the objective of a comprehensive test ban treaty being negotiated.

The five authorized tests under the statute included three for the Department of Defense to improve safety measures on bomber weapons, which the Department of Defense didn't

want for two reasons: first, they were expensive—six billion dollars or something like that—and second, these weapons were no longer deployed. Pursuant to the understanding between President Bush and President Gorbachev in the fall of 1991, all nuclear weapons had been taken off bombers on both sides and, additionally (supposedly), tactical nuclear weapons were to be reduced by 95 percent and nuclear weapons would no longer be deployed on surface ships. There remains a question whether Russia ever actually did significantly reduce its tactical nuclear weapons. Also Gorbachev committed to bring all tactical nuclear weapons back to Russia from other parts of the former Soviet Union. Christmas Day, 1991 the Soviet Union dissolved. In 1992 President Yeltsin committed himself, as well, to bringing all the remaining nuclear weapons left in the successor states back to Russia. That's a whole separate story: the return of nuclear weapons was finally completed in the first year of Clinton. I discussed earlier the significant number of strategic weapons left in the territory of Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus.

Q: Were the innards taken out of them?

GRAHAM: No, no. They were live; they were ready to go. The tactical nuclear weapons in a lot of other successor states were eventually all brought back to Russia. For example, Kazakhstan had 110 SS-18s with ten warheads each, 500 kilotons each per warhead and, according to the President of Kazakhstan, there was considerable interest among certain Middle East states in the weapons. But Kazakhstan decided to return them to Russia. These of course were strategic weapons not tactical.

Back to the tests congress authorized the President to conduct in the 1992 law. The Defense Department was not interested in their allowed three tests because bomber nuclear weapons were not deployed on bombers anymore. And such safety measures were very expensive. The fourth test was for the British, and why should the U.S. government protect the British nuclear weapon program? The fifth test was for purposes of reliability and the U.S. had almost never done tests for the reliability of its nuclear weapons. The law was known as the Hatfield Mitchell Exxon law after the three senators who cosponsored it. President George H. W. Bush reluctantly signed it because, attached to it was money for the Super Collider in Texas, which he thought would be helpful for his reelection. So it was law in 1993. In the spring, May or June, the Clinton administration had to decide about the tests because the nine month mandated test moratorium would be up then. So a process began.

I may as well continue to talk about the CTBT now and maybe next time we can talk more about ACDA and about the non-proliferation treaty.

In any case, that law required that a decision be made. I was the acting director now so I had a vote on the National Security Council although several well-meaning colleagues came and talked to me about that and said, "Look, you can probably avoid the vote or say you are only acting and therefore you are going to be neutral or something like that." I thought to myself, "I don't think that's what I am going to do." I notified Bob Bell on the National Security Council staff that I intended to support the continuation of the moratorium indefinitely and not doing the tests. I did that on a telephone call, as I recall.

He was rather unhappy with my position. I said the same thing in a note to Lynn Davis at the State Department, who was the Under Secretary for international security but also was leading the effort to eliminate the Arms Control Agency. I received an ambiguous reply to my note. I couldn't tell precisely where she stood. Then I went to see Barry McCaffrey, Lieutenant General Barry McCaffrey, who was the Assistant Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-5).

Q: And had been the drug czar.

GRAHAM: Later but at that time he was an active duty military officer and his responsibility among other things was arms control under Chairman Shalikashvili. So I went to see him. He said, "Of course, that's what you should do. You are the acting director of ACDA. Your responsibility is the non-proliferation treaty, its strengthening and continuance. The test ban is part of that. Of course, you should support the continuation of a moratorium. You would be derelict in your duty if you did anything else. It's for us to argue the other side. That's the way government is supposed to work. And, by the way, there are some guys that came to see me in striped pants the other day, who wanted to convince me that ACDA should be eliminated and that the Joint Chiefs should support that. I threw them out of my office, telling them that what you are suggesting is not consistent with the national interests of the United States."

Q: Who came to see him?

GRAHAM: He didn't say who—"people from the State Department in striped pants," he said.

I was the acting director, but there wasn't anybody acting as deputy so I went to both the National Security Council deputy meetings and the NSC Principals meetings. At the deputy meetings I made the argument that we had a situation where France has declared a moratorium on nuclear weapon tests some years previous as had Russia. Great Britain tests at our test sites so whatever we do, they have to do. The Chinese haven't done a test in three years. If the U.S. resumes nuclear testing, in less than two years there is going to be a vote of the non-proliferation treaty parties in New York on NPT extension. If the U.S. is in the midst of a test program while the other nuclear weapon states are not, then the international community is going to conclude that we just love nuclear weapons so much that we can't give them up. So why should they make the NPT permanent as we want so much? Our voice will be very limited in its effect and probably it would mean that the NPT would not be permanently extended as we so much want. Testing would undercut our ability to achieve indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. In fact, it would probably make it impossible I argued.

Second, pursuant to the Yeltsin effort to get nuclear weapons back into Russia, we know we are going to have a difficult time with Ukraine. We have known that now, for a year or more—ever since the visit there in early 1992. How could we effectively argue with Ukraine that they should give up their nuclear weapons, which are on their territory,

which we are asking them to return them to Russia, when we are engaged in an active test program? So to resume these tests would undermine two fundamental objectives of the United States; one, indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in 1995 and two, persuading Ukraine to return the strategic nuclear weapons left on its territory by the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, with respect to the three tests, the Department of Defense doesn't want the technology these tests are designed to prove out, that is, the safety measures on the strategic bomber weapons. They just want to do tests. They don't want the tests for the reasons in the law. We are not going to test just for the sake of the British and we rarely do reliability tests. So the tests are certainly not high priority for the United States. Those were the arguments I made. Everyone else was in favor of doing the tests, all other agencies, so I was alone at the deputy level.

Then the discussion was moved to the National Security Council—Principals-level or Cabinet-level—since my vote resulted in a disagreement at the deputy level. I had a meeting before the first NSC Principals meeting with the Deputy Energy Secretary and he said that no program should last forever. Government programs should end when their usefulness has ended and this may be one of those cases. So that was an encouraging conversation at the Department of Energy before the first National Security Council meeting. Mary Lib Hoinkes the acting General Counsel, my Deputy for many years, spoke with the White House Science Adviser, Dr. John Gibbons and he indicated that perhaps he was for the moratorium and against the tests.

So we came to this first meeting. I remember sitting outside the White House Cabinet Room where the first meeting was to be held, pretty nervous about what I was going to do. We went in there and on one side of the table were Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, and Chairman of Joint Chiefs Colin Powell. Tony Lake, the National Security Advisor was the Chairman of the meeting. His Deputy Sandy Berger, and senior assistant to the President on the NSC were also present. On my side of the table, were Jim Woolsey, the CIA director. Jim Woolsey was on my left and on my right the White House Science Adviser, and finally Hazel O'Leary, the new Secretary of Energy. At my end of the table was the Deputy National Security Adviser and at the other end of the table was Tony Lake, the National Security Adviser.

We first dealt with other issues and then had some preliminary discussions on the moratorium. Then Tony asked for everyone to state his/her position. Warren Christopher and Les Aspen both said, "This was the deal, you know, that we would have a nine month moratorium and then would do these five tests a year for three years and a moratorium until there is a test ban. That's the political deal and we should carry it out." Chairman Powell said that nuclear weapons are the crown jewels of the Department of Defense and we want to make sure they are reliable and so associated himself with the first two.

Before all that started Jim Woolsey, the CIA director, made a few opening comments of a general nature, but he was not allowed to have a substantive position as CIA director. He was not supposed to speak on policy, only on intelligence and that was strictly enforced

in the Clinton administration. Next it was my turn. I made the same argument there that I had made at the deputies meeting, which I have previously described. Jack Gibbons, the Science Advisor, indicated that he generally favored my position. Finally, Secretary O’Leary said that she was the new kid on the block. She had just been in office two weeks and she wasn’t ready to make a decision like this. She wanted first to be briefed by her staff and she asked if the meeting could be postponed for two weeks. Tony Lake was very unhappy with that request. Nevertheless, he said, “Okay, we’ll have another meeting in roughly two weeks’ time, whereupon the first meeting ended.

In between the two meetings I had a meeting with Hazel O’Leary and with her assistant secretary for nuclear weapons, Vic Reis, a very distinguished expert. I recall her deputy was there as well. I was accompanied by Ivo Spalatin, whom I had asked to come on board from a long-time Congressional staff position to act as congressional liaison. He had been a long-time senior staff person on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the chairman who had supported him for so many years had just retired. So he was looking for a new job. I met with him early on in February and asked him to come to ACDA and after a lot of discussion, he finally agreed to do that. He had been at ACDA a month or so.

These NSC meetings were perhaps in April after several months of preparation, writing of papers and so forth. First, there was an assistant-secretary-level meeting and then there were the deputy meetings that I described. At the deputy meetings John Deutch represented the Energy Department. He was a senior assistant secretary. Eventually John was moved over to Defense to be the Deputy there under the Clinton administration. Maybe that happened later during the first year of the Clinton administration because, at the time of the deputies meeting, he was there acting at the deputy level. But I don’t think he was present at DOE at the time of the later NSC discussions in April, May.

I took Ivo with me to the meeting at the Energy Department with the Secretary and her staff. It was just the two of us. In that meeting Hazel O’Leary made it very clear that she was going to support the moratorium and argue against doing the tests. She was going to bring senior National Laboratory experts with her to explain that the stockpile is safe, secure and reliable and would remain so for at least 10 years—even if no test were done. Her assistant, Vic Reis, her assistant secretary for nuclear weapons who was present was very supportive of this position as well.

So the second NSC Principals meeting took place. Same characters, same seating and again in the Cabinet Room of the White house. Almost the entire focus of this meeting was on the moratorium, other test ban issues were not extensively discussed. The discussion went around the table again after a presentation by the two National Laboratory scientists that Hazel had brought with her. They explained how, for at least ten years, even if we were to do nothing—no tests—there would be no problem with the safety, security and reliability of the Stockpile. The round robin discussion began this time with General Powell. His position had shifted slightly. He said, “My responsibility is to the military. If the Secretary of Energy tells me that I need to test, then I want to test. If the Secretary of Energy tells I don’t need to test, then I don’t want to test.” Secretaries

Christopher and Aspin, who spoke next, reiterated their position at the first meeting—that there was a potential deal for the fifteen tests and that we should do the tests.

Tony again said, “Who will speak for the other side?” I raised my hand and gave my (by now) standard speech, concluding that the moratorium should be extended until we have a comprehensive test ban assuring that no other nation tests (a concession we had to make early on to the JCS because it was in the law.) The White House Science Adviser, Jack Gibbons said, “I agree” and Hazel O’Leary said, “I agree.” So that meant there was a split and we would have to go to the President.

As I indicated, we addressed another issue in the first meeting—that the law provided that the moratorium did not have to be continued if another nation tests. Originally, the law said “if Russia tests.” The White House in 1992 was able to change “Russia” to “any other nation,” thus providing a bigger out. So that was carried forward in the discussions within the Executive branch all the way to the National Security Council level, but we had not addressed that point because we were arguing for continuance of the moratorium. I just didn’t think that the traffic would bear fighting over this issue so I didn’t resist that issue when raised by the JCS and it was agreed by all that if a moratorium was going on and another nation tested, then that would be the end of the moratorium.

Q: Even if it would be a minor nation such as Pakistan?

GRAHAM: Any other nation; it wasn’t specific. Next the decision went to the president. Tony Lake checked with the three senators who sponsored the legislation and also with other important senators like Senator Nunn and all were comfortable with the idea of the indefinite moratorium. So the President decided it our way. He decided the tests would not be done and that the moratorium would be continued indefinitely, but it would have to be renewed each year as a formal matter by the President saying, “Yes, let’s continue it” and it would continue indefinitely until there was a comprehensive test ban treaty. Early next year we would promptly seek a test ban treaty at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. That decision was made in June of 1993.

In August of 1993, two months later, unmistakable evidence appeared that the Chinese, after three and a half years of not testing, were preparing to do a test. The tower was built, the hole in the ground where the device would be placed was prepared. As our satellite pictures revealed, it was more and more clear that another nation was going to test. So at the end of August we had a third meeting of the National Security Council and those of us that had supported the continuance of the moratorium were very, very concerned that another nation was clearly going to test so all would be off and we would be back to doing the 15 tests over three years with the expected negative effect it would have on our non-proliferation interests. At the end of August the meeting took place—this time in the Situation Room at the White House, not in the Cabinet Room.

Because the Situation Room is a much smaller room, everyone was sitting right next to one another. I had the White House Science Adviser sitting on my left and General Powell on my right. Sandy Berger, the National Security Adviser, was sitting nearby.

Also around the table were Tony Lake, the National Security Adviser and on his left Les Aspin, the Secretary of Defense, on his right Warren Christopher, the Secretary of State, and one or two other people. There were a few seats for staffers on either side. All were on the edge of their seats, realizing that a really important decision was going to be made. Some of us were very worried.

Tony opened the meeting, “Well, we are here because it looks like the Chinese are going to do a test. There was a caveat to our agreement in June that the moratorium would be indefinitely extended—namely, that this decision would be reconsidered if another nation tests. So what do we do? First, I’d like to call on Jim Woolsey to present the intelligence.” Jim spent the next ten minutes outlining the information we had which made it absolutely clear that China was going to test in two or three weeks, for sure. Virtually for sure, anyway. So after that was over, Tony decided to go round the room once more to ask people what their position was. Les Aspin raised his hand; the Secretary of Defense asked to speak first. Tony nodded to him, so he said—and this is a rough quote but it is close to what he said, “Well, we are Americans. Why should our policy be controlled by what some guys over there in Beijing are going to do?” Everybody else said, “That’s right” and that was the end of the meeting.

The moratorium is still continuing today. The U.S. has never tested since. Ultimately none of the P-5 countries have tested since 1996 after the French closed their test site. The Pakistanis and Indians tested in 1998, but, since then, have been observing the moratorium. Only the North Koreans have tested recently. So that was how the moratorium happened.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations formally began in January, 1994 and, of course, in 1995 we had the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) extension conference. In 1996 the CTBT negotiations were completed and the Treaty was signed in September of 1996 and sent to the Senate in 1997. In 1999—due to a combination of Clinton administration ineptitude and malevolence on the part of Senators Helms and Kyl—it was voted down by the Senate. It didn’t even get 50 votes; it got 49 votes. It was 18 votes short of the required two-thirds. I will quickly go over some of the test ban issues and then I’ll come back to the ACDA issue, which we won’t have enough time to complete today.

Negotiations began in January of 1994 at the Conference of Disarmament in Geneva. After the NPT was indefinitely extended in 1995, the French in May resumed their nuclear test program, ending the moratorium of the previous French President, Mitterrand, who had adopted it some years ago. Chirac was elected President in June of 1995 and he announced that France would go back to testing because they hadn’t completed the tests they needed. Many countries denounced Chirac’s decision, saying that it was a breach of faith after the indefinite extension of the NPT.

The Defense Department started to pass around a proposal, that we should have a threshold test ban and allow explosions up to 500 pounds. The Russians response was that they’d have to have ten tons, not 500 pounds. The Russians said their technology was

not as good as ours. They'd need 10 tons. The French said something else. There was an avalanche of complaints from the non-nuclear weapon states about the French and about the idea of a threshold.

The U.S. hadn't decided what it was going to do about this proposal. A senior official at the White House informed me that it was very important that the State Department not back the threshold, at last not a majority of the Bureaus. "We know where Defense is. If State Department sides with Defense, we are going to have real problems so you've got to make sure all seven bureaus of the State Department don't support this threshold idea." That was easy—one of the easiest jobs I ever had. I went around to the European Bureau, the Near East and South Asian Bureau, the African Bureau, the South Pacific Bureau, the Latin American Bureau. They were just being overwhelmed with complaints from their 'clients', the countries from their region. Each Assistant Secretary said, "Oh, absolutely we are against that." The political military affairs under Assistant Secretary Holbrook and the Bureau of International Security were with Defense. The Secretary of State sent an ambiguous letter to the White House saying that most of the departments opposed the Defense view but some liked it. That was okay for Tony Lake; it meant the State Department was split. So he worked out something with the President whereby a program of stockpile stewardship was announced, pursuant to which six billion dollars a year would be given to the National Laboratories to do simulations of nuclear weapon tests and offset any argument about a need for tests. Then the president announced that the U.S. would support a zero nuclear weapon, comprehensive test ban. Then the other nuclear weapon states formally stated the same thing in Geneva and that's what we ended up with. The sincerity of the Russian commitment to zero is being questioned today by some Senators, but I don't think there is any argument there at all.

Toward the end of the negotiations, another big issue emerged. The Indians made it very clear that they were not going to support the test ban even though they had been calling for the a comprehensive test ban for years. The truth was that they wanted nuclear weapons and they were not going to support the ban. They had been making this argument for about a year in Geneva. In 1996 some of the other countries, having been diplomatically scratching each other's backs in Geneva, began to support the Indian view—in particular the Egyptian delegation, even though Egypt had always been for a comprehensive test ban. So I was commissioned by the White House to go around the world and talk to some of these countries and get them to strengthen their view against the Indians. It was very important that Pakistan not support India because, even though it had nuclear weapons, if it supported the Indian view, others would say this would be the first time the two have ever agreed on anything maybe they are right.

So I did go to Pakistan and I did talk with senior foreign ministry people—the foreign secretary, and the deputy foreign minister. They agreed that they wouldn't support the Indian view. They felt their stockpile was very secure without tests anyway. Of course, they did do tests a few years later after the Indians did. While I was there, I stayed with the American ambassador, Tom Simons. He had a dinner for me. He said, "I will invite a lot of the top government people from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, nuclear weapons program, Defense Ministry—25 to 30 people. Why don't you put a question to them?" I said, "Okay Tom, I will." There ended up being about 30 guests. We talked a little bit and

then I put a question to them. I said, “The ambassador has asked me to put a question to you, which we will debate for the rest of the dinner. The question or proposition is that when the comprehensive test ban treaty is finally complete, Pakistan should sign—sign, not ratify—the Treaty, no matter what India does. A huge debate followed, lasting about three hours until after dessert. The final conclusion was it would be in Pakistan’s interest to do that, but the politics wouldn’t support it.

My trip included other countries. I went to Israel and said, “Don’t support the Indian position and support the test ban.” I talked with the head of the Atomic Energy Agency and he said, “We don’t have any problem with the test ban. We will support it as long as you can guarantee to me we won’t have Egypt making up stories about Israeli nuclear tests every time there is an earthquake under the Red Sea.”

I talked with the Indonesians and said, “Look, you have always supported the comprehensive test ban. You’ve got to speak out against the Indians even though you are both non-aligned countries, prominent Non-Allied Movement (NAM) countries; you have to speak out against that.” They said, “Yes, that’s been our policy. We will do that.”

I also went to Egypt. I spoke with the Foreign Minister Amr Moussa, with whom I fought furiously over NPT extension. I said the same thing to him: “Egypt has always been for the test ban. You have got to stop supporting Indians. Your ambassador there has been consistently supporting the Indians in Geneva.” He said, “Oh, yes. I will put a stop to that.” That discussion took place in Cairo in 1996. A few months later Amr Moussa, accompanied by his assistant Nabil Fahmy – later for nine years Ambassador of Washington, came to Washington. The Egyptian ambassador was still supporting the Indians. I had a rather pleasant meeting with Moussa, did not raise this issue with him and went back to my office to take an urgent call from one of our officials at the negotiations who said that the Egyptian ambassador had just made a major speech supporting the Indian position against the test ban. I called Nabil Fahmy after receiving the call from Geneva, who is now – 2013 - the Foreign Minister of Egypt, by the way. He was been appointed just a few weeks earlier in the new government. When I called him, he was still with the Foreign Minister in the hotel suite. I told him what happened just a few hours previously in Geneva and he said, “I’ll take care of it.” About two hours after that—it was still the morning in Washington so afternoon in Geneva, I received a call from my colleague in Geneva saying the Egyptian ambassador just made another speech and he had never seen anyone turn around quite so fast.

In any case, by the end of the negotiations in June of 1996, nobody was supporting the Indian position except, to some degree, Iran. But the Conference on Disarmament (CD) operates on the basis of consensus. So whereas we could perhaps get the finished, draft treaty out of the subcommittee and before the full Conference on Disarmament, we could not get it reported to the United Nations without unanimity. Some in the leadership of the State Department, but not the Secretary, wanted to change the draft treaty to provide that there wouldn’t be any specific requirements as to who had to join it, but just a number of states so we could go ahead and have a treaty after the Indians did not sign. But it was very clear to me and I argued to the contrary that we had to have a requirement that all

states with nuclear weapons sign this treaty and become part of this treaty because the Chinese made it very clear they were not going to sign it if the Indians didn't and even the British were a bit wobbly. Without the Chinese and the British we didn't have a Treaty. I said, "We just can't go that way." Eventually that view prevailed and in Geneva what was developed was a provision that the treaty will enter into force after those 46 countries that have nuclear technology on their territory and are members of the Conference on Disarmament (so as to not single out the nuclear weapon states), are parties. Even so, the Indians said, "You are compelling us to sign the treaty, this is a violation of international law. We are not going to support it."

At ACDA we developed this idea that perhaps the Conference on Disarmament could send a report to the United Nations saying, "We ended our session. Here is where we were and here is this draft treaty. Then a friendly country or two could introduce it as a resolution in the United Nations and attach the treaty saying let's support this and we could have a vote, which is what we wanted. We thought the so-called "troika" (Mexico, New Zealand and Australia), which introduced every year at the United Nations a resolution supporting a comprehensive test ban treaty might introduce the resolution. (I voted for the "troika" resolution in 1993 when I was acting director, the first year that the U.S. voted for it. These countries had always supported the idea of the comprehensive test ban. We contacted the three and Mexico and New Zealand begged off. They were not willing to do it.

Q: Why not?

GRAHAM: They didn't want to confront the Indians, but Australia didn't back down easily. "Of course we will do it," they said and they did. It was introduced in late June, early July in the United Nations and in September it passed 158 to 3. The three were India, Iraq and Bhutan—Iraq under Saddam Hussein. I was there at the time of the vote on the floor of the General Assembly. The same officer that called my attention to the Egyptian speech in Geneva was also there—Kathy Grettenberger, a very capable diplomat. She liked to organize bridge games and the Pakistani ambassador, Munir Akram, was a great bridge player—in fact, a master point bridge player was there as well. Kathy said to Munir, "Munir, let's have a bridge game and it will be Tom and me against you and the U.K. ambassador. If we win, you will agree that Pakistan will sign the treaty. You're a really good bridge player. How about it?" He said, "Oh, no. I'm not going to take that chance." That was all in good humor.

The treaty was opened for signature in September. President Clinton himself was the first to sign. A very large number of countries – including three of the P-5 and other important countries have ratified the treaty now and among the 46 all, except for the United States, China, Iran, Israel, Egypt, India, Pakistan and North Korea. It is easy to see how it could come together. The U.S. would ratify. China has made it very clear that they would then ratify. Israel is waiting for us too. Egypt has made it very clear they are waiting for Israel so that leaves India, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea. In 1998, India—before the treaty's defeat in the U.S. Senate in 1999—secretly promised President Clinton it would sign because they had done their tests and they haven't tested since and are following a

moratorium. Of course, Pakistan would do it if India did. That would leave North Korea and Iran. For Iran to hold out under those circumstances would convince the entire world they had a nuclear weapons program. So they probably would ratify. It would be up to the world community as to whether we could strong-arm North Korea. I think we could. China could just tell them to sign.

That's the test ban issue.

Maybe we can talk just a couple of minutes coming back to the ACDA situation. The other two things I wanted to accomplish as acting director were that I wanted to remake the agency as a more rationally organized entity and I wanted to save it, to ensure its survival. In terms of saving ACDA, I enlisted everybody that I could. Tony Lake was quietly for ACDA survival. We had an interagency vote on eliminating ACDA and everybody was against it except the State Department. We had a friend at Defense News, whom I didn't know, who kept denouncing the attempted takeover. I was to appear as the acting director before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on the State Department judiciary, to support the ACDA budget. The night before I went there, I received a message from Lynn Davis, she and the Undersecretary for Management, Brian Atwood, an old friend, were the leaders of the opposition to ACDA. The message from Lynn said that I had to include a paragraph in my opening statement, which said that no matter what I said about providing funds for ACDA, the agency was probably going to be merged into the State Department anyway. She provided the text.

So I had a long evening discussion that night at the agency, primarily with Norm Wulf, the head of our non-proliferation bureau. What should I do? Should I refuse to include the provided text? Should I say something about it? We finally all agreed that I should just put it in and see what happens. So I did. I sent the statement up to Committee that way. I decided that I wouldn't personally deliver a statement at all. I would just speak about how important ACDA was in the mind of President Kennedy when he established it.

I did that. It was in a small room and the place was packed. I made my comments and turned over my written statement for the record. The Chairman, who was our friend, asked me a couple of soft ball questions and then the ranking Republican spoke up and said, "What's this third paragraph about eliminating the agency and merging it into the State Department? Why is that there?" I thought to myself, "It is a crime to lie to Congress. I better not lie." I replied that I was asked to put that in. He said, "By whom?" I said, "Brian Atwood." He was behind proposal even though Lynn sent it to me. He said, "Who's he?" I said, "He is Undersecretary for Management at the Department of State." He said, "I don't see why you put that paragraph in your statement, you're an independent agency. I don't see why you should take orders from him, he is an official of the State Department." I said, "Well, maybe you are right, Congressman." And so the hearing went on. The rest was easy, but I knew I was really going to catch it when I got back to the State Department. I tried to call Lynn and Brian after I returned, but they would not take my call. I said to myself, "I didn't plant those questions, but I was not going to commit a crime. It's a crime to lie to Congress."

The next day I received a summons from the Deputy Secretary to be in his office at 11AM two days hence. The Defense News the following day ran an article saying that Tom Graham was going to be “taken to the woodshed” at the State Department. So this really stirred things up. When I spoke to Rose Gottemoeller at the NSC, she said she would try to calm the Deputy Secretary down. My remarkable assistant, Barbara Starr said to me, “Well, you’re pretty down about this now, but, believe me, this is going to be a turning point of saving ACDA. You wait and see.”

I went to that meeting with Deputy Secretary Wharton and appeared at the appointed time at the Deputy Secretary’s outer office. His secretary brought me in to his larger office for meetings and I sat down on the couch. He came in and sat in a chair to my left and his assistant entered and sat to my right. There were two chairs opposite me that were empty. We did some small talk and after a while Brian and Lynn came in, faces were contorted with rage. They were so angry they couldn’t speak. They sat down. The Deputy Secretary said, “Well, Mr. Graham, I understand that you have been making anti-State Department statements on Capitol Hill.” I said, “Mr. Secretary, I think the State Department is a wonderful organization. I was not making anti-State Department statements up there. I was answering questions from members of Congress and just telling the truth. I didn’t plant those questions. I just did not want to lie to the Congress.” He said, “Well, okay but don’t do it again” and that was the end of the meeting. We all left without speaking.

Several weeks later Warren Christopher traveled to Minneapolis to do an event at the Hubert Humphrey Memorial. His widow was still alive and was present. Somehow I was able to get a message to her asking her to say something to Secretary Christopher about how much Senator Humphrey cared about the creation of ACDA. About ten days after that event I got a telephone call from Secretary Christopher. He said that he had listened carefully to all sides of this debate and he had great confidence in Lynn Davis and Brian Atwood, as well as great confidence in me. He said that he had decided ACDA should continue as an independent organization. He had been persuaded as well by the Humphrey legacy and so that was the end of the 1993 ACDA survival story. So we saved ACDA. Even though it was destroyed four years later, we saved it for four years.

I accomplished another thing in working with the Senate Foreign Relations staff—principally Bill Parsons, who was on loan to the Committee for a year, and Bill Ashworth, the senior staff member. I arranged to be asked in a hearing by Chairman Pell about the ABM Treaty interpretation that we discussed sometime back, the so-called broad interpretation. The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Pell asked me, “What is the correct interpretation, Mr. Graham, of Article V, 1 of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty relative to space-based systems?” I took the question for the record and then coordinated a response to that question among all the agencies. It read: The correct interpretation is the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty that the treaty bans the development, testing and deployment of space-based ABM systems regardless of the technology involved.” All agencies signed off on that interpretation so I signed the letter transmitting it. There’s a picture over there of me signing the letter with my staff behind me. That formally ended the interpretation debate. I received of letters from former ACDA officials praising the day, including one from Ambassador Smith in

which he said that he did not think that he would live to see the day when the broad interpretation was repealed. Very, very, heartwarming.

Q: Where shall we pick up the next time?

GRAHAM: Next time let's talk about a few more things at ACDA and then the effort to indefinitely extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We could touch on the actual end of ACDA, which was more or less put in place just as I was leaving the government and other bits and pieces.

Q: Today is the 19th of September, 2013 with Tom Graham. We have just finished up you had signed off on the broad interpretation of the anti ABM Treaty.

GRAHAM: I signed off on the repeal of the broad interpretation. Did I talk about the test ban? What about the survival of the Arms Control Agency?

Q: You were saying you wanted to talk about some of the, you talked about early stages.

GRAHAM: I am going to repeat for emphasis the 1993 attempt to eliminate ACDA in one continuous narrative. In the incoming Clinton administration in 1993 there were those who were desirous in the Clinton State Department of eliminating the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and merging it into the State Department—making it essentially a bureau of the State Department. This was argued to be the right thing to do because it would permit arms control/ non-proliferation issues to be managed by a powerful agency rather than a small one. Of course, the real reason was that State just wanted a bigger piece of the foreign relations pie.

The arguments the other way were very powerful and still are. ACDA, by statute, had the right to attend National Security Council meetings and present its views whenever the subject was related to arms control and non-proliferation. It also had the right to appeal directly to the President without having to get clearance from anyone. Those two rights were extremely important in the history of arms control. In the discussions of the 1960s within the U.S. government, only the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency favored the negotiation of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty over the so-called Multilateral Force. The State Department, supported by the Defense Department, wanted to create a multilateral nuclear force for important NATO countries (to include Germany). The Soviet Union made it very clear that if there were such a force, there could be no nuclear non-proliferation treaty. This debate lasted for about a year and eventually President Johnson agreed with the ACDA Director and overruled the State Department and the Defense Department. Then the U.S., working with the Soviet Union, developed a common draft of the non-proliferation treaty. It was negotiated in Geneva, signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970 and the rest is history. Without ACDA there may never have been a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. If ACDA had been part of the State Department, then there probably never would have been a Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty.

A second example, the Pressler amendment passed by the Senate and Congress in 1980s: it provided that U.S. military aid to Pakistan should be cut off if it developed—built— a nuclear weapon, and in order for Congress to approve the military aid, it required the President each year to certify that Pakistan did not have a nuclear weapon. This, of course, was during the period of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, which the U.S. was opposing with Pakistan as a very important ally and a means by which arms could be shipped to the mujaheddin, the rebels. Nevertheless, Presidential certification was required.

For perhaps six years, from 1985 to 1991, the president was tasked with the question of making this certification and each year there were memoranda sent to him by the State Department, the Defense Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Each one of the years, 1985 through 1990, the President did make the certification. Each year President Reagan and then Bush received three memoranda. The State Department said Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon. The Defense Department said Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency said that it did possess a nuclear weapon. Each year Pakistan did, in fact, possess a nuclear weapon and said so publicly in a backhanded way, so each year the President because of the ACDA memoranda knew he was making an untrue declaration when he made it. In 1989 President Bush indicated this was is the last year he could make this certification. The Afghan war had just ended. The next year President Bush refused to make the certification and military aid was cut off to Pakistan. Those are two examples of the value of the independent voice of ACDA.

The other very, very important reason for an independent ACDA is, unlike the Foreign Service that moves people around, ACDA would retain experts for long periods in various fields such as chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, and so forth. Many of these people were scientists, Ph.D.s who would hardly fit in the Foreign Service culture and, in fact, never have fit in the Foreign Service culture. If ACDA were to be eliminated, eventually that expertise would be lost, which in fact is exactly what happened later on.

Those were the points made by both sides and, with the transition to the Clinton administration, all of the political officers at ACDA who had been confirmed by the Senate resigned as was the custom. I was General Counsel, a political officer, but not Senate confirmable so I did not have to resign and I did not. That left me the most senior officer in the agency. The White House appointed no new officers because of State's advocacy of ACDA being merged into the State Department.

With the assistance of the Clinton Transition Team for ACDA, which included Laura Holgate and Rose Gottemoeller (the head of the Team) and several others, the Arms Control Agency created internal procedures, which provided, in the absence of a political Senate-confirmed officer, that the General Counsel would be the Acting Director. So on January 20, 1993 I became the Acting Director of ACDA and one of my first assignments was to try to save the agency. It was a long struggle. The White House, the National

Security Council staff anyway, was under the table supporting ACDA. I remember Leon Fuerth, who was the national security adviser for Vice President Al Gore, said to me, “What do corporations do when threatened with a hostile takeover? ACDA should do something similar.” I had a discussion with Tony Lake, the National Security Adviser. He clearly favored the retention of ACDA. He had a weekly luncheon with Secretary of State Christopher and Secretary of Defense Aspin and made positive comments about ACDA there.

I should mention General Barry McCaffrey at the Joint Staff, the J-5, the senior most officer at the Joint Chief, responsible for arms control and non-proliferation. I went to see him to tell him I was going to oppose the ending of the moratorium on testing nuclear weapons and advocate moving toward negotiating a comprehensive test ban treaty promptly. I just wanted to tell him that in advance. He said, “Well, of course, that’s what you should do. Your job is to defend the non-proliferation treaty. My job is to defend the acquisition of weapons. We are supposed to fight it out. That’s the way it is supposed to work. That is the right and normal thing to do and by the way, on another subject, there were some guys in striped pants from State Department who came over to see me recently. They advocated the elimination of ACDA and I said, please leave my office. What you are advocating is contrary to the national security interest of the United States.” I knew I had a supporter there.

The White House circulated a decision memorandum to all agencies on the subject of whether ACDA should be eliminated and all agencies opposed except the State Department. And we had support in the Congress as well, from Chairman Pell of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a number of others.

I had been acting director for about three months. The time came for ACDA to present its budget before the House subcommittee responsible for ACDA, chaired by Bob Carr, a longtime friend of the Agency. So I knew the hearing would be friendly. But the night before I was to appear I was editing the formal budget statement I was going to make to the subcommittee on behalf of the ACDA. The statement described what the ACDA Bureaus were planning and how much it would cost for the coming year. I sent it up to Lynn Davis in the State Department for a courtesy review. She was undersecretary of state for international security and was one of the leading advocates of merging ACDA into the State Department. She and Brian Atwood, who was the undersecretary for management, were the two leaders of that effort. I sent it up to her and she sent it back to me saying that State (I understood this came from Brian) insisted I insert a paragraph—a new paragraph—with a statement which said that Congress should be aware in approving this budget that ACDA may be abolished soon. I stayed at the office late that night talking to Acting Assistant Director Norman Wulf (who later became a U.S. ambassador) and others about what I should do. Should I refuse to accept it? Should I put it in? Should I tell the Committee I couldn’t come? What should I do? After long discussions, we finally decided I would include the paragraph and send the statement to the Committee.

The next day I appeared before the Subcommittee. I don’t believe anyone was accompanying me. On the way to the Hill in the car, I decided what I was going to do; I

would put my statement in for the record and discuss the founding of ACDA by John F. Kennedy and its importance to him. So I arrived at the small hearing room. It was packed; there must have been 30 people in the audience packed tightly in this room as well as a number of photographers and the entire Subcommittee sitting at the table. I was sitting opposite them. I suspect the State Department had a number of representatives in the back of the room.

So I did what I decided in the car I would do. I discussed John F. Kennedy's founding of ACDA and why he thought it was important. Then the questioning started. First there were some helpful questions from our friend, Chairman Bob Carr. Then it was the ranking Republican's turn. He said, "Mr. Graham, what does this third paragraph in here mean? How can you be asking us for money when you say you might be abolished?" I said, something like well, "You have the statement we prepared; I was asked to insert that third paragraph. The member of the Republican ranking member said, "Who asked you to put that in there?" I thought to myself, "It's a crime to lie to Congress. I better not lie." "Brian Atwood, sir." "And who is Brian Atwood?" "He is undersecretary for management at the State Department." "Well," said the Congressman, "you just tell Mr. Atwood that you are an independent agency and you are not going to take his advice. You just tell him he is from another agency and you don't have to take his advice and we will just ignore that paragraph."

I knew I was really going to catch it when I got back to the State Department. I thought to myself going back in the car, "I did not plant that question, but I don't think I could give untruthful answers and avoid legal liability." When I returned, I called both Lynn Davis and Brian Atwood to explain, but neither one would take my call. After the attempted calls, I discussed the situation with the superb executive secretary at ACDA, Barbara Starr, who had been there for many years, and who now works for Rose Gottemoeller at the State Department. She has returned to government service after a number of years raising her family. She said back then, "Tom, don't worry about it. You are going to find out that this was the turning point in your effort to save ACDA." I replied, "Well, I hope you're right."

We had friendly press, such as it was. Defense News, a publication that is widely read in Washington then and now, had a series of articles. I am not sure who wrote them. It might have been Theresa Hitchens who was a reporter for them at the time. She is now the head of the Geneva UN disarmament office. It might have been her, but I am not sure. They published an article the next day about the hearing and about the fact a few hours later I was asked by the then deputy secretary of state to come to his office two days hence to discuss the hearing. I discussed this with the NSC staff, with Rose. She said, "We will try to see that nothing too bad happens." I certainly didn't talk to Defense News; I wasn't even sure who was writing the articles. Somehow Defense News the next day had an article that said, Graham was to be taken to the woodshed by State Department.

I went to Deputy Secretary Wharton's office at 11AM two days later as requested. I was invited into his inner conference office and I sat down on the couch. The only other

person in the room was his special assistant, Bill Montgomery. I was sitting on the couch; he was sitting in a chair to my right. There were two chairs opposite me conspicuously empty and then the chair to my left for the deputy secretary. Then the deputy secretary came in and sat down to my left. After a few minutes Lynn Davis and Brian Atwood entered. Both were livid. Two days had passed but both were still so angry that they couldn't speak; they couldn't say a word. They sat there fuming. The deputy secretary's special assistant was taking notes. Deputy Secretary Wharton said, "Mr. Graham, I understand that you have been on Capitol Hill making critical remarks about the State Department—that you've been making anti-State Department comments on Capitol Hill." I said, "Mr. Secretary, that isn't correct. I have not been making anti-State-Department comments. I was asked questions by a member of Congress and I gave truthful answers, realizing it is a crime to lie to Congress. That is all that happened and I did not plant those questions." The Deputy Secretary said, "OK, but don't let it happen again" and that was the end of the meeting.

So I went back to work trying to save the Arms Control Agency. I had recruited an old friend, Ivo Spalatin, who was retiring from the staff of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. He had been a long time important official there and worked for Congressman Clement Zablocki, who was retiring as Chairman. In any case, he was looking for a new job. I asked if he'd come to ACDA. After some persuasion, he agreed to do so and he helped me a lot. He spoke with some people who spoke with Hubert Humphrey's widow, knowing Secretary of State Warren Christopher was going to be in Minneapolis for a speech a week hence and was going to meet with her as the widow of the great Hubert Humphrey, Vice President of the United States. Humphrey had been one of the founders of ACDA along with President Kennedy and cared a lot about the Agency. Mrs. Humphrey was going to remind the Secretary of that. When Secretary Christopher met with her, she brought up how much Senator Humphrey cared about ACDA. A week after that in April or May, Secretary Christopher called me and said that he had decided, especially after meeting with Mrs. Humphrey and learning of Hubert Humphrey's great commitment to an independent Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to support the idea of the continued independence of ACDA. So at least for Clinton's first term, that was the end of the State Department's effort to take over the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The other issue I would like to go over again at this time is the comprehensive test ban treaty, which came up at the same time that the ACDA battle was going on—in the late January through June timeframe. During the previous year, 1992, a law passed the Congress called the Hatfield Mitchell Exxon law, which provided that the United States would continue the ongoing nuclear test moratorium. The U.S. had not done a nuclear test for about a year. The moratorium on nuclear testing would be continued for nine months and then a decision would be made whether or not to make the moratorium permanent or, as authorized by the law, decide to do five nuclear weapon tests a year for three years and then observe a moratorium until a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty permanently banning nuclear weapon tests worldwide could be negotiated.

The five tests a year for three years included three for the purpose of testing safety

devices for B-52 bomber weapons, which would cost around six billion dollars. The safety devices would be for weapons that were no longer in active service because all bomber weapons, pursuant to the Bush-Gorbachev agreement in 1991, had been taken off bombers. As a result, the Pentagon had no interest in the safety devices, but they did have an interest in tests of other things. A fourth test was for reliability. The U.S. had virtually never done any tests for reliability of its nuclear weapons because there was great confidence in the designs that were themselves tested. The fifth test was for the British and, as far as any of us were concerned, Britain is another country. It is not the United States.

So that's what the law said. President H. W. Bush had opposed the test provision, but it was attached to a bill funding the Super Collider in Texas during the 1992 reelection campaign and he thought that was important. So he signed the Bill. In signing it, he asked for and achieved a change in the law. The law said that this situation, the moratorium, would only last as long as Russia didn't do nuclear tests. Gorbachev had announced a nuclear test moratorium as had the President of France several years ago. China had not tested a nuclear weapon in three years. Britain did all of its tests at our test site. President Bush asked that "as long as Russia doesn't test" be changed to "as long as no other nation tests" and that's the way the law was passed.

So early on in the Clinton administration, a decision had to be made whether to extend the moratorium or to do the five tests; extend the moratorium while negotiating a test ban or do the five tests a year for three years and later negotiate a nuclear weapon test ban treaty. Because two years hence we were going to try to make the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty permanent in 1995, and also we were trying to persuade Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons, I didn't see how either effort could be successful if we were engaged in an ongoing nuclear test program. The rationale for the five tests, as I just explained, was not good. The Pentagon didn't want the safety devices; we didn't need reliability tests nor want to do tests just for the British.

As Acting Director, I decided that ACDA would support the extension of the moratorium and oppose the tests. I believed that, before the debate began, I should inform some other agencies. I informed the national security staff, Bob Bell in particular, and he was not happy with my position. I informed Lynn Davis *via* a note and received a note back from her that was ambiguous. Then I went to see General Barry McCaffrey and he responded, as I said before, that of course that was what I should do.

Since I was an acting Director, I didn't have a deputy so I participated at the deputy level and at the principals level in the debate. At the deputy level all agencies except ACDA supported the tests—State, Defense, JCS and Energy. I alone opposed testing and made the argument that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes up for extension in two years. We wanted to use that opportunity to make the NPT permanent and make sure it survives forever since doing so was a very, very important national priority. Furthermore, we were attempting—with considerable difficulty—to persuade Ukraine to give up the significant strategic nuclear weapons left on its territory at the end of the Cold War after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Both of those tasks would be made much more

difficult—if not impossible—were we engaged in an ongoing nuclear test program. Therefore we should not do the tests and should extend the moratorium and immediately seek to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear weapon test ban.

So this went to the principals or cabinet level of the NSC process since there was one agency that disagreed. I attended two National Security Council meetings on this subject as Acting Director at the principals level. Representing the State Department at the meetings was Warren Christopher; representing the Defense Department was the Defense Secretary Les Aspin; representing the Joint Chiefs was Chairman Colin Powell; and Jim Woolsey, Director of CIA was there. I was there. The White House science adviser, John Gibbons was there and Hazel O’Leary, Secretary of Energy. Also present were Tony Lake, the National Security Adviser, and Sandy Berger, the Deputy National Security Adviser, and the senior assistant Robert Bell.

In the first meeting there were a couple of important preliminary issues. In the last 15 minutes or so the meeting turned to the question of should we extend the moratorium or do the tests? The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense argued that this was the Congressional political deal: five tests a year for three years, then a moratorium, then pursuing a test ban. So, they argued, that was what we should do. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs said, “Well, nuclear weapons are the crown jewels and I want to ensure they are sound.” Then Tony Lake asked, “Who will speak for the other side?” I raised my hand and I said what I said at the deputy’s level—the same argument. Jack Gibbons, the Science Advisor, said that he agreed with this, that we should extend the moratorium. (My Deputy General Counsel—now Acting General Counsel—Mary Lib Hoinkes knew Jack Gibbons well and had spoken to him in advance.) Hazel O’Leary said, “Well, I have just been confirmed. I am not up to speed on these issues. I would like to have this meeting postponed for two weeks before making a decision on this because I want to learn more about it.”

The request for postponement made Tony Lake quite unhappy because he wanted to have the issue resolved as it had been debated for months and the nine-month period was coming to an end. But he had no choice but to agree. So it was settled that we would reconvene two weeks later. In the interim I had a meeting with Hazel O’Leary and her assistant for nuclear weapons Victor Reis as well her deputy, who had indicated support previously. Hazel said, “We should stop testing these weapons and I will bring senior Laboratory scientists with me to explain that we don’t need to test to assure the security and reliability of our nuclear weapon stockpile.” She had told the meeting, the first meeting of the National Security Council Principals on this subject, that she would bring scientists with her at the next meeting to address the question of security and reliability of the nuclear weapon stockpile in the absence of testing.

It wasn’t long before we were back in the Cabinet Room at the White House where the first meeting was held. I don’t recall the director of CIA saying much in either of these two meetings. It really wasn’t an intelligence issue. This was a policy issue we were arguing. This second meeting, unlike the first, focused virtually entirely on the moratorium issue. As she said she would, Hazel O’Leary had brought with her two

prominent nuclear weapon scientists, who presented a short briefing to the effect that—without any doubt—the stockpile was safe and secure and reliable for ten years without testing and probably far beyond that.

Then Tony went around the room, this time calling on General Powell first. Colin Powell shifted his argument slightly. He said, “Nuclear weapons are the crown jewels, but I am Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I am not responsible for decisions on testing. The Secretary of Energy is responsible for that. If he or she tells me that I need to test nuclear weapons, then I want to do tests. If he or she tells me I don’t need to do that, then I don’t want to test.” The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense made the same arguments they had made before. But as a general matter they supported the tests. Tony called on me. I made the same argument that I had made twice before at the deputies’ level and at the first meeting—the non-proliferation treaty argument and the Ukraine argument. The White House science adviser Jack Gibbons said, “I agree.” Then Hazel O’Leary said, “I agree” so there was a split decision, three to three.

There was one other issue resolved at the first meeting; that is, the provision of the law that President Bush had adjusted before signing the law—that in effect a moratorium continuance decision would only be valid as long as no other nation tests. I didn’t think that the politics were such that I could challenge that. To take on preventing the tests and extending the moratorium was considered a virtually impossible job at the beginning and I felt that was as much as I could take on. So we all agreed to the Bush proviso early on. But on the question of the extension of the moratorium there was a three-three split. So it went to the President. Tony Lake had some consultations with such senior senators as Senator Nunn and the cosponsors of the law as well as with others. When they all indicated that they could support the extension of the moratorium, the President of the United States in early June announced that his decision was to extend the moratorium for a year beyond the nine months and then each year continue to extend it until a nuclear comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty was negotiated.

There is one more piece to the story. Remember, this was only to be valid as long as no other nation tested. The French and the Russians had moratoria in effect, but the Chinese had just tested not tested for three years. By the end of August it became absolutely clear that China was going to do a test. They were putting up the tower and drilling the hole where the device would go. So we had another meeting of the NSC principals and this time it was in the Situation Room, a smaller room. I was sitting next to Colin Powell and the White House science adviser, that is, this time, the deputy science adviser, Jane Wales, present for this meeting. Everybody else was there—all on the edge of their seats. Would the policy decision to be turned over by this Chinese action? Is all going to be lost after all the effort to decide on continuing the moratorium? The air was really electric.

Tony Lake was the chair so he turned to Jim Woolsey and said, “Jim, give us the intelligence.” In the Clinton administration the CIA director was not allowed to participate in policy discussions. He could only present the intelligence. He wasn’t a policy officer so Jim couldn’t give his views about the moratorium. He could only say what the intelligence was. He did that very effectively as he always did. He made it

crystal clear that a Chinese test was about two to three weeks away. So then Tony Lake said, "Well, you all know what the President decided in June and you all know there was a caveat to it that this is valid only as long as no other nation tests. Well, another nation is about to test. Does this mean we reverse our policy on extending the moratorium and start the three year nuclear test program or not?" By now all were really on the edge of their seats. Les Aspin, the Secretary of Defense raised his hand. Tony called on him and he said, "Well, we're Americans and why should our policy be determined by what some guys in Beijing do?" And everybody else said, "That's right" and that was the end of the meeting. The moratorium was confirmed indefinitely.

The United States has not done a test in over 20 years and we have a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty now exists that most of the world has signed up to. Unfortunately, the U.S. has not, but one day it will and one day it will be final. There have been problems with India and Pakistan, who did nuclear weapon tests in the late 1990s. But they haven't done any since and, of course, the world knows about North Korea and the three tests they have done. But eventually nuclear weapon testing will be history. It was this process that really made it possible.

Moving on from that, we still have a little time here. That October I was still acting director. I chaired the U.S. delegation at the five-year review conference of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which came to a successful result. We had some debates about missile defense. The Clinton Defense Department wanted to do theater high altitude missile defense. The Defense Department argued that testing ABM missiles called THAD (Theater High Altitude Defense) wasn't a violation of the anti-ballistic missile treaty in that these were theater systems. We had some National Security Council debates on that. Missile defense has always been tough to stop even when it makes no sense as it almost never does. This meeting was no exception, but the Defense Department did begin to move in the direction of recognizing the problems attendant with missile defense at that time.

Toward the end of November, 1993, John Holum was confirmed as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and I became the Acting Deputy Director where I served until the following summer of 1994. When John was sworn in and came to the office right at the end of November, I was one of the first people with whom he met. He said, "I would like to offer you whatever job you want at the arms control agency. You can be Ambassador and Special Assistant to the President or you can be Deputy Director." I said, "I would rather be Ambassador for Non-proliferation and lead the efforts to make the NPT permanent." He said, "You have the job. I will propose you to the White House, but would you also please serve as acting deputy until we have a deputy?" I agreed to do that.

He further asked, "Also would you help me recruit the assistant directors and the deputy director? You know the community better than I do." I said I would do so and early in 1994 I began to work on that. The White House had decreed that at least two of our four Assistant Directors be women. I knew very few women at senior levels in the national security community. John told me he had approached Catherine Kelleher, who originally

had accepted but had backed away because her husband was ill. I recruited one woman, Amy Sands, to be Assistant Director for Intelligence. I talked to a number of women about that job including Sally Ride, the astronaut, who turned it down. Amy did a truly outstanding job.

I persuaded Lori Murray to take the position of Assistant Director for Multilateral Affairs, which was the job Catherine Kelleher had declined. Lori was a young woman I had known during the Carter administration. At this time, the late 1970s, she was working at ACDA as a recent college and Master's degree graduate. (She had written her Masters thesis on the SALT II negotiations). She later also acquired a Ph.D. Subsequently, she spent seven years working for Senator Kassebaum on arms control issues. I thought she might be good in the job. She was somewhat reluctant to accept because she had two small children. I asked her to come in and talk about it. As we were walking down the hall in the State Department to have lunch together, she said, "Tom, you undoubtedly remember me from the Carter Administration as a 21-year-old bimbo, but now I am a 38-year-old mother of two." That convinced me on the spot that she was the right person. We had lunch. She agreed to take the job if offered. Right after lunch we went to see John and I said, "John, here's Lori. You will not be sorry if you hire her as Assistant Director." He did and he wasn't sorry.

Q: We have already covered the extension of the non-proliferation.

GRAHAM: No, we haven't discussed that. It was the extension of ACDA, the test ban and other little bits and pieces that we have reviewed. We have discussed 1993 and 1994. The extension of the non-proliferation treaty was in 1995 so that could be for next time.

Q: Today is the 30th of September, 2013 with Tom Graham.

GRAHAM: Beginning at the very end of 1993 and the beginning of 1994. When John Holum was confirmed as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in late November, 1993, I met with him the first day he was on board, which was maybe November 30th. He said that he wanted me to have whatever position I wanted. I was no longer Acting Director. He was the confirmed Director. He said you can be my deputy or you can have the special assistant to the President position with rank of ambassador, either one. Those are the two that are available. I said I would take the ambassador's job and I would like as my assignment to be the leadership of the U.S. government to extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty permanently at the Conference in April/May, 1995, some year and a half hence. He said, "You have it."

I was nominated by President Clinton to the position of Special Assistant to the President for Arms Control Non-Proliferation and Disarmament with the rank of Ambassador. However, my name did not go to the senate immediately because Director Holum wanted to send the other four assistant directors up at the same time. We had already selected two of them and he thought, hopefully, we might sign up the other two soon. Two of the four

were required by the White House to be women. John Holum selected Michael Nacht from Berkeley to be Assistant Director for Strategic Affairs and Larry Scheinman to be Assistant Director for Non-Proliferation. I more or less took the lead in filling the other two positions. However, I didn't think that I knew that many women in the security field. So I undertook this assignment to find a qualified female candidate for Assistant Director for Intelligence and a qualified female candidate for Assistant Director for Multilateral Affairs. The latter position had responsibility for the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, chemical weapons, and related issues.

I began with the intelligence job. I contacted a number of different women, some of whom I didn't know. For example, I called Sally Ride, the astronaut and asked her if she would be interested and she declined. Finally, I found Amy Sands on the West Coast. She in recent years has been the President of the Monterrey Institute in California. She turned out to be a superb candidate for the intelligence job. And she did accept.

We still needed one more and I thought and thought and thought. The person that we thought was going to take the job, Catherine Kellerher, withdrew because of her husband's ill health. So I thought and thought and thought and then I remembered Lori Murray, who was Lori Esposito when I knew her before. During the Carter administration, she had worked at the Arms Control Agency as a young Master's degree graduate, having written her master's thesis on SALT II. She was very intelligent, very lively and vigorous and I thought, well a number of years have passed, Lori might be interested. She was qualified. She had spent the last seven years working on international security issues for Senator Kassebaum. Before that, she was with the American Association for Advancement of Science for about three years. She had just left Senator Kassebaum because she wanted to spend more time with her young children. It would be a hard sell. I invited her come in and talk. She agreed to have lunch with me. As we were walking down the hallway toward the State Department dining room she said to me, "Tom, when you last knew me, I was a 21 year old bimbo. Now I am a 38-year-old mother of two. I am a different person." That sort of persuaded me that she was the person I wanted. During lunch I talked to her a lot about the job and she agreed to take it if offered and, of course, if confirmed. After lunch I took her down to John's office and brought her in. I said, "John, this is Lori Murray. She would be excellent for the position of multilateral affairs." I ran through her background and I said, "You will never be sorry if you hire her." And John said, "You're hired."

And so that was the slate that went up to the Senate—except for deputy director. The names of four assistant directors and my name were sent to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A number of months later, Ralph Earle was selected as the Deputy Director so I remained the acting Deputy Director until about July of 1994, which is about the time I was confirmed as Ambassador. The two jobs overlapped for only a short time because it took about five months for nominations to get through the Senate. The five of us appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Helms and Senator Pell were chairing the nomination hearings. Senator Helms decided to leave and do something else when we were called up. Chairman Pell was very friendly, asked a few questions, and we were all duly confirmed. So that gave me a confirmed title of ambassador. I began

the effort to seek indefinite extension of the NPT in December of 1993, even before I was confirmed—when I was Acting Deputy—with discussions in New York at the UN. In addition, I was invited to speak to the Secretary General’s Advisory Committee on Disarmament in Geneva in early 1994.

Most people thought the United States’ success in achieving indefinite status for the NPT would be a long shot. Most members of the NPT were against a permanent NPT because the majority of NPT parties, even then in 1993, were members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) or otherwise associated with the Third World. The Third World was of the view that a permanent NPT would make it much less likely that the nuclear weapon states would ever treat them fairly or agree to gradually phase out their nuclear weapons. Almost everyone thought that the U.S. would eventually compromise on something else but, of course, permanently extending the NPT was a onetime opportunity. We would never get another one.

We could extend it for 25 years, for 10 years, for one year or we could do what the some members of the NAM were arguing—extend for rolling periods of 25 years and have a conference to renew it every 25 years on the condition that there had been progress on disarmament. I didn’t think it right to condition the most important international security treaty in existence on disarmament progress. Who could say whether progress had or had not happened? Furthermore, I didn’t think that proposal was even legal because the treaty itself makes it clear that extending it under Article X and not as an amendment to the Treaty – requiring the approval of then 178 national legislatures - was a onetime opportunity.

In early 1994 I tried to go to Sri Lanka to meet Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala on the way to a conference in Nepal. But, accompanied by my right-hand person for this effort, Susan Burk, my plane was delayed in Dubai and Ambassador Dhanapala had left by the time we arrived in Sri Lanka. I did meet him not long afterwards and we discussed the rolling-period idea. I said that the United States would not compromise on permanent extension. If the vote goes against us, it goes against us, but we would not compromise. And we would be happy with a one-vote margin. The treaty says “majority vote” and that is what we were aiming for.

So I began the campaign. NATO, early on, backed permanent extension, as did the P-4 (the U.S., UK, France and Russia). China never took a position on whether they supported it or not. Gradually some of the former Soviet Republics that were now independent states, like Kazakhstan and Belarus, came on board for indefinite extension. The Kazakhstani Ambassador came to my office and said that his country had been ruined by 450 nuclear weapon tests at the Semipalatinsk test site in eastern Kazakhstan and they were definitely for indefinite extension.

Early on I decided not to rely too much on the Preparatory Committee meetings, of which there were four. I was not on board for the first one, but was present for the last three. Also I would not rely too heavily on discussions in Geneva or New York. I decided to travel as much as possible to capitals to talk to the people who really made the decisions

on foreign policy and who had broader views of the world—who cared more about their country's relationship with the United States than some of the more narrow-gauged diplomats in Geneva.

Early on I realized that I had to find a way to prevent the NAM from taking a position on the rolling 25s or anything other than permanent extension because that would defeat us. No member of the NAM is going to go against a NAM decision and of the then 178 NPT parties, 110 were NAM members. The way the NAM worked (and perhaps still does work) was that decisions were made by a small group and never submitted to the broad membership. The small group consisted of the previous chairman, the next chairman and the chairman in place and their staffs; they made most of the decisions.

I remember once sitting behind the Ambassador from Venezuela on the floor of one of the large UN meeting rooms—not the General Assembly room—while some aspect of the issue of indefinite extension was being debated. It was one of the prep-coms and the NAM took a position on one of the related issues that was clearly counter to Venezuela's interests. The Ambassador was sitting right in front of me. I tapped him on the shoulder and said, "Ambassador, that NAM position is contrary to Venezuela's interests. How can you go along with that?" He said, "You just don't understand how the NAM works" and he then explained how decisions are made in the NAM and, once they are made, no member of the NAM wants to go against the organization for political reasons. So it was very important to prevent a NAM decision favoring the rolling 25s.

Indonesia was the Chairman of the NAM. I would have to go there to talk to them. Columbia was the past chairman. I would have to go talk to them and, of course, I would have to talk to the next chairman, South Africa—truly the key state as a state that formerly had held nuclear weapons and given them up. In addition, I thought there were several key areas that had to be addressed. I needed to go to Egypt to talk to Egypt and probably would have to talk to Israel and Jordan as well because of the Middle East question.

Argentina had just decided they were going to put aside their long history of staying outside the NPT—their long history of having a nuclear weapon program of sorts to offset Brazil. Argentina was a convert for non-proliferation and came to Washington early in 1994. They brought a special delegation to Washington, headed by the number three person in their Foreign Ministry. The delegation also included the Deputy Minister of Defense. It was a very emotional meeting. The Deputy Minister of Defense at the State Department spoke to a small group of us after dinner and said that for many years Argentina has remained aloof from the NPT and related instruments and maintained the option of acquiring nuclear weapons, thinking that this would strengthen Argentina's security. "But," he said, "We found it prevented us from having normal relations with the countries we wanted to have good relations with and so we have made the decision." As I said, it was a very emotional meeting. Not long after that I went to their Embassy in Washington and spoke with their Ambassador about the NPT extension process and he told me that, "We will be with you, all the way."

In the spring of 1994 I went to Bariloche, Argentina to a non-proliferation conference and made a long speech denouncing Brazil for not doing the same thing. Argentina joined NPT in time to vote for indefinite extension. Brazil did not join the NPT until several years later—1998.

Q: Brazil and Argentina were messing around with; how far had they proceeded as far as

GRAHAM: I wouldn't say very far. They definitively had nuclear weapon programs, especially Brazil. Brazil has the complete fuel cycle with enrichment and all of that. They certainly could have done it. Argentina was somewhat behind them.

I began the effort. I went to Egypt in the spring of 1994 and had a meeting with the Egyptian foreign minister, Amr Moussa. Susan Burk was with me. Nabil Fahmy was his special assistant. Later he was ambassador to Washington for nine years and presently is the Foreign Minister of Egypt. His father had also been Foreign Minister. As we walked in, Nabil told Susan he was an old friend of both of us. "Susan, what you are proposing for the NPT is Catholic marriage." Susan, a devout Catholic, said bristling. "And what is wrong with Catholic marriage?" Then we went in to see Moussa and had—perhaps—the most unpleasant conversation I have ever participated in. It was a long diatribe on the subject of "what good is the NPT to Egypt?" Right next door to us we have a country with hundreds of nuclear weapons that can obliterate the entire Middle East in 15 minutes. What guarantee, pointing to me, what guarantee can you give me that some crazy Likudist will not come to power there some day and kill us all? Right now we have good relations with that country, with the government, but we can't be confident that is always going to be the case. So since the NPT does nothing about Israel, and the U.S. doesn't propose doing anything about Israel, why should I support indefinite extension? Why do I even care about the NPT?" He went on for about 40 minutes. I said things like, "You don't want Libya to have nuclear weapons, do you?" He said, "Libya? They'll never have nuclear weapons. They have never figured out how to make them. In any case I have 300 or so that already exist right next door." As Susan and I were leaving, Nabil said at the door, "Tom I don't want you to think the meeting with the Foreign Minister was a failure." I said, "Well, Nabil, what else would you call it?"

That began a long, long effort to persuade Israel to take at least a step in the direction of joining the NPT which is what Egypt told us was their minimum requirement to support NPT indefinite extension. I pushed the State Department for a long time about making a trip to Israel to talk to them and ask them to consider a step toward the NPT. State was very reluctant. "Oh," they said, "you mention the NPT in Israel, they'll run you out of the country on a rail. It would be too dangerous." Finally in December of 1994 the State Department agreed that I could go to Israel as long as I took one of theirs along as a minder, and that the centerpieces of my trip be a lecture at an academic institution, not appointments with Israeli government officials.

As it turned out, it was Susan who would go with me and we would be accompanied by a capable State Department Official we knew well. The ostensible focus of my trip would be a speech at Tel Aviv University. First we went to Egypt and were again vigorously

spoken to by Amr Moussa and from Cairo we traveled to Israel. I made a speech at Tel Aviv University that, contrary to predictions, was very well received. I was asked a lot of good questions. The audience was very polite. There was no move to run me out of the country on a rail. We went to the Foreign Ministry, talked to the Deputy Foreign Minister and he said, “We are very sympathetic with this. We understand how important the NPT is to us, but right now we can’t join it as long as we have Iraq over there pursuing nuclear weapons and Iran as well.” Then I met with the Deputy Defense Minister and he wasn’t as positive but he wasn’t impolite either. So, while no progress was made, it was a positive visit.

We stayed in Jerusalem for a couple of days because it was Friday and Saturday and then went across the Jordan valley to Amman for discussions there. We had a meeting scheduled with the special assistant to the crown prince who had the arms control portfolio. He was the Jordanian equivalent of the head of the Arms Control Agency in the U.S., but was called the international security adviser to the Crown Prince. His name was Abdullah Toucan. Our meeting with him was scheduled on Tuesday. On Monday night, I made a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in Amman to a tumultuous audience with people jumping up and denouncing the Israeli nuclear program and the Israelis. My two companions, I think, were a little bit horrified by the audience. We returned to our hotel safely.

We thought we would get more of the same the next day at the meeting with the Jordanian government—something similar to our meeting with Amr Moussa. We went over to the appropriate building and were taken to the second floor where there was a large cabinet style meeting room. We were ushered into that room and, waiting for us on the other side of a long table, were Abdullah Toucan and two generals, one on either side of him, frowning at us. We sat down opposite them. I sat down opposite to Abdullah Toucan with my State Department colleague on my right and Susan on my left. The three of us were rather tense figuring we were going to get blasted here once more as in Cairo and as on the previous evening. However, before the discussions began, Abdullah Toucan leaned across the table and said, “Before we start talking, Ambassador Graham, I just want you to understand how much I enjoy my summer place on Cape Cod.” Thus I knew everything was going to be fine and we had a good discussion. Abdullah Toucan said, “The Egyptians have it all wrong. One day the Israelis will join the NPT, but only after a long period during which their security is assured.”

Q: Why would Egypt and why would the Israelis not want the spirit of non-proliferation? If they non-proliferated it meant they had stuff and the other people didn't.

GRAHAM: That’s what the Israelis wanted. They had anywhere between 150 and 300 nuclear weapons and they believed that guaranteed their survival in the face of the hostile Arab world even though the Israeli conventional forces were much more powerful than all their neighbors combined.

On another trip Susan and I went to Saudi Arabia. We stopped in France on the way to talk to our supporters and colleagues there and have lunch. Then we flew on to Morocco,

met with the Moroccan government, which said they would support us. The second day I churlishly left Susan in the office to write the cable to Washington reporting on the meeting. It was Friday, prayer day, and I went out to the royal golf course for a game. It being prayer day, I was the only player on the course so I played 18 holes on one of the most beautiful golf courses you can imagine. I came back very happy. Susan was somewhat less happy, but we went out to a nice dinner in the old quarter in Rabat, the capital of Morocco and that made her somewhat happier. We caught the red eye that night to Cairo from the Casablanca airport, which was not far from Rabat. Neither of us saw either Humphrey Bogart or Ingrid Bergman. That's where the airport was. We had a good flight to Egypt and arrived just at dawn when we could see the sunlight on the pyramids as we came into Cairo. That's when we had our spectacular meeting with Amr Moussa, the first of several.

On that trip we went on to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were generally supportive. We also met with the Gulf Cooperation Council, an organization of Saudi Arabia and the five Gulf states. The Chairman at one point said, "You know, the Israeli nuclear program really gives us a lot of political problems. It is not so much that we fear the Israelis, but it creates a lot of political problems for us. It would really help us if the United States just occasionally would denounce the Israeli nuclear weapon program. You don't have to mean it, just do it every now and then. It would be a big help to us." That evening Susan and a female Embassy Official and I went on a shopping visit to the Souk and had a run in with the Saudi religious police because the women did not have their heads covered. It was brief; they had scarves in their purses. We flew back home, stopping briefly in Damascus, but not long enough to meet with Syrian officials.

I made a number of trips to Latin America. The first one was to Argentina and I made another to Chile for the meeting of the Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone implementing organization called OPANAL, the Spanish acronym for the Organization. There were discussions with the Chilean government. They were supportive. Earlier that same year (1994), I had been to the OPANAL meeting in Mexico because the Secretary General, Enrique Roman-Morey, a highly distinguished diplomat from Peru, was a strong supporter. He had lined up a large number of Latin American states though OPANAL to support indefinite extension.

I made a trip to Caracas to talk to the Venezuelan government. The government was moderately positive, but their NPT Ambassador was an opponent.

Q: Was Chavez in power then?

GRAHAM: No, no. Long before. The visit was moderately positive. The Venezuelans resisted us to the very end. Their Ambassador Taiylordot personally opposed indefinite extension, and agreed with the NAM. It was difficult to make progress there.

I went to Columbia and met with their Foreign Minister. He and his colleagues were a bit standoffish, but I thought that maybe in the end they would support us.

I went to Ecuador and had a very positive meeting there. While there, I took a few days off. I had taken my daughter Eliza with me. We spent four days in the Galapagos Islands, which were really wonderful.

I made a trip to Australia at the tail end of an around-the-world trip. I had a meeting in Geneva and took a flight from Geneva to Frankfurt to Manila where I received a lot of support from the Philippine government. The Philippines were very important because they were the chair of the Group of 77 at the United Nations. The Embassy arranged a number of other things like a speech to the military academy.

After that I flew on to Canberra for meetings with the Australian government. The Australians were just wonderful to work with. They said, "Oh, yes. All we care about is a one-vote margin. You can count on us to help you get it."

There were meetings in Geneva. The Japanese pledged very strong support to us and were instrumental gaining support of many countries for NPT. Korea was helpful although I didn't visit Korea until after the decision on extension.

I made a trip to Indonesia, which was also at the tail end of an around-the-world trip. This trip included several meetings in Europe and then a meeting in Thailand where I met with the Thai government. I traveled onto Jakarta, but despite my advance request, they would not let me meet with the Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas. He was a prominent world leader in arms control and non-proliferation policy and was famous for his advocacy of a comprehensive test ban. I was only permitted to speak with the third ranking official in the Foreign Ministry and his staff. This was so even though I was carrying a letter from President Clinton, which I was instructed to personally deliver to the Foreign Minister, addressed to President Suharto. This letter for the first time pledged U.S. support for the Southeast Asian nuclear weapon free zone, an important Indonesian objective. Thus I was forced to deal only with disarmament bureaucrats. They said, "We assume you are going to agree to a compromise in New York." I said, "I am not going to make a compromise in New York. We are going to be either voted up or voted down." They replied, "Well, I guess it's going to be a very difficult conference."

In many ways the most important meeting that Susan and I went to in 1994 was the one in South Africa. The first day of a two-day visit we spent at the Foreign Ministry arguing our case for permanent extension and the second day we were given a tour of their former nuclear weapon establishment. We were taken to their mothballed enrichment facility at Pelindaba and then we were taken over to Valindaba where they actually assembled the weapons. They took us to the room where the weapons had been assembled and said look around you. There was nothing there you wouldn't find in any high school machine shop. They took us to where the weapons were stored and we saw the crates in which they had been stored. The weapons had been stored in large boxes and were stored in two parts, but we could get an idea of how large the weapons were. It was clear they would fit in the back of a panel truck. Then they gave us a lecture, "You are the first Americans to see this except for the two on the International Atomic Energy Agency team that came here after we gave up our nuclear weapon program and our nuclear weapons. The reason we

are showing you this is we are trying to convince you that, if they do it the way we did it, almost any country could easily build weapons. We never had more than 150 people working on this. We only spent 25 million dollars. We made six weapons, we had a seventh under construction, 20 kilotons. We knew they would work. We used the gun type design, which didn't need to be tested. So you don't need a big infrastructure like Iraq had, we are just telling you: Watch out!"

The next year in early 1995 the South African Ambassador asked to see John Holum and me. He came to tell us that South Africa had decided to support indefinite extension, but in a way that would be unifying rather than divisive. There had been a long internal debate with the partisans of each side from the African National Union and the final decision was made by Deputy President Mbeki. There were several reasons why we made this decision, but there is one important reason I want to mention to you. "We in the South African government regard the Republican Party in your country as a vehicle of reaction whereas we regard the Democrats led by President Clinton as a vehicle of progressive policy. We understand that this is something that President Clinton wants very much. Therefore, we want to give it to him." Then the Ambassador went on to talk a little about President Mandela. He had been in prison with him. The Ambassador said, "You know, President Nelson Mandela is a very religious man, a Christian, but you also have noticed no doubt that he never makes political references in his speeches to Christianity or the Bible, because the Bible was used to support apartheid. Rather he tries to understand what it is that Jesus would want him to do and then that is what he does." It was an unforgettable comment.

In late January, 1994 the New York Times published an article by their correspondent Barbara Crossette, its only major article on the NPT conference. The Times carried an article on the front page, which said that this very important conference was coming up in three months and the U.S. was completely unprepared. That galvanized the White House and many things began to happen. Even so, I already knew that we had the votes. Up to that time, I basically could write my own instructions and did what I thought was right for about a year and a half. We had an interagency committee. It was chaired by Susan. She made sure the interagency committee always supported what she and I wanted to do and they always did. We had been below the radar of the White House—but no longer. Now the White House was in charge.

The White House demanded the Mexicans fire their longtime disarmament Ambassador, Miguel Marin-Bosch, because he was such a thorn in our side. He was difficult, but I didn't think he was that much of a thorn. He was fired; he was transferred to be Consul General in Barcelona but not until after the Conference. The State Department sent an Assistant Secretary to try to deliver a letter to President Zedillo of Mexico during the Conference complaining about a Mexican counter draft for NPT extension, which the White House did not like. But he never got to see Zedillo. On the other hand the Mexican proposal garnered no support at the Conference and the Mexicans didn't push it very hard.

The Conference opened in April 1995. Shortly before the Conference there was a UN

Security Council Resolution adopted on negative security assurances; that is, the commitment of the nuclear weapon states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT. This is part of the basic bargain, something that the non-nuclear states had always sought, but it was not made legally binding as they wanted. It was a resolution by the Security Council, but the associated substantive statements of the individual nuclear weapon states were just national declarations.

I might revert back briefly to the previous year, 1994. There were two interesting P-5 (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security council; U.S.; U.K.; Russia, France, China) Ambassador meetings worth reporting—one in Geneva and one in Vienna. During the one in Geneva in mid-1994, French Ambassador Gerard Errera raised this question at dinner with the Chinese ambassador, Ambassador Ho. “Ambassador Ho, does China support indefinite extension of the NPT? The rest of us here do; Russia, the U.S., the UK.” Ambassador Ho replied, “Indefinite is a very fine word, but we don’t have that word in the Chinese language.” That is all he would say. At a later P-5 meeting in Vienna, Ambassador Errera said to the Chinese Ambassador there – their disarmament ambassador wasn’t at either meeting in contrast to the others – “You have said that once the U.S. and Russia reduce their nuclear weapons by 50 percent China will begin reductions, the START treaty accomplishes that, so what is your response? The Chinese ambassador’s reply was: Oh no, we never said that.” (which they had). China played that ambiguous role throughout the conference, throughout the whole process, although at one point John Holum and I went to Beijing to talk to the Chinese leadership—the relevant vice minister on this subject—and in the corridor the Chinese disarmament ambassador told me that China really does believe that five nuclear weapons states in the world is enough—but don’t ask us to say so. Throughout, China said all that they wanted was a “smooth” extension.

While there John and I tried to negotiate a no-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons agreement between the U.S. and China. Russia had just signed one and all it said was Russia promises not to use nuclear weapons against China and vice versa as long as it doesn’t change its mind. We proposed the same thing for U.S. and China. We won’t use nuclear weapons against China unless we change our mind and vice versa. The Chinese officials told us that if the U.S. did this it would dramatically improve U.S. Chinese relations. At the same time there was discussion of a de-targeting of nuclear weapons agreement between China and the U.S., which, simply put, meant we would no longer target each other with nuclear weapons, but of course that could be changed with the flick of a switch on a computer. It was virtually meaningless.

We thought that a no-first-use agreement without legal force—as I just described—would be useful in this context. So we proposed it. The U.S. Ambassador in China supported it. You would have thought a tactical nuclear weapon had exploded in Washington. Washington went absolutely berserk over this idea. The chairman of the joint chiefs came over to talk to Bob Bell at the National Security Council staff to denounce such an agreement. So we got instructions. We had to walk that back. We had mentioned it to the Vice Minister and to the Chinese arms control ambassador, but we had to walk it back.

Ridiculous, but we did.

In the winter of 1995, maybe February or early March, I made a trip to Ghana. I was in Ghana for one day. I traveled nearly 24 hours to get there, and nearly 24 hours to get back. I went to Ghana for one day because I hadn't visited West Africa. I had visited every other region of the world. I just thought I should and so I did. There were very good conversations with the Foreign Minister and the First Lady of the country, who was, in some ways, the *de facto* deputy ruler of the country assisting her husband, President Rollins.

I went to Kenya and proposed to them support of indefinite extension and made a show of going to the Jomo Kenyatta hospital there to say that one of the things you get with the NPT is International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) support for medical equipment, nuclear medical equipment. I guess no other Western official had ever visited that hospital before because it was huge front-page headlines in the local newspapers the next day. It seemed to me a normal thing to do.

I went to Namibia before going to South Africa and had a positive discussion there. It was interesting to talk with the Defense Ministry senior officials there, who had all been trained in Qaddafi's Libya.

Things were beginning to come together with all the consultations in Latin America, Asia and the South Pacific. The Conference opened in April of 1995 and on the very first day the South African Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo said in his speech that South Africa would support indefinite extension, but wanted to do it in a way that would bring the sides together. They proposed a statement on principles and objectives for non-proliferation and disarmament to accompany the resolution on indefinite extension and also an enhanced review process: instead of just having the review every five years, there would be meetings in between to prepare for the five-year review.

The President of the conference, Jayantha Dhanapala, formed a Presidential committee of 25 countries, which included the P-5, Iran, Germany, and Japan—everyone he thought they had something to say about the issue. The Committee was tasked with agreeing on an indefinite extension resolution, a resolution on a statement of principles and objectives for arms control and non-proliferation and an enhanced review resolution. From time to time during the year and a half run-up to the Conference, I had to speak with the Iranian ambassador because he was a player of some significance. But the White House had a firm rule that I could never talk to him alone. Whenever I needed to talk to him, I would ask two or three ambassadors from the European Union if they would give a lunch. They would sit at the ends of the table, the Iranian ambassador and I would sit opposite one another. We would talk and they wouldn't say anything. Years later after I left government, I encountered my Iranian opposite number, Cyrus Nasser, in Vienna. He also had left the Iranian Foreign Ministry. I think he was then working for the IAEA. I told him about this restriction on me. He looked at me and said, "I had the same one."

The CIA did a national intelligence estimate (NIE) especially for me for this Conference

so I knew everything about all the other delegations or at least most of the relevant delegations as a result of this very, very well done NIE. And we thought we had a good idea of what the former British English-speaking West African states were going to do, how they were going to vote; less so about the French-speaking ones. So we agreed to exchange intelligence on the English-speaking West African states with the French intelligence service on the francophone states. The French were every good with those states. They delivered them all. I was the person who handed over the CIA intelligence report on English speaking West Africans to one of my French opposite numbers who handed me the French intelligence report on the francophone states in West Africa. We did a similar exchange with the Russians. They had their number three man in the Federal Security Service, who had been a KGB General with whom I worked with during the CFE negotiations. These exchanges were very useful.

The ambassador from Benin was very strongly motivated to support what the French wanted and what the United States wanted. The Indonesians called an anniversary conference in Indonesia the second week of the NPT conference to commemorate the anniversary of the Bandung Conference that established the NAM. This meeting was a major NAM meeting to which many Ambassadors traveled all the way from New York interrupting their participation in the NPT conference. At the meeting the Indonesians tried to line up a unified NAM position on indefinite extension, which would have been the rolling 25. The Ambassador from Benin stood up and said, “I object. There is no consensus” and the South African ambassador did the same so that initiative failed. There never was a NAM position and that is one reason we succeeded.

The next week—the third of the four weeks of the Conference—the Canadians introduced their resolution which had 111 cosponsors, clearly a majority; a resolution indefinitely extending the NPT. From there we went to a negotiation of the content in the President’s Committee of the Statement of Principles and Objectives. It was essentially an expanded redo of the objectives of the non-nuclear-weapon states in the NPT negotiations in 1968—what the non-nuclear states had wanted in terms of commitments from the nuclear weapon states, although more strongly stated on the CTBT. In the 1995 Statement, the NPT parties pledged to achieve a comprehensive test ban treaty in one year, a fissile material cut off agreement, improved verification, legally binding negative security assurances, worldwide reductions in nuclear weapons and more nuclear free weapon zones including the Middle East. The indefinite extension resolution was legally binding. The Statement was politically binding—the political price for indefinite extension. We flouted its provisions at our own risk.

The second resolution was the establishment of preparatory committee meetings each year leading up to the five year Review Conference—not the year after the Review Conference but the second, third and fourth years after a particular Review Conference, leading to the fifth year when there would be another Review Conference. The Review Conferences were four weeks long, the preparatory committee meetings two weeks long.

The President of the Conference brought the three resolutions (extension, Statement, enhanced review) to the floor the next to last day of the conference. The night before the

U.S., Egypt and Syria were meeting in the basement of the UN to try to reach a solution on the Middle East. There had been endless discussions among the U.S., even at the Secretary of State level, Egyptians and the Israelis about the Israelis taking some sort of step toward the NPT. The Egyptians moderated their demands somewhat and wanted a Conference resolution reflecting the importance of all Middle East states to join the NPT (naming them, including Israel and achieving a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East, but nothing had been agreed. Saudi Arabia was involved in this as well.

So here we were the night before. We were in the basement of the United Nations trying to deal with this important question. The Egyptians had about 16 other countries with them. There was a possibility we might not get even a parliamentary consensus. Early on, when I told Dhanapala we would go with a one vote margin, he said, “No, no. We have to do this by consensus like all other international agreements. But perhaps it could be a parliamentary consensus”—which means no objection. That’s what he was striving for. This goal would be frustrated if we could not do something for the Middle East. So we met. For the U.S., it was Madeline Albright, our UN Ambassador, Bob Einhorn from State and me. Nabil Fahmy was there for Egypt, assisted by several Egyptian diplomats, and there were several Syria diplomats participating. President Dhanapala was in the Chair. A text was worked out verbally that the Conference called upon all those states in the Middle East that had not yet joined the NPT to do so. That at the time included Israel, Oman and Djibouti. It was very important to the Egyptians and Syrians that Israel be named in this resolution. Every half hour or so Bob Einhorn was running to the telephone at the far end of the room in order to keep the Israeli mission advised.

Then suddenly the ambassadors from Oman and Djibouti appeared and they said, “We don’t want to be named in this either” and Israel was strongly opposed. So that cut the ground out from under Egypt and Syria. If Oman and Djibouti were opposed, Egypt and Syria couldn’t insist on naming Israel as a non-party. The Arabs were disgusted, saying they would not even cosponsor the Middle East resolution if Israel could not be put on the spot. “We don’t care what you do,” they said.

Dhanapala from the Chair said, “We must have a resolution because it is essential to gaining a parliamentary consensus. As it now stands, we need it, but don’t look to me to introduce it.” He looked at me and said, “The NPT Depositaries (Russia, the UK and the U.S.)—will they cosponsor it?” I replied, “Speaking for the U.S., ‘Yes,’ but I will have to call my other two colleagues on the telephone and ask them. They are having a nice dinner together where I would be if I weren’t in this meeting, so I know where they are.” I called the restaurant and was connected to the private room where the other P-5 Ambassadors, plus Germany minus China were dining. (This special working group at the 1995 Conference tried to meet at the close of every day. This night a dinner together had been scheduled.) I got the British Ambassador on the telephone and I asked him. He said, “Yes, the UK will cosponsor.” Next I spoke with the Russian ambassador on the phone, Sergey Kislyak. He said, “I will have to ask Moscow.” Remember there was nothing written down yet; we were just talking about what the resolution would contain. It was drafted by several of the staff after the meeting ended about 9 o’clock.

The previous evening the Indonesians had at last brought in their Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, after having lost their rolling 25. The Minister proposed a mild face-saving measure that the preparatory committee meetings be authorized to discuss the issues in the Statement of Principles and Objectives. His Ambassador came up to me and asked, "Will the U.S. accept that?" I hesitated. The Defense Department representatives were sitting right behind me in the room where we were meeting. He said, "Oh, come on Tom. Give us a crumb" so I decided to make a leap of faith and I said, "Okay." Defense never complained about it. So that addition was added to the enhanced review resolution.

Returning to the Middle East resolution: when I woke the next morning, I did not know whether we had Russian agreement to cosponsor. In my room at the hotel I was eating breakfast and a call came in about 7:30. It was Ambassador Kislyak and he said, "Tom, Moscow says I can cosponsor but there is a condition." "What's that, Sergey?" "Moscow says I have to read it first."

On the floor of the United Nations General Assembly room later that morning, President Dhanapala first brought up the indefinite extension Resolution. He read the resolution out and said, "Do I hear objections? Hearing none, passed." He waited about two seconds for any objections and then he did the same thing on the resolution for Principles and Objectives for Non-proliferation and Disarmament and the same thing on the Resolution on the enhanced review. These three resolutions in the official record were called Decisions 1, 2, and 3 in reverse order. These three resolutions, Decisions 1, 2, and 3 were introduced by the President of the Conference. Then another resolution on the Middle East was introduced by the Depositories. Even though the Depositories traditionally had always been the managers of the NPT process—in the absence of a secretariat - this seemed a little weird. This Resolution was held up on the floor for about two hours while the Iranians argued about references to the peace process in Palestine, but eventually they relented and it was passed on the same basis—parliamentary consensus. "Are there any objections to this Resolution? Hearing none, it is passed." Then, by script, 17 nations were permitted to make speeches denouncing indefinite extension including Egypt, Malaysia and Syria and then 17 other nations made speeches supporting indefinite extension. That was the final outcome and indefinite extension was accomplished. The NPT was now permanent.

There was still one more day left in the Conference to complete a Final Document describing what the Conference had done. The British and French were blocking a Final Document because they thought it had too much language on nuclear disarmament. I happened to be in Dhanapala's office while this was going on. He was furious and said to me, "All I can say is, it is typical of the British and the French, and it reveals once again that this is a discriminatory treaty. I can tell you, when I leave the Sri Lankan foreign service, I am going to organize an Asian pull out from the NPT." I returned to the Western Group meeting (around 40 countries), which was in progress. Our chairman, from the U.K, Sir Michael Weston was presiding. I reported on the meeting with Dhanapala. The Defense Department representatives were sitting nearby and I turned and said, "He wasn't referring to us." There was a debate and it was finally decided to send Sir Michael as an emissary of peace to Dhanapala in an effort to calm him down. I was

standing by the door as Michael went on his way to see Dhanapala with the superb French Ambassador, Gerard Errera, standing next to me. Errera said, “I am not so sure Sir Michael is the best representative we could send to see President Dhanapala. You see, he believes that Sir Michael is an imperialist and Sir Michael believes that Dhanapala is a wog.” (an epithet from the distant imperial past), Michael was also an outstanding ambassador.

That was the only reference the State Department reviewer asked that I remove from my memoirs—that exchange. I always found Errera a wonderful man, a brilliant ambassador, a great international public and national servant for France. He had such a sense of how people from various countries really thought. I remember once he told me, “Get over there and talk to [Russian ambassador], Grigory [Berdennikov], before he goes into one of those nihilistic fits that the Russians always do.” But the State Department deletion was correct, this was a spur of the moment comment, probably accurate, but nonetheless not for a published memoir.

Indefinite extension was passed and the world is much better off for it. As everyone knows not long after the indefinite extension was passed in the summer of 1995, the French resumed nuclear testing after a long moratorium and, as many delegates believed, demonstrated bad faith after indefinite NPT extension.

Q: Why did they do that?

GRAHAM: Because the French Generals decided they hadn’t tested enough before President Mitterrand some years back had established a moratorium. France received worldwide condemnation as a result of resuming nuclear tests. The various county clients of the regional bureaus of the State Department—countries from all over the world—poured in complaints, particularly South Africa, a central ally in NPT extension. The Japanese cut off trade relations. This, after all, was the 50th anniversary of Hiroshima. Supposedly President Chirac said, “Why didn’t somebody tell me it was the 50th anniversary of Hiroshima?” I don’t know why he didn’t know. The Australians and New Zealanders were furious. In addition, there were suggestions within the U.S. government that the U.S. support a less-than-a-zero yield CTBT—perhaps 500 pounds. The Russian reaction to this was that they had to have ten tons as a threshold if the U.S. had 500 pounds. A huge debate broke out in the U.S. government about whether the CTBT, that was being negotiated in Geneva and which had been further mandated by the NPT conference, was going to be a zero yield treaty or not. From the non-nuclear weapons state point of view, the only way it could be negotiated was as zero yield.

I was advised by the White House that they wanted the debate to conclude in favor of zero yield but, to achieve this outcome, it was very important that the State Department not adopt a unified position against this. So I went around to the various regional bureaus—Near East, Far East, South Asia, and Europe. The regional bureaus were absolutely totally for a zero yield test ban because they thought it was consistent with indefinite extension and their client countries were demanding it. However, the Bureau of Political Military Affairs, under Holbrooke, did support the threshold idea. In the end

what Secretary Christopher sent to the White House as the State Department position represented a split at State, while a majority of the Bureaus supported zero. The Secretary's memorandum therefore had to be "on the one hand" and "on the other hand." That was enough for Tony Lake to broker a deal whereby the U.S. would support a zero yield comprehensive nuclear test ban and there would be a very elaborate stockpile stewardship program to ensure our nuclear stockpile would remain secure and reliable. Also there would have to be a certification each year by the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Defense that the stockpile remained secure and reliable. If ever this certification was not given, the President was obliged to withdraw from the CTBT.

The test ban negotiations continued on into next year. The text was nearly complete when, in the summer of 1996, the Indians—to some extent assisted by the Iranians—said they were going to block consensus. India was always hypocritical about the test ban. No matter what they said in international conferences about it over the years, they wanted the nuclear option. The ostensible reason for blocking consensus was that the Treaty forced countries to join and this was contrary to international law.

I was dispatched by the NSC to talk to countries around the world and to persuade them not to support the Indian position in Geneva. I went to Israel and met with the head of their Atomic Energy Commission. He said that Israel had no problem with the test ban as long as they weren't accused of doing secret tests under the bed of the Red Sea as Egypt had done occasionally. I went to Pakistan. It was very important that Pakistan not support the Indians because, if Pakistan were to agree with India on anything, people might think there was something to it. I went to Egypt and I met with Moussa one more time and I said, "Mr. Foreign Minister, Egypt has always supported the test ban. You can't support the Indians now" and he agreed with that. Egypt would not support India. I went to Indonesia and Malaysia and received their strong support.

In the summer of 1996 Amr Moussa came to Washington. My relationship with him was much better now. During the run-up to the indefinite extension decision there was a hearing by the Senate Armed Services. After the formal statements had been made, Senator McCain asked me, "Why are Mexico and Egypt not supporting us in this? Mexico is our neighbor and Egypt, we give them billions a year. Why are they not supporting us?" I replied, "Senator McCain, I can't explain Mexico's policy but I will say that Egypt lives in a difficult neighborhood."

Nabil Fahmy, Foreign Minister Moussa's aide, was in Washington a few months later while in town he came over to my office to see me and say that the Foreign Minister had asked him to give to me his thanks for the statement I made to Senator McCain. Later in the summer of 1996 there was trouble in Geneva. I met with Foreign Minister Moussa in Washington during a visit. Among the issues I mentioned was that the Egyptian Ambassador in Geneva was still causing problems. I said, "Mr. Minister, you told me back in Cairo that you were not going to support the Indian position, but your Ambassador right now as we speak in Geneva is doing that."

Q: How did you react to that?

GRAHAM: He said, "That's going to stop." I was advised by Kathy Crittenberger on our delegation in Geneva on the telephone that the Egyptian Ambassador had made another statement supporting India. I promptly called over to Nabil Fahmy who was with the Foreign Minister at the time and said it had happened again. He said, "Don't worry. I'll take care of it." A few hours later I received another telephone call from Kathy and she said, "You've never seen an ambassador turn around as fast as that one did."

Iran sort of fell by the wayside. I never had much trouble with Iran during indefinite extension. There wasn't much trouble on the test ban either. With India there was a lot. They refused to agree to the text and broke consensus on its being sent to New York for a vote. For many years there had been three states—Mexico Australia, New Zealand—who every year introduced a resolution calling for a CTBT. They were known as the "troika." I suggested, "Let's have the troika introduce the text as a separate resolution." So we asked the three countries. Mexico and New Zealand declined, but Australia did not.

There had been a lively debate that summer within the U.S. government on whether or not the U.S. should accede to the Indian request that they not be included in the test ban as a necessary party. Not to require India be a party before the CTBT could come into force would have meant China wouldn't have approved it either. I argued, "That's no test ban at all. We can't agree to that." The State Department wanted to just require a certain number of parties—the standard treaty approach for entry into force and not require specific countries. But this was different. To be real, we had to require those states that had done nuclear tests be necessary parties for entry into force. Finally, State came around to our view.

Only Australia introduced the text of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and it was approved in September, 1996 by a vote of 158 to 3, the three being Iraq, India and Bhutan. It was promptly scheduled to be opened for signature. While the debate was going on the floor of the UN General Assembly, Kathy Crittenberger, from our Geneva delegation, suggested a bridge game to Munir Akram, the Pakistani Ambassador, who was a master bridge player. Sir Michael Weston, the British Ambassador, and she and I would make up the foursome. The prize to the winners would be Pakistani signature and ratification of the CTBT. Munir wanted nothing to do with that. The CTBT ban was signed by a large number of countries, in September of 1996, President Clinton being the first.

A few other things. I thought in late 1996 that there ought to be a briefing for the NAM by the United States as to where we now stood with the NPT and the test ban. Apparently no American had ever briefed the NAM before. Once more the State Department thought I was being suicidal, but they let me do it anyway. Once again the briefing at the United Nations was a very polite discussion. I became involved in an argument with the Indian ambassador and he walked out, but other than that, it went well. There were many questions after my opening statement. Afterwards Munir Akram came up, congratulated me, and said, "You survived."

In the fall of 1996 and into the spring of 1997, I tried to work out the differences over the

Southeast Asian nuclear weapon free zone. I led a small delegation to Jakarta to join in a P-5 presentation to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the emerging treaty. We were going to have a meeting with the Chinese before the meeting with ASEAN. I was leading the U.S. delegation. I promptly led them in a false direction. While we were changing planes in Detroit (I thought Detroit was in the Central Time Zone) so I assumed we had an extra hour before our next flight to have a little discussion among ourselves. But Detroit is in the Eastern Time Zone. When we got back to the gate, there was our plane pulling away. It was Northwest Airlines. Highly perturbed, I said to the airline official that the gate, “We have a really important meeting in Jakarta. How are we going to get there now?” She said, “I can’t get you on this plane, but I will send you the other way.” We went on KLM, a partner airline, with a six-hour stop in Amsterdam and then we flew to Jakarta. We arrived three hours before our meeting with the Chinese. We were supposed to be there the day before. So we had just enough time to get to our hotel, change clothes and show up for the Chinese. But I guess all’s well that ends well, as they say.

Then we had our presentations to ASEAN. The issue was that the ASEAN nations insisted on extending their nuclear weapon free zone to the outer limits of the Exclusive Economic Zone, (the EEZ), 200 miles from land. This meant that U.S. ships and airplanes would have a problem transiting the area if they had nuclear weapons on board. The U.S. Navy couldn’t live with that. The Chinese, for their own geopolitical reasons, couldn’t live with that either because there are were lots of arguments going on about the Spratly Islands and who owns what parts of the ocean in Southeast Asia with their oil reserves and so on. So they supported us. The British, the French, and the Russians, for the sake of P-5 solidarity, supported us. They didn’t really care, but the Chinese did care.

I opened the formal meeting with ASEAN with a long presentation. Then there was a break before the other four made their presentations. In the break I spoke with the deputy Singapore Ambassador, a woman in her 40s and said, “Why are the Chinese so difficult? Why do they never tell you what their position is? How can you negotiate with a country and reach a compromise if you don’t know what they want? Why won’t they tell us?” She said, “Two reasons—one is the Chinese tradition, “to find out anything, you have to travel to see the emperor or, in modern times, you have to go to Beijing; and the second reason is that they are very suspicious of the West and that is not going to change. The U.S. is the leader of the West and so they are going to be very suspicious of you. You might as well get used to it.” I said, “Do you mean because of the Korean war and Taiwan?” “Of course not, no; because of the Opium War and the Boxer Rebellion.” That was a memorable comment.

ASEAN never changed its position and at the end of 1997 they signed the treaty in Bangkok anyway. It is known as the Treaty of Bangkok. It establishes a nuclear weapon free zone for Southeast Asia—for all ASEAN countries. It retains the provision extending the nuclear free zone to the EEZ. I made four trips to the region to try to persuade them to change that provision. One of the trips was to Malaysia and the Philippines. The Philippines indicated flexibility but said Malaysia was the problem. I spoke with the acting Foreign Minister in Malaysia and he said, “We are not going to change our

position. This is an anti-Chinese move and you can tell Washington that and we're not going to change." So they never did change and, as a result, none of the five nuclear-weapon states supported the Southeast Asian nuclear weapon free zone by signing the relevant Protocol, unlike the free zones for Latin America, the South Pacific and Africa. Unfortunately the Senate has never ratified the Protocols to the Pelindaba Treaty (Africa) nor the Rarotonga Treaty (South Pacific)—even though the U.S. signed them almost 20 years ago.

The effort to eliminate the Arms Control Agency and merge it into the State Department was renewed again in early 1997. The Chemical Weapons Convention was on the floor for a vote for ratification in the summer of 1996. During the campaign someone slipped a note to the Republican candidate Bob Dole that this Treaty was not verifiable. Even though he had supported it earlier, he made a statement to the effect that it was unenforceable and that meant the situation was untenable on the floor. So Secretary Christopher and the White House requested that the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms, take it back into Committee. He did that. The next year it was clear that the Treaty was going to enter into force in the spring of 1997 and the verification system, which was going to be very elaborate, was going to be created at that time. The U.S. very much wanted to be a part of that negotiation. Senator Helms indicated that he would be happy to release the Chemical Weapons Convention from the Committee as long as the White House agreed to merge ACDA into State Department; merge the United States Information Agency (USIA) into the State Department; and merge the Agency for International Development (AID) into the State Department.

So the Clinton White House decided to fold on that issue and not fight Senator Helms. That left ACDA without allies and in an untenable position because Helms announced that ACDA wouldn't get any new confirmed Assistant Directors (the incumbents having resigned after the Presidential election). USIA was in a similar situation. So ACDA tried to formulate a "within the State Department" arrangement whereby the rights to communicate directly to the President; to have a degree of independence; to hire technical experts and keep them for a long time were preserved. The new Secretary of State Madeleine Albright agreed to that and so the ACDA legislation was amended over the next two years when ACDA was merged into the State Department on an appropriate day, April 1, 1999. However, this legislation was never observed by the State Department and ACDA just disappeared much to the national security detriment of the United States.

In closing I will mention again mention the visit I made to Albuquerque, New Mexico in February of 1997 to speak to the Council on Foreign Resolutions there. It was a dinner speech. Since I was the guest speaker, I was put at the head table. Sitting next to me was seated a beautiful woman in her 40s. She said to me after I sat down, "Do you know what country I am from?" I looked at her place card and it said something like Obkhurova. I said, "You must be from Russia." She said, "That's right." I said, "Where in Russia are you from?" She said, "I am from Moscow. I was the first woman graduate of the Soviet Diplomatic Academy in Moscow and my classmate was Andrei Kosygin, the first Foreign Minister for Boris Yeltsin. He served for three years. Andrei had this idea that if Russia would just made enough concessions, it would eventually be welcomed back into

Europe like the prodigal son. But Andrei was wrong, wasn't he?" Instead NATO has expanded and Russia had been excluded from Europe. Again this was much to the detriment of U.S. security; but not only U.S. security, everyone's security.

And I will end there. Thank you.

Q: I thank you.

End of interview