The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR ROBERT WILLIAM FARRAND

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is the 28th of March, 2001. This is an interview with Robert William Farrand and you go by William, so by Bill. All right, to start with I wonder if you could just tell me when and where you were born and something about your family.

FARRAND: The place I was born is about as far north as you can go in the Middle Atlantic States. I was born in a town called Watertown in the year 1934 and I was the first of six.

Q: Watertown, what, which state?

FARRAND: New York. There's a Watertown, Massachusetts; you're right. This was Watertown, New York. A small city probably at the time sized at 30,000 - something like that - back in the Depression, just after.

Q: Born in 1934?

FARRAND: '34.

Q: Okay, tell me first about your father. What's his background and his family background and what was he doing?

FARRAND: My father was the younger of two sons of William and Maude Farrand. Her maiden name, his mother, was Maude Parminter, Nancy Maude Parminter. That name Parminter has always intrigued me because in the northern part of New York State there are a number of French names that seem to have been anglicized. I suspect that Farrand itself may be an anglicized French name. There is a city in France called Clermont-Ferrand about which I have a theory. My father would never satisfy me on the point about our European origins. My mother, an Irish American, was always quite ready to tell us that we children were Irish; but my father would only say "you're an American." When I would press him by saying, "Dad, that isn't enough," and he'd reply, "That's all you need. You're an American." "American" was enough for Dad. He never strayed from that line all his life. He was born in 1908 in a small town in northern New York called Savannah, around the Finger Lakes region. He was one of two. His father and mother, to the best of my knowledge, were Congregationalists as was my dad. My grandfather, William Farrand, was a jeweler, gunsmith, and watchmaker. Both he and my father were physically tall men, much taller than I grew to be. My dad graduated from high school just before the "Crash" (of 1929). He was born with club feet.

Q: Yes, those are the two professions that really call for precision work.

FARRAND: Without question. May I indulge in a small digression?

Q: Sure.

FARRAND: I know from personal experience that a child can remember things from three years old. I was three years old when my paternal grandfather, the watchmaker, died in 1937. I clearly remember standing at his elbow many evenings by his worktable at home. He would have on an eyeglass that was like a monocle, but more than a monocle, it was a magnifying glass – like a miniature telescope. He had it on as he worked over a watch. He used a liquid to clean the watches, which I learned years later – because I never forgot the smell of it – was carbon tetrachloride. You could pour it over watch parts to clean them and it would disappear. It would evaporate immediately and leave no residue. I can remember the smell of it to this day. I remember his hands and I remember watching

him with that glass in his eye. So I can prove from my own life that children can remember things from their third year.

My father, Robert Isaac Farrand, the second son, wanted to study wanted to attend Syracuse University's School of Business, but couldn't because of the Depression.

Q: Did he, was he able to do anything about the clubbed feet or not?

FARRAND: My grandfather was gifted mechanically and, working with a doctor, crafted a device that helped straighten my father's ankles so that his legs and feet grew almost normally. A baby's bones are plastic, much more than we think. Simply by main might the doctor and my grandfather took that little boy's ankles and gently but firmly straightened and secured them in a clamp of sorts. I have a younger brother who also was born with club feet. The same situation. Working with a doctor, my father did for my brother what his father had once done for him. That's what I can tell you about my father, a man I greatly admire. He married a feisty little Irish Catholic girl and they had six children. He was quiet and calm and patient; she wasn't. So, it was a noisy relationship over the years.

Q: Well, what did your father do?

FARRAND: When he got out of high school he went to work at a local gravel plant in northern New York because the economy was flat. Unemployment was sky high. I mean sky high. What was it? I guess it reached a peak of around twenty-three or twenty-four percent during the Great Depression; but you know that number would be a disaster for any of us today. Except that in countries I have served in unemployment has been a lot higher than that sometimes. In any case, my father worked in the gravel pit and then the war hit. He went to work for a little while in his father's a gun and watch shop in this little town down the road apiece from Watertown. Then the war hit. By then my father had three children and, because of his feet, couldn't march. He was declared 4F by the local draft board, so he was not drafted into the armed forces. Instead, he went to Buffalo, New York, in the same state, and went to work for the Curtis Wright Corporation which produced war planes. For example, Curtis Wright produced the P-40, also known as the Kitty Hawk and the Flying Tiger, and a transport plane. My father soon became an "expediter," that is, after working for a little bit on the line somebody must have realized that he could get along with others interpersonally. So, they sent him out as an expediter because manufacturers of aircraft in those years would have ailerons produced here and wheels produced there. In Curtis Wright's case they all had to come together in Buffalo. In those days Buffalo had major aircraft factories for Douglas, Bell Helicopter, and Curtis Wright - those three at least. We lived in Buffalo, New York, during the war on ration cards.

When WWII was over my maternal grandfather, Joseph William Cain (known to all as "J.W."), invited my father, another son-in-law, and my grandfather's son (both my

uncles) to come back to Adams, New York, which is fourteen miles south of Watertown, to join the family business. As a family partnership, that worked for a short while.

Q: What sort of business were they in?

FARRAND: My maternal grandfather was Irish-American - maybe second generation. In any case, he and my grandmother moved into this little town of Adams, estimated population 1,500, in the last decade of the nineteenth century, somewhere in the 1890s. In those days, Adams was the commercial hub of a farming community. My grandfather opened a grocery store that served the farm families - selling food and sundry items. The store survived the Great Depression in reasonably good shape because that's what happens when you sell things people cannot live without. Of course, not everyone could pay their bills, so my grandfather accepted goods in kind (sacks of potatoes, a side of beef, etc.), but he survived and that was the important thing. After the war, he decided he to branch out from groceries into appliances, small household appliances as well as water heaters and milk coolers. Milk coolers are large receptacles in which water is refrigerated so that dairy farmers can store their fresh (warm) milk cans while waiting for the wholesale collector to come by. My father came back and joined that business with my grandfather at the helm and his two brothers-in-law as partners.

Q: Your mother, what sort of education did she have?

FARRAND: My mother, Helen Frances Cain, was born in 1910, two years after my father, in a town six miles away in northern New York, upstate they call it. Actually they don't call it upstate, it's the north country. If you live in Manhattan, upstate is the Bronx and White Plains; that's far from the north country. Upstate can go as far as Albany, but you go further north, way up where we lived, that's the North Country. It's cold, cold, cold. My mother went through her formative years during the First World War and, later, the Roaring Twenties. She did not want to go to college. Her father had attended an academy; in those days there was such a thing as an academy. My mother's mother, also Irish-Catholic, had gone to a similar academy, or normal school, and became a primary school teacher. My grandparents had four children; my mother was the youngest daughter. Her parents wanted all their children to go to college, and three of the four did. But my mother fought it. They finally persuaded her to go to Rochester, New York and attend the Eastman School of Dental Hygienistry, named after the same family that founded Eastman Kodak. So after a year of study, she became a dental hygienist. I don't think she liked it, but she completed her studies. In those days, you only had to go for one year to be a dental hygienist; today, it's two minimum. So my mother had a year of technical education and my father had none past high school for the reasons I mentioned.

Q: What was family life at the home of the Farrands that you recall? Did you sit and discuss things or was everybody doing their own thing? You know, I'm thinking of dinnertime or something like that.

FARRAND: We had traditional dinner hour and, of course, during the war my father had to work a lot of overtime; but that didn't matter, we sat down each evening for dinner. My mother held to that tradition. No television, thank god, and while we might have some radio music in the background, we sat at the dinner table. We children often got our own breakfast, but mother always prepared supper. My mother and father got their news from the newspaper and the radio. My mother read novels, but my father was too busy immersed in business to read very much. So discussion around the dinner table tended to run to topics of local interest, school events, sports, and the like.

Q: Where did your family fall in the political spectrum that you recall particularly I'm talking about the in the '40s and all that?

FARRAND: In those days - and in fact, still today - the north country from Syracuse up to Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River, and then east to the Adirondack Mountains, Plattsburg and south to the upper Hudson River, the state of New York in its rural areas was to my best recollection ninety-five percent Republican. My maternal grandfather, "J.W." Cain, however, was not. He was a Democrat. As to my paternal grandfather's politics, I don't know. I sense looking back that his views on politics were not that strong. But my maternal grandfather was a Democrat. He arrived in Adams, New York, about 1895. Later, during the Depression, Roosevelt became president and named Jim Farley his postmaster general. Through some combination of events, Jim Farley gave my grandfather, who led the diminutive Democratic Party in Adams, the postmastership of the town and surrounding precincts in Jefferson County. So the Democratic tradition in my family, which my father shared even though I remember it as coming mostly from Grandfather Cain, is strong and deep flowing. I well recall in later years my father talking about that era. My father, as I have said, did not read a lot of books: he read the newspaper and listened to the news. An intelligent man, but not a scholar, my father would become emotional when he talked about Roosevelt and the positive things he did for average Americans like us.

Q: Well, I mean for many, my family, too, Roosevelt was a thing about, I mean it was a real presence. What school, where did you go, I mean you were in Rochester, but I guess you were.

FARRAND: No, I wasn't in Rochester. I was raised mostly in this little village of Adams, south of Watertown by fourteen miles. I went to the same elementary and high school my mother had attended as a little girl, as well as her two sisters and brother. It was a school that used to be called the Hungerford Institute, but for reasons I don't know it became a high school. Probably they standardized these institutes and academies at one point in the 1920s maybe. By the time I came along it was a combined grade and high school (K-12) with maybe 300 kids from bottom to top. I bounced around a bit, living first in my father's town, Sandy Creek, for a year or two, then Adams until 1941 and then Buffalo. We lived in Buffalo during the war where my sister and I went to a Catholic grade school: St. Joseph's. In 1946 we returned to Adams where I finished my schooling from fifth grade all the way to senior in high school.

Q: What sort of subjects particularly interested you?

FARRAND: I took mathematics only because it was required. English, history, Latin, and drama (plays and acting) were the subjects that drew me mostly.

Q: Do you recall any of the books that particularly struck you while you were doing this?

FARRAND: I was a kid and read this and that. Our grade school teacher read to us from the adventures of a boy named Penrod, as I recall. I loved it. I got by first library card in Buffalo and went there as often as my parents would take me. I was a regular customer at the village library in Adams. We read a lot in those days. But actual titles escape me. Kenneth Roberts's "Rabble in Arms" was a book I loved.

Q: Bruce Tarkenton. Penrod, Penrod and Sam.

FARRAND: Penrod and Sam, that's it. I loved that and I loved the poems of Longfellow and Hiawatha. All of that sort of thing. Look, this was a farming community. We're not talking about Exeter or Princeton here.

Q: No, but I was wondering though sometimes some children are more turned on by reading, usually often it's later. I was wondering whether.

FARRAND: I clearly remember learning to read with Dick and Jane - and their dog, Spot. I remember how much I loved that school book. Now, you asked the question. I can go back and say that was one of the most enjoyable experiences of my life: learning to read. Just learning as a little, little boy. Sure, I would read. We had a town library and I had a friend who was a bookworm. He got me into it and sometimes just to stay up with him I would take out a book and read it. I read a lot of books come to think of it. Also read the newspaper every day in junior high school and later in high school. I would come home and there was the evening newspaper, "The Watertown Daily Times." I would lay on the living room floor and read it before dinner.

Q: What did one do for recreation in these small towns?

FARRAND: Oh, it was the best place in the world. You never had any trouble that way. You were never bored. You had the run of the town. You knew how to go cross lots; you knew how to go through somebody's backyard to get to Norm Percy's house or to Eddie Frappier's house. You had a bicycle and you used that bicycle for transportation, not for exercise. Our school, near the center of town, had nice playing field that was open to everybody in the evenings and on weekends. The village had a playing field, too, and you could go down there and could hit balls or whatever. If you want to talk about gangs, a couple of guys would get together and recruit five or six of us and we'd all go running around town doing all sorts of crazy things. We were never destructive, though, except maybe at Halloween when we'd soap windows and let the air out of tires. In the fall, we'd

go out into a farmer's field at night and steal a cabbage. That was exciting; steal a pumpkin and get a real kick out of it. Always worried that the farmer would put rock salt in his shotgun and shoot it in your behind where it was going to sting. Adams was just a very fine, little, isolated community of around 2,000 in which young kids could grow up reasonably straight, although nothing of great consequence ever happened there. Actually, a fellow named Morton who later founded Arbor Day in Nebraska, was born in Adams.

Q: Did you ever have snow up there?

FARRAND: I have served twice in Moscow in the former Soviet Union and traveled widely in the then-Soviet Union. I've gone to a city in Siberia on the Russian border with China – Khabarovsk – in the winter when it was snowy and cold. But I can say without exaggerating that I have never experienced snow or cold anywhere on earth like that in my home town. And I don't believe I am remembering it wrongly or looking back with tainted eyes. Adams, New York, in the dead of winter is a very, very cold and snowy place.

Q: That's the Snow Belt up there anyway?

FARRAND: Yes, but I never realized it as a boy. So, when people here in the Washington area have two inches of snow and everything goes into a tizzy, for me and others like me, my friends from the north country, it's just comical.

Q: You went to high school there?

FARRAND: Yes, in Adams, New York.

Q: Did you find that you're, I mean if you're at a school with 300 kids, which includes high school and kindergarten that means that you have pretty small high school classes?

FARRAND: Yes, that's right. We had thirty in my high school graduating class all of whom had known each other from at least fifth grade. Some may have known each other from kindergarten, because remember I only came into the system in the fifth grade.

Q: Did the high school, I mean did one specialize, or was it a pretty general course?

FARRAND: Two tracks: academic and commercial. I went the academic route, which meant you took mathematics, Latin, and science courses. I took two years of Latin in high school, which I don't think is common these days. That's in a public high school now. Remember, we were under the New York State Regents system, which imposed uniform examinations on all high schools in the state on a specific date at the same hour: in New York City, as well as in Adams, New York.

Q: Yes, I remember at the time I used to use those things to prep up for exams when I went to school. I mean, those are real tough exams.

FARRAND: Well, people today talk about the need for uniform testing around the country and having a centralized system. New York had such a system more than half a century ago. Now, did teachers "teach to the examination"? Yes, I'm sure to a degree they did. But then you had nearly a five-month semester, almost five months in the fall and five months in the spring, I don't know. Now the academic year is much shorter. We only had two months - July and August - off from school for summer vacation. So, if you had well over four months in each semester, let's say, and you're taking a course in Latin, the teacher held off teaching to the Regent's exam until the last three weeks of the year. She's go through some old Latin exams she may have remembered. For the bulk of the year, therefore, she taught the basic course in Latin: declensions, conjugations, and that sort of thing. It wasn't until the last three weeks that she would start prepping you for the exam. To teach toward the exam all the time would be absurd. As between those who took the academic over the commercial stream, the split in my class would have been around fifty-fifty. The commercial graduates came out of high school able to type, take shorthand, keep a set of books, understand office routine, and, if fortune was with them, eventually run their own business.

Q: Well, now, when you're getting ready to graduate from college, I mean from high school, in a small sort of rural town, what were you pointed towards?

FARRAND: Nothing, I was pointed toward nothing.

Q: You graduated in 19, what?

FARRAND: I graduated in '52.

Q: '52. Korean War was on.

FARRAND: Yes, but I was pointed toward literally nothing. I've thought about this many times because of where I went to college. I do not recall anyone in my school advising me or having an office to which I could go to get advice about colleges or about financial assistance or aid. I don't remember that at all, nor do I remember ever taking the SATs. This was 1952 now. I do remember taking an examination given to our high school because we were only about 150 miles north of Ithaca, New York, where Cornell University is located. We took an exam for Cornell that I remember hoping I would pass it. Well, I never heard, so I guess I wasn't competitive. But, to my knowledge, I never took the SATs. Nor did I recall having any counseling for college. Now *that* was a real failing in our school system.

Q: For somebody reading this, SATs are the Scholastic Aptitude Test, which are given by Princeton, an outfit in Princeton given around the country.

FARRAND: Around the country and still the best. I found something out about this the other day and whoever looks at this will probably dispute what I have to say, but the SAT

was devised as a way of determining who from among the thousands of servicemen coming back into the system after World War II should be admitted to college under the GI Bill. There had to be some way of determining who could do it. That was where the SAT had its beginning, I guess. So, 1952 was not so long after the war and the SAT exam had yet to focus on every aspiring college kid. At least in my community it didn't. So, I was pointing nowhere.

Q: Yes, I was going to say and also from your, nobody in your family had college experience so I mean it wasn't, this wasn't part of the ethos of the time?

FARRAND: Except that all of my male high school friends, all of my close friends, eventually went off to college. Most of them went into the New York State University system. It wasn't then as coordinated as it is today under the State University of New York (SUNY) system. There were teachers colleges around the state and the best of the bunch was in Albany. So, two of my friends went to Albany State Teachers College and a couple of others to Oswego State Teachers College. My industrial arts teacher tried to persuade me to go to Oswego, but that was all.

Q: What did you do?

FARRAND: I had a very fortunate thing happen. In the summer following my graduation from high school, I was working on a farm. Actually I was working in a field as a laborer helping to process peas for Birds Eye Snyder Frozen Foods. Ever remember Birds Eye?

Q: Oh, yes, oh, sure. Bird's Eye was the ancestor of all frozen food and peas were the first product.

FARRAND: Not only the first product, but it's a fact in agronomy that peas are one of the earlier crops to come in. Bird's Eye came to the fields around Adams every July and I had worked for them two summers running. This was the third time I was going to work there. They came in and set up their huge wheezing processing machines that were located in the fields around our town. We all got jobs for about three weeks. You'd get up early in the morning and work well into the night under lights trying to get the peas processed. They would bring in workers from Cuba and Haiti and we young high school fellows would work alongside them. Looking back, I don't think it was a very healthy worker/company relationship. It was not healthy. I have some negatives that I carried away from my time working for Bird's Eye Snyder. Anyway, I had done it for a couple of summers, so I went to work for them again. Now, one night in July I come home from work to find my mother sitting on the front porch. Now mind you, this is early July and I have no plans for anything. My mother asks me to sit down. She then tells me that she had been left a little money by my grandmother, who had died in the winter just passed. My mother asked: "Bill, I would like you to tell me what you are going to do?" I said, "Mom, I don't know." She said, "Well, we have a little money. Would you like to go to this college?" At that, she handed me a brochure given to her, she said, earlier that day by Rev. T. Walter Cleary, pastor of our local (and only) Catholic Church. I'd been an altar

boy there for eight years. The brochure, as all college recruiting brochures are, was full of beautiful photographs of a small Catholic college in Maryland. Having never been out of New York State, the name Maryland had an almost a musical sound and I said, "Well, what are you saying?" And she said, "If you'd like to go to this college, we'll try to help you get there on grandmother's money at least for the first year. We can't do anything beyond that." So, I ended up at little Mount Saint Mary's College in Emmitsburg, Maryland, just up the road from Washington. It just fell out of the sky. Otherwise, without my mother's (and, I'm sure, my father's) marvelously generous intervention, I would probably not have attended college at all. God bless them.

Q: When you were at Mount Saint Mary's from '52 to '56?

FARRAND: '52 to '57. I ran out of money in 1954 and had to go back to work for a year to earn tuition money so that I could return to the Mount to graduate a year late.

Q: Let's talk about Mount Saint Mary's. What was it like at that time?

FARRAND: It had just come out of the war. During the war you were saying that this building we are sitting in was what school?

Q: This is Arlington Hall.

FARRAND: Arlington Hall. OK. Mount Saint Mary's was founded in 1808. It goes way back to one of the first Catholic bishops that came to the United States to establish the Baltimore diocese. The bishop founded this institution partly as a school for young men and partly as a training ground for priests – a seminary. There are two parts to the school. They're truly separate, but to the outsider they look like they're combined. The college survived all those years as a small, all-male, diocesan (non-order) college. The Catholic Church, as you may know, has priests who are members of "orders," such as Jesuits, Dominicans, Benedictines, Franciscans, etc.; and priests who serve the faithful in parishes around the country. They are diocesan priests. Georgetown University, for example, is a Jesuit school founded in 1789. Mount Saint Mary's was established nineteen years later by priests who were not members of orders. It was and is a diocesan-sponsored school. Many dioceses in the north-east provide teaching staff to the Mount - New York, New Jersey, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Washington, as well as Baltimore. The bishops of these dioceses looked to the Mount as a Catholic college where they could encourage young men to go for a secular education as well as, for a chosen few, to study for the priesthood. During the Second World War in about 1942, the Navy came and basically took over the Mount's campus and classrooms for an officer training facility. It was called something like the V6 or V9 program. In any case, the Mount today is the nation's second oldest Catholic college after Georgetown University.

Q: Well, there's a V12 or V6. Yes, the V6, for how long it was it might have been six months or something like that.

FARRAND: That's right. During the war that particular program caused real enrollment at the school to fall below 100 students. As the college regained momentum in the aftermath of the War, however, enrollment stabilized and soon began to climb back to its pre-war levels. When I arrived in the fall of 1952, it was a school for about 400 men. Today, enrollment has grown to around 1,600 students of both sexes divided evenly between men and women. Back in 1952 there were two colleges in Emmitsburg: St. Joseph's College for women and MSM for men three miles south of town. In any case, my entering freshman class was about 110 fellows, none of whom from my part of the country. They were all mostly from urban areas like New York City; Boston (five or six); Hartford, Connecticut; New Jersey (Newark and Trenton); Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Harrisburg, Baltimore, and a few from Washington and further south.

Q: What was the tie there to Mother Seton?

FARRAND: Mother Seton was not directly connected to Mount Saint Mary's. She founded the order of the Sisters of Charity in the early 19th century in Baltimore. They, in turn, established St. Joseph's College for Women in the town of Emmitsburg. The Sisters of Charity wore habits with big white sails as headdress back in those days. St. Joseph's had a student body of 200 young women. At the time, we used to say the first Irish and first Italian families of America would send their daughters there. That may or may not have been true, but in any case the St. Joseph's was a higher-class place than the Mount, or so it seemed to me.

Q: Well, how did you find the education there?

FARRAND: My first year at the Mount was one of the finer years of my life. It was an eye opening experience for a country boy and an absolutely superb introduction to higher education. For a person of my background with my personality traits, my freshman year could not have been better. Classes were small and taught by professors, not graduate assistants. I was introduced to philosophy, logic, literature, Spanish, American history, and economics. I had never of the study of logic before. The various survey courses in economics, literature, and history were also new to me. It was just a fine year. I'm sure the quality of teaching was not what it would have been at a more exclusive school. On the other hand, it suited me just fine. I ended the year fourth in my class academically. A stimulating year.

Q: Did you feel since mostly students there were city boys, did you feel, did it take a while to get used to it?

FARRAND: Yes, quite a while. The city boys were much more used to the rough and tumble of a boy's school and so they quickly formed their own brand of cliques. I never liked all of that. So that was probably a bit negative, but, hey, it wasn't going to bother me. The whole experience was new and absorbing and I learned a lot.

Q: You say you had a hiatus?

FARRAND: Well, I then did something my father urged me to do as the eldest of six. As I said, he never attended college. He was always an aspiring businessman. Coming home after spending the war in defense plants in Buffalo and Akron, Ohio, he joined up in this family partnership with my grandfather and his two brothers-in-law, which, after a few good years, frankly turned into a disaster. In this connection, a professor of business law at Mount Saint Mary's, a priest, told us one day in class: "Men, of all the forms of business organization - sole proprietorship, partnership, limited partnership, or corporation - the most unstable and the most dangerous is the family partnership. Avoid getting involved in a family partnership at all costs." That was 1953. Well, there I was sitting in my cozy classroom thinking that's exactly what my father's engaged in four or five hundred miles away trying to raise five children at home with his eldest away in college for the first time. At college, I was trying to study as hard as I could and keep my discretionary spending to the absolute minimum. In my sophomore year, I was trying to meet my own tuition expenses with a low-paying campus job as telephone operator through the night. There was no student aid of any kind. Back then a small school the size of the Mount had very little by way of an endowment. So, you pay your bills or eventually out you go. But, it wasn't a lot of money. Listen to this. In 1952, for $495 a semester, I received tuition, room, and board because I lived right on campus. It was very isolated up in the hills, up in the Blue Ridge Mountains in western Maryland. So you had to live on campus. Board, this is hard to believe, included full laundry service as well as having our room cleaned weekly by nuns and local women. Our shirts were pressed with starch. We would deliver the dirty laundry on Monday and we'd get it back on a Thursday. Imagine such services! Incredible, looking back.

Q: Because you wore a coat and tie in class?

FARRAND: Yes, we wore coat and tie to class and, as I said, we had our laundry done by nuns. Nuns would even clean our windows; I've got to tell you, it is embarrassing when I think back on it. All for ten bucks less than $1,000! That said, I never had any spending money, so I always ate in the chow hall where the food was generally OK but nothing to write home about. I learned how to take care of myself money-wise, tracking every nickel. My second year was also a good year, but that was when the money bite started and the front office began leaving me little notes. They carried me and carried me until, in the middle of my junior year, they said, "No, we can't carry you anymore." So, I had to leave the Mount and go home in the middle of the year. That was kind of a sad day. All the guys said goodbye. By then my family had moved south from Adams down to Albany, the state capital. The economy was in a recession then, 1954-1955. There were very few jobs. After a couple of months being unemployed, our next door neighbor helped wangle me into a civil service job at the State of New York's Department of Health in the Alfred E. Smith Building in downtown Albany. A low-level clerk's job, but it was a lifesaver to me. I enrolled in night school at a Catholic college up there called Siena (after St. Bernadine of Siena). I completed twenty-eight credits at night over the next eighteen months; then I went back and finished up at the Mount in June, 1957.

Q: While you were at the Mount were you majoring in anything. I mean, what were you pointing towards?

FARRAND: Well, they did not explain it to me, but what was in the back of my mother's mind then, strongly influenced by our parish priest, Thomas W. Cleary, was that I would enter the seminary and become a Catholic priest. I found out when I went to sign up for classes that I had already been pre-enrolled in what we called the "pre-seminary" curriculum: Latin, Greek, philosophy, theology, and the like. Yet I knew that my father had a business career in mind for me. It was a very surrealistic time, as I think back on it. When the registrar said "You are pre-enrolled in 'pre-sem'," I said, "I don't think so." So, I went away and said I'd be back the next day. I looked at the catalog and decided on a spur to study economics and the social sciences. I changed my courses to line up that way. The parish priest visited me six months later and was vastly upset. He wasn't happy. He said, "Why did you do this?" I said, "Well, Father, nobody had talked to me first." My sainted mother never owned up either; she was part of the conspiracy. So, I studied economics and I found out I liked it. As I've already said, I had my eyes opened academically that first year. During the summer my father said to me, "You know you really have to narrow it down so that you will come out of here with some skills." So, I said, "What do you suggest, Dad?" He said, "Take accounting." So I enrolled in accounting and I changed my course of studies from social science to business administration and that's what I got for a bachelor's degree: business administration, with a major in economics and a minor in accounting.

Q: You graduated in '57?

FARRAND: That's right.

Q: This was of course, the Cold War was going strong, did international affairs intrude much on your radar at all while you were there?

FARRAND: No, I stuck pretty closely to my studies, unfortunately. A classmate from Pittsburgh across the hall got the New York Times every Sunday and he devoted his Sundays to reading the New York Times. I always said to him, "Tim, why do you do this? You've got a lot of course work." But he'd say, "You've got to keep up." Then I'd say, "Well, I'm not interested in current events." I knew about the Korean War because the Mount's graduating class that year had a "greeting" from their draft board awaiting them. That's the way it was going to be for us, too, so we were all quietly hoping that the Korean War would be over by the time we graduated. And, in fact, by '53 it was pretty much at an end. In fact, Korean War veterans started using their GI Bill to come to Mt. St. Mary's. So, we undergrads got to talk to them a bit and gain insights into that "police action." But the 1950s were a time of khaki pants, white T-shirts, white bucks - a shoe with white uppers and a pink rubber bottom. They were best worn when dirty. It was the Eisenhower years, remember, and there wasn't a lot of activism on campuses anywhere in America. There was no outright activism against the Korean War, as I recall, because the Korean War was fought largely by "re-upped" and recalled army reserves. The Army, by

and large, wasn't made up of young college students. Korea didn't last long enough to really have an impact on campus. So, it was not a time of political activism or protest. My political views, therefore, were not stimulated by a sense of ferment on campus.

If I had anything I was interested in, anything that started to light my fire a little bit, and this will sound quaint, it was the American labor movement. In studying economics, I had taken an excellent course on labor economics, which I found fascinating. When you're young, eighteen or nineteen, I think you need something to become a little passionate about. You need something. So the labor movement just seven or eight from the end of WWII, became my special interest for a while. It was a mild passion, but I thought I might like to go to work for the labor movement. Remember, we weren't very far from the Depression: the 1930s when there were no jobs. If you didn't have the National Labor Relations Act and the Taft Hartley Law and some of these other laws passed during the New Deal to protect the rights of the working man, I don't know where industrial American might have gone in the aftermath of WWII. It was a ticklish time for unions as they began to grow and test their powers under these laws against employers.

I mean, you know, after a stint in the Navy I went on to spend my life in government. I probably did that because on a deeper level, I didn't want to expose yet another generation of my family to being wiped out economically. There are those who say the better way of running the world is on classic business principles, the "bottom line" and all that. It may well be that there is more acuity and wisdom and vision and ability to control events in business than in government. But I don't believe it, nor do I find that argument very impressive right now. It certainly wasn't impressive in the years leading up to 1929. After the excesses of the Twenties, when businessmen were following each other like lemmings off the "laissez-faire" cliff together, that proposition was put severely to the test and found wanting. In any case, unbridled business competition without regulation wasn't something that had a beneficial effect on my family.

Q: And so, when you graduated in '57 what did you do?

FARRAND: Well, I had taken interviews during my senior year with several corporations that came to campus. Two guys out of my senior class were offered a job with IBM after taking its battery of exams: I was one of them. In those days, IBM was the model employer for men wearing the gray flannel suit. You remember the book by that title?

Q: Yes, <u>The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit</u>.

FARRAND: You may also remember that IBM had a reputation in those early years as being a very paternal corporation. They wanted their people to all look alike, to dress the same way, a little bit like the FBI.

Q: There was a book called The Organization Man, which was par excellence.

FARRAND: Exactly. I had either read that book or had skimmed it, and had read the other book also. I didn't really want to step out of college and go directly into that sort of stultified world. I had too much I had to learn. Going from a little town to a small college in the countryside, I realized there was much more I wanted to see of the world. A couple of other corporations were similarly interested in hiring me, but I can't remember their names now - W.R. Grace, I think, was one of them. IBM graciously said, "We'll hold a slot open for you. You go out and get your military service over; when you come back you can go to work with us." So I went down to the army/navy recruiting building in Albany. I decided rather than go into the Army as an enlisted man, I would join the Navy as an officer, something I had always hankered to do anyway. I would have to go for three years, versus two in the Army, but I decided it was worth it. Ever since the Second World War, I had been attracted to the Navy. They sent me off to officers' candidate school in Newport, Rhode Island, to become a naval officer in four months. In those days, they called OCS graduates "120-day wonders."

Q: Let's talk a bit about your naval career. This is in '57 to '60?

FARRAND: '64.

Q: '64?

FARRAND: Yes. I went into the Navy in November 1957 and became an ensign in 120-days during the cold of winter in Newport. It was biting cold every morning at 5:30 out on the parade ground standing at attention in pea coats and sailor hats that left your ears exposed to the wind off Naragansett Bay. Our class was about 180 officer candidates from colleges all over the country. I held my own, graduating in the upper third of the class. When I finished OCS, I was sent to air controller school in NAS Glynco (near New Brunswick), Georgia, for five months to learn how to direct fighter aircraft from the ground. From Georgia, I went to sea on a radar picket ship home-ported at Treasure Island in San Francisco Bay for three years as part of the North American Air Defense Command. The NORAD early warning system, it was called. Our squadron of ships formed the seaborne extension - on the east and west coasts both - of the Air Force-manned Distant Early Warning (or DEW) line. The Navy converted old World War II freighters (Liberty ships) by reconditioning them top to bottom into floating electronic platforms with the latest in radar and communications systems. We normally went to sea for a month or more, with ten days or so in port for R&R and reprovisioning. I sailed for three years on the USS Interceptor (AGR-8) as my then-wife and - by the end of my tour at sea - three kids, lived ashore in Berkeley, California.

Q: Did you get any time to go to Japan or Korea or something?

FARRAND: No, sir, I did not, and that was a great regret. I did not serve on a naval warship: a destroyer or carrier. Mine was rather restricted duty aboard an auxiliary vessel. While we were on patrol at sea a great deal of time, we were always "on station" – a fixed spot on the ocean's surface some fifty nautical miles in diameter. We sailed singly, not in

convoy. During those three years I learned a lot. In my last year, I became the ship's operations officer responsible for all radar and communications activity with a crew of seventy men. I had more raw management responsibility as a young Lieutenant (Junior Grade) in the Navy than I enjoyed in the Foreign Service for many years.

Q: You mentioned you were married?

FARRAND: Yes.

Q: Where did you meet your wife? What was her background?

FARRAND: I met Sandra Godell, my first wife, in Albany, New York, in 1956 where she was a freshman at Albany State Teacher's College. I had taken a year off from Mount Saint Mary's to earn tuition money. I was working during the day at the New York State Department of Public Health and studying at Siena College at night. We married in September 1957 just before I went off to OCS in Newport. We had three children: William Patrick, Michael Joseph, and Carol Elaine. William was born in Albany, New York in 1958 and Michael and Carol were born on the West Coast at Oakland Naval Air Station in 1959 and 1961. Then when the war was over - Good Lord, no, I mean when *my time at sea* was over - the Navy invited me to stay on to participate in one of two programs: (1) teaching naval science at one of several universities around the country, or (2) to teach in my academic area at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis. I still had that IBM offer, remember, but over the intervening years I had decided not to pursue it. In any case, I thought if I went back to Annapolis on the east coast I could probably teach economics and the humanities while studying for a master's degree. I consulted with my Navy friends; some were for it, some were not. In the end, I went to Annapolis and taught economics, naval history and government for three years: 1961 to 1964.

Q: This would be what, '60 to?

FARRAND: '61 to '64.

Q: Well, the time by 1960 there was the campaign between the two navy men, Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy. Did that stir up any feelings or anything like that?

FARRAND: Not really, as I recall. The ship I sailed on was skippered by a lieutenant commander while I was a lieutenant (junior grade). The number two – the executive officer - was a senior lieutenant, equivalent to a captain in the army. I sailed under three fine skippers who, although of differing strengths, were all decent, honorable people. We didn't talk politics in the wardroom. So I really didn't get a feel for Navy politics while on the USS Interceptor.

Mount Saint Mary's, you need to remember, drew its student body from the community of American Catholics, mostly immigrant Irish-Americans, Italian-Americans, Polish-Americans, and people of similar backgrounds. The unwritten but widely accepted view

was that Mount students and faculty were all pretty much supporters of the Democratic Party. That was the way of it – or at least the way I saw it from the simple mind of an 18-year-old - at the Mount half a century ago.

The three captains of my ship neither indicated where they leaned politically nor questioned my politics. When I started teaching in Naval Academy classrooms my political bent (Democratic) would occasionally come out. Midshipmen obviously wouldn't react in class; they were students after all. And, remember, I was not a trained educator. I had to work like hell the summer of 1961 before classes began in the fall to bring myself up to speed academically. For three solid months I read, studied, and talked endlessly to tenured professors who generously helped me get (somewhat) up to the mark. The Nixon/Kennedy presidential campaign had just swept the country. Before the election, the midshipmen had conducted a straw poll the results of which were a real eye opener for me. The tally among 4,000 midshipmen was around 94 percent for Nixon! That straw poll knocked the socks off me; I never forgot it. Its lesson stuck with me over the years: in a word, the Navy is a politically conservative body.

Let me cite another anecdote that helps describe politics at Annapolis. On November 23, 1963, I had just walked in to an afternoon class. The time was 1300 (Navy talk for 1:00 p.m.), the first class after the lunch hour. The Naval Academy has an honor system. So as I entered the room I asked the midshipmen to close their books and proceeded to put a quiz, called a "pop" quiz (because unannounced) on the black board, three short questions as I recall. I then told the midshipmen I'd be back in fifteen minutes and left the room at about 1305. My friend, Commander "Tip" Russell, happened to be walking down the corridor as I emerged from the classroom. Tip said to me, "Bill, the President's been shot." Tip was a practical joker and a strong Republican. So, I said, "Tip, that's not funny thing." I turned toward the committee room, but Tip kept walking behind me down the long corridor. He said, "Bill, I'm not fooling." I turned to face him and Tip said, "No - and they don't know what's going to happen." So, I walked quickly into the empty committee room where twenty professors had their desks. I picked up a phone and called home. I said to my wife, "Do you have the television on?" She said, "No, but let me switch it on." After several agonizing seconds I said, "What do you see?" Sandra exclaimed, "Oh, my God!"

So, I walked back into the classroom, waited five minutes and asked the midshipmen to pass their papers forward. I then said, "Gentlemen, I have some bad news. The President has been shot." At that, one second-class midshipman (a sophomore in the civilian world) burst out and said: "Good! Now we won't have to march in Philadelphia this weekend!" The annual Army-Navy game was scheduled for that weekend and it the weather was expected to be windy and cold. Caught off guard by his outburst, I recall simply looking at the young man. To their credit, other midshipmen turned to look at him, too. None of them said a word. Why do I tell you all this? Because it was a lesson I've kept with me all these years: our uniformed services tend to a sharply conservative political bent.

Q: What about, going back a bit, how did the, what was some of the feeling during the missile crisis confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States which was essentially a naval exercise?

FARRAND: Two quick comments on that. One of the first things I did was to take advantage of the Naval Academy's program of tuition assistance for those who wished to get a graduate degree at a local university so long as the degree was in the discipline in which they were teaching. I chose to study at Georgetown University leading to a master's degree in economics. One evening in October, I was sitting in the back of a statistics class when word came that President Kennedy had announced the imposition of a naval blockade around Cuba. I remember very much wanting to leave the class immediately and hightail it back to Annapolis, which was forty miles away. When the class finally ended, I did just that thinking all the way about what we were going to do. Everybody was focused on that. That's my first comment. Number two. It would have been okay if it had just been a young naval officer getting a little dicey. At the Academy I was teaching naval history at that time. I was instructing alongside a professor who was a Harvard-trained Ph.D. in naval and military history. This man was a quiet, unassuming, and exceptionally erudite person who was earning a full professor's salary. Now, you know, he lived okay; but I'm sure he wasn't a wealthy person. He drove a little old car. When the Cuban missile crisis broke that fall he took his savings out of the bank and sunk them into a backyard bomb shelter. As I watched him do that I said, "My God, this man is a student of war and he is doing this! What about the rest of us who don't have the money to burrow underground?" You know, it dawns on me that in this country today there must be lots of those concrete bomb shelters below the surface of the ground on private property all around the Washington area that you never hear about anymore. I'm sure they've just been covered over. They certainly continue to exist below ground because it would cost too much to dismantle or blow them up. So, that may not be responsive to your question, but there was a very high degree of nervousness even at a place of higher learning like the U.S. Naval Academy where you might have expected some balance or special insight that would have gone beyond what the common person was sensing or hearing.

Q: Okay, well this is a good place to stop and we'll pick this up again. I put at the end of the tape where we were. We'll pick this up the next time when you were leaving the Naval Academy and what you're up to.

FARRAND: That'll be good.

Q: It was '64?

FARRAND: That's correct.

Q: Okay, we'll do that then.

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Today is the 10th of May, 2001. Bill where were you, where did you go in 1964?

FARRAND: On the 29th of June, I mustered out of the U.S. Navy after six and a quarter years. The very next day, on the 30th of June, I was sworn into the Foreign Service. There wasn't even a full day's break in employment. I immediately brought my family to the Washington area; we found a place to live not very far from the city.

Q: In Arlington, at Arlington Hall?

FARRAND: Just up the road here a little bit near the intersection of Glebe Road and Pershing Drive. I was quickly inducted into the Foreign Service's "A-100" orientation class for the remainder of the summer. It was around eight weeks in length.

Q: What was your initial impression of your group and all that came in at that time?

FARRAND: That's a very good question. After six years in the Navy, both at sea and ashore, I was pretty well into Navy life. Having gone through Officers' Candidate School in Rhode Island, where I joined in with some 160 graduates of universities from all over the country to learn how to become a naval officer, I was accustomed to coping in new situations. But when I left the Navy to come into the Foreign Service, I didn't know exactly what to I expect. I do recall, however, that after passing the written and oral exams I was invited to the State Department for a series of administrative interviews prior to the swearing–in ceremony. During one of those interviews, a Foreign Service Officer, whose name and title I forget, looked at my curriculum vitae and said, "You've been in the military." "Yes," I replied. To which he remarked in words close to these: "Well, yes, we take in persons with military background from time to time." Such a comment coming from someone in authority was, frankly, a dissonant note that I found curious. It certainly made an impression on me then; it also said a lot about Foreign Service attitudes toward military service that I was to encounter again in future years.

Q: I find that, too. All of us who are at a certain age have had a good solid dose of the military, either professional or unwilling. I mean it's just part of the function.

FARRAND: In any case, when I came into the Foreign Service the entering A-100 class was something like thirty people. I found it easy to make friends among my classmates, even though I was a bit older than they: 29 going on 30. They all seemed younger than I with most just having gotten out of graduate school. At that time, I was still immersed in graduate studies at Georgetown University. Many of my new friends had attended prestigious graduate and undergraduate schools, including SAIS, Harvard, Yale, and the like. So, I felt a little disoriented for a time. I think I was the only person in the A-100 entering class to come in directly from a stint in the armed forces.

Q: Well, I think that at least for some of us, when I came in I came in at 1955 and had four years as an enlisted man in the air force I had gone to army language school and

all, and I'd gone to an ivy league college and just had a master's degree from Boston University. I thought when I came in there; I thought I was out of place. This is for fancy folk and I'm not fancy. Most of us were. All of us that came in, after a while began to realize that there were training options that could take a week. But it takes a little while.

FARRAND: Well, as you know, my educational background was at a small private college, not Ivy League. I've never fully understood the concept of Ivy League beyond harboring a sense that to a large degree it rests on the ability to pay a high tuition fee. In any case, I took it as a measure of something or other that I was able to pass the Foreign Service written and oral examinations and to do reasonably well over time. But I am more in the category of a journeyman who works hard, if a bit ploddingly, rather than a person able to skip from peak to peak without having to engage in the weeds down in the valley.

Q: The so-called water walkers.

FARRAND: Well, I was never a water walker.

Q: How did you find the A-100 group at that time?

FARRAND: As I say, I felt a little out of my element for a few weeks. As I said, most of the people I was with had no military or naval experience. There were a significant number of women in the group, although probably no more than fifteen percent. The level of discourse among the class, on the other hand, was interesting. At times, I must say, I found arguments put forward by my new-found friends a bit on the naïve side. When that happened I reminded myself: "No, they can't be naïve, because they are the best and the brightest. They can't be naïve by definition." So, gradually I settled in although I did not find it a place for easy rapport or even a place where I felt we were all pulling together to become part of the new organization we had all just joined. I think my expectations along these lines were unrealistic, however. Remember, I had just left an organization – the U.S. Navy – in which you were actively encouraged to think as part of a team. Teamwork: you can't get your mission done without your mate working with you, that sort of thing. The Navy, I came to realize was strong on always having a mission statement to refer to for guidance; the Foreign Service, I soon discerned, was not so convinced of the value of mission statements. In fact, the diplomatic serviced seemed uncomfortable with, even dismissive of, mission statements. These were basic managerial concepts in the corporate world. By way of a short digression, let me say I had been hired by IBM out of college. At my first pre-employment interview back in 1957, the IBM executives with whom I spoke said that before they could hire me I should get my military service out of the way. "We'll hold the job offer open for you while you go and do that." So I had that offer weighing in the balance when deciding on joining the Foreign Service. But I had done a fair amount of reading about the corporate world, as well as having asked a lot of questions about IBM specifically; so by the time I needed to decide I had mostly made up my mind that I did not want to go into a paternalistic corporation as IBM was then depicted to be. I didn't want to work in that sort of atmosphere. Yet, I knew the corporate world was testing new ideas and thoughts about managerial theory

and performance. I recall, in particular, self-evident ideas like when all parts of an organization pull together, that sort of thing, it's better for the whole. This included, among other things, the concept of agreed mission statements to the organization in its work.

Q: Well, I think so many come out of academia and out of grad school and go straight into the Foreign Service. I was basically a consular officer all my time and I found that I never quite felt comfortable with the paper world of writing papers and having, you know, getting clearances and all this. It was just, I just kind of did my thing and made my decisions and I've always watched this, but it just wasn't my world.

FARRAND: I had studied economics in college and then taught Econ. 101 for three years at the Naval Academy. So I took the economics portion of the F.S. examination. As you remember, there was one portion of the written exam that focused on one of the so-called "cone" specialties - it lasted only an hour. I probably did well enough on that part of the exam to pull me up in other areas where I was weaker. I well remember the oral interview in which I had to sit in the middle of a room with three veteran FSOs looking across a table at me. I was out there with only a chair and a tiny table. I had heard there would be no ashtray: a gimmick meant to test those who smoked. What were they going to do with the ash? Luckily, I didn't smoke. I answered the three FSOs' questions for over an hour. My mind was eased by the fact I had already weathered several similar job interviews. So this was, to me, just one more in a series of oral grillings. So I wasn't particularly jittery or nervous and maybe that somehow impressed them. I don't know. Also, I was a family man with three children, had managed sailors at sea, taught scores of midshipmen; I was not going to be totally intimidated by this panel of questioners. I had been intimidated by Navy four-stripers (captains) and admirals. That said, I wanted to do well, because by then I was sold on the idea of entering the Foreign Service. I never knew how I passed - they probably gave me a two-to-one vote, something like that. That's all right, I passed, which was the main thing.

Q: When you were in the A-100, where did you see yourself going? What areas of specialty?

FARRAND: I am an organization man at heart. I've come to think of myself that way. I did not sit there and say, "I am going to blow this little A-100 thing aside. I'm going to go for the best job in the Department of State right from the get-go and I am going to start that climb as rapidly as possible." No, I didn't think that way at all. Why? Because, first, I didn't know anything about the Foreign Service. I was interested in foreign affairs always, but I was not an analyst nor had I studied international affairs in college. I studied economics after all, and most Foreign Service people aren't deeply interested in economics. I learned more about this phenomenon later. Despite periodic calls emanating normally from outside the State Department urging our diplomatic service really to get behind business as a way of helping America succeed; it all tends to fall on tepid ears. Over the years, I've concluded if you have to talk up an idea like supporting U.S. industry abroad, saying the State Department really needs to get into it, then U.S. industry is in

trouble already. When things are going fine, industry prefers to operate without official help, it's when things aren't going well that they call on government for support. That's a bit wide of your question. Sorry.

Anyway, I intended to take the first job the Foreign Service gave to me and do it well. That was how I planned to go about it. I saw myself at the bottom of another rung on the career ladder; that's what happens in life. You go up and the next job you go to is at the bottom of another waterfall, albeit at a higher level. That said, I did not want to go to Western Europe and told them so. Nor did I want to go to Africa. I told them that, too. Foolishly, in retrospect, I told them I did not want to study the French language. I may have been mistaken in all three cases; but we really wanted to go to an exotic part of the world. My only concern was the posting be in a country where they had a good primary school. Beyond that, "I'm yours" was my attitude. They sent me to Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia. Since I had never heard of Kuala Lumpur before, and since Malaysia was a former British colony with English language schools, we were very happy with the posting. As for timing, this was just after the insurgency - the Chinese insurgency - which had been put down by the British in the late 1950s, but which was sputtering back to life on the border with Thailand. KL was the ideal assignment, so far as I was concerned. The rotational program for junior officers was then in place, as you know. You circulated among Embassy sections, spending roughly 6-8 months in two other sections outside your specialty "cone."

Q: You were there in Kuala Lumpur from when to when? How many years?

FARRAND: I was there from 1965 to 1967, no, '64 to '66.

Q: What was Malaysia at that time, was it an independent state and what did it consist of?

FARRAND: It had just received its independence from the United Kingdom in the late 1950s. Following Malaysia's independence, however, the British Army had to stay in order to help put down and insurgency of so-called communist terrorists in the jungle areas bordering on Thailand. Malaysia at independence consisted of the Malay Peninsula, Singapore, and two provinces in northern Borneo: Sabah and Sarawak. I can't remember exactly how many provinces there are in total, but I think there are ten or eleven on the Malay Peninsula – the locus of what used to be British Malaya. Singapore was located at the tip of the peninsula, across the causeway. While I was there, a young Chinese politician was part of the Singapore delegation in the Malaysian parliament controlled at that time by the Malay party of UMNO (United Malay National Organization). The young politician was Lee Kuan Yu. He was a firebrand, bright and irascible; and he was driving the Malays nuts. So, about 1965, while I was there, UMNO engineered Singapore's ejection from Malaysia. As I recall, the break had to do in some part with Lee Kuan Yu's strong personality. Surely UMNO's reasons for taking such a drastic measure were more complicated, but as a junior officer working in the consular section, not the political section, it stuck in my mind that way. They just voted to chop Singapore off and that was

supposed to go a long way toward solving a major part of their problem with the Chinese minority.

Q: The territories in Borneo did that play much of a role while you were there? Was that considered very important?

FARRAND: Well, not really, no. Only insofar as the Borneo provinces could serve as listening posts for what was happening in Indonesia. At that time Indonesia's president Sukarno had declared a state of hostility - or "Konfrontasi" in the Malay/Indonesian language - with Malaysia. Thus, all direct travel between Malaysia and Indonesia was prohibited. I mean you couldn't travel directly between the capitals of Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta or between any other cities in the two countries. To go to Jakarta from KL you had to go first to Thailand (Bangkok), change planes and then fly down. Of course, as a junior officer I'd never have an opportunity to do that. Such travel was rare and only undertaken by more senior officers as circumstances dictated.

Q: Who was the ambassador while you were there?

FARRAND: A marvelous career Foreign Service Officer by the name of James Dunbar Bell. He was a man of maturity, toughness, taciturnity - physically lean, white-maned, and large in stature. He played a good game of golf, which was the thing to do in Malaysia. Business was done on the beautiful course at the Royal Selangor Golf Club right in the heart of Kuala Lumpur. The RSGC has to rank I'm sure with one of the world's more beautiful golf courses. Expensive to join, the Royal Selangor was outside the budget of a junior officer. But, Ambassador Bell was a very good person to work under and to learn from at my first posting. For me, he set the standard for how an ambassador should carry out his mission. An excellent role model for me, just entering the Service.

Q: Let's start with your posting. What were you doing?

FARRAND: Are you ready for this?

Q: Yes.

FARRAND: Well, here is a division officer who had served aboard a naval vessel with sixty or seventy men under him responsible for radar communications, electronic navigation, and weather aerography; followed by some years as an instructor at the U.S. Naval Academy going around in this spit-and-polish kind of place at the heart of the naval establishment. Now, as a junior FSO in Kuala Lumpur, I am assigned for six months as assistant – get that? - assistant General Services Officer. Assistant General Services Officer!

Q: One usually thinks of this as making sure the plumbing works and stuff like that.

FARRAND: I did all that and I actually liked it. I tried to do it well, even though the content of my work was rather unlike anything I'd done before. Some of the junior officers upstairs were scratching their heads, "What the hell is he doing down in GSO?" *(Stopped editing here on January 30, 2005.)* But it helped that I was working for a very fine guy, Art Goodwin, and he was an excellent GSO, he really was a person who devoted himself to cutting costs, figuring out how to get things done. He was not a person that was, he was an administrative officer that saw the mission needed to be supported and he imbued me with that. It wasn't hard. It was for six months. I worked hard at it. The one thing I did that probably stood me in good stead. The ambassador's wife had been an administrative officer in the Foreign Service. They had a large residence and the kitchen was peopled with Malay and Chinese, not so many Indians, but Malay and Chinese cooks and bottle washers and people that deliver and all of this business. Well, she asked me at one point if I would come and take a look at the inventory of her house and I did. I went into the kitchen with my little clipboard and I looked around and I know that the country was loaded with cockroaches and I thought to myself that this kitchen has to be no different. So, I opened up all the cabinets underneath, there were many. Opened them up and I looked back in and I didn't see cockroaches, but what I did see was lots of cooking ware that had been sitting back there collecting dust and there were droppings and this and that and I said to the head of them. I said, "Mr. Cole or Mr. Kim I want all of this cleaned up. I want all of it, all, everything, pulled out, every piece of crockery, I want it washed before it is put back in. I want all of that way back in there to be all washed out, I want this cleaned." That was my naval training because we would have never have permitted the galley to look like that. That established me with Mrs. Bell, that established me with the ambassador. I could do no wrong from then on because, of course, she knew some of this. She was a flunks at hard to deal with. The games that are played.

Q: How did you find working with, you say the trainees in Malay and Indians. The Indonesians are a different tribe when you're the GSO you're really need the tribal politics.

FARRAND: It was constant. (Bell goes off.)

Q: We were talking about GSO dealing with the different nationalities there.

FARRAND: In answering the question you just unlocked a little cabinet. I don't want to blow on it. I just came from working for three months in Bosnia with the Croat Serbs and Muslims and I just wonder whether my ability to interact successfully with Malays, Chinese and Indians over the years had any official effect.

Q: There's a spillover.

FARRAND: Well, but it's not necessarily a clear-cut spillover. It just kind of builds into what you understand that they, you can't take sides.

Q: No.

FARRAND: Well, you can't take sides and as came clear later, in 1969 I left, I was in Kuala Lumpur. Actually, Kuala Lumpur was '65 to '67. In 1969, just two years later there was an awful blood bath right in the city when the Malays took out after the Chinese down in their unclaimed downtown part and it was just terrible. It probably wasn't as bad as what happened in Indonesia in 1965 when the Malays went after the Chinese, I'm sorry the Indonesians, which are the same stock. It was horrific.

Q: Did you find that having some of these three groups, the Indians, the Malays and the Chinese, did this make it hard to work in this for an American in this area?

FARRAND: No. Not an American who was naive. An American who had no predispositions who came on the whole thing fresh, no. I just went about my kind of, as I say, my open faced way working with them all. I recognized the people on my staff where all three and I had to be a little bit sensitive to that, but I let them know not by saying it, but you know we're all working together here and I'll need to support. I treated them all as well as I could.

Q: Well, then after six months doing this, what did you do?

FARRAND: There was a consular officer by the name of Samuel Hart who is in retirement now from, he went to Old Miss. He was running the consular office. It was a single consular officer. He took his wife, a lovely young woman and two Indian ladies in the backseat of his Mercedes and drove on the road from Kuala Lumpur to Singapore. He came around the bend and met a logging truck head on, driven into the rice paddy, lay there bleeding, his wife lay there dying, the Indian ladies were in terrible pain and no one, they would gather around and look at him, but they wouldn't do anything because in the I don't know what particular religious strain holds this view or whether it's just an animus strain from the villages. If you help someone and save that person's life, then you are responsible for that person for the rest of his life or her life. So, they wouldn't do anything. He hollered out.

Finally, along came a policeman and they got them all to a hospital. Mrs. Hart died on the way and Sam was left with two children and a broken leg and a broken pelvis, all kinds of other things and the ambassador said to the General Services Officer, "I'm going to have to take your assistant." I had already taken the consular course, so they put me directly in. So, for nine months I had to pick up a moving operation and I had to go into it just willy nilly and it wasn't just dealing, as you can imagine, it wasn't just dealing on a visa line with non-immigrant visas. It wasn't just dealing on the immigrant visa line. It wasn't just dealing with citizenship and welfare, nor was it dealing with only passports, nor tourist problems. It was everything in a city, a country of about ten million people that wasn't yet on the tourists maps like it is today or was, but it, there were plenty of people passing through with all kinds of problems and I, I mean you want to talk challenging. For nine or ten months I ran that and I would actually go back after dinner and sit in my office from oh, 7:00 or 8:00 in the evening until 2:00 in the morning. The air conditioning was off.

The building didn't have the air conditioning on after a certain time so I would sit there, stripped, sweating and just trying to keep up with, trying to keep up with the massive amounts of, and reading the regulations and try to be sure I was doing everything right. It drove me crazy.

Q: What were the, were there many immigrants to the United States or tourists to the United States:

FARRAND: The quick answer is no. There were enough. The Vietnam War was just beginning to start across the South China Sea and that meant that U.S. immigration policy was tighter I suppose from that part of the world than it might otherwise have been. Also, what was happening, there would be a bleed off in consul work. You well know that if one post is tough people will shop for another post, which isn't so tough. It worked out that there was a lady consular officer in Singapore. Her name escapes me, but not her approach to consular work. She was swamped with Nonyung Chinese, South Seas Chinese, Nonyung. She was swamped with them and she was hell on wheels when it came to ferreting out fraud to the point that she would have at her desk a large magnifying glass that she would take every photograph and bring it under close observation to see if it hadn't been cropped or added to. Her toughness led to an up flux of Chinese to Kuala Lumpur and then I had to be tough, but of course, I was naive. I mean I was not naive, I was new.

Q: Well, you didn't know the territory.

FARRAND: As an ex-naval officer I mean I don't want you to get the feeling that I was a child, I wasn't, but I did want to do it according to the book. I did want to do it according to the law and it took a lot out of me.

Q: What type of fraud were you running into?

FARRAND: Oh, God. People would say they were family members when they weren't. You got, you know someone what is it under the NIB that could prove that you have a residence abroad and had intention of abandoning. Well, I mean I had young women of mixed background, in other words, their father might have been Chinese and their mother might have been Malay. That didn't happen very often, but when it happened. So, they are Eurasian, Portuguese and they would do anything to get out and get to the States and that was it.

Q: Well, what about what sort of consular problems, did you have people getting arrested and things of that nature there, drugs?

FARRAND: Yes. Drugs were just beginning, but I would have people getting arrested. I would have people getting across the law. There was a large Peace Corps contingent in Malaysia and that Peace Corps contingent was in the segment of Malaysia that you were talking about. It was in Borneo, north Borneo in Saba and Sarawa and that Peace Corps

contingent was as I've said already, large. We had them on the mainland, too, the main peninsula of Malaysia, but they were over there and they had a tendency to get romantically involved. I remember one fellow wanted to marry a Diack woman. Now this fellow had gone to a good university in the United States. A tall, lanky guy, nice appearing fellow who was going to get married to this Diack woman and I will admit that she was an attractive woman, but she probably had two years of education or three. I could not imagine in any way how he would bring her back to the United States and how she would ever fit in. I suspect they didn't. That sort of thing. If you ask for one specific thing, I'm not going to be able to come up with it because there was such a broad range of things and remember Malaysia had a university and did Singapore. Missionaries had been there and the local school system itself wasn't bad. We're not talking about a nation of primitives here, although that may have occurred in certain pockets, but no, no, you're talking about kind of the reasonably well-advanced country even then. Now, of course, it's percolating along with the highest buildings in the world.

Q: What about, were you getting R&R people from Vietnam? That must have caused problems?

FARRAND: Yes, yes. That was the first, we were the first, that program began in Malaysia and Singapore. I don't know if it went to Thailand as much, but young troops would be brought in by air, let's say on a Friday and the following Friday they would be picked up and taken back to the war zone. Marines, army, navy, this was one of our obligations and so we, I had something to because I was a consular officer, was trying to mobilize the embassy itself to be open to these young men. It was young men, all young men to come in and to invite them, get them, show them a good time. But that was, I remember one marine got off and we had him over for drinks and he was a husky guy, but he looked at me and he said, "I saw my best friend last week cut in half by machine gun bullets." It was surreal living in Malaysia going in the diplomatic circuit, having young men come in and say this is what happened. It happened many times.

Q: Did you have much contact with people in the political section and all, it was probably a small embassy, wasn't it, or not? Maybe it wasn't? I was wondering.

FARRAND: Yes, yes, no the embassy was probably the perfect size for a junior officer. It was not a large embassy and it was not a small embassy. I would estimate the size at something in the order of it, being in general services, I probably had thirty to forty houses I had to look after. There was a large station there. I can say that? There was a large station there. The station was a quarter of the size of the embassy itself and because it was a watching place for Vietnam. A watching place for the Chinese, a watching place for all kinds of area activity because we're just across. No, I had plenty of interaction and a very fine political consular would invite me over, a very fine political officers I became friends of them and still am, yes.

Q: What was sort of the embassy reaction when Malaysia split with Singapore? It happened on your watch there.

FARRAND: I'm going to say that James Dunbar Bell was. This was the first occasion I had to see the interaction between the CIA and the Department of State abroad and a particular thing happened before Singapore split or was cut adrift by Malaysia. A couple of, there was going to be a meeting, I think it's the Rapus Hotel, you remember that famous old hotel. It was still old now it has been upgraded, but it is still there. There was going to be a meeting between as I recall it, some Chinese politicians possibly local, possibly involving others to the north and the CIA wanted to listen in. So, they were tampering to put their bug in with some wires probably I have it in my mind in one of those fans that goes around. Well, the whole thing they shorted something or something, the lights went out, this and that and the other and looking into it. Here is this bug found and it was a major embarrassment, major embarrassment and who had to pick up the pieces was James Dunbar Bell who had to fly to Singapore because he was ambassador of that area and I remember him on in the newspapers and on the radio explaining away this incident doing what he could. He had never been brought in on it and I knew that, too. So, it was the agency doing their cowboy thing and then it was the middle standard, oh I don't mean standard, it was your exposed diplomat who had to sweep up the glass and take care of it. I never forgot that and it informed a lot of my interaction with the agency later. Although I have a great deal of respect, enormous respect, but I am not sure that I always have great respect for operations. I think they can always stand a little outside with you. Now, put that aside.

That probably the embassy and the ambassador, they probably were officially unhappy that Malaysia and Singapore had split because we don't go around wanting everybody to split up, tighter and tighter. On the other hand, I think that the difference between the cultures of the Malaysia mainland and Singapore were such that unless you were there physically and Singapore, even though there was only two million people there, these are two million energetic, moving all the time people whereas in the compounds in the outside of the cities of Malaysia proper, life was at a far, far, far slower pace. So, that when it came to political tempo, Singapore probably had it. If you were in Singapore, you were in Kuala Lumpur and you couldn't be down there all the time and there wasn't the natural, easy going back and forth. So, from many angles, probably from many angles, it is better to have two embassies to deal with those two areas. Probably, I think so.

Q: Well, after you got up to '67 and you sort of face your...

FARRAND: I must say to you that the most meaningful experience of that time came when after nine months in consular work I was tapped to go into the economic section for ten months. In that economic section I became deeply engrossed in Malaysia's two top industries in those days. One, natural rubber from rubber trees; two, tin from the great tin deposits around there. In those days Lyndon Johnson was trying to fight the war in Vietnam and have his great society as well. To get money for the Vietnam War, he began to look very carefully he and his administration at selling off the national stock pile of strategic materials which had been built up since the second world war because we were caught flat footed in 1939, '40 and '41. So, we built up all kinds of supplies of things

including massive warehouses full of natural rubber in bales and warehouses full of tins for and many other things. Any of the rare metals, any of the things which you cannot get in the United States, they were stored in Maryland, they were stored in lots of places around the country. The sensitivity of general services administration ran all of this and they were under pressure from the White House to sell, but of course, given the amounts they had, when they sold it, it would depress world prices and I was in the middle of that. That was a marvelous learning experience.

Q: Obviously the Malaysians on rubber and tin were screaming bloody murder, weren't they? How did we deal with it?

FARRAND: Yes. Very delicately. The standard line over here in Washington was that we are conducting these sales from the national stockpiles. By the way, these weren't the only two commodities; there were probably another hundred commodities. But, a lot of money from that could come to the White House or to the Congress and then it could be dispensed. (Bell rings.) I just wanted to say that it was just an enormous experience and here is a situation where and it taught me a great lesson that I may or may not have benefitted from and one is that you don't, you should take jobs that you are interested in because those jobs may become because of events they may rise in importance and it happened in Kuala Lumpur at the American Embassy that the economic section of the embassy was easily equal to in its work to what the political section was doing. Easily because we were focusing on the sensitive issues that were far more upsetting to the government. The sale of 1,000 tons of natural rubber back here in Washington was far more critical to our bilateral relations out there than was the visit of Senator Foghorn.

Q: But, what could we do about it outside of just tell them, "Here it comes boys, we're doing it"?

FARRAND: There was an ambassador in Bolivia, he was of Italian American background, Ernest Syracrusa. At the very same time, what when I came back from Malaysia they brought me into the economic bureau and they had me work on tin and rubber and then later iron and steel. Syracrusa was down there in Bolivia and what he did was, he told Washington at one point. Our ambassador didn't do this. "If there is one more ton, metric ton of tin sold from the national stockpile," said Syracrusa, "I can no longer vouch for the safety of the members of my staff or of any American in Bolivia," and that stopped the sales of tin. Now it didn't happen while I was out there, but I can well remember putting together seriously long one or two seriously long telegrams for me. I'm not a great, I don't enjoy it that much, but I like it when I'm in it, but I don't like to contemplate it. But, I made this long argument which the ambassador had asked me to do and I cleared it with political and I cleared it with the DCM and everything and the ambassador and he looked and he made a few changes, but it was a agreed more or less telling Washington this is what you're doing to your relations with Malaysia if Malaysia matters. You see in situations like that, Malaysia may just be put aside.

Q: Pushed to one side, but

FARRAND: Yes, there were American interests there. Colgate Palmolive was there, there were other, you know.

Q: Also, too, at the time Johnson was looking for support for the war there and this must have played a, you know, I mean, you can't dump almost literally on a friendly nation and then expect them to come around and give you support on your war in their area?

FARRAND: Johnson, perhaps speaking to this, came himself to Malaysia. He spent thirty-six hours there.

Q: How did the visit go, I mean a presidential visit is usually equivalent to a major earthquake for an embassy.

FARRAND: Bob Bliss, Robert Bliss, was the admin officer and a good fellow and he told me that he was given, he gave me a number. He said they came in and they gave me a checkbook and here was the number in it, they just gave me a checkbook, the White House, State Department. That's it, just get it done. Every limousine in town, every driver, every. Bundy was there and yes, I think through that there was a lot of being careful because sales of rubber and tin were at the top of the agenda when he spoke to the Tucu Abdul Rafman. That's how, that was it was done. It was done with smoke and mirrors and trying to say to that and oh by the way, oh by the way, the Malays' particular UMNO were scared silly about the prospects of this looming monster to the north, China coming down. So, they were not unhappy to have the United States there doing its business in Vietnam. So, they could put up with it. Who was getting hurt? On the rubber and the tin? Malay Chinese. See what I mean?

Q: What was the impression you were getting from your own experience being around there and from your fellow officers about Abdul Rafman, the prime minister?

FARRAND: Tengku?

Q: Yes.

FARRAND: I think well, like in lots of places, since he was on top sure there was criticism, but in time I'm not going to say then because I didn't focus on the Tengku all the time, but I will say this, that in time I think that Tengku Abdul Rafman who passed away here about twelve years ago. I think in time he came to be seen as as far as Malay politicians are concerned as a statesman and good, good for the country and good for the region. You see what's happened to the Mahateer now. I mean this guy is everything in many ways. Tengku would never have permitted this to happen. I don't want to lionize it because he was Malay after all.

Q: What about while you were there with your wife and all, what about social occasions? Was it easy to get to know the Malays or the Chinese or the others or not?

FARRAND: Reasonably, yes it was, it was. The only thing that would interfere with that would be their traditional approach to their own private time, their traditional approach. I don't think that there was any effort to freeze out the Americans even young or old. The embassy, as all embassies, had so much money to go for representation. My areas of expertise and responsibility. There was a board and a panel, a DCM, I don't know, our section as consular officer, when I was assistant GSO forget it, but when I was a consular officer I was the only consul so I got to know all the consuls in town. I got to know the consular division at the ministry of foreign affairs. That was my bag. I had enough. I wasn't still in the mode of you know high entertaining because you know I was a brand new junior officer, but I had enough. I could go to lunches at least and take people. When I was in the economic unit it became a little wider, a little more expansive and I participated there, but I had no trouble in getting the key people when I wanted them to come around, but remember as a third secretary who the hell's going to come to your house?

Q: Yes. How was the Vietnam War playing from your contacts who were seen in Malaysia? At that time, '65 to '67?

FARRAND: I'll divide this into two parts. There was a massive ignoring of the Vietnam War on the part of the people mostly. The local newspapers did not carry extensive accounts of it except by AP or UPI, lawyers, stuff like that, but there wasn't any original reporting in the local newspapers. It didn't appear I'm not even sure in those days if we had television. I'm trying to think if we had television. We must have but it was thirty-five years ago. So, you went about your business as though the Vietnam War wasn't going on. That was kind of the official approach to it. Way up high there was this I've already alluded to it, nervousness about the fallout of what might happen if the allies, the United States, Australia, whomever else was fighting with us, South Korea, were to fail in checking the Viet Cong and in checking Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. So that was up there at a higher level. That's what I think. Now on the more gut level as consular officer I got to see the riff raff that floated throughout Southeast Asia. I got to see those who were cast off from the war, those were trying to get in the war, trying to work for Brown and Root, not Brown and Root, there was another big one. Morris and Knuts.

Q: Knutson, Pacific Architects and Engineers.

FARRAND: But mostly Morris Knutson. Morris Knutson, I've never heard of them again. I don't know if they're in business anymore. But, anyway, Morris Knutson, you'd see these drifters, fellows that would be between thirty-five and fifty. You know, you didn't know how old they were, all you knew was they looked kind of tough and down at the edges. They would be coming in for all kinds of different consular services, but the one service they never wanted to hear about was the possibility of going back because for many of them if they landed in the United States there would be a warrant for their arrest or for back child payments, child support or something of this nature. Somebody was after them. They often would hook up with local women and then they would find their

way back to Vietnam to work for any of these contractors who were having obscene amounts of money shoveled at them to keep the bases up or to do whatever. It was the very, I mean, it was the underside of the war. It made the war look like a tawdry, tawdry dog's breakfast from where I sat.

Q: But, the Malays, I mean, this just sort of, that's your thing and not our thing, sort of?

FARRAND: Yes, at the level at which, that's right, yes, yes. I come back to this. My suspicion is that when the ambassador would have conversations with the prime minister and the foreign minister, etc., then a greater grand strategic view would emerge, but it certainly didn't on a daily basis where I was.

Q: Well, during the time you were there, the Chinese guerrilla movement was completely dead, I mean, was it over there?

FARRAND: No, it was dead for all intents and purposes, but there was still a small cadre that lived on the Thai/Malaysia border way up into the heart of the jungle and they hung on, they hung on, they had a particular leader and his name was known. They hung on.

Q: Did you get any feel for how the Malays and the Thais got along or didn't get along on both the unofficial and official levels?

FARRAND: No, I don't have a feeling for that. Remember Malaysia is Islam and Thailand is what is Thailand?

Q: I thought it was more of a Buddhist type of thing.

FARRAND: Yes. That made for serious cognitive dissidence on lots of things. If you look at the Malay Peninsula it connects Malaysia with Thailand and then Burma comes down, too. It connects Thailand not for a very large part. Not. So, I, no, I did not have a strong sense of Malay Thai relations.

Q: Well, then in 1967 wither?

FARRAND: I put an application in for an onward assignment after two years. I decided at that point I was still young enough that I could leave the Foreign Service. I was in the throes of making up my decision. There were aspects of it that I was still questioning. I can't exactly put my finger on those. I was still questioning whether this was what I wanted to do. There were these feelings that had persisted a certain, I really don't belong in this crowd, that type of thing, but at the same time, I had lots of friends. So, I said I'm going to try it once more. I want to go where Coca-Cola isn't. So, I said I want, I'll try and see what happens. So, I said send me to the Soviet Union via Russian language training. They did. My boss when he got it, it was on a Saturday morning, the telegrams come in and when I got in a little later than he, he came in and he said, "Well, here's your assignment," and I read it to U.S. Embassy Moscow via ten months of Russian language

training at the Foreign Service Institute. I looked at it and he looked down at me and he said, "Now I can have this changed. I can get this changed for you." I said, "But, John, I don't want it changed." He said, "Well, okay, if that's what you want." So, then I went off to Russian language school.

Q: I think this might be a good point to stop because it's 12:30.

FARRAND: I have to be at a course.

Q: So, we'll pick this up next time in 1967. We'll talk a bit about Russian language training. Then we'll move to your going to the Soviet Union.

FARRAND: I will.

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Q: This is the 17th of May 2001. Bill, 1967, how did you find, you took Russian I take it from '67 to '68 sort of?

FARRAND: Roughly.

Q: How did you find Russian?

FARRAND: It is a majestic language. It's a marvelous language. At that time of course, it had a cache which perhaps today it doesn't, but I viewed it then and view it now as the mother of the Slavic languages. I suspect that's wrong. I suspect they would say that's not anywhere near correct, but given the importance of the Soviet Union at that time I was anxious to study it and enthusiastic about the idea. In fact, maybe had I not gotten Russian language training I might have just decided to move on into something else. It was kind of my determination that if I could go to the Soviet Union then I might stay in the Foreign Service. That has its flaws, too, not being a Soviet expert, just a journeyman coming in from the side, but it was okay.

Q: Did you pick much up about while you were taking the language, did you get much of a feeling from most of your teachers and from your area studies about the Soviet Union? How did you find the training?

FARRAND: The teaching of the language itself was better than the area studies by a wide mile. Area studies could not, there was a very fine fellow, I forget his name, forgotten his name who was in charge of area studies and he sought to do what he could to bring the cadre of language students up to a certain level of understanding of the Soviet Union, but you had so much on you and it was only once a week and it was on a Wednesday afternoon or whatever. I did not find that very effective and there was a great disparity among the students themselves in their level of understanding. I perhaps because I was interested would fall in the category of someone who had never really studied the Soviet

Union, but through newspapers and magazines and being interested in things, I suppose I had a modicum of understanding that might have been in keeping with the rest of the class. Although several others, one had a Ph.D. in Russian history and another in literature, so you couldn't deal with that.

Q: In your group that was studying Russian at the time, do you remember any of the names?

FARRAND: Oh yes, yes. People who did quite well, there was Sheridan McCall who became deputy director of the Soviet desk and later deputy chief of mission in Stockholm. There was Michael Wygant, Michael went on to become ambassador in the South Pacific about the time when I was there. He was there before me. William Maines, Charles William Maines, who left the Foreign Service. He was picked up by the Carter administration, made assistant secretary for international organizations and then became for a time the founder or at least the editor of foreign policy.

Q: I've interviewed both Mike Wygant and Bill Maines.

FARRAND: Well, there you are. So, they were both in the language study and their wives and you know it was a good class.

Q: Did you know what you were going to do when you went to the Soviet Union?

FARRAND: Well, because I was still a junior officer, my presumption was and because I had more or less kind of put my name forward to go to the Soviet Union as I've indicated, a lot of people didn't and wouldn't have wanted to, but I did want to. I knew that probably I would be good in one of the lower rung starting jobs in the embassy when I got out there and in fact, that was the case. They made me vice consul. There were three consular officers. There was a consul and two vice consuls. The consul was Robert Barry who has done wonderfully in the Foreign Service.

Q: Bob's still in Bosnia right now.

FARRAND: We were together in Bosnia. He was in a different organization. A fellow who had gone to Garmisch, just prior, both Bob and this fellow had graduated from Garmisch Partenkirchen which put their Russian on a whole different level from mine.

Q: This is the additional training at the military school of Garmisch at the Department's Detachment R?

FARRAND: And so, all of the young officers except for McCall and for Wygant, the young officers had gone to Detachment R so all of their Russian was considerably behind theirs.

Q: You were there from '68 to '69 probably?

FARRAND: Summer of '68 to the summer of '70. Yes, we're talking Moscow.

Q: What was the situation, vis-à-vis, when you arrived, what sort of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States when you got there?

FARRAND: Well, it was the great period that we now call stagnation, at that time I don't think I heard that word very much, but Brezhnev was, well, let's see '68, Stalin died in '53 and Khrushchev was pushed out in what year?

Q: Oh, '64 or something, '65? So, he'd been out for four or five years?

FARRAND: Yes. Brezhnev was still very much in power. The KGB was in power and at its strongest or at least at a very strong stage. Brezhnev was a man, what can I add to millions of words written on Brezhnev? All I can say is there was this sense of stodgy stability at the top of the Soviet government committed to control at all costs. I had never been there before. I was a little in awe in the first weeks and months. I was in the consular section and as a result I had a tendency to see some ugly things, as you do when you're in consular work. Bob Barry was the consul and another fellow, George Humphrey, who left the Service, and I were the vice consuls. We rotated between the two of us every six months. There was a heavy concentration of official visas because Soviet delegations would go to the United Nations, Soviet delegations would come to the United States and, of course, it was reciprocal. So, we had to have a careful set of rules of which I became familiar in time on the job. There I didn't have a special course, but I had been consular officer, had taken the consular course when I first got in the Foreign Service three years earlier. I had been consular officer for nine or ten months in Kuala Lumpur where I did everything virtually everything because there was only one officer. I got very close to FAM 7 and 8 and 9.

Q: These are the consular Foreign Affairs Manuals. These are the instructions of what the rules and regulations of how to do.

FARRAND: Foreign Affairs Manuals. Yes, I got very close to them. I knew that. Then I went to the Soviet Union and it was almost as though you put those blue books on the side because there was another book and it was called Annex A or something. All the sheets were salmon colored, yellow colored, salmon colored, as I recall. It was not as thick as the others, but it was very precise on all sorts of techniques and procedures one needed to follow in granting a visa to a Soviet citizen or official. That was a whole new world and that was not trained. We were not trained in that prior to going out. So, I had to learn that on the job. There was no part of the consular course back here that took in that.

Q: When you were there, you said you saw some ugly things. What did you see, as a consular officer?

FARRAND: Well, I don't want to get into you know, story telling.

Q: Well, story telling is important in this type of interview because it gives a flavor for the time.

FARRAND: One of the things that happened that gave me an incite early on into the Soviet Union and what a secret police system entailed. I'll just talk about two out of many. The first was three young people, Americans, the Vietnam War was on and they were in the generation of opposing the war and they went over and out into the world. They found themselves in, as I recall in Afghanistan, in Kabul and they were what I guess you would call, hippies, whatever you want to say something of that generation. It was three young men. One young man who was a son of a wealthy family in New England. One young man was the son of a sharecropper, a Mexican sharecropper in the southwest of the United States, probably California. The third young man I forget. They wanted to go. This was just prior to my coming. They wanted to go from Kabul to Stockholm because Stockholm was the center of liberal acceptance of anti-war types.

Q: And people who were denouncing the selective service and they found refuge there.

FARRAND: In Stockholm, Sweden. They wanted to go from Kabul to Stockholm. Now there's ways you can do that of course. You can get on an airplane and you can go to, I don't know some major point in the Middle East and then you can fly to Rome, Italy and then up to Stockholm or you could go to Frankfurt, or you could do a number of things. They didn't want to spend the money doing that and they knew if they got to Stockholm and had some marijuana, I think it was marijuana in this case, hash, hashish. I never did know the difference, anyway hashish. They went to a bazaar and a trader saw them and said that he could sell them the hashish and they were going to invest what money they had, they didn't have a lot, even the rich fellow didn't have a lot, the parents had cut him off. They were going to take the money, spend it on hashish, then they were going to smuggle it across the Soviet Union into Stockholm, Sweden and on the basis of the hashish they could live fine because they would cut it up and sell it and they would be just fine. Now, this fellow that sold this to them, this trader in the markets of Kabul, said, "I not only will sell it to you, but I also have here, right here a suitcase that I can sell to you, too, that has a secret compartment." Being young men of discernment and quick eye they saw this as a great idea.

So, they bought from this fellow and they put their hashish in this secret compartment and they went to the airport and they flew from Kabul to Tashkent, in those days it was the Uzbek Republic and they set down the airplane and were met there by police who took the bag and confiscated the hash and put them, arrested them and put them in prison, put them on trial and Bob Barry's predecessor, the consul, one of the finest Foreign Service officers I've ever met, named Samuel Edwin Fry, Jr. Yes, he's taller than you are. Sam was the fellow that had to go down there to Tashkent and sit through those trials and counsel these people and write up reports and Sam and I became friends at that point. I got there early, left my family behind for about three weeks. Sam and I became close friends and remain, but he taught me a lot about that case and his successor, Bob Barry,

my boss had to take over responsibility for the case, but inevitably there was a lot of skol. Now, these three young men were put in prison. I'm going to draw this to a close. They were put in prison and they were transported occasionally whenever we asked for consular access to Moscow and we learned that by asking we quickly learned, Bob Barry was a real Soviet hand expert and had worked on the Soviet desk in the bilateral division. So, he had worked with a lot of this mucky stuff on this side of the ocean and so he brought that stability to that situation. We knew that their prison conditions in Tashkent were deplorable for each of these three men. We knew that one of them; the son of the sharecropper was a defiant sort. He wasn't going to be broken and he was put into solitary. Now, we would put a note in to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MID, and we would ask for consular access. They would then start their song and dance every time, song and dance, every time, song and dance. So, no sooner than we'd meet with them, then we would prepare and within a very few weeks we would put another note in because we knew it would take a couple of months to get the access, but we also knew that having those boys flown into Moscow from Tashkent that they would be washed, they would be cleaned up and that they would be given some food so that they looked okay. They would be threatened we knew and I would go, it would depend, but I went a number of times and saw these guys at the tough prison in Moscow in those days. It was a prison was called Bokitar and it had a bad reputation.

They would come into the room and they would sit opposite, of course, there was green hatted Soviet officers sitting around and I'm sure there was not only the prison officials, but KGB in the room and we would talk to them. Now, they couldn't say much. But we would talk to them, we'd bring them what letters we had, we'd bring them clothing and food and stuff that had been sent from the United States for them and we, too would go out on our own and we put a little fund together amongst them and then we would buy stuff for them and take it to them. Now, these boxes of stuff that we would give them was just absolutely golden. These young men were shaken up thoroughly by this time, they realized they were going to be in prison for three years. There was nothing to do for it except to keep on it. I got inside the Soviet prison. I got to see the KGB rub them like this and I found that sobering and I realized at that time. In fact, I wrote a letter to the editor of Life Magazine and they published it about the prison conditions in the Soviet Union and about how young people should not just go around thinking that because they hate the United States government that other governments are more benign, particularly when it comes to drugs. We did get these guys eventually out, we did. Eventually we were able to work out an arrangement. I went to the airport. They were delivered to the airport in a special room in Cheramechuva. I went there and I said goodbye to all three. I had been working with them. By that time I was consul. It was my second year, I was consul. I had said goodbye and on they went to the airport. After all that I received a letter from one of them. Which one do you think sent me the letter?

Q: The sharecropper?

FARRAND: The son of the sharecropper. I don't know why you thought that.

Q: Well, I was thinking that normally you wouldn't think it would be.

FARRAND: It was a very nice letter thanking us. It was good and bad. It was bitter and sweet. It was sweet and bitter. Thanking us for taking the time, knowing that it was our job, but we did it with a special humanity. He was appreciative of that. The other two, they just went off. He said, "I must also tell you, however, that my job situation here isn't very good, so I am going to have to begin trading drugs again." That was a depressant. Now, so that story taught me so much. It was a great benchmark to come in and have three young people in prison and have to deal with that and have to deal with all of the practical and theoretical legal considerations. That was a great learning. That has stuck with me the rest of my career.

The other time when I was consul in my second year, there was a professor from Cornell University who was also of the anti-war pro-dissident category. Now, I don't care about the anti-war, but he was doing what he could to assist the dissidents in the Soviet Union in his writings back at Cornell. But, anyway, they permitted him to come with his family. His wife and two small children, girls as I recall. He was at one of the universities at Leningrad State University. He was bearded, more bearded than you, and he had a tendency to let his hair grow long. It was all of that. He was picked up by the KGB and was thrown into what they call the big house up there in Leningrad which, if anything, had as hard a KGB contingent as there existed because it was close to the city in the west, Leningrad. He was in prison. I was not yet the consul. Bob Barry was still the consul. He sent me up there to look after this man's family and they put her up in a hotel. She was a very practical woman and a very concerned one. She was very concerned about what was happening her husband. The husband I met, I went to the prison and met him and I said now what are the circumstances and he told me. He was doing what in this country would be certainly all right. Just going by and visiting some poets. The day I went to the prison though, the KGB headquarters to see him, I did see a man being pushed into a car rather roughly and I found out later that it was Joseph Bronsky. I was there, happened by chance to see Joseph Bronsky being picked up, the famous dissident poet. They let this fellow out into my custody, but he had to stay in a hotel. In talking to this young man I realized that there was a wide, wide gap in the understanding of the Soviet Union by intellectuals in the United States, or at least by this one intellectual who represented I presume a couple of others, at least and the practical realities of what happens when you come there and start pricking the bear.

One day the KGB called for him and they wanted him to come down to the big house. I said, "Well, he's not going without me." So, I walked down with him and we stood in this cold interior, this dark interior of this room waiting for somebody to come. We stood there and we waited, and we waited and we waited and we waited. Of course, they saw me coming because it was and they could see you. I remember that after about forty-five minutes and nobody came, I said to him, "Let's simply go now." So, we turned and we walked out and we walked away from that building. I remember in those days I had hair and the hair on the back on the back of my neck was rising as we were displaying our backs to that window to that big building because we knew that we were being observed

and we knew that they could have taken us out if they wished. We did get the guy out finally. I don't think we ever received anything from him, but there was an idea and of course, these are the heroes of life, but on the other hand to bring your wife and your family into that. If you want to do it yourself, that's one thing.

Q: How did your wife and your kids were pretty young, but how did your wife find living there?

FARRAND: The period of l968 to l970 was a watershed in our marriage. She, in fact, left me. She did not like the Soviet Union. She did not like living there and she learned not to like me, so.

Q: I mean, this is of course, one of the untold stories about the Foreign Service, it puts strains on a marriage that are difficult to imagine. Particularly some posts are so much worse than other posts and that makes a strain even worse.

FARRAND: In those days this was 1968, this was before the 1972 agreement between Under Secretary for Management, oh I forget his name, but there was an agreement with the wives and spouses and the Department that no longer would wives be expected, you know. They couldn't become a part and the evaluation reports and all of that. But, up until then it was still wide open. The difficulty is that I had three children at one point. I'm not going to go into this deeply. She took them, I said, "Fine, why don't you leave a little early." When the time came for me to depart and she left about a month early and I stayed on and wrapped up activities, writing evaluation reports and doing all the other things and turning it over to my successor, Peter Burke. I left, but she. When she took my children she just kept on going. So, it was a pretty traumatic time for me.

Q: Who was the ambassador while you were there?

FARRAND: I was fortunate. My first six months was Llewellyn Thompson, one of the great, greats of the Foreign Service. The last eighteen months was Jacob Beam, a wonderful, wonderful man. I don't suppose that Jake Beam ever reached the pinnacle of, I don't know, being well known as was Thompson, but he was a man of solidity and in those days Henry Kissinger was first Secretary of State, he was National Security Advisor.

Q: He was National Security Advisor, came in with Nixon in '69.

FARRAND: Exactly and that was the second year of my time there and about, well, I don't know the times when the president comes in, but certainly, probably in the spring of 1969 an embarrassment happened that we all in the embassy staff were aware of. In those days the embassy was so cramped, it still is in the same building; they put up all of this new construction. That is one of the great tragedies, the construction of the embassy in Moscow is one of the great, the level of the understanding of the Soviet Union and of management of resources that went into that building. I got my syntax screwed up here, is

almost unforgivable. I was asked by Boris Klaussen, ever remember the name? God rest his sole. Boris was the deputy chief of mission, first was Koby Swank. Koby Swank was the Deputy Chief of Mission when I first arrived. A grand gentlemen and a supporter of junior officers in the proper way, not because he was told. Klaussen was the same. They couldn't have been two finer DCMs, of course, this goes back when I'm younger and more naive, I suppose. But, still, I knew a little bit about management from my navy years and they served first Llewellyn Thompson and Jake Beam. Jake Beam was a diffident man. Jake Beam was probably, you know in the Meyers Briggs, he was probably an introvert. Kissinger actually came to Moscow and was installed on Lenin Hills in one of the apartments by visiting dignitaries by the Brezhnev regime and then called Jake Beam up to Lenin Hills and Kissinger was sitting there. This was a rank insult of the very first order. To take a man like Beam who was a professional at the top of his career and to come to town because you see, the Nixon people didn't trust the Foreign Service or the State Department, they had this deep mistrust. As I have found, republicans often do. They just, it was just an absolute, you know, you just can't imagine and Jake Beam took it and he turned the other cheek and took it. You can debate on whether that was he right thing to do or not. I would like to think that I would not have. I would like to think that he should not have, but he did because he said the president runs foreign policy. There's nothing in the constitution that says there's a secretary of state or anything else that runs foreign policy. We remained, of course, loyal to him, but we were appalled that the embassy could not be trusted to be brought in on a visit of the national security advisor to Moscow. I think I saw that, I saw other things that Kissinger has done and you're either going to have a structure, you're either going to have professionals, you're either going to have it or you're not.

Q: How did you find life in Moscow or did you get to make any trips? Were you harassed, or were there problems or how did things go?

FARRAND: I had said on an earlier tape when I was in Kuala Lumpur I would try one more tour in the Foreign Service to test it to see if this is really what I wanted to do. I wanted to get away from the reach of Coca-Cola. Well, I was successful. I found myself in Moscow and there was no Coca-Cola, not on the local stamps, anywhere. Today, I guess I would have said McDonald's. But, today McDonald's biggest stores in the world are in Moscow. I found it absolutely fascinating. I lived on the outskirts, but far away from the embassy and I would often walk to the metro which is one of the world class undergrounds in the world. I would walk. They didn't have many stations so that was a problem, but I would walk just to see the people on the street in the morning. Then I would go down deep, deep down and I would make my way across town by metro and I would observe people, observe their faces. On August 21, 1968 I was there now about seven weeks, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia. I remember in my own little way saying, "I'm going to watch." After it sunk in on us that they really had I was in Moscow and the people were grim. The faces coming up and down these big long, and these were deep, deep, deep escalators far deeper. I mean, the one at Rosslyn here is very deep, but the one over there would be even once and a half again and you're going down a very steep incline. You could see these folks. There was a grimness that I reported to the

political section, but you know, that's something that you can't. But, I had been doing it enough so that I noticed there was a certain grimness in the people and a certain concern because they were being served garbage by Pravda. I found the conditions of life there; the conditions of supply were deplorable. It was summertime, when I first arrived, July, August, September and that made it as nice as it could be. Dust and dirt, drab, drab storefronts, the system of supply were such that each store supplied only one item. For example, this is dairy and you have to go another two blocks and find one that sells meat, if they sell meat at all. Then you have to go another three or four blocks that might sell some vegetables and the women walking around, trudging around with their little string bags or no bags. Shoes, terrible shoes, very gray, very gray, but I was fascinated by it. I saw, this was where I wanted to be.

Q: Did you have any problems with the KGB just in going around?

FARRAND: Well, the place where we lived was watched. There was a policeman at the front door so as you went in and out there was always a policeman. Any hotel you ever went into, each floor in any hotel had a woman, her name was Dejurnia. Her job was to apparently look after your needs, but in fact to look after you. She would always be a woman of uncertain age and she reported directly. You always got your tickets and you got your hotel reservations and train tickets wherever you were to go and we always traveled in twos, two by twos. You could never travel alone, two by two. You could travel with your wife and that would be two by two, but basically they wanted two officers. Your officers went through a central place, Opideka, and wherever you went was always checked with the KGB and they would pick you up. I can recall being in Kiev along the banks of the Inyepit River and walking along and seeing a man reading a newspaper, standing and reading a newspaper. I thought to myself people don't stand and read newspapers, you read it against a building. Oh, you might, but his age was such that I didn't think that was entirely appropriate. I saw that many times. You could pick them up much more easily because they became fact in their own country. They weren't up against real and I wasn't a professional, so they weren't up against the real stuff. So, they got sloppy, you could pick them out. You didn't have to turn around to stare at them. You could pick them out. That sort of thing. Did they ever try to knock me off a train platform under the third rail, did they ever drive my car off the edge of the road or something of this nature. No, no, but you knew they were there.

Q: What was the sort of the feeling, I mean you would be talking to the other officers about this, were you seeing this as a system that really was running into, maybe not then, but eventually would run into a dead end because of the economics effect? It wasn't really delivering things or not or was it felt to be a presence that would be there forever and ever?

FARRAND: That question I hope you're asking of everybody that's been there. It's really on target. How is it that a group of young Foreign Service officers, mostly male in those years, but female as well later, could, with all their education with all their exposure to democratic principles and the so-called free market and all of this other stuff, how is it

that, and I was part of them. That we could be there and we could watch all of this and we could not predict with some certainty that this is not going to go on. This is a train rocketing down very slowly. It's like that train out there in the Midwest the other day rumbling along, nobody could shift it or change it.

Q: It was a train that got started without the driver and nobody was on board, it just accidentally started going. I'm just putting this on the side.

FARRAND: Yes, and it went for sixty-five miles, sixty-three miles with nobody on board at speeds of forty and forty-five miles an hour through towns, I mean, incredible in Ohio. Now, the Soviet Union did have a driver when it started. Lenin and his ideas, he wrote them down and then, of course, he gave it over to Stalin and then other things happened along the way. By the time we were there, there wasn't anything that wasn't going to change the direction of that train. That train under non-thinkers, arterial sclerotic people like Brezhnev, there was no chance that anybody was going to be able to pull the train over to the siding and see whether all the valves are working right, there was nothing. It was headed, but no one that I know was coming forward with a report. This would include the friends up the river, the CIA. There was no one saying this train is headed for a wreck because even though on a daily basis we saw how wholly inadequate the system was to do anything for the people. I won't go into it. It's been written about too much. To produce those things that a normal, modern society needs so that the people could have a standard of living above that of just the essentials on Moslow's hierarchy of need. Except for the party types, they were of course, up on the top there of Moslow's pyramid.

The annual two times a year, I guess it was done in October and then again, I guess on the day of the great revolution and then on May 1st they would put these big parades through Red Square. They'd have this massive rumbling through of tanks and guns and these troops all coming through. That was what was broadcast to the world. It was a display of a lot of heavy stuff and then, of course, you knew about all these secret places that you couldn't go and missiles and bombs and airplanes and guns and tanks and all of this business. Somehow we all became mesmerized thinking that was the key measure and despite the fact that they couldn't produce enough meat for the people or good quality shoes or their clothes in the stores you couldn't sell at a thrift shop here in the United States.

That was true, we all knew that that was reflective of something else going on and the quality control, but the facts were they could still blow us off the face of the planet and we had to take them seriously. Nobody was prepared to say that this train wreck which was coming was going to happen, when it was going to happen or when it happened that the train wouldn't fall over in such a manner that it would destroy the entire train station and that train stations around the world. That was a very bad analogy. Nobody could predict that this thing was going to implode, they thought it would explode if it ever came to an end and nobody was ready, me included. Yet, there were times when I would say, I would say it to my friends, "What the hell are we afraid of?", We'd say, "Yes, why are we worried, we could run these people into the ground." But, they had the bomb and they had

it deployed, you know. But even the great thinkers, they didn't pick it up. I think the CIA got it wrong and there's a professor at Harvard at Vasser, his name is Marshall Goldman. He came as close as anybody. He's still in the business and he's a very bright, fine man.

Q: Well, in 1970 you left Moscow, whither?

FARRAND: Under the rules at the time you had six years to prove your work in the Foreign Service and I wish, I wish I really believed that. I mean I wish that that was a real, what's the word, a real hoop to jump through. I really wish it were. It's not, but that's the way you go. So, you had three tours and at the end of the third tour then you got, what is this thing called, oh I don't know, ten-year. It became ten year later, but at that time, it was just kind of informal. It was a threshold that you had to go through a certain pattern and one of those patterns was you went overseas for one tour and that was your rotational junior officer rotation. Then you went to another posting for another tour in something else in another part of the world and then you came home to the Department and you worked for two years in an office somewhere. Then, that gave you rotation, that gave you a solid job in a second embassy and then you came home and then you worked in the Department and at the end of that. And, you know what, not bad, not bad. I think that was good if it could have been sustained and if it could have been held rigidly and if there was in fact a board to look you over, but, I mean I think it got too much shoeinism. So, anyway, I came back to the Department of State and because I was an economic officer and I had been overseas now for two tours and I had only ten months of economic work I went to the economic bureau. This wonderful lady, Frances Wilson.

Q: Frances Wilson, oh yes, her name runs throughout my interviews. She was the czar of the economics, a civil servant who really looked after her boys.

FARRAND: This is what the feckless and I want this to go into the record, the feckless Department of State needs is someone like and she only comes once in a generating. She worked for Phil Tresize and she worked hand in glove. He was a Foreign Service officer, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs and he was good as an economist and it was a functional bureau. There's a whole lot I could say at some point about the difference between functional bureaus and the queenly bureaus, the regional bureaus. This functional bureau was a good outfit at that time and it had a good reputation and I felt good coming back to the economic bureau and there were good people in it. I'm not going to say it's not good today, but it's nowhere near what it was then. Its been watered down, its been chipped away because a series of secretaries of state who talk the talk about economics and commercial work and could care less, could care absolutely less. I think George Shultz would be the exception to this, but all the rest. So, the Department of State has lost ground around Washington in this crucial area. Nonetheless, I came back to the Bureau of Economic Affairs and I worked under a man who stands along with lots of others at the top, near the top, close to the top, of the people for whom I have ever worked and that was Julius Katz.

Q: Well, he's preeminent now, unfortunately gone, but I have. What were you doing, what area were you given?

FARRAND: They brought me back because I had worked, they brought me back to work under Office Director at the time, Michael Calingaert and they wanted me to work in Food for Peace. I didn't know anything about Food for Peace and I'm an organization man so they said you're going to work in Food for Peace. I thought all right; I'll come back and work for Food for Peace. Well, I was back there and I was trying to find my way into this new job. I was into it about, oh, I don't know, three weeks, two weeks when word came down that Joseph Kyle was the officer, I think Joe has also passed, he worked under Jules that it was an office of resources and food policy. Word came down that I knew something about iron, I knew something about the rubber and tin industry because of my time in Malaysia. Would I be interested in moving to the Office of Industrial and Strategic Materials and taking over the rubber and tin account. Would I be interested? I was so pleased I said yes. I did. I came under, in either case I would have been under Jules; he was the Deputy Assistant Secretary. I worked on rubber and tin for a while and then the big problem, which is with us today and never changed, but it was the big problem then, was heading the Department under Nixon with John Connelly as Secretary Treasurer. That the American Iron and Steel Industry was being inundated with imports cheap from Japan and from the European Union. Would I work on iron and steel? Again, I did and I worked for a year and a half up to my ears on voluntary arrangements on iron and steel. It was Jules and Nap Samuels the Under Secretary of Economic Affairs and a very good guy, whose name I have forgotten right now.

Q: We're just about at the end, what were the issues that we were concerned, whether the steel and the other one, rubber and tin. We're talking about '71 to '73 I guess, wasn't it?

FARRAND: It was '70 to '72. The non-glamorous aspect of economic work in the Department in those days was far outweighed by the serious with which the top levels of the government were taking some of these things. It didn't hit the newspapers a lot, but it was very important. We were in those days the American iron and steel industry in this country was producing something like between 85 and 90 million, well maybe even close to 100 million tons a year. You want to take a look at those numbers today and back then we had huge steel firms, ARAMCO, Bethlehem, U.S. Steel, big, big firms in this country. I learned something about all of this. Anytime an economic issue hits the Department of State that industry in this country is in trouble and, probably, in terminal trouble. But, I didn't really have that insight at the time. I was given this job to do and I, there was a man that was the chairman or at least the number two in the counsel of economic advisors. His name was Houthakker, from Harvard; he was a Dutch American with a Dutch descent. He was given the job of studying the American steel industry to find out for the White House what to do. He put me in tow and we traveled this country and I was excited, to Pittsburgh and all sorts of places and steel mills and out. It was a marvelous just on one level a marvelous education. On another level it told you what was happening when the great Rust Belt of America began to develop and it also told you a lot about the willingness of industry leaders in an old line industry like steel to change or to read the

tea leaves and to make changes and to insert new technology. The great thing that put us behind the ball on steel was the Second World War. We came out of the Second World War largely unscathed. That, that was a real problem for our industry because most of the people who rose to the top were production men, engineers, and the idea that they could be overtaken by Germans or Japanese or Austrians even who were putting in brand new technology to replace their old, destroyed plants and mills and that they had to keep up was. All they did was turn to Washington and say, "You got to help us." Of course, in those years, that's what the Nixon administration wanted to do anyway. I was witness to a great drama, which goes on today as the steel mills continue to close. I read the other day that Bethlehem is now looking into coming very close to bankruptcy. They may have to combine, I hope they do, hope we end up with a steel industry on shore.

Q: Were we get moving into specialized steel, which I understand is?

FARRAND: Yes, there are three categories of steel. There is carbon, which is the big stuff you see around, the girders. The specialty and then there is a high, narrow, little category called tool steel which is very hard steel. It's done with special metals and all of this. But, even in the area of specialty steels, which are produced by smaller plants, electric furnaces, they are able to; they aren't able to keep up with competition from abroad particularly as the dollar strengthens.

Q: What did you find yourself doing?

FARRAND: I was the Batman. I was the person that, I took all the incoming phone calls, not all of them, the big ones went upstairs, but Jules relied upon me for a constant flow of statistical analysis, a constant flow and ideas and options for what should be done. Jules Katz knew instinctively that the steel industry was jerking the U.S. government around. They weren't putting money into modernization and to plant upgrades, just a lot of that.

Q: How about Congress? Were you getting a lot of heat from Congress?

FARRAND: Oh, yes, oh, yes. And heat from the Treasury Department, John Connelly, who was a. A curious thing, Connelly was a democrat, remember?

Q: Oh, yes, he was a democratic governor of Texas.

FARRAND: He was under, he was in the car when Kennedy was assassinated, but he ends up as Nixon's secretary of treasury. I don't know if I ever knew that story.

Q: Dillon, I mean there was a lot more bipartisanship than we have today. Dillon, for example, was secretary of treasury under Kennedy and was a republican. This was done all the time.

FARRAND: If you take a look at the number of secretaries of the treasury that have been from Texas, you'd be quite surprised. Connelly being one, Detson being another and a couple of others.

Q: Did you, basically what we were trying to do was put restrictions on, was that the end run?

FARRAND: Yes, yes, I remember a confrontation, not a confrontation, a couple of White House staffers, not White House staffers, consultants to the White House, that confronted me on the street one day by saying, "Well, I hope you're proud of yourself. You are working to restrain market forces." I thought, well, yes, that's right and on the other hand, there are so many jobs maybe we have to have a department, not only of economics, but of socioeconomics at the State Department. Maybe we need something like that. It was, even Howtocker wasn't pleased with it. To these economists, of course, what you're doing is you're restraining competition.

Q: Well, I think back in the late '80s I was in Italy, southern Italy and they had some big steel mills there that were dinosaurs owned by the government, but they employed maybe 10,000 people total down in southern Italy and those were jobs. They couldn't, at that time; they didn't have the political clout to close them.

FARRAND: I can sit here and be critical and you can, but if you were in the politician's shoes, you'd think long and hard.

Q: Well, I watched the French camp close. Anyway, I think this probably a good place, I know you have to leave to stop and we'll pick this up next time in what, 1972 or where did you go after the economic bureau?

FARRAND: I went to Prague.

Q: All right, you went there when?

FARRAND: I went there in the winter of 1972.

Q: '72?

FARRAND: I went there in December of '72.

Q: Of '72. Okay, we'll pick up that up then. Great.

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Today is the 20th of June, 2001. We're in 1972 and you're off to Prague. In the first place, you were in Prague from when to when, years?

FARRAND: December ‘72 until February of ‘75 and that’s rather strange kind of catenation of times given the personnel system, but that’s the way it was.

Q: Well, we’ll pick it up at the end how you did that. So, you were in Prague. What was Prague like in ‘72, well, first what was the state of our relations with the Czechs in 1972?

FARRAND: Not good. Not good. It was almost four years with a few months added on when I arrived from the time of the Soviet invasion.

Q: The ‘68 one?

FARRAND: The ‘68 invasion, August of 1968, so this was December of ‘72, a little over four years. The Prague and Czechoslovakia was an occupied country for all intents and purposes. The Soviets had established military bases outside of the capital city, which was Prague. They had base in the central part of the country and they had military units. They kept them out of sight because the Czechs were not at all happy with the situation, but the Czechs could do little and we did none, nothing that was kind of a replay of the 1956 invasion of Hungary when the Soviets came in. We talked a lot, but we didn’t do anything. Even with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia we didn’t do quite so much talking I think.

Q: We learned our lesson there.

FARRAND: I hope, I think we had, but it let the Czechs down, of course. As far as relations with the United States and Czechoslovakia were not good at that time.

Q: What was your job when you went there?

FARRAND: Someone had a very good FSO-3 officer.

Q: About the equivalent of a colonel in the military?

FARRAND: Yes, equivalent. Today it’s FSO-1. In those days I used, I have remembered this man’s name; he was a very good officer. He had been in Prague from, I guess he was in Prague, he went to Prague in 1972 as economic and commercial officer. It was a combined, actually it was a political economic, it was a pol/ec as we call it and the political officer was a man who has become a very good friend of mine, Peter Bridges, and the officer that was to be his economic assistant and commercial officer was this FSO-1 officer whose name I will remember who we had each year we participated in the Czech’s industrial fair in the city of Brno which is located in Meridia. This man was on his way down there with an assistant and another Foreign Service officer friend of mine and the car spun out of control, the man was killed. His son, a twelve-year-old was riding in the back seat. He held his father’s hands as the man died. I think Cocksum was the name. His name was Emmett Cocksum. Well, the post was then unmanned on the economic side. The personnel system was caught off guard and I was working in the

economic bureau and we got a call one day from a fellow named Bob Morley and Bob called me and said, "I understand well you're in the economic bureau. Would you be interested in Prague as economic officer? I understand you speak Russian?" I said, "Yes, I do, but I only speak Russian." He said, "Don't worry. It's easily convertible. They're in the same family of languages." I was naive enough to believe that, but I had been in the Department for almost pushing three years and I said, "Sure I'll go." So, I up and went. But, as I say, it was a dark, gray, demoralized time. December is in central Europe, but added to that was the sense of brooding, defeat and a feeling of feeling of kind of an accepted despair. I don't know if those words fit, but anyway.

Q: Who was our ambassador at the time when you got there?

FARRAND: Albert W. Sherer, Jr.

Q: What was his background?

FARRAND: Africa and Central Europe. He had served, I think, in Guinea-Bissau as ambassador and then they tapped him to do this. He perhaps had had one previous tour in Poland. A fine man.

Q: The DCM, do you recall?

FARRAND: I do, indeed. The DCM was Arthur Wortzel. Arthur Wortzel was a very humane and excellent DCM in my memory.

Q: What were working conditions for you in Czechoslovakia at that time? How did you go about your business?

FARRAND: Well, physical working conditions. The embassy was located in the Schonbrunn Palace, which was the northern branch of the Austrian-Hungarian Schonbrunn family in Vienna. In Vienna there is a big one.

Q: So, that's the Hapsburgs' seat of government, or at least was.

FARRAND: I think you're probably right, I didn't, I'm not a student of the Hapsburgs or all of this. I just was located in a communist country, north of Vienna; occasionally we got down there, but not often. The Schonbrunn Palace had been held through the war, the Second World War, there was a Czech man. We left, George Kennen had been the charge d'affaires there and was evacuated at one point. He writes extensively about Prague and his time there. At one point during the Second World War they were evacuated so that the building which we had gotten in the 1920s when a man had been ambassador who was a scion of the Crane Plumbing Company, you know? Toilet bowls? Well, we had that big palace so it was located in the cramped streets, one of the cramped streets in the old part of Prague and as you come up on it from the front, it's a facade. As you enter the gate, it's an old creaky, wooden gate, literally that was what it was when I arrived. It had a single

little key that you put in and you would open this creaky, wooden gate to let your car in. It was a cobbled interior and you walked in, the scene unfolded in front of you of this wonderful 18th century interior courtyard and the building rose on either side. We both lived there and had the office there. So, working conditions were better than I had ever experienced in the Foreign Service because I parked my car on a Sunday afternoon and didn't have to move it until the next weekend. Now, about interaction with the Czechs, I sometimes wondered why we had an economic and commercial unit working there because, number one the official position of the Czech government was the same as that of the Soviet Union and the Czechs and the Bulgarians were at the bottom of the heap of the six countries of Eastern Europe. The Czechs and the Bulgarians. When it came to servitude, vasseldom, they were right in lock step with the Soviets. The Soviet embassy in town was a large embassy, the ambassador there was essentially, it was very important to the day to day runnings of the affairs of the Czech government. At the time the prime minister, they called him that I guess it was the president. No, there's a president and a Prime Minister. The Prime Minister was Gustav Husak and he was a Brezhnev clone, I mean he had a very deep, resonate baritone voice. That was his distinguishing feature, but everything else he was just a Brezhnev clone. Nothing moved, nothing much happened and the idea of inviting American firms to come in and help the Czech industrial base improve itself or modernize or bring on new methods of production, production lines, new machinery, that was not in the cards. That was not in the cards to the great detriment of the Czech economy because before the war, before the second world war, during the interwar years under Massovik, Czechoslovakia which was formed largely at a conference in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania of all things, to bring the Czechs and the Slovaks together. Czechoslovakia, Woodrow Wilson, had a lot to do with that, but Czechoslovakia became one of the leading industrial and manufacturing companies per capital of all Europe. Their standard of living I have this on third account, but their standard of living equaled or surpassed that of Switzerland for a few years in the war years. But, of course, then things took another turn.

Q: How did you get outside, I mean obviously you read the paper diligently, or somebody read them for you?

FARRAND: Right.

Q: How about contacts? Did you have any contacts with commercial or manufacturing people or anything like that?

FARRAND: Well, the Soviet system divided the countries of Eastern Europe into various categories under this arrangement known as commicon or CMEA, Counsel of Mutual Economic Assistance. We called it commicon. Long before I ever got there and long before our embassy was robust enough to have any influence, not that it would have, so I should strike that comment. The Soviets decided that certain parts of their eastern, well it would be their Western Empire, the six countries of Eastern Europe, what we call it, would do various things for the Soviet industrial machine. They would produce certain things and the Soviets divvied it out that way. For example, there were three parts of

Czechoslovakia. There's Bohemia, in the west of which Prague is the center, there's Moravia in the center of which the city Brno is the most important town and then there is Slovakia in which Bratislava is the important city. Now, historically, Bohemia is inhabited by Czech peoples and as a just as a rough thumb, populist rule of thumb; the Czech peoples drink beer and are industrialized. As you go further east and get into Slovakia you come onto people who are agricultural and drink wine. Now, those are simple little differences, but they were used as a kind of a shorthand way of defining. Into Slovakia the Soviets gave the obligation to produce to build a huge steel mill in the far, far eastern reaches of Slovakia right up chock a block up against the Ukraine and to build a lot of steel for heavy application. For example, tank, tank turrets, engines, not so much the engines, but the housings for the engines of trains and things of this nature. This was something that these people had no experience in, they had no iron ore and the Soviets would ship the iron ore to them and then they would struggle to make this huge, massive, inefficient, behemoth of a plant work. It was that sort of thing that happened. The Czechs were to produce over in Bohemia all of the streetcars, the trolley cars that were used throughout that part of Europe. They were to produce the engines for trains and Czech engines, there was an outfit called Czechkaday who produced these huge massive engines and they became the engines that drove a lot of trains through the commicon countries. Czech streetcars would be on the streets of Poland and streets of Warsaw and places like that. Kiev. But, all of this was without the law of comparative advantage being applied and without any competition. So, they just kept slagging backwards. They wouldn't come up with new innovative things. We could have helped there, but the Soviets of course; it was a political thing.

Q: Did you go visit factories and that sort of thing?

FARRAND: That was the thing where there was a great deal of interest and those who listen to this later, if anyone ever does, will particularly if they're from Czechoslovakia will know that as an economics officer, I had a natural entree to talk to the heads of factories. When you talk about contacts, most of my contacts were carefully controlled through three ministries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ministry of well, they call it FMTD, it was the ministry of technology development and then another ministry was the ministry of, I want to say commerce, the ministry of trade. So, the ministry of trade and I had three people that I dealt with at all times and I would have them to my house as a unit and we would talk and sit around. I was trying to do this so that I could occasionally go visit some of these large factories. And your question is spot on. I would visit the large factories and I would talk to the heads of factories. They would give me tours of the works. I am not an engineer, so I sometimes didn't know what I was seeing, but I would keep my eyes out for all sorts of little things, like working conditions for the workers; safety equipment. Did the workers wear safety equipment? It was appalling to see workers walking around huge heavy cranes overhead moving large pieces of equipment and some of the foundries and things of this nature. They're walking around in sandals; I mean the open-toed sandals with a pair of heavy socks on, no helmets, none, no gloves. Where did I see that? The aisles of the factories. In one case I remember so well, the aisles of the factories were not delineated. I don't know if you've ever visited an

American plant, a big American plant that produces for example, aircraft or helicopters. In this country today, everything is palletized and everything is even in this massive building. Everything is carefully segmented with a big yellow line and you don't put things outside that yellow line into the lane where forklift trucks are moving, where bicycles are going, where all kinds of things are. Everything is there. Not in Czechoslovakia in those days. It was, I don't know how to say it. They must have had industrial accidents of horrific proportions and I would report that. Of course, there was a great deal of interest in my reports because there were a lot of people in the embassy who couldn't get inside those places.

Q: How did we feel about the whole Czechoslovakian production? East Germany had been targeted as being the best of the economic states within the commicon, but what was your impression from what you were getting in Czechoslovakia?

FARRAND: I think, Stuart, the way that you've expressed that is accurate. We saw it roughly that way. I think I had found myself when I'd go to certain embassies trying to normally, trying to put the, maybe it's just an unconscious thing, maybe it's just something that I did, but I would try to find out the best I could to put facts in line to make the country I was working in to the positive side of things. I would try to find something that they really would excel in production of. I guess it really came down to the city of Plzen, it was about an hour by road to the west of Prague in Bohemia and the German adjective would be Pilsner and the beer they produced there for four hundred years was just superb. So, it still is today. Pilsner was a great beer. They know how to do that and they did it well. So, they did that well, but you notice I'm not talking about anything else. Now, I will say, I will say that even in this period, the Czechs had an industry of producing small trainer aircraft, LET was the name. That was by all accounts a very good small trainer aircraft for beginning pilots. I suppose their turbines and their large engines for trains, I suppose they were okay, but I was never aware of any quality control standards. I was never made aware by any American. That's the other thing, an American businessman would come and he would get an opportunity to go see a plant. This didn't happen very often, it was not a very robust operation I can tell you, but when they did, I would talk to them, I would learn over time because they were the best source because they were engineers and they knew what they were looking at. They knew what they were looking at. We didn't.

Q: Were we seeing essentially, was it an inefficient workforce that you were seeing even in Czechoslovakia?

FARRAND: Yes, yes, inefficient. The Czechs are a remarkable people though. They have bent over the years, they have swayed over the years, they haven't always been resistant. They're right in the heart of Europe; they're surrounded by low mountains. Hitler had viewed Bohemia. He was thinking about making it as I understand the center, the heart of the Third Reich because it was behind these low mountains and it was kind of a bowl called the Shumama Mountains on the west of the country. It was the Czechs, the Czechs, you know, over the centuries, that's the reason why the Charles Bridge across the Vltava

in downtown Prague has stood since 1348. The Prague River, the bridge has stood there. It's a stone bridge, it's a beautiful bridge and it's never been destroyed. Why hasn't it ever been destroyed? Well, because the Czechs always found a way of making an accommodation with their conquerors. Probably that's good for the city that's good for Prague. I'm not so sure it's good for the spirit of the Czech people.

Q: How about going about your business around Prague? Was the security a problem for you and your family?

FARRAND: No. Those of us who worked in that part of the world and this was my second tour inside of a communist country. I had been in the Soviet Union as we earlier talked for a couple of years as consular officer. I had known, I knew and had felt the eyes of surveillance on me and the sense that things that you were saying over the telephone were recorded and all of this sort of thing. There were, the fact that there were bugs and all of this business, that became kind of a little game with everybody and it added to the spice of life. When I went to Prague the same thing was in place, they did not have the KGB, they had an STB and their STB was better in many ways than the KGB. Why, because they were up on the front line right across from Germany and there were German businessmen who would come in and they would use as targets of opportunity. So, yes, we were watched. It was a thuggish group, but it didn't really hamper. It probably cooled, if I was waiting in the outside waiting room and you are an official of a trading house and you know the American commercial officer's out there, well, I'm sure there was a protocol that you probably had to let STB know or they found out or something later, but you were on your guard. You had to be or there was going to be trouble. So, I dealt with that. So, that really cut into our ability to do what the Department in those days wanted was a reasonable commercial job. We did involve ourselves in big trade shows. They one huge trade show a year and then other minor ones. We got involved. I was very active in that getting American businessmen in to display their wares?

Q: What was the purpose of the trade shows from our point of view?

FARRAND: From our point of view? Well, I mean, let's just be real pragmatic Yankees. We wanted to sell some things to them that were not on the prohibited list. From their point of view, what they wanted was for western firms all over Western Europe, United States, Canada, wherever to bring in state of the art equipment that they could look over and study and not necessarily buy. Or if they bought they would buy a prototype and try to reverse engineering. Well, of course, that rarely works.

Q: Well, I would think that as a practical measure it would be hard to work up much enthusiasm for these trade shows?

FARRAND: Not so, not so. There were a number of American firms, particularly in the agricultural business and things. John Deere, other firms that were associated. I'm having a mental blank, but there were others like John Deere who were quite anxious to come in and show their stuff. I remember one big crane coming in from an outfit up in Grove,

Pennsylvania. In fact, it was the Grove Crane Company. It still exists. It's up in Pennsylvania. They brought a crane over and showed it and it was a very flexible crane. It could do things that the cranes that they were using weren't. So, yes, there was a lot of interest. American businessmen would come and they would see what was needed on the ground and they would say, "Boy, we can really come in." I didn't want to say no to them. I'd point out the downsides, but they'd come. There's optimism in American businessmen that you can't extinguish.

Q: Well, it probably works in the long run because it keeps them from doing write-offs and maybe the time has come for something to happen.

FARRAND: Right, right.

Q: What about the skoda works?

FARRAND: The skoda works was a difficult place for me to visit. It was always difficult to work out a visit to a skoda works. What we finally did do though, we finally got a visit to the skoda works but by not me going, but asking for the ambassador to go and they said yes to him. They equivocated with me. He went, I went, my boss, Peter Bridges went, the three of us went to see the skoda works one day over in Pilzen, where the Pilsner beer was produced also. Massive works, massive and it produced the skoda truck, the lorry. The Czechs produced good trucks. I mean, I think that not only a skoda, but another one down in the heart of the Tatra Mountains called Copshinitza. They produced an articulated truck, you know, the cab and the back end. But, and so we went there. We went there and my memory of it was that as we sat down they began to immediately hit the ambassador after opening pleasantries with a fact that occurred in world war two that some American bombers near the end of the war came in and bombed the skoda works, bombed it. So, they had to spend time remonstrating with him about this thing. Well, it worked out that Bud Scherer had been an army air force flyer in the Second World War and he flew I think liberators. He flew on bombing missions and he said, "I can tell you that these bombing missions, mistakes were often made. It was very difficult to know exactly what every building was." He got around it that way.

Q: Of course, the other side of the coin was that they were producing stuff for the Germany army.

FARRAND: Yes, but the standard routine of communist propaganda, the standard way of going about dealing in those years with westerners like us would be to get you always on the back foot right away, to make a charge of some awful that had happened in the past about which the facts were mostly known, but somewhat not known and then put you on the back foot and you in a moral bind because Americans, for sure, Americans, I don't know about Western Europeans, for sure Americans, when we come into a conversation with people, almost any interlocutor with whom we're going to be speaking, almost there is a natural tendency for Americans to want to be friendly at the outset and any number of photographs, I tried to restrain myself. But, in any number of photographs you'll see from

the period and maybe from other places, too, you'll see three or four people, two people from the host country in the communist world and one or two from the Americans and they'll be shaking hands and the Americans will inevitably be smiling and the others will not. They'll be shaking hands without smiling and we will always be smiling. So, I tried to stop my smiling. I'm getting off the subject here. That was, the whole skoda thing was to put the ambassador on his back foot right away and he just came back at them. He just said, "Look, things like this happen in war." He was a combat veteran, so they couldn't really trump him.

Q: Was it impossible to sort of talk to Czechs in the street or as you drove around?

FARRAND: No, it wasn't. I will give you. No, obviously there was a reluctance to invite you to their homes, although if they ever did invite you to their homes, everything they had in the house was yours, unlike the Soviets in that regard. They're very hospitable people and, of course, unlike the Soviets and the Russians, the Czechs had lived for a considerable amount of time under the Austrian/Hungarian empire as the northern branch and then during the interwar years under a philosopher statesman, Thomas Massovik, who by any account was a marvelous human being. So, they had known culture, Dvorak, Martinue, people like this. They had artists, I can't think of the name of the famous artist around the turn of the century. The Czechs are by nature a very refined people by nature. Their upper classes are opera goers, symphony goers and they have an ad before the war and have again at these studios outside of Prague called Boddumdof. They had a very good movie industry and they produced some fine films. I've seen a couple of Czech short films that are built during the past fifteen or twenty years that are just marvelous. But, as far talking to people on the street, when I first arrived because I naively assumed that maybe my Russian would be used there, I went to a restaurant with my wife on one of the very first nights I was there. The waiter came up and he was dressed as often happens in Czech restaurants even under communism, he was dressed in a tuxedo. He asked me in Czech, of which I had studied just a very little bit of before I went, he asked me in Czech if I wished to order. I spoke in Russian in response to him and there was an awkward moment when he wouldn't say anything. Then he said, looking at me knowing from my shoes mostly that I was not a Russian and certainly not a Czech, he said to me in English, "Sir, if you would speak to me in a civilized language then I would be happy to serve you." It was all done very quietly, nicely and I realized at that point that I had made a major blunder, not a small blunder, but a major blunder. Speaking Russian on a street in a town that had just been occupied four years earlier in which blood had flown and in which a young man had emulated himself in front of the, I mean, to do that as a westerner. It would have been better if I had just stumbled along in English. I mean, you know, made my best try, but to speak Russian was to acknowledge and to say to them we validate the Russian invasion in your country and we understand that this is the. At that moment, it was in one way good, I stopped. I said to myself here I am in a little country. I know a language, a Russian language which covers a large huge number of people, but I'm going to put my skills in the Russian language on the chopping block and I'm going to learn Czech. I started within a week of getting up early in the morning. In those days people were hungry for hard currency and I could hire a lady. The Czechs get up

incredibly early in the morning as a people. They are up and out on the streets by 5:00 or 5:30. They're moving toward their workplace at 6:00. This is a marvelous feature. They also go to bed early, but when you're up that early, for me, I don't like getting up in the morning. I'm a late night person, but anyway I would get up early and she would come to my apartment in the embassy and she would come in and sit down and I would have some coffee made and she would teach me one on one Czech. We did that for a year, I did it actually for the better part of three years. When I came out of there I was speaking better Czech by far than I was speaking Russian. I at least started doing it and then I could have conversations with the Czech. I took into account this sensitivity and put it behind me right away. It was very naive on my part even to listen to the Department of State telling me you can do that.

Q: Well, that's a personnel officer trying to get you there in a hurry.

FARRAND: And he's trying to fill a slot. Yes. I understand. I understand his position. He's a great guy, I know him. Bob Morley. He's a great guy. I worked in personnel so I suppose I would have done some of the same things, but anyway.

Q: So many of the Czechs would sort of blossom during the Prague spring, were sat upon very heavily. Was there sort of a dissident group that made itself known or were they keeping quiet?

FARRAND: There was. There was, they were keeping quiet, but they were keeping quiet and it was not my job. I was economic and commercial. The political officer, there were two political officers, there was my boss who was a political economics chief. Then there was a junior officer, Ken Brown was one of them and then another was a fellow named Bob, I'll think of it. But in any case, these were responsible for these people were responsible for doing the workhorse political report. I will have to say in retrospect that I don't think either officer spent much time at all cultivating the Prague spring crowd. If they hear this they will probably say, no that's wrong, but I don't think they did. I want to tell you, I want to tell you that in comparison with the Soviet Union, the Czechoslovakian scene was much more ominous, the sense of control and the sense of surveillance was more pervasive in Czechoslovakia than it was in the Soviet Union. That's probably because the KGB was tucked way, way back across the steps in Moscow and they got a little, I don't know if they got sloppy, but they didn't really have to think that everything was on the line like when you're right out there next to NATO in the NATO corridor. So, it wasn't until I came back as deputy chief of mission in Prague some eight or nine years later that we can talk about getting involved with the dissidents.

Q: As economic officer, were the Czechs through the Pentagon system pushing products to the third world selling streetcars and that sort of thing? How were they?

FARRAND: Yes. The third world doesn't have streetcars. The Czechs produced a very good pistol. I think they produced I want to say another small arm, I'm going to say that I don't know why. I can't put my finger on it, my memory on it. One thing they produced

which was of very high quality was this plastic explosive known as syntax. That couldn't be detected by x-ray machines and I don't know about dogs, I guess dogs could detect anything. But, that syntax is wreaked a lot of havoc on the word.

Q: Yes, by terrorist groups.

FARRAND: I mean this was when they turned in their efforts. I think Hovel now and the Czech government has done something about that, but I don't know if they've closed it all off.

Q: Were you following their export business?

FARRAND: As best I could. As best I could. Their statistics were published. You couldn't trust them. You couldn't get a handle on a lot of this stuff. Czechs were in communication with a lot of countries of northern Africa, what do they call that? The Maghreb. Along there. In southeast Asia.

Q: How did your wife find it?

FARRAND: My first marriage broke up in Moscow as I think I indicated and so by the time it was two and a half years later that I went back to Prague and by that time I had met and asked another lady to marry me. On the day that I was offered a job, when Morley called, Morley called and said, "Would you be interested?" and I said, "I would." He said words to this effect, "There is one thing." And I said, "What is that?" And he said, "You are married, aren't you?" And I said, "Well, I could be." He said, "Well, that's important because the ambassador wants a married officer." You see in those days you didn't want officers that flying free so they greet the swallows and the swans and all the others that came with them. So, I said okay. I put the phone down and I dialed the young lady that I was seeing across town and asked her to marry me. Actually I didn't ask her to marry me, I asked her to go to Prague with me. She said, "Well, what does that mean?" I said, "It means what it means. We should go to Prague and I think we ought to get married." We did. How did she like it? She was fresh faced, hadn't been in the Foreign Service and I could say that she found it absolutely fascinating, I think I can say. I was flat broke.

Q: In '75 whither, you left there at an early time, how did that come?

FARRAND: In '75, I left there at an early time because Henry Kissinger and President Nixon's administration had struck an arrangement with the Soviet Union or at least they thought they had struck up an arrangement with the Soviet Union, it was detente. About 1973, either late '73 or early '74 they opened in Moscow a commercial office to really expand trade between the United States and the Soviet Union. This was part of a multipronged effort to probe the system and maybe with a series of agreements, to have linkages across a spectrum of things. The university exchanges, etc., that would in time of tension hold, you know, that would be an inhibitor to an all out strike or an all out war,

whatever the thinking was. Part of that, the serious part of it was a commercial effort and so where they had never done this before; they opened a commercial office in downtown Prague. Did I say Prague? I meant Moscow. They opened a commercial office and it wasn't downtown. It was about a city block away from the U.S. embassy. They found the building that had a large area, it was a high rise apartment building, but on the ground floor there was a large area all opened by windows that would have been used as a trading house of some sort. Not a trading house, but one of those import type things. So, the Commerce Department, the U.S. Commerce Department took that over and renovated it top to bottom. They brought in a design expert and made this into kind of a western style and put cubicles in for businessmen to come in, various things of the day, a typewriter, a telex machine and then had a staff of an American officer in charge of it at the O-4 level, today O-2 level in those days, actually O-1 level. They were looking for somebody to go do that. I had had two and one-half years, almost three years experience in Prague doing it. There was no question; I wanted to go back. I applied for it and got the job. So, they yanked me out and I have to learn that I have to get my Russian back on stream again if I'm to do this. So, they sent me to two and one-half months of language training at Rosslyn. They sent me to a couple months of language brush up along with Ken Skoug, Don Kirsch, a couple of others that were going out. So, I had a staff of about three or four officers. I had a Congress department guy and two or three State Department officers who worked with me and we, for me it was a brand new thing. I had never really done anything quite like it because this was high intensity. I mean you had Commerce Department pushing trade missions on you, you had, they had trade exhibits, we had a big enough area right there that we could put on what we called mini-trade shows. We invited a dozen firms and they could all have a little desk about this size here. They could sit here and they could put their displays out. Anyway, it was high intensity for two years. I got the job. I followed Thomas Myles. He opened it.

Q: Yes, I knew Tom. You were there from '75 to when?

FARRAND: '75 to '77. No, wait a minute, yes, yes. Well, I got there in the summer of '75 and I left in the summer of '77. That's right.

Q: In the first place, who was our ambassador in '75?

FARRAND: Walter Stoessel.

Q: When you left?

FARRAND: Malcolm Tomb.

Q: How did these men treat the trade side of the embassy?

FARRAND: All political officers in the Department of State knew high policy questions and high policy issues and the most crucial aspect of foreign affairs. Political officers by nature, look askance it would seem to me those aspects of foreign affairs, yet don't meet

the standard of what I just said. This is part of their work and it's part of their, it's the way it is. For example, a science and technology officer, I don't think a political officer would ever apply for a job as science and technology officer in an embassy anywhere. Even though, I mean, you know, you should have people who know something. You should have physicists or chemists or biologists or someone that would take those jobs and that's hard to find in the Foreign Service. So, you'd have to go outside, so maybe science and technology is not the best place, but when it comes to commerce, commercial, this is considered working with businessmen who are not known to be really up to speed on great grand issues of politics. They are more short-term maximizers of profit, etc. They don't fit. So, therefore, now I am making general comments here. I haven't answered your question. I would say that Stoessel and Tomb were broadly supportive of the process of detente. I would say that they would see the role of U.S. industry and business in helping to do this was very important and they would lend support to my work. They did. They did. They would have things that, Stoessel house was the ambassador's residence, they would hold events there. So, I have no complaints. The Deputy Chief of Mission, Jack Matlock, was someone who got it. I mean Jack Matlock got it. He was a political officer, he had all these other things. He understood. He would come down if I asked him and he would support. He would address the businessmen. He would give up his time to do that.

Q: How did you find, let's talk about trying to run a commercial place in Moscow in '75 to '77 years. How did it work? How did you see it?

FARRAND: Right. Oh, by the way I think I went to '78 because, I think I did because I got there at a half-year point. I have to figure this out. Well, anyway, how did I find it? The Soviets insisted on putting a guardhouse on the front stoop of this, for Moscow, very modern establishment, colorful, lights, glitter. The gray Russian would be walking by outside, trudging home in the middle of the dark hours of winter and he'd look in and see these windows ablaze with lights and it was quite a thing. But, they put an interior department guy down at the front door. They watched everybody who came in and everybody who came out and then they hoisted Russian employees on us who would report to them.

Q: How did it work, what were we trying to sell and what was your experience?

FARRAND: From the Russian point of view, here again was almost the same as in the Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, not the Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia. From the Russian point of view what they were interested in was we would call them technical trade seminars. They were interested in aspects of industry that, of course, they always were interested in having a trade show, having us pull together and then put out on a trade show that would go to one of their sectors of industry that they were anxious to find out as much as what was happening in the west as possible. So, they would have a tendency to want electronics, to want computer related, computers were just in their infancy back then. They would be interested in all kinds of technology having to do with energy, with heating aspects, heating units, heating industry, how you do all of that, how you. They

didn't have air conditioning, but the heating aspect. No air conditioning in the Soviet Union in those days. So, all of these things they would be interested in. Now, really for our part we would be interested in farm equipment because we knew that they had this massive, massive amount of land under agricultural. We'd be interested in showing them ways of harvesting their timber, processing wood. We'd be interested in bringing food processing equipment, equipment that would help make restaurants and eating establishments much better. We'd do all of that. That's what we'd be interested in. But, they were interested in the other. Now, if we put on one of these shows of food processing they'd come, of course, but we would always have the firm bring a sales person or somebody on that side of the house and an engineer. So, the products would be explained to the Soviets in a series of seminars and the engineers would get up and explain the product and then they could make a sales pitch. The more technical it became the more Soviets showed up. What they were interested in doing was milking American firms. They would send engineers because they would perk up when the engineers from the American firm would start talking. The trouble with engineers is they don't get out of the back room very often and they love to talk when they get a chance. So, I always had to say to them, "Be a little careful here. That you're not giving away some things that you shouldn't give away, you know in your technical slides and all the other stuff." I don't know if that answers your question, but that's essentially the way it was. They would keep the actual purchases to a minimum and they were hoping to suck the knowledge out of the American.

Q: It sounds in a way like this calculation was to put it in the upper level to make a gesture towards what we wee trying to do, in opening up things. But, in the long run this wasn't really helping us a bit.

FARRAND: Well, it's not true that things weren't sold. There were sales. They weren't' of a major kind. I don't think any firm really had major firms. IBM came and opened an office there. Citibank came and opened an office there. Morgan Guaranty Trust came and opened an office downtown. I think Morgan Guaranty Trust. PepsiCo under Donald Kendall opened an office there because Pepsi Cola is the republican drink. Coca-Cola is the democratic drink. Coca-Cola was in Atlanta when Jimmy Carter was president and Coca-Cola was being pushed. I think in those days it was viewed that way. The PepsiCo came, oh, good lord, there must have been ten or twelve Armand Hammer, what was his firm called? Occidental Petroleum? They opened an office. I've already said IBM. Hewlett Packard opened a big office in Moscow and sent a permanent resident. All these firms sent permanent representatives. I dealt with all of these firms. They were my constituents. I was trying to help them with the Soviet ministries. I don't think under the Soviet Union. American Express was there and had been for years and had done a reasonably good business. Pan American was there, of course, the airplane, the airline. They had done business, they had done business, but it was never the huge business that they were looking for. McDonald's came later after I left. Now McDonald's is booming over there. One of the problems was the hard currency. You couldn't get the hard currency. You could take what it was in rubles, but you couldn't get it out in hard currency.

Q: Were there many American firms that came, tried for a while and left and said, "The hell with this"?

FARRAND: It took time. There were, but it took time and at any time a large organization or firm commits itself to a market, it doesn't leave right away even in the face of negative news. It stays, it sticks, but yes, yes, some just after a point left. However, the consensus was you know, International Harvester was there. I think International Harvester no longer exists, but I think it exists now and the name of the firm is called Navistar. I think it's out in the Midwest somewhere. International Harvester was it. What the Soviets did there, they took the technical representative. There was both a corporate type and a technical rep and the two of them represented with the office. They picked this technical rep up on the street and they sent him, they just took him and yanked him out of his car and whisked him off to Botierska Prison and he became a cause celebre for about three and a half to four weeks. He was a friend of mine and when he was imprisoned like that everybody became concerned. Headquarters of International Harvester way back in Chicago or wherever it was, sent out one of their top people, executive vice president or maybe even their chairman came out to plead the case for this guy. The Soviets charged him with espionage. It was all nonsense. Now, I will say this, that this particular fellow did get into a lot of Soviet industrial activities and told me about them later. He would go off into the Arctic; he would see what the Soviets were doing by drilling for oil up there in the middle of the dead of winter. One of the most remarkable stories he would tell would be how they would start up their heavy equipment in the morning, in the Arctic morning. How they would keep it alive. They would build bonfires under the engine block. Bonfires to get the heat up, under a machine, you build a bonfire. But, anyway, they put him in prison. Well, this became a great big thing. Carrator had an office there and I found out that a lot of businessman began to question whether businessman showed their lack of political acumen by saying, "Yes, maybe he did it. Yes, maybe he was doing it." American businessmen, his colleagues, would say, "You know I always wondered about him." I would say, "Gentlemen, ladies, please, please." What happened on the Garden State Parkway in New Jersey just a month earlier yet the eyes swooped down on two Soviets at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations that were trying to suborn a lieutenant commander in the United States Navy and he notified the FBI so they set up a sting operation and they were waiting for them and he went to meet them and bingo. They got him. This was only retaliation.

Q: In a way did you kind of wonder what you were doing, did you feel you were advancing any cause?

FARRAND: I think the presence of so many corporate executives from the United States on the streets of Moscow for the first time in I don't know how many years, I don't know how many decades, I don't know I guess you could go back to the interwar years. No, you'd have to go back earlier than that. So, the very first time that modern corporate America got to see the Soviet Union and got in some cases inside their factories and began to realize just how lopsided was the Soviet industrial capability that it was very

good when it came to defense, it was very good when it came to missile technology and to space exploration. It was terrible in the medical field; it was terrible in anything having to do with energy and environment, anything of that nature. Just deplorable. So, I think that this was good and I think that it helped to influence because these people were very powerful particularly within the Republican Party and helped to influence the thinking within political circles back home, but it wasn't decisive. It wasn't decisive. What we were pushing is trade and it was very hard. It was uphill all the way. We got a lot of exposure out of it though and those of us who did it had a heck of a lot of fun.

Q: Was there talking among yourselves, I mean, everybody knew it, but somehow it just didn't seem to get translated into our calculations that the Soviet Union was essentially falling apart economically? But, was anybody around talking about you know this thing can't last much longer or not?

FARRAND: Yes. Marshall Goldman at wait a minute now, Marshall Goldman is not at Harvard, he's not MIT, is it Vasser, no. He's at a major school, one of the seven sisters up in Boston. What would that be?

Q: Well, Radcliff it used to be, which is now Harvard.

FARRAND: Okay, okay, it was that part of it. It was the Radcliff Harvard situation and he was up there. He formed a Soviet studies unit up there. Marshall was saying for a long time that this thing is not doing well. The CIA, and he accused the CIA. It was a lopsided debate. Marshall would make his claims and the CIA wouldn't respond. But, he would say that they were just reading it totally wrong. They were reading as maximum threat, you know, in those days, the CIA. They were touting the strength of the Soviet Union and he was saying it's not strong at all. That's as quick an answer as I can give you. I'll tell you this. Those of us who were there would openly deride the system amongst ourselves and we'd say where is this going, how can we be afraid of these people? Well, you have to be afraid of such a people who has a massive missile inventory and it's shown that they can put rockets into space and they've shown they can do it. I mean, you know, the fact that they can't produce Kleenex for the people and they can't produce toilet paper in enough quantities or they can't do anything of this nature, well. I mean, you know.

Q: Did you run across any Soviet engineers or people who came who were concerned or who had come and obviously take a shine to what we're doing and be interested in how they could improve things in the Soviet Union?

FARRAND: Yes, but the system worked against them. This would happen. This would happen and occasionally, if you could have a conversation with somebody on the side, they would let you know that this is very, very good. What you're showing here is very, very good, but we just, (a) we don't have the money for it and (b) we can't get approval. This is really marvelous what we're seeing here. I mean, he's not going to say that in front of anybody and he's going to be careful that he's not saying it in an enclosed room. So, you don't have that much. I didn't have, I served in the Soviet Union two times. I

served earlier of what I've talked about and I served this time. I didn't have a friend, a Russian friend; I didn't have a Russian friend. Maybe a few people that I felt friendly around and we would trade jokes and things of this nature, maybe in the bureaucracy. But, as far as a friend is concerned, somebody I correspond with to this day, no. In Bosnia, where I just came back from three months, they gave me a Russian deputy who was an active diplomat at an ambassadorial rank and he is now currently an ambassador for Russian somewhere in the world. That man and I have a friendship and that has survived and we correspond by e-mail and one future day sometime we will get together somewhere. I know we will because he's a good fellow. That's the only one. You know, trying to get inside that puzzle, that enigma, that closed state was very difficult and to have them say what they thought about your products would be few and far between, but of course, they had nothing to compete.

Q: Was there a type of the Soviet side that would sell things to the United States?

FARRAND: Oh yes, sure, that was the big thing. The only way that they would do business with you is if you could work out some sort of a compensatory deal that would bring in the same amount of money, so it would be a wash. They called it barter. What did they have to barter? Well, they had some timber. They had lots of natural resources. I'm talking ores. It was difficult to work out these kinds of deals, very difficult. Some got into them, I think PepsiCo got into them. What were they taking? Oh, everybody wanted the vodka trade. Everybody wanted the caviar and the vodka trade so that was overburdened with these, they had a word for it and I can't remember it right now. They had a word for it where you bounce this off and I can't think of the word right now, of the phrase. Everybody wanted at the vodka and at the caviar. That could, you know, a couple of firms, one firm out of New York bottled all of that up and maybe PepsiCo did some of it, but big outfits like International Harvester or Caterpillar. What would these guys, these are heavy equipment manufacturers, what would they do if they had a shipload of vodka arrive at port? They don't know how to market vodka. They don't know how to market liquor so they would sell it off to somebody else and it would cut into their profits.

Q: Did you have any problems with the KGB while you were there?

FARRAND: Oh, well, this businessman that was picked up on the street, that was a KGB operation, all of it and that disrupted our operations heavily as I weighed in, helped the embassy up the street, the consular section, helped them build, you know, they're making their demarches and stuff like this. It affected the morale of all the other businessmen. They became very skittish. Jack Matlock had told me, he said, "You better tell all the businessmen to be the alert." I was waiting to get them all together. I often got them, all the businessmen together at a time of a breakfast meeting with coffee and stuff. I was waiting for such a thing to happen. I shouldn't have waited. I shouldn't, but I had to let twenty offices know and I had to do it individually. I couldn't do it over the phone. It was just, I wanted to get them all in a room and say, "Be on the lookout, one of you may be a target." Well, not only businessmen may be a target, but the exchange students could be a target and people that were there like visiting professors and others could be a target, so it

wasn't only the businessmen, but it Matlock's caution turned out to be the right one. Regrettably, between the time he told me and the time it happened, I didn't, I either had to go around to twenty offices which took time in Moscow traffic and tell each one individually or I had to get them together and there was no occasion for that.

Q: The man was released or what?

FARRAND: He was released after about a month in prison, maybe three weeks in prison. Then he had to leave the country. He ended up marrying my secretary and I was best man at their wedding years and years later up in Pennsylvania. Months later, not years.

Q: Well, then in 1977 you left? Maybe '78?

FARRAND: Yes, I'm trying to think. I didn't get there. You know what, you know what? It was February of 1976, not February of 1975 that I went back to Washington to study Russian to get ready. I got there in the summer of '76 and I left in the summer of '78. I was there from '76 to '78. Yes.

Q: The Carter administration had come in by that time and I guess Ambassador Watson came out? Now, did he, in a way, Carter when he first came in was, he was really going to open up things with the Soviet Union.

FARRAND: That's right.

Q: My understanding is that Ambassador Watson was put out there to promote the new spirit of the times in early Carter. How did that affect you when he came out?

FARRAND: Watson didn't, I was there for about six months with Stoessel and eighteen months with Tomb. Tomb had his, Malcolm Tomb had his two years to run out so Watson wasn't there, but what I did I was recruited to go back onto the Soviet desk and to work on the Soviet desk. This time on the political side and I did that. Watson then came out. I met Watson later, but Watson came out and I think it was an acknowledgment on the Carter administration side that this particular initiative the detente was not a bad idea. I mean, I look at that in retrospect. I haven't done much thinking on it over the years, but I think it was pretty good, not bad because by putting Watson out there they were imitating what the Nixon people had done. Watson was not a professional diplomat and Moscow had already been in the hands of professional diplomat. Stoessel, Coler, Jake Read, Thompson, Boland, Tomb, all had been professionals and he was not a professional and this of course, immediately Soviet hands in the Department of State now began to question whether this was a good idea or not. He brought energy to it. I don't think he was able to crack it. He wasn't able to crack it, but there was an effort to do it. There was an effort to up the stakes, but he wasn't able to crack it.

Q: You came back to Washington, then is that right?

FARRAND: Yes, to the Soviet desk.

Q: You were there from?

FARRAND: '78 to '80.

Q: What part of the action were you given?

FARRAND: I was given their four parts of the Soviet desk in those days. It was under an office director by the name of William Schinn, Bill Schinn. He had a deputy by the name of Sherad McCall and it was Sherad who recruited me to the job. There were four parts to the desk. There was the kind of the political side of it, which was divided into, multilateral and bilateral. Then there was the economic unit and there was an exchange unit. There was an officer, Ed Herwitz, responsible for exchange. Then Martin Gwenick was responsible for economic and then the political was divided into two. There was the multiside, which was Gary Matthews, and the bilateral side which was Farrand. Now, by bilateral what are we talking? Are we talking politics, are we talking administration of the Soviet account within the U.S. government? It was more of the latter. I dealt with situations, which ranged from everything that was going around here under the rock, under the stones of the city. FBI surveillance of Soviet diplomats here, CIA interests in dissidents or in defectors, defectors, I dealt with all defectors. I dealt with any ham handed tactics that the Soviets were using in town to try to recruit. I don't want to sound like I'm, I don't want to sound like a cold warrior, but it was all that sort of thing. Soviet parking tickets, I mean good God, they would go anywhere and they would park anywhere. They would build up these enormous amount of parking tickets. They'd park in places where they shouldn't park and then the D.C. police would get all upset. The D.C. police would come in and say you know, you can't do this because the neighborhoods are complaining. Well, what are we going to do? Then the Soviets wouldn't pay their parking tickets the D.C. police would there. They didn't have to pay. In Moscow, our diplomats, there were no parking meters and there were no parking police. So, our diplomats would and it's a huge city and there weren't a lot of cars, now there are. Now the place is choking with automobiles and trucks, but in those days it wasn't quite choking. From the American Embassy it was a dog's breakfast for parking out there, but we found places. The Soviets didn't have any places downtown so they just took advantage of everything it was a real running sore. Soviet women at their embassy would, the Soviets would never hire anybody, never hire an American. We hired Russians all the time at our embassy in Moscow and they would do things. They were Xerox operators and all sorts of things. You know, probably it was a mistake. I mean they were probably doing games on us all the time.

Q: It probably didn't make a hell of a lot of difference.

FARRAND: It didn't make a hell of a lot of difference at the end of the day. We were doing most all of our stuff upstairs and we were doing it behind closed doors and we had Americans up there for that. If we had tried to have our motor pool all run by Americans

and every other aspect of it, the State Department could never have gotten that amount of money out of the Congress or the White House.

Q: Well, you wouldn't have gotten the job well done because if you have local people doing it, they can get things done within, they speak the language.

FARRAND: Yes, they speak the language. Our people would never have spoken the language and you were upped the number of recruitment attempts against our staff and you would have upped the number of drunken things on a weekend and altercations of every kind.

Q: When you hire basically lower class people, I mean, I hate to put it in those terms, but it's true, they're not as controllable.

FARRAND: Oh boy, oh boy, but in any way, the Soviets, what they would do. No one would be hired from the local economy back here. Everyone they would bring in. Now, what did they do? They pressed into duty all of their spouses, all of their spouses. So, even the ambassador's wife, maybe she was freed of it, but everyone else's wife would take turns coming in and manning the vacuum cleaners and cleaning the embassy. They brought over their own drivers, they brought over, they were a very closed, secretive type outfit. As events of recent months have shown, I mean look, they were worried that we were going to try to penetrate their embassy in any way we could and we were. So, they chose the other route. So, what would happen on a weekend or during the week, they would get a van together and they would take the van and go out to a place called, it's no longer running. K-Mart up in northern Virginia somewhere.

Q: It's a discount, big department, not really a department store, but a general store lower prices. Old Crusty outfit I think.

FARRAND: Bulk items. Is that Old Crusty? Is that what it became? That's an interesting thing. You see, I learned something. They would get a van together about once in a period of time, once in a while and they would take all of these staff wives, spouses, to a K-Mart and they would give them a little bit of money, a little bit of hard currency. They would go into these stores and go crazy because back in the Soviet Union there were hardly any consumer goods worth exporting surely. They would be stunned when they walked into these stores. What would happen, happened one night. The guard at the gate of the K-Mart asked this Russian woman who was about to walk out, she had a big overcoat on and it was a big overcoat... Well, he stopped her, opened up the overcoat and you know, she was ladened with all kinds of things she was stealing, taking from the store. Well, she was taken into custody, then of course, telephone calls come and we got her released. She goes back and then the case is against her. We have to work on situations like that. All manner of ugliness that went on here between the FBI, between the DC police department all over the country when defectors would come in, when people would come in, Russian citizens would come into a police station in Chicago, Illinois and say, "I want asylum, I don't want to go back to the Ukraine. I don't want to go back. I have nothing." We would

get involved and then we would have to work it out as best we could before it hit the press and once it hit the press, of course, it was katie by the door. Then it becomes this great big circus, you know.

So, the construction of the new embassy in Moscow... We had to work on that. We had to work on tracking where the Soviets went, they tracked us, we tracked them and everybody had to have a travel note. All travel notes in the Soviet Union came to my unit and then they had to be looked over. This is the first secretary, he says he wants to go to Phoenix, Arizona. All right, when's he going? What flight? Where? When? So, everybody knows along the way. One time a Soviet comes in and this happened over several, several months before we got onto it. They'd say they wanted to go to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and we'd say okay and they'd say, how and they'd say by air on a certain date. Fine. We had to tighten this up, but it went on for a couple of series of such trips that this particular Soviet would go out here to Leesburg to one of these little airports and he would rent a pilot, but he would rent one of these little four seaters. They'd take off and fly to Pittsburgh at 4,000 feet or 8,000 feet and he'd be looking down and taking photos and doing all this la la stuff and he'd land in Pittsburgh. He went there by air. Well, we had to close that thing. You know, this was before the satellites were doing all that stuff. I mean all of this is so silly. Some of it was cops and robbers, katzenjammer kids. Tit for tat. As a result of all of this, Jack Matlock came up with the idea because over there in Russia they had a thing which all of us used to call UPDK, Uproblema Diplomatitistroya Corpus. In other words, it was the body set up over there to control all diplomatic travel inside Russia, to control all licensing of vehicles inside Russia, to control all internal documents, everything having to do with diplomats and employees. Everything and all was under the KGB and it just blanketed the diplomatic community. So, Jack Matlock said why don't we do one back here? Now that was a rather bold idea because it was going to cost money, right, nobody likes to cost money. Except when the security boys back here get smelling something like that, the FBI jumped onboard, said, yes, yes, we need one of those. Of course, they'll have to ask for it; Langley would be on that and on all of them. All of them said, hey, let's get going. So, we formed a thing, which exists to this day in diplomatic security, and you'll see all these red, white and blue license plates of diplomats around town with little codes on them. You know, you've seen them. They're issued by the Department of State. Why do you think they exist? Why do they have to have every diplomat put on? Why, because we couldn't single out the Russians, but our purpose was to get a license tag on every Russian diplomat vehicle, Soviet, that we would know by looking at it, you know, that's a Soviet, right? But, you couldn't do it, just one, so we had to do it for all. It's not a bad system.

Q: No, I know. When I was in Yugoslavia all Americans had a 60-A and then a number. The Soviets had a 10-A; Canadians had 63 and Poles I think were 12. Those things I remember to this day.

FARRAND: Amazing things to remember.

Q: Yes, so I used to keep a little list. I'd see a car and I knew exactly where it came from. It was kind of fun.

FARRAND: Well, I'll tell you what's kind of fun, if you don't know it, I don't think they hand them out like candy, but there is little book you can actually buy them in a bookstore, but you have to ask for them. It was this little book put out by the State Department with all those codes. So, I have one for each of my cars and I'm driving down the road and there's a guy sitting next to me and I see LR. So, I look inside, Bosnia Herzegovina. I was amazed. LR. It was a big Lincoln; they can't afford them back there. They can have one here. I see AF is Japan. I can tell you that. XZ is Australia. PD is the United Kingdom. I can tell you that and I look so I know that guy's from San Salvador or El Salvador. They don't know who I am, but I know who they are.

Q: You were there until '80. After the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December of '79, was there a major change in how we treated the Soviet Union? That was the end of the Carter effort to play nice.

FARRAND: Yes, that brought it all down. Marshall Schulman, do you know the name?

Q: I've heard of it.

FARRAND: Well, he was a professor at Columbia. He ran the School of Soviet Studies at Columbia and he was brought in by Vance and Carter to be the Soviet guru at the Department of State. He had this effecting habit of wearing a green eyeshade; a green eyeshade is the old fashion thing that goes around. Bookkeepers and accountants wore them. He wore it in the Department of State. I guess, I don't know why. Professor Schulman, there was Marshall Goldman and Marshall Schulman, but Marshall Schulman was a very strong influence on the Soviet desk and he had working as his assistant a fellow by the name of Curt Cammen. He was a very bright Foreign Service officer who, after all this, many years, Curt had experience in the Soviet Union and Curt was a quiet man, but highly intelligent. Schulman is sitting on the seventh floor of the Department of State would look down, Curt would be his emissary to those of us, and we were on the fourth floor of the Department of State if I'm not mistaken. Then, of course, the deputy assistant secretary and the assistant secretary were on the sixth floor. The office director was Bill Schinn. He was a Princeton graduate, a scholar of Russian literature and a student and a man thoroughly devoted to Soviet studies. He had several offices that were working, and this is a very big office, I mean you probably had thirty officers in there. I had about eight, six or eight officers of my own in this bilateral unit. Some of them were deeply educated in Soviet affairs like Sean Burns and others like me had not been deeply educated in it, but we had served there and we had had particular expertise that we brought to the job, plus talking about it everyday amongst each other so you build up a lot of knowledge, some of it good, some of it not so good. Schinn was a and he's retired now I think, God bless him, wherever he is, he bridled I think a little under this watchdog thing that came down from the Schulman office upstairs. In between there was a deputy assistant secretary named Robert L. Barry. Barry has just come back from Bosnia here

last week as head of the OSCE operation in Sarajevo. Before that he was ambassador to Indonesia and before that ambassador to Bulgaria. Barry and Schinn did not get on, did not get on. Both were and are highly intelligent people. Schinn probably took more, however, to the Schulman approach to things than Barry. I'm going to say that. Barry, I worked for him as consular officer in my first year in Moscow years back. So, Bob and I are friends, but Barry is a very realistic, oh, Barry is a person that isn't swept away by emotions of the moment. I mean he saw the Soviets for what they were. Schulman, the word that came down from Schulman was this, for my desk and the desk in general, to "stop being all arms and elbows with the Soviet, let's try another approach. Let's try to put out our hand and get on with it." That marked the underlying philosophy of my two years on the desk. Even though I would see the Soviets kick us in the groin regularly.

Q: Was there a change though after December '79?

FARRAND: Oh, absolutely. Absolutely. Went south. Yes. Went south. All sorts of things stopped. The commercial office that I had departed from became just cobwebs. Another fellow went out to run it, but just cobwebs, nothing moved.

Q: I think this is a good place to stop and we'll pick this up in 1980 when you left the Soviet desk, where did you go in 1980?

FARRAND: The War College.

Q: Okay, so we'll pick it up in 1980 when you go to the War College. Great.

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Today is the 5th of July, 2001. Bill, 1980 you went to the War College you were there from '80 to '81 I take it?

FARRAND: That's right.

Q: Which war college did you go to?

FARRAND: I went to the National War College.

Q: Can you tell me something about your experience there? What did you get out of it and what was your impression of it, particularly your military colleagues?

FARRAND: This is to me a very interesting topic and it deserves a little of maybe a few more words than you might think. I say that because of my generation I entered the military after I left college and spent, I was going to spend three years, but I ended up spending six, but I had military experience. In 1974 I believe it was, or maybe '75, the draft was stopped. I think it was President Nixon. They just broke off the draft and there was no more draft. So, a young Foreign Service officer coming in in 1974 or '75 today

would have been twenty-six years in the service. If he came directly, he or she, came directly out of college they wouldn't have gone into the military by direction, they might have gone in. My sense of it is though they would not. You have a gap there in understanding because someone who has been in the Foreign Service for twenty-six years by now if they've stayed in, have been reasonably successful, they would be a senior officer, senior Foreign Service officer and they would be in positions of authority when the come to certain things that happen overseas. If those involve conflict or post conflict environments then you're going to see Foreign Service officers by force of circumstance required to deal with the United States military. At that time you will find that the military, defense department, because it has such vast resources in comparison with the Department of State and in comparison even with USAID, can be a source of not necessarily financial or other kind of benefit, but technical assistance that you can't get elsewhere and you need to have a broad understanding of the structure of the United States military and the culture it represents which is different from the Foreign Service. Anyone who doubts that is wrong. It is a different culture; it views problems and problem solving in different ways. It analyzes the world and it analyzes the issues that are in front of it, I'm talking about the military somewhat differently from the way the Foreign Service does. I, over the years, have become familiar with the Meyers Briggs instrument for I don't know, I guess telling human beings they way their preferences for learning. The way that they bring information into their minds and the Meyers Briggs divides the population into sixteen categories as I recall. Introvert and extrovert are one of the categories. The population at large is about sixty-five or sixty-six percent extroverted, about twenty to thirty percent introverted. In the Foreign Service that's just reversed. Most FSO's, according to the fellow that puts this on, this test on and I have great familiarity with it both at the War College that year and then later assured that there is this certain, it's not an extroverted world. It's not a world of the backslapping politician and we know that as Foreign Service officers. We're not. There's always a reserve between the Foreign Service officers when they meet for the first time. The military, they also tend to be introverted, but they also are very much driven by mission, love of unit, love of command and country. It is a serious thing. It is not to be parodied or stereotyped in any way. I believe the Foreign Service needs to take more advantage of the military schoolhouse as they call it, because they have schools around. The War College for me was an excellent adjustment. I needed it at the time. I'll stop there.

Q: What was your impression of, you had had your time particularly in the Soviet Union and all, and this was when the Soviets were beginning to, things were really changing. Well, it hadn't changed yet, in fact they there at their worst. Did you find yourself seeing a different Soviet Union than they saw? Could you talk a little about that?

FARRAND: Yes. I will. I will. I will say at the end of the day, however, we had to come out in roughly the same place, but the student body at the National War College is limited by the space that they have there and by budget and it's come down to around 160 students every year for one year of sabbatical study. Now that 160 divides into four parts of forty each. Forty land services, army; forty sea services, navy, marines; forty air, which is the air force; and then the forty that's reserved for the civilians was divided roughly

into thirds. There were about sixteen Foreign Service officers there. We made out because George Kennen after the Second World War had a lot to do with founding that school. Kennen felt that he, well, he was sent over there to do this. I'm not sure how it all goes, but I know that he ended up doing this and he was the fellow that was, maybe the inspiration came from elsewhere, but he was the active person who put it together. The idea was after the Second World War, you read the book by Robert Murphy and his

Q: Diplomat Among Warriors.

FARRAND: Diplomat Among Warriors and how he had to work with the United States and the allied military on the continent of Europe, North Africa, worked with them to help bring about a re-restoration of civil order in the chaos in the aftermath of the war. Kennen wanted to capture that, what the major lessons were from that. Very important because I must tell you my experience in Bosnia tells me that those lessons of the post-World War Two time, both in Germany and in Japan have largely dissipated. Because we didn't have the same thing in Korea, after Korea and we didn't have the same thing after Vietnam. So, anyway, that was the War College. Sixteen, seventeen Foreign Service officers and they had sixteen seminars. They let the computers whirr and they dealt the cards out that each seminar would have roughly four sea service, four land service, four air service and four civilians. One of the civilians would be a Foreign Service officer. Now, to bring this to a head, the Foreign Service officers were seeded into these seminars. The purpose was to bring that perspective to the table. In the beginning it was, there was a lot of military officers that were wonderful, they humorous and they are, they're just wonderful for camaraderie. They would take off after the Foreign Service officer as being a sellout artist, as being soft on communism, as being all of these things. But, while they were doing that, they were also extremely fascinated by what went on in the diplomatic service, what went on in that hard to understand building called State Department, Foggy Bottom, whatever. So, over the year there would be a ten month academic year, over the year you would go from this jocular throwing off little stereotypical barbs at one another, although the Foreign Service officer generally didn't go back at them that way to an understanding, a grudging and then an easiness with the concept that the forces of good and evil in the world sometimes shade off into gray. Is that a result; is it worth all the effort? I think it probably is worth all the effort, although I must say I think more needs to be done. I think more needs to be done to take advantage of this because there is such a pass through in the military, up or out. The Foreign Service has now adopted up or out, so you have to have a schoolhouse with a curriculum that is repetitive and is upgraded all the time, but continues to train his cadres, continues. Educate and train, educate and train.

Q: Did you see any difference, granted these are all stereotypes, between the ground, the army, the navy/marines and the air force?

FARRAND: Yes, I did. Yes, I did. Anybody who listens to this later or who reads this will probably react, but never mind. I see it this way. I see the army, the army is made up of offices who are very much mission oriented, objective oriented, maybe that should be

the best. Give me the objective and I will achieve it. They like clear instructions, they, however, alone among the services are in touch with the local populace on the ground, on the ground. Therefore, there is even though they have a tendency to be buttoned up because of things like forced protection and things of this nature, the perception that the American public will not accept anymore, body bags. I mean, I think that this has gotten seriously out of hand, never mind. The army is an organization that probably is not as imaginative as you and I would like to see it. However, they are there and they are ready, and they are an instrument that can be used in a marvelous way. They are ready to go forward. They're closest to the people because they serve on land. By the people I mean the host country or those with whom you are in conflict or whatever, they're closest to it. The navy is the most tradition bound of the services and, at the same time, the most conservative. I think the navy suffers from long periods at sea and isolation in bottling themselves with the technical aspects of warships, aircraft and all of that sort of thing, hardware, coming ashore only rarely. I'm sorry, when they come to shore; they don't necessarily have any remit to deal with the local populace except with the local port authorities. So, that maybe, that it's steeped in tradition, it's the oldest branch of the, and it is steeped in tradition and therefore it leads to a conservatism that I think is a little bit difficult to deal with. The air force is not a tight military organization. I have referred to it jokingly as the military civil service. They are, the air force is much more devoted than certainly than the navy, even the army to send their officers off for advance degrees. They send them off for advance degrees. The Foreign Service always would send you off to a school and say we want you to study, but we don't want you to go for a degree. So, many Foreign Service officers always would have a tendency to when they had that year to go, they would want to go to Harvard if they could, to Wisconsin, to Stanford and you know, to schools like that; the University of Pennsylvania and spend a year in study, I chose the opposite. I chose to go to a school that probably would be considered not of that academic status, but I wanted to mix it up with the military and with others. I wanted to be involved with daily policy questions and that's what the War College gives you. I'm sorry about the name, War College. Well, life as such. It's all under the National Defense University.

Q: How about the Marines? In a way they're different?

FARRAND: They are different. The United States Marines are different. They are in very many ways, even though I was a naval officer; they're my favorite branch. They are, the Marines have now a university at Quantico. They call it the Marine Corps University. It's a school and they give a masters degree in national strategy studies or something of this nature. They study the basic things of war, the cause of it and all that business. The Marines, to put them into this category, they are in many ways, the more flexible because they're a mission, they're small. Their mission is to be the first on the beach, to get the thing stabilized until the big, main forces come in and then move out and go do something else. They also being small, they have to always take the last seat when it comes to getting new weapon systems. Their weapon systems tend to be hand me downs. Hand me downs from the army, the tanks; hand me downs from other places. They're working on this now, but one thing they tried to do the off spray. You know, it's had its troubles, well that was their baby and they liked it and I understand why they liked it

because there wasn't anything like it in the army. I guess I'm not answering your question. I find the Marines as Marines, a very likeable branch. Now, where do they fit in the big picture and at the table at the Pentagon when they're talking strategy and talking big policy? I don't know. I don't know, but every now and then you have a marine that stands out. You take Anthony Zinney, who was a retired two star, you can read his talks and you learn something.

Q: Well, I've heard people say that they were surprised to find that of the armed services that by the time they got to the War College, the Marines were there were sometimes the most thought intellectuals of the group. I mean, this is just somebody's other people's opinion.

FARRAND: I'm not going to challenge that. I'm not going to give you any examples of it either, but I'm not going to challenge it. I saw them as always inquiring. Always inquiring. They weren't quite. Maybe this is the way to put it, the Marines weren't quite as ready as army officers to expect a school solution.

Q: Well then in 1981, whither?

FARRAND: If I can tarry just a little bit on the War College. I truly hope that more, rather than fewer, Foreign Service officers are encouraged, if not encouraged, almost asked, we want you to go to the War College. In order to build up that critical network of contacts throughout the Pentagon and throughout the civilian establishment in town. You'd make friends there that will last during his or her career and it's very useful to be able to get on the telephone with a sink, commander-in-chief's command in SOUTHCOM or off in Europe and you know colonel Joe Smith and you can say, "Colonel Smith, this is Bill Farrand, you remember me?" "Sure I remember you; you were the little one that made all the foolish jokes." "Yes, that's me. I'm having some trouble with certain parts, I'm having some difficulty, can you help me out. How should I go about this?" "Don't worry, I'll take care of it." They are people who take care of things. They take care of business and it's something that we could learn from. We do, too. We do, too in our own way, but I would hope we would do more of it because of the gap. We cannot have a gap opening up any wider. A lot of Foreign Service officers going through the university in 1970s had young professors who were war protestors and deep viscera against the military and against the intelligence establishment.

Q: They're still around. They're now the elderly professors. I hope they'll have a new generation.

FARRAND: I mean, they served their purpose, but I mean, you know, it's no good, it's no good to have just a way of thinking of the military of nothing but knuckle dragging people that wish to nuclear bomb little people around the world into submission. This isn't the case.

Q: Okay, in '81 where did you go?

FARRAND: While I was at the War College, a good friend of mine Peter Bridges, became director of the office of eastern European affairs. That would be the six countries of the former, what we called Eastern Europe; Romania, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was included. Albania and for cosmetic purposes we had Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

Q: Well, they were still part of the Soviet Union?

FARRAND: Right, but for cosmetic purposes we put them there in the Department of State, so we collaborated with the Soviet desk on that. As a matter of fact, the Soviet desk virtually ran it and we would run the front. So, somebody had to come in like the Latvian Charge who had left in 1938 or '39 and he was living over on Foxhall Road and he had to come in. He would come in tomorrow, he would know the Soviets were dealing with it. Peter called me, in fact, before I went to the War College, he said, "I think I'm getting this job. Would come on and be my deputy?" So, that was very hopeful because we all had to do a major paper at the War College and so I said fine. I will do my paper on what our policy should be toward Eastern Europe. So, I was able to spend a year at part-time, I had other things to do, just focusing on my next assignment. I went from there having done my paper on Eastern Europe and how I felt the instruments of government could be used. I go there and I work for Peter.

Q: You did this from '81 until when?

FARRAND: I did it from '81 until '83. Yes.

Q: When you arrived there in '81 what were some of the main issues on your plate when you got there?

FARRAND: I'm going to say this is a complex part of my life because Peter, I arrived on the desk in August and Peter was tabbed to go off to, it was just out of the blue, Ambassador Max Rabb in Italy asked him to come and be his deputy chief of mission. Peter went off and became DCM in Rome.

Q: Let me just turn this over here.

FARRAND: Sure. Peter was succeeded by John Davis who had been deputy chief of mission in Warsaw, Poland. Peter had served in Moscow, John had not. John had served in Poland. Now, I'm a Moscow hand who had served in Czechoslovakia, so I brought Czechoslovakia to the table, John brought Poland to the table and then the other countries we had good, we had about eight, six desk officers as I recall, nine desk officers I don't know why nine. Oh yes, we had two economic officers, one for the northern tier, one for the southern tier. They basically fell to me, that was mine to administer. John came onboard and he came onboard in November and all hell broke loose in December. The Reagan administration had just taken office. They had just taken office and as you know,

there was a very strong anti-communist feeling amongst the Reagan people and Lech Walesa. When I arrived onboard, Lech Walesa in Poland, that was the story. That was the issue and that's one of the reasons they brought John in. For once they seemed to do something with a little bit of rationale. John came on and his knowledge of Poland, plus we had a very active Polish desk officer. We were able to stay pretty much on top of the Walesa solidarity challenge to the government, but then on December 13, 1981, I'm going to say, yes, General Jaruzelski declared Marshall law in Poland and that became the issue of my time. Now, John had that well in hand, but clearly he would be off on speaking trips and things so I had to interact with the seventh floor, the sixth floor, the seventh floor and the White House on reacting to this Polish general declaring marshal law in a communist state. A bit for an anomaly for the communists to have a military government, but they did. All of the troubles that succeeded, they threw Walesa in jail, they did this and they did that. I mean they were using powerful water hoses on crowds in Warsaw, crowds in Gdansk, crowds in Krakow and it became a very all consuming time.

Q: How did we see the situation in Poland? Did we see this as a weakening of the Soviet Bloch or that the Soviets were, they were using everything they could. I mean because this is still a time of when the Soviets still seemed to be on the offensive or how were we seeing this?

FARRAND: It was a very confused time. The Reagan people wanted to bring clarity to the whole thing by hitting back hard against Jaruzelski. This was their first opportunity to really mix it up with the communists was how I saw it. I think they of course, they put in place I think it was the Reagan administration, it was the first to bring into place political appointed deputy assistant secretaries in the bureaus in the Department. Each one had to have a political one. More or less as a watchdog over the State Department, the way we've read it, the way I've read, over a State Department they didn't really trust for whatever reasons. There was a lot of, there was a great felt desire by the administration to kick back and to kick back hard. So, we as the keepers of the bureaucratic process, we were the ones who had to come up with the memoranda, the people on the sixth floor didn't write their own memoranda, certainly the seventh floor didn't write their own memoranda. So, we would be writing these memoranda, action memos. They wanted sanctions. They wanted sanctions against Poland. Come up with sanctions. So, we sat down and we wanted to think. Now, I think everybody who may ever use this will understand there was an economic concept or economic term then in vogue in the world. I don't know, I think I've heard it's been changed. It was called the most favorite nation trading status. That mean that if the United States granted another country most favorite nation trading status or MFN as it was called, it was not as lots of people like to characterize it, it was not that country that was the most favored nation in our trading practices at all. It mean that, you simply brought them up to the point that the tariffs that they had to pay in trading with us were equivalent or equal to and no higher than the tariffs of our partner who was the most favorite partner. Poland had the most favorite nation trading status and that was crucially important. Stalin had refused, just after the Second World War, to accept in open trading thing with the West through his satellite countries. Poland had been granted most favorite nation status and had it and we in the

bureaucracy felt it needed to be defended because it was going to be the devil to get it back once it was gone. If it was canceled you go back to the hill and it would never be restored again. So, we came up with a list of sanctions that did not include most favorite nation status and we sent it up the line. We cut off exchanges; we cut off any kind of assistance that was happening through educational institutions, anything, even humanitarian. When it came back from the White House, it had a long line right straight down from Ron Reagan saying, "I accept all of this, give me more." That meant that most favorite nation that there were people around him that wanted most favorite nation tackled. If I ever had a contribution to American foreign policy it was at this point as they were shouting for this and I said, "No, we should not cancel most favorite nation status, we should suspend it." Suspend is a big word because if you suspend it and there was a muted reaction, here goes one of these State Department limp wristed fellows. I said, "Now, just a minute I'm looking out for the interests of the President here. If you suspend it, you suspend it, which you can do. Then you don't have it, it's here in the wings and the President, the Executive, can then reactivate it. Keep the power in the hands of the President." And they did and that's what we did and, of course, now Poland today I mean you know. Things shift and change.

Q: I would have thought that there would have been another element there and that was that there are so many Poles, people of Polish extraction, in the United States that you have to tread a little bit carefully, because when you were beginning you were trying to be beastly to the Polish government, you were also being beastly to a lot of Polish academic families, traders, Polish hands, the whole thing.

FARRAND: I know, I know it and you're right. You're right, but the Polish American community which in Chicago I don't know this to be the case, but I've heard that in Chicago there's almost as many Polish Americans as there are in Warsaw.

Q: I got it from the Polish Consular General, this was back in '75 in Chicago saying that Chicago was the second largest Polish city.

FARRAND: Okay, second largest. That would make more sense. Anyway, I mean, Polish Americans like Ukrainian Americans, actually Ukrainian Americans were more difficult to deal with than Polish Americans. They are straight down the line, hard line communist, you know, they are absolute haters of it with every justification in the world and they always wanted a harder, stronger, harder, harder, harder line, always. The Poles were slightly different. They had a couple of people at the top particularly in Chicago, a few others, that would be in touch with us on a daily basis talking about ways of working this situation, you know. But, if you want a position from them on those issues, they were going to be hard, they were going to be hard. They weren't, I mean, at the leadership they were informed, but a lot of the people were not informed, not informed on some of the nuances. Now, in a situation where it is as chaotic as that and where it is as clear cut, there don't have to be a lot of nuances. So, maybe I'm overdoing that, however, the approach that we finally took. You know, we brought the sanctions and then Hollywood got involved with Ronald Reagan being a movie star, Hollywood and Frank Sinatra and a

few others. They made a USIA was under a man out of Hollywood by the name of, Glick or something just like that.

Q: Wick, Charlie Wick?

FARRAND: Wick. Charlie Wick. Charlie Wick made a movie called "Let Poland Be Poland." It was a documentary with people going up and lighting candles. It was big, lot of. You know, it was Charlton Heston and all these actors making statements on this documentary and over and over. I don't think it did very much, but it occupied that element of the republican side.

Q: How did we feel about Czechoslovakia at the time?

FARRAND: Hardly at all. Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria were at the bottom of the heap. We never paid attention. Kissinger had a view under, he had an advisor a consular at the Department of State for a while under Kissinger. It was a man by the name of, it starts with M. Anyway, they basically together came up, this man in consular came up with this idea and Kissinger signed off and it had to do with a certain ranking of the governments of Eastern Europe. Top most was Yugoslavia, except Yugoslavia was suey generous because under Tito it hadn't really joined the Warsaw Pact, so that Yugoslavia let's say, Poland because of the efforts of solidarity and there was a nascent dissent movement there, a rather good dissent movement that was taking on the government. Poland was up there; Romania was up there because Romania wouldn't let NATO troops on its soil, Warsaw Pact troops on its soil. Never mind, Ceausescu, one of the great tyrants of our age. Then, under that came, oh, I don't know, who were the middle ones? Hungary, then at the bottom, trading places with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia. I suppose Czechs were just a little above Bulgaria because Bulgaria just was in the back pocket. There was very little done and it was frustrating for some of us, but we couldn't fight it because there was very little justification for doing very much.

Q: Well, just to sort of nail this down, during this time

FARRAND: Oh, East Germany, East Germany was high. East Germany was higher up.

Q: At that '81 to '83 there wasn't any feeling, let's put Poland off to one side, but with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and maybe East Germany, there wasn't much you could maneuver with? I mean, this was, none of these countries was freely loose I mean obviously Poland was a country that if they didn't crack down could move more closely to the West, so there was something.

FARRAND: There was more room to play.

Q: But, we didn't have the feeling that we could play around and there was just sort of regular relations?

FARRAND: Lousy, low level regular relations. We bought their newspapers, they bought our newspapers. We sent delegations occasionally, but Poland also you know if you take a look at all of those peoples. I think, I counted them up once, I think there were 135 million people from Stetton to the Adriatic, the same iron curtain line, I mean 135 million people in there. Poland had forty. That was a big portion of it and Poland really was the big buffer between Germany and Russia and meant a lot to Russians, meant a lot to Soviet planners sitting back in the Kremlin or wherever they sat.

Q: All their troops, I mean if there is going to be a war. That was a city of supply lines.

FARRAND: Yes, yes and you see Poland is relatively flat land, whereas you go south into Bohemia, Moravia you got to go over mountains. Now, they're not huge mountains, but they're mountains. They complicate life and then in Romania you've got the caucus, the Transcaucuses. So, they wanted to stay in that upper corridor.

Q: How about East Germany, what was the feeling towards East Germany at that time? Were you handling that or did that always fall into the sort of the German orbit?

FARRAND: It fell into the German orbit, the German desk was loathe to the German desk in the Department, was loathe to have much truck with either the Soviet desk I support more with the Soviet desk, but not the Eastern European desk. No, East Germany was their baby and it was all right to let them handle it. We would prefer for policy reasons not to look at East Germany as a separate entity, you know, even though we had to at a practical level.

Q: What was your impression of the embassies of the states you were dealing with?

FARRAND: U.S.?

Q: The Czech embassy, the Polish embassy, etc., etc. Did they seem to have or be at all, were they doing anything other than spying?

FARRAND: I am sure that the embassies from Eastern Europe as we called it then, had delegated to them, by Moscow certain jobs to do and probably, probably, I don't know this to be the case, but the way they operate. Probably there was a certain division of labor, probably, but I don't know about that. The embassies here, the Polish embassy had an ambassador whose wife, he was communist, but his wife was Roman Catholic and she was a courageous woman in the sense that she spoke out. The ambassador in point of fact when marshal law went into effect, he defected and stayed here with his wife, therefore we had no relations. We had no ambassadors in sight because it worked out that Frank Meehan, our ambassador had by reverse serendipity come back to attend some family event and he was caught flatfooted here in the United States. So, when their ambassador defected in the wake of the late December of 1981, the they were anxious to have they just disbarred him from coming back. So, we were left with charges. The Polish ambassador, therefore, and the Polish embassy was a place of great interest and it became

a place where we could talk to them. Hungarians always had a well-staffed embassy, but it was staffed on the communist mold, well trained. The Czechs had an embassy that they had fixed over, it was highly secretive, big walls and all of this business. Bulgarians, the same, they weren't very much actors in town, neither one of them. Romania, not much worth, not much value. In fact, none of them were of much value.

Q: Did you have a problem, I mean I was wondering about Romania, the policy there. We were certainly during the Nixon time, the Reagan time, I was wondering whether we were sort of saying nice things about Romania, but at the same time we really had to hold our nose. Was Reagan using Romania as a possible wager at this time or not?

FARRAND: You have to go back further than Reagan. You have to go back to Nixon and you have to go back to the time when Nixon was in exile, when he was a lawyer out in California. He had, who was the gentlemen who worked with him, a big man?
Q: Meese?

FARRAND: Not Meese, a big man with dark hair that was one of his two German advisors.

Q: Haldeman or Ehrlichman?

FARRAND: Ehrlichman. My first Foreign Service tour was in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and it was during the time of the Johnson administration. Kennedy had just been killed and I was there from '65 to '67. When one day the ambassador who was appointed by Bobby Kennedy, Foreign Service officer appointed by Bobby Kennedy to take the job arrived to tell at the embassy to say that Richard Nixon was coming to visit. Richard Nixon was on a world tour and he had with him a man who I later learned to be Mr. Ehrlichman. He came to Kuala Lumpur and I was the general services officer, I wasn't even the general services officer, I was the assistant general services officer. It was my first tour. I get in the car and I go to the airport and I pick up Mr. Nixon and Mr. Ehrlichman and I bring them into town in a checker, the ambassador's checker cab limousine. Checker cab, black, but it was a checker cab. I brought them into town, took them to the hotel, it was a quiet, Malaysian afternoon and then they were coming to the ambassador's residence that evening and I was invited. They came over and spoke with the ambassador. What I want to say to you is I remember this because they went from there to Pakistan. Most countries in the world were because it was a democratic administration, this was Richard Nixon coming through, former vice president under President Eisenhower, they more or less downplayed this rival and they kind of snubbed him in a way, even Malaysia. I mean it was just the two of them. He didn't have an entourage, you know, they were flying commercial. He went to Pakistan and Pakistan really received him well, whoever was the president in charge of Pakistan, they received him well. When he went to Eastern Europe, Ceausescu received him well, well. They feted him in both Pakistan and both of those countries, for a long time thereafter were given the tilt during the Nixon administration for sure. There it was known as the tilt toward Romania and the tilt toward Pakistan. You go back and look this up. That

persisted in republican minds somehow, but it seemed to surface again with Romania. Now, it is true and I made much of it myself even in my own public argument discussions, that Romania by keeping Warsaw Pact troops off its soil was a chink in that perfect armor, that buffer zone. That's the whole purposes. Needing the Russians, the Soviets, nor Western Europe cared much about Eastern Europe, they just wanted it as a buffer. So, they didn't do much for these people like building up. They garrisoned some of their troops there and they would do some things for the local troops, but essentially they wanted to be preeminent and powerful and they didn't want any challenges to that. So, Romania had got a tilt for a strategic reason, got a tilt for a political reason. Ceausescu was outspoken; he was such a dictator, total autocrat, that he would even be outspoken occasionally against the Soviets. So, anytime you saw that, it was a rather simplistic thing, it was foreign policy by stinks. Stink figures.

Q: In '83 where did you go?

FARRAND: Jack Matlock had been appointed as ambassador to Prague which had always been in professional hands going all the way back to the Second World War, except for one time in the late '20s when Prague was in the hands of the Crane Toilet, scion of the Crane toilet bowl manufacturers. I knew as deputy director of the office that I was in a good position probably to get a deputy chief of mission shift in one of these six countries, which was my love. Eastern Europe and the Slavic world was what I had decided what I wanted to do. I got a call from the Deputy Chief of Mission, Marty Weinock, saying to me, "Bill, if you are interested to coming to Prague to succeed me, you'd better let Jack know." So, I got myself, John Davis asked me to take a tour of all of the countries and I did. I went to all of the countries and all the capitals talking to everybody in about a two week visit. In my last stop was Prague and when I drove in there and I really didn't want to go back to Prague, I'd already served there, but when I drove into Prague by train, it was a bright, sunny springtime day and there was something about the way the sun glinted on the city and the embassy look that day. It was an old coming home. I told Jack that if he would let me, I would like to be his DCM so he brought me out. I went to Prague as deputy chief of mission. That's the answer.

Q: Then you did that from '83 to when?

FARRAND: '85.

Q: What was '83 to '85 like, what was the situation while you there?

FARRAND: Gustav Hussack was the Prime Minister and he was the Prime Minister under the president named Sloboda. A war hero, a white manned war hero from the Second World War, but the and I may have his name just wrong there, but I think that was it. The Prime Minister was a commie, total totee of Moscow. His name was Gustav Hussack. His only, the only thing I remember about him was he had a deep, sonorous voice. He could have been a radio announcer, he could have been anything he wished to do as long as he used his voice, but he was what he was. It was a very hard time for us.

There was very little interaction. They had the embassy under total surveillance. It was a time of testing, always of testing.

Q: The Czechs were notorious for running, training secret service agents of Czechs and East Germans abroad in socialist countries. There wasn't much we could do about that was there?

FARRAND: We had a two-man station and that was their function to watch that aspect. We had, our embassy was about thirty-seven officers, something. It wasn't a large embassy, but it wasn't a small embassy. It was at the smaller end of a medium sized embassy. We had everything we needed. In other words, we had all of the various units. I don't think we had an agricultural attache, we didn't. We took one officer and made him agricultural attache, but that's the only thing. We had USIA; we had a full consular section and all of this. It was a hard time. We had to make such progress I guess as we could, but how do you define progress? Do you define progress, as good bilateral relations in typical Foreign Service is that good bilateral relations, is it progress? No, there shouldn't have been. Now, I'll tell you a small anecdote. When I arrived in Prague in August of 1983, Jack Matlock was the ambassador, but he came in not more than two days after saying, "Richard Pipes and Ronald Reagan want me to return to the NSC as Soviet Affairs Specialist. I don't want to go I'm enjoying this here. I'm really have been enjoying being an ambassador and I don't want to go, but they're being very insistent. I'll let you know." Well, I was there a week, maybe two weeks. The third week he came in, he sat in the office right next door. He said, "Sorry, I've got some news. I've got to go. They have not yet decided who will be my successor, so for a time you're going to be charge." Well, I didn't come here for that. So, I listened and I said, "Jack, give me some hints, will you?" He said, "Yes, I will." One hint he gave me, he said, "Bill, as you go into this, there's one thing you got to keep in mind. As much as you much focus on the larger issues, you must also focus on the smaller issues as well. Don't let them get out of focus because the little things can really trip you up." So, then he left and he came in in a funny way and said, "Oh by the way, I will do all I can to delay my successor's arrival for you." He joked. The successor was eventually Bill Lewers, William Lewers, who had been ambassador to Venezuela and was a Soviet hand and well known, and had been deputy assistant secretary in EUR. Bill was, had been slated to go to Spain, but instead of giving Bill Spain, they gave Spain to that great, big tall ambassador, Thomas Enders. They owed him for something.

Q: Yes. They wanted to get him out of ARA because he was proving to be difficult for the Ollie North and other people.

FARRAND: Isn't, that too bad. Wouldn't it have been better if they had left him there?

Q: Oh, absolutely.

FARRAND: Well, anyway they gave it to Enders, and Lewers then got Czechoslovakia as, what do you call it when you don't get the top prize?

Q: Booby prize.

FARRAND: Well, not booby.

Q: Some consolation, second prize.

FARRAND: Yes, yes, well, so Bill was going to come and it was now August, September, October, November, and December. It was now early part of August. I guess I got there in July. Jack leaves in the early part of August. So, now I'm charge. This is the anecdote. This is I think worth talking about a little bit. In 1977, in Moscow when Malcolm Tomb was ambassador I think it was seven, but it might have been five, but I think it was seven Pentacostalists from Siberia came to the American Embassy's consular section, got inside and refused to leave. Refused to leave. The consul general at the time, I was head of the commercial section down below, but the consul general at the time had not either alerted the ambassador or had alerted him and in any way, it just wasn't taken double, triple serious. There were other things going on upstairs in the embassy and it just wasn't taken double, triple serious. Now, a government building in the U.S. government closes at 5:00. At 5:00 all unauthorized personnel leave the government building. I suppose there's large exceptions to this, but as a general rule if you want to get tight about it, that's the way it is. An embassy is a government building. These people had said, "We're not leaving." So, they were allowed to stay in the waiting room overnight. Now, that meant that the rule that you leave a government building at 5:00 had been broken. In other words, you were now pregnant. By the time this got to the ambassador it was a day later or two days later. He said, "What, they have to leave." They won't leave because they were under such pressure from the KGB and not only the KGB, the IBD, the internal police. They were from Siberia, they were Pentacostalists and they had been severely harassed. They had children with them, they had women with them and there were two men. The other man was the pastor and he was not going to budge. Now, why is this important? How long do you think it took to get those seven people out of the American Embassy? Years, years, years, years. Apartments had to be prepared for them, beds prepared for them, stoves, places to wash their clothes, the police were all around the outside of the embassy to make sure that they weren't slipped out. We couldn't get them out of the country through the airport because the airport is totally controlled. It became, well, with us. I went from Moscow where I had been commercial attache I went back to the desk and became head of the bilateral section in the political division and I was responsible for working with these Pentecostals and with all of the Pentecostal groups in the United States who were doing everything they could to keep them in the American Embassy. The ambassador wanted them out. They lost that on the first day. They were pregnant. We were pregnant and then all of our because then if we were going to put them out, by then the news had been out and if we were going to throw them out onto the street we were going to do it on CNN with Christiane Amanpour talking into the machine. I don't think she was there yet, I don't think Christiane Amanpour was there yet, but you know what I'm saying. ABC, CBS, they were all there in Moscow and it would have been. The Congress would have been, come on. Now, now we go back to Prague. That

occurred in 1977 and we didn't get them out of there until. I was on the desk '78 to '79 and we didn't get them out of there until '81. Now, I go off to Prague in '83. I made charge. Now let's talk East Germany. If in your mind's eye the listener's mind's eye, you can picture East Germany as being to the northwest of Czechoslovakia connected at a city called Kepp, or right near Kepp, connected, but to the northwest with Poland kind of hovering right over Czechoslovakia, with East Germany off to the northwest. What, this is what happened in those days. Nobody from Eastern Europe could get a visa to go to the West, nobody could defect and get out unless you were very lucky, you married one and somehow you were very, very lucky. But, what happened was this. A great number of Germans would come from Bavaria into Bohemia which is the western most part of Czechoslovakia, come to Prague, drink cheap beer and make some business deals with the communists, Germans, German businessmen would do this.

Q: Oh, West Germans.

FARRAND: West Germans, Bavarians, West Germans would come in, they could do it because Prague and Czechoslovakia liked Germany money. The Deutschmark was considered a hard money. They were playing games, too. Now, now, what happened, the dissident movement and the movement of people who wanted to be refugees out of East Germany and who didn't, learned that they could come south, cross the border from East Germany into Czechoslovakia, a sister Warsaw Pact state and say they were coming into Prague to do so shopping. Not a problem because Czechs went to Poland, Poles came down into Czechoslovakia. East Germans did some of the same because they didn't go to Poland anywhere near like they'd go to Czechoslovakia because of historical reasons and because the Poles didn't have a very well developed economy, the Czechs did more. Then, what was happening and this is very important, these people would come and they started coming in the autumn of 1983. Now this was something I didn't know about. I didn't know about this happening. They would come down, the businessmen from West Germany would be in the beer stuba downtown, St. Thomas' beer stuba, down would come the Germans, East Germans, and they would come into the same beer stuba. They would make all kinds of contacts, which they could not do across the wall and this was insidious and then they would make more and more. They would trade information about families, they would. There were even some cases where they would be smuggled in the West German businessman's car across the border, sleeping, sitting in the gas tank or some damn thing. While this was happening, as more East Germans came down, they realized that Czechoslovakia was a place that they could put pressure on to get themselves out to their families in West Germany. They began to come and stay. They began to come down and refused to go back and they were supported in this by West Germans. Now, right up the street from me from the American embassy. We were on a cul de sac, but right up the street, there were three palaces up the street. There was the German embassy, which was a palace. These people would come up and run into the German embassy. Now, in those days, the German foreign minister was who, Genscher, Hans Dietrich Genscher. Genscher was of the liberal wing of the liberal party, of the free, of the FDP, Free Democratic Party. He held that the German constitution was open to every German returning from everywhere and we could not throw him out of an embassy.

So, he put the word to the embassy in Prague, accept all Germans of whatever side. Now, I'll finish this shortly. Up the street from me, which led to a cul de sac, the German ambassador, Meyer, was accepting East Germans into his embassy. In the beginning, one or two, three or four, four or five, five or six, six or seven, seven or eight, and he was coming to the point that his embassy was jammed to the gills. He didn't have enough water, he didn't have enough toilet facilities, he didn't have places, but they would not leave and Bonn was telling him keep them, don't send them out. The Czechs got very nervous about this and they started putting police along the way and they started harassing. Well, since we were 300 meters down the street from them, these people who were having trouble with the Czech police and difficulties at the German embassy because it was so jammed. They started coming into our embassy; they started coming into our embassy. They would duck into our embassy because it was very loosely guarded on the front gate. They would duck into our embassy, ask to see the consul, get in the consular section and say they wouldn't leave. Now, I had my experience in Moscow, so I said, "No, none of them will be staying here tonight." The consul was a young man, fine young man who was going off to Romania to be DCM right now, but anyways, a fine young man, Thomas Delmare. He said, "But, DCM, Bill, what can I do?" Then I said, "You just tell them that they have to leave by 5:00. It's now 2:30, they've been here since 10:00 this morning, they have two and a half or three hours to get out of here." "Well, what if they don't go?" "Just tell them that." Then I got my marine guards and I said, "I want you to dress up." They didn't have any gun. I said, "Now, I just want you to just walk in there and stand in the consular section and I want you, the consular officer every thirty minutes and tell me what the situation is." "Will you come and talk to them?" "No, I won't come talk to them. I am the Wizard of Oz. You will go, but they will be out." I went through about two and a half or three months of this and every single one of them would crack before the end of the day and would leave through our front door and we would close it at 5:00. Every single one, even the father of a little child who was crying. I said, no they will be out of this embassy. I did not want that to happen on my time. I was doing this, I was reporting this to the Department, but again the Department wasn't going to be interested in Prague and then comes the ambassador and we were still having this issue. The ambassador comes and I said, "Mr. Ambassador, I want you to know what's been going on here for the past four and a half months, five months. I want you to know I received a demarche from the German ambassador asking me to come and see him because I was the charge and he was ambassador. I went up to see him and sat in his office and he said, "Please tell me what are you doing? What are you doing?" I said, "Well, Mr. Ambassador, I'm not doing anything. I'm just not going to have unauthorized persons in my embassy past working hours. They can come, they can petition, they can talk to us, they can give us their stories, I will give you their stories, I will treat them humanely, but they will not stay past." He said, "My God, this is going to lead to a disaster." I said, "Well, it hasn't yet." When the ambassador came he said, "We'd better put this in front of the Department. I want a policy on this." I said, "Alright." So, I wrote up a policy and sent it in and he sent it up to then Undersecretary for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger. Eagleburger came back in a high dudgeon and said, "I, from hence forward, I will approve each of these expulsions from our embassy personally." I said to Ambassador Lewers, I said, "Bill, that is a recipe for total disaster. First of all, no

way if one of these East German families comes in here and throws themselves on our mercy at 3:00 in the afternoon are we ever going to get back to the Department with a report of it and all of the details that they will need to see whether this is a legitimate case or not and get the turnaround time. I mean, I can't even be sure we will get the. I mean, in those days we had typewriters right? Selectric typewriters. Get the cable out and approved, get it back there and get the okay to put them on the street by 5:00. I said, "No way." I said, "Second, you know Eagleburger, this is just harrumph and he won't even be available. He'll be in a meeting with the Prime Minister of Thailand and he won't be able to pass sand on this. We will start eating these and you're going to have a situation. Once you've eaten one, you can't then say the next day you're going to have this place jammed just as Hans Meyer has up the street." By that time the German ambassador was going bats. He had one little toilet in an open area. It was a big palace. I said, "What's going to happen when one of these young woman is pregnant? Are we going to send her to the Czech hospital to have her baby? Who's going to come in and look at that pregnant girl? How are we going to get her? Who's going to take care of that pregnant girl?" Well, it happened. It happened and they had to deliver a baby inside of their embassy. The argument I made to the Department was hey, we are an embassy the way embassies are in this part of the world. We have no commissary; we have no special facility, no clinic. We don't have a doctor assigned to our staff. Even if we did have a doctor assigned to our staff, is that doctor qualified to practice in another country? Now, in an emergency, of course, but so Ambassador Lewers saw this immediately. This can't work and I said, I explained everything I explained to you. I think it's a big mistake if we soften on just one case. By the way, the word then was getting out in the community, the American Embassy will not accept you. It was keeping the people away; otherwise we would have gotten our entire courtyard filled. So, this was a time when experience that I had seen in another place that worked to our disadvantage, four years is a long time to have people. I didn't know at that time, nor did Mac Tomb, nor did Bill Lewers, nor Lawrence Eagleburger, or anybody that the communist party was going to collapse in six years. We could have had huge numbers of people in our courtyard for six years. All right, that's my hero speech.

Q: So, anyway, what happened?

FARRAND: Eagleburger backed off and actually what happened, the Czech government negotiated with the German government, and I'm talking here western, the Federal Republic of Germany and they were working all the time. A big deal was made and about five big busses were sent in from Germany, people were loaded on and taken straight out as a convoy and then they agreed not to take anymore. That defused it.

Q: Well, Bill we have to stop at this point, but I tell you what, the next time we come before we leave Czechoslovakia, '83 to '85, I'd like to ask you about how we saw relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks. Also, did you have any connection with the dissident movement and the Helsinki Accords? Was this beginning to resonant? We'll pick that up the next time.

FARRAND: Alright.

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Q: Today is the 16th of July, 2001. Bill, we're still back in Czechoslovakia. What was your take on the relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks at that point?

FARRAND: That situation I feel particularly badly how it has all come out, but Czechoslovakia, if I have my history right, was essentially broken and put back together after the First World War at a conference held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Largely brokered by Woodrow Wilson or at least he had a role in it. The Czechs made up roughly two-thirds of Czechoslovakia, with the Slovaks one-third. This may have contributed to the problem. The Slovaks were more deeply indebted in the Slavic world, that is being further to the east. The Czech Republic as it is today or back then, Czechoslovakia, the Czech part of it, Bohemia and Moravia were like a thumb sticking into what I guess you would call traditional Western Europe. That gave them an outlook possibly that, possibly the fact that they had had Charles University since 1348. They had had a great relationship under the Holy Roman Empire. Some of their kings were related to kings from Western Europe, principally France. So, that they had a Western outlook, perhaps the Slovaks had a more Eastern outlook. I don't know. I do know this, that there was a problem all along and, I guess it comes down to use pop psychology to one of kind of a superiority inferiority relationship.

Q: Well, I'm trying to get at how you saw it at the time, members of the embassy. Was it something that you thought was significant or was it just?

FARRAND: Oh, absolutely, absolutely, it was, there was I think it wasn't spoken about a lot because it didn't look like there was going to be a real movement to divide, but if you had asked any of them, the ambassadors under whom I worked, deputy chiefs of mission, there would have been unanimity, that in unity the Czech and the Slovak peoples had a better chance in the world. They were landlocked after all; they had no outlet to the sea, north, south, east or west. The Danube River came through on the southern border for part of it with Austria, but really the Czechs had to rely and the Slovaks had to rely on highways and secondary, really secondary rivers for their goods. So, there would have been no difference of opinion within the embassy that this union should stay together particularly because it was brokered by the United States, but there was in the United States a very strong Slovak American movement. There was a congress, maybe still is a Slovak American congress unless I remember it was focused in Pittsburgh, could be wrong. In any case, these people were constantly pushing to have a hyphen; they were pushing for a hyphen. They wanted Czecho-Slovakia. They could not stand Czechoslovakia because it gave the Czechs the capital C and they didn't get a capital S. Stuff like this and it was.

Q: But, relations were so, I take it, relations were so poor with Czechoslovakia at that time that we weren't really looking at the divisions and what this would cause because there just didn't seem to be any room for any political movement to wiggle in, in that?

FARRAND: Absolutely right. The Soviets would have had no interest in splitting up Czechoslovakia, but made it more difficult for them. They had unity of command or command control by having them together, no, absolutely right. That's an excellent point because the larger problem was the dead end of communism.

Q: What about the dissident movement, which became so important four or five years later. Was that at all apparent or did you have any contact with the embassy?

FARRAND: We had a three person political section. I instructed the political counselor, well when I was charge and then when I was deputy chief of mission. I instructed the political counselor to be in touch with the dissident movement, but I left it to him. He, in fact, delegated it.

Q: Who was that?

FARRAND: That would have been, now we're talking about my second time, when I was deputy chief of mission, correct? That would have been James Bodnar. He was not a Foreign Service officer. He was a civil servant that had spent about eighteen years roughly in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research focusing on Eastern Europe. Jim was a good man, but he was, I will have to say it, he was not a street man. He simply wasn't a street man.

Q: You mean somebody to go out and meet people and all, looking at papers and so on?

FARRAND: No, he was excellent when given the job of analyzing what might appear in the newspapers, most of the news in the newspapers when it came to political matters, of course was air sots. That was his strength. His strength was not the street, the back. It was very difficult. I mean, you're still talking, the hold of communism was still strong. The Czechs had an intelligence service internal that rivaled the KGB. It was as good as or better than the KGB. They went to school on the KGB, but being Czechs and being more exposed to the West they had more chance to exercise, whereas KGB was deep inside. Their targets of opportunity were fewer and they stuck out more strongly and it didn't require quite the, I don't know. The fingerspitzengafeela, as the Germans say it. It didn't require quite the same thing, but the Czechs had a very strong and vicious STB they called it, it's the same thing. Well, so the contact with the dissidents fell to a young woman, whose name I'll remember, excellent and she and her husband, he was a spouse, a dependent spouse would have the dissidents around and I encouraged that. I told them that I, at the DCM house, because my house was on the ambassadorial compound. The ambassadorial compound had three police kiosks watching everything we did. I said, "Look, it's not a good for these people to come to my house, but they can come to your house." Then occasionally, maybe once a month invite me and my wife, just invite me

and we'll come and then we'll mingle. I had no trouble with the ambassador, I mean, he put, this was his house, but we thought absolutely alike because we were old Soviet hands and knew how crucially important it was to keep in touch with the opposition and we did. The dissidents came to this young woman's house, we would sit and I'd have conversations well into the night. She did too, more than I.

Q: How did you see the dissident movement at the time?

FARRAND: I saw it as I saw Czech opposition in major wars that they had endured over the years. The Czechs are not a confrontive people. They are, the Czechs are a quizzical people. The difference between a Czech and a Russian after I've lived both places for a long time is quite remarkable. Both are capable of hardship and enduring hardship, but the Czech is going to be, is going to retreat into his mind and in his thoughts. The Russian is going to let you know what his thoughts are right out there on the table and then he gets on with his life, hard as it may be. The Czech is more self-contained.

Q: You left Prague in 1985?

FARRAND: I left in '85.

Q: Where did you go?

FARRAND: But, before we leave, you had another part to your, you had three things you wanted to talk about with the Czechs. You had the dissidents, you had the Slovaks and the Helsinki Accord. If I might say just before we leave the Slovak thing, that I followed that and after in the early 1990s, the Slovaks split and became a country, Slovakia. I remember hearing that where I was, I guess I was out in the South Pacific and I just shook my head and continue to shake my head. It just seems to me that the Slovaks in doing what they've done is to shoot themselves directly in the foot.

Q: When you look at it, it was really not even put to a vote, it was a political thing.

FARRAND: No, Mecchear pushing it then and it was given support by this congress back here, of course. Now, here they are even more isolated, even less supported and the Czechs would and Hovell, Hovell would have resisted, I don't know about Klauss, but Hovell was resisting and he would have. It is probably true that the Czechs in their internal conversations looked down on the Slovaks and the Slovaks feel this, but that is not a reason to break up a country. In the intermarriage rate was something in the rate of, I don't know, it had to be a significant number in the double figures.

Q: Oh, yes. Well, it's the same way when I was in Naples, the northern Italians looked down on the Southern Italians, but you know they not going to, I mean, I don't think the Italians are stupid enough to declare a northern republic. There are some that talk way.

FARRAND: Both the Czechs and the Slovaks have been diminished, both have been diminished. Mostly the Slovaks have been diminished. You know, you talk about dissidents, when Hovell was released from prison and Yurgi Deemspear, who is their foreign minister, I had them, all of them, over to my house on that occasion, had Hovell sitting in my front living room. He was nothing but an ex-con sitting in the front living room. I didn't speak really fluent Czech, I spoke decent Czech, but not really fluent. So, he didn't speak any English. We couldn't communicate, but I communicated with his wife and others. On one occasion I had Yurgi Deemspear try to come see me one night and he was hiding in the bushes outside my house in the porch to give you an idea. I mean, we ere giving them considerable amount of support. I would have to say as much; well I won't get into comparisons. I was going to say in comparison with other Western embassies. I certainly, we were after near the top. But, now on the Helsinki. Now on Helsinki it worked out that Albert Scherer, Jr. was the first ambassador under whom I served, not during the tour that we're talking about here, but earlier. He had been pulled off by the White House to become the United States Representative at the Helsinki Talks. He went there and did that. At the same time, having his hat as ambassador to Czechoslovakia. So, the embassy in Prague had contributed directly to at least by our ambassador being there, so we knew probably as much about that or as maybe as any other non-supporting embassy. Helsinki Talks, they became an increasing factor in 1975, they were signed up there in Helsinki and they became an increasing factor in our work. Actually they were very helpful because we could quote parts to the government and put out to press, media, freedom of the press.

Q: Well then, in '85, whither?

FARRAND: I didn't know Bill Lewers wrote a letter back and said he'd like to support his DCM, who was me for a decent job. There were no office directorships coming open in EUR, so I got a tickle from Bill Swing who was the head of the personnel division, assignments division and asked if I would be his deputy and I did that. I came back and was deputy what was known at that time as FCA, Foreign Career Assignments.

Q: You did that from when to when?

FARRAND: '85 to '87. It was a great learning experience.

Q: Tell me about the job.

FARRAND: I will say that any Foreign Service officer, myself included, that doesn't at one point or another try to work in that area does himself and probably the system a disservice. I learned more about how assignments are made, broken, how people are put into positions where they can be promoted and about promotion rates between various cones and things of that nature than any other place. The personnel system as it was then designed and probably still is designed, but it's not working that way, the personnel system relied upon a series of negotiations between bureaus that were hammered out in a thing called a panel. The panel would meet once a week, the big panel. There would be

smaller panels, which I chaired that would meet all week long for political officers, for consular officers, for economic officers, for administrative officers, for secretaries and for security officers and communicators, so there were really seven. Now, on Friday morning at 10:15 we would all foregather under the director, normally an ambassador. There would be about sixteen people at the table, maybe fifteen representing each of the bureaus and representing each of the cones and we would sit and you may have an agenda that would last for six hours. We would break for lunch and come back. Everything was done in confidence and we would through Stuart Kennedy's name on the table and say, Mr. Kennedy is being looked at by the African bureau as consul general in Johannesburg. At the same time there is little Miss Sally Trueheart who deputy secretary wishes to have looked at for that job and there is Johnny Dogood who is being pushed by the assistant secretary for African affairs. Then you have a debate and then we would vote. We were and I think the personnel system is, it's the Foreign Service. If it is strong, if it holds to its rules, then the Service has internal discipline and there is fairness. If it does not hold, if it does not hold, then to that degree there is arbitrariness introduced into the system and the system is. When Foreign Service officers see that immediately and I think it has a great deleterious affect because I think that the panel system is a good system. It operates under rules, internal rules.

Q: How did you find this, if one of our principles, you know somebody from the upper floors of the State Department, somebody whose quite senior in the State Department wanted Joe Blow or Susie Smith

FARRAND: Yes, I called her Susie Trueheart and Johnny Dogood.

Q: Well, if he or she, somebody wants someone, what is your impression of how the system worked during your time?

FARRAND: My predecessors plus one was a man by the name of Harry Coberg. Harry took me to lunch one day. He had been consul general in Naples. Harry took me to lunch one day and said, "Bill." He asked me the same question that you asked me. "How is it going, how do you see it right now and in particular, Bill, how many directed assignments are being made?" Now a directed assignment is when the panel sits and meets and debates for twenty-five minutes. Everybody throws in their piece and they all want to operate by a series of rules, which exist, based on regulations and based on law and based on diversity. You know EEO? When the panel makes a decision, all of those decisions then go up to the director general because if a panel sitting down below is ad referendum and so it goes to the director general. The director general takes a look at all of them and blesses them or does not bless them. Now, let's go to your case. In every instances, in virtually, I will say in ninety-five percent of the cases that you're talking about or that I was talking about where a senior man on the seventh floor, a woman, wants one of their special assistants to get a job. It will, almost inevitably, involve someone being pushed well ahead of his or her grade and perhaps outside of his or her cone or specialty. Whatever you may believe about cone specialties. That would then become, if the director general chose to agree with the seventh floor, which is above his floor, he's on

the sixth floor after all. Then that would become a directive assignment. In other words, you would rake the consensus that had emerged on the panel that Stuart Kennedy should be out to Johannesburg and instead, someone else younger, almost always, out of cone, would go there. That would be called a directive assignment. So, Harry takes me to lunch and says, "Bill, how many directive assignments are happening?" This was in 1985 and I said, "Harry, about one or two a month." He was shocked. He said, "My God, we never permitted that." There were people and I can't remember their names right now, but they were kind of legendary that ran the assignment system for years. Oh the names will come to mind, but they stayed there for four and five years. These guys were long enough in tooth that they could apparently beat back this sort of thing. You can't beat back much of it, but you can beat back a lot of it. I shouldn't say you can't beat back all of it, but you can beat back a lot of that. So, when I said that to Harry he was just shocked and I'll tell you another anecdote in a moment.

Q: I mean, one of the pernicious things is that you see this within the State Department and, I think it has gotten worse, but it's always been there, it's true in the military. The staff assistants are essentially bright, but have they're working for somebody and they're speaking in their name, therefore, they're not really bringing much to the table themselves. They're getting these jobs and are becoming Washington operators and frankly, they're not as good as really experienced people are.

FARRAND: On top of that, I agree with everything you've said, on top of that, they come away because bright is not what we're talking about. When people say, well she's very bright or he's very bright. Bright, all Foreign Service officers are considered bright, some don't shine their light quite as brightly as others because they go off and do jobs out in the field. They make maybe a miscalculation based upon the name of the service, Foreign Service, that they should be in a foreign country. As I say, that can be a miscalculation if what you're looking for is fast track. Because that's what you're looking for, is fast track on the way up. Well, I think that that works to the detriment of the Service and it's difficult to cope with this particularly when you have a series of directors general who are not at the end of their careers who are still in the saddle and hope as a result of the director generalship to pick off another large embassy.

Q: This is a bad mistake.

FARRAND: Absolutely, absolutely. It's happened for the past four or five directors general. They've all gone off. Now, today, Canberra is the sinecure for directors general. We've had the third one now in a row has gone to Canberra. So, Canberra has just become the graveyard for directors general. That clears the game for other senior offices when you have a director general also looking out for his or herself to get another post. I've worked, my time in personnel, I was under the last person whom I consider thoroughly professional to the core and that would have been George Vest. He, too, needed his spine stiffened occasionally and I can give you a couple of instances, but I won't do it.

Q: Why not?

FARRAND: Well.

Q: At least give one, I mean if you can.

FARRAND: I'll give one, I'll try to make it as short as I can because presumably people who will look at this are Foreign Service and will understand. The embassy in Sudan, the ambassador was a fellow by the name of Norman Anderson, but a Soviet hand with whom I had lived in Moscow years ago. Norman came in, they were having real trouble in the Sudan then and now. Norman came into the Department, came to see the director general and to see Bill Swing who was my boss, who was the head of foreign assignments, came to see them and said, "I must tell you that I really am concerned about the safety of my people. I've got an embassy of, I don't know what, thirty-five Foreign Service people with other agencies, and I'm very concerned about the safety. I'm very concerned that I'm not controlling the resources of the embassy." Norm was a political officer. Political officers normally don't want to get involved in resources, but Norm said, "I am very concerned that I am not controlling the inventory. I don't know what's happening. There is high crime. The people are living out there exposed. I've got to improve the administration of my post." The director general and Ambassador Swing said to him, to Norman Anderson, to Ambassador Anderson, "What do you mean?" He said, "I need a very good, strong general services officer. That's what I need." The word came down to me because I chaired the administrative panel. Find Ambassador Anderson a good general services officer, very good, strong, good knowledge, courage, able to think outside the envelope and really, to go to a hard place, find that person. I came to the panel, I said to the head of the administrative; do you know the word CDO [career development officer]. I said to the career development officer for administration. I called him in and I said, "Look, I need one of the best GSOs in the business. Ambassador Anderson has been given an assurance by the director general that we will put our minds to this and get a good man out there for him, or person, woman, it doesn't matter." Probably under those circumstances, a man would have been better; I don't care if I'm taken to court over this. Now, this man dragged his feet, he just hemmed and hawed. He said to me, "Bill, do you know what you're asking?" I said, "No, what am I asking? How many general services officers do we have in the system at class 1? We must have about 56? We can find one of these that will go there." He said, "But they're all assigned." I said, "I understand that they're assigned and I understand this is going to be messy because when you pull somebody out of one assignment, then you have to fill it, it sets off the daisy chain." This is something that is not well understood on the seventh floor and not well understood by ambassadors. I said, "Now, I think we ought to do this and we've got to get on it. So, I want you next week when we sit at panel you come with a list of names. I want you to come in with a list." He said, "I can't make the decision because I cannot in all conscience ask somebody to leave The Hague and go to Sudan, Khartoum. Khartoum of all places. I can't ask them." I said, "Well, fine, then I will do it, but here's what you do, you come in with a list of ten names. We're going to debate those ten names if it takes us until all day." He came the next week, he gave us the list of ten names and he

gave us a little paragraph write up on each person and then anybody on the panel and this was a smaller panel because it was administrative only. They could look at it. We looked them all over and I said, "Now, we've looked over these ten names, we've talked about it now for two hours today. Next week when we meet I want this list reduced now to five names." So, we did. Next week we got rid of some of those. Some people had mothers who are in nursing homes and can't leave the United States, others had autistic children who have to be and on and on it goes. This is all held confidential. He came back the next week with five; we debated for another two and a half-hours. Everybody was just reluctant and I kept pushing it. I kept getting indications from upstairs, have we done anything for Ambassador Anderson. We got it down to three names, then we got it down to two. This took a month. You would think with all the authority we could just do it like this. No. We came down to a particular officer and he was working for an excellent administrative counselor and as it worked out by chance, it happened to be Kemper. We came down and to this one officer, energetic, O-1, had all of the skills necessary and we said. We put up a vote and I said, "Now, I want everybody to vote." People were reluctant. They all finally said, this one fellow, even the fellow was his career development officer raised his hand. I said, "Okay, now we're unanimous now. Now, this is going to be sensitive because the first thing we do, we will send it up to the director general. We'll say director general this is the name we select after a month and this is the person we think should go and we have debated this from every single angle possible." Up the name went, he approved it, word went out to Kemper, Mr. Jones we'll call him. Your assignment to Kemper has been broken and you are directed by a certain time and date to report to Embassy Khartoum. You may come back to the Department of State for three days of, etc. and out-processing and in processing and off you go. The director general said, "Good, this has taken a long time." I said, "Well, I'm sorry Mr. DG." It was George Vest. He signed it and we sent it out. All hell broke loose; the EAP bureau came in and said, no the ambassador out there isn't going to put up with this. The young man involved said, "I am coming back to Washington. I am getting onboard an airplane tonight and I'm flying to Washington and I want a meeting with the director general." The director general being George Vest. He said, "Of course, I'd be happy to meet him." Two days later or however long it takes to come back from Australia, this young man comes in. I know his name now, but I'm not going to give it. He comes in and he sits down with the director general and he gave the director general this marvelous story, which was a true story I suppose. He had just met a young lady in Australia. They were going to get married and his marriage plans would be upset by this. He had a commitment renting a house out there, oh lord, all these things. The director general looked at him and said, "well, you've made a convincing case and I'm going to reverse my decision. You may stay in Canberra." The word came down to us, the word came to me. I walked in to Bill Swing. It was on a Friday evening, all things happen then. I walked into Bill Swing and I said, "Bill, the director general has just reversed our decision on this young man to go to Khartoum to meet this commitment and I tell you Bill, I've scoured the bottom, I've scoured everything. I don't know what else to do." Bill is a man of great grace and self-composure. His face went, his face was just drained of blood. He took it and he said, "I'll be back." He walked upstairs on a Friday evening, 6:00. He walked upstairs and I went back into my office and did papers and things, but I was putting my head on my desk.

About an hour later he came down and he said, "This man is going to Khartoum." The next Monday the director general called the young man in and ate his words ate his own words. Now, why do I tell that story? I tell that story because here is a director general who had his heart in the right place, who knew exactly what he wanted to do and gave us an assignment and we fulfilled it and took a long time to do it. That's how hard it is to impose discipline on the system and yet he held. Ambassador Vest held and he did the right thing. It's so easy to cave under these. That happens to be the one I told you.

Q: What was your feeling, was there sort of a change because you know so often in interviewing people, obviously there is, I don't think a certain amount of exaggeration, but basically people of somewhat older, and I consider myself to be this, say, well I was ordered there and I said oh, God, I don't want to go and then I saluted and went. There is beginning to be a change, were you seeing that, that there was a real problem in filling jobs?

FARRAND: Oh, absolutely. It's an epidemic now. You cannot find in the Foreign Service of the United States a career, I'm sorry, I don't mean career, I mean a counselor. You know how they have it now, you're an O-1, then you're a counselor, then you're a minister counselor, then you're, what is it a career minister?

Q: Well, there's minister counselor, then career minister.

FARRAND: Then ambassador, career ambassador.

Q: But, that's just an honorary title.

FARRAND: They're only doing one career minister a year for the past five or six years. So, you really, to get to MC is about all you can expect in the Foreign Service today. You won't find an OC that will go out and take a political counselor job or an economic counselor job. Everyone wants what they call a jump, I forget what it's called, but it's a grade leap. They all want deputy chief of missionships or ambassadors, of course. With the heavy pressure from the political side on ambassadors for sale you can only normally, if you do get an ambassadorship if you're lucky enough, you're going off to some small place, Gabon, Senegal, The Gambia, where, what? Power wide. You know, so the big embassies that we think of when we think of diplomacy overseas all of the Western European embassies, many of the embassies along the Maghreb, not all because some of them are very dangerous and political appointees don't want to go there. It is basically in the hands of the politicals now. Prague, forever since before the war and through the war, Prague was always in the hands of career professionals. As soon as the wall went down the ambassador's residence in Prague is probably one of the most magnificent in the world and it has been in the hands of political appointees ever since.

Q: What about diversity? I mean, could you explain what diversity meant at the time you were there and how, what was your impression of how it worked?

FARRAND: It was at the top of our plate. William Swing is one of the most dedicated principled men in the Foreign Service and he in his own way impressed upon me that we were going to give every chance to minorities to fill jobs and we always brought candidates to panel for discussion and debate and we always had the EEO representative make the case. The bureaus, including some of the largest. By the way, when you look at the Department of State, until you've worked in personnel, you don't maybe you do, but you certainly do if you're in personnel, you see the difference between the bureaus. There's about eighteen to nineteen bureaus in the Department of State. Six matter. The others are secondary.

Q: Which are the ones that matter?

FARRAND: The European and the regionals, European bureau, East Asian bureau, Middle Eastern bureau, African bureau, Latin American bureau, South Asian bureau. These are the bureaus. These control not only, jobs, but also real estate overseas. They, therefore, are the way that you get you get the jobs that you're looking for by working there. The functional bureaus, political military, consular, economic and business affairs, international narcotics and law enforcement, human rights, well, they call it something different now, but the human rights bureau. These bureaus are in danger of not getting the top candidates for the jobs and this is an inherit thing in the Department.

Q: From your personnel point of view, could you rank the bureaus about their effectiveness as far as dealing with the personnel system?

FARRAND: Oh, yes, this is highly subjective, this is highly subjective and anybody who reads this, half the people will react to it, but here's how I see it and, I think, most of my colleagues at the time. At the top of the heap is the European bureau, top of the heap. It normally attracts, when the bidding season comes around, it attracts many bidders for any of its jobs, many bidders. It has a luxury of choice. At the bottom of the heap, is the African bureau, which for many of its jobs attracts no bidders at all. So, you have to go to Oslo as number two in the political section, forty bidders, or to go as head of the economic section in Dublin, you have fifty bidders for DCM Dublin. DCM Dublin and what other one post, well, maybe Paris, but certainly Dublin was the top most bid job in the Department of Stet for a couple of years running. Fifty to sixty bidders for one job.

Q: I mean, if you look at it professionally, it's a nothing job.

FARRAND: No question about it. Bill Swing's maxim and it's one that I adopted is there are no bad jobs in the Foreign Service, I mean, really when you think about it. You go out and take it on and do it and then add to it and really push. You're going to learn from whatever you do. Then you go to Sudan, you go to Khartoum and you take a look at the DCMship. You say, yes, Africa's up here, but you go to Khartoum and you get no bidders for the deputy chief of mission job. If you're in Uganda, for example, head of the consular section, maybe one bidder, maybe two bidders. The way that the personnel system has to deal with this is to say that your bid list has to have a minimum number of bids. You

can't just go in and say I only want to go to Dublin as head of the consular section. You must also say I want to go elsewhere and you must put down. You rank your bids from a high, medium and low in priority, but people had better learn and they have learned, those, many, is if you put down and I was of this view. I'm a strict disciplinarian on this. If people had eight bids that had to come in and they put Dublin at the top and then Oslo and then Lisbon and then they put Tripoli and I forget the capitals of these places and on down. Then because they have to put in a hardship post, they do put down Fort Lamy and it's a low bid and they come and the bureau sees this, the bureau gets all of these, the bureau looks at it and says, "We'll take it." It comes to panel and we look at it and we say fine, done. Then this fellow or this woman who has made these bids in this way and put Fort Lamy at the bottom and called it L is now assigned. Under the theory very elemental. A card laid and is card played and don't come back, and they do. Instantly, they come back and they say, "But that was not my top assignment." They come in and the tears. Card laid, card played. If you didn't want to go to Fort Lamy you should not have put it down. Now at the end of the day, all right I'm going to say European bureau at the top. In between how are the games played? In between, the next most attractive bureau is the East Asia bureau, the middle bureau is NEA, and then ARA and then down at the bottom is AF. Now, the executive directors of the bureaus depending upon their skills at planning this out and working it out for the whole bureau can have an enormous role to play. They will particularly in the European bureau will come in and say, "When it comes to diversity, you know, you too are part of the Foreign Service." Yes, yes, and we have no trouble with that. Absolutely no difficulty with that at all so long as the person is qualified. We have no problem whatsoever so long as the person is qualified. Bong. So long as the person is qualified. Throw everything into that basket and you come off sounding perfect, but then there is this difficulty. Sometimes people aren't exactly qualified, but you know what? In any system, any system of 1,000 people who have to be assigned and by the way, a third of the system is assigned every year, so if you've got 4,500 officers, 1,500 are going to move in any given year. I was there for two years, so I went through 3,000 officers. I didn't get to one of the one-thirds. There are always going to be people at the top who are stars, people in the middle who are excellent and people at the bottom who are less than excellent performers. All the bureaus of course, want to avoid that, but we have to come to a point and say, everyone is being paid a salary, everyone has a job and you are a part of the Foreign Service, You, the European bureau, are a part of the Foreign Service, too. So, you need to participate in the broad spectrum of assignments. We were able to shame them to a degree. The real manipulators of the system I found during that time, they're all manipulators, every single one of them is a manipulator. The panel had a warm spot in his heart for Africa. The panel wanted these posts well staffed and we knew by the way going back that young man who was told he had to leave Canberra and go to Khartoum and do that job who hated it, who did everything under the sun, he had the ambassador call, he had the assistant secretary call, everybody to block it. He went, he eventually went. He could have left the Service, but he didn't, he went and he absolutely excelled, absolutely excelled. The ambassador was so pleased that he went on. It turned out to be a very good thing for him to do.

Q: Well, usually these, again and again in my interviews I have people say they in their early assignment they were made GSO or budget officer or something and they screamed and yelled and they really learned something and came to the attention of the proper authorities.

FARRAND: Absolutely. My first job was assistant general services officer. Assistant and I absolutely enjoyed the job and enjoyed the people I worked with. Now, I had been a naval officer. I had been onboard a ship. I had had sixty or seventy men working for me. Anyway, that's not so important. The important thing is that the Foreign Service needs to rely on a central personnel system which operates under a set of transparent rules, open debate and all considerations are made on the table and then a vote is taken by thirteen or fourteen people, yes or no and then the director general of the Foreign Service and those in the higher ups should abide by those decisions because the panel left to itself will make a better judgment over time. It will make mistakes, yes it will, but it will make a better judgment over time than a director general bowing to the wishes of an undersecretary for political affairs, who doesn't care about the system because he's political or she.

Q: What about women in the Foreign Service? Were you under remedial obligation to make certain assignments and all?

FARRAND: Yes, yes. Remember the Alison Palmer case? We took very carefully into account this. I think, I don't know, my memory of it is a little bit clouded because I'm not sure the Alison Palmer thing had come to total in state, but I really believe today that the gender issue in personnel assignments in the Foreign Service has, of course, people are going to say you're a white male, you would say this. But, I still think that it has been largely resolved. I don't think the issue is gender anymore, I think the issue now is ethnic.

Q: How about on the ethnic side, how did that go?

FARRAND: Well, there would still be, there was still a lot of resentment among the minorities, particularly black Americans that the system was dealing with them totally square. We did everything we could to make that open and clear. I spent hours counseling and talking to black Americans and doing everything we could to make it possible that they didn't have to feel that they had been shunted aside and I'll tell you something. The best of them were the best of anywhere in the system. They're marvelous, marvelous people.

Q: Usually, a personnel system can often deal with very good people. What happened though if you find yourself, and I'm not talking about ethnic or gender or anything else, I'm just talking about, what happened when you ran across any individuals who really weren't very good. They'd been tried and all. Did you find the system, what did you do with people who, you know, for all sorts of reasons, just were poor performers?

FARRAND: Right and that exists. I think probably each year, the two years I was there at the end of the cycle we would have maybe a dozen officers that had not, that did not have

jobs. They didn't have jobs because personnel is a three-legged stool, it is a three-legged stool. You need the support, if you want a specific job and you're an officer you need the support of personnel which means you need your career development officer on your side to help push you for that job in Beijing. You need the bureau, the East Asian bureau in this case, Beijing, pushing for you and you then need to get out there yourself. You cannot simply, and lots of people, that's young people not knowing this, until their third or fourth assignment. They permit the system to operate on their best behalf and they think that I've put in my bid, I've asked to go to Beijing, I am wonderful because all of my life I've been the teacher's pet and I've been on the dean's list and I have been the most academically qualified, I was the salutatorian or valedictorian of my high school class and I did very well at Brown. So, all I have to do is write this down and clearly, I mean they would be foolish not to pick me up. Well, the difficulty is that there's many, many people in the Foreign Service that have similar backgrounds. So, the person has to go out and sell his or herself just as much as relying on the system and those that don't get shunted. Some people who have this particular frame of mind and I'm not always sure that our recruiting picks up the qualities that are needed for diplomacy. I mean brains, yes, high scholarship, yes, high aptitude for learning languages because you have that number on your test, you know; high SATs I suppose, I don't know all that goes into it, but it would seem to me that the reason that you have that three person panel that interviews everybody would try to pick out some other things, too. You know? Interpersonal skills that are very hard to define, but if you don't have them, they are very easy. Many of the dozen or so officers that could not be assigned and it would come down to the end of the time, as Dick Scissors a friend of mine said, he was in personnel, he was an economic CDO, so he knows these terms. He says, "The system clears, the market clears, all the goods that are up for sale will sell. It's just a question of what the price is." Everything will sell, just a question of price. So, when we came to the end of the year, and we still had Joe Drudge who interviews abysmally or who has done something to block his copybook with one bureau, and then you see the trouble is if he spent three tours in this bureau and then suddenly he is bidding for a job outside the bureau; well, these executive directors again, they are judged by their assistant, not their assistant secretary, but by their deputy assistant secretary responsible for personnel under the assistant secretary. They are judged by the quality of people that they deliver. So, they are going to call up and if ARA is where this person has been for five tours, suddenly he wants to go to NEA which is very tough anyway and he wants to go to EAP; EAP's executive director calls up ARA's executive director and says, "Hey, Joe, tell me this, what about this fellow Max Drudge? Well, he's bidding on a job down in Vietnam and he wants to go to Saigon as the number two in the consular section." "Don't touch him, that's all", click. Then it's back to us. So, then we sit down and we have a special panel called hard to fill jobs and we put the jobs out on the table and we put the people out and we start saying you will go here, you will go here and then we put that out and then the bureaus descend upon us. "Oh my God, well, no you can't do that, oh, no, no. Look, look." My friend, it is a system and you are part of it. It can get very nasty and it sometimes can go all the way up to the seventh floor and then down will come the telephone call to the director general. Remember I told you about Harry Coburg and how he took me to lunch asked me how many directive assignments are being made or broken. How many panel decisions are

being broken, that's what a directive assignment is. I told him and it was a shock. I was in Bosnia and the director general of the Foreign Service came about three years ago and we were sitting at dinner. I said to him, "Mr. Director General, how many assignments are you directing?" Answer, "I direct lots of assignments. She's going to get whomever she wants." Paraphrase, close paraphrase. Harry was appalled when I gave him that; I was appalled when I heard that and no apologies, no. The judgment of the director general and many highly successful Foreign Service officers that had been directors general recently, had never had to use the personnel system at all because they worked the special assistant game.

Q: Well, probably the thing was... Obviously, this is a reference to Madeleine Albright, who has not come down as a sterling supporter of the Foreign Service system, highly personalized, which in a way helped to make her tenure less than sterling. Very little respect for her.

FARRAND: You see, I was there during the time of George Shultz and that was when George Vest was director general I think, I'm trying to think. Shultz respected Spiers, Ron Spiers, who was undersecretary for management? Spiers respected Vest. Vest respected Swing and Swing, I hope to a small degree, probably more than he should have, respected me to be square on the panels to do everything we could to get all these factors that you've mentioned and others into the equation before we made the assignment. So, when it went up and the director general in those days said this is the way it is, then nobody was going to break through up above. But, when you have a totally political seventh floor, as you've had for the past eight or nine years, its pity by the door.

Q: That's the thing, and also, I might say in the opinion of the professionals who I have interviewed, over 700 or so, so far, George Shultz stands out almost preeminent as the best secretary, the most effective secretary of state.

FARRAND: He was my minor hero. This current secretary of state because he's come up through the military chain and the military gauges and evaluates and assesses officers in part as to how they look out for their troops, particularly in the army, that is going to carry over and we may have a secretary of state here who will actually care about the people in the field and others. He might, might not, but certainly, certainly, the last, you know, I mean, when you look at Baker, he came in with an absolute feeling against the State Department from the Treasury Department. A closed circle.

Q: Often in personnel, at least one thing one can do is sort of name one's next assignment or at least you know how the system works. What did you do for yourself or what did they do for you?

FARRAND: Right, you can do that, you can do that, particularly if you are a representative of the bureau. An assignments officer who represents the bureau, but you can do that. It's not quite as easy as you think, but in my case, one day a piece of paper came down, it was from Frank Cohen and it was a small piece of paper written in pencil

and it simply said, “Bill” and it wasn’t to me, it was to Swing, “Dick Shifter in HA is looking for a senior DAS, HC.” Swing brought it into me and said, “You have any ideas?” I said, “Yes, maybe I’d do that.” Telephone call. I went up to interview with Richard Shifter and a week later I was being paneled to be the senior DAS in the bureau of human rights. It’s a functional bureau, it doesn’t have anywhere near the clout of a regional bureau, but I was interested in human rights. It had a particular interest in the Soviet Union, Jews in the Soviet Union being oppressed there. So, I got that job.

Q: So, you did that from ‘87 to when?

FARRAND: ‘89.

Q: How would you describe the situation of the human rights bureau at that time because you know, it’s gone up and down?

FARRAND: Right. It was coming off a low under Elliott Abrams. The human rights bureau was founded under Carter. Vance was the secretary of state and they selected as the first assistant secretary a woman by the name of Patt Derian. With two t’s. She had two t’s. She was cut from the liberal mode. She decided to take on military dictatorships around the world, particularly Latin America. It came across that she wasn’t as interested in tackling some of the human rights abuses in the communist world, which are just as bad or worse, as in the military. So, of course, she’s going to go right up against lots of rice bowls in town. After Derian, they brought in Elliott Abrams because I think Reagan succeeded, right? It was carter and then Reagan. Am I right?

Q: Yes.

FARRAND: Reagan came in and brought Elliott Abrams. Elliott Abrams was going to bring realism to human rights. His principal deputy at the time, Malivisky told me that, he said, “We’re going go bring realism up here.” I said, “Well, good luck now.” I was not on the Soviet desk. I said, “Good luck now bringing in realism.” So, they eased up and started swinging their big guns on the Soviet Union and its satellites and any communist regime anywhere. Easing up on the military dictatorships, that’s how it was perceived. Shifter succeeded. Shifter was a political. Derian was political. Elliott Abrams was political and Shifter was political. That’s why they always had a senior DAS in there who was career. It was a very exposed position for a senior DAS in their because all of the bureaus didn’t want to hear from the bureau of human rights. None of the regional bureaus, they were all cluck, cluck and talk about human rights and democratic principles and all this, but they really don’t at the end of the day want to hear about it. They do not. So, you see it was. I don’t know if that answers your question.

Q: Yes. Well, then during this time how did you find the bureau’s staff because that would be part of your major interest?

FARRAND: Well, remember, I had just come from personnel and so I was aware of some of the things that I was telling you about. I began to spend a good bit of time trying to recruit better people from the bureau, not that they weren't all good, but I was trying to reach out to Foreign Service officers to let them know that a tour in the bureau of human rights was not necessarily the kiss of death. They could learn. You know, the bureau of human rights publishes every year a report on human rights around the world. It's a very thick volume. It's one of the more valuable reference works that the Department of State puts out. Henry Kissinger fought against the bureau of human rights, never wanted a bureau of human rights because it interfered with the concept of his ideas of real politic. Now, I know where I can't, I don't consider myself a theoretician of foreign affairs, I really don't. I read a lot about it, but I don't consider myself a theoretician. Human rights had to become at least a factor in decisions that we make with various countries. It doesn't have to be the controlling factor and that's how I viewed it. I think Shifter viewed it the same way. He was a brilliant lawyer. Princeton graduate, Yale Law School and he is a brilliant guy.

Q: You were saying about Shifter?

FARRAND: Oh, he's a marvelous man, not a bureaucrat and he drove other bureaucrats crazy. He was a young lad of about eleven years old living in Vienna or another city in Austria. He was the only son of a Jewish mother and a Jewish father who in 1938 or thereabouts got the wind for sure and they took their son from Austria down to Italy and put him on a steamer for the United States for sixty-five U.S. dollars in his pocket or the equivalent thereof. I guess that would be what, $400 or $500 today? I don't know what it would be. They said, "We will follow." They gave him an address somewhere in New Jersey, Hoboken or someplace and said, "You go there and they will take care of you and we will follow." He did and he never saw his parents again. They were picked up by the Nazis and found their final resting place in a concentration camp between Warsaw and the White Russian border, starts with M. Anyway, during those years as a young boy, Richard Shifter was put through school by family and friends and he kept writing to the Department of State to find out about his parents and being totally focused on this and being a highly, highly concerned young man, would not get responses or the responses he would get would be very late or brush-offs and he never forgot that. He never forgot that, never and he told me at one point, that experience has taught him the necessity of a bureaucracy to be human. "When people write and are in trouble, have deep trouble, then the response should try to address to a degree that trouble. I want you to insure that of the officers." The bureau at that time, oh I don't know what it was; it was probably something like twenty officers and maybe a staff of similar size. Probably forty-five people, probably, today it's a little larger and more ingrained. That was one of my roles was to humanize the correspondence that was going out to the public about people who were concerned. I had them doing that on the Soviet desk up to my ears, so I wasn't thoroughly unfamiliar with it. That and many, many more things. That was his primary concern from the start was to fight for people around the world, but Soviet Jewery was very heavy.

Q: Well, now one of the places where it seems that there is a major problem in human rights in the United States. You mentioned Mr. Shifter and others, I mean the plight of Soviet Jewery, often there is a Jewish component to concerns about human rights which is one of the great benefits of the influence of Judaism or at least the influence of the people who have been brought up under this, but when it gets to Palestine and gets to the Palestinians, it seems to fade away because obviously Israel is, and has been, a great violator of human rights with the Palestinians. How did you all deal with that?

FARRAND: With great, great care and caution. There was no one in the bureau that understood the issue as well as Richard Shifter. I had this put to me by a United States air force general about three months ago. I don't know where I was, but I was at a function. This general said to me that he was a fighter pilot and at one point some dozen years ago he was in Tel Aviv and he was talking with his counterpart in the Israeli air force and the guy said, "Let's go up, the two of us." So, they went out to the airport and got in two fighter jets. They took off, one after the other, and the man told him before they took off and everything else, he said, "As you're coming out, I want you to bank almost immediately as you fly out, we're going south, I want you to bank almost immediately because if you don't bank you're going to get into Egyptian air territory. As you bank, you cut to the left and you start inland a bit, then I want you only to go about three or four miles and you're going to bank again to the north because if you don't you'll be over Jordanian air space and as you go north, we'll go up north for about eight or ten minutes and then we're going to cut left and go out over the sea because if we go any further we're going to be over Lebanese air space and Syrian air space." Now, this general said to me, he said to me, "Bill, the Israeli armed forces and their defense establishment cannot lose one battle or one war. They cannot lose a battle or a war or it's over." The Arabs that were in Israel can afford to lose battles and wars because their ultimate existence isn't going to be at stake. Now, I tell you that Stuart because in talking about how Richard Shifter viewed Israel clearly, clearly, as a victim of the Holocaust himself he had to view Israel's long-term interests had to be preeminent in his mind and they were. It came down to me to deal with Palestinian groups or Arab American groups that came to the office. Dick just did not feel comfortable that way. I don't know, he's a gift man with the written word and with the spoken word, but I don't know if he felt that he could deal in an arm's length way with components with those beseechers, there were always beseechers.

Q: Well, how did you feel about this? How did you deal with the Arab Americans?

FARRAND: Now, there's two, there's two. There are the Arab Americans and then, of course, there is the non-represented group of Palestinians. The Palestinians are the football of the Middle East, it seems to me. They don't have good strong support from the Arabs that they can count on and they don't have, of course, they know they have to deal with the Israelis. The United States has taken a very strong position because of the money that we've given them, but also because of the constituency here in the United States. Israel is our ally and performs those kinds of roles. That kind of role. I am not a, I never served in the Middle East. The issue of Palestine and the issue of Israel is one that I pick up on the front pages of the Washington Post and the New York Times and the

Economist of London and I do as much reading about it as I can't, but I can't immerse myself in it because there are so many other things going on. I guess that there are times when I believe that the way the Israelis react to the Palestinians is excessive and the wrong thing to do. Then I come back to conversations like the one I had with the American general who is not Jewish and I figure that I'm wondering right now, but I figure that the issues are too damned important just to dismiss and say that it's all one way. It's not all one way. You know, you can't get around this fact. This is the other trouble, you can't get around the fact that most of the Arab countries all around and then when you get further in to the East, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman and other places, these are not democracies at all. At least Israel does submit itself to the polls and their governments rise and fall depending on these things. It's about a messy a thing as you can get and I am morally conflicted.

Q: I have a problem with this. As I look at this I see this as a land grab, I mean the West Bank.

FARRAND: That drives me crazy, particularly when I listen to the New York accents of many of the sufferers.

Q: I mean, it's a land grab and so-called strategic settlements. It's a difficult one and it's one that I think we've been wrestling with. What about other issues? How did you find, let's look at Africa, Africa was at the time you were there, was replete with dictatorial governments, mistreated their people and yet we sort of as you say had a soft spot in our heart for Africa and we don't want to beat them back in personnel But, I was just wondering whether you had any problems with Africa, for example?

FARRAND: Oh, many, many. The difficulty with the bureau of human rights is it had to pick its issues because with only twenty professionals working the angles and I'm not even sure, but the twenty is probably a strong twenty, a light twenty. You had to pick your issues. In Africa we focused on South Africa, we focused on the apartheid issue. Mozambique was, in those days, in great trouble. I'm not going to be able to sit here and tell you that I think that we did an awful lot on Africa. We tried to nudge the African bureau and by the way, the African bureau was not a difficult bureau to deal with in this area. Primarily because we had a very fine young woman lawyer working in our division on Africa who could go over there and talk to them and say, "Look, maybe if we send in a demarche, could we do that, could we do this or that?" But, Shifter taught me and what I hope taught the bureau, but of course, things go and come with personalities. He taught me the advantage of doing human rights case by case. For example, because he was a lawyer. He used to do case law and if you get a case taken care of between I can't even think of a good name, but I mean, that is being oppressed by his or her government, if you get that case resolved and get that case resolved in a positive way, it becomes an example for the next case. I can tell you from my experience on the Soviet desk in dealing with the mass, and I hope I'm not jumping here too much, in dealing with the mass of Soviet Jewery there are I don't know how many. Then there were the Pentecostals, there were the Ukrainian Catholics, a whole group of peoples being sat upon by the Soviet

government. The Jews were of particular interest because of the effectiveness of their domestic constituency and I remember- (end of tape)

Congress would send letters to the Department of State, to the Secretary of State forwarding those letters from constituents who were concerned about their family members in some part of the Soviet Union, either in prison or under oppression or just being discriminated against. Congress would simply forward those under a buck slip or sometimes there would be a handwritten or typewritten note from the senator to the secretary of state and those that were issued, had to be responded within in three days. We had so many of these congressional letters that my wife almost left me when I was working on the Soviet desk because I would go in early, I would stay late and then when I came home I would eat dinner and then pull out congressionals and start with them at the kitchen table until midnight. Actually George Vest was the assistant secretary for the European bureau at the time, but he had a deputy assistant secretary by the name of Richard Vine. Vine took a messianic approach to Vance's desire to mend relations with the Hill after the rather dismissive years of the Kissinger time, when Kissinger did not treat the, did not view congressional relations as a priority, Vance did. It trickled down and Vine wanted every letter answered within three days. We, on the Soviet desk, this goes back to the Soviet desk, we probably were getting something in the order of fifty or sixty a month and I had just a small staff. Three days trying to get these all done and they would be kicked back for any grammatical error; we didn't have computers in those days. It was really a burden, a real burden. It became a point of contention between me and my boss at the time, Sheered McCall, who would not take my explanations that this could not be done perfectly, every time, every single week. What that led to and I'm telling you this for a reason was a certain, find the way of answering to people and get it moved out. Make sure the letters were human and everything, but keep the letters being moved because Vance wanted everything answered within three days. Now I go to the bureau of human rights and of course, the bureau of human rights was receiving the same number of letters and they would write to the secretary some of them, some would go to the Soviet desk, some would come to the bureau of human rights, all on the Soviet Jewery issue. Now, look, what the Vance seventh floor would do, they would ask every time Vance would go to Moscow for a list of all of the cases and so it was our job to keep that list, this list accurate and it was a consuming, all consuming function. We would give the list to the secretary of state's spear-carriers and they would carry it along. Then they would hand it across to their interlocutors and that would then satisfy the congress because we could then refresh our letters and say the secretary on his recent visit to Moscow raised again the case of Eda Mudaro or Neton Sharansky, who is now one of the big shots in the government of Israel, at least in one of the opposition parties. We have raised it again. That would refresh our letters, but it did nothing for the Soviets. Now, Shifter came in and said we're going to do this differently. I'm going to take that list. He clashed with the Soviet desk. I'm going to take that list and I'm going to go to the foreign ministry and I'm going to sit down and I'm going to say to the people in the foreign ministry, "All right, I'm here and we have this list that you see. Now, I'd like to go down these cases and like to find out exactly what's happening in each case." They'd say, "I don't know," the KGB. He'd say, "No, I want to go, so let's start off with Agraham

Agrahmovich, all right." They'd say, "What?" He'd say, "I want to know" and there's 330 names, but he starts, "I want to know now what's happened to Agraham Agrahmovich." They would expostulate and do all of these things. He'd say, "No, I'm serious now, where are you going?" Eventually he would get them to tell what happened to Agraham Agrahmovich and where he is and where he's sitting and what the case number is before the courts and everything. He'd say, "Okay, now I want to see results on this case the next time we talk and I'm coming again in three weeks. Now, let's go down to Bernard Bernardovich." And A, B, C, D, right down through and it blew their minds, but he got people out.

Q: In a way, what clout did we have? These were not American citizens.

FARRAND: The only clout we had was that the Soviets did not have most favored nation trading status with us which they wanted, there were arms control agreements that they were dealing with us on. Look, the Soviets were a shameless lot and you couldn't shame them, you couldn't shame them, but you could, they were bullies, they understood bullies. They were bullies and they understand bullying, but bullies are deep inside, they have their own problems, right? We can all think about what they might be. That's what you push on. We'll be back.

Q: How did the desk, I mean the bureau didn't like us?

FARRAND: No, the European bureau, the assistant secretary at the time was Rosalind Ridgeway and they had a director of the Soviet desk who was a bright young officer, a graduate of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, Mark Paris and Ridgeway was exceedingly turf conscious and that was not a difficult problem either for Paris. So, they did all they could to blunt Richard Shifter's interest in Soviet Jewery. Now, look I don't want to say, Shifter was also dealing with the Allende case in Chile; he was dealing with the Central America situation; he was dealing with and was interested in the Cuba problem. I mean we had a global reach, I used the Soviet Jewery thing only because it was probably very near the top in those days.

Q: What about Central America at that time? I would think this would be very complicated.

FARRAND: Exceptionally complicated and I will have to say to you that I was coming off from two years from personnel account finding it extremely difficult to get my mind around these global human rights concerns because all of them had Byzantine little stories, you know. Things aren't, as they seem to be with many of these countries. Now, you remember when the Reagan administration wanted at all costs to stop the influx of communism into Central Europe, in Central America. So, they were quite willing to, they seemed to be at least in retrospect willing to cut corners when it came to things like human rights and the Ollie North, remember Elliott Abrams who was one of the predecessors of Shifter? So, this was exceptionally complex and could have taken up all of your time, you know? We worked with ARA on it, but there wasn't for example, the

same fervor about getting to the bottom of the killings of the eight or nine Jesuit priests and then the Carmelite nuns, I don't know if they were Carmelite, but nuns. It wasn't the same fervor because we were going to be pushing against; I can't remember his name. He's a rather banal figure today, but then he was a very important guy. He too, went to Georgetown as I recall, one of the generals. I'm sorry, but.

Q: This was in El Salvador?

FARRAND: I'm thinking El Salvador, yes, El Salvador when it came to the killing of the Jesuits. Remember Honduras and Guatemala, the military regime in Guatemala. It was imperfectly done. It always will be imperfectly done.

Q: Were there any sort of tricky cases that we got involved with, say with Northern Ireland and the detention of the IRA people and all that?

FARRAND: I remember the Soviets putting a Lithuanian Catholic priest in prison. His name was Duskaveyvitch. But, anyway, I was in Europe with Dick Shifter and he said, "We're going to go to Rome, we're going to go to the Vatican, we're going to talk to the Vatican about this priest who has been so wrongfully imprisoned and other things." We did and we met with the representative in the Vatican, Monsignor, who took down what we were saying and we said, "We really feel that a joint demarche would help if we could do this." That was a small tricky case. Dick said at the time, probably at the Vatican, he said, they're saying who is this Goddamn Jew coming in here and helping us in some of our affairs. But you know what, at the end of the day, we got the guy out. So, that's the sort of case that we're talking about. There's others. I spent a full year on the abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union for political purposes. All dissidents, not just Jewish, but all kinds of dissidents were put into Soviet hospitals and given shots of Atropine and all sorts of other things to, you know, because they were dissidents. You couldn't be a dissident in a perfect country like that. If you were a dissident in a country where everything was perfect and you know, the people, everything was done with the people, if you disagree to that you must be nuts. So, I worked on that for a year and I led a delegation of American psychiatrists to Moscow and we interviewed in Soviet mental hospitals. That was in 1988, '89 just before the wall fell. So, all of the good work kind of. But, it was that sort of thing that we did. Do I think that the bureau of human rights is an important adjunct to the State Department? I think I do. In time more and more officers have served there and gone back to the bureau so they'd bring a sprinkling of that experience to it and they improve the quality of the human rights reports which come in from the field.

Q: On drafting these human rights reports, who got a crack at them?

FARRAND: I could have a crack at every single one of them and I foolishly thought at the beginning thought that's what I was going to do. The thing is about 600 pages long when it's done. What we ended up doing, what we did, not ended up doing, what we did, we brought in WAE, do you know what that is?

Q: When actually employed?

FARRAND: When actually employed. We brought in experts from each of the bureaus, former deputy chiefs of missions, political counselors that wee in retirement that wanted to come back and work with us for about three months to help us cull and edit and put into a common form all of these reports and then I worked, my second year, I worked closely with them rather than trying to touch every jot and tilt. You can get lost in that swamp forever. Those reports, as I've said, have become a respected reference work and are good. If it weren't for the bureau of human rights the Department would be nipping and tucking on lots of sensitive issues. Saddam Hussein for example, it would be nipping and tucking.

Q: It's sort of a moral gyrocompass in a way?

FARRAND: Yes, it is, but you know what, like Jiminy Cricket, Pinocchio didn't always want to hear what he had to say.

Q: You left there in '89, where did you go?

FARRAND: I got a call one day from personnel saying that the White House, now what White House was this?

Q: The Bush administration, Bush one.

FARRAND: The Bush administration wanted to make room in the bureau of human rights for a Reaganite, young man who wanted to come to the bureau of human rights and be the principal deputy assistant secretary, political. Room had to be made for this person. In order to sweeten the pill, they said, "We're looking for an embassy for you." I said, "Well, that's nice, that's nice. Are you dissatisfied with my work?" "No, no, we're not dissatisfied with your work, but we have to make room for this political type." He was coming out of the former Reagan White House who was not going to find any room in the Bush White House I guess. Anyway, that took place and they started looking for, they started looking for embassies. That's why I kid Ken Brown because Brown, they were going to foist me and that's what I think, foist me on Africa. Now, I had never served in Africa and I think that's an affront to my colleagues in the Foreign Service who have served in Africa over the years, eaten sand, had fever, malaria, or whatever one gets and all of the hardships and then an outsider is parachuted in to take over an embassy. Well, they offered me a post and they gave me the post one day and then the next day they said that the White House had decided to give it to a political appointee out of Long Island and would I consider another post. It was to The Gambia and I didn't want to go to Gambia. I said, yes, I'll consider another post. Well, they said Tanzania. I said that I would certainly be interested in Tanzania and I waited a week and Ken didn't get back to me. He didn't get back to me and finally Bill Swing called me on the phone and Bill said, because he was still in charge of personnel, I was upstairs. He said, "Bill", he was not a deputy

assistant secretary, of course, now, "what about Papua New Guinea and you would have the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu as well." I said, "Yes." I said, "but they are tough places." He said, "I know, but what about it?" I said, because I knew from personnel that Port Moresby was one of the last places you wanted to go in East Asia, but I said, "Well, let me talk to the Ward Department." So, I called up my wife and I said, "I don't know how I can ever make this happen. My children are both in middle school." She said, "Well, you know, it's an embassy." I said, "Yes, you're right." So, I took it.

Q: Well, we'll pick this up next time in 1989 when you're off to Papa New Guinea. Great.

FARRAND: Excellent. Thank you.

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Q: Today is the 29th of August, 2001. Bill you're off to Papa New Guinea. How about confirmation and all that sort of thing? Was there are any political types who had raised noises or was this not exactly a political plum?

FARRAND: Nobody cared I think about Papa New Guinea, but at that time the Department of State and the bureau of East Asian and Pacific affairs under Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary was developing or deeply enmeshed in working out some sort of a peace arrangement in Cambodia and, which is thoroughly unrelated to the southwest Pacific, but the congress was not happy with Solomon's pushing for the inclusion of the

Q: Oh, what's his name, he was the not a Comer Rouge, but a Vietnamese communist sponsored

FARRAND: Yes, and in addition the Comer Rouge, the package that was put together and I wasn't a close student of it, but as I came to understand it, the package that was put together had the Comer Rouge as part of the discussion. Now, those in the congress, the senate particularly, that felt that this was absolutely wrongheaded, decided to put a hold on my hearings and I sat for eight, count them, months in the Department to go out to this small embassy, tucked off in the corner of the world, where nobody is really popping up and down for anything. It was left in the hands of a charge and he did an excellent job, but I was

Q: What did you do?

FARRAND: I stayed in the Department. I scoured the town for anybody interested in Melanesia because I not only had Papa New Guinea, but also I was going to be named conterminously as ambassador to the Solomon Islands and the little island nation of Vanuatu, that up until the 1960s had been the New Heverdes, a joint condominium type arrangement between the British and the French. All part of Melanesia. So, I went around the town and scratched here and there, sat in the Department of State and cooled my

heels, but I did an awful lot of advance work. Much, much more advanced on a small post like that that I think would be normal.

Q: Read your Jack London and all that?

FARRAND: I didn't read Jack London because I know he took his little boat out there, but I read significantly. There were other things to do, but I did not care for it.

Q: You got out there when and you left when, just to get the dates?

FARRAND: Yes, I arrived in Papa New Guinea, finally, in April of 1990 and I departed in September of 1993. I was there three and a half years because there was some difficulties getting my successor out. I mean, you know, these unrelated things get caught up in the senate and, you know, here's the thing that I said to one of my friends at the time. When I finally learned why I was being held up, I finally heard and knew somebody, I got the name of a staffer up on the Hill and it worked out that he came to Papa, New Guinea. He was on the senate foreign relation's committee staff. I never learned anything about this before, but later he, along with Senator Claiborne Pell and Borum, from Oklahoma, a senator. Anyway, it starts with B, came out and sitting in my residence looking over the south of the Coral Sea, this young staffer said, "You know why they're really holding you up?" I said, "Yes, I know how you hold me up." He said, "Well, it had nothing to do with you." I said, "Well, I assumed it had nothing to do with me. You know in holding up Papa, New Guinea, do you think you are really bringing any leverage on the Department? The Department didn't care whether there was an ambassador there or not or ever." So, I mean, what kind of leverage do you have, you didn't have any leverage.

Q: Well, anyway, you arrived in April 1989. Can you describe the situation? Let's take each separate place so let's take Papa, New Guinea first. What was the embassy like, what were our concerns, what was the government like, the economy and all?

FARRAND: First, the first thing you have to deal with with Papa, New Guinea, is the reputation it has outside of its borders for being one of the most dangerous places in the world. Urban and rural crime are reputed to be out of control. The phrase that I had never heard before was gang rape, actually pack rape, they called it pack rape of women which is a very off-putting thing. I mean for thinking of taking my wife and daughter with me. Then robberies, being waylaid on the road if there aren't that many roads, but if you were waylaid, you were waylaid. That was the single biggest thing that one had to deal with, this perception. We arrived at the airport, which was built by the United States Army during the Second World War. MacArthur had his headquarters in Port Moresby. Port Moresby is the capital. The airport, as you come in, you can see these circular revetments that still exist where B-17s, the flying fortress were backed in and then covered with jungle canopy faults to throw off the Japanese. We got off the airplane, we were hit with a blast of hot air, it came through the door. It was very warm and taken into the town. I must say as we drove along on the way in, we were both struck, my wife and I and my daughter.

Q: How old was your daughter?

FARRAND: She was thirteen and she did not want to be there. I had to take her out of her school. Here, over in McLean, had to take her out of her school and all of her friends; you know a thirteen-year-old girl. She absolutely did not want to be there and was very, very unhappy and very unhappy with her parents for making this happen. But, you ask about the state of the government, the economy, the politics, etc. First, we were received most graciously, most graciously. We were given, it is part of the commonwealth, part of the British Commonwealth and we were given a proper reception, the Prime Minister received me, the president of the country received in a special place and then we had a little drum roll with some troops, a police force. It's a police constabulary; it's a defense force there that does most everything. The people in the city cold not have been nicer. There was a sense, you got a sense because you saw high fences around villas and business establishments, you saw that sort of thing. So, you knew that there was crime, you knew that. Papa, New Guinea got its independence back in, I think, 1965. I had that number right on my lips. It was under a mandate from the First World War, the Germans held the north coast, the Bismarck Sea and all across the north coast was called New Guinea and in the south was Papua. The country is as large as California in land surface and it has four million people. It has a thousand clans. According to the Whitewith out of Dallas, Texas, which is a Protestant missionary bible group, bible group and based on missionaries there to translate these languages into the bible, the New Testament into these languages. According to them, there are 832 separate and distinct languages spoken by four million people. Now, the world has six thousand languages, just a little bit more, they're declining, but they have about six thousand languages. Papua, New Guinea has 830 of them. There are reasons for this and I won't go into it now, but Margaret Mead did much of her work up in the north part of the country where the Germans had been, but when the First World War was over, of course, German possessions around the world were taken under and put under mandate in one sort or another, I'm not a historian. The British were given the mandate over Papua, New Guinea, but they devolved their mandate onto the Australians. They said to the Australians, will you be ours? So, the Australians went up and took over under the League of Nations a mandate to more or less run Papua, New Guinea. More or less run Papuate and New Guinea. New Guinea being the north down the spine. The spine of this island, which if you take into account Indonesia's part of it, Irian Jaya. Irian Jaya is on the, east you look at the map, it's to the east, no to the west, and Papua, New Guinea is to the east. The total island, it's the second largest island after Greenland in the world. It looks like a great pterodactyl hanging over Australia. It's just the way it looks. By the time we got there, they had a constitutional democracy. They have a parliament, they have elections. The elections are done under the parliamentary system, they're called. They have to have one in five years. They have very spirited debates in their parliaments. They have had instances where people in the parliament getting hot under the collar, would jump at one another, but I think you can find that in our own history.

Q: We've had that during the just before the Civil War. Billy Preston beat Edmund Sumner with his cane, right on the floor of congress.

FARRAND: There's much that can be said. I feel or thought at the time, and by the way, I guess by my nature I'm too active a person just to sit back and do nothing and twiddle my thumbs and go to diplomatic receptions in the evening. There were about twenty diplomatic missions there. Australia, of course, high commission; New Zealand, of course; Fiji, of course, but Japan was there, China was there.

Q: Indonesia, of course.

FARRAND: Indonesia, of course, absolutely. Ambassadors, full staffs, I mean, the French were there, the Brits were there, and the Germans were there. The European Commission was there. The Malays were there. Were the Thais there? The Thais were not, but the Malaysians were. Singapore. Absolutely everybody was there, why because this is a huge piece of real estate. It's one of the last frontiers, probably is the last frontier in the world. There's maybe one or two places they haven't pushed back into yet. But, you know, in the 1930s, in the 1930s, '33 and '34, there was a central part of north of Papua, south of New Guinea, right along the Owen Stanley Range of mountains. You're right near the equator, there three or four degrees south of the equator, but the Owen Stanley Range rises to 14,000 feet. Snow peaks on the equator. Now, it doesn't happen all the time, but this was during the Second World War, a ferocious battlefield, ferocious.

Q: That trail between the Owen Stanley was, the Japanese nearly made it and then they basically were killed and starved to death.

FARRAND: Killed starved to death and our greatest ally was the mosquito. The other little ugly bugs that exist there. You can read about this in Mansfield's Heart of Darkness. I can only say that for going off to what I perceived at the time was a backwater, which I think probably is, it was fascinating to the core.

Q: What were, okay, it's a big island, that has all these languages, but what interest is it to particularly the United States and all these other countries?

FARRAND: The United States basically, the United States basically has, if it has a policy, the policy is one of what, was it Monahan who talked about benign neglect? It's basically let it off their run. We had commercial interests there. While I was there in 1992, Chevron brought in first oil. Now, in the industry that's something. First Oil, that's where you go into a community and you have sunk your, done your seismic, you've sunk your wells and you hit for the first time. So, in the first time in the history of Papua, New Guinea which became Papua, New Guinea in 1965, the long negotiation, of how they were going to do it. Was it going to be Papua and New Guinea, was it, anyway. The Chevron team had been working and looking. It's a very complicated geological structure, very complicated because it is built on limestone and there's coral, of course, down underneath. It's along the rim; you know that rim of fire that goes way out around

the Aleutians? All the way down, actually to South American and across, all around. Japan is on the rim of fire, Papua; New Guinea is on the southern, southwestern rim of the rim of fire. Volcanic, earthquakes, tsunami. After I left just about three years ago, they had a tsunami that hit the north coast. It was a wall of water thirty feet high, came out of nowhere and destroyed utterly a village, utterly. There was nothing left of the village after the water receded except and 3,000 people gone. I mean, you know, you talk about nature. Anyway, the seismic, the geology is so complicated that when you send your impulses down into the heart of the earth to find out what's there, they send back echoes, but the echoes are false echoes and they go in this direction and that because there's these open caverns and it distorts it very much, so it's very complex. Chevron was able to overcome and find oil and it was sweet oil and it was up in the highlands and they're still pumping. Now, Chevron is a California firm and so I gave Chevron all the support I could. They didn't, on the technical side, they needed nothing. Actually, because their financial investment there was so great, they didn't need much of anything, but I did have to keep certain doors open for them and I did have to run a little interference for them occasionally. Now, that was one thing. I had to sit down, Stuart and ask myself the question you had asked. What am I going to do? So, I got my staff around. I had a staff of twelve. I had a classic small embassy. I had one of everything, one consular officer, one administrative officer, had one general services officer, I had one political officer, I had one AID officer, one, one, one, one, one and I did have defense there. I did have the agency there because they were concerned at the time with the Chinese and the Russians were there. Oh, I didn't say that. The Russians had an embassy there. The Chinese and Russians were there.

Q: Actually the Russians would have been Soviets at that point? Just before you left.

FARRAND: Absolutely, it was that way. Well, they were in transition, I mean, you know the wall fell out in '89.

Q: What about, what was your impression of dealing with the government there, the ministry of foreign affairs and other parts of the government? How did you find it?

FARRAND: It was a revelation first, the government had in it a number of Australian expats. The Australians had during their time of mandate really entrenched themselves in Papua, New Guinea. They owned plantations, they pursued mining rights, they were in the bureaucracy and given the, okay, I'll use the word primitiveness. Primitiveness of the people, I hate to use that word because I have so many friends from Papua, New Guinea who are every bit and brighter than many people that I deal with here in this country or in other places. But, they were hampered because they weren't able to get off the island that much, although they do now. They were hampered because their perception of themselves was formed in part by the way that the Australians depicted them to themselves. Australians are goodhearted people, but I don't think they've been kind, necessarily to Papua, New Guinea. I don't think that it's necessarily the best recipe for bringing some of these countries out along on the path of development to, that's a touch area here, but to bring them under tutelage. That is really colonialism masked is another way. That wasn't

well presented because I'm trying to be, I don't want to upset my Australian friends either.

Q: Well, at the same time, I mean, the Australians, I mean things have changed, but they were coming out of very much sort of as often happens, it is a sort of semi-colonial country itself and is a little more colonialist than the original mother country. Also, in Australia at that time, they certainly had a white only policy and you know, I could see where it could be racist is a strong word, but I think it may be pertinent. I'm not trying to put words in your mouth.

FARRAND: Australia, on the ground, I got to know Australia, because they were the watering hole next door. I got down there. Australia is about in my judgment internally the way it goes about its own affairs internally, it's while I was there I was thinking I was back in the 1930s. I don't know I was born in the '30s, I don't know the '30s, but it reminded me of that. Certainly the '50s. You go into a small town and you'd think you're in the 1950s in the United States. Now all this computer and that will all change immediately. But, the Australians were much of what you say. It wasn't always the most. I met excellent people, but they themselves, they themselves, see I was to work with Papua, New Guinea. That's how I viewed it. So, the Aussies wanted me to join their clubs, their billiard clubs, they wanted me to join their tennis clubs, they wanted me to join their this and that. I didn't. I stayed out of their clubs. I allowed myself under pressure to join the Lions Clubs. You know, it's one of those fraternal organizations and I found myself going once a month or twice a month to meeting nothing but Australian expats were sitting around talking and Brits and others. Of course, there might be one or two token Papua, New Guineans there. So, finally I dropped out of that, it was a mistake to get into it, they implored me and I did, but I just dropped out of that. I tried to do as much as I could with the Papua, New Guineans, but you know what, sometimes they wouldn't respond.

The foreign ministry had a minister and then they had as in the British system a secretary who was in the civil service. Now, if you watch any of those programs, Mr. Minister, well it was somewhat like that. The minister would be the political in the cabinet and the prime minister, but the secretary and his minions would be the ones with whom you dealt on a day by day basis. The secretary was a young, educated, reasonably educated young man. He'd been educated in Australia and he had a bias. He, I don't think, particularly liked the United States. You know, I think he just didn't like the United States, but maybe he had his own racial kickback. Actually it was fun on a general level working in Papua, New Guinea, because the whole country was black. There were so many clans and the clans looked different from one another and after you were there for a while; I was there for three and a half years, I could tell by looking at a person what clan roughly he was from. There was differentiation amongst between the blacks. The blacks of the coastal, the blacks of the midrange and the blacks of the higherants and the island blacks who lived out in the little dotted islands around. They had their own internal problems with each other. So, they were not united as one against the white man. In fact, it was just refreshing to be amongst them because they didn't have a chip on their shoulder and, as

an American, as an American I did not get the backwash from the anti-Australian sentiment. Also, if something bad happened in the country, if there was an earthquake, if there was a volcanic eruption, if there was a fire in the town, and it was a big disaster, the United Stats wasn't blamed for it, Australia was. So, it was interesting to sit off to the side and see that happen. But, I tried to develop a positive agenda, I did and I sold the agenda to Washington and I went about trying to fulfill it. Did I make a big difference? I don't think so, but at one point some Australians complained that what are the Americans trying to do, take over here? I never carried that kickback because I tried to introduce American business out there. I knew something about American business because I am an economic officer; I've worked with commercial officers elsewhere in the world. I tried to bring in cultural groups; there are stories that I could tell.

Q: Well, tell a few.

FARRAND: I'll tell, against the backdrop, I don't want to use up too much of your tape. Against the backdrop of the crime and the violence that was endemic in the town of Port Moresby which had a population of just under a quarter of a million, but it was a separated city. It was down on the coast and you had to go up a hill and over the other side and on the other side there was another hill and that's where some of the settlements were. What happened? Because the mountains are oriented east west, with deep huge valleys in-between, the road system north-south was terrible. A young man from the highlands would find, by hook or by crook, a way of getting, maybe by an airplane, maybe going to the coast and around by boat to Port Moresby, they would get to Port Moresby, they would think they were going to, this was a Holy Grail, but, of course, its happening all over the world. There were no jobs. The economy was not. These young men did not come educated in many cases although the missionaries there and the Australians and others and the government itself has done a reasonably good job of trying to educate everybody up to the sixth grade level. There's a good bit of literacy, but these young men would come down and then they couldn't get back and then, of course, they would live at the edge of society and they would to a degree prey on society. There was a source of much of what was this crime problem was. Well, one day I had a young, well he wasn't young, I suppose he was in his late thirties, early forties, a fellow from Harvard University, who was our public affairs officers. I said to him, "Look, I would like to get a group out here." So, I came back to Washington and I went up to the USIA and I spoke to a high level official at USIA. It was a friend of mine. I said to her, "Could you not, based on our own relationship, find me a group that would represent the best of the American music? I would like it to be a black group. Send it to me in Papua, New Guinea." She said, "I'll see what I can do." Voila. She contacts me, contacts through the USIA system and this young man comes to me and says, "We're going to receive a jazz group, called the Dirty Dozen from New Orleans. It's coming in two months." I said, "That is wonderful news." Now, the Dirty Dozen, there were eight or nine people in the entourage in the ensemble, that's a dirty dozen, not a dozen, the dirty dozen. They arrive, this young man who is very bright and very, oh, what's the word of it? Very precise in his work. He had everything lined up. He was a clipboard man. He was a clipboard man. He was very proper, almost all the time very proper. His wife, I didn't learn this until later, but his wife

was living in their apartment. She would live in their apartment all week long until Friday night, he would go home Friday night and they would go together to a local restaurant and eat in a certain particular restaurant and they'd go back out and it would be her only outing, she was so fearful, she was so fearful. I wasn't learning this. So, this group comes. They arrive at the airport. I send this young man out to pick them up and bring them back and then we're going to meet them at a local hotel where they're going to stay overnight, they're going to get over their jet lag and then they're going to put on some shows. So, this young man goes to the airport. The fellows in the group, the tuba player, the bassoon player, the banjo, all this stuff, they all get off and they come walking down and they get on the bus. We hired a bus. They're all sitting there like this with their baseball caps on backwards, big tall guys, heavy guys, small guys, and he says to them as the bus starts rumbling away from the airport coming down the road toward Port Moresby, it's about an eight mile or ten mile ride, "I'd like to just brief you on a few," and he stands up in front with his clipboard and his little bow tie, I say bow tie because that's the type, he didn't wear a bow tie, but that's the type. He says to the, "Now you must understand, you'll be staying in the hotel and it's right on the hill looking over the water and it's right in the heart of town. But, I think it's very important that you understand that you should not stray out of the compound after 8:00 and you should be in two's and three's before 8:00 and you should." and this voice in the back says, or the guy raises his hand from the back and says, "Hey, man" and he finally gets his attention, and he says, "Yes, yes, do you have a question?" He says, "Yes, man is what you're saying big city rules apply?" Our hero says, "Well, I, yes, I guess I should." "Sit down man. You're telling us about crime in the cities in the downtown areas of cities where, you're telling us about crime? God." I missed a bet with these guys, the first night they came and put on a jam session at the hotel, which the whole diplomatic community came to, the whole professional, the professors from the university, the lawyers from downtown. I'm not trying to say to you this is hotsy, totsy in any way, but the people who kind of ran things came to that night. It was a mixed crowd, about 300. Tables everything. They put on a jam session that had the roof popping off. It was, people were dancing and the air conditioning couldn't hold up to the sweating. That wasn't why I brought them. I didn't bring them for that reason, I didn't bring them for that crowd, I wanted them to be in front of the people and this is where I made a crucial mistake. I allowed this guy, this young fellow, this public affairs officer to. I normally delegate and let them do it, but I allowed him to hold it in a hall inside a very secure area and the hall wasn't large enough and the price was too pricey. We should have put it out in the big stadium and we should have kept the price right down to the cost of half a can of soft drink so I could have gotten maybe a thousand or two thousand people. I would have beefed the police up, but I didn't and he held it and it was probably no more than 250, 300. It's painful for me even to think of it now because I permitted this fellow's natural instincts to protect, protect, protect. You've got to take chances. But, that was one anecdote. There are many, many others, thousands of anecdotes. As regards to how one deals with a parliamentary democracy that still exists that has parts of its members that still exists in the Stone Age. I will say this; they had a, you know, we have a congressional record. What do the Brits have? What do they publish everyday? Henside. The Henside. Well, they had a similar that came out every day what Parliament had done. Who raised what position, what laws wee passed and debated? In the

Parliament and I've gone many times and looked down and watched the proceedings. The parties would be on either side, the government and the opposition. There would be question time, there would be question time just as in the British Parliament, but you could still have somebody. In fact, I have a picture at home, I'll bring it the next time to show you, you could still have somebody coming dressed in regale with a pig, nose plugs and he could be wearing some feathers and he could be sitting there like this. I mean, it was. Everybody accepted it because that was his tribal dress. His tribal ceremonial dress, but on a certain day if up in the highlands his tribe, his clan is having a day, it's incumbent upon him to reflect that in the capital.

I remember they were going to have a particular critical vote on a particularly critical bill that could topple the government. I had the office director from the Department of State out staying with me. The Department of State in general. There were three parts to the Pacific. The three parts to, no. Anyway, there's three parts to the islands in the Pacific. There is Micronesia which is north of the equator and west of the international date line, that's Micronesia, those are the islands, the Gilberts, the Mariannas, this is the old, old, now today they're the Quadulay, Bikini Atoll, Guam, places like that. They are run largely, partly by the, well the State Department has an interest in it, as the defense Department does, too, but the Interior Department, the Department of the Interior administers those on the ground. Then there is Polynesia, that's the part that we all think about when we think about the South Sea Islands and that is Hawaii, Fiji, Tahiti and west of Tahiti and halfway down to Tahiti, because Tahiti is half Polynesian and half Melanesian. Melanesia, south of the equator over, that's there I was. Melanesia falls off the charts when it comes to the United States and the Department of State is Fiji's center. They focus on Fiji, they focus on. They don't think about that because they have in fact devolved most of the responsibility over that onto Australia. I think that's a mistake. I think we have our own interests there and ours are separate and distinct from Australia, because Australia, frankly, resents our presence out there and resents, if we try to become a little, well if we come a little active.

Q: What about the other embassies? Where they doing much?

FARRAND: The European Union tried to be reasonably active with the idea that all of Europe had an interest in these countries. No, no I think not I think the American embassy was probably second after the Australians.

Q: I would think that almost a prime concern of yours would be the morale, the protection of your staff. I mean, I can think of particularly a single woman or a married woman, but particularly a single woman with packs running around. I mean, this would be a horrible place to go.

FARRAND: Well, first, the packs weren't running around. There was one case that was constantly played back to us time and time again. It was twelve years old. I ran into one woman, one Australian woman, actually she was British, but she was married to an Australian who had come upon somebody in her house who had raped her. But, the

stories abounded, but nothing untoward occurred. My wife drove all over that town everyday doing things. In her car driving herself. She always stayed to the main roads, but there were, it was vastly overblown and not that there weren't troubles. Listen, now you can't say it to an American audience, but there are troubles right here. There are places you don't go.

Q: Oh absolutely, here in the Washington area, yes. But anyway, so this was not, but the perception is that this is a place that you do not want to go to?

FARRAND: Yes, that's a perception, but we had some good staff. I had one or two. I had a secretary who was very attractive and she lived by herself. She followed all the good procedures. I did two or three things. I asked the State Department to send out its team of specialists in self-defense. They did, they came out and they gave us a week of their time, training up the staff in elemental things of self-defense. Things that even somebody who is not a black belt can do that can help themselves. Number two, I made sure that in case of women in particular, that there were always vehicles available. I made it a liberal policy so that a vehicle can go and pick them up. The taxi service wasn't any good. The third thing I will say, I will say that this was a little bit odd. I remember asking about a team to get together and to sit down and to write up a protocol. I wanted it very precise, I wanted it very humane, action directed on what to do in case of rape. How should we all react in case of rape? This group sat, I had the head of the Peace Corps who was a wonderful woman who lived alone. Head of the Peace Corps lived alone. We had, I had 145 Peace Corps volunteers in the hills all over and I had all of them into my residence to talk to them before they went out and then in the middle and then at the end. I visited them when I was in the hills. I didn't go way back into the villages where they worked. What's there in the villages, what's there in the villages, nothing's going to happen. See the world is changing. The village is breaking down, in America, too. Once they were in the villages and once they had shown themselves to be working, hardworking, the village took care of them and nothing was going to happen. In the cities you had to be concerned. So, we sat down, we had this committee that came up with a, and I waned it short, I didn't want it to go on and on. I think it was two pages, maybe it was three and it stated the first time when you would hear that something like this had occurred, here are the steps you would take and here is what you would do and what you would not do. One of the things that I remember that stood out in my mind is the very first thing you don't do is say, "Why were you wearing that dress?" You can't make the victim part of the crime and then we went through, here's who you call, here's the next thing you do. Get the person in this case to the embassy or something, then a whole series of things, here is the service to call, here is the doctor's number, here is, if we're going to have an evacuation, helicopter service if necessary. Here is where that is; where would they go? To Brisbane, do they go to Darwin, where do you go, what do you do, who do you notify. You know, what kind of message do we send out? Etc., etc. We had it all laid out very tight and we chewed it over so it wasn't full of superfluous words, but it had enough in there and I remember sending it in to CLO, FLO?

Q: Yes, the Family Liaison Officer, FLO.

FARRAND: They were very impressed. But I never had anything like that happen.

Q: How did the Australian high commissioner treat you? Was there sort of a confrontational situation there would you say?

FARRAND: Not between me and the Australian high commissioner. We became friends. He was clearly the most important man in town. We became friends, but there was midlevel skirmishing going on at lower levels between our embassy and his midlevel managers. He had a commission of 200 or 250; I had a little outfit of twelve. But we were probing, anyway of keeping ourselves active. We were earning our money; we were doing what we were supposed to do.

Q: What was the Peace Corps doing?

FARRAND: The Peace Corps was doing developmental work in the hills, would go into the villages, sanitation was a big thing, children's health, childbirth, USAID was there, too, and they worked and talked with the Peace Corps a lot. I encouraged that. They brought specialists in childbirth would be one, simple methods of childbirth. In some clans in the mountains, in the highlands, when the time came for parturition, the woman, she had been told by the old cronies in town what to do, in the village. The woman crawled back into the jungle by herself, crawled by herself into the jungle or walked and then when the time came, she administered unto herself. She dug a pit beneath her and she was over the pit so there would be a place for the baby to drop. She did it all herself. Now, of course, she lost a number of her children that way. So, you asked me about the Peace Corps and I'm talking a little bit about what AID brought in a program; simple, clean, sterile, birthing methods. That if it's going to be this way, well here's what we can do to enhance the chances that the child will be healthy and all of that. The Peace Corps had lots of, as you would imagine, young, idealistic people, a lot of them from the Midwest of the United States, very upright, going into some tough situations. They did a wide range of things and I wouldn't be able to pinpoint it. Did they teach? Yes, they taught, but you know in the deep village the language that they might be up against would not be English and it would not be pigeon. It would be something wholly unintelligible. So, it posed all sorts of, we had to be careful about where we sent everybody to make sure that they were going to be utilized.

Q: What about relations, how about the Solomon Islands, for example?

FARRAND: The Solomon Islands with a population of about 350,000 people. The capital is Honiara which they had had no capital, nothing like it up until the Second World War, but after the Second World War was over on the island of Guadalcanal which is where this capital was the capital became transformed, a supply depot in the 25th Infantry Division, the infantry division that came on after the Marines to drive the Japanese off of Guadalcanal and to drive them all the way up the slot. John F. Kennedy had his major, his big accident there.

Q: He was run down by a Japanese destroyer.

FARRAND: Run down by a Japanese destroyer in a thing called the slot which was just miles to the northwest of Guadalcanal, the island of Guadalcanal, which is the largest island on the Solomon chain. The Solomon chain is nothing but the same chain that comes out of Papua, New Guinea, they just stopped it at Bougainville. You know Bougainville? That's where Richard Nixon fought or played poker. Then down the slot comes the Solomons and then way, way, way out into the ocean and down is the new Hydrides which is the end of the, tail end of the chain and it all starts up the Owen Stanley Range goes all the way down the spine of this chain. The Solomons are here again; you had a dozen embassies. You may say, why can that be, well, not all of them, I operated out of Port Moresby as did the Russians, as did a few others, the Chinese, they came down and they did their business. What is the interest of the Solomon Islands to the world? Tuna and hardwood, tropical hardwood. They had some of the most exotic stands, just as Papua, New Guinea does of exotic woods. This for the people that are after these hardwoods are the north Asians and they are exploiters par excellence. I'll just say it. The Japanese, the Koreans and the Taiwanese and they'd come down there and the same phenomenon linguistic and the clan phenomenon that existed in Papua, New Guinea that exists in Papua, New Guinea exists also on a smaller scale in the Solomons. The Solomons has about 160 languages, 160 clans. Now, because it's been difficult for them to pull everything together, they do have a pilot, we built them a beautiful pilot building under the impulse of Steve Solarz. Do you know Steve Solarz?

Q: I've interviewed him, yes.

FARRAND: He and I worked together to put up a very, it was his push, he wanted to give them a pilot building and he did, and its' there and they'd meet and they'd discuss and they'd debate and they'd elect and they had parties and they had electing campaigns. The islands are scattered about and there are differences between the islands, of course and old enmities and all that other stuff. The Second World War came and went. The Solomon Islanders could never understand why it was that when the Japanese came down and took Guadalcanal and built Henderson Field, then we came in and drove them off, and we got Henderson Field back. I don't know, we call it Henderson Field.

Q: It was the Japanese were building an airfield and we came in and finished it off.

FARRAND: Then finished it. It became, there is a thick book written on the Guadalcanal campaign and it became the, well the reason that Guadalcanal became so strategically important was that it served as a fixed aircraft carrier in the southwest Pacific and it was the very first time that we took on the Japanese offensively going back toward them, the very first time, August 7, 1942.

Q: The Guadalcanal is fascinating, I've read several books on this, both naval and air and the ground.

FARRAND: By the way, you say naval, air and ground. That was the other aspect of it, it was the first time that we blocked air, sea and land forces together in one concerted effort against the Japanese during the whole Second World War.

Q: Well, these were you know you might say two mighty powers this was the one place where they really hit each other to begin with, they fought for about a year.

FARRAND: Yes, they fought for about a year. But the Islanders who helped us out, they were very heroic in doing it; there's one or two of them that were incredibly courageous to assist us. The fuzzy wuzzies they were called. They were so devoted to because the Japanese treated them most cruelly. The Japanese did not have to do that, but they did it and they wanted them gone and we drove them away and then after we drove them away, we went away. Now, in their mentality, a victor stays back and runs the place. We simply left, we left the consulate, we left the airstrip, we left anything else we had built and destroyed, but built, we left and we went away and never came back. They said, oh, what's this all about? They left.

Q: Was the cargo cult still growing there?

FARRAND: Yes, but not as much as in Papua New Guinea.

Q. Well, did you get many vets coming, I mean both the Solomons and in Papua New Guinea. I would think there would be great scuba diving in Iron Bottom Sound off Solomon Island and all that.

FARRAND: Iron Bottom Sound had twenty-three capital ships at both sides at the bottom. The scuba diving on those wrecks, yes, is a major thing. The same guy that found the Titanic, Ballard, he came out there with his team and they did an underwater survey of those vessels and it's a documentary somewhere. One of the major things that I did and that really occupied my time was to get linked up back in Washington at the Pentagon with a two-star general who was put in charge, he was retired, of World War Two commemorations, fiftieth. Remember that was during the fiftieth? I was there in '91 and '92. In '92, the fiftieth anniversary we had on Guadalcanal we worked like beavers to make sure that the marines came, that the army came and that veterans came out of Chicago. They put up for the very first time a memorial. The Japanese went all over the island and put memorials everywhere for their battles. Maybe in the '70s and the 80's. We did very little; the Battle of Monuments Commission did very little. Now on Guadalcanal on top of the ridge where marines fought so long, there was a big ridge.

Q: Bloody ridge I think it was called, chesty puller and all that?

FARRAND: Yes. I mean, you know, there was a monument that is properly representative of what went on there. It was paid for by private money, mostly private money, a little bit of government money and was done by a doctor out of Chicago who

pulled this thing together. So, I certainly invited him and had everybody there and we had a massive display and Japanese veterans came back to and they were caught sitting together, Japanese and the Americans in the bar of the big hotel down by the lagoon, talking to each other. Not many Japanese, but enough, tears coming down their face. That was a big thing.

Q: Did the Newhambergese, what do they consist of?

FARRAND: Eighty islands shaped like a wishbone, Bali Hi. Do you know Mitchner's Tales of the South Pacific? Bali Hi was the island of Ambae, which was just opposite the place where he and his people naval types and marines were training; George Shultz trained there as a young marine. He wrote South Pacific in the Newhambergese. He looked at this island across the way, it was in the mist and he wrote all about it and he never went to visit it because he didn't want anything to destroy his dream. These are the people which, there's 160,000 of them, again another thirty languages, forty, incredibly beautiful spot, but it was up until the Second World War, run by the Brits and the French in condominium. So, if you go into a village and there would be a French school and a British school, English, French, all over. It didn't work very well. Now it's joined together, it's called Vanuatu. It has a parliament. It has it's own political structure. Each of the islands, of course, have a different agenda. It's being exploited right now a little bit. These are weak governments and outsiders can come in. All over the Pacific, those little island chains, those little island countries they all own a slice of the bandwidth above them. I don't know how it works, but sharpies from outside have come in and persuaded the government to sell over some of these bands and then they auction them off.

Q: You're talking about radio bands?

FARRAND: I'm talking about radio bands, I'm talking about Internet bands.

Q: Did we get much in the way of naval ship visits to your area?

FARRAND: Yes, I had a good relationship with the CINCPAC and NAVPAK. I don't know if they call it NAVPAK, but anyway, I had at least four ship visits that came through and they were very successful. They would pull in. That was something the Australians never did. That's something any other government never did and it was very much, it was a real positive bonus when you could do that.

Q: Were we concerned at that time about the influence of the Peoples Republic of China? You know, extending its influence in that area?

FARRAND: Yes. I was concerned but it was premature at that time to be too concerned, but I have seen since articles appearing. I saw one in the Economist, not that I follow everything, I can't. I saw something in the Economist here that was sent to me by some friends of mine out there talking about how the Chinese are very definitely, I won't say

very definitely, but the Chinese have shown interest in extending their influence into Oceania into Oceania. This would be the first place to start the Melanesian Archipelago.

Q: Well, were we kind of watching that at the time?

FARRAND: I was, I was, I don't think that Washington. Look, come on, you're talking for all of Oceania, for all of Oceania, I'm talking Polynesia, Micronesia and Melanesia, there's only about six and a half to seven million people total. No, no, actually that's wrong. It's up in the eight to nine million, but four and a half million, four and a half million are in Melanesia. Maybe I'm right. Maybe it's only about six to seven million over all of Oceania, and that would include Tahiti, that would include Fiji, that would include Samoa, that would include Nauru, all of those, Guam, but Melanesia has the biggest concentration of people, roughly sixty-five percent of the population of Oceania is in Melanesia.

Q: Any migration to the United States from your area?

FARRAND: No, no. No desire.

Q: How about the French? Where is New Caledonia?

FARRAND: That's Melanesian, but it's outside. There's four Melanesian islands, Papua, New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and New Caledonia, but New Caledonia is French. Well, it's the department of France.

Q: Did you cover that, I mean, keep an eye on it?

FARRAND: I went there twice, well, probably once. It's very much under French control. They have it as a, I went to Tahiti, too and I saw protesters. There was a big delegation coming all over the Pacific and the Department of State, Washington couldn't send anybody, so they asked me to cover it and I did. That was fascinating in Tahiti. The French influence there is at least, there is a significant portion of the population that do not like the French in Tahiti and the same is true in New Caledonia.

Q: New Caledonia also doesn't have a people, what are they Tunkenese or something?

FARRAND: Tunken, from Vietnam.

Q: Yes, so I was thinking, I mean, I know the French have had riots in Caledonia all the time. Well, were you sort of the New Caledonia watcher where you were?

FARRAND: That's it, that's it. I've sent in maybe one report on it. No, I would say it would probably fall to the American embassy of Canberra to watch that if anybody's watching at all. You know, in those days, the East Asian Bureau was focused virtually,

focused on three major issues. Cambodia, China and Japan. I sometimes think and I'm no expert at all, but I sometimes think that we give. (End of tape)

I was just talking about Japan. I don't know, I don't know. It's above me, it's above me and it was with them, too. I thought that sometimes the quality of our diplomacy and focus on Japan was not what it was for, for example, for China or for Southeast Asia, Cambodia, Indonesia. We had a number of ambassadors who were not from the region.

Q: Were we keeping an eye on Indonesia, which of course, was a West area.

FARRAND: Irian Jaya connected the popular city.

Q: Were you picking up anything about how things were going there?

FARRAND: Yes, because there was an insurgency against the Indonesian government in the hills in the highlands and in the coastal regions, Papua Mondeka, wanted a free Papua, wanted a free island of New Guinea and still do and they are persistent and pesky. I went up one time to the, I went up way up to the border area and actually walked across the border into Indonesia. There was nobody around. There was a rock and a helicopter let down here and it was a rock and it said Indonesia. So, took my camera and walked across into Indonesia, walked around a little bit into the jungle into the grassy area, then came right back out, had a picture taken. I went up on the coast, too, along the coast road and then the coast road just peters off. Angiapura is on the north coast of Irian Jaya and you could see it at night, the lights, but when I went from the last wewak, I think we walked as far as the road could go and it just petered out, became nothing so we just kept going with four wheel drive and then we got out at the water's edge. There's another little mark that says Indonesia walked across it again. It's a long thousand miles, thousand kilometers.

Q: Well, you can't really do it here.

FARRAND: Well, all I'm saying is that's a long way and there it is.

Q: Well, yes, during the war, MacArthur had quite an extensive campaign. Wewak was one of the places we landed and I think that was probably towards the end of the campaign there. But, was the government of Papua, New Guinea doing anything to foster a greater Papua, New Guinea? This was sort of a local thing.

FARRAND: No, no. Oh, yes, this impulse came from Irian Jayans. This came from Irian Jayans who were living under Indonesian rule, that did not want it. So, they gravitated toward the border area probably, or maybe they were there anyway, but they made their mischief up in the hills slopping across and into. They would use Papua, New Guinea as a refuge when the Indonesians were chasing them. Of course, the Indonesians because it was a porous border, they didn't always necessarily honor that either and that became a real friction between the government of Papua, New Guinea and Indonesia. When you are

living, sleeping alongside an 800-pound gorilla, you don't poke him with a hard stick all the time, a pointed stick all the time. You'd be very careful. That's what Papua, New Guinea wants to have, what Papua, New Guinea does not want would be a surge by Indonesia so they do all they can. I mean, a westward, an eastward push by Indonesia into what is Papua, New Guinea, thus extending Indonesia's control over New Guinea, the big island, the big island, is called New Guinea extending its control is now fifty percent and if they pushed they would get more. So, Papua, New Guinea's foreign policy has to be deeply concerned with maintaining good and correct relations with Indonesia and they extend considerable efforts in this regard. While I was there, they invited defense minister. I met him from Indonesia. I don't think they had a head of state exchange, but they sent delegations to Jakarta and they do what they can to smooth over this border problem and not become too upset if occasionally an Indonesian patrol moves across the line. Then there's fighter jets that will come over the air space occasionally or aircraft chasing these people. I don't know where it sits today; I'm just reflecting where it was then.

Q: Well, that's what our interest is at the time. Did you exchange information or was there any point in doing that with the embassy in Jakarta?

FARRAND: Yes, the American Ambassador in Jakarta was Robert Barry. He was a good friend of mine from Soviet days and he asked if I would take the time to send him an assessment of what I saw, so I didn't do it immediately, I couldn't do it immediately because I couldn't get up there, but I did after a while and I sent him off a message one time saying, "Here is how I see it from our side of it." I never heard back from him and Washington never asked.

Q: What about the missionaries, were they, I was thinking, I hear of people dedicating their lives by going up in rather difficult areas. Was sort of the care and feeding of the missionaries a major problem for you?

FARRAND: Yes, it was. They did not come to the U.S. government for physical assistance, money or anything of that nature. Maybe they did, but they didn't do it out in the field. If they did, they did it through Washington, but there were any number of religious groups that were in Papua, New Guinea from the United States. Evangelical groups, probably as many, I'm going to say at one point, that I counted I'm going to do this this way. There is and I think this is in the vernacular of the literature of religious life in America today even. There are the mainstream churches. There are the mainline Protestant churches. There is the Roman Catholic Church; of course, there is the Jewish faith and the Muslim faith here. We don't have that; neither of the latter two do we have in Papua, New Guinea. It's all Christian and its Christian divided between Protestant and Catholic. As far as the Protestants are concerned there is the London Missionary Society, LMS, which is the Church of England. There are Presbyterians, there are Methodists, there are Baptists and Lutherans, very important. Lutherans on the north coast speak German, along the Bismarck Sea and places of that nature. Now, in addition to those that I just mentioned and most of those that I have just mentioned are what one would call

church planting, church planting religions, faiths, faiths. They would build a church a physical church were they'd go. Now, they over the years, the LMS, the Lutherans and the Catholics, in particular, the LMS, the Lutherans and the Catholics, they had worked out a sort of working relationship. The LMS would take the south coast where Port Moresby was and along out in the Trobian Islands. The Lutherans would take the north coast. The Catholics had a tendency to, they were not exclusive, but they had a tendency to be in the highlands. Up until 1933 everyone thought that the highlands were uninhabited, uninhabited. In fact, it was written on a map at the time, uninhabited, that was the word was written across the whole Stanley Range and for a whole area probably four hundred miles wide and five hundred miles in length, three hundred and fifty miles wide, thoroughly uninhabited. The Irish Australian named Mick Lahey and his two brothers, Dan Lahey and I forgot the other one. They decided they wanted to push back in there in the '30s to see if there was gold. They put together a land expedition and they had bearers, probably one hundred bearers or two hundred bearers to bring the stuff along. The best thing they ever brought along was a box camera. You've had one of these things? That was the best thing they brought along. Now, did they find gold? It works out they did find gold. The Lahey family is still, I can take you up, I don't think he's dead yet, I can take you up and introduce you. Mick is gone, but the others. They got up in there and they pushed up over the top of the one of the ridges and they looked down and they're astounded in 1933 as they look down on this valley to see little fires coming out of the canopy. There's a fire here, and a fire here, fires, wooden stoves, little campfires. As they walked further in people started emerging coming up to them with their mouths wide open. They had never ever seen each other before and this was called first contact. It is written up in a marvelous book with these photographs from this big black box where these cultures came together for the very first time. They found a million; no you can't say they found, there were a million people. I didn't find you, you existed, you're right to exist is greater than mine. I can't say that I discovered you, no, but they contacted for the first time. So, there's a million people added right there to the rolls. Now, when news of all of this got out, there's all of these heathen souls, the missionaries got a savior of souls. So, this was a great impulse to push into the highlands. The war came, took time, it took them a long time to get a road built back up in there and that road is the subject of difficulties. So, what happened, it drew in a large number of missionaries. Today, I counted when I was there twenty-eight non-mainstream churches from the United States, mostly from the southwestern part of the United States, twenty-eight. One day there was a minister, they have a minister of culture and what not, but anyway, the minister who could have been the attorney general called me in. He said to me, "You know, we're having terrible difficulties with all of these churches and their countries, all of these missionaries. What can you do?" I said, "I can do nothing." He said, "It's confusing to our people because they're all Christian, but the are differences between them and they don't agree and the people are confused." Then, of course, the differences, there are really stiff rivalries between them.

Q: Well, did you get involved in any of these or this is sort of an internecine battle that was going on up in the highlands and along the coast?

FARRAND: When I would visit the highlands or when I would visit other places, missionary groups would often ask if I would, in particularly the highlands where you were really isolated and where the families were living in the bush and they would come together periodically in the city like, for example, a large settlement called the Skoroka. They would ask me to speak and I would speak in front of them and I would talk in front of them and I would give them a briefing about U.S. relations with Papua, New Guinea and I would talk about what we were trying to do, what we supported. After all, it was a democracy. After all, it was in fact a functioning democracy. This was something that I always wanted to bring more to Washington's attention that we ought to, when something is working and working reasonably well, we ought to put together a strategic, it doesn't have to cost a lot of money, but a strategic plan and then work on that plan. That's what I tried to do while I was there, bring all these strands and elements of what we were doing on that island, as small as it was and make sure that it was fitting in with a strategy to buttress democracy. So, I sent people, for example, back to, anything having to do, I'm not a lawyer, but anything having to do with strengthening the law, strengthening the legal profession, strengthening the courts, the prosecutors, justices, anything, I tried. I had some moderate success in that.

Q: How about medical, did you or the embassy get involved in medical evacuations with people up in the hills and all that?

FARRAND: No, too costly, well I mean, no. It was all pretty much handled by the groups themselves. These churches, many of them, the missionaries themselves have to raise their own money, they come back after five years and they go on the speaking circuit and then after six months of that, the money they've piled up, they can then take back. They share some of it with their church out wherever it may be, Dallas, Houston or wherever and then they go back to with the remainder and they live on that for the next five years.

Q: Is there anything else we could cover before we move on?

FARRAND: Let's see if I can just say two things quickly. Number one, I suppose there'll never be another war like World War Two, there'll never be anything like that again, but I believe that small nations like the three to which I was ambassador, all of them democracies struggling, weak, but struggling democracies, need support. Shortsighted or decisions made, actually there's no decisions made. The non-decisions that are made over little governments like that, that is, simply they can be ignored, we can have representation there, but we don't want to put very much behind it beyond that and when we're in a budget cutting mode, the first candidates to go would be for example, our one person embassy on Honiara I have a charge d' affaire there in the Solomon Islands. The total cost per year was $387,000. I figured it out that under Baker, Secretary Baker, there was an undersecretary for management named Rogers, to show the White House that we were being very frugal, cut three embassies in the world and one of them was this one. I did everything I could to keep that open because our tuna industry depends very much on having access to and good relations with these governments and Guadalcanal means a lot to our history. I'm going to go back at this, I'm going to get some allies from the U.S.

Marine retired community and I'm going to try to get that embassy opened again, but I can't. It would be difficult now, everybody will be crying the woes about no money, but the Japanese are there, the Chinese are there, the Europeans, the Australians, the New Zealanders and others because they are looking after their interests there, but the United States cannot spend half a million dollars keeping a small one person embassy alive in an island that it freed from the Japanese. That would be one thing I would say and I would say that should apply.

The other thing I would say was all of these islands, a study was done confidential back in 1980 by a guy named Jim Kelly who was going on as ambassador, but he was waiting so they sent him out on a, he was waiting and waiting for this. They sent him out on this mission. He didn't know anything about the South Pacific. He went through all the various countries and he came back and wrote a confidential report which stated that the best investment we have for the smallest amount of money within those countries because it was about fifteen nations out there across the Pacific. They all vote with us. They vote with us in the UN. All they need is a little respect. It wouldn't cost very much. Very inexpensive, but we can't bring ourselves up to keep a small little embassy going here and a little embassy going there. We're shortsighted.

Q: Well, then Bill you left in 1993? Where did you go?

FARRAND: I came back to, I left in late '93 and I came back to become the, they said at the time the deputy commandant of the industrial college of the armed forces, ICAP, over at the National Defense University? Yes, deputy commandant, I was really the international affairs advisor to the commandant.

Q: How long did you do that?

FARRAND: Twenty months.

Q: Then what happened?

FARRAND: I was there for twenty months and I went to the Inspection Corps

Q: Okay, well why don't we do it the next time we have another session and cover ICAP and the inspection part?

FARRAND: Good. Great.

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Q: This is September 7, 2001. We're at ICAP. Where did ICAP fit into the Industrial College of the Armed Forces? How did you see it fit into the defense university system?

FARRAND: Right. ICAP has an identity problem, partly because of its name, which is not one that rolls off the tongue and not one that floats into the ear with a maloneous tone, the industrial college of the armed forces. I took the job because I had a conversation with the then commandant who was a rear admiral, upper, upper, rear admiral upper in the United States navy. I smile because that's kind of a naval construct you don't see it. A major general, two-star. He was very dedicated. His name was Jerry Smith. He was very dedicated to the curriculum, very dedicated to making the industrial college as a person in his position would be, dedicated to making a player. I sensed in him someone who was very interested, very seriously interested in bringing onboard this civilian component of someone who could work with him. I don't think it hurt the fact that I had been in the navy and he was a naval officer. However, Jerry was a bigger man than just that obviously. He had had his Ph.D. at I think Stanford, possibly electrical engineering. He was a devourer of books and someone with whom I could come back from Papua, New Guinea and recycle into life back here. I'll tell you frankly that having been ambassador to Papua, New Guinea, there was very little chance that the East Asian bureau was going to pick me up for another ambassadorship even though I had begun my career in Malaysia I had wandered off to the European Bureau and the fact that the system and Larry Eagleburger and others for lots of reasons had prevailed upon the system to take me to Papua, New Guinea it wasn't standard East Asia hand that wanted it. So, I really didn't think that when I came back that there was going to be anything for me in East Asia, but that's the way it worked. I hadn't had any trickles from them. In fact, the assistant secretary who succeeded Richard Solomon, I forget his name, but he had never visited, he had never communicated and when the time came to write up my evaluation report, he downgraded me from the superior to the good or whatever that was. I reacted. I said, "How could he do this?" Well, it was explained to me by his aides that he used the bell shaped curve and everybody couldn't be at the top. So, there had to be somebody at the bottom. I said, "Yes, but you don't know what I've done out here. You don't know how I pushed the agenda or anything." I became, his name was Bill, a former ambassador to Japan, but a man that I had always gotten along with, but that really put the stopper on it for me so I said when I came back that I would do something useful. I'd get away from the East Asian Bureau and then perhaps see what took place. My career was winding down; I didn't have any chance of making career minister, so I took the job. Now, about the industrial college of the armed forces and about the questions that you asked. It works out that in the First World War, when we went to war, we were not prepared. We were not ready for war. We were still dressing our troops in uniforms and covering them with blankets that were produced during the Spanish American War. It took us three years to get into the First World War and when we finally did go we were being carried over in British ships. We were transported to the front in French trucks. We did not have the war material.

Q: There were no American airplanes in combat.

FARRAND: There were no American airplanes in combat and, to a degree, now I don't want to overdo it because I'm not a historian of this, but to a degree we were even using their small arms. Of course, when you do that you have the big problem of inoperability.

You don't have the same size cartridge and that can mean life and death on the battlefield. Well, they had set up a war materials board. I don't suppose that was a precise name and we came, the United States government came face to face, not for the first time, but certainly for serious, serious big time, with the fact that in a democracy where private industry operates, private sector operates independently of government control and probably so and rightly so, what do you do when you need to marshall your productive might to do something like a war. What do you do? Bernard Baruk, I believe was head of this board, this war production board and what happened, as our troops were leaving as the eleventh day, the eleventh month, the eleventh hour, as Armistice Day came, our factories and plants started pouring out war material for the front, but it was too late and our boys were coming home, the material was ready. It was a total disconnect. Baruk said at the time, "This lesson we must learn and we must study this. We must not let this happen again, we must study it." So, to study it, we need a little school. This is what the words came to me. We need a little school to capture this. So, in about 1922 or '23, they formed the Industrial College of the United States Army and they put it over at Fort McNair. It was linked up to the National War College. It was alongside with a different focus, much the same, but a slightly different focus. The National War College studies national security policy. The Industrial College studies national preparedness policy, readiness for war and in that term it focuses much more on the economy than does the War College. The War College is more a policy, cum strategy, cum political input and the Industrial College is, of course, under strategy. It has to focus on strategy, but it also focuses on the state of the economy and where the economy is going and what the defense establishment can count on by way of support.

Well, anyway, they formed this little college and it is called the Industrial College of the U.S. Army. Two young majors were assigned to the faculty in the early 1930s. One was Dwight D. Eisenhower and the other was Half Arnold and these were army officers. Half Arnold went on to become the head of the U.S. Army Air Force. Eisenhower, well. Eisenhower languished in a sense, but while he did, he did a study there. He did a study there of how to prepare for the next war and how to approach industry and what we wee going to probably have to do. In some cases, maybe even nationalize if necessary the big Ford Motor Company at Willow Run and others, too to do what needed to be done. Also, in those days, we had a big armory system across the United States. Armories, we used to have them in small towns, actually small cities where things were produced like long gun barrels, forges, there were, I don't know, all the paraphernalia that had to go into it. It was a place of producing ordinates and stockpiling it and having it ready. Well, of course, much of that is gone now and I don't know of an armory. I guess there might be one in downtown Washington, I don't know. Anyway, Eisenhower's paper typed out on an old Underwood typewriter is still on display. You can go to the Industrial College and check it out and read what this young major had to say about what would happen if war hit again. I think he did the paper in about 1935 or '36. He was there for five or six years. He stayed as a major all that time. There was no movement or move upward in the college. Of course, to go from 1935 as a major to 1945 as a five-star general, not four-star, not four-star, five-star. I don't think we have more than a dozen five-star generals in our entire history. I think, Washington, less, less, so. But, he had it was very revealing to me

when I saw that paper that he had done, the intellectual background work which I'm sure was not a transformational thing in his mind, but nonetheless he had done the groundwork. He knew something about what was required, he just didn't want to pound on his desk and say, "I need more howitzers" or "I need more tanks." He acknowledged that there was a lot of disconnects in that system, but that little college and that's what that little college does, even today. It's part of the National Defense University.

Q: Who were the students when you were there? Where were they coming from and where were they going?

FARRAND: The way they do it, there's, I believe the student body is 230. Whatever would divide easily into four parts, about 230, 240. They are all drawn from all service branches including the civilian sector of the government. It is a one-year curriculum, ten and a half months. The half of the curriculum studies the same basic curriculum as at the National War College. We studied basic strategy; you get the basic lay of the world, how the world is, you look at it strategically. Then you begin, now, the student body has, as I said about 230, 240. They're divided into four segments. One segment is sea services, one segment is land services, and the other segment is air services and then the fourth segment is civilians. So, that goes into, four goes into 240, about sixty each. Now, these would all be colonels in the land and air services or captains in the sea services, including the coast guard, which comes from. Who's the coast guard come from?

Q: Well, it's under the Treasury, then it comes under the, maybe it's transport.

FARRAND: Transport, today it's under transport, but during a war it's under Treasury.

Q: Well, during the way it becomes part of the navy.

FARRAND: Right, to do the coast. In any case, these are all officers who have been selected to go across the threshold and become flag officers. Now, they haven't been selected, but they have been kind of eyeballed as people that can make it into the flag ranks. The civilian side is supposed to be that way, as well. GS-15s who might become SES, Foreign Service Officers class 1 who might become OCs? Okay? Now, ideally the sixty civilians will have a heavy national security component and the largest single slice of those sixty officers will be Foreign Service and my time there I think it was something like in the zone of fifteen or sixteen officers that came over. I'll tell you a little something on that, a little anecdote. All of the names are put into a computer and out comes sixteen seminars. I don't know what sixteen divides into 240, but I'm going to say, I should probably do it before I make a fool of myself, but it comes out something in the order of fourteen or fifteen people per seminar. Now, the seminars and this is done the same way at the War College right across the campus. The seminars are divided with, let's say there are fourteen or fifteen, well, there's roughly three or four land, and three to four sea services and three to four civilians. Now, those civilians can be from, one can be from the FBI, one can be from the CIA, but they always try to have in every seminar, one Foreign Service officer so the Foreign Service officers that go there are both students and teachers

because they are to leaven. The phrase that's used over there and other places and at the Pentagon is stove piping. You know, the concept that I only do army and I only do tanks and I am very good at tanks and army and don't talk to me about anything else. The Foreign Service officer, the theory is to have by that time an out after his fifteen or eighteen years in the Service and he's been out around the world and he or she can come in and help to leaven the stove piping, of course. The Foreign Service Officer could get himself or herself is also stovepipe in a sense. They don't see the military component. So, that's the reason for it. I've talked too long.

Q: What were you doing?

FARRAND: In rank, I was the number two person, but the admiral had a competent chief of staff who was a colonel in the air force who ran the place, so there wasn't any deputy commandant aspects to it. When the admiral was gone, I would chair things in his absence. Since it's a military school under the Defense Department school system if I can use that expression and, by the way, that school system is all, most of it is under the umbrella of the National Defense University which was set up back in the late '60s as I recall. They have a big building over there. It's worth going over and looking at it. Makes this look fairly antique, but you have the National War College. They all have two stars as their commanders, the colleges, but the university has a three star. So, the three star runs the whole thing, but it will shift from air force to army to navy. During my time it went from army to air force and I was working under a naval officer. The purpose of the whole thing is to try to make people more joint in their thinking. Goldwater Nickols was a bill that was passed about ten or fifteen years ago. It was aimed at trying to make military officers break down the walls between the services, become more purple suited, they call it. Don't wear green, don't wear blue, wear a purple suit, unfortunate color, but anyway. I was the commandant's right hand man when it came to those civilian components, about sixty students. I took a special interest in all the civilians. I also helped him when he had questions in dealing with the State Department or dealing with the civilian bureaucracy. I gave lectures. I did not have a particular background except that I am an economic officer and I studied economics in the university. It was a pretty good trip for me and a massive eye opener, a massive eye opener.

Q: How in the military and students that are seen, the civilian industrial side and the military. It seems as it gets more and more specialized you ending up with one supplier or something. Was this a matter of concern?

FARRAND: Oh, of constant discussion. I remember I had been back there were whole seminars devoted just to this. Whole segments of a curriculum devoted just to this question that you're put forth. The same question that Baruk asked back in the 1920s would still be asked in the 1990s, the middle of the '90s, seventy years later when I was there. What do we do? Do we allow, for example, our merchant marines to dwindle and continue to dwindle? All American ships have Panamanian flags or flags of the Seychelles or Liberian flags, I mean, what do we do? How do we capture those vessels if we need them again to move materials? Well, will a war ever last long enough to move

things by sea at all? Is anything that's on the surface of the sea a sitting duck for all of these marvelous satellites and everything else? The question of how do you keep McDonnell, Grumman, Northrop, Lockheed, they're all going to. We saw it coming back then. Here I am now seven or eight years away from it and it has happened. All of these major aeronautical corporations, I say aeronautical, I suppose they're air defense have now combined. I don't know how many, but there aren't very many. So then when a big government contract comes, how are you going, are you going to take the bids? If you take the bids, how are you going to compare the bids? If you've just given, I hope I get this right, what is it? I don't even know the names the way the combinations have gone.

Q: McDonnell Douglas is one.

FARRAND: Say McDonnell Douglas and Northrop, Grumman. Let's say Northrop Grumman is together if they are, I hope they are, because this will go down forever. If one gets that big contract, how do you divide this up? How do you divide this up? Is it a clean game? Is this bidding really open and or are you just distributing contracts around to keep the production lines of these various organizations hot. No, not hot. You don't want them hot necessarily, you want them warm, but you absolutely don't want them cold. That means that they are shut down, shut down. All of the workers have been let go, the expertise that's in the mind of the worker and the technicians that run the place, the managers and all, that all dissipates off, then you've got to get that all back again. Can you bring back the team again in time of crisis? All these sorts of questions which are thorny questions and they're not just little things.

Q: You did this when to when?

FARRAND: I did this from about I'm going to say the late fall of '93 through '94 into the spring of '95.

Q: How did you find the FSO's work within this venue?

FARRAND: I wanted to tell you a little anecdote, may I? I don't know, I hope it will be relevant here. When, on two occasions I welcomed new classes and I brought them into my office. I had a large and spacious office and it was a very impressive kind of place as the military would do because they treated me as an MC, so I had two stars. Now in the Department of State, MCs you trip over them and sometimes they're asleep lying asleep crosswise. But, over here at the Industrial College and in the whole defense establishment you're given a, I don't know if it's due you or not, but you certainly are given recognition that you don't get in your own slap of the house. I called in the FSOs and they sat around my office. There must have been about twelve or fifteen of them that day. I ordered pizza and it came and we had Coca-Cola and what not and I said to them all, all right here it is, it's in the fall now and you're entering this year of sabbatical. I would like to think, Stuart, that the Department, I know it doesn't. In fact it's not true than it doesn't because I was on the, when I was in personnel, I was the chair of the selection board for senior training. I know we went through and characterized very carefully all of the officers'

jackets, performance jackets and the rank ordered them and then we took people from the top and we'd keep asking, here's an invitation for you to go to school, etc. We're not a course of organization so many would say, no, I don't want to go or the bureaus would say, sir, we can't let this fellow go at this time. The regional bureaus in the Department of State are, the five or six regional bureaus, are massively disinterested in long-term development of the Foreign Service. It's appalling. They want good people, their short-term profit maximizers. They're only interested in this time, right now because most of the assistant secretaries are political and they want production out of their people, so they don't care. We, in the central system, would insist that certain officers be taken off. Now, it was time for them to get some training and we always had a battle on that. So, what you ended up with was very good officers, but probably not the high flyers. None of the high flyers would necessarily go off and do this because they thought it was interfering with their high flying. Although I must say at my class in the War College, there were fourteen of us, that goes back before my time at the ICAP, but my class every single one with perhaps one exception became an ambassador and that doesn't necessarily translate to much. Now, I got them all into the room at the Industrial College and I said to them, "Now, I have to ask a simple question of you all. It is a very elemental question. How many of you" remember this was about October of 1993, I got there about October and they had just arrived in September, so it was about a month after they had been onboard when I called them in. I said, "How many of you men here in the United States military, how many of you have worn a uniform?" There were about as I'm going to say there's about fourteen or fifteen in the room. What would you think that the number of hands would be raised?

Q: If it's a new ballgame, I'd say about three or four.

FARRAND: One because you're got to figure this was 1993 late. I think the draft was taken away in 1974 by Nixon if I'm not mistaken, so this is nineteen years later. So, nineteen years these guys, these men and women had been in the Foreign Service most of them, they were in the sixteen to eighteen year range. So, they didn't have to go to the draft, so since they didn't have to go to the draft, none of them joined the military. Now, I said, "Look, this is going to be a factor in your life here and you've already experienced it. The military, the United States military officer has a particular view of the Department of State and you, for your part, coming off the Vietnam generation, many of your professors in school were coming through that time, you have a particular view, many of you of the U.S. military. These, not all of you, but many of you, and these stereotypes are going to interfere with your learning experience that you have at the school and in part, the reason that you're here is to help kind of break down the stereotypes so that you can function together in some of the complex types of situations, hybrid situations that are coming up. One had had it and he was a military policeman for one year. He had been in the reserves and came in as a military policeman for one year.

Q: Yes, well it's a new world.

FARRAND: It has only gotten, it has only drifted further apart. This is a concern that I have, I talked to a lot of people about and I've gathered articles on it. I'd like someday to write something on it.

Q: In '95 where did you go?

FARRAND: There was a undersecretary for management, his name was Richard Moose who was the undersecretary during the time I was at the Industrial College and he held an open house, an open forum session in the Department one day and he had it put on videotape and it was brought over and I viewed it along with Howard Walker who was the Vice President of the National Defense University. He was my boss, my punitive boss, but my counterpart over at the National Defense. We viewed this together and it was a tape in which Richard Moose, there were about two hundred people in the auditorium, one of the auditoriums in the Department and they were talking about the personnel system. There were a group of people that were complaining about how the system worked and Moose was entering right into the mood of the audience, rolling his eyes at the absurdities of the system and I thought doing an altogether unprofessional job of chairing this large meeting which he had attended and was taking onboard the comments of many civil servants who were complaining about the Foreign Service and taking onboard uncritically many comments. I had been in the system and I knew that the system wasn't, had more to deal with than what he was accepting that day. I tell you all of this because it, as I watched it on this tape I became more and more upset. So, I sat down with my machine and I wrote a letter to him taking issue with his taking issue with the fundamental procedures that are used to assign people and promote people which is the heart of the Foreign Service. I basically laid out for him what I thought would be a fair way of doing it and in fact, if the sixth floor and the seventh floor in particular would keep its hands off the personnel system, then the personnel system would do a fair job for most of its successors. I sent that letter over to him. I got, of course, oh maybe I got a two-line reply, because you could predict it, thank you for your views. They will be taken into account. Right.

About two weeks later, the number two or number three of the inspection corps called me on the phone and said they'd like me to consider joining the inspection corps as a team leader. I said, what's this. Well, it turns out that that letter of mine had made its way not only to Moose, but somehow he had farmed it down and it came the attention of the top levels of OIG and they wrote on it, somebody wrote on it, Clyde Taylor or somebody, "right on target." So, they thought that this, I guess this commended themselves to them, so they offered me a job and I said, okay. I had been there two years, Smith was about to change, it was time for a change and I moved over to the Inspection Corps.

Q: You were in the Inspection Corps from '95 to when?

FARRAND: I was with the Inspection Corps from probably May of '95 to February of '97, of '97. Yes.

Q: As an inspector, how did you see the system, the system has changed considerably since the time you came in. How did you see the inspection system working from '95 to '97? What were they after, how did it operate, how effective, how much clout did it have?

FARRAND: Clout, an important word. There is a tension in the Office of the Inspector General between auditors, between the auditing branch which is very crucial, and the security branch and what you and I know as the classic inspection arm that would be the teams that go around not only the world, but in the Department; interview you and try to bring to bear on your organization, the cobily accepted management principles. Mostly management. There's a tension and I must say that in today's world with the focus on fraud and security breeches and all of that business, that the inspection side of the inspection service was always in danger of being shuffled aside. So, you could, as I did, come back with, you really pour yourself into this. This is many hours late hours of work and drafting and interviewing and discussing and talking because the teams are about ten strong and they go across all the specialties in the Service. There were four teams, I had one. When you came back you would make certain recommendations and you'd say this is a finding. We find that the American Embassy in Bern, Switzerland needs a thorough overhaul of its internal procedures for promoting Foreign Service Nationals. If the Embassy challenged that, then of course, it entered into a big debate. Now, would you be able to push through your recommendation? It all depended on the inspector general herself and how much she was willing in this case to put on the male and the armor and say, "I'm going to take this to the ground." She had other things happening all the time. This was, but it, every Foreign Service officer worth her or his salt should do this at some time in their life. They would become enormously better managers as a result.

Q: When you were there from '95 to '97, it really was a very difficult time. I mean, particularly because of money. What were your impressions of how posts and how the system was working at that time?

FARRAND: This was just before the full brunt of the shortsighted management decisions made by such people as well, I won't use names, I'll simply say a series of under secretaries.

Q: Well, use names.

FARRAND: All right. A series of under secretaries of Management. Ivan Selin comes to mind, John F. W. Rodgers who was there under Baker comes to mind and this, we have since Eagleburger we haven't had an undersecretary for management who was a Foreign Service officer. Spiers, Ron Spiers was also Undersecretary for Management, but since those two, Eagleburger, then Spiers, we haven't had FSOs up in that job. Now, are FSOs good managers? Well, historically and everything else by reputation, no we're not supposed to be. However, bringing in party stalwarts that may have had, as in Ivan Selins instance he was a successful corporate leader. He was very proud that he spoke four foreign languages and he had two Ph.D.s and things of this nature. That all may be true, but what was also true, was that his judgment and his application of what he perceived to

be good management procedures which he would rail against the system, the Foreign Service all the time, rail against it, but he would put into effect a very dislocated and, for example, I'll give you one simple example that had to do I suppose with the system, too. It was very costly. He decided that at the end of the summer into the fall that the promotion panels which meet all summer should, there was always a tension within the personnel system when you began the assignments cycle and when you finished the promotion panels. If you began the assignments cycle, let us say, let us say you began in fact right now, right now, right over there in the building right now this thing is ongoing. Do you begin assigning people for next summer now about the fifteenth of September? Or do you wait until the promotion panels make their promotion panels make their promotions known about the first week of October? He said we cannot wait, we must begin because precision and efficiency demands it. So, you began assigning people in September, the panels began to meet. There's a lot of jobs out there, 2,000, 3,000, 4,000 jobs have to be assigned and you started assigning them on the panels and then three weeks later the promotions come through. Now, if you assign a guy at a certain level who has an area of expertise to Zaire and he speaks Swahili. I don't know if they speak Swahili in Zaire, but let's say and you assign it, he's an O-2 officer and you put him in as a O-2 in the consular section or the economic section and the promotion list comes out and he's now an O-1. That doesn't matter, just move forward. Well, of course it matters. It matters very much and if you take an O-1 who has just been newly promoted and he goes to the post and he's working under an O-1 his or her morale takes a hit. This is widespread, but it didn't matter. We had the clear-eyed managerial vision from the outside world that helped us to resolve in a very dysfunctional way that particular problem. Well, it all had to be reworked later, but at what cost. He brought people in without coning them. Now, I don't know what we think about the cone system, but he brought them in and says for four years they won't be coned, then they can select. Did that help us? Did that help us around the problem that most people want to be a political officer and not so many people want to be administrative officers? Did that help us? It did not. It all had to be reworked, but you had a cohort then going through his successor, Rodgers, following up on Secretary of State Baker's pledge to the President, "We will not ask during my time for anymore money for the State Department." So, that resulted in having to close embassies and do all sorts of other dysfunctional things, not embassies, but you closed small posts. Open, close, open, close, open, close and they also cut down on the number of Foreign Service officers coming through the system. This was happening back at the time I was in the inspection corps. Today, we are paying full price for that, full price for that now because we didn't bring in enough junior officers. We used to bring in two hundred a year roughly. During the time of these boys we were bringing in a hundred. So, as that constricted part of the python goes through the python you've still got jobs to fill, so what do you do? What do you do? You offer the jobs to civil servants in the Department. Right now we have a great number of civil servants serving overseas in Foreign Service positions. You make you convert secretaries to vice consuls; dependents at post you make vice consuls because you don't have the Foreign Service officers to fill the jobs. Now this is management and we come off, the Foreign Service types, as the bad managers, which we may or may not be. Part of the reason we

are is that we are kept away from management. Now, I don't know if I've gone anywhere toward your question.

Q: Looking at this, how did you find the staffing of our posts? Did you see any real problems as you went around?

FARRAND: Yes, that's a good question. The Foreign Service is as good as it is, not because it is well advantaged, but because of the quality of its people and they will continue to adjust to bad management and swallow it. I found overseas; I was very pleasantly surprised to find the commitment and the quality of people abroad with several exceptions. I was very surprised at how thoughtful was the supervision that was given to junior officers and in some posts junior officers were dealt with beautifully, others of course, it varied. Deputies Chiefs of Mission are responsible for junior officers and they, in some places, would take real time to help the JO along as a sort of mentor. Now, it wasn't uniformly positive, but it was very, very good. What the embassies needed most was a responsive and caring department and where you had that in certain bureaus, you had it more than in others, you had successful posts.

Q: You were mentioning when we started the first set of interviews, not on tape I don't think, you found a real problem in Africa. What was that?

FARRAND: I went twice to Africa. I was in Nigeria and Chad and I spent probably a total of maybe what, maybe six or seven weeks there. That doesn't make me an expert. I think what I was referring to in that comment was not so much what I saw at the posts because I thought the posts were engaged with the local issues, in fact they were exposed in Nigeria. Nigeria is a tough place. I found in those years that the African Bureau, this was just these two posts, I found the African bureau and I want to say right here, I'm not an African hand, not an African expert, but based on things that I had observed and talked about, I didn't think that they had a strategic, a strategy, a carefully thought through strategy to deal with Nigeria. If you're talking Africa, you've got to talk Nigeria. It's the largest by population; it's the most influential country in sub-Saharan Africa after South Africa and a few others. This is a very big shouldered country and it was in deplorable state and I didn't think that the bureau had a strategy, which it was pursuing with energy and vision. I just didn't and I told them that and they became defensive. I don't think they liked my inspection.

Q: Well, after the inspection, I'm just looking at the time here, after the inspection what did you do?

FARRAND: I had inspected oh, I don't know, maybe eight or nine or ten overseas posts and maybe three bureaus in the Department of State, when I received a telephone call. I was in Saudi Arabia already about two weeks into an inspection there, just after, not just after, but shortly after the bombing at Dhahran of the Khobar Towers and I received a telephone call from Washington asking me to go to Bosnia and take on a job in a

contested city in the northeastern part of the country to take on, in fact to take on the city, to run the city.

Q: What city is this?

FARRAND: It's a vowel-challenged city, a little city of about 80,000 people, a vowel challenge. It's Brcko.

Q: Yes, we'll do another session on that, but before we finish this inspection thing, how did you find security, particularly after the bombing at Khobar Towers and all? How did you find the sort of security side was operating? Was this becoming sort of paramount?

FARRAND: Yes, it was and my team, we were constantly, even though we were old, we'd been around most of us a lot. We would shake our heads when we would go into certain embassies that had just been hardened and just been tightened by security. The one that comes to mind is in La Paz, Bolivia at the 11,000 foot mark. They took an embassy which had been a two or three story affair that stretched for a city block and they compressed it into so a footprint on the ground was much smaller and then they went up ten floors and they in the new rules the fact of the building, any face of a building can only have thirty percent glass. That number could be twenty-five or it could be thirty-two, but I'm going to say thirty percent glass. So, you had this big stone monolith rising out of the ground up ten floors and then, as you entered it, in fact, it looks like a mausoleum. The entrance looks like a mausoleum the way that it has been done. As you enter you are greeted, it is now set back a hundred feet because as I say, they took the long lying building which members of the embassy that were there before said, we were a family. As I walked out, if I had to walk down the corridor to go see the political section or if I wanted to walk down the corridor to go to see the general services officer or the ambassador's office I would walk by two or three other offices and somebody would say, "Hello, Joe, how are you this morning?" "Oh, I'm fine." "Oh, by the way did you ever get back to me on that other?" "No, I didn't, but I will. Thanks for reminding me." and on by. These little social connectors that made it a community and actually improved through communication, better, easy communication improve the functioning suddenly was all shut off when you went to a ten floor thing and each floor had not airlocks as in a submarine, but they certainly had door locks in-between each floor and the going up on the elevator, well you entered outside, you went through a metal detector at the gate. You went through a metal detector, you had to show your pass, then you got into the courtyard. Then you came into the embassy once again you went through another metal detector unaccountably and then you went to the elevators and at the elevator you had to key in your code to get to your floor. Well, the first three or four floors were open to Foreign Service nationals, so on the elevator, we were inspectors watching this. On the elevators there would be Foreign Service nationals, maybe five and then there would be five embassy types and maybe three of us who were coming to work, too. The ones that were going higher than the fourth floor had to key their numbers in. What they would do, they would turn their back to the FSNs, hide like this and then they would do this, tick, tick, tick, tick. Then when we got up, the third floor would debouch all the Foreign

Service nationals, let's say, then you went to the fifth floor and you would get off and when you'd get off immediately you had another door that you had to go through with another series of tick, tick, ticks. Then when you got into the intercorridor of that floor, let's say the sixth floor were the economic unit was head, there might be the anti-drug people down the corridor, then there might be the economic unit over here and then maybe one other unit the defense establishment might be. Each had its own series of keys. When you got inside, you had to go to your office. Now, clearly in your office you have a safe. Now your safe has its special dials and the special dials you can only leave your stuff on your desk while you're there, then you must put it back. You must take your hard drive or your disk out, hard drive, hard disk. You must have somebody watching at all times. If you need to respond to a call of nature, this was one of the biggest problems in that embassy. You have to put away everything if there was nobody there, close everything up and then go back through this series of click, click, click. Now, you could not have the same code for everywhere. That would defeat the system, so you had to have different codes. Now how are you going to remember all those codes? How? You write them down. Where do you write them? On a piece of paper. Where do you put it? In your wallet. Now, I've go to tell you and the boys room and the girls room on one corridor on one floor that we knew was in the drug enforcement agency's area. You had to go through the click, click; go through the door, say hello to the secretary, and walk down the corridor where there were cubicles on either side and then through another door and then you found the facility. The drug enforcement chief refused to allow any other than his own people to use that head, even though that head was in a common area. He refused because they had to go through his area. So, I went to the ambassador. I went to the deputy chief of mission. I said, "You have about thirty people who instead of being able to reasonably conveniently have the facility on their own floor, must go through on the elevator down one or up one and the building being big, the stairs were long, you must instruct this person." "Well, I don't know, this is rather delicate." "Yes, it is delicate, but this is a U.S. government facility. Everybody is being paid." Could never get it done, this was a recommendation called up about six months later and it had not been done. The Drug Enforcement Agency chief was able to prevail over the ambassador. These are the sorts of things. Small stuff, small stuff maybe.

When you talk about how people are doing at post and how their morale is, etc., the smaller the post as we both know, the harder the hardship, the better the morale. Right?

Q: Oh, boy. Okay, well we'll stop at this point and we'll pick this up in 1997 when you're off to Bosnia, to Brcko.

FARRAND: Okay.

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Q: Today is December 11, 2001. Bill, you were in Bosnia from 1997 to when?

FARRAND: The 3lst of May, 2000.

Q: Well, tell me how the assignment came about.

FARRAND: I was on an inspection team and we had landed a couple of weeks earlier, or ten days maybe in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and we were setting up to inspect the embassy in Riyadh, the consulate in Jeddah and in Dhahran in the aftermath, well, it was probably a year after the bombing that had taken place in Dhahran at the Khobar Towers. I was sitting one evening watching a film and I got a tap on my shoulder, it was the marine guard saying that Washington wanted to speak to me right way. I got on the line with Washington, I guess it was close to midnight in Riyadh so I guess that would have made it about 6:00 in Washington or maybe 5:00 and it was Bill Montgomery, who was an old acquaintance. He said, he was calling from the European Bureau and he said, "We'd like you to go and take on a big assignment, a big one in Bosnia." I said, "What's it about?" He told me and I said, "Give me overnight to think about it." I told him that I was in a middle of starting off on a very serious inspection in an important country that we had spent several months getting ready to be there because that's how it works. He said, "That's not important, don't worry about that. Just tell me whether you'll do it or you won't. We want you to go to a town called Brcko." Sure, it's vowel challenged, I'll repeat that, it's vowel challenged. Brcko. So many people say Berko or Brickle or something of that nature, but in linguistics, the 'r' is rolled, so a rolled r becomes a vowel. The 'c' has a little hat on it so it's Brcko. You can say it like a birch tree, with a 'ko' on the end, Brcko, but you put the emphasis on the first. Anyway, what I did, it had then the major sticking point at the Dayton Peace Talks out in Bright Patterson Air Force Base in November, December of '95 that it was the one issue that could not be resolved. There were other tough issues, as in all negotiations like that, leading them to some tough peace accord between three warring factions, there were things that were simply papered over. This one they couldn't, nobody would give in, it was a town of 90,000 people, 85,000 people up on the border with Croatia on the Sava River up in the corner next to Yugoslavia, of Bosnia. So, I didn't know anything about it. I mean, I had been doing other things. I followed the Bosnian War generally, but it was all too confusing for me, the Bosnian War. You had when you went to read articles on it, you would read about the Croats and then about the Bosnian Croats and then about the Serbians and then about the Bosnian Serbs and then the Bosniacs, which means Bosnian Muslims as opposed to Muslims elsewhere. It became very difficult to follow, all the factions, and all of the ins and outs and I had plenty on my plate out in the South Pacific when I was ambassador out there. So, I followed it generally, but I didn't follow it closely. Well, would I take this on? He would give me overnight. So, I went to bed, got up in the morning and I'd been thinking about it and I said, "Yes, I think so. I want to get back into the active screen." I had been in the Inspection Corps for about fifteen months, maybe sixteen and I had found it very rewarding, but I was a passive observer. I wanted to be active. So, I told him yes, I hadn't even called my wife. He said, "Leave it to us." I must say within six hours I received in the middle of the day I received call from the Inspector General. She said to me, "Bill we just have been called. The seventh floor wants you to come back. Is this in accordance with what you want to do?" I said, I explained to her and I was in a funny position, but I said, "Look, if it's serious I'll do it." I would like to think with some reluctance, maybe

not, maybe she was happy to see my backside. Within two or three days I was back in Washington and then within three or four days of that I was sitting at a huge table in Vienna where all the foreign ministers of the various countries that were helping to implement the Dayton Peace Accord. They are called, it's a new term and it's unique only to the Balkans, unique only to Bosnia. They were called, these fifty-five nations, the Peace Implementation Council. That's what they were called, the Peace Implementation Council. This particular issue, Brcko, there were only two entities in Bosnia, it's like having two states in the United States, and they're shaped like an amoeba and at one point the amoeba for the Serbs comes down to 5,000 meters and is right at this city called Brcko. That's why they felt they had to have it because they had stolen it fair and square during the war and they ere going to keep it. I'm paraphrasing what?

Q: Teddy Roosevelt?

FARRAND: It was a Senator Hiacowa from San Francisco. He was a semanticist when we wee going to give back the Panal Canal. He said, "We stole it fair and square." I think it was Hiacowa, I think so.

Q: Well, anyway, it referred to the Panama Canal.

FARRAND: Anyway, and to a small extent, this little thing of Brcko, is not unlike the Panama Canal. It was this little strip of land about twenty kilometers long and it was only at its widest point about ten kilometers and that was where the road, the major east west highway went through. That's how the Serbs felt they had to. On either side of it there were half a million Serbs and I for the reader or the listener I depict it the following way. The two, first of all Bosnia and Herzegovina is the size of West Virginia. It had about 4.2, 4.3 million people before the war. West Virginia doesn't have that I don't think. (End of tape)

Q: Yes, you had gone on after the other tape had run out so you'll have to do a bit of back tracking. Bill, maybe you could start you were telling about Brcko as being between betwixt and between the pommel of the saddle between the Serbs on one side and the Serbs on the other side.

FARRAND: I'll try to recreate and I hope I don't double over, but anyway, the quick description without having a white board of Bosnia as I've already indicated the size of the territory, but it was broken down at the Dayton Peace Accords because there was a hammered out agreement that the Serbs would have forty-nine percent of the territory and the Bosnians and the Croats, Bosniacs, which are the Muslims and the Croats would have fifty-one. Now, this was a, as you can imagine, a terrific problem of allocating real estate around the country between these two entities. It meant in the case of the Serbs that the Serb entity ended up looking like an amoeba. It was the what's the word we use in American politics when you.

Q: The gerrymander.

FARRAND: It was the gerrymander from hell. A quick description would be like this. The Croat Muslim federation if you would visualize them in your mind as a mule standing facing roughly north south, maybe a little bit northeast, southwest, orientation, a mule and then over that mule would be thrown a saddle and two saddlebags. One saddlebag goes down the right-hand side, the eastern side, the other saddlebag goes down the western side to the left as you look at it. Each saddlebag was half of the Serb population, roughly half a million people in each saddlebag. The saddlebags came together at the top of the mule with a saddle and the saddle was the narrow corridor and the pommel of the saddle was Brcko, the little city of about 85,000 people before the war that had been unremarkable for most of its history. Five hundred year old town with the banks on the Sava River which had been an internal river in Yugoslavia so it was no big deal. It had been an unremarkable town for maybe one hundred years or seventy-five years it had been under Austro-Hungarian rule control. It had marks of Austro-Hungary in the village you could see that. Only because of the accident of war, Brcko assumed enormous importance because it was the second serious city that Milosevic's Serbian forces out of Serbia hit on the night of late April 3, 1992. They swept into the town, blew up both of the bridges, this is element of the Yugoslavian national army, Yugoslavs and these terror groups, militias that were under such people as Archon and Shashell and Captain Dragan and all of these other unfavored characters. Archon has gone to his rest, which I hope is not a rest. There was a city between Brcko and the border of Yugoslavia called Yillia. It was hit first and then Brcko was hit. In the succeeding two weeks, or maybe a month they became, these towns just became horrible places. As these thugs came through with their AK47s driving little old ladies, little old men out of their houses, stealing their televisions, stealing their washing machines. Anybody who wasn't a Serb was driven out and the house was destroyed. There was a huge amount of destruction.

At the point where the saddle, at the top, the Sava River is right there and on the other side is Croatia. That doesn't help Bosnia having Croatia across the river doesn't help Bosnia. Having Yugoslavia just maybe forty kilometers from Brcko on the Dreena River, that doesn't help. The destabilization because there were hard lined forces both in Croatia and in Serbia and they all came together with an intensity here in this little town because the Serbs felt, there was an east west highway through there. I'm talking of Bosnian Serbs now, the Bosnian Serbs. They had to keep that east west highway. As I said, they had stolen, raped and pillaged Brcko fair and square and they were going to keep it. Now, the Muslims and the Croats who together had made up about seventy percent of the population of Brcko before the war felt that for reasons of equity and simple justice they should have access to that town again because it was most of the real estate. By the way, you're talking about a little town, that's true, but this wasn't primitive. This was a nice little town, with little houses and nice houses.

Q: Nice town, not a bunch of mud huts.

FARRAND: Absolutely not. Yes. They had a library before the war; they had two nice hotels. They had twenty-six or twenty-seven factories. Brcko it worked out had produced

for Yugoslavia much of the vegetable oil, which is pressed out of seeds like sunflower and rapsey and other stuff like that. They had a big huge plant that produced much of the vegetable oil for all of Yugoslavia. Just works that way. They had a big shoe factory and the shoe factory employed 1,200 people and you figure 1,200 times four, because the average family would be four. That would be 4,800 people, close to 5,000 people living directly on the shoe factory, well it was the ripple effect. That was destroyed utterly during the war. Housing, I mean. I'm laying out for you why it's important here.

Now, there was a ceasefire line which I think I've mentioned, there's a ceasefire line in the Brcko area, the corridor, this long narrow corridor which is so strategically important for the Serbs and for the others to keep the two sides of the saddlebags together. The two saddlebags together. The ceasefire was a real line; the trenches, the minefields and everything were established in this area. They were real; they were as a result of heavy fierce fighting during the war. They were not drawn politically as Dayton felt, they were real. Right in the middle the United States Army carved out a place for a camp right on the line and demined it, demined it with huge machines that came in and blew up mines and then they put themselves in, about nine months prior to my arrival. So, the army was running it when I arrived. There was a lieutenant colonel in charge of eight hundred troops, but he was basically doing the things that needed to be done to keep the warring factions apart and to start setting the stage for a return of refugees and internal displaced persons to go home which is the primary right under the Dayton Accord. People have a right to return to their homes freely and without fear. That was my number two job.

The number one job when I got there was to restore freedom of movement because before the war the Brcko Municipality which it was called. Brcko was the seat of we would call a county, like Fairfax. It would like drawing a line right through the middle of Fairfax and up to the north would live all of the I don't know what, and in the south would live all of the others. Then they would be divided. In the southern portion and right in a horseshoe shape around the city of Brcko everything was leveled, leveled. I never, I read about Dresden in World War Two. I'm sure it wasn't as bad as Dresden, but that's what struck my mind when my helicopter landed there on April 11, no April 10, 1997. Now, but to go back, so the whole peace agreement that was hammered out in Dayton in three weeks almost fell apart because of Brcko. It almost fell apart. Neither side would budge at all. It was going to become, people were concerned, it would become Kaiser's belie again. A trigger for more fighting from the partisan groups, things of this nature. So, they agreed at Dayton, this was before my time, I had no knowledge of this, I was out doing other things, inspecting posts in Africa, they agreed at Dayton, I think it was Christopher who came forward and said, "Look, we can't resolve this issue. We're going to have to figure out what to do. What if we did this? What if" lawyers probably do this, "what if we put this under arbitration, finding arbitration for one year? What about that?" In other words, we close this discussion down, this three week discussion down and we leave this one issue out here hanging, breathing, but we put it under binding arbitration and all three of you, will put a tribunal. We'll have a Serb and we'll have a representative of the Federation and a representative of the Republic of Serbska. They'll both be legal minds and the two of them together will get together and select a third member to be the

presiding arbitrator under UN rule under the United Nations rules. This doesn't mean it's the United Nations, but they used those rules. So, reluctantly, Milosevic said yes because he is a snake. Tudjman said yes, and Ambagavich was very unhappy. Ambagavich was very unhappy. He said, this is an unfair, unjust way of going about this, but I'll go about it because we need peace. It was agreed. In world court, these two people were assigned. The Serbs named their man and the Bosniacs named their man. The Croats were not represented. But, those were very weak, they were professors of law, they were very weak. They had no mandate, they were just figureheads, they could do nothing. So, when it came time for them to select they couldn't do it. So, the world court stepped in and with consultations with the United States and named an American who had been the legal advisor for Cyrus Vance, secretary of state and then the key legal guy on Holbrook's team, a guy named Robert Sopoan from Covington. Named him to be the providing arbitrator. He then took over the tribunal and for one year struggled to do something about Brcko.

Q: This was before your time?

FARRAND: Before my time, for one year they struggled to do something about Brcko. They could not resolve it, nothing changed, nothing. In fact, if anything they became more firmly entrenched. We must have it, we must have it. I think it was the presiding arbitrator, but it could have been somebody else, but I think it was he who said, "What we're probably going to have to do here after a year is up, we're going to put this under international supervision. We're going to put it under direct supervision. We're going to put a supervisor right on a plane in there." People agreed and I got my phone call and I accepted and the next thing I know I'm in front of the Peace Implementation Council in Vienna, a massive room, glittering chandeliers all the way around and I'm sitting at the front table right next to the high representative. The high representative was the ex-prime minister of Sweden, a young, brilliant man by the name of Carl Bildt and Bildt, Bildt, I'm not sure, well, yes, I am sure. I think that Bildt's relationship with Holbrook and Holbrook's relationship with Bildt was less than harmonious. They couldn't have an American; they did not want an American in charge. The principal deputy high representative was an American. In fact, that's wrong. In fact, that is also wrong. They put a German in as the principal deputy high representative. Then they had three deputy high representatives around the country. One in Mustar in the southwest, one up in the north, so I had two titles. I was the deputy high representative in the north and I was the supervisor of Brcko. All of this was codified in a document known as the award. Again, and I learned that when an arbitrator arbitrates between two parties or three, whatever, the decision that comes down is an award. So, the first award came down in Rome, it was signed in Rome, Italy in February of 1997. It established this supervisory regime for Brcko. It all had to do with Brcko. It was forty pages long. Buried in there it states that there will be a deputy high representative named by the high representative and then he would have two hats, that person and it would be a he, believe me. I'm in front of this huge room and they introduce me and I'm sitting here saying to myself, "What in God's name have you gotten yourself into?" I had no idea. I want to make this point now, if I don't I'll make it probably at the end, but I want to make this point now. Apart from life

experience, apart from all that goes into what that makes up a reasonably educated person in this world, I had no prior training or no prior preparation. My Foreign Service career did not prepare me for what was about to come and fall on me. We are taught in the Foreign Service as diplomats, and this is the point, if there is a point out of this, if there is one. We're trained to be close observers of host country governments. We are trained to analyze, to observe, to analyze and to report on what we see and to suggest policy options and if the policy options are accepted back here in the metropol, and then they come back out and say yes this is what we shall do, then we become part of the implementation of that policy, but the policy is carefully controlled afar or by the ambassador. It is coordinated and when we implement it our implementation does not go to interfering in the affairs of the other country. In fact, that's one of the other things we're never supposed to do. You must not interfere in the affairs. Well, of course, we do it all the time, but we're not supposed to do it. We become nudgers of policy. Don't you think you should do this? We try to through exhortation and other things persuade oral argument to persuade the others to do what we wish to have done. We do not take over, but in this job as supervisor I was given the task of going in and running this town. I was very close to people would say proconsul and I used the word, so I'm tied to it now, I rarely do; for sake of shorthand, so there you are.

Q: What did you find when you got to Brcko?

FARRAND: From the time that they called me on February 27, I think it was out in Riyadh and I was back at this big meeting in Vienna on the sixth of March. I then went to Sarajevo where the high representative had his office in a big bombed out old building. I was given; it was catchers catch can, but I was given as much as they could give me by way of briefings. I was introduced to the military side, I was introduced at the non-governmental organization side, I was introduced to those international organizations, such as the special representative of the secretary general, who at that time was a Norwegian ambassador; a representative to the Red Cross to the International Rescue Committee, to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, which was there primarily to monitor and hold the technical aspects of elections and all of these things were supposed to get me ready to go up there. In addition, there was this basic document called the award. In the award, it stated, and I'm going to quote this, there's other things that it says, but I'm going to quote this, it stated that, "As the supervisors, such orders and regulations as the supervisor may deem fit to issue will prevail as against any existing law. Such orders and regulations as the supervisor may deem fit to issue shall prevail as against any, any law."

Q: This is known as carte blanche.

FARRAND: Any. In my little microcosm, my little postage stamp I want to explain this because I think it didn't get on here. The city of Brcko before the war, there were probably throughout the entire province of Bosnia and Herzegovina because it was a province of Yugoslavia at one time. There are probably something on the order of thirty or forty, thirty-five counties. They called them obschenas. Thirty counties. This was one

county. Brcko was the seat of that county. The county itself was probably something on the order of five hundred and fifty square kilometers. So, you can drop that down to, what would that be three hundred and fifty square miles? Something like that? Not big, but not small. The war cut it right in half and at the end of the war to the north with the Serbs who were living in all the Bosniac houses and before the war the municipality, that is the county of Brcko, as I said had about 85,000 people in it, but the plurality, the vast plurality were Muslims and they were in the towns, but they were the entrepreneurs. They had the houses. The Serbs were mostly country people. The hard scrabble farmers, but then they moved into the town and took over these houses and in the heart of the town this was planned by Karagee and company. They were stuck that town with Serbs so that it could never go back and that's what they did. They destroyed 10,000 homes so if you figure a family and then times four, that's 40,000 people out of a population of 80,000 that were left homeless and driven out. The tension and the pressure was enormous.

Now, your question goes to what did I find when I arrived? I wanted to tell you about my authority which was something again that I had never touched in the Foreign Service and with thirty years in the Foreign Service, I had never had, I mean sure sometimes I would run a section and you know how it is in the Foreign Service. You think management, you run a junior officer and a half of a secretary and that goes for management? Now, suddenly I've got a staff, an international staff of about twenty people. I'll just quickly go through. I had Brits, Germans, Danes, Swedes, I had an Australian believe it or not. I had one Canadian later on, then two Canadians. I had an Italian later on; I had a Swiss later on, a Swiss Italian. I had for a couple of years I had a Spanish woman, a newspaper reporter from Madrid who came on my staff to run my press. It was just a polyglot and then we had to hire local people because we were given an office in the downtown which was an old communist trading house full of plate glass windows; plate glass windows on the ground floor, big windows on every floor, I mean, my God. No setback, it was just on the street, no setback at all. The military lived four thousand meters away, which is roughly three miles away. They were in battle rattle. Do you know what that means?

Q: Yes, flack jackets, helmets?

FARRAND: Flack jackets, keblars, they call them today, helmets. Every time they went out they bristled and they had Bradley fighting machines when I first arrived rumbling through the town. They even had a huge tank, big tank; big massive thing because it had to block the river access, had to block the access to the bridge. They had jury-rigged a couple of baileys because the bridge had been dropped. Two spans had been dropped out of seven spans, two were dropped. We spanned those spans with old World War Two baileys.

Q: Bailey being a type of bridge?

FARRAND: Yes, kind of a temporary bridge. Then the bridge could then be used, but only by the army going back and forth, that would be our army because we had a massive camp up in Hungary. So, they would go across, go through Croatia, into Hungary. Croatia

was at its fattest point there, but its fattest point is only a couple of hundred miles, a hundred and fifty miles something like that. The town was and they were all waiting for this supervisor to come. Finally, the day comes, Bildt who was one of my minor heroes I really think the world of Carl Bildt. He has something, he taught me a lot and one of the things he taught me was the way a politician looks at problems like this. I'm afraid that people in our profession have a tendency to immediately in a circumstance like that immerse themselves in either the written or the oral word; start issuing reports. Now, I have never considered myself, I'm going to say this because I'm retired now, I've never considered myself a typical Foreign Service officer. I did not go to an Ivy League school, quite the contrary and I learned what I learned on the run. My masters degree was in economics, it was not in diplomacy, law and diplomacy. So, I learned what I learned on the run. I never really in fact, it was, when I came in there was no course over here at the Foreign Service Institute on how to be a political officer or an economic officer. I had to take it from my bosses and from criticisms that come back. I always kind of approached some of this probably a little too tentatively at first and it took me time to catch my wind in the Foreign Service. I can look back now and say that some of that, where I don't consider myself cut from a mold of the Foreign Service. It may have been good for me up there in Brcko because I have a naturally, I just have a naturally outgoing personality, it's just the way I am. I tend to talk more than I should and that is not bad when you don't want somebody who is terrible introverted in a job where you've got all these people that are seething with anger and distrust and they're looking at you. I'm just going to give you this anecdote, I know I shouldn't lard this up with anecdotes.

Q: No, anecdotes are fine.

FARRAND: This was big day, the supervisor was finally coming. Two or three helicopters, escort helicopters took off from the base in Sarajevo, Bildt was sitting next to me. I had never been to Brcko before. It was only a forty-minute ride over these low mountains, I mean I've got to tell you. Bosnia could be a very beautiful place if it didn't have the troubles that it has. We went up there, we had the head of the United Nations, the special representative, SRSG they called it, the head of OSCE, the head of the United Nations International Police Task Force who was a Dane, a policeman, we had the American ambassador and that was wise, there was no American ambassador at the time. There was a charge and he came. There was a bevy of people that came from the press and this helicopter has lifted off and then forty minutes later we start settling down over what once was a soccer field and probably is today, in Brcko. Heavy, armed guards around and out I come. Now, I am not a physically imposing person, I'm five foot eight, maybe five foot seven now that age has battered me down. I step off the plane and I've got Carl Bildt beside me and he's six foot five. He's a Viking, a Viking and we start across, and I'm introduced to the town fathers such as they were. There were no town fathers, but there was a mayor that had been appointed a Serb. They wait and wait and wait and wait and finally they put me into a cavalcade. I ride into town in this bullet proof vehicle, bullet proof and in front there are these HUMVs and in back there are HUMVs and the things rumble, rumble into town. Again, I'm asking myself, "What in God's name have you gotten yourself into. You damned fool." At the same time, you're excited by this

prospect you say, Jesus this is a huge. As we settle down, I look at the devastation around that town, my heart sank. I said, "Well, we're supposed to get this built back again?" By the way I should say here, when they asked me to do the job, they said, "Look you're going to have," are you ready for this? "You're going to have two million dollars in walking around money in your pocket and you're going to see something and you're going to say get that fixed. So, you can make a quick impact on the people, if the international community is here it's going to make a quick impact on your life and it's going to start making things better. It's going to lower the temperature because people have had nothing and we're going to give you something and when you have something you have something to lose. So, I was told not to worry. Two million. Three years later after much haranguing and jawboning on my part and coming back, three years later I received the first installment on that which was $235,000. Three years later. Now, I go back and I ask myself, I'm jumbling in and out, what should I have done differently? Should I have said I'd like that in writing? I'm talking to an old friend who says, "Don't worry you're going to have it." Should I say I want that in writing, Bill? Then I'm calling into question his veracity and we do things by word, don't we? Yes, well. I land, we come into town and I'm going to tell you this anecdote. There was a huge crowd around this building. When I say huge crowd, I'm going to say three hundred people, that's not huge, but it seemed huge. Upstairs I go, we all go into this office that has been arranged for me later with a big, big thing of bulletproof glass between my desk and the window. It was installed later. It kind of made me feel good having that bulletproof glass right there. We go out to the front and they say, "You're going to give a speech now. You're going to give a speech and say you're here." We had worked on a speech together, but it had largely been written for me and I had added my thing to this and that. As we walk out to the front, I've got Bildt who is the higher rep on my staff and others. As we walk out I'm going to do the Foreign Service thing, just stand there and be you know, with my little shined shoes. Vince grabbed me by the arm and says, "Come on." I said, "Where is this?" He says, "Bill, come on." He took me by the arm down the stairs and into the crowd and it drove the security people nuts. I had a security detail of six guys. Had them for all the time I was there. Great cost. Anyway, down we went. Now, I don't speak the language, a little bit. He doesn't speak the language a little bit, but we both have interpreters. So, Bildt has got me right in the middle and the people surround us. Serbs all, all Serbs. I remember one man who had about three teeth in his head and he had a huge bushy mustache, with a black flat hat on and he is very angry and he's looking at Bildt and he's saying, "I'll never live with the bastards again. I'll never let them back. We'll never let them back." Bildt is saying to him and this was the anecdote, Bildt is saying to him, "Who do you hate?" "I hate them; I hate them, the Turks. We'll never let them back." He said, "Well, what happened?" He said, "They burned my house and they took my sister away and they beat up my boy, these are people who live right down the street." Bildt says, "The people lived right down the street, is that correct?" He said, "Yes." He said, "Do you know who they are?" He said, "Yes, I do know who they are." Bildt said, "Then hate them, don't hate them all, and hate the people that did it to you. Don't hate everyone. Hate the two or three that did it. Take out your anger on them." That was a very good lesson for me to learn because I used that line many times after when I would be in

similar circumstances and people shouting. There is standoffishness in our profession that is inappropriate for a situation like that. Can you understand what I'm saying?

Q: Oh, absolutely. In other words you're saying in this case, I mean you really have to be the politician. The acumus politician to get up and get into the.

FARRAND: You have to be the politician. You have to be, that's right. When I was at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, I don't want to hammer this. I know I sound like Johnny One Note, but when I was at the Industrial College as deputy commandant, so called, there was two years running a, they took the student body and put them through a test called the Meyers Briggs personality. It was how you like to receive information, how you like to relate to the world. The doctor the Ph.D. that did it lives over here in northern Virginia and I'll think of his name. He would come into my office before he went off to make his presentation and we got talking. I said to him, "How is this, is this really a valuable thing?" He'd say, "Yes, it's very valuable. It's been going on for many years. It's based on union psychiatry." It basically, there is a strong indicator if people prefer to be quiet or introverted or prefer to be extroverted. He said, "Let me tell you something about your branch of government, the Foreign Service. I've done this at the Foreign Service Institute. At this stage we have millions of validations of this test. The American people are roughly two-thirds extroverted and a third introverted. It's just the reverse in the Foreign Service." Now, you can believe that or not or it's a broad statistic. There does need to be, this is not the time to be owlish and academic, hiding behind the door, issuing reports and orders. So, I took this very much to heart what Bildt had said and others and I became, I let that side of me open up more. There were times when you had to be a play actor and times when you had to be stern, but there were other times when what you really needed to do was listen to people, just get out there and let them nater at you, let people natter at you. I had five children I know there's times when what they really do is just air their grievances. I'll stop there.

Q: What were the issues, I mean, how did it progress?

FARRAND: I had four objectives laid on me by the award. I was given one year to restore freedom of movement in this small little Gaza Strip. They called it the Porsavina Corridor because the Sava River is the root word, Porsavina and it's the corridor. Nothing could move in this 225 square kilometer spit of land if it wasn't Serb. Anything other than Serb, automobile, person, would be in trouble. Same to the south. The Serbs could not go to the south of the line and the line was actually very reasonably defined because there are the mine fields on either side and nobody had kept good records during the war. It's still a problem today, a huge problem. First thing was to get restored. So, you had the mine fields, you had freedom of movement, no automobiles traveled north south, they all traveled east west and trucks and other things there could be no crossing of the line. That was the first thing because in order because the second thing which was crucially important was to set up a procedure to enable under the Dayton Peace Accord people to return to their homes of origin. As I've already told you before the ward Brcko and the Brcko Corridor were seventy percent non-Serb. Because of the war it was ninety-seven

percent Serb when I arrived, packed in there by Coragig and the hardliners to frustrate me. We called them biological blockers. Now, as Bosnia had lost during the war thirty percent of its housing nationwide, thirty percent. That meant, and of course, there were many people who left the country and went off to northern Europe, Germany, Switzerland, places like that, Austria and some to the United States. We have 100,000 Bosnians in the United States, most of them Bosniacs, most of them Muslims as a result of that war, but they had left. That took out some pressure on the housing, but still you were down thirty percent of your housing. People were packed into houses, two and three families. It was our job to make it possible for those people to come back north of the line because the Muslims and the Croats were south of the line, but to the north of the line come back and take over their houses. The strategy on that had to be all worked out and it was a very delicate thing.

The third thing I had to do and that I had to do within a year, I had to get the people back within a year. I set myself a target not knowing it, but I set myself a target of trying to have 7,000 people back by the end of the year. I was told by people that that was considered quite remarkable, but I had no judge. They asked me, "How many are you going to have back at the end of the year?" I said, "Well, 7,000." They said, "Well, they'll bless you if you do." Then the third thing was to hold free and fair elections in that year with the organization for security and cooperation. The fourth thing was to restart the economy. The first three things we were able to get done mostly. We were able to get a good heavy start on it. It was all a process but we couldn't get the economy restarted. That was just too premature. Those are the four objectives.

Q: Let's take a look. The traffic one I would think would be with the military force that would be almost the simplest one to do or not? Maybe it wasn't?

FARRAND: I'm just going to try to say a few words and be brief on the role of the military in Bosnia. There were twelve annexes to the Dayton Peace Agreement. The Dayton Peace Agreement had a framework up front and then there were twelve annexes. The first annex was responsible, eleven or twelve. The first annex was the military annex and there was annex A and annex B and they took up together about twelve pages of the whole award. That was the military's obligation and that was negotiated at Dayton and it was negotiated between the Pentagon and State Department and all others, too. The basic thrust of the United States Pentagon and the thrust of the military in negotiating their instructions under this peace agreement was to keep out of it as much as possible. Hands off. Be a presence; separate the warring factions around the ceasefire line, which became known as the interentity boundary line. The interentity boundary line, IEBL, was about one thousand kilometers long. Two kilometers to the north of it and two kilometers to the south of it, the military, that would be S4, I4 in the beginning, then S4 was to keep all military activity of any kind out of that area. That became that ribbon of four kilometers, a thousand kilometers long, four kilometers wide all across the country was divided into two entities became S4 country. Nothing went on in there. There could not be movements of Serb forces towed the line or movements from the north or from the south, nothing. By the time S4 got there, I4 got there and then S4, NATO, by the time they got there the two

sides had virtually exhausted themselves. So, this job while complex was not, you say, freedom of movement would have been relatively not difficult. This was relatively not difficult. The military took great pride in the fact and still do that they were able to get in and get their job done. Their job was to separate the warring factions and to ensure that they not start again. Pick up arms. Administer military bases to insure that nothing moves inside unless it was approved, etc. Now, when it came to intervening in the affairs of the country, particularly on the security side, the military wanted no part of that, unless, there was a clear danger to life, clear danger to life. Then the U.S. military and the others could move in to help rectify the situation to their delight, but not property. They would not go in to protect property. So, if some Serbs were blowing up buildings, these guys didn't go into to protect the building. They might rumble through town, rumble, rumble, rumble around and suppress things just by their very presence, but getting out and mixing it up, no, that was left to the police. What police? What police? Who were the police? The police were the thugs who were running the God damned war. I know we're not supposed to swear.

Q: Yes, you can. This is all history, you're allowed.

FARRAND: What do I have to rely upon when it comes to restoring freedom of movement? Can I ask the army, the U.S. army to come up and rumble through town and say, "Okay, Mr. Muslim, you follow me, here's my Bradley fighting machine, and you follow me with your little Hugo car and we'll take you up to the middle of town and you can do what you want and when you're ready we'll drive you back down." That's restoring freedom of movement. First, some freedom and some movement. No, there was a contingent, an international contingent of twenty-nine countries sent a total of 258 police to Brcko unarmed to become the International Police Task Force whose responsibility was to monitor and train or train and monitor the local police. The local police at that time were all Serbs and they were wearing purple onion suits, they wore purple camouflage suits which came right out of the war and which were anathema to the Muslims and the Croats when they saw those suits. They wore slouch hats, which were purple. The police had no badge, no identifying documents of any kind, no number, nothing. They had weapons, which they did not display stuffed inside their balloon pants pockets and they were swaggerers. Essentially, their role was to protect the Serb power structure and there were upwards of five hundred of them. We didn't know who they were. I had another marvelous man who was a police commander, a chief of police from the city of Santa Fe, New Mexico, an American. His age, his looks belied his age. He probably was, he could have been ten years older than he looked. He was in absolute top physical condition, a Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in something related to public administration, thoroughly dedicated, stood six foot three, athletic build, an American black by the name of Don Grady. He came in and we sat down and I'd say, "Don, we've got to get the police in shape." He said, "I know. What do you want?" I said, "Well, what do I want?" He said, "Yes, sir you're the boss. You tell me what you want." I said, "I think I want a better police force." "Yes, but specifically what do you want?" "Well, hum." He said, "Why don't I come back to you with a plan and we'll look at it?" I said, "Do that, do that." He did. I had a Russian; oh I didn't tell you I had a Russian on

my staff of ambassador rank, my deputy. I had two deputies, a retired brigadier general from the British Royal Parachutes and a retired ambassador from the Soviet Union. They were my two deputies. So, we had a triumvirate, me, a Brit and so we called ourselves, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. We even took a photograph, they did it, and they cut out the faces and they put our faces in, it's a sketch. With everybody talking and we would talk these things through in endless discussion, how to do everything because there was no template. There was no book; I couldn't turn to anything. As a matter of fact, nothing has ever been written, I am writing it now.

Q: Excellent.

FARRAND: I am, but because I'm spending a lot of time blarneying with you and others I don't get much going on that, but anyway, the thing is that we had to get a police force and it was the civilian contingent of the international community, this task force, IPTF, International Police Task Force, under the United Nations that helped to get the police set up properly so that we could then have a multiethnic police force on the streets; so that the people from the south at least feel that they weren't going to be picked up by cops who were instantly going to beat them up. We had all the patrols on the streets, there would never be two and two. The police had worked together before the war. We got rid of half of the five hundred thugs. We sent them through a psychological testing and attesting on what they knew about police. Half of them didn't know anything about police; they were just brought on. We put training courses in place. It was not easy and people who listen to this say how could you assess cross culturally psychological aspects of a person? Well, it's hard and I'm not sure that we did it right in every case. We surely didn't, but we cut half of them out and we sent them off to other parts of the Republic of Serbska to join police forces elsewhere, whatever, just get them out of town. We cut it down to about 230 officers and then we, by that time, we were going to hold elections then on the basis of the election results those ratios were used to put the multiethnic police together. There were several things moving in parallel all at once all the time.

Now, freedom of movement. First priority. I got to Brcko on the 10th of April. Three weeks later, it's May 1, now May 1st in the communist world is May Day. This is going to be a big day. The Muslims came to me and said, "We want to bring two busloads of our citizens up to visit you in the heart of Brcko on May Day. We always celebrated May Day and so we want to do it now." They told me this, I don't know what day May Day was, but say May Day was a Monday. They tell me this about on a Saturday, we're coming north with these two buses and a long string of cars and we want to come in and you are our protector, you are our little godfather. You will protect us, throw your mantle of protection over us as we move north on this bomb, mortar pocked road that is just a disaster. You could only crawl on it because of the potholes and the mortar rounds. You couldn't go out there because of mines. We're going to come up and we're going to do it at 11:00 in the morning on May 1st. Well, this is my decision, so I get my people together and we debate back and forth, back and forth. If we get the police, can we do it? I go down and see the local police commander. I physically go down and see the local police commander. Drive over, drop into his office. He's a guy, he sits behind his desk like this

and his name is Velosovich. I said, “Commander Velosovich, chief, can you deal with this? Can your police force deal with this because they’re asking to come up, two busloads, four kilometers up the road to visit me in my office and turn around and go on back? No big deal, but can you deal with it?” He kept his face straight. I said, “It’s important that you do this. You know this is one of my functions here.” He shrugs his shoulders and looks unhappy. I said, and this was a big mistake on my part because I had been told by people that had been dealing with him. If you can get a Serb in a position of authority to say, “Yes, I will do it”, if you can get them to say that to you, then you can rely upon that, but if they don’t, then you don’t have anything. You can walk away from that meeting and you think, well he didn’t say no. You can’t take the lack of a no for a yes, which I chose to do. The military, the United States military started getting on the line, they were very nervous. This was my first test of me and the base was right on the road and actually it straddled the road. These two buses would have to go through this military base and then come out the other side and go right up the road. I had a two star general fly in and say, “What are you going to do?” I had a one star general come up to me and say, “Mr. Ambassador, do you know what’s happening, or do you know what you’re going to do here?” I remembered him and I said, “General Abasak, let me ask you a question.” He had all these troops outside rumbling. I said, “Let me ask you a question. You read this, it says that my job is to get freedom of movement going. Now, this is my first opportunity to test whether how bad that is. What am I going to do? Am I going to wait on you because what I’m sensing here is that you guys wish this wouldn’t happen? You don’t want the commotion. Yes? This instruction doesn’t speak to you, it speaks to me.” I remember saying that to him. He just went and looked at me. Anyway, I stepped off the diving board with that. I said, two buses can come, no cars, no trailers, two buses can come up, they'll come to my office, I’ll meet the delegation head and then he goes back down and they all get on the bus and leave. The day comes, everybody is tense and they start rolling forward. I start getting reports. I’m just sitting in my office, but I’m getting reports, we had walkie talkies. They’re coming up through, they’re moving now. What happened, just before these two buses were to go through the camp and head north the three or four kilometers to my office, two other buses loaded with U.S. servicemen going out to Hungary across the damaged bridge for R&R headed out. This wasn’t very well coordinated. This was if you want to think about it, a mistake that I never knew. The military never told me they had two. These two buses which are of Hungarian make, start coming up that road and the thugs who had all been preplanned by the local hardline Serbs with the rocks as these buses came up, the thugs came out from behind the bombed out basements and sheds and things, they all came out throwing rocks at these two buses. With one driver who was a Hungarian was hit, the rock came through the windshield, hit him and glazed off of him. These two buses came under the attack. Well, they keep on going, they get to Brcko, they keep on going they keep on going because now they can’t turn around and go back down, they don’t want to get hit again and the servicemen and, remember, force protection is the crucial thing. Force protection is number one, nobody can get hurt. So, they got to keep on going, they get to the town, they get to the bridge, the tank pulls back and these two buses get across and once it closes, once in Croatia, everything is all right. They’ve patched themselves up. This one guy got hurt, they took him to the hospital up there and the military was crazy now. Then the two buses loaded

with the Bosniacs start up the road. The thugs, not being very well organized, with their sneakers and their leather jackets, they've dispersed. The buses make it all the way up to my office, quite nice. It's a warm day, the sun is shining and it's hot and there's no air conditioning. The two buses pull in front of my office. I send word down to have all the people come off and serve them soft drinks. We had that set up. They all went inside. We had a large gathering room. I said to send the top delegation up, let the top delegation come up, the guy that had headed the delegation into Bosniac. He is now their Prime Minister of Bosnia right now. His name is Labugia. They come into my office, he speaks English, studied in America and I said, "Now, this is a tense moment and you're only going to stay here for about five minutes." There are eight of them around the table. I said, "You can stay for five minutes. I'm happy that you got this far, this thing isn't over yet. I'm doing this because you requested to come, but my responsibility is not to instigate a bow up here in this town again." Just as I'm starting to say that, in comes my lieutenant saying, "Sir, there's a crowd gathering around the two buses out in the street and they're beginning to sound real ugly." I said, "Where are the police?" He said, "Well, the police are there, but they've let the crowd get through." The IPTF commander, this man came in to see me and said, "What do you want me to do?" I said, "Can you get out there?" He said, "Yes." He went down, he waded right into them. Now, he's six foot three, just like Bildt. He waded right into, talking to all of them, talking to the people. Now, let's not have any trouble here. He looked at the Serb police and they're in the road, but they're doing nothing because Yalosovich, the guy that I said had never given me the high sign so he said, "It's getting ugly." I said to everybody sitting around my table, "I think now it's time to reboard the buses. It's good that you came. Reboard the buses now, we'll get your people" there were forty people on one bus and forty on another, "get your people back on the buses now." Now the way the buses had pulled up to the building was such that if the building is this way and the bus pulls up this way and this was the entrance to the building to get back out, but this is where the driver sits, the entrances are here. So, the people who come back out have to go around and negotiate the crowd to get back into the buses. Probably 250 to 300 people were now gathering and there was a harridan, a woman screaming in the midst with big black hair, screaming about the Turks and how evil everything was. They get back aboard the buses and they finally get back just before the first rock hit. We get our people out and I said, "I don't want them going back down that road, I want them to go through town over to the Arizona road and down through the Arizona market and out. Get them out of the town and out into the countryside and down. I want them not to go back because the thugs will have reloaded and be ready for them." It was so many pockmarks they would have been sitting ducks. They left the town, they started out and went through the town and they start out to the countryside over about eight kilometers and then head south by about six kilometers and be back south of the interentity boundary line, about fourteen kilometers. Now, you asked me whether these things are easy or not and you asked me with the military there isn't this the easiest thing? As they pulled out, the thugs had been repositioned. The organizers of the opposition had prepositioned them. As they pulled out on the first street and they got through two of these massive apartment buildings, out from the alleyways came phalanxes of thugs throwing rocks and they busted most of the windows. Everybody by this time is ducking way down below that metal, you know how the metal comes up and

then there's windows? So, they were going through town, they got out the edge of town, the U.S. military is activated by now, but they are not in anyway intervening in no way. Helicopters above the buses while the buses are being attacked the helicopters are above. You would have thought that would have intimidated somebody. No, not at all. By the time these buses got back to what we call the Arizona market, where they could then be back in safe territory, they were just. We had three people hurt, including the guy that was the leader. He got a little scratch. In fact, I think he loved it. Nobody got killed and I was the luckiest guy on earth. I had four star generals visiting me. I had people on the phone, the Pentagon was concerned, but I established wittingly or not, what my line was. My line was, it's pretty bad. I couldn't rely upon the military; I had to have a police force. This took time. Long answer to a short question.

Q: Let's talk about the police force, how did this work out? Were you able to get a police chief who cooperated, were you able to get a police force that would do something?

FARRAND: This was one of the most delicate tasks of all and this became a serious flashpoint between Radervonkovadgidg.

Q: Who is a Serb nationalist leader in Bosnia. Also, an unapprehended as of today, war criminal?

FARRAND: It's one of the greatest blights on our whole policy toward Bosnia that he hasn't been picked up. We're going after Osama Bin Laden, but we can't go after... He's responsible for just as much killing. A woman by the name of Vienna Plotsige, who was also a nationalist Serb, but somewhat more moderate and somewhat, and she lived in the western saddlebag, he lived in the eastern saddlebag, which is by far the more orthodox hardline. The whole question became who controls Brcko and in their calculus who controls the police force of Brcko. It came down to a big struggle for the control of the police force of Brcko with us in the middle and they could play all kinds of games around us because of course, they know the territory, they know the terrain, the language, the people, the history and we are meddling outsiders who are struggling to catch up to these power plays. It all culminated in an enormous eruption of violence on the 28th of August, 1997 starting at about 3:00 in the morning and ending probably not the next morning at 3:00, but maybe at noon the following day. The police of Brcko, this guy Velosovich that I was telling you about, tried to throw his lot in with Plasige to the west, the more moderate. The people in Poly, Karagig forces wanted that to happen not at all. A great struggle took place that broke out into open conflict over the police station and the U.S. military in this instance did get involved. They did get involved. They actually got down there and tried to ring off the police station with barbed wire and to protect its incumbents. The extreme nationalists under Karagig brought in thugs from out of town and there were plenty of thugs in town, but they brought in thugs from out of town and they had a pitch battle at the bridge. Bradleys were brought in, a couple of soldiers got badly hurt and Molotov cocktails were thrown. The whole city was under siege by the people that were raveled out into all of this. All of the vehicles, most of the vehicles that the International Police Task Force had, they had about forty or fifty small vehicles, most

of them were destroyed. Most of the vehicles around my compound were destroyed that were left on the street and it was a great big compulsive affair that ended with calm being restored with the help of the U.S. military. That may or may not have been the high point of the hardliners efforts to frustrate what we were doing there, what we were sent out to do. He still remains at large. This is one of the great mistakes of our policy in Bosnia is not to go after that man. If we did go after him, just like Osama Bin Laden, we would take losses.

Q: How did the military restore order or who helped restore, how was order restored?

FARRAND: In the military way. They just blanketed the town with patrols and everybody again went into a battle mode. All vehicles had fifty caliber guns on the swivels. The people that had been used went back to their homes. All the people were out. What we had to do was get rid of the thugs. So, we did. One of the great lessons I learned from that experience was a gun; a gun pointed at somebody can pacify that person, but only so far. What really pacifies them, what really gets them dodging for cover is a video camera? The army had video cameras and all you need to do is see somebody up there doing this. Before you know it, they'd be jumping, pulling things over, dodging and trying to get out of there. It's marvelous, marvelous. One of the things I asked for as a result of that, I wanted the international community to cough up money for about twenty-five or thirty video cameras that I could give to police patrols. Just bring that up and oh boy, they don't want that. This could be used in lots of places. I don't know why, but surely. It was nip and tuck for some time, we did restore order. We didn't know what had hit us for a while, but we kept on moving with our program. Underlying everything one of the things I've learned from all of this is the hardliners, whoever they may be, wherever they may be, Al Qaida, they do not have a positive program for the people. They don't have a positive program; they have a program of mayhem and destruction and defense and destruction and obstruction, all those words. They don't have a program for the people. What about medical care or social welfare or food or anything of this nature. They're taking care of themselves, the big boys and then they're having their lieutenants who are fanatics out there do all of this mayhem. They don't have a program. The people are threatened, so they are not going to come forward and give you their allegiance, that being the international community. They're not going to come forward and say, "We're happy to have you here." Or any spontaneity of any type. You're not going to get that from them because they're calculating, where do we go, where do we go? Because if they get too far out, they're going to get chopped off by the guys, the hardliners, going to get chopped off or killed. They stay and they shudder and stay in and watch. Then if you, the international community in this case, can restore something like a moniker of normality, something like so that a little store could open that sells milk, little store could open that sells potatoes. People aren't getting hit on the street and they come back out slowly, slowly and start going about their affairs. If you can maintain that and get your police going properly, then you are beginning to achieve something, something, but you've got to keep the peace.

Q: Did you find that the police became an effective force?

FARRAND: Yes, they did. They did, surprisingly, but you couldn't put too much weight on them. You had to keep the International Police Task Force monitoring the patrols, going around with patrols. They have twenty-nine countries, the police, in addition to the United States and the United Kingdom and Germany who would send police, not troops and Spain and Argentina and a few others. You also had countries like Jordan, Egypt, Sierra Leone, and Morocco. It's a tough thing, what's going on, tough thing.

Q: What about people coming. By the time you left could you get people in and out of the area?

FARRAND: Yes, yes, by the time I left they were moving freely north and south, by the time I left. Actually by the end of the first year, people were coming slowly back into town, slowly, slowly. The big problem that we had was how to get Serbs out of houses.

Q: What had, I mean what had stopped the bullyboys from coming in? Were they on call?

FARRAND: Yes, yes. That was a combination of factors of messages being put out. I think that the involvement of the U.S. army on that fateful day back on August 28th, they realized that they had pushed a button one too far because they had picked up. You remember when I told you about the buses coming in and how the helicopters flew overhead while the buses were being destroyed. The helicopters had troops on them and nobody was raising a finger from stopping those buses from being destroyed. Nobody was getting involved. The military was not backing me up on that. People like Karagig, just like Osama Bin Laden built a school. Osama Bin Laden went to school on President Reagan's reaction to the bombing of the marine barracks in Lebanon. You remember what happened? Just simply pulled everybody out and we left. Just pulled them all out and went away with our tails between our legs. Huh? Osama Bin Laden saw that, Osama Bin Laden took a look at what happened in the aftermath of the Cole. Nothing.

Q: A destroyer that was bombed by his people.

FARRAND: A destroyer. Nothing. We went to school on all of these things. The people who are against you are watching you and that happened in Bosnia.

Q: Okay, they saw that our military was ineffective as a protector. So what happened? Why didn't they keep it up?

FARRAND: When the military reacted on August 28th and actually engaged in combat.

Q: I mean there was enough, they didn't send the bullyboys in again after the August time?

FARRAND: There were threats, but they never did it. General Shinsecky was the four star who was in charge of escort at the time. He is now the chief of staff of the army over

here at the Pentagon. He came out about a year later and we were standing at the bridge talking, he and I and he said, "You know, Bill, I think they shot, they threw their best shot at us that day and when they failed, they realized that all they could do from then on was fluster and go underground and do other types of intimidation, but don't come up and do it head on again because we stopped them." That was only because the military actually did, did stop them. Now, you see if the military had chosen on the day when the buses were coming through, I didn't say this when I was recounting this. From the time that the buses departed from my office and started back out to go back down south to the interentity boundary line, the IEBL, by another route, army helicopters were above those buses all the way and the thugs by some miracle were transported down the road. There would seem to be an inexhaustible source of rock throwers and you know. The U.S. military helicopters did not set down, deploy and put these guys in irons, no, did not. So, they were being, it was like we could do whatever we wanted and it's nice to have them up there because it's a hot day and they're fanning us. I think they miscalculated.

Q: In your relations with the American military, I would think. I want, you know, after the non-intervention of our support of the S4, during the bus incident, this must have caused a certain amount of tension between you and your staff and the American military because I mean, you know, they didn't do a bloody thing and there must have been a certain amount of embarrassment on their part, too? I mean, how did that work out?

FARRAND: Based on the amount of visits I had from ranking military officers in the aftermath of the main first bus incident, I would say that that incident did more to ring the bell of. You see these things go all the way up to the top to the Pentagon. I can tell you, my name suddenly, at least around those categories, about people involved in that, I'm a name. Farrand. I'm sure they were saying, "What the hell is Farrand doing today?" I am sure as I sit here that at the tank, they said, "What the f--- is Farrand doing out there?" I have no doubt in my mind. Of course, I wasn't there and I've never been in those corridors and all of that, but I just. What I needed. Well, you're going to ask about my relations. Relations between the military and the civilian side were always touch and go. Even in that situation. I look at the Afghanistan situation with a whole different set of eyes perhaps from not wholly different, but in significant respects different from the way you look at it because I am seeing what's going to have to be done coming down the line now when this all settles down. All of these things have lessons. Some large and some small. I'll suppress those comments; however, it's against the background of what I saw in Brcko and what I viewed over time as a microcosm. I had all three ethnic groups in this town. In the thousands that was a microcosm of the macrocosm of Bosnia and, I would argue of the larger regional area, too. Few other communities had all three warring factions in one place. None, that I can think of, not Sarajevo, not Mustar. Now Brcko, the military, the last thing a military commander wants is anything to happen to any one of his soldiers. Minor injuries are acceptable, but a major injury a life threatening injury and heaven forefend, a death of a soldier is that is at the end of the stone because if you are a lieutenant colonel hoping to make full bird in one day. Full bird being full colonel, and you had something like that happen, this is a very unforgiving atmosphere in Washington today in the army, the Pentagon and in the civilian side. Somebody is always to blame in

litigious America. If I fall on the sidewalk somebody is to blame, not me, who owns this sidewalk, I sue them. That what happens in the military so that force protection is the very first thing. Everything is gauged on keeping the forces out of danger which puts a tremendous burden on young commanders and these are young commanders, lieutenant commander is in his late thirties or early forties. It puts a tremendous burden on these boys and they're all boys thus far. The need to avoid exposing your forces to danger runs directly counter to what I had to achieve. Now, I didn't want their people to get hurt, but at the same time I'm not going to go anywhere until I test the waters until I find out what the limits are here. Now to the credit of the army and to the credit of the commander, I'm going from May 1st now to August 28th, that would be May, June, July, August, four months later. When the police struggle erupted in the middle of the night in downtown Brcko our military was there and in the course of the day they put themselves in harm's way. By putting themselves in harm's way, they sent a very clear message back up the line. Brcko was not where the decisions were being made. Decisions were being made in the mountain vastness where Karagig was sitting with his counsel and that's what, how it was being done. That message went back up the line that we were not paper tigers, that we were able to go out there. One kid, I think got hurt. Molotov cocktail being thrown at you, I don't care. They escorted some people out of danger. The police chief that I was telling you about from Santa Fe, the International Police Task Force, you know, one of the things that really drives me crazy in giving an interview like this, I cannot use freely. (End of tape)

Q: You were saying that the international police force was...

FARRAND: Yes, he found himself barricaded during these riots at the police office downtown and we couldn't get at him. The mob was swirling about and we just could not extricate him, well we finally did find a way of getting another vehicle in there and were able to get him out, but and that was with the active collaboration of the U.S. military in this case. Where their instructions were coming from, they did not answer to me, they had to take into account what I was doing, but they didn't answer to me. I could not call upon them for security or anything. They were getting their instructions from the headquarters of the multinational division north which was in Tuzla with instructions from the S4 commander, that would be General Shinsefey in Sarajevo who was probably hearing from the commander of the U.S. forces in Belgium who was probably hearing from the Pentagon. Everybody just was on tenderhooks. Now, I am on and I am not privy to these communications, only privy to what happened, not to what to the. Because I had no secure communications.

Q: Was anybody from the State Department saying to go to it or don't, or were they sort of saying, well, you're on your own, fellow?

FARRAND: One of the great dissidents, dysfunctionalities in Washington in the relations between State Department desk operators and the Pentagon in the time of a crisis of this nature. Now, the crisis that I'm talking about here would not be a crisis if it were not where it happened. I mean, I have a little riot in a town where a few people get roughed

up and some Soviets get hurt. This is not, good God, this happens in Northern Ireland everyday, what happened there was a quiet evening in Northern Ireland. It happened to be, however, right in the focus of everybody's' attention. This happened to be the most sensitive area at the time I was there. Today it is not such a sensitive area. It's quite a story about what happened there and I'm not sure I'm going to have the time to stretch it all out and I don't want to say it over here because I want to put it in my book. So, why should I give it to you for free when I want to write it in my book? I should probably start lying and not tell the truth until my book. The facts are that the military had put itself into a very difficult time. After Somalia, right after Vietnam, Somalia for sure where eighteen Rangers were lost, it just kind of made the majors, captains, very uncomfortable and very uneasy. They want to do some more things, but they can't. People lose promotions over it. This is serious. If I'm a one star general and I'm in charge of this particular area and something happens, a couple of soldiers get killed, I'm never going to see two stars. I would just kiss it goodbye. You think, oh sure, you think, oh things can't be that base. Oh, yes, they can.

Q: Back to this, particularly after the May Day thing, did you find that relations between you and the military and your staff cold?

FARRAND: The Brit, my deputy supervisor, who was a brigadier retired, Royal Parachutes, knew the military more than that he knew the American military because he had as an active duty officer in the British army, had come to Ft. Bragg and was made a deputy company commander for one of those exchange programs. So, he knew our people. He took it upon himself to keep a closer tab and a closer watch and I urged him to do so. The difficulty was the lieutenant colonel at the time, don't need to deal with personalities, did not particularly cotton to this British brigadier. So, it didn't become as easy a flow as it should have been. Now, the fact that S4, the stabilization force had been in position in Brcko for about eight to nine months prior to my arrival, prior to the arrival of a supervisor, civilian supervisor, meant that those lieutenant colonels, there was one prior to me and then this fellow, these lieutenant colonels, they had a civilian responsibility for monitoring the government of that sensitive little area. They became, they had to do things right, worry about what the mayor was doing. They had to do things like be concerned about electricity supply, things that a government of a city would normally do. When I came on the scene, it was after this fellow had been in place for about two months; he was already in the saddle and feeling his oats a little bit. He didn't necessarily I suppose, I never talked to him about him, but could tell by his actions, didn't necessarily feel that this civilian, gray haired, balding, who took a different approach to solving problems indeed was very threatening. Another anecdote that will bring out the point here perhaps you're looking at. When I arrived on April 10, 1997, two weeks before the bus incident, I received a regular stream of delegations of military officers coming up to visit me. A bewildering array, people who were the chief of staff, people who were the deputy adjutant, people who were, you know, decom ops, or G3, or, or G2, G5, G7, coming up to see me and say, "Bill, Mr. Ambassador, we're going to give you all the support you need. You just let us know what you need. Tell me what you need and we will give you that support. Tell me what you need." I would say, "Well, I certainly will

and I thank you very much for your offer of assistance. I can't tell you how much it's appreciated. General, I just need a little time to find my footing here because I'm not sure I know what I really need. I don't know what to ask you yet." Well, the U.S. military, before they deploy on any mission outside of their home base wherever that may be here in America, if they deploy and they're going to be under canvas, they take their command components of those contingents who are going over and they bring them together and they subject them to chalkboard instruction, power point instruction, cable cot exercises and they go down to Ft. Poko, Louisiana and they go into the field and they recreate a village just very much like it and they put signs on old blown houses and homes and things, and you move in and you actually run a live exercise. You do it in as close to the conditions as possible and they spend big time on this, I mean big time. When they arrive on the scene, because they've located for six months, they've got a huge job, they have and by the way they train their people for worst case scenarios. So, that when they arrive on the scene, they are most everybody is familiar with the terminology and everybody is familiar roughly with certainly the strategic situation and the tactical situation, tactical more than strategic. Now, here they're faced with a supervisor who was plucked out not more than two weeks earlier from a totally different function in another part of the world, raced around Washington, raced through some quick briefings down in Sarajevo and plopped on the scene who had had no previous experience with police work, supervising police forces, no previous experience running cities and towns, the infrastructure, mains, water mains, sewer mains, buildings, lights, no previous experience. No hands on experience of running a city and no previous experience except for my time in the military which was navy, not army, working directly with military commanders. This commander can't take that onboard. How could it be? Well, it could be because the organization that you work for for most of your adult career and mine is truly averse. The Department of State does not train or educate maybe to have this, but they don't train you up for operational duties. They assume you can pick it up because we're all so bright. We are so terribly, terribly, intelligent. We can do that without any extra care and we don't have enough people in our business to have surge capacity or the flow capacity to take people off line, keep our positions filled and train. So, we are an enigma to the U.S. military, we are an enigma to the Pentagon. The Pentagon doesn't understand how we can operate this way. Neither do I. They're not wrong.

Q: Oh, I agree. Well, Bill, I'm going to stop at this point and I'll put at the end. I think we've got one more session to go. We'll come back to Brcko. We've already talked about your relations with the military; we've talked about the incidents of May and August of 1997 and how that helped the back, the August time, of some of the police side and so, but we will move on and what I would like to talk about your staff which is an international one and then talk about the other things; getting people to come back to Brcko and running the place and your relations with not only just the military, but with your group of foreign ministers who supposedly were supervisor and the State Department. So, we'll do that.

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Today is the 18th of December, 2001. Bill, I'd like to add one note. I've been thinking about what we were talking about last night and you were talking about how unprepared you were and the State Department doesn't train its people and that you were thrown into this. At the same time, your diplomatic background and your understanding of the situation, the May Day situation when the people came, it was a messy situation where, the buses were being stoned, but if you hadn't let them come, it would have sent a very powerful signal that the Muslims are really, couldn't depend on you. I'm not sure that any training, particularly military training which is usually designed to avoid risk under the rules of the game and all, would have helped. So, I mean, whatever it was that you had picked up over the years or internalized, worked. I must say I was interviewing shortly thereafter, Bob Barry, who was I think heading OSCE in Sarajevo at the time and he said, "Well, you know Brcko had far more success in resettlement and other things and getting things done than other places. It was the most critical spot." I mean, whatever the background was, whatever it took, you did the right thing. So, let's go on. Your staff, you had this international staff, what were they doing and how effective were they?

FARRAND: In all of my diplomatic career, I have served in places where I think I'm accurate in saying this, only an American staff, either in an American embassy or back here in Washington, I never served at the United Nations, I didn't serve in multilateral organizations and therefore, this was the first time that I found myself in charge of a staff which I suppose at its outside was twenty-five professionals from, and I suppose, I counted them once, as many as eighteen countries. I'm not going to try to list them. The challenge of that, of course, after you've bumped around as long as I have, you have Stuart, you're right. There is a certain coming in to your experience a certain version a life's experience, of course, which is the primary thing. No amount of training could overcome someone who was not able to interact and work with people without and in keeping them on the side without these life skills, what you talk about. So, the multilateral staff was made up largely of, well, I had a senior military brigadier from the Royal Parachutes from the British army who was retired who was my senior deputy. He had an equivalent deputy who was a Russian ambassador actually; they do it that way. This man was of ambassadorial rank. I told you I think why I think that they both were assigned and we made jokes about it later because there was a concern on the part of Russia, particularly, that an American would come in and do harm in some way to the Bosnia Serbs that were occupying the town. So, I don't know where I'm going with this reply. Could you sharpen it a bit?

Q: Oh, yes. What types of things, were these people coming in not just to watch you, but did they have their own jobs? Wee they bringing expertise such as sewage education, electricity, I mean, what have you?

FARRAND: Right. I don't want to tell you they were only there to watch me. They were there for sure to give a balance to the administration of this highly combustible community where it was teetering on the edge. It had come out of a chaotic situation in the war and the feelings were raw. The ethnic and enmity between the three groups. That

would be the Bosnian Croats, the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Serbs was at top pitch. There is no question about that. They brought balance, they brought solidity, they helped me to explore other ways of doing things that I would not have thought of, they served occasionally as a break on my enthusiasm if I felt that yes, we ought to do this, they would say, "May we close the door and talk for a minute?" We would and we would go through it very carefully. I think one of the things I want to ease up on the State Department here. One of the things the Department did for me that I didn't realize until later. There was a course actually here at the Foreign Service Institute and I think the course was conducted up in the hills of West Virginia. I believe it had to do with supervisory management, and I believe I took it just before I became a deputy chief of mission. In fact, I think it's called the DCM course. That course was invaluable, not so much for what it did, not so much for the substance, but for the attitudinal approach. The way that the instructors who were down from Cambridge. They were contracting organizations, but they were from Cambridge and they said, they brought out you don't have to be the most brilliant person on your staff. You don't have to be the most accomplished person on your staff. You don't have to be the bravest person on your staff. You do have to, however, understand where those strengths and build on the strengths. If a person has a weakness, don't go crazy about that person's weakness if it can be gotten around when you are pushing forward on a complex mandate, a complex program as this was. That was an excellent. It changed my thinking. It really did because I probably was always a bit concerned that how can I deal with somebody who had steeped themselves in history of the Balkans, who has his Ph.D. on the Balkans? How can I deal with that? I know something about the Balkans, but certainly nothing like this. Yet, I had such people and we were able to build on those strengths. I guess I would have to say to you that I conducted an open shop, an open front office. I probably drove my people a little nuts by calling them in. I'm talking a German, a Swede, a Brit, a Russian, a Canadian, a Spaniard and English, by the way, was the language. I probably occasionally want to have a meeting tomorrow on the question that we have just discussed here at this staff meeting this morning. I don't want to conduct it right here because I have things to do today. I want to think about it and I want to get together with you, you, you, you and please come to my office and I would turn to my administrative assistant and say, "Please set this meeting up." They would come and we would sit and I would try to follow as best I could the reason for this meeting is the following or here's what I would like to come out of this meeting. I didn't always do it that way, but I tried to hone to that and I think, am I going where you want me to go? I think the, for me, the best result, the best outcome was a couple of times when a senior fellow on my staff and that's what would happen in the international community by the way, one has to be ready for this if one is going to get engaged in these type of hybrid operations than don't' fit within the bilateral diplomatic paragon. If you're going to get involved in this, you've got to recognize that these people may not come into this with the same enthusiasm that you have for getting the job done. They may, they may, but they look at it slightly differently because there is out there, which I hadn't known, I really hadn't known, but there is out there, kind of a professional international community, I won't say worker, but a person who kind of goes from the crisis in Bosnia to the crisis in East Timor to the crisis in the Sudan or if there is one down in Namibia, they keep their ear tuned. There is a vast network of nongovernmental

organizations that are tied to the governments, international organizations which are tied to governments and then, of course, the governments themselves. They're always looking for people and there is a whole cadre, cohort of people, if you will, out there ready to go different places depending on a number of factors, family, because lots of times they are more comfortable traveling away from their places for long periods of time. I had a number of British officers, by that I mean professionals, that were working with me that would go home and see their family every two and a half months and it was understood. It was accepted I think over there. The Brits have done that perhaps more than we. Anyway, because of their empire. The thing that I learned was that these folks, you can get working with them and then all of a sudden, they come and say to you, "By the way, boss I have an offer." I would say, "What is the offer?" They'd say, "Well, you know the problem in East Timor; you know the problems in Kosovo?" I'd say, "Yes?" "Well, I think I'm going off there." You can't say no, you can fluster a little bit, but you can't really say no. When they did, I had two people come back to me and say in one way I'm sorry I left because I've come into a, that's the person that left, is saying, I, the person that left, am in a situation now where the international community shuts down all internal communications because the person at the top has a closed way of operating. You did not. You did not. That they said to me and I felt good about that. It was part of the reason why we could make such progress there in Brcko. Over here in Mitusubishain or Kristina, there is no cross organization between agencies. I felt good about that. I had another person called me, too from Macedonia. He's working at that time for Catholic Relief Services, but now he's got a job with the international crisis group. He did this about four months ago. He lives in town and he called and said that he just wanted me to know that that style of management was an enormous assist to the program to the mission.

Q: Let's talk about first as you mentioned the Russian ambassador there was there more or less to see that you were working with the Serbs? Was there a problem? You're trying to put this together, yet it's the Serbs who are being the bullyboys. You know, in a lot of cases they weren't being the bullyboys, they were just Serbs. Did you find that you had to watch yourself and your team not to be beastly to the Serbs as opposed to the Croats and Muslims?

FARRAND: You know, there might be something to be said for bringing somebody like me onto the scene who had not been immersed in it and had not been there during the war and had not seen some of the atrocious acts and I'm going to say by the Serbs against the non-Serbs, however, once the thing got rolling of course, then there is going to be some tit for tat. Well, the tit for tat, this particular round of the never ending round of Balkan conflicts that seems to go back for some time. This one you've got to lay in the hands of the Serbs, you've got to, Milosevic. The Serbians, I'm not going to say the Bosnian Serbs, I'm going to say the Serbians. Look, the situation was such that the municipality, they called it, the town had 85,000 people before the war. Well, probably, I don't how many, 1,000 were killed, just killed. They were non-Serbs, non-Bosnian Serbs and were driven away, some driven out of the country, some driven into the country, but the place was all Serb when I got there. Now, what am I going to do? Poke a sharp stick in the eye of everybody I talk to and just say I want you all to know that I find you all morally

repugnant. As far as I am concerned you should be categorized with animals, we ought to treat you like that. No, you can't do that; you can't do that because they're pretty punch drunk, too at this point. Punch drunk from the war, punch drunk from all the pressures they're getting internally and not well.

Q: How did you go about the resettlement process? What did you see as your objective and what did you do?

FARRAND: Yes. The people back here in Washington that I had to go around and see in a blur of one on one meetings with people, over at NSC, certainly at many offices at State, out to the agency, out to the Pentagon, all wanted to know the answer to that question. What do you see as your goal? How many people you going to get back? Well, I never was on the ground. I hadn't followed in any great detail the war. I was learning fast about what happened, but I was behind the curve all the way. I, therefore, could not say look I think it's going to be possible to bring back within a year x number of people. Although with one man I did, his name was, he was a special representative over at the White House sitting in the State Department. His name is Sklaar. He said, "How many do you think?" I said, "7,000." He looked at me and his jaw dropped. He said, "Well, if you can do that, you'll be a hero." So, I figured I just took the number out of the air, 7,000 people, not families, families would be times four, would be 28,000. No, no, no. Just 7,000 I said. So, I tested the waters. I plucked that out of the air, but I remembered it. When I reached 7,000 when the numbers got up to 7,000 I don't think it was done in a year. Surely it was not, but I think by the end of the second year I was hitting in those numbers and then it began. It was a tumble down effect. You had to, the fear was palpable, the hostility was palpable and you had to devise a plan which was laid on me to do although I had a great deal of help in this from the high representative himself personally, Carl Bildt and from the head of the United Nations high commission for refugees that sat in Geneva, came all the way in to number two. Not Ogata, Madame Ogata, but her number two came in. Lawyers and others came in and we sat around and jawboned for a couple of days, three days, coming up with a plan to bring people back which was the primary right under the Dayton Peace Accord, the primary right under the Dayton Peace Accord, stated, "All persons shall have the right freely to return to their homes of origin." Freely to return to their homes of origins. Now, of course, it was laid on the parties, not on the international treaty, on the parties to make that work. Well, we went about it very carefully in the beginning because there was going to be no receptivity to any of it at all, none, no receptivity. Serbs would say that. We'll never have them back. They use a pejorative. The pejorative that the Bosnian Serbs used to describe the Bosnian Muslims was Turk. That was the lowest word you could use. We'll never have the Turks back. You had to chew away at that. Of course, the Bosnian Muslims were saying, "Okay, you big man, you have all the powers. It states right in the final award that all rules or orders and regulations laid down by the supervisor shall prevail as against any conflicting law, any conflicting law." The seeds of that statement were built a sure fire problem with the office of the high representative; you can see that can't you? That began to grow as the initial period of enthusiasm. As we began to make some progress, then that power

which was pretty broad began to come up against the power of the high representative, that was the problem.

Q: How do you convince, how did you sort of get the trickle going?

FARRAND: Right, right. What we did, I think I said in an earlier session, that the ceasefire line which was a real battle line, it was not politically drawn through the Brcko municipality. The word for cognoscenti is opstina. That line, all around the country, was about a thousand kilometers long, plus or minus a couple of kilometers, I don't know. Under the Dayton Agreement, two kilometers north of it and two kilometers south of it. Well, two kilometers either side of it was the area in which the stabilization force, S4 was given total authority to keep out all, any kind of military activity of any sort. It went through the Brcko area, about forty kilometers east west and S4 controlled, because we had a major battalion there, three hundred troops; S4 controlled that strip of land. Four kilometers wide, forty kilometers long. Now, that kind of real estate is going to have within it some villages and indeed, right near where we were there were about three, two for sure, Muslim villages that had been destroyed and emptied out by the Serbs. It worked out that those villages fell within this four kilometer strip centered on the interentity boundary line, which was the ceasefire line, the IEBL. Right on that line, so that what we did, we started to put out feelers that people could come back to those villages and they bought it, why not? Because S4 controlled it. They were going to come under the mantel of S4's protection. Now, S4 was not a police force, but so long as S4 had total control over that strip, then the people would come back in. So, we started very delicately, sensitively bringing a few back in there. Then we started working off the line. Marginal.

Q: How did S4 feel about these people coming in?

FARRAND: Well, S4, that's a good question. They felt good about it, but they didn't want to be responsible for it. In other words, if there was going to be a fight breaking out between the two factions if it happened, they didn't want to have to be in a position to protect those people's lives, oh property, sorry, property. Lives yes, but not property. Well, when you're reestablishing a village, when you're building up a village, you're talking about property. You're talking about restoring property to its previous owners. So, S4 was under technically speaking, this was not S4's job, but S4 was very interested in getting out of Bosnia and one way of getting out of Bosnia is to get the people back to their homes and get life back to the way it is which is the standard intelligent way to go about things. That wasn't what was written into the mandate, not quite the same way. S4 always did state that after its first mission, which was to protect its soldiers, force protection, that's the first mission. The second mission was to get people back to their homes.

Q: What about houses and property either side of the line because you're saying this is a Serb dominated area? In the first place, who were these people? Were they Croatians or Muslims or both was it preponderates of one of those groups coming?

FARRAND: The preponderates were the Muslims returning. Before the war the Muslims had been up forty-five to fifty percent of the population and after the war, and the Serbs only twenty percent. The Croats were in there with twenty-five percent. So, you had Muslim Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Muslims, which made up something on the order of seventy percent of the population of Brcko. After the war, the city had been ethnically cleansed and it's loaded with Serbs. So, this was, these Serbs were internally displaced from all over Bosnia, all over Bosnia, the far south, all over the place, they were jammed in there by Karagig and his henchmen.

Q: When you started moving away from the neutral zone, what happened? I know from my experience of just hearing about it when I was in Derventa and I went over to Vanaluka and I know that every time they would try and build something, some jolly boys would show up and dynamite and blow it up again. This was about the same time you were doing this I think.

FARRAND: Probably.

Q: So, what was happening with you all?

FARRAND: Well, I had this British retired brigadier. His name was Ian McCloud. He was a great fellow. He had a lot of experience in Northern Ireland, which is a great benefit to us, actually. Sometimes he would say when we would be having some trouble; "This is a quiet night in Belfast." He would also say, he had one saying that I wrote down, "You only have setbacks. You're never defeated until you quit. Setbacks, yes, you get setbacks, but you're never defeated." So no matter what we did, we would encourage the people, that would be the Muslims if they were coming back to get up, brush themselves off and start again and then we for our part would start again. We never got set back. Set back, yes, but not. We weren't going to take these things as the final word because of course, that's what they wanted?

Q: What did you do about the bullyboys with the dynamite?

FARRAND: For one thing, they were all cowards. They only do these things at night. They didn't have dynamite per se; they would have grenades or LPGs. There was no electricity; there were no lights in the city. We had lights. There were lights in the city and there was some electricity, but it was about a third of what you had had before the war. Now, out in the regions around the town, three and four kilometers out were all this reconstruction we were trying to get going. This is where the mischief would happen. There were no lights out there. So, you had this problem that would take place mostly at night. These people did not have generators, these portable generators. No. So, we had to get electricity going. What you had to do was to shine light on the issue, you had to shine light on the issue. We fooled around on a couple of ideas. One idea, which didn't go anywhere, it did go somewhere, but it wasn't a good idea. Yet, I agreed with it. The idea was to get some towers and to bring towers in that would be a hundred feet in the air, if you could get a little higher that would be better and put policemen up there with heat

seeking lights, infrared type optical things. Big lights. Actually we got along, people were willing to do it, they found a couple of towers, they brought them up by helicopter, we implanted them, but then the police, that would be the western police, the International Police Task Force didn't want to be up there. You can see why.

Q: They'd be targets.

FARRAND: They'd be sitting ducks. Had we thought of that? No. They didn't want to go up there. So, it didn't work. We left them there for a couple of months and eventually we took them away. That was something that didn't work. One thing that did work, however, I think in time it worked. I went out to see the base commander, the lieutenant commander, the lieutenant colonel, I'm sorry, I'm an ex-navy man, lieutenant colonel. I said to him, "Look, I know your mandate, I know you're not supposed to protect people, but one of the things." I'm sorry, you do protect people when their lives are in danger, but you don't protect property. So, let me correct what I just said. I said to him, "Your mandate is that you are not paid to protect property." He said, "That's correct." I said, "Well, look, on the way up from your base to the heart of town and you start right on the IEBL, and it's only about four kilometers up to town, you go through some rugged territory. You go basically through one road, one pockmarked, potholed, mess of a joke of a road and as you come up that road, that is your patrol. Then you get into town and you patrol on the streets and then you go back, put your people to bed and another patrol comes out and you do this around the clock, right?" "Right." I said, "But you know, some of the regions in which we are reconstructing is off to the side of that main road, maybe a kilometer over here, maybe a kilometer over here." This is in the beginning stages, we're just probing, but I said, "They're having this difficulty at night. Would there be any chance with your people, as they come up the road that they could take a side tour? In other words, they're headed from the camp to the town to start their patrols, could they start out ten minutes early, rumble up the road, rumble off to the side, rumble down into some of these little areas, rumble around, rumble around, come back out on the main road and then come on up and do that on a irregular basis, on a random basis?" He thought about it, "We can do that," he said. I said, "I'm not asking you to get out, I'm not asking you to put troops around the particular houses that had their roofs destroyed, or anything of that nature. I'm just asking you to rumble by, just rumble by. You don't have to do anymore than that." He was amenable to that. We never asked Washington because if you had they would have said no, the Pentagon. Without any fuss he did it and it had a salutary effect of suppressing some of this arbitrary random violence just because the troops were rumbling around. Of course, they had lights on their machines; they could see where they were going. It was quite evident there's guys up there still going around with their fifty caliber.

Q: Did the international police and eventually the Brcko local police begin to control the sort of hoodlum element and the bullyboy element?

FARRAND: You never knew. In the early days there, I'm talking the first I'm going to say the first seven or eight months, you never knew whether the police or the bullyboys

were different. You never knew. The police were virtually all Serb and, as I said, our estimate was, we would try to get a number fixed on them, but we couldn't get a real fix, but our estimate was after we had our IPTF, we had two hundred fifty IPTF guys there from about twenty countries. They had this marvelous commander from Santa Fe, New Mexico and he did a careful look at it. He said, "I think there's about five hundred of them." But they're not trained as policemen; some of them are nothing but paramilitary fighters during the war, just paramilitary. All they did was put on a uniform, and it's not even a uniform, it's a combat type uniform. They slouched around town. They drank coffee and basically protected the party, protected the Serb Orthodox party. When I say Orthodox, I mean hard line. That was their particular function. We had to get rid of them and we did. By the end of the year, after we had had elections. Once we had elections, which took place in September of '97; I got there in April and in September of '97, once we'd had elections we could then once the elections took place we could then get ratios. This was anathema back here in the United States, but that's what we had to do. We took ratios. How many Bosnian Serbs were elected? How many Bosnian Croats and how many Bosnian Muslims were elected? We took ratios. On the basis of that ratio, that's how we formed our police force. That's how we formed our police force on that ratio. We got rid of roughly half of the police so-called police; got rid of half of them. The other half we had them all take tests and we opened it up to others who wished to come in and those who didn't pass the tests were dumped and then those who did pass the test were put through training, even, are you ready for this? Human rights, lectures and we impressed upon them that they were to be a professional police force and that's what they were to do. We made our patrols dual ethnic. It worked out that the number was two hundred thirty, that's what we cut them down to, two thirty. It worked out that the ratios left us with the following out of the two hundred thirty, one hundred twenty were Serbs, Bosnian Serbs, ninety were Bosniacs or Bosnian Muslims, and twenty only were Croat, Bosnian Croats. That was our police force. You saw the ninety and the twenty is one hundred and ten, it doesn't really match the one hundred twenty here, but it was such that we could have no Serb out on patrol unless he had somebody that was not a Serb with him on patrol. You would have thought that there was going and there was in the beginning, when we put this in place on the first of January 1988 and I addressed them all. I addressed them all. I called them over to the office. We had a great big room and I addressed them and I was kind of impressed that I didn't see on their face this look of surliness that I expected. It might have been in their hearts, but I didn't see it on their faces. I was kind of really pessimistic that this was going to work, but because of the way that the IPTF went about it and because we stayed with it and wouldn't let it go, and we had one or two officers on my staff, one of them was a Brit, a young man, very bright, who had served in the Cold Stream Guards, was a young man. He went out and he took a special interest in this. We had civilian and the UN staff, too. This was kind of a complex interweaving and if I could put in a plug again, this would be where I would see State getting serious about introducing persons that the State Department wished to send into situations like this. I know a little bit about the perplexity of the international structure. Your own structure, that would be good and then they don't do that very well. You pick it up. They expect you to pick it up.

Q: Did you find that as you introduced these bipolar patrols or whatever you want to call them, did you find that they were beginning to get professional and stop you know, people from messing around at night and all that?

FARRAND: The quick answer is yes, the quick answer is yes. It didn't mean that there weren't significant, there wasn't a significant amount of trouble along the way. The professionalization of the police would be if I had to leave one thing for whoever looks at this down the road wherever, would be the professionalization of the police and the multiethnicization is probably one of the very first things you need to do if you ever, ever expect to get out of that community. I think that's going to have to happen in the Middle East. I won't get off on that. I think they're going to certainly have to do it in Afghanistan. It's going to be hard, but you've got to do it and you have to take time and think it all through. The devil is in the details. But, yes, they did start acting professionally.

Q: Particularly the Bosniacs who were coming back, one thinks of these flattened houses, what did they come back to and how did they settle in?

FARRAND: Sure. Okay. The United States army has a, what is it called, call it a regiment. It's probably not a regiment, but it's a large organization of persons who are civil affairs officers. Now what does that mean? That means that you can bring back in time of crisis from the civilian world, reservists, reservists put them into uniform and depending on their expertise and private life, utilize them as advisors and assist in many, many different ways in a conflict zone. The U.S. army in the course of my three and a quarter years there provided me with at least eleven or maybe twelve of these people. They came with me for ten months. One of them in the very opening days was a Ph.D. in systems analysis out of Florida. Someday I'll look up his name. It's Jim, but I can't remember his last name. A man of quiet competence and I said to him, "Jim, we and I don't know how to do, I don't know how to do it, I don't what to do, but we need because my people are advising me that we need it, we need a systems approach to all of these destroyed houses. We need to know, we need somehow to find a way of marking all of these destroyed houses because they're all sitting on pieces of property. Now, it's all a jumble and a blur." One thing the Serbs did before they left was to take all the street signs and the road signs and take them all, take them all away. They wanted nobody back ever, this was meant to be the final thing; you will never come back. This is all destroyed; you will never come back. You won't even know where you are when you do come back because all the street signs have been moved away, all of the road signs, anything that would identify. "So, would it be possible, Jim?" He said, "Got you covered?" You don't need to. He went down to the bowels of this building of mine, ours and he sat with another highly competent civil affairs officer who, let's see, am I getting this? Well, anyway, he worked out a system so that he went out into using the Cadastre records. Do you know the word Cadastre?

Q: Yes, the town records.

FARRAND: Yes, the town records. They're using the Cadastre records, which curiously enough, the Serbs had not destroyed. They're were a bit like the Germans in the Second World War, they kept all their records because they were compulsive and obsessive about record keeping. Well, the Serbs had not destroyed this and even if they had, there was a juadetic survey in Sarajevo, which had a microfilm of all property records throughout Bosnia. We could have always backed that up if we had to. So, what we did is, we went downtown. I'm sorry, yes; we went downtown, worked with the Cadastre records and then using a relatively simple marketing system. I forget how it went, but I think it was, let's say it was red paint with a number, red paint. That meant Bosniac or green paint meant Bosniac, red paint meant Serb and blue meant Croat. The numbers were put on. We had this huge grid and I also asked, he asked me and I arranged with the general to go up in the helicopter and spend about an hour and a half and I did. They had, they brought their best cameras down and we took overhead cameras, click, click, click, and put them in grids. By the time we were done, we had a pretty decent way of telling Mohammed and his wife, Admirer and their five children, that piece of rubble is yours, if Mohammed wished to tell where he was before the war. So, it was painstaking and it always is, but that's how we did it. I don't know if that's responsive to your question.

Q: Where did you get building materials?

FARRAND: The House of Said.

Q: All right, Saudi Arabia.

FARRAND: The House of Said.

Q: This is obviously for the Bosniacs?

FARRAND: Right. They were the ones, they ere the ones that were in the plurality before the war.

Q: Were there problems with Serb families that had been displaced somewhere else moving in and taking over a Croatian or Muslim house?

FARRAND: Sure, sure, all over the place. Sure. That was the problem. So, then the question is, you see because the combustibility of the situation was. What we decided, Stu, essentially was we're first going to establish the principle that people can come back. They're going to come back to destroyed and unoccupied homes first. Then we're going to run that out as long as we can. Before we take on the real tough nut of having to start coming into areas where Serbs are living in non-Serb homes. We had to play. We were playing, what's the word? I was playing a short game, not a long game. The short game that I was playing I was getting ready for the long game. You had to first establish these people coming back. They are coming back. You could do this or you could do that, you Serbs, but they're coming. Now, the Serbs did not view their return as a humanitarian or a legal issues. The Serbs viewed their return in strategic military delight. If you've ever

seen a military map of how a battle envelops and these big arrows, these big flat headed arrows, coming here and here; that's how they saw it. We had to be aware; those of us, you always had to pull your head up. You always had to remind, I certainly did, that this is not a technical issue, only to mark hole houses only so you can bring Mohammad and his wife, Admira, and his six children back to a house. Yes, that's the goal, but getting all of that in place means that you've got to have some basic things there. You're going to have to have, he's going to have to have a small stove of some sort, he's going to have to have some plastics for the windows so the winds don't blow in while he's trying to rebuild the walls and put the roof on again, all this other stuff. But, you can get lost in that and as Ian McCloud used to say, "You can get up so close to the cold face that you don't see the scene." You've got to pull back and say the Serbs are doing all of this. Uh, oh, here comes, here, here. They're putting all together in their minds in this vast conspiracy theory which wasn't very clever as a conspiracy theory that it was all a threat to them. They realized that as it happened in some future point, their ability to stay in the homes that were not theirs was going to be challenged. You kept working, working with them, talking, talking, being as open and transparent as possible. I had stated on the very first day you will recall the last time when I said my first speech on the steps of the Brcko's supervisor's office. Carl Bildt was there and he and his people had drafted the speech and then I changed the speech a little bit to suit my own style. One of the things that was in the speech was this statement to the Serbs because that's who I'm talking to in the downtown area on the opening day. "You will not be thrown out on the street if you have nowhere else to go." That was my fundamental contract. Wasn't even a contract, it was a one-sided assurance to them. We had thought this thing through because what was their sensitivity about my coming? Their sensitivity is "what's going to happen to us?" Are they going to have bayonets coming at us in the middle of the night? We had to calm them down and that did more, that one statement, did more to establish a certain basis at least some basis to go forward. Without that, I would have been deep kim chi and I must have repeated that over the course of the next year or two. Perhaps oh I don't know probably two dozen times in public statements.

Q: Where did you find the alternate housing?

FARRAND: There really wasn't any. I tried hard to persuade the international community, the givers, that would be the European Commission, the European Union and some bilateral governments as well that I needed buffer housing, buffer housing that would permit me to have a series of housing units that would be used as pass through units. For example, if Mohammed to the south of the line is coming back to take over, I'm going to try and think of a good Serb name. Anyway, Petar's house. Petar and his wife and two children are living in Mohammad's house in the heart of Brcko town. Mohammad wants to come back, but Petar has no place to go so if I had some housing units, maybe sixty, maybe a hundred. I could move Petar to those housing units under an agreement with Petar that as soon as we were to find permanent ongoing housing for him that he would leave these quarters. That would put a time limit on it, too. Then Mohammad could come back up and go into his home which is Petar is now living in the buffer quarters. Then, when you get about the business of trying to find a community in

the south where Petar had lived before to see whether his house down there couldn't be vacated. Now, to vacate his house of course, down there, you're going to put a Bosniac out because that's what was happening in Sarajevo. Bosniacs were living in Serb houses and if you were over in Mustar, which was the Croat area, you had that other combination going. It was constipated. It was absolutely constipated. How to administer a little tablespoon of mineral oil to start the ball rolling very, very. This was the challenge that we faced all the time.

Q: Did you find as you were beginning to put this together, was entrepreneurship beginning to develop? I'm thinking about you know, housing, masons and people who could build a little and the shops and things like that. Were you finding a community developing?

FARRAND: It came very slowly, but the people of the Balkans, most men are adept, are adept at things which a lot of people in this country are not anymore.

Q: They can build.

FARRAND: They can build. They can build. The construction of their houses, they do not use wood. They only use masonry and it's a particular type of masonry. So, you learn how to stack, stack, stack, mortar stack, stack, and you leave space for windows and almost all the houses are identical. Once you learn how to build one, you can build another. There are people that are good at putting on roofs, tile roofs, there are people among that group that can do that better, so there was a division of labor and there was a certain flowering of the comparative advantage, a little bit. What we were trying to do in the beginning was to bring the families, we didn't want to flood the area, you couldn't flood the area. If we flooded the area we were going to trigger a violent response. We tried to bring them back and I urged everybody when they were thinking about this and I didn't micromanage to bring them back in groups of twenty or twenty-five families. Twenty families. Bring them back to the same section, the same section and let them all come back to the same section. Because there's twenty families they can provide a modicum of security for each other if they are in the same rough area. A modicum. They can't do it, but they can provide a modicum. Some of the people always said, "Well, what if somebody tries to steal somebody else's property?" Well, I mean, the records aren't so great. The only thing that he has to show from before the war is a utility bill, an electricity bill that's torn on the top. His name is there and the address and it shows that for the month of I don't know, July 1984, that he paid the electricity bill at that piece of property. They stripped him of his ID cards. That's the one beautiful thing that the Serbs did, they did it in Kosovo you saw it. They took away everything, they stripped a person of every single piece of identity. They stripped them of all their legal documents. This was, well, forget about that. When that Muslim comes up in front of the board, which we established, he had to show that he could get, that he as closely as he could that he owned that piece of land. A lot of doubts rose up. What happens if they get there and he's an imposter and he's taking somebody else's land because the records aren't so hot? Well, we thought that one through pretty thoroughly and we determined that if we brought them

back in clumps, of a couple of dozen families here and a couple dozen over there. These people are not like Americans. There is no real estate market in Bosnia, no effective real estate market, Century 21, none of that. People are born on a piece of land and they live on that land. The father and their grandfather lived there before. Yes, maybe they could work out a transfer, but it would probably be a crude transfer, one on one worked out between them. It's not a sophisticated real estate market. So, there's a great deal of stability in the neighborhoods or was until the war. Now, that means if you put twenty-four families in and there's one ringer in they're trying to take somebody else's property, he's going to stand out like a sore thumb. Everybody's going to say, "Hey, we've never seen you before, who are you?" At that point it never happened. Never did I have any trouble with that, maybe once.

Q: Well, now what did these families, all the families including the Serbs that were there, what were they doing in order to reestablish a normal life regarding work and generating money and all that?

FARRAND: Well that, of course, is the $64,000 question. You can bring people back, but if they don't have jobs or if they don't have a way of making a living, what in God's name is going to happen to them and what is going to happen to you and your program? Well, we couldn't solve every problem all at once, but I can assure you that my eye was never far off the economic scene. Because to draw back just a little bit, there was no template for how to do this, there was no book I could go to. There was no, in fact, maybe that's what I'm writing now, what I'm trying to write now, some practical thoughts on all of this. It's complex because we were moving on all fronts at once. I didn't have the luxury of only dealing with returned people and then later dealing with the economy and then later dealing with reestablishing the court of law and the police, first the police, and then getting the freedom of movement going and then, you know, I didn't have the luxury. I had to move on several tracks at once and the tracks were not totally separate, they were in fact interwoven. Jobs, education, schools, the churches, the mosques, getting the market downtown up.

Q: Electricity, water, and sewage.

FARRAND: Water, sewage, electricity and emergency services. In Mosloff's Hierarchy of Need, you're right down there at the bottom. Food, shelter, water and clothing. This is not the time to bring in the Hamburg Symphony Orchestra to make them feel good at night. I mean, maybe they weren't feeling good, but you don't want to put your efforts on that, let's get them fed and clothed first. So, but there was a considerable reliance in my mind on the concept that if people could be gotten back to their homes they would calm down, their anxieties would be reduced and their energies would be totally taken up with clearing the rubble and starting again. Then go to bed at night tired. Not so anxious to go downtown and mix it up with the Malamute Saloon, something like that.

Q: How much support were you getting from this, I don't know what you call it, consortium of all these European nations?

FARRAND: Peace Implementation Council?

Q: Yes, they baited you and talked you into this. What were you getting from them?

FARRAND: Not very much. The problem of Brcko, because it was in the north, northern sector which was the American sector and because it was an outgrowth of the peace talks at Dayton, Ohio, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, and because they had placed Brcko under an arbitral tribunal and the person named to be the presiding arbitrator was an American and because when the time came for him to say we can't do it without on scene supervision, they selected an American. The Europeans were quite anxious. They were not willing to take on too much at Brcko. This was an American problem, the Americans want it, the Americans have got it. Well, the Americans didn't want it in that way, the Americans were anxious to set up a proper structure so that we could resolve this issue if it was resolvable. The Europeans, you had a problem there. There was no particular separate line item in the Peace Implementation Council's budget for Brcko and that was a problem I had to fight all the way.

Q: Until you can establish commerce and all, there must, I mean you need, how were you feeding the people, how were you getting supplies?

FARRAND: When I got there, before I got there USAID had been very forthcoming with cooking oil, baking flour, and sugar, raw sugar. I think that's right, but certainly cooking oil. There were huge tin cans piled inside of old gutted buildings. The whole dang thing would be piled up with USAID hand clasps and then these things had been opened and they'd poured out the oil and I guess they mixed it with the flour and they made bread or they made something. I don't know what you do. I'm not a cook, so I don't know how much cooking oil, but there was great evidence that that had been distributed. Who else? I can't really point to any particular country besides us that was coming in with food.

Q: How about Serbia itself, were they cranking anything in?

FARRAND: Only small items, which I cannot identify that would be totally unhelpful to the peace process to prop up or keep in place the Karagig part, which is the Serb democratic party which was founded by Karagig.

Q: This is a Poly group?

FARRAND: Yes, Poly which is outside of Sarajevo up in the mountains in the Republic of Serbska. The party was known as the Serb Democratic Party, which in the Serb language is SDS. So, if I refer to SDS, it's the tough guys. They're still in power over there. They're still driving people nuts.

Q: Around the time you ere there and when I was in Germany and I guess it was the September election out of Derventa.

FARRAND: Were you there in ‘97 September?

Q: Yes.

FARRAND: Yes, that was the election.

Q: But I was rather surprised seeing how things, commerce was coming back, the farms looked pretty good, better than the Soviets blown up buildings. Things were moving and just outside they had some very large fish farms which was sort of an innovation which I’d never seen before when I had been in Yugoslavia thirty years before. Was any of this sort of showing itself in Brcko?

FARRAND: No, not at this time. What you had mostly in Brcko, between Derventa and Brcko, closer to Brcko, than Derventa, was a colony a little enclave, two enclaves really of Croats up on the boarder on the Sava River which was the border with Croatia which you were up another sixty kilometers up to the east. I’m sorry to the west, to the northwest; you were up, up, further. If you had come up to these enclaves and there was a bridge had been taken out, but they had a big ferry. That ferry was in operation connecting up a road called by the American soldiers, the Arizona Highway. Down where the Arizona Highway connected with the interentity boundary line, roughly interentity boundary line goes east west and the Arizona Highway runs from the Sava River down to Sarajevo north south where they intersect tat the interentity boundary line. A colonel in the U.S. army, Fantouno and his lieutenant colonel who was in charge of the battalion that was right there near Brcko, Camp McGovern, a fellow by the name of Tony Cuckulo. Fantouno and Cuckulo decided that it would be a good idea to establish a little place where people could exchange goods, not money, because they had different currencies. They could exchange goods across and maybe that would be a way of getting them to start to talk to each other. So, they did and they set it up under U.S. army auspices and they had it protected by a tank right on that road and they just lent them their own little stalls. Little wooden stalls. That became known, that worked. In fact it was one of those ideas which was a good idea at the time, but it didn’t have any program beyond that. It began to grow and grow and grow and grow and became a huge cancer of smuggled goods and black market and whorehouses and no administration. That was going to be a problem for me and it was a problem for me and it became a sore point. One of the major different points. I would differ with Bob Barry for example on what should have been done there and is being done. What I was going to do is being done now, but it took a year and we lost a lot of revenue. That is one of the economic impulses, it wasn’t a totally healthy one, but it was an economic impulse. The difficulty, Brcko had about twenty-six factories before the war ranging from the production of vegetable oil to shoes to automobile batteries to, what was the other major one. Well, the processing of meat, big meat processing place, then several others that were of a smaller size. All of these factors had been largely gutted or damaged and not maintained and the machinery not maintained or stripped and taken to Belgrade by the Serbians. All that had to be gotten going again, but you can’t get those things going on until you have your law on property in place, your

law on contracts in place, your law on commerce, commercial code and all of that requires a multiethnic legislature and it was mostly Serb at the time and it's all interwoven.

Q: While you were doing this the three years you were there, was the Serbska Republica legislature putting together a working system, legal system that you know would help things develop?

FARRAND: No, no, no. They had no program. It took me time to realize this. Your question is a good one, but it took me time to realize that they had no program. Their basic strategy was to obstruct, delay, and frustrate the international community in every way so that it would be impossible to bring people back and to do whatever you could to undermine without being overly negative. I mean, you could smile at the supervisor and tell him one thing one night and change it the next after Poly had placed a telephone call to them or you would place a telephone call to Poly. So, no the answer is no. They were incapable of coming up with a coherent plan for the redevelopment of their community.

Q: You left there when?

FARRAND: 31st of May, 2000.

Q: When you left there, what had been done and what hadn't been done?

FARRAND: By the time I left we were evicting people, we were evicting the Serb families from the non-Serb houses they were occupying in the heart of town at the rate of two to three a week. We had set up a board to look over these applications very carefully. We had tackled the very first thing that we tackled, when we had to come down to hitting the hard nut of the town and we were going to do some evictions. The first thing we looked at was persons who- (end of tape)

Q: You had said you were working to get the double occupiers out.

FARRAND: Okay, okay. It just follows along, that what you do it would seem to me in a circumstance like we were in, when I think back on it I was really following a strategy of bringing people back to homes to their properties, first destroyed and unoccupied and then destroyed and then partially occupied and then when we got up to the heart of town, we were always going for the low hanging one first. We would take what was easiest to get first. Gradually nibble it down. This never made the Bosniacs happy. In fact, at the end they were attacking me for doing nothing. They just wanted to make a smear campaign against me at the end. This was because of a particular decision I had made about the composition of the interim assembly. That would be the legislature. At the time I had made a decision that didn't please one man and then he launched a smear campaign. We took first the people. For example, there would be a Serb because he was in a position of authority and influence. He would take over a very nice house and it was a very nice Bosniac, Muslim house. Then he would go down the street and see a nice Croat house

and take over that and he'd live in both. He'd have his son, twenty-four year old son and their daughter in this house and he and his wife in this house. Plus, out in the country would be his Serb house toward Bevra. He had three houses. It worked out that all they would never say it, there were a lot of Serbs who were very unhappy with that circumstance and would be quite happy to see this man taken down a peg. Now, they're not going to say it, but internally they're not going to give you any trouble. So, it was a win-win situation. We set up a board, it was a multiethnic board and we oversaw it and we brought these cases and they would be discussed in front of this board and then determination was great. Yes, you have three houses; well you can only have one house under the law; so many square feet per person. Therefore, you're going to have to divest yourself of a couple of houses and the choice is yours. It's going to be a matter of time. What really happened, Stu, as this got going, this was a way of delaying the really hard problem of evicting that Serb who, this was the only house he had because there was nothing for him. If he lived before the war down in Sarajevo, if he had lived in another town, there was nothing for them there. He was huddling down, hunkering down and we were going to get to him eventually, but we're taking this. That's satisfying first of all, the numbers are getting better and gradually as we do these evictions and what happened the man that had three houses, many of these people, most of these people are honorable people. They go home and they say this isn't right, I never felt right about anyway. So, we're going to have to give it up. They would come in and hand the keys in without having the eviction forces to come. We got along a great way, that way. I would say that today the process has really opened up and its moving quite rapidly and families are coming back to their homes today. I just was over there about four weeks ago, six weeks and it seems to be going quite well. Now, so that was what we did there. Now, what other things did we do? Well, freedom of movement was restored within a year. By my first twelve months their people could pretty much come back up into town without having to get harassed. They didn't worry about it too much. Maybe the first fifteen months.

Q: They changed the license plates, too, didn't they?

FARRAND: They did and that was done down in Sarajevo at the idea of a fellow from New Zealand who had worked for the United Nations. He came up with this idea because we've got thirty-two characters in the Serb [alphabet] and you've got twenty-eight, twenty-six characters, in the Latanic and when you bring them together, there are ten of them, which are identical. O is identical, H, now H is "huh," in Latanic it's "umh," but it doesn't matter, it doesn't matter, it's still an H. You don't know what it is, so you put NH2345. Actually what they did is to put that letter in the middle, three numbers on the right, three numbers on the left and it gave you a huge array.

Q: Prior to that I mean in the old communist Yugoslavia, the license plates told you where somebody was from. I had, a BG meant it was Belgrade, SA was Sarajevo. This, of course, was an identifier for somebody who hated somebody from one of these places and so by making the numbers no longer correlate to place, it meant that people were no longer identified as being from the wrong area so they could move around.

FARRAND: That's very true, but in Brcko we had, that helped, but we had largely reestablished freedom of movement before this new license plate came in. The license plate was the cream on the cake, but we had largely reestablished it. The police were enforcing it. One thing that the communist police always did, the Soviet Union, all places, Czechoslovakia, Poland was they policed by the little popsicle sticks, the checkpoint. They would pull people over and stop them and "Let me see your papers, let me see your documents." Then check, check, check, check and then probably take a little money on the side if they found something. We attached that checkpoint policy and got rid of it. We made it to the point that they could not have checkpoints. They could only have a checkpoint if they went to the International Police Task Force and got the commander to say you can have one, but you can only have it for thirty minutes and you can only have it tomorrow night between the hours of 9:00 and 12:00 and no more. By getting rid of that you see, that starts the flow, even with the different license places. You're absolutely right, the guy who thought this up was really bright.

Q: We talked about the resettlement, the movement and by the time you left, the tasks that you'd been given which seemed almost impossible had taken hold?

FARRAND: We had the elections in cooperation with, Barry wasn't there at the time, his predecessor, Bob Frolick. We had elections on the basis of the elections we established a multiethnic police and assembly. We downsized the government just like Fiat; we set up a law revision commission to harmonize the laws. We set up a neutral district, de-militarized. This was because of the arbitrator. That was the way he was deciding things and were carrying it out on the ground. Brcko did go a long way.

Q: How about your relations with the State Department and with Sitban first and Sarajevo second? Were you more or less I mean did they bother you much, look over your shoulder?

FARRAND: State passed from a hands on group in the beginning in the first year, a hands on group that was very, very concerned. They told me when I go out, you get Brcko right and we'll have a chance for the Dayton Peace process in Bosnia. If you don't get Brcko right, the peace process in Bosnia is in real trouble. Brcko is the key. So, I operated under that presumption and nobody ever changed, but the people in Washington began to change. They changed and Kosovo happened. When Kosovo happened it was right near the presidential elections. They didn't want any bumping up of trouble in Kosovo so they brought a new envoy in after Gelpart. Gelpart was always; he's a man that wants to be in charge of everything. He's very territorial, but he's smart as a whip and he understood the importance of Brcko. We had our differences he and I, but we got over them. I hope he got comfortable with me, I was reasonably comfortable with him and I could call on him for what I called top cover when I was getting heat because the Europeans never liked the Brcko concept, you see. We were moving faster, we were getting things done and the office of the high representative went from Bildt to a Spaniard to an Austrian. From Bildt, a Swedish prime minister to a Spaniard ex-foreign minister, to an Austrian ex-ambassador.

Q: They're going down?

FARRAND: In my judgment, but up in petty fogging and bureaucratism. So, at the end I will have to say that my relations with the high representative's office in Sarajevo were a big, total and I have my story to tell on that, they have their story to tell, too. I think I was that I wasn't dealt with straight. I didn't get any comfort from State because State goes off on other things. They're allowing little O-1 and O-2 officers to deal and that's no way to do it. I couldn't get any traction and then State wanted no to have any trouble with the high representative. Even though maybe I had a couple whisper to me, "You did a great job." They wouldn't stand up, you see? So, I was taken out and another fellow was put in, a friend of mine, a former friend of mine who went in and started to dismantle a number of things which you had to reestablish later because there's only one way to do it, but any way. I don't want to get into that.

Q: Okay, well, I think maybe this is a good place to stop. What do you think?

FARRAND: That's fine. If I could say one thing?

Q: Yes.

FARRAND: Beyond doubt it was the most, beyond doubt it was the most demanding and at the same time fulfilling job I ever had in thirty-five years, thirty-four years in the Foreign Service.

Q: Well, anybody who's aware of the complexities of trying to deal with this and get anywhere and trying to put it back after what had happened.

FARRAND: Well, I don't know, I don't know. Maybe my ignorance was playing because if you have a generally optimistic approach to life and you're not ready to hang up the cleats, this sort of thing is good. Nobody on the line, nobody in the middle of their careers like an OC officer or an MC officer would take this on because if they're still in the Service they have to make decisions. You're given primary authority and you have to make decisions. I've done it and sometimes they didn't go right. Most of the times they were okay, thank God. On that school bus incident, I made that decision. That could have been a life or death decision and I could have been wrong. If I'd been in the Service they'd been jumping all over me, you see? So, I was in the Service, I was in the Service, but I was a year from retirement. They asked me to do this tough job and I did it. I took the decisions. If you're in the line it would be probably too much, you know, human nature being such. It was the greatest thing and I am, I can't let go of it. I think of it all the time and I'm writing a book on it. I've got to stop doing all of this so I can get my book done.

Q: All right, that's it then.

End of interview