

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR JONATHAN DEAN

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy

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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is the 8th of July, 1997. This is an interview with Jonathan Dean. It is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. I would like to begin at the beginning. Could you tell me when and where you were born and something about your family.

DEAN: I was born June 15, 1924 in New York City. My father was a stockbroker and we moved fairly soon to the outskirts. My grandfather had a big family compound in Stamford, Connecticut where he built a house for each of his six children. We lived there for a time and then my father built a house of his own in Darien, Connecticut. That’s where I grew up until the early death of my mother. We then moved to New York and I

went to a school in Yonkers called Riverdale Country School and then to Harvard College. I went from there to the Canadian army shortly after the United States entered World War II. I was under age for the U.S. armed forces at 17.

Q: I want to move back a bit. Everybody tries to get modest and they don't want to talk about their early days. I do like to catch a little more of the person because I think it is interesting for future historians to understand who are these people who are involved in foreign affairs rather than sort of springing up. In your early schooling what sort of books did you read and what interested you particularly?

DEAN: There is a clue there, definitely. My father was a great fan of George Alfred Henty, G.A. Henty, a British writer of the nineteenth century who wrote historical novels for boys.

Q: Oh, yes, "A Dash for Khartoum."

DEAN: Yes, among 100 other titles. I still have about 50 of them.

Q: "With Clive in India."

DEAN: *With Clive in India*, *The Cat of Bubastes* (that was one of the Egyptian ones), *Baric the Briton* and *True to the Old Flag*; it had to do with the American Revolution.

Q: You might explain who Henty was and why the interest in him.

DEAN: George Alfred (G.A. is the only way he's known.) Henty was a British writer of boys books in the 1880s and 1890s who used a standard plot in myriad historical circumstances. His history was quite good and quite detailed. For example in one, *Through Russian Snows*, I believe it was called, he shows you the campaign of Napoleon as he advanced into Russia and gives you a good deal of detail. Other books would actually have military diagrams of battles with the position of the troops and so on. He made history interesting to kids, mostly British kids at that time, but also American ones. My father read them as a boy and he read them to me. Of course the plots were rather sort of a British Horatio Alger; usually, some disadvantaged youth would meet the beautiful daughter of some very distinguished person and end up marrying her after bravely carrying out an assignment for the distinguished person, a military commander usually.

Q: You are not the first. Obviously I was touched by Henty. There were others I've interviewed that Henty had a real influence on. It was a good way to cram history down...

DEAN: Yes, very palatable and I think his books that I've looked at as an adult seem to me to be quite accurate. However, where they dealt with aspects of British history, they were rather Kiplingesque, justifying empire. He did get in an enormous amount of detail for that time.

Q: You had this interest in history, did this continue?

DEAN: I had an excellent American history teacher in Riverdale School. His name was "Mickey" Murray and he was superior. He aroused interest in all of the kids and I got a history prize a couple of times from his class or from the school. I also had an extremely fine Latin instructor, Mr. Lubey, who filled us with ancient history on Caesar and so forth.

Q: You were going to school in about the early '30s?

DEAN: Yes.

Q: As you were going through did foreign affairs intrude much into your thought process or field of vision?

DEAN: Scarcely at all I felt. Not until I got into college did I develop much interest in it. Our family was having a hard enough time because of the Depression. My mother died early on and going to school was kind of rough. As a day student it took me two hours each way, and then as a boarding student it was not too happy a time.

Q: I think for many people, the schools where you went away particularly, did cause some distress and all that. I went away to Kent and it was difficult but you sure got a hell of a good education.

DEAN: I think the net result was certainly good. It was a better education. I also went to several public schools and I remember the very patriotic public school that was on 23rd Street in Manhattan where Miss Julia Wagner was my teacher. At that time you had to say allegiance to the flag, sing a patriotic song or two and so forth, and then we were drilled in handwriting and so forth. She was very nice.

Q: When you went to Harvard was this just following a family tradition or did you have any thought in mind of why you were going there?

DEAN: Yes, it was following in the family tradition. I didn't have much intellectual maturity. I was just sort of casting around for some kind of interest and I ended up with ethnology, which was what I was working on. A lot of that has to do with foreign countries.

Q: It does, very much so. You went into Harvard when?

DEAN: I was in the class of '44 so I went there in 1940 and I was there until the end of '41. December of '41 was Pearl Harbor and I cut out. Because I was underage for the American forces, I went up to Canada and joined the Canadian army.

Q: A number of young men did this at that time. How old were you then?

DEAN: 17.

Q: Can you tell me a little about the Canadian army at that time?

DEAN: Oh yes. It was organized very much on the British system. At first I joined an artillery field spotting survey outfit but I talked to some of the other men in the barracks, the Valcartier Barracks in Montreal, and they said that was not a real fighting outfit, so they persuaded me to join the Royal Rifles of Canada, an infantry unit. It was being formed to avenge the loss of the first battalion, Royal Rifles in Hong Kong to the Japanese. The replacement unit never actually did see service overseas, although I did. It was an English speaking unit from Quebec City and it was extremely British in every possible way. The officers, the uniforms, the drill, and the whole system were on the lines of the British permanent army establishment. We had an old regimental Sergeant Major Jock Sawyer, who had been on the Black Watch in the First World War and there was Colonel Lamb who also had been in the First World War in British units. The uniforms were British, we had Lee Enfield rifles, and so forth.

Q: As an American how were you accepted?

DEAN: Fairly well. It never played much of a role except I remember when I was made corporal for the first time, I forget where this happened, but this guy called me "Yank" and I didn't think this label comported with my dignity as a non-commissioned officer. So I put him on company parade to the company office and marched him in. The captain gave him two days confined to barracks. He told me to stay behind and said, "If you do that again I will take away your stripes," for not handling the matter the right way. That was a good lesson.

Q: That's just one of those lessons one should have. You said that you didn't get overseas?

DEAN: The unit did not, as a unit. We went across Canada to British Columbia to Vancouver Island and trained there for a time. Then they took a group of us and sent us to Britain to be part of another unit.

Q: It must be you're moving up to around '44?

DEAN: That would be around late '43.

Q: This was still when the Canadian army had been essentially sitting in Britain now for about three or four years.

DEAN: That's right. A few had been in the raid on Dieppe. Yes, we were at Aldershot, one of the permanent bases of the British Army. G.A. Henty was there every day. I was in a barracks called Salamanca, after Wellington's peninsular campaigns. We got marched to church parade and in the church they had the original banners from the Napoleonic wars. The barracks were something. I had a bed that folded up. It was made out of metal slats and it ran on runners and you just folded it in half and put these biscuit mattresses on top of each other to straighten up. It was really quite something.

Q: How long were you there?

DEAN: I was transferred to a Field Security Unit, the British-Canadian equivalent of the American CIC or Counter Intelligence Corps. I served in it until the invasion; we landed two days after D-Day. About a month after the invasion, while we were in Normandy, I got transferred to the American army so I finished up with an American unit.

Q: I think it is interesting in view of later careers, the military experience. What did you do? In the Canadian army you went in...

DEAN: That was an infantry battalion. Then for a time while in Britain I was in a field security unit which is like the CIC in the American army, counter intelligence. When I transferred to the American army I was in an infantry battalion again.

Q: How did you find the American army after the Canadian army?

DEAN: Sloppy, with lower morale. Many were draftees. This really shook me up quite a bit because the Canadian army was all volunteers from heavily Anglicized Canada. Just as we left they had begun a draft. It was an all volunteer army up until that time. They were bringing in men in chains; Italians and some others who had some ties with the Axis and therefore were far from volunteering. Anyhow, at that point, the nature of the Canadian army then changed somewhat. Ours, they were just sloppy in the superficial sense and also in morale. But there were many good men. Part of them were from New Jersey and the other part were from Arkansas. It was a National Guard division based in Arkansas called the Ozark Division, the 102nd Infantry Division. I was in the 407th Infantry Regiment. I remember having a big argument in a huge factory hall on the Elbe, which we had made a POW cage, with several of these guys and some of the POWs. I found myself more mentally attuned to some of the POWs than to the Americans.

Q: These were German POWs?

DEAN: That's right. They were just fresh ones we'd just taken. They struggled across the Elbe River in front of the Russian army and we picked them up and put them in this great big industrial hall and shipped them off behind the lines the next day. They were the lucky ones, those who were prisoners of war to the Western allies.

Q: The 102nd, where did it go during the war?

DEAN: It was in the Ninth Army on the extreme left flank of the American forces right next to the Canadians. I believe it was under Montgomery's command, part of the 21st Army Group, as it was called. We tried to cross the Roer River, a tributary of the Rhine, near Bielefeld and I was wounded there. I went to hospital in Paris and then went back to the unit. By that time, we had mechanized ourselves by taking every available wheeled vehicle and we tooted on to the Elbe, where we met the Russian forces near Tangermunde-Tangerhutte. That's where we ran the big hall for POWs. Later, in

accordance with the agreement reached in London during the war, we withdrew through Thuringia to the border of Bavaria where I stayed a short time then came back and was mustered out.

Q: When you came back and were mustered out it was I guess late '45?

DEAN: It was September or October of '45 because I had a lot of overseas service through my Canadian service. It reminds me that, the first day I was in the Canadian army, they told me to fall out in front of the huts at 4:00 a.m. in fatigues, the overalls they issued us. I did so with three or four other men, kids. It was very dark and very cold. A truck drove up and somebody told us to get on the truck. We drove around and stopped. They said, "all right get off, take out the ashes." Our job was take out the cool ashes from these huts; they all had these great potbellied stoves for heat. We were black from head to foot and this man who was impeccably clad was directing us. I finally summoned up the courage to ask him who he was and he said he was a German POW from North Africa. I realized that was my first good lesson in army life and who's on top. But I remember my last day in the army. They gave us a great meal at Fort Dix. This time it was served by real POWs who were waiting on the tables.

Q: Did you have any plans of what you wanted to do while you were waiting for your discharge?

DEAN: I didn't have anything very serious in mind. I went back to Harvard. I had some administrative difficulties there and ended up in Columbia College.

Q: You say administrative difficulties. Did this mean you didn't get along?

DEAN: Yes, right. It was a disciplinary issue and my responsibility. Anyhow, I ended up at Columbia. The Columbia director of admissions, who later ran the College Entrance Board, said to me that we were obviously in a situation where the United States role abroad would expand and I should think of going into the Foreign Service. That was the first time that I really seriously thought of it. I began to read the *New York Times* as we slid into the cold war, and I signed up with the Columbia Institute of International Affairs and took the Foreign Service exam.

Q: At Columbia, you were there from about '46 until when?

DEAN: I was there from '47 to '48.

Q: You graduated in '48?

DEAN: Yes.

Q: Were you taking any particular major?

DEAN: English literature. My favorite course was on Shakespeare with Andrew Chiappe,

a great teacher. At that point I was thinking of being a university teacher in English literature. I had an Australian friend who was very political; he had been the youth secretary of the Australian Communist Party and had then gone against the party. He was working for *Time Magazine* and was a close friend of Whittaker Chambers.

Q: Oh, yes. He had also been in the Communist Party, got out, and moved way over to the other side.

DEAN: We had an enormous amount of discussion of communism; the Soviet union and Alger Hiss, whom I then found it difficult to believe was guilty.

Q: Columbia was a very political university even then wasn't it?

DEAN: Yes, but I had two or three politically-interested friends and we kept talking about these events.

Q: How about the United Nations? Was this an object of some interest, hope or anything like that at that time or was it too early on?

DEAN: It was too early on. I would say that my intellectual immaturity lasted quite a long time. We did have a great faculty at the Columbia Institute. Grayson Kirk, Andrew Cordier and others. We were early working on the UN. Gradually, largely through Alwyn Lee and others who kept insistently directing my attention to what was going on in the world of politics, I began to be a little more aware. I didn't pay much attention to the United Nations then at that time, although I have to tell you now in the postscript that I am the president of the UN Association of the National Capital Area.

Q: I was not a veteran but I graduated from college in 1950 and I remember getting a very solid dose of the UN and sort of where government was really going. Joseph Johnson was one of my professors and we were getting a very strong dose of the UN two years later.

DEAN: When I went to the Columbia Institute of International Affairs, I definitely got that from Grayson Kirk, who was the director. We had very good teachers there. We had Gordon Craig, who was an expert on the German army, and Franz Neumann, an exiled German Social Democrat, and a superb analyst of the Nazi system. That was when I really began to wonder what the war had really been about, why this had happened, and so forth.

Q: Just to get the timing, you finished your bachelors degree by '48 and you went on to the Institute. How about the Foreign Service, how did that work?

DEAN: When I was talking with Frank (I forget his last name.) who was the director of admissions at Columbia, he pointed me in this direction. I got one of the forms to apply for the written exam and I filled it out. Things moved slowly. I went to this institute to a cram course for the foreign service exam, which was being given at George Washington University. Otherwise, I would never have passed the examination. I came down here in

the summer of 1948.

Q: You were really rather serious about it by this time?

DEAN: Yes. I never would have gotten in because with my rather patchwork academic background, I never had a university course in economics, American history. After I took the exam, I went to the Columbia Institute.

Q: You took the exam and I assume passed it then?

DEAN: Yes.

Q: This was about '49?

DEAN: Yes. I went on the waiting list for foreign service officers. Then owing to the fact that the State Department had taken over responsibility for the occupation of Germany from the Army, the State Department administration took an extra group from the foreign service waiting list to fill out their ranks.

Q: You became a kreis officer?

DEAN: Right, a kreis resident officer.

Q: By that time had you taken the oral exam?

DEAN: Yes. Actually the group I was with that I still associate with today -- we were all on the waiting list for the regular Foreign Service when they engaged us, gave us FSS staff appointments and took us over to Germany. They gave us about three months training and we went to our assignments as resident officers, local representatives of the High Commission.

Q: Do you remember any of the sort of things you were asked during the oral exam?

DEAN: One of the examiners asked me whether I would need a Foreign Service salary to live on and I assured him that I would. I must have given him the wrong impression. They asked me a question about the balance of payments which I was unable to answer and one of the examiners helpfully provided the answer.

Q: When you were taking the kreis resident officer course, KRO course, what were they teaching you?

DEAN: It was in the hands of a gentleman named Moran who was an ex-FBI agent. Part of it was language training of a straight forward kind which I was glad to have. Most of it was the structure, activities, and programs of the High Commission.

Q: When you went over, where was your initial assignment?

DEAN: It was in Limburg on the Lahn, which is the seat of the bishopric of Frankfurt am Main. I also was responsible for the adjoining Oberlahn kreis.

Q: What was the purpose of this KRO program and what were you doing?

DEAN: What was I really doing in it or the purpose?

Q: Let's state the purpose first.

DEAN: This was a residual function of the U.S. occupation of Germany. By the time we got into it, in the spring of 1950, the High Commission was actively engaged in the effort to democratize post-war Germany. That was also then the main function of the kreis resident officers. Their work involved attempting to set up youth organizations, women's organizations, mobilize voters, trying to get town meetings going, things of that kind. For most of us, as well as for the Germans, it was pretty much an educational experience on the fundamentals of democracy.

Q: Talking about educational experiences, I was thinking here you go out; yes you had been in the military which gave you a feeling for structure and all. All of a sudden to be tossed into what amounted to what could have been a fairly responsible administrative position in a foreign country under very difficult circumstances considering where the Germans were at that time, how did you operate?

DEAN: We did have an extremely good U.S. Land Commission, responsible for occupation matters in the Land or state of Hesse. It was very active. The Land Commission had a gifted man responsible for coordinating the kreis resident officer program, Linton Lovett. He called us frequently, and called us in frequently, for discussions of what we were trying to do or supposed to be doing. He and his colleagues had a pretty clear idea of what they were trying to do and I think they got some fairly good performance out of these young men. In some of the other German Lander, they had less gifted organizers. But we had a high commissioner, James Newman, who had been a power in American education. He had a clear concept of what he was trying to achieve. I had quite a bit of opportunity to compare with the British and French occupation systems (we were on the border of the French occupation zone). In my opinion, we did corporately achieve a great deal in the direction of democratization, voter education, formation of free trade unions, free press and free radio.

Q: I understand part of the reason for the kreis officers was to have a gradual transition away from the military role to put in civilians so it would be an easier way of doing it. It would sort of free the military from this and also to get them out of the government.

DEAN: That's correct. That's right. That's why the function was handed over to the State Department to civilianize the operation. Of course, it did then train quite a number of people for the occupation who then, as I did, stayed on in German affairs. It was very good training for that, because you experienced German society from the ground up.

Q: I know because I've interviewed quite a few. I remember my first post abroad was in

'55 in Frankfurt and I replaced Kennedy Smertz, who was one of the KROs.

DEAN: Right.

Q: Can you describe what a day or any experiences you had as a resident officer?

DEAN: I would go around and talk to the local burgermeisters and try to get them to organize town meetings to discuss affairs of the community with the citizens and report to them. That was an alien concept and the burgermeister didn't like it much, but usually they would give me a glass of schnapps or two and we would have a convivial time and ultimately hold a meeting. Occasionally, I would go to a county fair to fire air rifles (regular fire arms were forbidden at that point) at a target with the local Landrat or county supervisor, who usually beat me (he was a professional soldier). Or I judged cattle, at which I was not very knowledgeable. I would talk to women's groups and urge them to form associations of their own and to inform themselves systematically on voter issues. I did speak a fair amount of German then, but I also had some quite capable German assistants. The group of Germans that we had working for us in the occupation were by and large of very good quality.

Q: Did you find, as most of us have in the Foreign Service, that the equivalent to your local employees were sort of behind the scenes making sure things worked?

DEAN: Oh yes, they had to do this because they had most of the contacts. They were very active and some of them were very devoted to the cause of German democracy; I've heard from them over the years since then.

Q: What was your impression of Germany at this time which was about five years after the end of the war?

DEAN: It was still flat on the ground. Frankfurt, which you saw, was just a rubble heap. Berlin was a rubble heap. Cologne was a rubble heap. Most Germans were extremely vigorously denying any complicity in the Third Reich. I found only one or two -- in later years I found more -- who would admit some degree of responsibility. As I looked at the situation and thought in particular of what I had read, and studied and heard from Franz Neumann, I began to feel that nearly any country with the unfortunate history of Germany and its hierarchical and military values might have developed the same way -- even ourselves. That most of us had the capacity to do evil things in a banal, unfeeling way. I had answered in part a question that had motivated me to enter the Foreign Service, what really had happened, why World War II and Nazism had happened. I formed a theory of that development, right or wrongly.

Q: You arrived in Germany within a year or two of two big events. One was the coup, or whatever you want to call it, and the takeover by the communists in Czechoslovakia and the other was the Berlin air lift. Both of these played a prominent part in getting the Cold War started.

DEAN: The third, I would say, of nearly equal importance was the beginning of the Korean War.

Q: Yes, in June of 1950. What was the attitude at this time? Did you sense a change in the approach towards Germany and what our adversaries would be and all, at that point?

DEAN: At that point I actually got involved with some exiled Ukrainians who were in Limburg where we were living. There was a rather clumsy KGB effort to assassinate me and my wife. There was a camp for so-called Ukrainian slave laborers in Limburg. We had a man from the camp as a gardener. They got to him and told him that the Red Army was coming and he was supposed to demonstrate his loyalty by doing something significant. He thought assassinating me and my wife would meet the requirements and the KGB agreed. Many of the details came out and I got in touch with a man from the fledgling CIA. He gave me the sterling advice to ride along with the plot. In that way, the CIA would find out who it was who was doing the contacts.

Actually, the complicity of our gardener was revealed by a fellow Ukrainian who came to me in my office and spilled the whole thing about this other Vasil. Each was called Vasil, and they had had some kind of falling out. Anyhow, I demonstratively flourished a shotgun around the place and fired it off over the wall and so forth. The gardener had been trying to figure out how to drive our car to make his escape. He had never had any driving lessons and he wasn't doing too well on that. He was amateurish, but the affair was sinister at the same time. Anyhow, Vasil Sleva, poor man, he disappeared back into the refugee camp but I don't think anything ever happened to him. I did not take the advice of the man from the CIA.

Those were big events. People felt that war was definitely in the air. I didn't come into contact with the rearming of Germany until I went up to Bonn and then definitely so. Of course, that was a major, major topic. For a short time – before we went to Bonn, this is the way the Foreign Service often tweaks you this way and that -- my next assignment was in the High Commission in Frankfurt where part of the U.S. High Commission still remained during the slow move to Bonn. My job was to follow the neo-Nazi developments, to analyze reports, to pull them together, and so forth. I did that for about three or four months and I was shipped up to Bonn and found myself more or less helping to organize the new German army.

Q: In the first place was there anything in the way of a neo-Nazi movement at the time?

DEAN: No serious movement. There were about five percent of absolutely unredeemed people. I've met more of them over the years in Austria than I ever did in Germany. There it was sort of like the British colonial carrying to the absolute extreme the values of the British – in this case of the Nazis. I picked up a man on the road in Austria one time and he wanted to bomb Russia immediately again. This must have been in the late '50s. In Germany, the neo-Nazis, people that really believed in Nazism and so forth were very small. The Republican Party as you know today are lucky if they can get four or five percent.

Q: Is this the FDP?

DEAN: No, those are the Free Democrats, who are a liberal party. Republikaner, the right wingers called themselves.

Q: Just to go back, when did you get married?

DEAN: I got married just before we left for Germany in March 1950.

Q: Where did you meet your wife?

DEAN: She was our next door neighbor from Darien, Connecticut. Her mother and father had died and meanwhile she was living in New York. My own father brought us together. He got tired of my rootless condition.

Q: So he fixed you.

DEAN: Exactly.

Q: During this you were a KRO from '50 to when?

DEAN: It was about two years. I went to Bonn in late 1951.

Q: Was there much concern about a Soviet attack on Germany at that time?

DEAN: There was indeed. This whole incident that I told you about with our Ukrainian gardener, was based on the idea that the Red Army was coming and that he had to demonstrate his loyalty to the Soviet Union in advance. Yes, people were worried about that definitely and continued to be.

Q: Did you see any change in sort of the German attitude towards Americans? Although the occupation was getting close to ending about that time, was there still a change between seeing the Americans as sort of occupiers into defenders?

DEAN: I didn't notice it, not at that time. The era of good feelings probably started in the mid-fifties. From the outset, I never saw a great deal of overt hostility. Obviously, people who felt it restrained it. Others seemed to think that it was fairly good that they had the Americans instead of the French or something telling them what to do. The British also had a resident officer program and a fairly good one. I went to a couple of their conferences. The French had nothing of that type on promoting democratic institutions, although they did do some cultural politics. I did run into two or three unreconstructed German nationalists. There was the mayor of the second kreis I was responsible for who was a very unpleasant man, had dueling scars, schmissee, all over his face, and was very dour, although superficially polite.

Q: We're talking about Dönitz guys.

DEAN: Yes, and he had been a professional officer. He gave me a hard time but not excessively. The man that owned the house that we were quartered in, which was sequestered, had also been a Nazi party member of some distinction. We had a few harsh discussions, but nothing else. By and large, and I think as I asked my colleagues they had the same experience; there were relatively few indications of overt hostility. Distance, but not hostility. Even before the Korean War and before the cold war became a serious source of concern for Germans, it was a relatively small number who openly expressed enmity. In Frankfurt did you see any of it?

Q: I got there in '55 and by that time I think the Cold War had really set in and it was in concrete at that time. I think it would stay for the next 30 years.

DEAN: There was also a certain amount of hierarchic servility in some Germans which created the artificial politeness.

Q: If you were an official and went somewhere, even no matter how young, I remember going into police stations as a vice council I felt very low down and all of a sudden the heels started clicking and it was almost a little heady I think. You moved up about '52 then to Bonn? I take it by this time you were fully into the Foreign Service as a regular FSO?

DEAN: Right.

Q: You were in Bonn from '52 until when?

DEAN: '56.

Q: You really had a very long time in Germany.

DEAN: Yes. I was very lucky. I had two assignments and worked on Germany in the Department. In Bonn, I was assigned to the political section. I went with my chief from the section following neo-Nazi extremism, Roger Dow, who was an academic folded into the Foreign Service, up to Bonn. I ended up in the political section under the distinguished leadership of John Paton Davies, one of the old China hands who had been attacked by McCarthy. Davies was a man of remarkable imagination and subtlety of mind. Knowing him was an education. A great leader with a real feel for developing younger officers.

Q: What were you doing then?

DEAN: I was just one of the reporting officers. But rather soon, I got assigned to an activity called the Liaison House. This was a contact place with the new German government. We served good food and good lunches when it was still somewhat scarce. We worked mainly with the parliament, the chancellor's office, and with the Amt Blank, as it developed with the new German army.

This liaison activity was run by Anton F. Pabsch, a German-American of remarkable qualities who had been one of General Clay's interpreters. Among his remarkable qualities, Tony Pabsch spoke about the most strongly accented Silesian German I have heard. But he was a very affable, very astute man and I just sort of acted as his sidekick. The second person we had there in the Liaison House was a Foreign Service officer, Norris Chipman, who had been one of those who trained with George Kennan in Russian in Riga and was an expert on communism. My goodness, what an education he gave me on communism in Europe.

Q: You said you got involved rather quickly into the complexities of rearming Germany?

DEAN: Yes, because that was our main job then. It was to liaise with Theodor Blank, the German trade union leader who was chosen to set up the new democratic German armed forces, and his Amt Blank, his fledgling Defense Ministry and the officers they had there, men like Ulrich de Maizière, who later became inspector general, senior officer of the new Bundeswehr. I mention him first because I just took his grandson from the airport up to Georgetown University the other day. It was quite a group of men there who were screening officer candidates for the new German forces. They were trying to develop a new form of discipline, based more on teamwork and less on the hierarchical system of the old Wehrmacht. I took the first group of deputies from the Bundestag Defense Committee to the United States in 1955 to look at how we did it and as a prelude to their own defense legislation. I proposed this trip to the State Department and I was asked to escort the group.

Q: How did these German Bundestag members react to the American system where congressional committees can have so much power over budgets, programs, and all?

DEAN: That was an eye opener to them. They were also very impressed by the comptroller in the Department of Defense who was a very powerful official and in effect kept the forces in line. The Congress impressed them and of course the country impressed them. Some of them were professional soldiers. One of them was General von Manteuffel, who had been the commander in the Battle of the Bulge. He told me he understood now how Germany had been defeated because of the huge size and the big military establishment. In any case, the deputies were very hostile towards each other at the outset, but they were quite friendly with one another at the end and that did make it possible to pass some quite sensible defense legislation.

Q: You are talking about the officers and the Bundestag members?

DEAN: Most participants were Bundestag members. There was actually a General Ferber who was assigned from the fledgling Defense Ministry to go with us and a second man, Dr. Wolfgang Cartellieri, a civilian from the Defense Ministry. The rest were all members of the Bundestag, including their chairman, Dr. Jager, who was from the Christian Social Union in Bavaria. At the other end of the spectrum was Fritz Erler, who was the defense expert, later chairman, of the Social Democratic Party. The two detested each other thoroughly. But my point is that, at the end of the trip whatever else they learned, they learned about each other and they were quite friendly and constructive

towards each other. They passed good legislation including a law providing for a wehrbeauftragter of the Bundestag, a kind of ombudsman who is supposed to ensure the democratic conditions inside the armed forces. So that was a good project.

Q: As you started getting involved with this rearming of Germany, what were the reactions about this from some of the fellow officers, particularly more senior ones in the embassy, from our military, and other Americans? Was there any disquiet about this that you know of?

DEAN: At this point, I ran afoul of the same CIA guy who had advised me to stick with the Ukrainian assassin to find out more about his backup. This time it was the Gehlen organization that we had taken over. I knew that from my own experience with the more democratic German officers who were selecting senior officers for the new German forces that Gehlen had a bunch of real villains within. I complained about this myself to the senior officers of the political section and they were worried about it. Then I had an interview with other senior CIA officials, including Richard Helms, later head of the CIA, who said we've got to do this and tried to explain the possibilities. But there was still a good deal of friction because of this issue.

Q: You might explain what the Gehlen organization was.

DEAN: The Gehlen organization was the military intelligence structure of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front against the Soviet Union which was taken over more or less intact by the United States and acted as a resource for it during the Cold War because of its great knowledge of the Soviet army. The action was understandable but the objections were also understandable. But to return to your original question, the main objections that I encountered to the rearming of Germany were from the Germans themselves and that was very violent. Part of my job was doing the Bundestag reporting and I covered all of the debates, including the opposition by the Social Democrats to the rearming.

Q: We want to cut off about now. Were there any other things you were dealing with in Germany before we move on because I would like to put it at the end of this so we will know if there are some other things we should cover in Germany?

DEAN: I stayed there for the next three-four years working on the military buildup and doing the domestic political reporting about all of the treaties that brought Germany into NATO and formally ended the occupation. I went back there in '68 right at the time of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia and of the Brandt Ostpolitik, that is what I did.

Q: We'll pick this one up and leave it about '53 or '54 and we'll still cover the time that you were a political officer in Bonn. We've talked about the early dealings with the new Germany army and developing the Bundestag Germany army relationship and all. The next time we will pick up some of the treaties bringing Germany into NATO, the end of the sort of full power of the German government, about repressions of Comrade Adenauer and how we looked at that. During this mid-'50s time we might also talk about

East Berlin and in '53 there were some disturbances.

DEAN: There was an uprising in East Berlin among the workers.

Q: Today is the 16th of September 1997. We are still in Germany. You were in Germany from when to when in this particular time?

DEAN: Until 1956.

Q: Let's talk about some of the occurrences. There was the East Berlin uprising in '53 which was a workers uprising wasn't it?

DEAN: Yes it was but it was not very large scale.

Q: As I remember, I was a GI and I was confined to barracks in Darmstadt during this time. I was in the air force and we weren't quite sure what was going to happen but it was enough to cause concern. How was it viewed from Bonn?

DEAN: Some dissatisfied workers demonstrated and were repressed by Soviet tanks. In Bonn I remember discussing this with John Paton Davies who was the political counselor then. We thought it was a demonstration that the East German system could not hold and that some of the things that Adenauer and others had been saying about the magnetic attraction of West Germany, Western Europe, western culture, on the East would be vindicated. Of course he and those of us who felt that way were right. But it was a very long time before that became evident.

Q: Was it a case of sort of the embassy mobilizing to think that maybe there might be something more to this than just a workers uprising and this might gather momentum and might cause us a problem?

DEAN: No, the events didn't appear to have that potential. There were pleas for help that we failed to do anything about, which reminds one of the much more dramatic circumstances in Hungary in 1956.

Q: You're talking about October of '56. Were you there at that point?

DEAN: No, I was here in Washington and I was having dinner at the German minister's house with Walter Lippman and Lady Barbara Salt who was the British minister at that point. There was a dramatic confrontation between the two.

Q: We'll come back to that later on if it's pertinent. What were the amalgamation or the German joining of NATO, this happened during your time didn't it?

DEAN: Yes, definitely. In the early '50s, with the outbreak of the Korean War, the

conclusion was reached in Washington and finally with the German leadership that there would have to be a rearming of Germany. It was feared then that there would be a worldwide military conflict. Actually we got some hints of that possibility as I was a resident officer in the early '50s in Limburg on the Lahn because our Ukrainian gardener who still lived in a refugee camp was subverted by a traveling KGB operative to prepare for arrival of the Red Army by assassinating us and the other few Americans who were in the town of Limburg on the Lahn. The Korean War cast its shadow, a personal shadow, on us. The fledgling CIA representative whom I knew pretty well said this was marvelous, just string along with this effort, and he would be able to find out who was behind it.

Q: Were you involved in any of the manufacturing of the treaty, negotiating the treaty and if you were could you talk about some of the issues that concerned us?

DEAN: I was involved in trying to get the German parliament to vote for the enabling legislation for ratification of the London and Paris treaties which returned a good deal of sovereignty to Germany and were the basis for German entry into NATO. Several years preceding that there had been strong efforts to get a European Defense Force, EDF, which would have had been an integrated force of the kind that you find in today's Franco- German corps, but associated with NATO and an important component of a future European Union, which I more or less automatically supported as the logical answer to the wars of the past. This was conceived as a way of making German rearmament more palatable and acceptable to Frenchmen and other Europeans. Right up to 1954, after a lot of ups and downs, it appeared that there would be some chance of that but under the government of Mendes-France, the French parliament finally turned it down, by making clear that they were not going to vote positively. So we had to go into high gear to bring German acceptance of an alternative agreement providing for their direct entry into NATO.

Germany held out then for the return of more sovereignty than the three allies were willing to give it. The net result was a very contentious group of laws and treaties. The Free Democrat, in coalition with Konrad Adenauer's Christian Democrats, split in half over this, with part of them voting for these treaties and part opposing. We had day-to-day dealings with two of those who were willing to vote for the treaties: the minister of housing, Emanuel Preusker, and a second leader, Euler, as well as Erich Mende. I remember one dramatic moment in which we assured them that the French parliament would vote on this positively and told them that to the best of our knowledge, that they had in fact done so. This later turned out to be incorrect, but in the meanwhile this group of Free Democrats joined the CDU and voted the treaty in, so I guess insufficient information was at the basis of this positive outcome.

Q: What were the objections of the members of the FDP that split off?

DEAN: Even those that supported the treaty represented a national interest viewpoint. They questioned whether Germany was getting enough, whether German rights were going to be respected, whether sufficient German sovereignty was being returned. The

opposition group carried these views further. The political future of the pro-CDU faction seemed very much to be on the line. In fact, Preusker, housing minister in the Adenauer cabinet, dropped out of circulation fairly soon thereafter, branded as an excessive collaborator with Adenauer.

Q: Adenauer remained didn't he?

DEAN: He stayed for many years, that is right. But the Free Democrats underwent one of their continuing divisions which comes from their position in the narrow terrain between Christian Democrats and Social Democrats. Even today they are either splitting up or on the verge of disappearance but still surviving.

Q: What about the SPD, the Social Democratic Party, where were they?

DEAN: From the outset they had been very strong opponents of German rearmament. They thought it was socially wrong, politically wrong, morally wrong. At this time, after the death of Kurt Schumacher, they were led by Erich Ollenhauer, a round faced, very pleasant quiet man, not at all charismatic. Yet he contributed to organizing a democratic constructive opposition in a very important way. Anyhow, the Social Democrats did have demonstrations, many of them, and they did vote consistently against the treaty. It wasn't until some years later under the impetus of Herbert Wehner, whom I was seeing quite a bit in those days, that they finally reconciled themselves to German membership in NATO and accepted it as desirable. Today, in 1999, the Social Democrats are pushing for NATO enlargement, so they have come a long way.

Q: Were we giving, I don't want to use a basketball term of a full court press, but were we pushing the Social Democrats at all from our embassy or did we just consider they aren't going to vote for it so let's work on others?

DEAN: The latter was the case, but we were surely pushing all the potential votes for the treaties - and thus for the German Army. There were a few Free Democrats like Thomas Dehler, the one-time minister of justice, who were very much for reconciliation with the Soviet Union. They feared with the Social Democrats that German membership in NATO would destroy for all time any possibility of peaceful German reunification. The stakes were very high for many people and that is the reason in part why the Free Democrats wouldn't vote for the treaties and why the others were on tenterhooks because of the pressures brought to bear on them. The Social Democrats were very strong proponents of the view that not only were the treaties wrong, but would end prospects for German unification. Of course, later on, they became the agents of a policy of reconciliation which enabled German unification, in my view, but that was still in the distant future.

Q: What was our reading on Konrad Adenauer at that time? How did he fit with our policy and our working with him and all?

DEAN: I didn't have a great deal to do with him since I was too junior at that point but I did participate in meeting in groups with him. He was revered, respected and he sometimes exasperated our own leaders, but he knew what he wanted. He always

explained clearly what he wanted and we were committed to supporting him. There were moments of friction, but the overall relationship was never in question.

Q: What about the French at that time? You mentioned that they weren't voting as we had hoped they would regarding NATO; what was the view from the lower ranks of the political section about the French?

DEAN: The French believed then and for many years to come that the best means of dealing with Germany was repression. They seemed to have the view of the First World War occupation still in their minds. As a Resident Officer, my district was right next to the French occupation zone so I had something to do with the French resident officer, Commandant Roquefeuille. He was a Gaullist and had a large group around him of the people who played very important roles in domestic politics afterwards, and I met them through him. Members of this group were always advocates of control and fearful of losing control and that the United States would be gulled by the Germans into unwise relaxation. This was a very different view from the embrace-them view of Robert Schuman.

Q: Were we seeing any glimmers of Adenauer's desire to really embrace the French which came later if I recall, as far as seeing that the French-German relationship was sort of the key to everything?

DEAN: Adenauer did speak of it often and of course the historical record was there that as a Zentrum Party representative he had spoken of a kind of separate status for the Rhineland like that of the Saar. He was in fact absolutely devoted to the idea of reconciliation with France and it was in that period that the Coal and Steel Community and the Schuman Plan got under way; while German cooperation with the United States was on a clear rational basis, they invested enormous amounts of emotional, political, and economic capital in their effort to reconcile with France. I remember Albrecht Krause who ran a network of youth exchanges. Germans were really committed, and remained committed, and developed a kind of partnership with the French government which in fact made the main decisions for the emerging European community then and in the future. This despite our own more skeptical view of the French.

Q: One of the latent motifs of our foreign policy and particularly among the professional diplomats has been a certain skepticism about the stand of the French and almost a dismissal that the French are always going to be on the other side. Did you find this developing among your political officer corps?

DEAN: This was a very familiar attitude then and I guess I shared it after the very serious disappointment that we all had with the failure of the European Defense Force which many thought was going to be a lead element in European integration. I think we can see now that military integration tends to follow integration of other kinds. But at that time, we hoped for a big breakthrough and the French were regarded as antiquated and not modern in their thinking, inflexible, and so forth. Later, in the Bonn Group and in the Berlin talks, I experienced other difficulties with the French who were perhaps

understandably intent on maintaining their dwindling legal hold over Germany.

Q: What about the press corps, did you have any dealings with them while you were there?

DEAN: No, not at that time; I stayed out of their way.

Q: Were there any other areas that we ought to chat about while you were in Germany?

DEAN: At that time I did have a fairly recurrent relationship with Herbert Wehner who was the deputy chair of the Social Democrats. He had been the chairman of the German Communist Party in exile in Moscow. It was later revealed that he apparently fingered with the Russians some colleagues for imprisonment and execution. At that time he was suspected as still a communist by many of our people. But I found him, as I did later Egon Bahr, more a deeply convinced German nationalist than anything else and perhaps the leading exponent of that sentiment.

At any event, I was sent by my boss, political counselor John Davies, always an imaginative and insightful man, around to Wehner and other Germans who knew something about Russia. John Davies believed that the Germans had a long knowledge and deep acquaintanceship with Russia in enmity and in peacetime, and might have many insights not shared by U.S. experts. He sent me around to a whole collection of rather eminent German specialists on the Soviet Union of the old kind: Arthur Just, and Professor Schiller, an expert in Russian agriculture. I also used to visit Wehner and other Social Democrats who had that knowledge.

Q: You were saying that you were dealing with various people in the SPD.

DEAN: Yes, I had fairly close contacts with them, and I don't know if I mentioned the Bundestag trip to the United States?

Q: You may have but let's go through it just in case we haven't; we can always edit this.

DEAN: I suggested to the embassy and to Washington that we should help with the German defense legislation by inviting the German Defense Committee to the United States to see how we did this kind of thing, especially civilian help with control of the military. We were especially concerned that the new Germany Army be thoroughly controlled by civilians to avoid mistakes of the past. They asked me to be the guide for this group. We took a six week trip around the United States with the result that the members of the committee, who were at swords' points at the outset, were personally quite friendly with one another and able when they got back to cooperate on this legislation. One of the participants was Fritz Ehler, who was the Social Democrat. He was to emerge as the leader and renovator of the party, opening the way to their ultimate takeover of government under Willy Brandt. He insisted on the acceptance of NATO, acceptance of capitalism, of the free market economy, and generally a very modern, Social Democrat today. Unfortunately he died of leukemia in his mid-50s. He had been a

political prisoner under the Nazis and was put in one of these penal battalions forced to attack very tough military positions.

Q: Did you find that there was difficulty in presenting the SPD to the American political establishment? I mean if you're simply called Christian and Democratic Union, this is a nice name, but Social Democrats is socialist implied.

DEAN: True. They had a very low standing and there was a great deal of suspicion about them. Of course this was the period of McCarthyism and I don't know if we discussed that but it had very strong reverberations in Bonn, very strong.

Q: Again it has been some time, what were the reverberations?

DEAN: Among other things they forced the resignations of our Deputy High Commissioner and of a couple of our USIA officers, including Ted Kaghan. This was the work of Cohn and Shine.

Q: That lovely comic duo from McCarthy's committee.

DEAN: Yes, exactly. They were a really revolting pair but people would quaver in fear of them. They caused the resignation of our assistant high commissioner, Samuel Reber, and of the consul general in Munich, Charles Thayer. In the latter's case, they got his medical records through the head of the medical service of the State Department and used them as leverage against him. They were a very damaging gang and they were not stopped by Secretary Dulles or anyone.

Q: It was not one of the best times of American diplomacy.

DEAN: My boss then, he's dead now, Elim O'Shaughnessy, told me that they came to him even as he was recovering from a stomach ulcer operation and asked him questions about his relationship when he was posted in Egypt with Ambassador Caffery.

Q: This is Jefferson Caffery.

DEAN: Yes, I gather his personal behavior may have been open to question, but he was a skilled professional. O'Shaughnessy was promoted a couple of times while serving with him, and so the security service idea was that O'Shaughnessy was affected by this, which of course was ridiculous. But this was really pervasive.

Q: Yes, this was an extremely difficult time.

DEAN: My boss, John Paton Davies, whom the Department had sent to Bonn because it could not get Senate confirmation for an embassy for him because of his involvement in China.

Q: He was the DCM under I guess Patrick Hurley wasn't he?

DEAN: Yes. We had also another officer a little bit later, Ray Ludden, who was consul general in Dusseldorf, also another China hand. That's when I joined the American Civil Liberties Union, because nobody was protecting these people and they were all fair game. These gunmen would come into town like Roy Cohn and Shine and destroy the whole embassy.

Q: It does not reflect well on basically President Eisenhower and on Dulles.

DEAN: It was a time of fear, consternation and misery; I remember it very sharply.

Q: Were we concerned about dealing with the Germans and also even within our own embassy with Soviet penetration?

DEAN: I didn't hear much about that then, but I did later. Of course Cohn and Shine and McCarthy were very much aware of this issue. It wasn't until the '70s, when I started negotiating in Vienna that I became aware of this activity in pretty lurid detail. Our own delegation was penetrated. Yet, overall it didn't play a big role. Of course Cohn and Shine said that these people were affected by communist association. At that time, I had my first experiences with the CIA, because I was arguing against the hiring of certain officers who later turned out to be part of the Gehlen Organization.

Q: The Gehlen Organization being a German intelligence organization well versed on particularly the Soviet Union.

DEAN: It was actually the organization of the Wehrmacht which had been used to gather intelligence against Russian armed forces, which we then took over lock, stock and barrel and incorporated into our CIA system in Germany. I complained about it then and Richard Helms (whom I guess was in charge in Germany at that time) told me that I was mistaken in my appraisal of these characters and nothing bad would happen.

Q: The Korean War had started and we were really gearing up and rearming Germany and all, was there within our political section a hard look at closet Nazis and Nazi movements and concern about this at that time? This was only about eight years after the war.

DEAN: That's the subject I worked on in the High Commission for six months before going to Bonn after I was a resident officer. However it didn't seem that the percentage of these people in local or state or land elections would get much beyond five percent even though we were all afraid of it. Our people greatly feared that widespread unemployment in Germany would be a multiplier. Later, with unemployment rates of over 10% in the 1980s and '90s, it was demonstrated that didn't happen. There was the BHE, the Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten with Dr. Theodor Oberlander. This was a party of expellees from former German territories in the East, which looked rather threatening. However they were gradually absorbed by the Christian Democrats and some also by the Social Democrats, particularly some Sudeten Germans. In this way,

they were pretty well neutralized. However, these people held out as a separate party until the late '50s or '60s and always had to be paid off in one way or another. It was a real achievement of the German political system that it took in these refugees with a cause who were very often advocating very extreme action against Poland, Czechoslovakia and so on. The CDU neutralized them and made them democratic citizens.

Q: In contrast to the French dealing with the Pied Noir and then Algeria who had a much more difficult time including having an army revolt.

DEAN: Yes, an assassination attempt on DeGaulle. Today with le Pen in France, they have about 15 percent or so, while the neo-Nazis, Republikaner and so forth in Germany are still not much over five percent. That was part of a remarkable democratic achievement even though everybody was very fearful for many years, quite understandably after the Nazi experience, that something like it would arise again.

Q: Was there any discussion within the embassy of an eventual recognition of East Germany at that time?

DEAN: No, although that was a period of the Soviets proposing ever new foreign ministers conferences on Germany. Russia put forward a proposal for alleged free elections leading to German unification. Herbert Wehner and others told me they felt it was a serious mistake on our part not to have exposed this proposal by discussing it in more detail. That Soviet offer was followed by the Eden Plan in which the West put forward its version of free elections. But Western governments never really looked into the Soviet proposal, so it led a kind of sub-surface life as an opportunity for unification which had not been really tried and which had been missed.

The real fact of the matter was the Western countries, the United States, Britain, France, really didn't trust Germany and Germans enough at that stage to undertake what they considered to be a major risk of neutralization. That was the real red thread that went through Western policy at that time. They feared that, through astute Soviet policy, Germany would become neutralized and therefore Europe would not be any longer defensible and Russia would gain the dominant position, possibly militarily also. It was an overassessment of Soviet propaganda capabilities and of German gullibility.

Q: I know when I came into the Foreign Service, one of the things I heard in my first assignment in Frankfurt, was actually we were rather comfortable with a divided Korea and a divided Germany.

DEAN: Yes, considering the conditions under which we feared at that time Germany might be unified. That is a subject that I followed a lot, the German unity question, and various Russian offers, German responses, what the Social Democrats were saying about it, and so forth. Usually the Social Democrats were more impressed than the Christian Democrats were.

Q: Was our embassy making any recommendations at that time? You say you were

looking at these offers that were coming through at that time.

DEAN: I always urged that we go further in trying to discuss these proposals in order to expose them and to demonstrate that there was nothing behind them. But I don't think the embassy was going on record with Washington for much of that type of thing. It was decidedly unpopular at that point. The fear was that German opinion would become so impressed that they would force their own government to have these free elections under conditions of enforced neutrality for Germany and that we would in fact lose our position of control over Germany. Actually the apex, the peak of the Soviet propaganda effort directed against Germany, came in the early '70s in the controversy over the IMF Treaty and the SS-20 missiles and the new Pershing deployment, when they did get a million demonstrators out on the streets in support of what was the then Soviet position.

Q: You left Germany in '56. The date in '56 is kind of important because a lot of things were happening in '56. You left when in '56?

DEAN: In the summer of '56.

Q: All hell broke loose in October of '56 both in the Suez crisis and the Hungarian uprising. Where did you go? What was your assignment?

DEAN: I went to the Bureau of German Affairs and I was working on East German matters. I was the East German desk officer for the next couple of years.

Q: Did you see a different perspective of Germany, and particularly East Germany, from the way you had been looking at it in Bonn when you got back to Washington because of the climate in the Department of State or in Washington?

DEAN: Yes. It was a big shift from immersion in German domestic politics to the considerations of operating a big establishment in Germany. I was awfully shaken by the inaction of the United States at the time of the Hungarian uprising and experienced the drama of that just by chance at a dinner at the German embassy with Walter Lippman and Lady Barbara Salt in which he attacked her for Suez and so forth. Of course it was clear that Suez distracted the attention of the Eisenhower government and it responded, in my view, inadequately to the Hungarian uprising, although the dangers of pressing the Soviets too far was also clear. I thought that they had left these people in the lurch, as many Hungarians did. Anyhow, it was a very sad awakening but the '53 repression in Germany and what the U.S. failed to do in Hungary led me to the conclusion that the Soviet and communist system was now relatively firmly established in Eastern Europe and that the way to deal with it was with what I then called a policy of engagement, something like what we much later applied to relations with South Africa in the apartheid period, and that's what I argued, and that working for a time for the Soviet desk, we prepared the failed Paris summit.

Q: This was while you were on the German desk, you moved over to the Soviet desk?

DEAN: I was on loan over there. We prepared the Paris summit, the one which was

destroyed through the shooting down of Powers with the U-2 aircraft.

Q: This was in '60?

DEAN: Yes.

Q: Khrushchev did not meet with Eisenhower. They both went to Paris but...

DEAN: I think they did meet but it was just a violent exchange. A good part of the problem was that Vice President Nixon commenting on the over-flight said, "Yes we did it and we'll continue to do it." That seemed to me to burn the iron deeper and to make it rather definite that nothing came of that particular meeting.

Q: Going back, something I did not mention while you were in Germany in '55, did the Austrian Peace Treaty have any reverberations? This was the neutralization essentially of Austria and the withdrawal of all our Allied and Soviet forces from there. Did that have any reverberations in Germany at the time or was it just considered a unique situation?

DEAN: In Germany, among those who believed that it was permissible to neutralize Germany as a price for unification, it had considerable impact, but the skepticism about the Soviet Union and Soviet behavior was extremely strong. There was however an organization called Indivisible Germany, Unteilbares Deutschland, headed by Wilhelm Wolfgang Schutz, who was quite a skilled and intelligent publicist. He went around the country arguing in a very discreet way, restrained way, for what amounted to neutrality in the Austrian pattern. He did get some support. Our people feared that there would be more support.

Q: While you were on the German desk looking at East Germany, what were you seeing about development in East Germany at that time?

DEAN: My main job was a rather unproductive one of preventing East German membership in international organizations. I thought that our mistake in the Hungarian uprising had been to deal with the people only, and that we should expand our dealings to include the communist hierarchy and actually wrestle with them intellectually. In the long run I felt we would be able to undermine their intellectual adherence to communism, move them to relax their control, and would in that way emerge victorious. I believe that's the process which did take place but I was arguing for it as a policy.

Q: When you got back to Washington we were still in the Eisenhower administration albeit with a Democratic Congress. The normal course of diplomacy is to talk with the other side and to try to reach agreement and all. Did you find that positions had hardened, things had so frozen in place that the political climate was that this just wasn't going to work very much?

DEAN: As you know, President Eisenhower went to the surprise attack conference in

Geneva and made the open skies proposal. He was continuously making efforts to break the logjam with the Soviets, but this was not visible to the public. It looked like we would be locked into position for a long time to come. That is why I suggested we deal with the leadership, instead of the attempt in which we had been engaged since the communist takeover of undermining the legality of these regimes and having as little as possible to do with them, hoping they would be swept away. This approach did culminate in the Hungarian uprising although its causes were more complicated. I suggested that the outcome of Hungary demonstrated that the Warsaw Pact system was going to be there for a long time so we might as well become more insidious and more refined in our approach.

Q: You talking the Hungarian uprising, here the uprising was mainly led by really rather young people who had had 10 years under sort of Soviet indoctrination.

DEAN: And by renegade nationalist communists.

Q: For those who were thinking about this beyond just the Cold War, were they thinking the system isn't really taking there and maybe there is something we can do with it?

DEAN: That's what I thought, but we failed the Hungarians. And we failed in the case of the Berlin Wall in August of '61 to take energetic action against them. In hindsight, it is understandable and probably correct that we would not intervene or risk military intervention. It was demonstrated that the Soviets were willing to engage in military intervention. Hence their hold over the area in the military sense was not going to be contested and would continue. Therefore, how could we work on a long-term basis to undermine their hold over the area? It seemed to me that the only way to do that was through a system of deliberate contacts not with only the general population, but with the regimes themselves in an attempt to change them over a period of time. That is why I applied for Czech language training and got assigned to Czechoslovakia in 1960.

Q: Here you were still a relatively junior mid-career officer on the German desk, did you find you were able to engage in intellectual discussions within the desk?

DEAN: Not much. My two immediate bosses were Jacques Reinstein, whom I still see around here. He is a nice guy but he was as a bureaucrat; a bureaucrat who was able in my opinion to take the simplest issue and make it complex. The other was Eleanor Dulles who was a very salty lady whom I saw during many years. We had a good personal relationship, but she was very arbitrary and threatened to summon her brothers, John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles, to her assistance at the drop of a hat. However, there was Leon Fuller on the policy planning staff, a very deep reflective mind, who did encourage me to think in other terms. The Soviet desk officer, a bluff character, Jack McSweeney, was also surprisingly subtle in his thinking. They after all considered the Russians to be humans and not cardboard figures. They were always figuring ways of trying to influence them in a positive constructive way.

Q: Eleanor Dulles was known throughout the State Department through administration

after administration as the Berlin desk officer.

DEAN: Indeed yes.

Q: How did you find her on Berlin and was there a problem?

DEAN: She wouldn't hear anything of discussion with Eastern governments and was mainly interested in the symbolism of the U.S. support for Berlin. In this way I ended up on one occasion writing a speech for Chief Justice Warren on the eternal principles of justice.

Q: This was Earl Warren?

DEAN: Yes. I suggested that Chief Justice Warren be one of the figures to go to Berlin to show the flag and to demonstrate continuing American interests. He consented to do so and picked me up in his huge Cadillac and took me over to the Supreme Court to discuss details of the trip. I was very impressed and told him that I assumed that he would want to write the speech himself or perhaps his staff. He said, "Nothing of the sort. You invited me, you write it," meaning the State Department. I went back to the Department and went all the way down the ladder of the various legal advisors and Dick Kearney, Jack Raymond, a whole bunch of them all with experience in Germany, but I ended up as the desk officer writing the speech. I put in a quote from George Herbert, an English metaphysical poet, from a poem called "The Pulley." In any case, Earl Warren thought that was far too highfalutin. Nonetheless, he gave the speech and it is in his collected speeches -- principles of eternal justice and how they would win out in Berlin and so forth.

Q: For everyone who has dealt with the world as a professional diplomat for almost the entire Cold War, Berlin has always stood as probably THE place where World War III could start, particularly an uprising in East Berlin followed by the West Germans maybe feeling they couldn't see their brothers die there and they might go in. That seemed to be the scenario.

DEAN: Or the Russians would finally block our military access and so forth, yes.

Q: During this time that you were on the German desk, did we have contingency plans? How were we feeling about this?

DEAN: Oh yes. There was in NATO a whole section (General Lemnitzer worked on it for quite some time) called Live Oak and they had high level exercises of breaking through militarily which came to a head after I was in Czechoslovakia with the construction of the Berlin Wall in August of '61. Yes, it was continually feared that our prestige and our support for West Germany would be placed into question by some Russian blockage of the access and of course the problem was that in the immediate post-war period, agreements were reached about military access to West Berlin for British, French and American troops. But there were no agreements about access of German

civilians. It was assumed, I guess, that movement from all parts of Germany would be at a low level. When West Germany was separated from East Germany and became the enemy, then of course access to and from Berlin, civilian access as well as visits to East Berlin by West Berliners with relatives there and West Germans with relatives there, became a very important issue. But that's moving up in time a little bit.

Q: At the time that you were on the German desk, one of the threats that hung over everyone that the Soviets used all the time was that they were going to sign a peace treaty with East Germany.

DEAN: That's what Khrushchev did threaten in the '61 crisis.

Q: But prior to that, that had also been a threat hadn't it?

DEAN: Yes, sure.

Q: Why was that of concern to us?

DEAN: That was of acute concern because the fear was that the East Germans, who were regarded as unrestrained, adventurous and without the restraint which the possibility of nuclear war gave the American-Soviet relationship, would pull some stunt like cutting off access to Berlin. It would then put both the Soviet Union and the United States at loggerheads with one another and possibly cause a conflict. That's why we viewed possible East German control with great concern.

Q: How did we view the East German government which was then under Walter Ulbricht? How did we view him and his government at that time?

DEAN: We regarded them as creatures of the Soviet system but also as people that wanted to build up their own status. Their intelligence activities in West Germany were beginning to be revealed and of course they were enormous, extending into the chancellor's office at the time of Willy Brandt. Every week there was a new secretary from the German NATO delegation who was compromised by some East German gigolo sent over by Marcus Wolfe.

Q: It did seem that the East Germans were providing the female secretarial staff of NATO with comforts that...

DEAN: That was Marcus Wolfe's policy and it's showing in his memoirs these days. I met him in a conference in Berlin. He is a very tall affable fellow.

Q: What was your impression or analysis of the East German government as far as their subservience to the Soviets? Was it complete or was there an independent streak that was showing at all at that time?

DEAN: Very rarely, they would act independently. It later transpired when we were

doing the Berlin negotiations they acted plenty independent so there was a good deal of this action going on below the surface that we didn't see at that time in terms of trying to get their own status, and so forth. Of course actually each of these Warsaw Pact members was very vigorously trying to do that, Ceausescu most ostentatiously in Romania.

Q: Again going back to this '56 to '60...

DEAN: Yes, it all seemed rather mechanical without the real life antagonists either in East Germany or in Moscow. Things were going on but at that point Ulbricht was consolidating his position and it looked pretty helpless there as well as elsewhere.

Q: While you were on the German desk, did the Hallstein Doctrine begin to emerge or had it emerged?

DEAN: It was just being developed because I think it was only applied once against Yugoslavia which did recognize East Germany as a separate state. It was just emerging because we as allies of Germany were loyally and fairly effectively doing what my job was; I tried to keep East Germans out of international organizations briefing American scientists going to this and that who were often bemused by these considerations to vote against allowing East Germany to become a member. It is true that the East Germans were getting individual breakthroughs at that time – time was on their side -- and the opinion was crystallizing that they would probably establish themselves as an independent state. This in actuality didn't happen until the early '70s but it was on the way.

Q: I think just for the record could you explain what the Hallstein Doctrine was?

DEAN: The Hallstein Doctrine was named after the secretary of state in the Foreign Ministry, Walter Hallstein, who argued that Federal Germany should sever its political and economic relations with any state which recognized East Germany as an independent country. The ceaseless effort of the Soviet Union especially after the Hungarian uprising was to try to gain international acceptance of these states as ongoing independent, sovereign states and to consolidate its hold over Eastern Europe in this way. They reached their point of success in the '70s with the entry of the two German states into the United Nations and of course as they reached their success, the pronounced decline of the system also began.

Q: On the German desk, what was your concern on the desk about the lack of essentially a Berlin Wall? In other words there was a hemorrhaging of East Germans going into Berlin and then moving into the West through there.

DEAN: That is definitely so.

Q: What was the view about the situation (this was prior to the Berlin Wall) about how this was working and how long could it be tolerated by the East Germans?

DEAN: They were clearly losing their intellectual cream and of course West Germany was receiving the refugees, taking care of them, and actually subsidizing them. That was a condition which actually continued right up until nearly the time of unification. It was a good deal for these individuals because they received economic help from the West German government but it did place in question the success of the system, not its hold over the situation but its economic and social success, and that definitely was open to question.

Q: Was there thought about how this situation in Berlin can't last and something is going to happen, i.e., there is going to be the equivalent to a wall or something, and what happens if it does happen? Were you thinking in those terms?

DEAN: I don't think anybody did think of a wall then. At least I hadn't heard at that time that they were thinking of a wall and that the East Germans might respond in that way though we had continuing trouble. They had very strong police guards and so forth so you couldn't get through anyhow. A number of people, refugees, did come but it wasn't easy. Anybody that got permission always had to leave their families behind. I guess the East German regime itself recognized more clearly than anyone else the damage that was being done to their economic and social fabric by this lesion.

Q: While you were on the desk were you in consultation with or dealing with the CIA and how did you classify what you were getting from the CIA if you were?

DEAN: We got some political reports on German domestic developments but I never felt that these reports, which came from similar sources to ours - and ours were freely given - did much more than duplicate embassy reporting on this score. That's my conclusion over the entire period. Occasionally you would get something about Russia that was different. The main information problem then, and I am sure it is still the case, was there was a huge amount of material that you had to read. It used to pile up on my desk there and I never got through it completely, but still one felt an obligation.

Q: I think one of the themes as we do these oral histories is the use of CIA material, one obviously the accuracy but the other is one of the major reasons for collecting this data is to have something for policy makers to use. Here you were at the working level and it sounds like you really didn't have time to deal with it.

DEAN: And what I looked at I considered repetitious. They did have very heavy coverage of Germany, understandable because Germany was considered to be extremely important to the United States. What they would cover, politicians that we were dealing with on a day-to-day open basis and try to establish some kind of relationship with them and then produce from them reports which were about the same as what we were producing ourselves. This is what I saw particularly when I was doing German domestic politics in the early '50s. I felt that the CIA were wasting their money there.

Q: I think that this is a theme again that seems to run through that there is an awful lot of repetition and most of the intelligence was available by using the press and by

conversations and contacts by normal diplomats.

DEAN: It's my view that German political leaders were quite open and if you yourself were informed enough to pose the right question then you usually got an answer. Of course you could see enough of them to check one off against the other and get a pretty good picture. Yes, I never saw much benefit from CIA's domestic reporting.

Q: What about Congress? As you were dealing with Germany did you find any members of Congress or any issues that particularly the desk can't deal with as we do in some other countries where you have interest groups and all?

DEAN: Not too many, at least I didn't see those because the East German issues were kind of cut off from that. We still had the House Un-American Activities Committee with its occasional forays. I was reminded of that because we had with us Ray Ludden, who was quartered with us in the East German section some time after he came back from Dusseldorf; he was one of the China hands they were after.

Q: Although the German-Americans are almost pervasive within the United States there wasn't a German lobby as there is say a Polish lobby, an Irish lobby, Jewish lobby?

DEAN: No, in fact it was notorious for its absence.

Q: One of the great pleasures.

DEAN: We got a lot of congressional correspondence but it was not of an unusual sort of ethnic type.

Q: Let me just put at the very end here, is there anything else we should cover on this German desk period?

DEAN: No, I don't think so. I went to language training and then went to Czechoslovakia and then to the Congo.

Q: Let's talk about Czech training. You started that when?

DEAN: I started that in the fall of 1960.

Q: We're talking about starting as usually after Labor Day in the fall of '60. We'll pick it up then.

DEAN: It was excellent language instruction. Actually even today, I meet Mike Newlin's wife who was our instructor then. He was a Foreign Service office. She was very good. The other instructor was Mrs. Pacok, wife of one of the earliest Czech foreign service defectors; she too was first rate.

Q: Today is the 13th of January, 1998. You took Czech. Was this for the usual ten months or something like that?

DEAN: Yes, it was nine or ten months. As I mentioned to you, I had developed this theory of the policy of engagement with the leadership of the communist countries. My thought was that up to that time we had maintained that the regimes in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact governments, were illegal and non-representative, which of course they were, and that we would have minimum relations with them. At the same time, we tried to maintain as broad a relationship as we could with their subject populations but this was increasingly difficult and it looked as though we were in for the long haul. My argument was that we should also have a policy of engagement with the leadership and that if we did we would probably undermine the intellectual attachment of the small number of them that were true believers in the system and in this way generally soften up the situation. This would mean a more deliberate effort to have contacts with regime representatives.

Q: When you were taking Czech, were you getting an equivalent to area studies, consultations with the desk? Were you sounding out and getting what the situation was in both Czechoslovakia and our relations with Czechoslovakia in 1960 and 1961?

DEAN: Some, but the area studies was not very heavily developed. I was doing a lot of reading of Czech history and the background of the current situation. I was also going over to the desk every once in a while and reading telegrams.

Q: You went out there when?

DEAN: It must have been the summer of '61. I was the first secretary there for economic and political issues.

Q: You were there how long?

DEAN: Two years from '61 to '63.

Q: What was the situation in Czechoslovakia in 1961 when you arrived?

DEAN: Czechoslovakia was the last holdout of Stalinism and they even had a statue of Stalin still intact. Anton Novotny, the party head, was an old line Stalinist and they did not permit even a slight movement or change. That spring when we arrived, or perhaps the spring thereafter, they had a traditional May Day celebration which people recited a poem called Queten, or May. This was certainly not an active resistance but they were able to get six or eight student together for this purpose. The regime was so thoroughly oppressive that they really couldn't get off the ground. Yet it was these celebrations which in the Dubcek era became the focus of the Prague Spring.

Q: Were you at the embassy following this type of modern dissidence at all?

DEAN: We tried to but the fact of the matter was that we were in relative isolation because of comprehensive police coverage. Every individual or person that we talked to was picked up and interrogated by the police. A few were permitted to have dealings with us, but reported to the police. I knew one musician who was also a curator of organs in the churches of the country and I went around with him on the clear understanding on my part that he was probably giving a summary of everything we said to the authorities.

They had 14 men in the United States section of the secret police and I got to know them all. One reason for this was that they had one portable motion picture camera that they used with us. It was in a blue plastic case and they passed it on from team to team as they took over the surveillance, so we gradually recognized them all. One time I attempted to get a man, who had come into the embassy apparently without being seen, out of the embassy. We sent out 12 cars in a row. I figured that would take them all away but our first car came back too soon. I dropped him on a bridge and they did pick him up. It was a complete police state.

I had a Czech language teacher, very capable. He had a police permit, but after a while they arrested him. They forced him to appear on a monthly television program about American spies to say that I tried to suborn him into espionage. He didn't cooperate very well with them so they removed him from his job as a secondary school teacher and put him on a road-building gang with some former priests. They took his own children out of secondary school and put them into trade school.

Q: Was it ever a matter of speculation at the embassy of why did the Czechs seem to be both so hard line and really basically quite effective as sort of the nasties in this Cold War business?

DEAN: They were the nasties and I remember that our desk officer was a particularly objectionable unpleasant man who jumped on the United States whenever possible. I remember him insulting Dean Rusk at an interview at the UN about Vietnam after I came back. Nevertheless, he turned up a few years later as one of the leaders of the Prague Spring. My theory about a policy of engagement might have been OK, but I never was really able to carry it out. I remember trying to contact a local district leader. He did finally see me but it was the last time I was able to do that. The Foreign Ministry sent us a message asking us not to disturb local officials in their work.

Q: Who was the ambassador at this time?

DEAN: We had two ambassadors. Christian Ravndal was the ambassador at the time I arrived. He had had the most ambassadorial posts in the service. There was a change of administration in Washington at the time. As was the custom, he submitted his resignation and was told that he should continue owing to his sterling record. Low and behold, about six weeks later in the middle of the night the telegram comes in, "You are hereby relieved," and so forth. He took it very hard and we had to try to help him, console him in this matter. Anyhow, he retired to Vienna, Austria where his wife had

been a concert pianist and he was trying to make it up to her by getting her back in her own milieu. Edward Wailes, who had been the director general of the Foreign Service became ambassador, though we had a considerable interregnum before he arrived.

Q: With both Ravndal and Wailes, how did they relate to the idea of you almost want to say constructive engagement or whatever?

DEAN: I think Ravndal agreed with it but he wasn't able to do much with it. He did perform in an extremely courageous way but was this was later toward the end of his tour in the Congo. Lumumba was deposed and shipped to the Katanga and died as a result of mistreatment en route I think. In all of the Warsaw Pact countries, there were very big demonstrations and we had an enormous demonstration in Prague.

They turned out all of the foreign students from the local university. They were organized by my friends from the secret police whom I could see loitering on the edges of the crowd. The student leader was a redheaded Argentinean. They came over the walls of our compound, pulled down the U.S. flag from the gloriotta, a little summer house in the back and crowded into the narrow triangular place in front of the entrance of the Schoenborn palace, which had been bought by Mr. Crane, the first American ambassador to Czechoslovakia after World War I - he was a personal friend of Thomas Masaryk - and presented the building to the U.S. government.

Our ambassador went out in the street alone and talked to these kids who were yelling, shouting and so forth. He spoke very good Spanish and spoke for a long time with the leader. He convinced the leader that his action was not worthy of a caballero, and that he should return the American flag to us. He actually convinced this kid to do that. The young fellow left, and went down the street with his group. They never returned because I saw the police closing in on him and so forth. It was a remarkable, unsung act of personal courage and genuine diplomacy on the part of Ambassador Ravndal.

Q: About this time I was in Yugoslavia and we were able to travel all over the country. We covered it like a blanket going to every little hamlet practically, calling on communist officials and all. I take it that this was not in the offing for you?

DEAN: I did travel to every okres, every single county, of Czechoslovakia. Day after day in traveling around -- I usually did it on a sort of art history or historical basis -- I was followed. The local United Nations representative, a man named Arnost Bares, told me that he was free of this surveillance and didn't have that problem. He invited us out to a place he had outside of town. We went out there and I observed that we were followed as always. However, we went into his house, sat down at the table, and started to talk. At one point, I looked up and in front of every ground floor window looking into the room there was a policeman looking in intently. That of course was very discouraging for Mr. Bares and it was the last time I think I ever saw him.

I would go along the road and pick up someone thumbing for a ride and would observe after I dropped them off that they were being picked up. Even the very last night I was

there, our public affairs officer, a rather feisty bird, tore down a poster from the Communist Party election of 1948. The next day the Foreign Ministry made a protest to our Embassy that I had defaced and destroyed government property, so they were right behind us even on that last day.

Q: Were there efforts or concerns about being set up usually with women but sometimes just handing over plans or something like this, this type of thing?

DEAN: We did have a lot of walk-ins.

Q: Could you explain what a walk-in is?

DEAN: A walk-in is somebody just appearing from the street and asking to talk to an American official. We did have a lot of them and I usually talked to most of them since I did speak Czech. One day this young kid of about 18 came in. He smelled pretty bad. He said he had been sleeping out in the woods for the past three or four days. He had quite a story which I became convinced was true. He was from a non-communist family and had wanted to go to the music conservatory. He had tried several times and had been turned down on political grounds. He was assigned to a chemical factory in Ustinad Labem in northern Czechoslovakia. He kept pestering the personnel director there for a chance to compete for the music academy. One day he went in to see the director and they fell to wrangling and he pushed this man. The man fell down, hitting his head, and apparently was unconscious or dead. The boy pushed the body into a closet, left and took about three days to get down to Prague. He came to the embassy and told me about this. I thought it might be really an artificial affair. He gave me a violin to keep for him and said he was going to try to get out to an international youth meeting through East Germany. Against my better judgment and standing regulations I took his violin and wished him the best. Six months later two kids appeared, other walk-ins, and they asked for Mr. Violin. I finally got the signal and I talked to them. They were young students and I was convinced they were pretty genuine. They told me this young fellow had been caught trying to go to East Berlin and get out that way. He was now in prison and he wanted them to have his violin, so I gave it to them. That was a fairly harrowing exchange.

In another aspect, the Czech secret police had broken into our embassy from a neighboring house and had put wiring all over the apartment ceilings, listening devices. They had put a listening device in the fireplace of the ambassador; the one that was later shown I think by Cabot Lodge at the UN. That aspect of life pretty well dominated everything else. Our consular officer was picked up in a military restricted area and declared persona non grata. Approximately half the country was a military restricted area. Many of us had persona non grata insurance to cover this contingency.

Q: I've never heard of that before, what is it?

DEAN: Particularly with communist regimes, you could be arbitrarily picked out for retaliation or get thrown out. If you had spent a lot of money getting supplies together, buying a new car, etc., being assigned to a new post, you could be very heavily out of

pocket. There was a British insurance outfit that insured you for a small sum against modest losses for a premature PNG.

Q: You were both political and economic officer?

DEAN: Yes.

Q: Can you describe how you went about your business routinely? Let's do the political side first then we'll do the economic side.

DEAN: It was a question of reading four or five Czech papers, listening to the radio and television which was of very poor quality, seeing a wide range of other diplomats, talking to them and talking to an occasional Czech journalist who was permitted to have foreign contacts. I knew a guy from Rude Pravo, the main party newspaper, and I was occasionally able to see him. We would just sort of piece things together, relying on continuity and full exposure to provide some assessment of significance. The product was not very high quality stuff in my opinion; it couldn't be. Economic reporting was similar. We would get an idea of some development and then attempt to go see some ministry official and so forth. Our efforts were usually quite fruitless. I tried to sign up for an adult education course in Marxist ethics, thinking I might hear some complaints, but in the second session, they told me to leave.

Q: Were you involved in a way of the art of Kremlinology? Who was standing where in pictures and this, or was there really much of a need to do that?

DEAN: There wasn't too much need for this because Novotny was very clearly on top of the situation and there didn't seem to be any cracks in that situation. We had a big issue with Czech gold, which had been taken by the Allies from the Germans, many millions of dollars. We had repeated discussions about it with the Foreign Ministry. The desk officer there, Duda, was an extremely unpleasant character. Above him was this other man, Hayek, who later became a leader of the Prague Spring and of the velvet revolution. It really was pretty desperate. It was tough, but still it was fascinating and the effort of trying to push against the system to try to learn something about it and influence it, however minimally, was fascinating and most of us thought it was worthwhile. The America House library and film showings were, however, getting to quite a large number of people.

Q: Did you have any problems with American newspaper men getting in there or media people that couldn't get out or anything like that while you were there?

DEAN: No. I did know a Czech journalist who had been in prison for illegal efforts to get out (He was the son of Alphonse Mucha, a well-known artist of the art nouveau period), and I knew a young Czech artist who also had worked in a foundry turning out statues of Lenin. In his spare time, he made me a Madonna but he couldn't cast it in Prague without getting into severe trouble, so we took it out to Nuremberg and got it cast. No, we didn't have any American citizen problem of that kind. Most of the problems were from our own personnel getting detained and worries about that. There were worries about the

Czech personnel who were working for the embassy with police permission, but who often fell afoul of the secret police nonetheless.

Q: What about Czechs who were getting Social Security and other benefits? I would have thought there would have been a relatively sizable community.

DEAN: There was but you couldn't get around to see many of them. You did have an America House operation with films which did have a modest outreach but their audiences of 30-50 people were rather marginal in the Czech society and couldn't go down much further and therefore didn't mind whatever additional opprobrium they had. I don't think one can dredge out of that experience any very big nuggets so to speak, unfortunately. We were there and the Czechoslovak people knew we were there and that was perhaps the best side of it.

Q: When did you leave in '63?

DEAN: I left in '63 and I went directly to the Congo. As a matter of fact, my British colleague, the first secretary, named Derrick Dodson, was transferred to the Congo at this time. We all thought and said that he must have disgraced himself greatly in order to receive this posting in the bush in the midst of the Katanga secession and so forth. Fortunately, he was a former paratrooper and tough. We had a big farewell for him. I guess it was not two weeks later that I received the word that I had been transferred to the same place, to Elisabethville in the Katanga. I believe Ambassador Ravndal's son, Frank Ravndal, was working in personnel at the time. He said they were looking for somebody who would be relatively tough with the secessionist government and so they sent me there. I tried to expostulate that I didn't know anything about the Congo or anything that was going on. I was really thrown into a remarkable new situation with not much intellectual preparation. The only preparation I had was the riots after the death of Lumumba that we had in Prague.

Q: Before we leave Czechoslovakia, in sort of the discussions that you would have had around the embassy and all, how was the role of the Czechs in the Warsaw Pact seen? Were they seen as a competent military force that was going to add to a possible Soviet attack on the West or were they seen as sort of not a very reliable ally of the Soviets?

DEAN: The general assessment of the Czechs was quite low. They were considered to be subservient and not willing to fight. Much of this reputation derived from the events around Hitler's takeover of the Sudetenland when the army had failed to fight. The picture of the Good Soldier Schweik tricking but not resisting his Austrian masters was dominant. The Czechs had actually quite a good record in World War I when they had a Czech legion that went all the way to Vladivostok. However, they were regarded as subservient, non-troublemaking, and so on. I think people who followed the dealings of the COMECON, the committee that the Soviets had set up to coordinate the Warsaw Pact economies, found that the Czechs as well as several others were far from subservient and were always raising difficulties for the Soviets. But that was not evident to us. It was evident in the State Department when I did later have a chance to go back and talk to

people there.

Q: I was trying to nail this down at the beginning. You went to the Congo when and when did you leave?

DEAN: '62 to '64.

Q: When we are looking at things we should move it back. Rather than starting Czech in '60 you started in '59, so we'll just move that all back. How direct did you go to the Congo? Did you go through Washington?

DEAN: No. I got on a plane and went to what is now called Kinshasa. Ambassador Ed Gullion was in charge and he gave me about an hour talk on the subject which was fascinating new terrain for me. They then shipped me off to Elisabethville where I had a day's overlap with my predecessor.

Q: Who was that?

DEAN: Lewis Hoffacker. A very amiable fellow and I thought very knowledgeable. He apparently was regarded by some in Washington as being "too soft" on the Katangans. I had no way of evaluating such opinions. In any event, it developed that both Belgian government policy and American policy was completely disunified and operated by different groups. In the United States, we had G. Mennen Williams who was Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs with his principal deputy Wayne Fredericks, a very astute and goal directed man who knew what he wanted and was very much for African independence. We also had my later and also former boss George McGhee who was Under Secretary for Political Affairs and who thought that the group of people in Kinshasa were corrupt and the only Congolese leader of any stature was Moise Tshombe, who in his view was one of the few non-racist constructive people in Africa. Then we had Douglas MacArthur II, our ambassador in Brussels. He would call me up occasionally and give me his pitch on things. He too tended to feel that Tshombe was more promising than given credit for. The Social Democratic Belgian government was completely split. The industrial mining interests, Union Miniere, favored Tshombe, who was their creation. The Belgian government of Paul Henri Spaak supported the central government in Kinshasa in this situation where Katanga had seceded and declared its independence.

Q: What was the situation in Elisabethville when you arrived there in 1962?

DEAN: There had been one conflict, outright war, between the United Nations forces, which were in effect surrounded and beleaguered in Elisabethville, and the Katangan Gendarmerie. The latter were the remnants of the earlier Congolese armed forces – the Force Publique -- taken over by the Katangans. This force had retained some Belgian officers, and were much better disciplined, better paid than Congolese troops in the rest of the Congo. They were stiffened by quite a large contingent of European mercenaries. You had people who were quite well known later on: Mike Hoar was one, Robert Denard, a Frenchman who ended up in the Seychelles in the late '90s with an attempted

coup, a whole group of rather well known mercenaries. They had succeeded the past Christmas in defeating the UN's forces efforts to break out of the city.

The UN forces were composed mainly of an Indian brigade of dogra soldiers which was poorly led. The commander apparently took refuge in a dugout during the fighting. In any case, the outcome was that they were surrounded and penned up in the city. Subsequent to that a systematic program of insults to the UN forces took place. The Katangan equivalent of Nigerian market women beat up Indian UN soldiers and things of that kind. Shortly before I arrived, the UN had pulled out the dogra brigade and put in another very different one. The Indian army had been quite humiliated by the performance and put in troops with combat experience in the recent border war with China.

Two days after I arrived I was summoned at 4:00 in the morning by Madam Vermeulen, a red-headed Belgian and amateur parachutist who was Tshombe's secretary. Mme. Vermeulen told me that the president very much wanted to see me. I said I would be delighted to call on him the next morning. His so-called palace, his building, was right next to our very old fashioned colonial thatched consulate. She said that would not do. I had to come see the president right away. I said, "All right. I will come over." She said, "No, not here, to the hospital." I did go to the hospital at 4:00 in the morning. As I arrived in the hospital entry hall, it was suddenly illuminated by Klieg lights and Tshombe launched into a tirade about what the UN, backed by the U.S., had done to Katangan soldiers. At the end of this harangue, he pulled a blanket off two stretchers showing two very badly burned bodies. His claim was that the UN had dropped napalm furnished by the U.S. on a Gendarmerie position. I said I didn't know anything, didn't know about the circumstances, but would look into it.

The next day, I went out to the place where this action had taken place. I saw blood on the ground. Apparently these men had been trying to move into the city and had been intercepted and shot by a UN patrol. I also saw that the brush was still burning in a circle around the site, but that it hadn't reached the site yet, the place where the gendarmes had fallen, so it could not have burned them. It was rather clear that the bodies had been prepared by someone assisting Tshombe to make a television case; this was broadcast to Europe and to the United States. I received a telephone call from George McGhee. He said "what do you mean by admitting U.S. complicity or guilt?" I said, "I didn't do that. I said I was going to look into it and what I found out was this." He said, "That's all right, but it looked as though you were fighting back at him." Anyhow, that was my introduction to the Katangan scene and from there on it just continued right until the end.

Q: Tshombe's position at that point was what?

DEAN: Tshombe had been the governor of the province of Katanga. When the Congolese army mutinied in other parts of the country, he seceded and declared the secession of Katanga as an independent state, and became its president.

Q: As far as our embassy was concerned, you mentioned this divided policy; George McGhee was going one way, the embassy was going another way. What were you

supposed to do?

DEAN: The embassy was strongly supporting the official UN and U.S. policy, which was to try to defeat the secession and to reunite the Congo. The U.S. fear was that if the Congo was “balkanized,” the term used at the time, it would become a sort of shifting, unstable center for the whole of Africa, or at least Central Africa, and create impossible political and economic conditions, which, the fear was at that time, the Soviet Union could profit from. At the time that Lumumba was deposed, several score Warsaw Pact advisors were arriving every day to take over various functions of the Congolese government. That was the fear of the time. Whether this would have really taken place or not, I don’t know, but the desire was to keep the country together.

Little or no progress was being made in resolving the secession. I gradually became aware of the fact that the UN force seemed to be preparing for further conflict. I reported this to Washington. Charles Whitehouse, a colleague from the Africa desk of the State Department, came to Elisabethville on a plane from Leopoldville (Kinshasa). I went out to the airport to talk with him, and he seemed to me to confirm this. Anyhow I just kept reporting. What did I know about this? Nobody had told me formally that anything was going on. On Christmas day, 1963...

Q: Would it have been ‘62 or ‘63?

DEAN: I believe it was 63. The Katangan Gendarmerie got their Christmas ration of Tembo beer, and a few of them climbed to the top of the huge center of tailings from the copper mine in Elisabethville (Lubumbashi it was later called) and started firing off their guns. Then they tipsily slid down this pile which I think was close to 200 feet high and their colleagues thought these soldiers were being fired on by the UN and they started shooting. The shooting went on all night, I think, sort of kept up, by the UN forces.

The next day the UN summoned Tshombe to a meeting with its civilian head, a man from Kenya, Eliud Mathu, and Major General Prem Chand, the Indian head of the UN force, with his brigadier, Noronha, a man from Goa. Tshombe insisted that his “corps diplomatique” attend him so Dodson and I went with him to the UN building. British policy at the time was to support Tshombe and not to push him. (Tshombe was assisted by Ian Smith in neighboring Rhodesia at that point.) The two UN officials told Tshombe that he had to give freedom of movement to the UN forces, they could not any longer accept being impeded. In fact the Katangan Gendarmerie had surrounded and encircled the UN force, not allowing them to move. Tshombe said he had to talk about this with his cabinet so they let him use the single side band radio. We did not have a Lunda language interpreter on hand at that time. Later, when the tape was translated, it developed that Tshombe said that he was just stalling and they should not move their forces back to give the UN free movement.

At the appointed hour, 3:00 p.m. that afternoon, the UN force did move out and they did a thorough job. They broke out with relatively few casualties and as a matter of fact they continued across the small Lufira River into the next mining town, a place called

Jadotville, contrary to an agreement that Secretary General U Thant had made with the Belgian government. Unfortunately, at a UN roadblock in Jadotville, two Belgian civilians were killed. This had been the Belgian concern, so there was a big stink about it. The Indian commanders and our own military attaché who was there giving them informal advice asked me whether I thought it was desirable to go further. I didn't know anything about the understanding with the Belgian government to stop at the Lufira River. I told the UN commanders, you had better get them while the hot pursuit is going on because otherwise you'll have to cope with this guy for the remainder of time. The UN then defeated Tshombe's forces and drove them out of Katanga into Angola (where they hung around for quite some time). The death of the two civilians resulted in an inquiry by U Thant, a visit to Elisabethville by Ralph Bunche, and an interview that I had with him about this subject.

Q: Our policy to support Tshombe would seem to be moving in two different directions.

DEAN: The policy of some was to support Tshombe. For example the Union Miniere, the big mining company, was of course supporting Tshombe and paying for his support staff. It turned out that Van Der Walle, the Belgian consul general who had earlier been the chief of the Surete for the whole of the colonial Congo, was actually writing Tshombe's letters for him that he sent to the UN complaining about its behavior and so forth. That part of the Belgian structure was supporting him. Quite frankly, I did have an intelligence representative in the consulate and he was arguing very strongly against urging the Indians to pursue this conflict, and so forth. That again is a demonstration of divided councils and government.

I took a very straightforward and perhaps unrefined view that the concerns about the continued and successful Katangan secession were correct, and, moreover, that the United Nations would be in an impossible position if it failed in this mission. I thought the values were on the side of going ahead and doing the job fully. Ralph Bunche when he came on his fact-finding trip said, "Well if you have suggestions like this in the future, please send them to Washington and observe the right chain of command and don't give them directly to the UN forces." He seemed to have something of a smile in the corner of his mouth as he administered this reprove to me. I'm sure he was pleased with the actual outcome.

Q: What about the embassy? Edmund Gullion was the ambassador at that time?

DEAN: Yes, and he definitely supported U.S. official policy of ending the Katangan secession. Robert Gardner, a Ghanaian who was the UN representative for the Congo, and Gullion saw eye-to-eye. I guess they felt that there would have to be some military denouement in Katanga, but I didn't know too much about it.

Q: What about during the period before the UN troops moved out, what was life like for you trying to deal with this situation? You were consul or consul general?

DEAN: Consul.

Q: How did you work within this at that particular time?

DEAN: I had fairly good superficial relations with Tshombe. I would go and see him fairly often. His interior minister was a very menacing man named Godfroid Munongo, whose teeth were filed sharp; his father had actually been executed as a cannibal by the Belgian colonial administration. He was very threatening and everybody was afraid of him. Anyhow, he kidnapped the Italian consul general. Italy had provided some aircraft to the UN and on that occasion some Italian aviators were killed and ritually eaten in Kindu, in another part of the Congo. Then this diplomat disappeared and Tshombe began to ask us whether he could expel somebody without his passport. It turned out that he had sent interior minister Munongo to the wife of the Italian consul general, Mrs. Natali, to ask for Natali's passport. She said, "No Natali, no passport" and faced them down. As it happened, Natali was being held in a bordello for the Katangan troops run by two Italians who finally told us about the entire matter. Natali was found in Rhodesia and restored to his wife.

Yes, we did have dealings with Tshombe. There were incidents with the UN forces. The Katangan Gendarmerie killed one or two UN soldiers from time to time. One Indian major was also cannibalized. There was an effort to negotiate between UN representative Mathu and Tshombe. The Belgian community, mostly business interests and so forth, were very strongly anti-UN. It was a fairly tense atmosphere, with all kinds of alarms and excursions. I had a good deal to do with the Indian brigade and the UN troops. I was honorary consul general for the Swedes, Norwegians, Irish and four or five other countries and celebrated their national days. Daily, I saw the UN people.

Q: You talk about Tshombe and his group and you talk about the UN, but what about the central government? Was there anything there?

DEAN: No, no one whatever. Tshombe had absorbed everything or expelled these other people. I talked with him and told him he had the qualities to become prime minister of the Congo. He told me that he might become prime minister again, but that he also would be killed. There was a long history there. In fact he did become prime minister after this, and then as you know he was exiled to Europe, to Barcelona. His enemies finally suborned the pilot of his aircraft and, while on a flight to Italy, he was landed in Algeria against his wishes. The Algerian government put him under house arrest and he was then said to have died from some internal ailment but of course there was suspicion he had been poisoned. In the meanwhile, his foreign minister, Everest Kimba, used to come around and he would ask me about my children. He would more or less blatantly threaten to kidnap these kids, as they had gotten Guido Natali. I would grind my teeth and tell him that the United States government was very vengeful. It was unpleasant but not a high degree of tension every day, but no progress and mounting tension, I would guess, in the overall situation.

Q: Were you and the rest of your consul corps really limited to this city of Elisabethville at that time?

DEAN: Pretty much. You could go to Rhodesia but nobody wanted to go out in the outer limits of the city because it was surrounded effectively by the Katanga gendarmes whose command and control was not very good, so people avoided that.

Q: Were there problems of, one hears about later of Katangan troops getting drunk and wandering around?

DEAN: It did happen from time to time and of course it happened at the dénouement there. For example Prem Chand, the Indian general was out on the golf course within the city limits playing one day. He happened to look up in a tree right in front of him where there was this Katangan gendarme drawing a bead on him. Fortunately, he didn't fire, but there was that kind of thing going on all the time.

Q: Maybe we better stop at this point and I'll put down here where we are. We have talked about your time in Katanga up to the time the UN broke out and we've talked about life under the sort of siege. We would like to talk about developments after that. I also would like to talk with you about your staff at the consulate and your relationship with the embassy. Was Stanleyville in operation in those days still?

DEAN: Yes, that had taken place just before I arrived, with Mike Hoyt and so forth.

Q: We will then talk about further developments after Tshombe and his troops had been pushed away from Katanga and we'll pick it up at that point.

Today is the 7th of May, 1998. Could you talk about the denouement with the UN and all?

DEAN: Yes. I may be repeating myself, but this was a very significant turning point in the Congo crisis. UN forces were encircled in Elisabethville, the capital of the free state of Katanga, the secessionist state of Katanga. They had been defeated in, I guess it was 1963, in their effort to break out of the city by Tshombe's Katanga Gendarmerie strengthened by quite a large number of well known mercenaries. The fate of the entire United Nations mission in the Congo was at stake. The UN was not able to have freedom of movement, not able to carry out its mission, and that was a source of great concern. Underlying it was the fear that the Congo would break apart not only with the secession of Katanga but with the secession of other segments and that you would have a communist dominated balkanization in the center of Africa; that was the main concern.

There was an incident in early 1963 (I'm trying to get the dates straight) in which Indian soldiers were roughed up in the market in Elisabethville intentionally. This was clearly prearranged. It humiliated the UN forces. Individual Indian soldiers were missing, some were killed. There was an episode which I believe I mentioned, where Indian soldiers killed some Katangan gendarmes in the periphery and I was summoned by Tshombe to

the city hospital to be berated in front of television for this genocidal attack of napalm and so forth.

In any case, the denouement came when at Christmas 1963 (if my recollection of dates is right) when the Katangan Gendarmerie got their Christmas bonus of beer. Several of them climbed to the top of this huge sinter heap outside of the copper mill in Elisabethville, now called Lubumbashi. Some of them slipped down and started firing off their weapons. Their colleagues thought these men on the sinter heap were being taken under fire by the United Nations forces and started firing, and the firing continued through the night. As I understand it, the United Nations deliberately maintained the exchange of fire throughout the night so as to have the *causus belli*, so-to-speak. But the Gendarmerie obligingly fired back.

The next day the United Nations authorities summoned Tshombe to their headquarters. The civilian in charge was a Kenyan Kikuyu named Mathu who was a rather weak person. He found himself under great psychological pressure because the UN was pushing his fellow African, Tshombe. He also appeared to be quite intoxicated. However, General Prem Chand and General Noronha, the two Indian generals, were present and acted as spokesmen. They told Tshombe that the UN would have to have freedom of movement or they would have to exercise it on their own and they gave him a deadline of 3:00 p.m. that day. He went to the sideband radio and allegedly talked to his cabinet. He was speaking in Lunda and there was no Lunda interpreter present but, as we later learned, he actually told them that he was just going to string on the UN and that they should hold out.

The UN forces did carry out a very successful, relatively bloodless operation with few casualties among the Gendarmerie and still fewer among the UN forces. The issue was whether they should proceed in hot pursuit. Unknown to me, Secretary General U Thant had promised the Belgians that that would not occur but the UN commanders asked me whether I thought it would be desirable to keep going. I had a very close daily relationship with them. Advised by the excellent military attaché, Colonel Knut Raudstein, an American paratroop officer, I told them that they should go ahead and do it.

Q: Where was this coming from, from you? Was the embassy involved?

DEAN: We had taken down our aerial because there had been riotous attacks by the Katangans on our consulate which was right next to Tshombe's palace so we weren't in any touch with them. The UN officers were asking me anyhow for my opinion.

Q: You're just somebody off the street. You were the consul general?

DEAN: Consul.

Q: Incidentally you took down the antennae because this was a provocation to crowds?

DEAN: Yes. They attacked us on two occasions, not with weapons but with mangoes,

rocks and so forth. We had no compound protection or anything and it was suggested to me in our consulate that the Katangans did not like our aeriels because they considered that we were communicating with the outside world through them and up to no good.

Q: When you gave this suggestion, obviously this carried some weight at the time. Looking at it, if the secretary general of the United Nations is saying nothing would happen...

DEAN: That they would stop at a certain point.

Q: From the local view, what was the purpose of pushing these people, where they wanted them to go, what was the idea?

DEAN: The issue was whether you should have so-called hot pursuit and end the secession and military action against the UN forces, or allow the Katangan forces possession of most of the territory of the Katanga and two big copper mines; the secession would have lasted forever. The UN forces did push further and they drove the Katangan forces out of the Congo into Angola where they hung around and were a source of difficulty in the future. The secession ended. In the process, two Belgian civilians made an effort to break through the roadblock set up by the Indian troops in Jadotville and were killed. This naturally triggered protests in Belgium and then to U Thant.

The upshot was I may have mentioned it before, that Ralph Bunche was sent to the scene and urged me with not very solemn mien to confine my suggestions to the State Department in the future and not pass them on to the local UN command. I was by nature of position and daily contact, the main foreign support of these UN soldiers and although they did have their own communications and so forth, they did rely on us for advice. I was advised by our intelligence representative not to do this, but I felt that it was the right thing under the circumstances that there would be endless troubles if the Katangans were only pushed back a few miles and could continue the war against the United Nations.

Q: Where were the mercenaries at this point?

DEAN: They did have a few at this time, but I believe the quality of the Indian forces had improved greatly over the Dogra brigade which they had before. The commander of the Dogra brigade was a man who apparently believed in conducting the fighting from his bunker, whereas Brigadier Reginald Noronha was one of the toughest characters I've seen. He went up to a couple of machine gun posts the Katangans had established during the night and just pushed their weapons aside with his swagger stick and told them to take their weapons out of here and go home, and they did. The UN command had in my opinion carefully planned this, and I think quite rightly in the circumstances.

Q: Of course we are talking about something which comes up again, and again, and again and that is the finely nuanced responses 10,000 miles away in a headquarters of people talking and then you have the people in the field who pretty well know what they should do.

DEAN: That's right and you frequently get this type of situation during negotiations. Of course the headquarters try to control the men in the field and it is a perpetual tug of war. Unless you have a certain amount of creative addition at the field post, I don't think it will work. But, clearly, there is a possibility of things going seriously wrong. If these UN forces had not succeeded in their further push, yes, it would have been a major imbroglio. After all, the issue was the secession of Katanga, which was controlling the Congo's main source of foreign currency imports through its control over the copper production, and it was the future of UN peacekeeping operations in general.

Shortly after arriving in Elisabethville I received a rather cryptic call from the White House. I assume it was President Kennedy talking; I wasn't sure. They told me that this was a very serious affair and they were counting on me and I should call them if I had any difficulties. Then it became clear to me as I reported to the State Department that the UN was preparing to break out of its encirclement. I reported that at length in telegrams. I had a meeting with a visiting colleague, an officer from the African Desk, Charles Whitehouse who came out to the Congo. I met him at the airport in Elisabethville which was still controlled by the UN. He indicated to me that there was going to be probably a showdown. So it was in the air and then I guess I would say that the United Nations command, properly in my opinion considering all the factors, seized on this episode to bring about the denouement.

Q: When Ralph Bunche came he told you not to do it again but with sort of a wink and a nod?

DEAN: Yes, he seemed to be smiling to me. At any rate, he wasn't very solemn about it. I can only imagine that he was, together with Robert Gardener, the Ghanaian head of the UN operation in the Congo, thoroughly satisfied with the outcome. It did end the secession. It reunified the Congo and brought back the foreign exchange from the copper exports of Katanga. Of course the Congo's troubles were not over by any means.

Q: Did you have any communication thereafter on this particular subject with the embassy? Was Mac Godley the ambassador at that time?

DEAN: No, I think it was Ed Gullion still. I didn't have a very close connection with the embassy for a variety of reasons. I had just come from Prague and I didn't know anything about this Africa situation. I never had any briefing and I was told later that they wanted to have some tough minded person in there to try to deal with Tshombe. I went for a couple of days to the embassy and got a memo in two days briefing and I thought Ambassadors Gullion and Godley were fairly straightforward in their opposition to Tshombe. Naturally I tried to learn, read, talk and so forth, one does. I became aware that there were various pressures. George McGhee, the political undersecretary, was more or less supportive of Tshombe. Douglas MacArthur was ambassador in Brussels and he called me from time to time and gave me his ideas on what I should be doing.

Q: Was he fairly close to the Belgians as far as their side?

DEAN: The Belgian government was deeply divided, with the Spaak government opposing the secession. But the whole business apparatus, the powerful Union Miniere, which was represented on the scene, supported Tshombe. Of course the British were also more or less quietly supporting Tshombe along with the secessionist governor general of Rhodesia, Ian Smith. There was a real mess of divergent motives. Governor Williams, who was the assistant secretary, and Wayne Fredericks the deputy assistant. They had a very clear view and wanted to end the secession. Anyhow, I relatively seldom went to the embassy after that. There wasn't a possibility of it. Things heated up in Elisabethville as soon as I got there. I did have a one day overlap with Lewis Hoffacker, my predecessor, a very reflective person.

Q: I'm going to be interviewing him in July. He is coming in from Texas.

DEAN: He's a very good man -- but some thought, I wasn't privy to any of these things - - that he was rather indulgent toward Tshombe. But personally I don't know whether he was or was not.

Q: What happened after the UN basically pushed Tshombe's forces out? What happened with Tshombe and also sort of your relations with whatever passed for the government there and with the Belgian group?

DEAN: Tshombe was out although he later returned as prime minister of the Congo because he represented too powerful a group, an ethnic group, to be cut out completely. Mobutu summoned me to a house on the outskirts of Elisabethville, where lying back in this big bed, he demanded a report on the conditions there. He didn't trust himself to go into the city as yet; I don't fault him for that. They did establish control. They did have a kind of election and a man named Edouard Balundwe became president. He was a very nice man and apparently quite inclined to be cooperative with the United States. I remember him coming to my house right near the consulate when President Kennedy was assassinated expressing his condolences. He later visited me when I was going to the War College. And he came to my home here in Great Falls. He was pretty good. They had UN administration which is not very memorable to me except that it included George Sherry, the American who was there also during this crisis.

In the Congo, we were soon swept up into the Simba uprising. It was a real uprising of disappointed expectations. There had been steady deterioration of the Congo economy since independence. It was not a mutiny of the Force Publique or any of these things. It was led by men with some education: Pierre Mulele and others. In any case, they took over several of the main centers in the Congo and they moved toward Albertville which was in the northern part of our consular district. The governor of that province, Jason Sendwe, was a Baluba chieftain but secularized so to speak. He was a school boy chum of Tshombe and from that day his rival. They both had been educated by American Methodist missionaries who came over from Rhodesia. Katanga was the part of the Congo where the American missionaries had more scope. The remainder was much more under the influence of the Catholic church and Protestants played a limited role. The

Methodists supported Tshombe and thought the U.S. was very wrong in its support of the Congo central government. Bishop Newell Boothe was very vehement in his support of Tshombe and of secession. So that was a further strand in American policy.

The Simba uprising spread rapidly. The denouement came as we tried to help Jason Sendwe stabilize his Albertville government against the Simbas. We were talking about giving him some arms for his police but had not yet done so. Meanwhile, we were told that a Simba column was approaching Albertville -- this was shortly before we left the Congo. The British consul general, Wilson, and I got a local Airbrousse aircraft and put a load of landmines in it so we could defend the airport in Albertville. This was not a very substantial enterprise. The landmines were in the central compartment of the airplane covered with a baby quilt and tied with some twine. They kept sliding back and forth in the compartment.

Wilson, I and two Congolese officers, one a warrant officer, were the only ones on the plane. We went to Albertville, circled around. The pilot didn't want to land because he was taking some small arms fire from the Simbas who were apparently approaching. We did finally land and we were surrounded immediately by a company of the Congolese National Army which had moved into the Katanga to assert its authority. The soldiers said it is very nice that you've brought this plane because we will take it and go because the Simba are approaching. The Congolese army warrant officer told the soldiers that they could have the plane, but of course you can stay here because there will not be any room for you; it does of course have a dangerous cargo and you will have to work a bit to take it off because it wouldn't be right to fly with it. When the soldiers heard these key words, danger and work, they faded into the bush and were seen no more.

The Simbas started approaching and we did see them. They wore white armbands or white headbands, or both. They went past the end of the road to the airport. About 30 minutes later we heard a lot of automatic pistol fire in the town. They had killed Sendwe, his wife and family, and immediate staff. We then got back on the plane with the landmines and flew back to Elisabethville. That was kind of the final act of our stay in the Congo. We flew over a big herd of elephants, eighteen or twenty, and thought, what a beautiful country the Congo could be given some decent government.

Q: It sounds like anybody who wanted to sort of have enough initiative to move could go anywhere they wanted in the Congo as opposed to those who were trying to oppose it? The Force Publique seemed to melt away at any...

DEAN: The Congolese army were not very good. Shortly after I arrived, I went to the funeral of their chief of staff, General Abeya, who had been killed on a patrol when he, because of the fact that the soldiers wanted to gravitate backwards, had to go up in the van and was killed by a poison arrow. It was a very loose situation. It's a very big country of only a few centers of activity, commerce, and minor industries like textiles. That was true of Albertville for example. I don't think I ever asked the embassy for permission to go on this flight. Wilson was interested in taking care of his citizens and I knew that we were trying to bolster Sendwe so it seemed to me to be logical to do this.

Q: What about the missionaries, this must have been quite a concern of yours?

DEAN: Most of them in the Katanga were Methodists, very courageous people. They flew around in small single-engine airplanes to very lonely missions. I thought they were people of very great character. They were strongly opposed to U.S. policy in support of the UN and anti-Tshombe. Many of them quite naturally had grown up with Tshombe as a friend, a fellow Methodist Christian so they believed, the U.S. government was trying to stifle the beginning of decent government in the Congo. They kind of tended to keep away from us and weren't terribly cordial. They'd keep to themselves.

Q: Were you concerned when the Simbas started moving toward your consular district?

DEAN: That was a concern of trying to stop them. It was feared that they would actually get as far as Elisabethville. Many Europeans and several Americans were there and this was the motivation of my British colleague. Even while the Simbas were going into Albertville, he wanted to go into the town to take care of his citizens. I held him back from this foolhardiness.

Q: Was this close to the end of your time?

DEAN: Yes, almost at the very end.

Q: When you left Elisabethville, what was your prognosis for the Congo at that point from your perspective?

DEAN: Things in Katanga were fairly calm. I went to the investiture of Tshombe's uncle as Lunda chief and he seemed to be cooperative with the central government. The government now had the copper revenues and there was still a pretty large, although smaller, Belgian infrastructure. I saw it crumbling around the edges when some very old Belgian women that were sort of the leftovers of the colonial period had to be shifted to Congolese social assistance, which was totally negligible. I don't know what happened to these poor women. Anyhow it seemed that the Congo had at least a breathing spell and it looked not too bad.

The Simba affair did peter out throughout the rest of the country and it looked as though Mobutu had a fairly firm hold on things. His complete corruption was not evident then and he had achieved prominence by saving the life of the American station chief in the capital in a riot of the Force Publique. The embassy felt that they had considerable influence over him. It was not too bad.

Q: I've never served in Africa so I'm speaking from just sort of hearsay but I have the feeling what you say, opposed to what people who let's say served in Ghana or Nigeria and all, that by and large the Congolese, the various tribal groups, weren't very aggressive as far as management or mercantile skills or anything like that.

DEAN: Scarcely, since I think the standard figure is that there were four to six university graduates when Belgium gave them independence, four of them priests. The Belgian government was panicked by what they saw going on in Algeria between the French and the Algerians. They didn't want to have anything like that so they cut the preparatory period for independence from the three- or four-year program which they had in mind -- even so a negligible period -- they cut the period to six months and in effect cut the Congolese loose to shift for themselves. That was really the underlying source of the unrest. Nearly complete ignorance of the values and practices of civil administration.

With the exception of the Simbas I don't feel that there was a great deal of militancy on the part of the Congolese. They were willing to work and most of them had to work very hard just to maintain daily existence. With the exception of the Lumumba, party politics was not highly developed. The Congolese were not heavily politicized and they generally accepted authority, I think possibly, from the colonial period and also their own Congolese authorities. They showed great good humor in adversity. They didn't have a big network of roads but they did have a fairly good network of mining and other industries which the Belgians had brought and which they were still in effect operating. Given that things went starting from a low base, the Congolese weren't too badly off.

Q: You left there in '64 was it?

DEAN: Yes.

Q: Where did you go?

DEAN: I came back here and went to the National War College.

Q: Was there any interest in what you had been doing from the African Bureau and all when you came back?

DEAN: I went there and of course I reported and talked to them a couple of times but that was about it. Later I was reproached for not maintaining contact with the Bureau by Charlie Whitehouse. But I wouldn't want to go back to that chaos again right away.

Q: You were at the War College from '64 to '65?

DEAN: Yes, that's right. Then I went to the UN desk for some months. That was a carryover from the Congo experience. Then I became the personal assistant for Robert Bowie, who was on his second tour as counselor at the State Department.

Q: What was your impression of the War College at this particular period?

DEAN: It was seized with the Vietnam issue right from the outset. After President Johnson opened that particular session with a promise of a pay raise for the military, the second or third lecture was from the officers of the Turner Joy, the destroyer which had allegedly been attacked by the North Vietnamese in the Tonkin Gulf. These officers

indicated, quite explicitly in my opinion, that they did not believe that they had been fired on by the Vietnamese, so there was a deep question in my mind about this involvement. From my Congo experience, I felt that the administration was getting in very deep militarily without having the right indigenous political infrastructure. I know now that the Vietnamese government and the political situation was more complex than I perceived it at the time, but that also the general finding was true. This theme went through the whole year and there were two men from the Foreign Service who kept raising it, quite rightly in my opinion. I've forgotten their names now but I could check. There was a considerable division of opinion among the military officers about the advisability of this action.

This War College course is a well arranged course, and I think still is, with excellent faculty people. It is a great experience because the quality of the military personnel and their willingness to sacrifice and work together and so forth was rather different from what I thought characterized the Foreign Service. There was much more collegial spirit.

Q: Did you find that you were drawing on contacts that you made at the War College in later years?

DEAN: Yes. General W.Y. Smith who was later head of the Institute for Defense Analysis, I met him many times and four or five of the other officers, yes, and the other civilians that were there I saw again repeatedly.

Q: This was really just when we were beginning to land troops really in there, '64, '65?

DEAN: Right. That was the first ground force involvement. That's exactly what I objected to, the ground force involvement, because then national prestige is engaged and you can't get out without a victory of some kind. On the basis of my Congo experience, I thought Vietnam lacked the people infrastructure for large-scale involvement.

Q: Was the military looking upon this, you say it was divided? Was it between the careerist who said any war is a good war?

DEAN: No, I think some did accept the rationale that this war was caused by communist expansion and they did feel that North Vietnamese were directly under communist control and acting on their behalf. I think at that stage there was less feeling about the military winability, but whether it was justified politically. There were many, many questions and it continued throughout the year. It wasn't violent or factional, as I assume it became later on.

Q: Why don't we stop at this point. We'll pick it up the next time when you were going to the United Nations Affairs. Was that IO?

DEAN: Yes.

Q: IO in 1965.

Today is the 17th of June, 1998.

DEAN: That's the anniversary of the 1953 uprising in East Berlin.

Q: In United Nations Affairs, you were there from...

DEAN: I was there actually a year or so after I went to the National War College. The first day I was at the National War College, if we didn't go over that, the first lecture was from the commander of the Turner Joy destroyer from the Tonkin Gulf who told the War College class fairly directly that he had not been fired on by the Vietnamese. So we had the Vietnam War right from the beginning.

Q: I think we covered most of that but if we missed it we can pick this up later. Why don't we start now when you went to IO. You were in IO from when to when?

DEAN: It must have been '65-'66 then I went to Robert Bowie as his assistant; he was on his second tour as counselor of the State Department.

Q: What were your responsibilities in IO, International Organizations?

DEAN: The assistant secretary, bureau director, was Joseph Sisco at that time, an extremely active person. His chief deputy was very knowledgeable, David Popper, who is still a member of our UN association here. Another man who was there as a special advisor with whom I still have contact, Gar Alperovitz, was one of the earliest of the revisionist historians. I don't know how he happened to be there but he was there as special advisor. He is working today on a special project to train peace studies instructors for universities. My actual position was deputy office director of the office of UN Political Affairs which works with the Security Council.

Q: Before we get to what you were doing, from what you observed at that time, could you talk a bit about Joseph Sisco because he is sort of a legend in the Department of State of his ability to get things done?

DEAN: Yes, he was the Holbrooke of his time.

Q: You're talking about Richard Holbrooke?

DEAN: That's right. Joe Sisco was supremely active, always on the move, always with new ideas. He would call me up, and everyone else, on weekends and expect us to appear on Saturdays, which was normal in those days. He was always pushing, prodding, bringing up new ideas, always formulating the situation of the UN. Because of the combination of his ingenuity, energy and doggedness and some personal ambition, he was an extremely effective director.

Q: It is easier and more stimulating to work for somebody who has clout within the Department, isn't it?

DEAN: Yes. Also, he repeatedly articulated the situation as he perceived it. That was a good attribute of his leadership. Every week or even several times a week, he would tell us what he thought was going on. So we did have a qualified observer at the top level. He was open in his descriptions. That was an important attribute of his leadership.

Q: How did we see the United Nations during this '65 to '66 period?

DEAN: I can't answer that question very well. The memory that I have of the Bureau was the way (and I assume that it is still that way today) that it was one point of a triangle composed of the Secretary of State on the one hand and the UN representative on the other. No. Four points, because the White House and NSC were also involved. This dispersal of power is also characteristic of the geographic bureaus, but with IO it was more pronounced. It is rare that an assistant secretary IO can lead as well as Sisco did. Although the bureau issued to the UN mission its instructions on Security Council issues, often it did not originate them, and they were often revised. The clearance game for instructions and telegrams, always a nightmare in the Department of State, was even more acute in that bureau. I understand better today that the UN is a shifting mix of shadow and substance.

Q: Who was our ambassador to the UN at that time?

DEAN: I don't remember who it was.

Q: Stevenson had left by that time?

DEAN: I believe so, yes. I have a vague memory, but it's probably incorrect, that it was Goldberg.

Q: What did your job entail?

DEAN: I mostly worked on Kashmir and in particular on Rhodesian sanctions. That was the time when Ian Smith had seized power in Rhodesia against the...

Q: That was the UDI, unilateral declaration of independence?

DEAN: Yes, that's exactly what happened. The British government declared him in practice an outlaw. We experimented for the first time with economic sanctions against Rhodesia which were supposed to cut off its flow of goods and services. A UN navy was assembled for a short time off the coast of Mozambique. Mainly sanctions were supposed to be cutting off the railroad and road traffic in prohibited goods from South Africa. This did not work. I should say that it worked slowly, because I think economic sanctions do work slowly. It did create many difficulties for Ian Smith.

This was the trial run for what later happened with South Africa where a set of sanctions was indeed effective in persuading the South African business community that they had to stop apartheid. So I think this was an important innovation. There may have been UN sanctions before that, but this was the first sort of major one. I remember debating with British diplomats who didn't like it at all, whether there would be a UN navy off of Walvis Bay in South Africa as a result. That was quite frustrating. Kashmir peacekeeping also was not productive as we know.

Q: We're talking about them practically on the verge of a nuclear war over Kashmir in 1998.

DEAN: That's right. This was after the second Indian-Pakistani war over Kashmir and there was a peacekeeping mission of the UN there which was an observer mission type. To get it there and to get the various UN resolutions backing it was our main work for quite some time.

Q: At that time did we have any thrust to our policy towards Kashmir?

DEAN: I think we did have a great deal of influence at that time in India, considerably more than we now have. The relationship was better and I think the United States did play an important role in bringing the war to an end, and then again in the later Indian-Pakistani war over Bangladesh in the early '70s. So yes, I think we did have considerable influence but not enough influence evidently to bring about a solution. What we were doing was sort of administering an on-going problem. But we didn't see it so at that time; then, we did hope for some kind of solution.

Q: How did you work in your job doing political affairs? You have your United Nations mission with reporting officers talking to other UN delegates. Were you sort of the window onto our embassies abroad dealing on UN affairs?

DEAN: The main emphasis was working with the bureaus, particularly on translating their views to Security Council action and on trying to get them to accept some UN input in their bilateral relations. A third project that we worked on that consumed a great deal of time was our report to the Trusteeship Council. We were still administering trust territories in the Pacific taken over from Japan in World War II. We spent a great deal of time fending off Cold War type criticisms from Russia and Warsaw Pact states and at the same time trying to move the Interior Department and the Defense Department to liberalize and give greater autonomy and self government to these territories.

Q: What were the sort of dynamics of the Department of Interior in this? One can understand the military, they never want to give up a base, but with Interior did you find sort of what they were after?

DEAN: They were the ones who had the greatest direct contact with the populations and they seemed to me to have mainly economic interests in mind. I don't mean selfish ones

but general economic and economic development considerations. In our various working group meetings, they usually bounce back our suggestions for change but with more politeness than the Defense Department.

Q: I understand that at least in later time you had several particular representatives in Congress who took a fairly strong paternalist view toward these territories. They liked to go visit them and they felt they were theirs, using the Interior as an entree. Did you find you were up against these people?

DEAN: Yes, because their activities were reported on also by some of these UN members who had a fairly keen eye about what was going on. Of course that was a source of information for us as to what was happening. It finally did culminate in our assessing our responsibility. It was a relatively successful enterprise, but in many cases life in these territories is somewhat like life on an Indian reservation. It's a dependent relationship in which personal initiative was not encouraged. Therefore there was a lot of unemployment, a lot of drunkenness, and so on. We were not exemplary administrators or trustees. The idea of course was to move toward a dissolution of the trusteeship relationship and to bring these territories to the best possible level before doing that. That was done and I would give them a mark of 75 percent for this effort.

Q: What about the issue that kept coming up really as a Cold War needle against us of Puerto Rican independence, did you get involved in that?

DEAN: No, although of course it did come up and it is still with us. But of course we were always twitted with that as well as about the trust territories, and I think that a kind of Cold War embarrassment did motivate the administration at that time and subsequently to try to get rid of this trusteeship responsibilities as soon as possible. The military, the Navy, wanted to keep hold of this real estate indefinitely. They saw no reason whatever to give it up. The Department of the Interior which had the greatest responsibility, in effect selected the governors and senior civil servants. It had a feeling of tutelage and a kind of responsibility for the welfare of the population, a tutelage, which made them reluctant to act.

Q: In your relationship with the geographic bureaus, I can imagine you are going and saying we really want you to press Belgium on this particular issue, or something.

DEAN: That's right, or sign on to the message which authorized that.

Q: I would think that there would be the reaction of, we have other things to worry about and you keep coming around with these things.

DEAN: Yes. I happened to get into the IO Bureau because I had been engaged in the peacekeeping exercise in the Congo. But it was not my first choice. I had been in line for assignment to Warsaw as DCM, but that fell through when a political ambassador was assigned and the current DCM had to stay on to back him up. At that time the IO Bureau and the United Nations were not held in high esteem in the State Department. The bureau

was regarded as an unserious operation which continually interfered in an amateurish way with the more solid operation of bilateral-lateral relationships.

Q: Yes, we are not talking about fixed ideas at all with institutional prejudices.

DEAN: Institutional prejudice was very strong at that time and I guess I didn't get the UN spirit. I happen, as you know, to presently be the head of the regional UN Association here in Washington. But I wasn't very enthused with the UN then. Sisco, Elizabeth Ann Brown, who was the office director, extremely well qualified and very good officer, Don McHenry who was in our section at that time, and Donald Morris who became an Episcopal priest in Anacostia, they all knew what they were doing. But I'm not sure that I got the idea too well. In that bureau, the State Department inclination to allusion and the assumption that new officers know all about what's going on and just need a few words of reference, rather than some intensive training and instruction, was at its height.

Q: Did you find in the bureau that you were running up against people who had been involved with the United Nations for a while? It is the sort of thing that you can end up with, with very true believers as opposed to somebody who is just a professional dealing with whatever job they have.

DEAN: That was definitely the case, especially with Elizabeth Ann Brown and with David Popper who was a real expert. They were dedicated UN people. Many in the bureau had been there for years. They all did have a strong dedication. I guess I regarded myself as just passing through.

Q: It is an interesting sort of bureaucratic phenomenon which is not limited to that bureau, but the United Nations has always had people who are either a strong believer or a so-so believer.

DEAN: Yes and of course that's its nature. The United Nations is really a tiny organization which carries on its shoulders the hopes of most of mankind. Consequently, it either infuses you with contempt or inspiration. Anyhow, I guess I was not a very enthusiastic player at that time owing to my own intellectual deficiencies and also because of the point that I raised that little or no effort was given to indoctrinate me. Because I believed I was expected to know what to do, I asked too few questions. This is the old Foreign Service thing where you get thrown into the job and you're expected to have a running start and start working right from the first day. Of all subjects, I would guess that the UN and its problems does require a certain degree of indoctrination which I never received, although all of the people I was working with were highly capable.

Q: This is part of the you might say training or non-training thing. You left there in '66 then you went to...

DEAN: Robert Bowie.

Q: Robert Bowie was in what job?

DEAN: He was on his second tour of duty as Counselor of the State Department. In his earlier one he had been Counselor and Head of the policy planning sector. Then it was the Cold War. This time it was Vietnam and Robert Bowie had an uneasy relationship with Secretary Rusk because of Bowie's skepticism about Vietnam.

Q: Under Dulles?

DEAN: Yes, that's right.

Q: But now we're talking about Johnson and Dean Rusk?

DEAN: Yes.

Q: What was your job as assistant?

DEAN: I was his dog robber to get his papers, get information, set up meetings, clear telegrams, and so forth. Some of his major functions at that time were to work on the Trilateral Group, which was a group which sought to meet congressional pressures to reduce troop strength in Europe by proposing a modest reduction of forces. It was part of the sempiternal effort of the administrations in trying to keep U.S. forces in Europe. Later on I worked on the same issue in the MBFR context with Senator Mansfield's resolution to withdraw troops. Anyhow, this pressure was there and the administration was responding.

We had an interagency working group with Robert Bowie of John McNaughton, a gifted assistant secretary of Defense ISA who died in an air crash, and various general officers. They produced a report which recommended a modest withdrawal and a modest increase in the support payments of the European allies for these forces. It was the overall problem in miniature. The administration wanted to keep the troops there but we were always up against the question, why after all of these years, are these troops still there, are they needed, are the allies doing enough, and so forth?

Q: You were doing this from '66 until when?

DEAN: Until '68 when I went to Germany.

Q: How serious did you feel we were about troop reduction there?

DEAN: None of the people that were working on it wanted to have troop reductions. They were just feeding the lions the minimum diet that they thought they could get away with. There was nothing incorrect about that. That is what they did and they did it relatively successfully. They bought more time and so that exercise was quite successful and quite worthwhile.

Then we worked on an effort to resolve a long standing airline negotiation dispute with

Italy. Robert Bowie in my opinion was a great skeptic about the Vietnam War and he kept trying to get ideas across to Rusk but Rusk was, shall we say, desperately committed and wasn't interested in listening to contrary advice. He was feeling the pressure more and more. I don't think that for Bowie, it was as productive a period of service as his earlier one with Dulles.

Q: What was your impression of how Robert Bowie operated in the Department at this particular time?

DEAN: If anything Robert Bowie was characterized by a trenchant intellect and clarity of presentation which had made him valuable before and at that time. I think he relied on his intellectual gifts to grasp a new situation and to produce some advice. He wrote many memos to the secretary on a whole variety of topics that were going on at that time, but the Vietnam War really overshadowed everything, and I feel he was underworked as a result.

Q: Did he have any part of that as far as his responsibility or was that somewhere else?

DEAN: No, that wasn't with him. I think as soon as Secretary Rusk realized that he was disaffected on the subject, he ceased referring topics of that kind to him. It was a rough time for everybody.

Q: Were you in this job in August of '68 when the Soviets moved into Czechoslovakia?

DEAN: No. I had just gone to Germany at that time.

Q: I was wondering then, this was before that happened when you were there, what was the attitude to the "Soviet menace?"

DEAN: I will say that I used to see a great deal at that time of Robert Barras, who was an INR Soviet expert, and Helmut Sonnenfeldt, whom I personally don't consider a very appealing person, but who was extremely well qualified. After I was designated to go to Bonn I talked to Sonnenfeldt quite a bit and he told me that in his opinion sooner or later, and probably sooner, the Soviet Union would in fact intervene in Czechoslovakia in some form. Just before I left for Germany, he gave me a fairly precise forecast that they would start exercises and move into Czechoslovakia, which was exactly what happened. The prevailing view was that Soviet imperialism was still extremely strong and the administration didn't see too much possibility at that point of new initiatives. However, out of this invasion of Czechoslovakia, as the Soviet Union attempted to reestablish its international credit, there came an opportunity on Berlin that we later were able to exploit.

Q: You left in '68 and went to Germany?

DEAN: Yes, in August.

Q: What was your job when you went to Germany?

DEAN: My old Congo nemesis, George McGhee, who was ambassador in Germany, asked me whether I was interested in becoming political counselor there at the embassy in Bonn. We arrived I think only about two weeks before the actual Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. I remember on that day the ambassador (I have the impression that it was Ambassador Lodge, but I'm not sure.) and I went to see the Chancellor Kiesinger. I saw again for the first time in several years Franz Joseph Strauss whom I knew quite well. He gave me a dirty grin as sort of triumphant, "I told you so about these Russians all the time."

That same morning, I received a phone call from the EUCOM commander, who was about to launch a very big military exercise along the Czechoslovak border using both German and American military forces. He asked me whether I thought he should go ahead with this. I told him that in my opinion he should suspend it immediately and that's what he did. There was some criticism afterward that we telegraphed the fact that we weren't going to interfere and this made it easier for the Soviets to carry out this invasion. I still think that it was the absolutely right thing to do under the circumstances.

Q: We had no intention of interfering and this could have made it worse.

DEAN: Yes. It could have resulted in a major confrontation.

Q: I would imagine that the fall of 1956 and the Hungarian revolution was very much on our minds, wasn't it, as far as we'd been accused of overstimulating the revolutionaries in Hungary and then letting them down, so this was a factor?

DEAN: Indeed it was. In 1956 I happened to be a guest of the German minister, Albrecht von Kessel, here in Washington, on the day of the Suez invasion. His guests were Walter Lippman and Lady Barbara Salt, minister at the British embassy. Lippman lit into Lady Barbara for carrying out this invasion and confusing international opinion at the very time when this very serious Russian invasion of Hungary was going on. I must say that I and others felt absolutely awful about our inactivity at that time and about the killing that went on. Yes, I had Hungary in mind.

Q: How did this hit Germany and our mission when this happened? Was it sort of expected?

DEAN: I think, as the behavior of Franz Joseph Strauss indicated, the Pact invasion was a classic example of Russian behavior. Dubcek had gone into the Prague Spring and had developed a remarkable flexibility in the country which I had served in several years before, which was then the prototype of the last redoubt of Stalinism under Novotny. So yes, it was a remarkable operation and fortunately there were not many casualties and there wasn't much physical resistance by the Czechs. The Russians carried it out and they had symbolic participation of East Germany and various other of their Warsaw Pact allies who must have felt badly about this, because it could happen to them and many

sympathized with the Dubcek policy.

Q: I would have imagined that in many ways, although it was a great tragedy for the Czechs and really for the world, at the same time from your perspective in Bonn it made things easier to a certain extent because we didn't want the Germans to get too far in their Ostpolitik or whatever.

DEAN: That was just cranking up.

Q: So this in a way kept them in line and you can say, see what happens?

DEAN: It did answer our critics in the United States of the American troop presence in Germany. It did confirm the continuing Cold War and the need for American military presence in Europe. But it didn't hold down the German thinking on the need for change from the Cold War line.

My first interview in the Foreign Ministry was with Ulrich Sahm, who was the head of their political department. He told me of the German interest that something be done to deal with the short-range Soviet nuclear weapons stationed in Eastern Europe. As you know this was the time when the SALT talks were supposed to begin and had to be postponed by President Johnson because of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Germans felt that we didn't take into consideration their security concerns in the preparations to negotiate reduction of strategic weapons aimed at the United States. This concern went on and on and played a role in German thinking, until it finally culminated in the great missile confrontation with the Pershing II's and the SS-20s in the early '80s.

It was just the version of that time of the continuing German malaise about American nuclear and defense protection vis-à-vis the Soviet Union which was a characteristic of the relationship – protection is good, but is it reliable? Can you really trust another country with final responsibility for your own security? It was a very deep problem and remained such throughout the Cold War. It was a recurrent theme in German-American relations together with the other theme which you've mentioned already -- German neutralism or whether Germany would be a reliable ally or not. This time the distrust was on the side of the U.S. These two factors – U.S. nuclear protection and German unity – were the two main factors in the German-American relationship. German unification was always believed by Americans to be the lever by which the Soviet Union could affect the loyalty of Germany and bring it over on its side. That theme of the German Ostpolitik came up in full force after Czechoslovakia, which many Germans regarded as the last paroxysm of Soviet imperialism.

Willy Brandt was the German foreign minister at that time and in December of 1968 he raised the issue in the so-called Bonn Group at the NATO. NATO foreign ministers gather once a year, at least, at the actual foreign minister level. Those having responsibility for Germany, that is the United States, Britain and France, together with Germany, formed the so-called Bonn Group in Bonn, usually staffed by the political counselors, unless a high-level issue was involved. The Bonn Group foreign ministers,

the four-powers, met on the edge of the annual NATO meetings and reviewed the situation. This was, shall we say, the core directorate of the Cold War of the Western states in the Cold War.

In that meeting, Brandt raised the possibility of negotiating on Berlin. The other ministers were quite skeptical. Brandt insisted that this would be possible. As it happened, his chief assistant, Egon Bahr, had extensive discussions with a Soviet representative in East Berlin about this issue and they apparently had indicated that they were willing to make a deal on Berlin. Anyhow, Brandt's proposal gestated for another year or so before it really became a prominent issue. Bahr's contacts with the Soviet Union were known to the U.S. and were a source of distrust for the Ostpolitik.

The Bonn Group on the operating level consisted of the political counselors of the British, French and U.S. embassies and the deputy political director of the Auswärtiges Amt, most of the time an official Gunther van Well, who was later German ambassador to the UN and to Washington. He was a very gifted interpreter of German policy. This man kept the allies more or less satisfied during the most intense and revolutionary period of the Ostpolitik by giving them his interpretation, his version, of what was going on and explaining to them each move in advance.

This stream of reports that the Bonn Group sent in more or less satisfied the home foreign ministries, though not entirely. Kissinger was very worried about the Germans getting out in front and taking the lead, the initiative, in dealings with the Soviet Union and undermining the authority of the United States. He indicated at various times his doubts and dissatisfaction and sometimes that came out in public and we had to answer questions about it.

Q: What about sort of your feeling and maybe of our embassy about Willy Brandt and possibly opening up this Ostpolitik? Was Willy Brandt somebody we were uncomfortable with at that particular time?

DEAN: I think the administration was rather uncomfortable with him. They wanted to be in charge and they suspected the Soviet Union deeply. They saw no benefit and a lot of risk in the Germans getting out in front. They did not trust German judgment and they overrated Soviet cleverness.

Personally, I had advocated various versions of what I call the policy of engagement with Eastern Europe earlier on. I considered this was the right time to try this approach in East Germany and Eastern Europe. I considered that it would contribute to stability in East-West relations, satisfy the German desire to play a more important role in their own future, a role which they merited, I thought, and would actually exploit an excellent tactical opportunity because the Russians and Soviet Union were making such a strong effort to reestablish themselves in world opinion after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. I thought that the Soviets could be brought to pay something in terms of actual concessions, especially on Berlin, the main area of our own security concerns and risks.

With regard to the dealings of the West Germans with the East Germans, I thought West Germany had proved itself to be by far the stronger and I was not worried that East Germany was going to develop some kind of leverage on West Germany and lead it into the political wilderness. For Washington, the question was whether Germany could be brought in some form to throw its weight to the other side – or, whether through this relationship, Germany would in fact contribute importantly to undermining Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, which was the actual outcome.

Q: This is interesting because I think to the general public with the Soviets moving in on Czechoslovakia this was meant to show they were really tough but actually this showed they were weak and this left them in a weaker position afterwards.

DEAN: Yes it did. The Soviets had alienated all of the Warsaw Pact countries including Romania which refused to participate. None of the others liked it. Fear of Germany had served as the only real glue there was for the Warsaw Pact, and here was Germany acting in a somewhat civilized manner. Later on, of course, as part of the Ostpolitik, Germany made great efforts to regularize its relationships with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and all of the Eastern European countries. These efforts paid off in 1989-1990 as the Warsaw Pact system collapsed in Eastern Europe.

Q: As the political counselor you were also looking at developments within Germany. Did we have a bias towards the CDU or a concern about the SPD?

DEAN: Yes, traditionally, we surely did. As part of this complex of German dependence on the U.S. for security and the possibility of some treasonous German deal with the East, the Social Democrats were suspect because they were supposed to be the ones that were going to sell out and lead Germany astray.

Q: I think we will pick this up the next time with major specific developments that happened during the time you were in Bonn. We talked about the Ostpolitik and the invasion of Czechoslovakia. You were in Bonn from when to when?

DEAN: That time from '68 to '72.

Q: Today is the 28th of July. Were you there when the Soviets and the satellites moved into Czechoslovakia?

DEAN: Definitely. I just arrived a few days before that. I don't know if we covered this point, but we can go over it again. I talked to Helmut Sonnenfeldt a few days before I left. Russian forces were moving around from their bases and he insisted with considerable foresight that Russia would indeed invade Czechoslovakia. That's what happened at the end of August 1968 under the guise of Warsaw Pact maneuvers. Later I talked to East Germans and others who were involved. The involvement of the other Warsaw Pact forces was titular, but none of them liked being forced into it, to repress a

fellow Eastern European country, because they could too easily see themselves in that situation.

The issue for us, and I think I did mention this already, was what was the significance of this Soviet action? Was it preparation for military activity, or a political action to repress the Prague Spring? We concluded it was the latter. I think I did mention that General Polk called me the morning of the invasion and wanted to know whether he should continue with a military exercise of the U.S. army and later German army on the Czech border. I urged him not to do that and he did postpone it.

Of course this Russian action did cause considerable concern in Germany about the future but there was relatively little fear of immediate military expansion. It was regarded by most as a confirmation of their views of the Soviet Union. This reaction did put the Soviet Union in the situation where it felt constrained to make various friendly gestures towards Western Europe in order to sort of reestablish itself. We saw that as a possibility for negotiation.

At the foreign ministers meeting that year in December at NATO, the meeting of the four foreign ministers having to do with Germany (France, the United States, the UK, and Germany) the so-called Bonn Group ministers, Willy Brandt insisted that they should negotiate with the Soviet Union about access to Berlin. I don't know if we covered this?

Q: Let's put on here if we have covered it, we'll check it and if we haven't covered it we will come back to it. What about sort of the back staffing that you found in Washington? When you arrived there was the election of '68, Nixon came in and with Nixon came Henry Kissinger, Helmut Sonnenfeldt and all. These were part of the German mafia almost. These were people who knew the area. Did this make a difference because at sort of the seat of power you had people who knew Germany but from their own perspective which was really one of being refugees at one point?

DEAN: I think his past experience contributed in the case of Kissinger to a low assessment of the intellectual powers of the Germans in general and of the Social Democrats in particular. That's why he was so disturbed by the idea that Willy Brandt should take the lead on Ostpolitik and not immediately maintain a respectful position a few paces behind the United States in developing relations with the Soviet Union.

Later, it became known to Kissinger and the administration from intelligence sources that Egon Bahr, Brandt's chief assistant in Berlin and then in Bonn, was continuing to see a Russian KGB man in East Berlin. This confirmed suspicions of the un-wisdom of the German Ostpolitik. There were lots of questions from the press back here and some in Bonn about whether we were losing confidence in the Germans and we at the embassy fended those questions off.

It did turn out that this KGB contact had rather practical consequences, because in effect it prepared the entire sequence of German treaties with East Germany as well as parts of the Berlin agreement which we then moved to negotiate on. It made those fairly smooth. Actually this Bahr contact was picked up by the Russian ambassador in Bonn, Falin, with

Ambassador Rush and did facilitate this Berlin negotiation, the Berlin quadripartite agreement. I'm not sure whether we went over this or not because it would be important to...

Q: I tell you what, what I'm going to do is when I get back I'm going to go over this last part again so we'll move on ahead and if not, we will come back if we haven't covered this in some detail. The whole Berlin negotiations are so important on this. I saw Dennis Kux just before I came here and Dennis was saying you were really the key person on all of this. I'm going to review this when I get back and the next time around we'll cover this if needed.

In general was it difficult dealing in West Germany, particularly with the West Germans, when you thought that almost everything you did was probably going to end up on the desk of Soviet intelligence somewhere or was this just an occupational hazard?

DEAN: We didn't think too much about that. The Soviets were surely very active at NATO and even more so later on when we got into the NATO-Warsaw Pact force reduction negotiations. This was also the period when the Kiesinger government was replaced by the Social Democratic government under Willy Brandt. First, he was the foreign minister under the coalition government with Kiesinger, which was an innovation and marked progress on the long pilgrimage of the Social Democrats towards political respectability. Then we had the Brandt government proper when Brandt was chancellor and Walter Scheel foreign minister.

A great deal was changing in Germany. Fears of the Cold War were gradually dissipating with a more positive relationship with Russia and with East Germany. I remember the status of women, in particular, was becoming much more active. The young socialists with Karsten Voigt, who is now about to retire from the Bundestag having achieved the age limit, were organizing all kinds of rallies and so forth which 10, 15 years later culminated in these immense anti-nuclear demonstrations in Bonn which were equaled here by this big rally in Central Park with a million people on essentially the same thing. That was the time of the real nuclear controversy, which was yet to come at that point.

Q: Did you find that in Bonn you were seeing a different Social Democrat than say Kissinger and, through Kissinger, Nixon were seeing back in Washington?

DEAN: Most of the Social Democrats that we saw running the party were quite savvy about foreign policy and domestic policy and were not especially radical. They were dealing with the problems as they saw them and were managing to maintain public peace, labor peace, although later in the Schmidt government they went through something we were just beginning to see then and that was the Bader Meinhof terrorism. It began in that period. It was a remarkable quintessence of German vices and virtues, a situation where these sons and daughters of the former Nazis turned against the entire society considering it indulgent towards the abhorrent German past. Through a series of cold-blooded crimes they tried to destroy that society.

This development caused the German government to have to establish all kinds of physical barricades and personnel checks of the same kind that we are familiar with today here. It was a real test of the German government. It passed new laws permitting the government to obtain court orders for wire tapping, which up to that time we had been doing under our own occupational authority and ordaining it. Anyhow, they came through this particular phase rather well, without having sacrificed any of their new democratic institutions and without moving towards the authoritarian in their effort to control this really fearsome phenomenon of terrorist strikes. This was yet another test of German democracy, an unexpected, but successful one.

Q: Were we using whatever information we had and did we pass on to the Germans what we were picking up?

DEAN: Yes, but I don't think we had a great deal of information on this. On the other hand, many of the terrorists were trained in the Soviet Union and there was an international network of that so I suppose we were picking up something, but not much that I know of.

Q: During the Bader Meinhof terrorist time, did you see any strengthening of the rightist parties or ones which we consider almost neo-Nazi in order to deal with this phenomenon?

DEAN: That might have been a plausible expectation, but it didn't actually occur. As I say it was yet another test and of course test after test came, but that one struck me as being particularly difficult because although Bader Meinhofs were in my opinion more fascist themselves than anything else, the general atmosphere of terrorism was left-wing extremism and so forth. The government's severity elicited quite a negative response and seemed to strengthen the left opposition and the Greens. I think if these events had happened here, the American polity might have reacted in a nationalistic, right wing way.

Q: I suspect it could have happened. I think probably more than any other country, we were continually taking the temperature of the Germans because of our concern particularly from the Adolf Hitler time. For some reason you have this type of action happening in Germany and a little latter it happened in Italy but it didn't happen in France.

DEAN: They did have a few incidents elsewhere, but not many, that's right. That's a good question. I don't know. Of course American military officers were targets of the later phase of Bader Meinhof during the missile controversy of the 1980s, and in Italy as well. There, they kidnapped a major general.

Q: Brigadier General Dozier in '81 I think.

DEAN: Anyhow this was a phenomenon. Then of course Japan was another focus. These developments were happening among the young generation in rather straitlaced societies which had been involved in the losing side in World War II. The younger generation in

its most extreme members was attacking the older generation.

Another thing that was important at that time in that period in Germany was the development of a critical press and public media. This came out more clearly later, but even at that time the German press was critical of the government no matter what it was. This was most extreme in the case of the *Spiegel* magazine, which was run by Augstein, which I thought was extremely unobjective and crusading in its muckraking attack on all authorities in power, with never a positive word for good performance. Many of us felt that this practice could critically undermine public respect for the new institutions of Germany and that it was not good. But Germans were able to digest this negativism together with these huge long reports of all kinds of facts, some of them rather skewed. Television, too, was very critical towards the German government, both the Social Democrats and later the Christian Democrats. They were criticized with extreme vigor and this was one more, positive sign that the German democracy had passed the test. In many ways, Germany today is a more thoroughly democratic society, with an exception of attitudes toward foreign workers, than the United States.

Q: Was there any women's movement going on at that time?

DEAN: Yes, definitely it was coming up and it was regarded as something strange but the younger generation of Germans at that time, around 30 or so or younger, were very open minded about novelties, very experiment minded and very open to new developments in sciences and all other fields. I think the women's movement in Germany never achieved the vehemence of the American version and it seemed to me to sort of fall through an open door into acceptance there.

Q: President Nixon must have made a visit or two during this time didn't he?

DEAN: Yes. His first visit I believe to Europe was to Germany. He was accompanied by Kissinger. The administration took over the whole embassy. Every presidential visit they would throw the deputy chief of mission out of his house. In the case of Lyndon Johnson they ripped out the bathroom and put in a new bathroom with different-colored tile, the imperial presidency. I remember I was supposed to be doing the arrangements for that visit but then I committed an error. I was supposed to bring Kissinger and Franz Joseph Strauss together but I sent one to an address, the same named street, in Bonn and one to the same named street in Bad Godesberg. At this point I was removed by the harried chargé d'affaires, Russ Fessenden, from this task. I must say he was very forbearing.

Q: I would imagine that Nixon would have been well respected in Germany.

DEAN: He was, yes. We had the imperial presidency. One of the first signs of that was John Ehrlichman, the administration's advance man, got quite a large part the embassy together and gave us a big talk on what the president wanted, what he expected, the atmosphere, the product that was supposed to come out of this trip, and so forth. Today we wouldn't consider that kind of advance team (three or four others, Haldeman was also there) as anything exceptional. But it was the inauguration of that kind of megalithic style

that we have maintained since. I saw President Clinton recently had an entourage of 1,000 in Beijing. They had their own communications, their own this and that. President Johnson had the entire contents of a favorite shoe store in Berlin brought to him in Bonn because he couldn't make it to Berlin, and so forth. This was, as I say, the imperial presidency. This was the first sign of that. Of course Nixon's election had been quite hard fought and we didn't know exactly what to expect. Anyhow the visit took place and it was a successful visit.

Q: When you were there Nixon appointed what ambassador?

DEAN: We had Henry Cabot Lodge and later it was Ken Rush. Henry Cabot Lodge was there at the outset, then we had a long interregnum and then Rush arrived.

Q: What was your impression of Lodge?

DEAN: He was a very affable, genial man. He told me he had been a journalist and therefore had intense distrust of journalists. The first thing that happened after he arrived in the business end was that some poor East German was shot attempting to cross the Berlin Wall. I issued a statement saying this was one more example of communist tyranny, barbarism, and so forth. It was nothing extraordinary but Ambassador Lodge took considerable exception to that. He didn't think we should talk to the press about anything. He said never trust them, never say anything to them. This apparently was the result of his own experience in the past.

I remember one event during the time he was ambassador. He had of course been ambassador in Vietnam. One day Major General George Keegan who later became the air force chief of intelligence (he was in my class at Harvard) showed up and gave a long talk to Ambassador Lodge and to me about how the Air Force had won the war in Vietnam, and the Air Force had bombed the Viet Minh trail to powder and pulp so that nobody could ever use it again and therefore the war was won in Vietnam. I guess this would be approximately in '69 or something.

Q: How did Lodge respond?

DEAN: I don't think he believed anything anybody told him at this point. He didn't say too much about it. In any case, he and his wife were well liked by German leaders. He was obviously an aristocratic type of person, but he was very affable and he was believed to have the ear of the president, so Germans were well satisfied.

Q: How about Rush?

DEAN: Rush was far more vigorous, far more determined. He had of course been Nixon's law professor at Duke and Nixon asked him later on to take on his defense in Watergate for that reason. Rush arranged that the president be told by various other officials in the administration that this would be a terrible mistake because Rush was so involved in serious foreign affairs at that time that he couldn't be spared. That was a later development. But he was a far more vigorous and far more take-charge guy than

Ambassador Lodge.

We had already started with tentative preparations for the Berlin negotiations and Ambassador Rush really took it up with great vigor. Unbeknownst to me at that time he established a back channel communication with Valentin Falin, the Soviet ambassador in Bonn, and with the very same Egon Bahr who was state secretary in the chancellor's office. Bahr was Brandt's chief assistant for foreign affairs and particularly for relations with the East. Rush really took charge and he was very decisive, very determined in what he said. He really had a clear mind and a lot of energy. I would say he was quite a good ambassador.

I do remember falling foul of him on one occasion. He didn't like it when his subordinates made arrangements for him that he didn't personally approve. I remember his giving me an awful dressing down about that when I tried to change his schedule without his knowledge. That incident was a reflection of the great tension between the Berlin experts in Berlin and the embassy political section during this Berlin negotiation. It was quite an intensive bureaucratic civil war.

Q: I wonder if you could talk a bit about this. You had I think Ms. Dulles and other people who essentially were there on the Berlin situation and who developed their own sort of cadre and own outlook. Then you had the ones dealing with the rest of Germany. Here we are at a very critical time in the '68-72 period, was there a difference in looking at the situation of people who concentrated on Berlin and the German end?

DEAN: Definitely. Willy Brandt, who originated this on the basis of Bahr's talks with the Russians, told the foreign ministers in December of '68 in Brussels at their Bonn Group meeting that he thought it would be possible to negotiate with the Russians on access to Berlin. This was the neglected area in wartime agreements having to do with setting up the four power control in Berlin and Germany. What had been neglected was German civilian access. All the arrangements had to do with military access and somehow it was assumed that civilian access would be automatic or that there would be only limited travel by German civilians. Of course, the division of the country was not foreseen at that time during those '44-'45 negotiations in London about the occupation zone, the command authority, control of Berlin, and so on.

Anyhow, Brandt insisted that it would be possible to improve the situation somewhat, you could get more passes for West Berliners to visit East Berlin. Brandt had been active as burgermeister, as mayor of Berlin, in getting some East German passes for people to visit their relatives in East Berlin. He thought something could be done on this, and that maybe the access situation could be improved.

The people operating the western mechanism in Berlin, that is the commandant who was a military officer but also the State Department officers, the permanent staff, in particular David Klein, the minister and the whole staff there I would say, had extremely strong possessive feelings about Berlin. Beyond that, they thought the mechanism that had grown up in and around Berlin was so intricate and so delicate that efforts to open it up in

negotiation would very probably result in its breakdown, so they very strongly opposed these negotiations.

I must say I was not fully informed at that point on all of the ins and outs and practices which had grown up over the years in and around Berlin; it was a whole culture of its own. I still had to learn that. However, I was convinced that Soviet efforts to reestablish the foreign standing of the Soviet Union after the invasion of Czechoslovakia could be exploited and that the Soviets could be made to pay with very specific improvements and demonstrations of these alleged good intentions. I also believed that it would be a mistake to try to frustrate, or to be seen to frustrate the Germans in the pursuit of what was after all their most intensely felt national interest. Even on those grounds alone, even if it didn't work, we should support the German policy. In any case we finally did decide to pursue it.

Q: Were you feeling at the time that Henry Kissinger was pretty much calling the shots, (obviously the president was the prime mover) within sort of the government bureaucracy or did you feel that the State Department was part of the process?

DEAN: No, Henry Kissinger was clearly doing it. But Henry Kissinger also didn't like these Berlin negotiations either because they represented in his eyes an excessive German independence in relations with Russia and a dangerous area. I think I did mention last time that, right from the division of Germany, the idea that Russia could neutralize the whole of Germany by propaganda, by seemingly serious proposals to reunite the country, were combined with a low estimate of German common sense and willingness to withstand these appeals to national feeling. The U.S. fear from the outset was that the entire Cold War could be lost with some brilliant Soviet propaganda which Western democracies, being subject to democratic controls, could never hope to equal and that the Soviets would in this way achieve political and military victory. In fact when Europe saw any German brewings, or even any German discussion, of reunification, or conditions for reunification, and so forth, this development was viewed with intense suspicion by successive administrations in Washington and I think it was probably maybe at its most intense with Kissinger.

Q: A move of this nature, the reverse was exactly what Kissinger would have loved to have done had he been sitting in Moscow instead of Washington.

DEAN: Yes, that kind of manipulation would surely have appealed to him. That's right. But this U.S. concern was generic, deep-seated and very widespread. I know from my first service in Bonn in 1951-1956, this was then the major subject or the major concern: German unification, how the Russians could play on German feelings. This is one of the prices Germans had to pay for Hitler and the war. Of course Germany continued to be divided and this fear, and this concern continued of course right up through Willy Brandt and beyond.

Q: Were you seeing any effort on the side of the Soviets to really try to exploit this and to do something about it, or was there in a way the same concern that they had a concern,

no matter neutral or not, a united Germany is not what they wanted?

DEAN: At a certain point in the development – it was after Germany joined NATO – the Soviets stopped making efforts to suggest all-German elections, and concentrated instead on bolstering East Germany and indeed the whole Warsaw Pact structure and on consolidating what they had. That of course was the threat behind Khrushchev's renewed blockade of Berlin in '61 when he threatened to transfer to the East Germans the complete responsibility for maintaining Berlin and access to Berlin. It was feared then that the East Germans would be far less responsible and far more inclined to extreme behavior than the Soviets because they did not have, shall we say, the worldwide interest in preventing an all-out conflict with the United States that the Soviet Union did. That was the background for these discussions about Berlin access.

There was a fear in Washington, not only of Sovietphobes, that East Germany would end up with its status increased. Indeed, that was exactly what did happen in that East Germany in practice became associated with the four wartime allies and the Federal Republic of Germany in the administration of Berlin. That was the practical outcome of these Berlin negotiations. And, of course, as part of the whole complex, the Federal Republic recognized East Germany as an independent state. They assumed diplomatic relations with one another and both German nations entered the United Nations as independent states. What some had feared as the outcome was indeed the outcome, but I would say that it was constructive.

Q: In a way with the Soviets behind the idea of creating a more legitimate East German state, it was playing to our hands too wasn't it? It kept this neutralist card from being played.

DEAN: That of course is the case, that's right. Very occasionally, but less frequently, the Soviets would mention German unification. Even less frequently, the East German leadership mentioned it, but the issue was there nonetheless even though they weren't making proposals. The desire of the German people in both parts of Germany was indeed for unification and that played a role.

Q: I would have thought a major concern would have been that all of a sudden East German people would just get tired of the whole thing and the East German government would be so inept or something or shoot the wrong students, or do something. All of a sudden there would be sort of a mass peoples uprising, not a war, and that the West Germans would sort of come in.

DEAN: Yes, there was fear of German military intervention. But German forces were so entwined in NATO that it was not a serious possibility. And that's what happened in a way at the end when the East German government in order to bolster its standing took up with the East German churches and they started all these meetings in the major cities, discussions which in several cases became mass demonstrations.

Q: We're talking about 1989.

DEAN: That's right.

Q: This must have been almost not a nightmare but something which certainly would be destabilizing as all hell because it could develop rather quickly.

DEAN: Yes.

Q: I'm talking about at the time that you were there.

DEAN: Of course the basic importance of the Ostpolitik and all of these agreements, coming to the final outcome and the conclusion, was that they convinced the East German officials that, if there was some kind of political settlement, they were not going to be taken out and executed by the victors. That eliminated probably the most basic reason for resisting the later unification.

Q: We can come back to this German thing. I am going to review it to make sure that we've covered the points because there may have been some things that we've missed and this is a critical period. To move on, in '72, you went where?

DEAN: I came back to Washington where Ken Rush was deputy secretary of State. I asked him if he would help me get assigned to the NATO-Pact force reduction talks that were just getting under way. He did designate me as the official in charge of the preparations for the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. I was interested in doing this because I felt this was the military component of ending the Cold War which the Berlin agreement had been the first political part.

Q: You did this from '72 until when?

DEAN: It was a good idea, but it did not come to fruition in my time. I was involved in MBFR from 1972 to 1981, a long stretch. Most of it was in Vienna itself. The first part of '72 was taken up with negotiations first among the Washington agencies, then with the NATO countries, and then preparatory talks with the Warsaw Pact in Vienna. The MBFR negotiations proper then got started in the fall of 1972.

Q: In '72 when you arrived on the scene, what was the status of the MBFR talks?

DEAN: They didn't exist. We started up an interagency group in Washington, developed a position, and then started to talk inside NATO about what we should do. The talks were encouraged by a statement by Brezhnev in Tbilisi that in this issue of force reductions we "should taste the wine." That encouraged the Western countries to move ahead. This was the period of the first SALT talks, as you know. The Germans were quite intent that if there was going to be a military detente or any form of disarmament between the United States and Russia on the strategic level, that they too should benefit and that there should be also a conventional force reduction. They were the chief instigators on the NATO side,

together with the smaller NATO countries, Netherlands and Belgium. They wanted force reductions and they wanted to be part of detente if it was going to take place.

This was the first NATO alliance negotiation with the Warsaw Pact and it started off rather badly. Donald Rumsfeld was our NATO representative at that time. I went over to NATO to present preliminary Washington views on the Western negotiating position for discussion in the Alliance. We had tentatively agreed with the Russians that we could meet in Vienna. This caused a great furor among the NATO ambassadors, because NATO had decided that the venue of the negotiation should be Geneva. The Soviet Union had proposed that the venue should be Vienna. I personally thought Vienna would be better than Geneva because the Austrian government could do better by us than the Swiss government for these talks. The Austrian chancellor was trying to build up, as he later explained to us, an Austrian involvement in the outside world and prevent provincialism. He went out of his way to be a very constructive host to these negotiations. Anyhow, we tentatively said it could be in Vienna and this caused enormous reaction from the NATO ambassadors. They said this was our first negotiation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and that it had been inaugurated by NATO's defeat over the venue.

Q: What was the theology behind Geneva or Vienna?

DEAN: The theology was that NATO had on the basis of not very serious criteria decided that Geneva was better. Possibly because the SALT talks were moving there, although they had taken place in Vienna earlier. In any case it was NATO's decision which was being contravened or not carried out by us. I had to go and talk with the ambassadors. Ambassador Spierenberg, the Netherlands ambassador, was very strong on this as was the Belgian ambassador. I had to reassure them that we weren't going to cave to the Russians and that we would be tough. Maintaining NATO coherence and unity in this first negotiation was an extremely important value, probably higher in the minds of many of the governments, including the U.S. government, than making any progress on these negotiations. We did a fair job, although the Belgians walked out of the talks at one point.

The cohesion issue arose at the very outset. Yuri Kwitzinski, later the Russian ambassador in Bonn and the acting foreign minister at the time of the anti-Gorbachev coup, and a member of the central committee, had been my opposite number in the Berlin talks. When we arrived in Vienna I called Kwitzinski and he said sure let's get together and we'll deal with these preliminaries. I said I am part of an alliance here. I am not authorized by them to do this on my own, and as a matter of fact, they have decided that the Netherlands representative should be their intermediary. "Pish" he said, "we don't want these small guys interfering with us." This was kind of embarrassing for me, so I finally arranged that both I and the Netherlands ambassador would see him. We used this system of dual intermediaries for quite some time to discuss the preliminaries.

For months in these talks, we were unable to hold a plenary session because of another issue of controversy between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The NATO Council had first decided that Hungary should not be among the countries whose own domestic military forces should be reduced as well as Russian forces and then had reversed itself and said

Hungary should be included. The Russians in Hungary were not forces intended for the central front if war broke out. The Hungarians wanted Russian forces there reduced but they couldn't break ranks with the Soviets. Anyhow, the problem was that, at the outset, NATO and the Pact disagreed over a division of the participants into countries which would reduce their forces and those which were so-called flanks, like Turkey and Norway on our side and Bulgaria on the Russia side. The flanks would not be called on to reduce their forces.

Q: Italy?

DEAN: Italy was an observer. In any case, there was no agreement with the Pact on this issue and on the status of participants, other than those on NATO's central front. On the first occasion in which we all met under the then Austrian Foreign Minister Kirschschrager (later president), it was really kind of diplomatically ridiculous, objectively ridiculous, the NATO delegates stood and the Warsaw Pact delegates sat. We stood because we had been assigned alphabetical positions and I ended up next to Bulgaria in the German alphabet or whatever they were using.

So we started off with a controversy about the status of Hungary which went on for six months and because we hadn't agreed what category the delegates should fit into, it prevented us from having a single plenary session of these negotiations. The Belgians who were very strong for progress in these talks, insisted there should be plenary sessions. We insisted there couldn't be any plenary sessions until we established the status of these countries, these representatives, and whether they were going to reduce their forces or not reduce their forces. We were insisting that Hungary and forces in it should be reduced; Russia said no.

Q: Obviously, the Hungarian military was of no particular importance in the equation.

DEAN: That's true for clear historic reasons, but the Hungarians deeply wanted the Russian forces reduced there.

Q: Was this a procedure on the part of the Soviets to block the negotiations?

DEAN: No. Allied intelligence authorities had concluded that the Group of Russian forces in Hungary would not be used on a direct attack on Germany which was the main access of potential attack but in fact had functions in Yugoslavia and northern Italy. For those reasons, the original NATO position had been not to invite Hungary to be a so-called direct participant.

This is going back in time, but in the preliminaries among NATO members, the Turks went to Ken Rush as undersecretary and said they would leave the alliance if they were not permitted to be present at these negotiations. We did not intend to have observers from other NATO countries but we ended up with observers with all of these countries. Italy decided it wanted to be there too. Then they increased their status.

Q: And Greece if Turkey went in had to be I'm sure.

DEAN: Greece had to be there, exactly, so it was. We ended up with a more unwieldy group with all countries except France, and these so-called flank participants or special participants exercised enormous influence on the specific day-to-day tactics of the NATO participants. In the case of Italy they were represented by a brilliant Ambassador Cagрати, and by a very good staff of men who later ran the disarmament section of the Italian foreign ministry. They were a distinct thorn in the side of the United States.

Q: What were they after?

DEAN: They had a very conservative agenda: no concessions, no mistakes in these talks; maintain Western unity and preferably let's not have any results out of these negotiations unless the Pact wants to surrender. In any case we ended up with these special participants. They were all massed there at this first session with the Austrian foreign minister and that was when the issue of alphabetical order and what groupings arose.

At the end of six months, I was told by Ray Garthoff, who was then in Political Military Affairs in the State Department, that before the preparatory talks began, Kissinger had made a secret deal with Brezhnev to accept that Hungary would not be a direct participant and the Hungarian forces and the Soviet forces in Hungary would not be reduced in these negotiations. The whole thing had already been cooked up and nobody had bothered to tell me. Anyhow, the tension of not having formal negotiations was beginning to tell. The Belgian delegation walked out and I had to go as a supplicant to Davignon of the Belgian foreign ministry and beg him to return his delegation. He sent an observer.

Q: One gets the strong feeling that Kissinger was probably more willing to give in than one normally credits him for and also this enjoyment of sort of undercutting the regular diplomatic process. But often there really were principles at stake which he was not that interested in.

DEAN: I think he had a strong feeling of contempt for the regular Foreign Service, at least that was my strong impression from various reports that we made to him, verbal reports. He was a person that placed great weight on establishing the subordination of everybody around him. He made the crudest remarks about Eagleburger, Sonnenfeldt and so forth, at the beginning of these reporting sessions and seemed to demean them ritually as a part of his satisfaction in life. I thought he was personally abominable for this reason. Otherwise I never had any personal complaints.

Anyhow, he had made this deal with Brezhnev and rather typically I think had failed to inform anyone about it because that was one of the real characteristics of his modus operandi was keeping all the details to himself and nobody else would interfere and bureaucracy couldn't block the deal. That's what happened in this case. In the case of the Berlin agreement, the back channel operation that he had also with Ken Rush broke down when he was out of the circuit and was not available. I think he was on one of his China

missions and the State Department ordered us at the end of the negotiation not to sign the agreement because we had not fulfilled all of the conditions which the State Department desk officer, Jim Sutterlin, had agreed on with the National Security Council on these negotiations. The outcome was okay with Kissinger, it later emerged, but we were ordered not to proceed. Rush told me to inform the State Department that we had already signed the agreement. That was another case in which Kissinger's failure to maintain contact caused considerable difficulties.

Q: In the first place could you talk about what was the goal of MBFR at the time? What was this supposed to do?

DEAN: The basic purpose was to reduce the very large numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces to a position of equality slightly below the level of the NATO forces. We proposed to lead off with quite a minor reduction of American forces of about 20,000, in return for a reduction of many more Russians. We pursued this goal in vain for over 16 years. I was with it for eight or nine years.

When the successor CFE talks were held, Shevardnadze as the Russian foreign minister stated that the purpose of the talks should be equality at a level lower than the level of the weaker side. He accepted our MBFR objective. Since the Russians then for the first time exchanged data on their forces showing huge Warsaw Pact numerical superiority in the first session of that negotiation, he conceded the point that we had been vainly attempting to get for 16 years in these prior negotiations.

Q: You were involved in this process at the beginning. Was there a feeling that this was going to go somewhere?

DEAN: The Germans wanted some progress and I thought it would be good because it was time to do it. Most Western experts were extremely skeptical that the Russians wanted anything. It became quite clear in the course of the talks that the Russian military wanted nothing. Foreign Minister Gromyko seemed to want to move not immoderately. The Foreign Ministry would make small concessions, but they never could break through to the central issue which I've already mentioned and that was to bring about an exchange of information on these forces on both sides, their numbers and armaments. We thought this would be a natural beginning for any kind of talk. Of course that would have documented our point that the Warsaw Pact was superior numerically and should be reduced.

We could have taken a different approach. We could have argued that both sides had formations with a certain amount of firepower and tried to equalize that. That approach probably would have made a somewhat better case for the Soviet forces. But we had started out with the idea that both sides should produce the total figures on their manpower and equipment. We did produce ours but they never produced theirs. We even produced some of our own figures on Pact forces in the effort to get a reaction and comment from them.

Q: We must have had a pretty good fix on what they had, didn't we?

DEAN: When the Pact finally produced their data at the beginning of the CFE talks, it was fairly close to what we had indicated we thought they had. However, our figures were based on extrapolation and estimates. We had very little information on specific units. The contested Soviet security had been too effective. But data exchange was a basic question. That, and verification, if reductions were agreed. They wouldn't give an inch on that either. That too came in with Gorbachev. He permitted the first on-site verification of the Soviet Union at the Stockholm CSCE talks.

Q: There was the beginning of what was known as the Helsinki Accords at this time too.

DEAN: That was parallel.

Q: Because these things became far more important later than I think anybody realized at the time on either side, I was wondering what was the attitude towards them from the people who were negotiating which sounded like much more of the big game effort?

DEAN: That's right. For the U.S., the force reductions were the main thing and the administration was not willing to go ahead with Helsinki and "detente," a word later forbidden by President Ford, unless the Soviets gave us dates for the beginning of the force reduction talks. Brezhnev turned out to be considerably more interested in the Helsinki talks, which in his view were supposed to lead to the political acceptance by Western countries of the legitimacy of the Warsaw Pact governments, than he was in the force reduction talks. Even though he had encouraged Helsinki to begin, I think that was all just part of reestablishing his credibility after this invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Russians were more interested in that subject, and the U.S. was more interested in the force reductions, not as a route to doing anything, but in terms of the seriousness of the negotiations.

Q: You keep pointing to something that I think is often lost, how badly the Soviets felt about how their prestige and all had been wounded by the Czech thing rather than this is just an exercise in might and we can do what we want. They felt that they really had to do things elsewhere to make up for that.

DEAN: That's right. That is how we saw it at the time. But the dominant Soviet motive at Berlin and Helsinki could have been to consolidate the legitimacy of the Pact governments, including the GDR. In fact, I think the Prague invasion was a weighty decision that they didn't want to have to take. It was just that they felt that, ideologically, continuation of the Dubcek approach would cause the dissolution of the system if they permitted it.

Q: You started this in '72, and you said you kept with this more or less until '81?

DEAN: Yes. I was first in charge of the interagency talks here in the State Department, then of the preparatory talks in Vienna, and then the negotiations proper took place.

Stanley Resor was designated as the head of the delegation and I was his deputy and remained that until '78 when I became the head.

Q: Talking about the interagency side, I would have thought that the real opponent would be the Pentagon as opposed to the Soviets for you.

DEAN: There was a very tight and apprehensive view of negotiating this kind of subject matter with the Russians and the Warsaw Pact. The National Security Council, under Kissinger and a series of people that ran the actual coordination, kept a very firm grip on the preparations. We developed the usual options. Kissinger refused to be confronted with a joint recommendation by the bureaucracy and insisted that the bureaucracy produce options from which the leadership would select. That was another of his mechanisms, pursued in great detail, for preventing the bureaucracy from preempting the decisions of the political leadership.

Q: You're saying the bureaucracy was not allowed to come up and say "this is what we should do"?

DEAN: That's right, it was not permitted to make specific recommendations, but only to describe at least three separate options. This is the core, or one of the chief methods, of Kissinger's system of controlling the bureaucracy. Another one was his use of this NSC coordinating mechanism, which had great authority, to put the various agencies at loggerheads with one another and to split them up rather than to bring them together except when it became finally necessary to do that. In any case, we produced options for reductions. Those were the positions that we then discussed with the allies.

Q: Let me just put at the end here, I'm going to go back and review to see how we stand on the Berlin negotiations, whether we covered that and the detail it warrants. Now we are talking about your '72 to '81 period with Mutual Balanced Force Reduction negotiations. We've already covered the preliminary side. I would like to ask you more about dealing with Henry Kissinger. One question we're talking about is how he wouldn't allow the bureaucracy to make suggestions. Sometimes I have the impression when talking about Henry Kissinger and his group that they may make decisions but they hadn't been dealing with them in great detail. Control is wonderful but you can give away the store or ask for impossible things if you really haven't been following the issue on a day-to-day basis. That is one question that we want to cover and then we'll talk about the continuation of these negotiations to the end of the Nixon period and into the Ford period, did this make any difference? Then move into the Carter period and how the Carter administration dealt with that and also the reaction and what happened with the December '79 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

This is an add on. I have checked on the tapes regarding time in Germany particularly in dealing with Berlin. I would like to have us talk a bit about actually how it went. We talked about the results, why and all but I would like to talk about some the personalities, techniques, and incidents, because this is an important series of talks so I would like to get down and dirty and more personal into it. We had covered sort of the overview but

maybe we could have a session just talking about how things went.

Today is the 14th of October, 1998. Could we go back to the Berlin negotiations? Every time I do interviews which deal with Germany they say you've got to get Jock Dean on the negotiations. I did review the tapes and we need more. In the first place, could you give me the time frame and then how you saw it when you went in and what were the issues, then we'll go into it?

DEAN: Let me give a footnote on Henry Kissinger's modus operandi which may be pertinent. He kept everything to himself notoriously, to the extent that, later, in the MBFR talks he did not reveal to me as the field negotiator that he had made a deal with Brezhnev to exclude Hungary from the area where reductions would take place, much to the disappointment of the Hungarians who were told this by the Russians in my presence late in the game. It was only after six months of playing around, having group marches, and singsongs in Vienna winehouses, that we were able to regularize the status of Hungary and start the MBFR talks.

The same thing happened in Berlin at the end of the Berlin talks on the issue of the Soviet consulate general in West Berlin. This was a rather dramatic turning point because the State Department instructed Ken Rush to stop the negotiations. That too was because Kissinger kept this point to himself and was not available at the critical moment.

Now, coming back to Germany and the Berlin talks, I returned to Bonn as political counselor in August 1968 just before the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. That was our immediate concern. In the meeting of the four foreign ministers that took place in December in Brussels, what we called the Bonn Group foreign ministers, (Britain, France, the United States and Federal Germany) Willy Brandt made a strong pitch for starting negotiations on Berlin and improving access from West Berlin to East Berlin and improving access to the city. Have we gone into this before?

Q: I don't know but let's do it. By the way the Johnson administration is still in power at this point.

DEAN: Yes, August of '68.

Q: You were saying December '68.

DEAN: December was the meeting in Brussels, that's correct. There the British, French and U.S. foreign ministers expressed polite interest but some skepticism and did not agree immediately. The next several months were taken with back and forth debate among the foreign ministers and the embassy in Berlin over whether there should be negotiations on this subject. Our officials in Berlin, David Klein, our minister there, and others (and I think this view was shared by the British and French missions in Berlin), thought it was inadvisable to negotiate on Berlin with the Soviets. They considered the status of Berlin as having been built up with great difficulty, detail by detail, over the

Cold War years and they thought that fiddling with it might leave us worse off at the end and taking this intricate mechanism under debate might actually undermine the rights and responsibilities of the Allied position in Berlin, which they considered precarious. They had been operating for years on the strength of willpower and feared that the situation could get a lot worse for everyone in maintaining this four power status.

In actuality, the Soviet Union and the GDR had in practice completely taken over East Berlin and ignored the four power status of the city. They had continued to crack down periodically on civilian access to the city, most notably of course during the Khrushchev period when he threatened to turn the responsibility for Berlin over to East Germany. That was regarded as a genuine threat by most Western observers because they believed that East Germany would not have the restraint, knowledge of the situation and the shared nuclear Armageddon prospects that the Soviet Union had in this respect. I and others argued that we should proceed to this negotiation. The Soviet Union after its invasion of Czechoslovakia was making strenuous efforts to reestablish itself internationally and was pushing for the beginning of the CSCE talks. To me the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was not a demonstration of Soviet expansionism but of a determination to hold to the status quo.

Q: Was it your analysis that in a way the Soviet Union was weak and it had done this, and now to restore itself it had to do something?

DEAN: Yes, it was making every effort in diplomacy throughout the world to try to reestablish itself in the status quo ante in terms of acceptance and so forth. Of course, what it had actually done was to repress with force rather limited beginnings of democracy under Dubcek in Czechoslovakia. I felt that we should make the Soviets pay for international acceptance with specific concessions relating to access to Berlin.

Q: William Rogers came on as secretary of State but more importantly you had Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger who had very strong policy projections there. Were you finding yourself melding with these? Where did you feel at that very early stage in the Nixon administration?

DEAN: As I have commented, there was very considerable resistance and suspicion in the administration of the Germans, particularly Willy Brandt, the foreign minister. There was still a big coalition with CDU chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger. There was great suspicion in Washington of the Social Democrats and Willy Brandt's chief advisor Egon Bahr. Beyond that, was the real problem of Germany as I think it was seen by American officials right from the division of Germany on. Germany was so vital to the security of Europe that the main U.S. fear was that someone would take it away. Their fear, articulated in many different ways, essentially was that the Soviet Union would play on the German desire for unification and in some way with devilish skill neutralize Germany, break up the Western military coalition and open Western Europe to communist political or military penetration. This concern was based on a low opinion of the common sense of the German people derived from World War II, but now focused particularly on the Social Democrats, who had made the most consistent efforts to do

something about the division of the country. The concern also extended to Free Democrats like Thomas Dehler, who broke ranks and occasionally proposed things which we regarded as unsafe. Kissinger and Nixon wanted to keep full control over the development of relations of the Soviet Union in their hands, and not in any sense let it slip into the hands of the Germans.

Q: Did you feel that the State Department was sort of being kept out of this German issue at this time? Word was that Kissinger came in and all the bureaus wrote position papers to keep them occupied while he went about and did his thing.

DEAN: Kissinger made the policy. The State Department did not. He had just instituted his version of the National Security Council, which took over the policymaking function from the State Department and has ever since. He rejected the idea that departments and agencies should on any given subject make joint recommendations to the White House or even any specific recommendation, even though it was still up to the president to decide. He felt that the bureaucracy could gang up on the president, on him. He obliged the Department, however artificially, to work in terms of options.

After discussions at various levels at the National Security Council, first working groups of working level officials, then at the level of assistant secretaries, and then of heads of departments, Kissinger would retire and write a short memorandum summarizing the discussion and making in effect his own recommendation to the president. That system, accompanied by his steady stream of sarcastic references to the bureaucracy, was the way in which he maintained control. Mr. Rogers was not a very strong personality and he was not able to put up much resistance. I don't know if he even wanted to. But later this system played a baneful role.

Q: What was your role at this time?

DEAN: I had just arrived in Bonn. George McGhee as retiring ambassador came to me one day when I was working for Robert Bowie in Washington and asked me if I would be interested in going back as political counselor; that is what I did. I arrived just before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August of 1968.

Q: On the Berlin side, from your perspective at the embassy and your staff and all, what was your view of reopening negotiations?

DEAN: The embassy argued for it. I mentioned that I believed that the Soviet Union had placed itself in the East-West context in a somewhat vulnerable situation and should be made to pay off with specific concessions. We did not know at that point that Brandt had actually felt out the terrain in detail and that his forecasts that something could be done were very well founded. Egon Bahr had been dealing with Soviet officials on the Berlin issue, and that process continued. In a way, since the Russians had decided to do business on Berlin, although we did not know this, our debate was with our own authorities. Second, our feeling was that even the Christian Democrats were moving in that direction, although more slowly, and that logically the Germans did not know least, as Kissinger

might have put it, but rather, best in terms of their own interests and what they wanted to do. As the Ostpolitik was developed still further by Brandt and put into operation as he took power in '69, my feeling was that we should go with the flow and not attempt to resist and hold back. We should not try to prevent the process because our capacity to do so was uncertain and the effort to do so would alienate us from the Germans and thus in effect deprive us to some extent of our influence over events.

Q: Did you feel from the perspective of Bonn some of the tension and differences between the White House, the NSC and the European Bureau on this while you were sitting there sort of a little out of the line of fire at that point?

DEAN: Yes. We just kept sending in these messages recommending action. We were out of the line of action but we had one advantage if you want to describe it as such. We had very close contact with the Germans and continued to report daily on their views.

Q: Was there any reaching by the White House to the embassy to find out, in a way to bypass the European Bureau?

DEAN: Bypass I wouldn't say but they did ask us to report on their worries. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who worked for Kissinger, came to Bonn a couple of times to check up. I had an active secure telephone contact with James Sutterlin, a desk officer in the State Department, a very gifted bureaucrat in the better sense of the term. He would keep me informed that the White House was worried over some specific topic. As the Ostpolitik developed, his suspicions and worries crystallized not the least because it was discovered by the CIA that some of Bahr's contacts belonged to the KGB, the ones he was seeing regularly and so forth. Although I did then and still do consider Egon Bahr a German nationalist, pure and simple, most in Washington thought he was sort of a Russian agent or influence or something of that kind, or might be.

Q: Was there any feeling that the KGB would have a role in Berlin? In other words was the KGB considered to be a player in the politburo at that time or not?

DEAN: I think we had an exaggerated estimate of the smoothness and coordination of the Soviet system and also of their ability to put over their propaganda. Really there were multiple players. This issue of German unification and what was going to happen to parts of Germany was center stage for the German people. This was so all through the years of the unsuccessful foreign ministers conferences where the Russians made a big effort to demonstrate that they were willing to have free elections. But none of these efforts really galvanized German public opinion. The culmination of these efforts came later at the beginning of the '80s, with the missile controversy where the Soviets poured on every possible thing that they could pour on and they failed. At the end, the German political system ratified the deployment of the Pershing II's and repulsed this final Soviet propaganda effort. In any case, Washington did have this great respect and fear for Soviet political manipulation and propaganda and, together with their low estimate of others, the Germans in this case, that was always an element in U.S. policy.

Q: What do you think sort of broke this suspicion or at least removed enough of it so that things began to progress for this German treaty?

DEAN: Willy Brandt became chancellor in 1969 and the administration had to pay attention to what he was suggesting. The Soviet Union was making many efforts to hold a conference on security and cooperation in Europe in Helsinki, which did start in '72. As I look back on the invasion of Czechoslovakia, developments there had frightened them and above all they wanted to consolidate the Warsaw Pact system. We wanted them to pay a price in Berlin as they later did in Helsinki, where they traded Western oversight of human rights for acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe. We at the embassy were pushing for a Berlin agreement to use Western leverage to improve our own situation in Berlin, and that was true of the British and French. Later on we did agree to the Helsinki talks. Third, the United States did adopt the idea that there should be MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction) talks with the Russians. These did take place starting in 1972.

The basic idea at this point on both sides was to make the division of Europe, of Germany and Berlin, more livable and less dangerous. This again was a German desire which Brandt had brought NATO. The feeling was shared by other European NATO members, but none more than Germany which was on the dividing line between East and West, that if there is going to be East-West U.S. Soviet negotiation over nuclear reductions, Germany and European NATO partners must benefit through a reduction of the immense conventional confrontation in Europe. NATO finally did take up this idea that there should be MBFR talks. So a Berlin settlement, Helsinki and MBFR talks were all part of an overall package as far as the NATO countries were concerned.

Q: How did it progress as far as your role in the Berlin talks?

DEAN: Ultimately it was decided first by the four governments and then backed by NATO, that the Berlin talks should take place. The ambassadors of the four wartime allies, the three western ambassadors and Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov were going to be the negotiators. Since the Bonn Group teams, the one dealing with Berlin access, Berlin issues, all-German issues, were right there with the Western ambassadors at their embassies, the three political counselors were in effect co-opted to be the negotiators and deputies for the ambassadors. This outcome was received with some annoyance by our colleagues in Berlin and that tension continued all the way through the talks right up to the end.

Q: Did you bring in somebody from Berlin, the equivalent to the political counselor, to sit there and to whisper into your ear?

DEAN: No. I think that, in hindsight, that might have been a good idea to diminish this sniping that went on, but they also would have loaded us with a lot of Berlin tradition to maintain. The way it was actually done was that the negotiating position was prepared by the Bonn Group. It was reported to the three foreign ministries and also of course to the Berlin people. The Berlin people commented on it as did the ministries and gradually the position was built up. James Sutterlin prides himself, and I think quite rightly, for having developed a summary of negotiating goals for which he gained acceptance by the

National Security Council staff. Using this summary he indicated throughout the talks how the negotiators were moving toward these goals; he was able, as he put it, to keep the NSC off our backs and that was useful.

Q: With these goals, could you talk a bit about our other partners, the French and the British? Were we one or were they each coming in with their own agenda?

DEAN: It emerged that their ambassadors, especially the French ambassador, shared some of the doubts of the three Berlin missions about the wisdom of tinkering with a delicate apparatus, so they were generally more conservative than we were. The whole operation was carried out in the so-called Bonn Group which was a meeting of the three political counselors with people from the other sections and the political department of the German foreign ministry, headed throughout these talks by Gunter Van Well, who was then the German ambassador to the UN and subsequently to Washington. Later Walter Scheel was the foreign minister. He was the head of the Free Democrats, and I suppose Van Well had some connection with the Free Democrats.

In any case, Van Well was the man who articulated, rationalized, and formulated what the Ostpolitik was supposed to mean in these talks and indeed in general because he had an important say in the German treaties with Moscow, Poland and Czechoslovakia as well as with Hungary. He would tell us in the Bonn Group what he thought it all meant at any given stage and we would comment on it and express polite skepticism. But, step by step, we developed an agreed position. Van Well was assisted by extremely competent men from the Minister of All-German Affairs, renamed Ministry of Inter-German Relations under Brandt. They were crackerjacks at knowing the details and they suggested specific formulations. I guess you could say we were a skeptical professional jury on their proposals. There was enormous potential for controversy and dispute, but the Bonn Group stuck together and developed a certain amount of organizational loyalty.

Q: Did you find yourself sort of in the position of trying to rein in slightly the Germans and at the same time trying to urge the French and the British to get onboard?

DEAN: Yes, I think so. Van Well was one to move fast and the British were in the middle and the French were the slowest, the most skeptical and the most desirous of maintaining their legal position as an occupying power, and not taking positions that might risk four power control, i.e. their legal rights of control, over Germany as a whole and over Berlin. I remember I even asked Ambassador Sauvignard, who later became the French foreign minister, to leave our meeting because he wasn't a member of the Bonn Group. He came in when we were holding it in the French embassy and was sort of vigorously dealing, interfering, or participating in the debate in the sense of holding back and holding on, so I reminded him he wasn't a member.

Q: I would have thought the French in a way had more at stake because they put so much onto prestige and their right. Berlin was one of the few places where the French were considered a co-equal in a meeting place between East and West.

DEAN: That was a place where their status, like their status in the UN Security Council, was assured, yes, and they did. But also I think we have to bear in mind that they had of course very deep feelings, as did the British, about Germany; much stronger than ours. They regarded their rights and responsibilities as a security device to prevent negative developments in Germany and they took that role very seriously. One has to respect those views. Nonetheless we did have to sort of shoehorn them along and they were always hanging back, right to the very end.

We aren't yet at that point, but at the end of the negotiations, Ambassador Sauvignard tried to break up an effort launched by Van Well and assisted by us and the Russian Kwitzinski to get an agreed East German and West German translation of the Berlin treaty. The effort did not fully succeed, but it was 80% successful. Sauvignard objected violently to me - Ambassador Rush was briefly out of action with nervous exhaustion, as was the UK counselor, Christopher Audland; the stress was fierce - that the Germans weren't party to this negotiation, the German language wasn't one of the four official languages, and so forth and so on. He said he would not appear at the signing, and he would not sign the agreement if this continued. That's the sharpest illustration. But Van Well and I plugged ahead with the translation.

Q: How did this work? First this Western allies group was put together to come...

DEAN: The Bonn Group had existed for many years and had rather strong traditions of its own, sort of a bureaucratic club of officials. It was quite naturally seized of this subject matter because of its specialization and work. It was then used to develop a position. We met two, sometimes three times a week circulating in maybe three embassies; the Germans always came to us. We would have sessions of two to three hours with advance papers, agendas and so forth. They were all very professional people and it went very well. We would then present the results to our respective ambassadors who usually would accept them and send them on to the home offices.

Q: Who was our ambassador at that time?

DEAN: Kenneth Rush became the ambassador just about that time. He had been a former executive with Union Carbide, a self made man. He had also been Richard Nixon's law professor at Duke University and was later deputy secretary of State and Defense also.

Q: How engaged was he did you find in this matter?

DEAN: He was an enthusiast with us for this project. He thought it was a good idea. He agreed with me that we might as well try to get something out of this situation and also see how far the German information was correct that the Soviets were ready to do some business. Of course unbeknownst to me, at least for most of the game, he established this back channel operation with Egon Bahr, with Falin the Soviet ambassador, and Kissinger. Bahr, Falin and Ken Rush would sit down periodically and work out the advance moves. I became aware of this situation in about the middle of the negotiations, because Kwitzinski said something to me about it, assuming I was informed. I reported this talk to

Rush. He then made me write out the whole circumstances and report them to two men from the White House communications network which they were operating separately from both the State Department and CIA communications channels.

Q: I would have thought that with this cozy little group meeting, it would have blown the whole thing apart if the French and British had become aware of this. Were they aware of it or what was your impression about them?

DEAN: They did not know during the Berlin talks. They did become aware of the back channel in the subsequent negotiations to admit the two German states into the UN which was a part of the Ostpolitik and this whole package. U.S. Ambassador Martin Hillenbrand left some references to the back channel on his desk during these talks and a British or French official saw it there. It was a back channel operation but it may not have had the same people running it as in the case of the Berlin talks as such.

Q: As far as you knew was there any comparable operation by the French and the British with their Soviet colleagues?

DEAN: It would surprise me a lot to hear that. I've never heard that.

Q: I'm not revealing anything?

DEAN: I don't think they would ever have thought of doing it. It would not have occurred to them ordinarily. I believe the U.S., Russian, German back channel was justified. I don't know who instigated it originally, probably Bahr as a way of moving things along. Ambassador Jackling, the British ambassador, had been the chief legal officer of the British Foreign Office and he was inclined to stick on details and the French were holding back quite a bit. They had a very nice counselor, Rene Lustig, an Alsatian, who later committed suicide because of feeling that he had not been honored and promoted sufficiently. Ironically, the last straw was when he was appointed French representative to CSCE, which the French (and U.S.) held in low regard. He was a very nice man, a very witty and a good intermediary between the French and German cultures. His assistant was François Plaisant, who later worked on the CFE talks (Conventional Forces in Europe), the successor to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations. He was a small man with a Napoleonic haircut and he usually managed to hold things back on the details and I'm sure that his people in Paris had a high opinion of him as a result. Anyhow we would prepare these positions and put them forward for negotiation.

Q: Did you have the feeling that as you prepared these positions, that Henry Kissinger or the White House would wade in from time to time?

DEAN: No. I think that as this back channel operated, Bahr, Falin and Ambassador Rush would get together and make some proposal which then was sent to Moscow and to Kissinger in Washington for approval. It was generally approved. The two capitals figured that if the three negotiators, each of whom had their full confidence, could agree

on something, it should be accepted. This of course speaks for the desire of all three governments to move ahead.

The agent of this for the Russians was Yuri Kwitzinski, who later became a member of the Soviet Central Committee, Soviet ambassador to Bonn, and actually was the acting foreign minister of the Soviet Union at the time of the anti-Gorbachev coup in August '91. He is the one, being the senior duty officer, who sent the instructions to the Soviet field posts to recognize the new coup government. Of course he was removed later on. He was the one who told me about this back channel operation, assuming that I knew about it.

Anyhow the way the back channel worked after I did find out about it, was that I would make some suggestions to Ambassador Rush who would try them out with this group and then would come back with acceptance or revisions. Then I would go to Donald Weameyer, our legal counsel, and say this is what the ambassador says should be our next move. Don would help me articulate it. Don was very gifted, a selfless American patriot, and we were very lucky to have him.

Q: What about as you were looking for moves to make, obviously a major part of this had to be what would be the Soviet reaction to any proposal we made, the likelihood of it being accepted or modified, were you getting any support from the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of State Intelligence and Research branch? Were they really players in your thinking or not?

DEAN: No, not to my knowledge. The first part of the negotiations were occupied in a vain effort to bring the Soviet negotiators, mainly Kwitzinski, and in the less frequent meetings of the four ambassadors, to accept the use of the word Berlin and of continuing four-power responsibility for all of Berlin in this agreement. For them, by definition, Berlin was the capital of the GDR and did not otherwise exist, and in particular there was no four-power responsibility for East Berlin. The outcome was an agreement which just mentions "the relevant area" but doesn't mention Berlin specifically.

Q: It's interesting, the Berlin agreement does not mention Berlin.

DEAN: Yes, it does say the talks were held in the American sector of Berlin, but then refers to the "relevant area." That aspect was understandably criticized by Western and Berlin critics. However, it was the slow progress on the legal status issue which triggered the back channel operation. As for day-to-day negotiation, we would go to the allied kommandatura building and discuss the various issues in which this negotiation was divided: passes for Berliners going to East Germany, the presence of the Federal Republic in the western sectors, etc. We had a big blackboard and I would write out what we had agreed to on the Western side. Kwitzinski would comment. In the final period of the negotiation, Van Well and his team were in a nearby room where we could consult with them. But that wasn't the case until the end phase. We did make a real effort to tell them exactly what happened.

Q: In these negotiations, were you, yourself and your team, sitting down with the Soviets?

DEAN: Sure. We had meetings of what amounted to the Bonn Group with Yuri Kwitzinski nearly every day. We would advance agreed allied positions. Kwitzinski would comment. I or UK or France would suggest some modifications of the western position to go toward meeting his comments. These sessions would go on from about ten in the morning until about five or six at night and sometimes seven, then each of us had to go and write up the report of the thing. I'd fall into bed about midnight or one o'clock. Then at 0800 was a meeting with the allies to figure out the specific positions to be taken before the 10:00 session began. It was exhausting.

Q: As you were having these meetings was there a real give and take or were you announcing a position, they would announce a position?

DEAN: There was negotiation on the spot. Kwitzinski was a powerful and competent personality and well connected. Falin and various others were his protectors so he was very self confident. We had very long debates in German which all four of us spoke quite well. On each point, there was long general discussion and I would say, how about this formulation? Then Kwitzinski would give a diatribe the Federal Republic has to get out of Berlin in a long political discussion. Then he would come back to the specific subject and often express practical views.

Q: What were your major concerns as you got into this? Did you see the Soviets as trying to essentially loosen our position in Berlin or were they really trying to come up with some sort of an accord?

DEAN: I think their main interest was to push Western acceptance of East Germany. Western acceptance and acknowledgment of the status quo in Eastern Europe was a cardinal policy of the Soviet Union under Brezhnev, as we saw in the CSCE. In the Berlin talks, we saw an effort to push East Germany. But as we probed we found a somewhat competing desire to maintain overall Russian responsibility for Berlin and Germany as a whole. East Germany was there in the background. Its leader, Walter Ulbricht, opposed upgrading the West German presence in the Western sectors and the maintenance of Russian responsibility for East Berlin and the city as a whole. He wanted responsibility to be turned over to East Germany. The Soviets pushed him out in May '71, a year before the Berlin agreement was signed. As far as I was concerned, as long as overall Russian responsibility was maintained, bringing the East Germans into the administration of the system and making it in effect a six power system with the Federal Germans, was a good idea. It would create a basis of stability for the operation of access to Berlin, which in practice it did do up to the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Q: Was this felt to be anathema by some people?

DEAN: Yes.

Q: Where was this coming from?

DEAN: From France in particular and from the Christian Democrats. One of the strongest critics of the whole agreement, on the grounds that it weakened Western responsibility for the Western sectors of Berlin and increased the status of East Germany, was a man named Alois Mertes, who was variously a Bundestag deputy and state secretary or deputy foreign minister. He, with unerring analytical ability, would put his finger on the weak points and was a very strong critic but personally a very nice man. Unlike some politicians I think he was a genuine German patriot as indeed were Bahr, Willy Brandt and Herbert Wehner.

Q: As you went into this move to what amounted to recognition of East Germany which we had been avoiding, did you feel more confident because you had a president, Richard Nixon, who had a strong right wing? In other words the very place where you probably expected to find the greatest opposition and sometimes it's handy to have a president who comes from the stronger anti-communist side to support you.

DEAN: He did that. As far as I know, we didn't hear any criticism from Congress at that time. I don't know of any congressional criticism or, at least, any weighty congressional criticism. I have to say that Washington, except at the very end point, left us to do the job. We did report copiously and we tried to show how we were fulfilling the negotiation agenda which had been developed by Jim Sutterlin and we were able to do so more or less. We regulated the questions of providing many more passes for West Berliners for going into East Berlin and we resolved civilian access to Berlin, the point that had been omitted from the four-power wartime agreements on administration of occupied Germany. We considered that we had consolidated the Federal German role in West Berlin and in that way had taken some of the weight off of us and made Federal Germany more responsible more directly. Ultimately, we could leave Berlin, which appeared very desirable assuming as everyone did at that time that Germany was going to continue divided into the indefinite future.

Q: Was the question of the Berlin Wall ever brought up? Was there a thought that maybe we can negotiate the elimination of the Berlin Wall or was that sort of an accepted fact?

DEAN: I would say the wall was an accepted factor. We made no serious effort to do that. Instead, the negotiations started from the effort to emphasize the four power status. We wanted to be sure not to weaken that status and if possible wanted to have it re-endorsed through this agreement. Even though we were unable to gain agreement to use the word Berlin, the agreement does speak of four power rights and responsibilities. I think there was general satisfaction on the Western side that we had gained this endorsement of continuing Western rights as well as of Soviet responsibility.

Q: Were you all as you did this looking towards one of the outcomes that the Soviets had been seeking of CSCE and that was of the sort of stabilization of the borders and all that throughout Eastern Europe?

DEAN: The Soviets wanted the borders accepted, true, but their main aim was Western

recognition of these regimes as legitimate. Most had been put in by a putsch one way or another. That acceptance ultimately did take place. The key to it was Federal German recognition of East Germany as a legitimate state. I had a particular interest in this subject because I had spent a tour of duty, about three or four years, in the State Department as the de facto East German desk officer. My main work there was to try to convince American scientists and other people going to specialist international conferences where East Germany might show up, to be sure to vote against their membership in the organization in order not to advance their international status. We were doing this sort of action in loyal support of Federal Germany's position.

Q: As negotiations progressed, was this a general sort of compromise as most negotiations are or did you feel that it was tilting one way or the other?

DEAN: Aside from the fact that we couldn't get the word Berlin, in the sense of explicitly confirming four-power responsibility "for Berlin," which did grate a lot of people, the agreement was a good one. The Berlin issue would be dealt with on a six power basis, more stable, with an acknowledged Federal German role and yet retained the legalism of the four power structure. I thought it was a good outcome. I thought the Federal German presence in West Berlin could, tactfully done, be actually built up. Unfortunately, Foreign Minister Genscher tried to do this with a big bang within the first weeks of the entry into force of this agreement with the Soviets by opening a new federal government office in West Berlin. That didn't work. It resulted in heavy Soviet protests.

On the other side, the much feared repercussions of the establishment of a Soviet consulate general in the western sector did not materialize. That issue did prove, in my view, to have been a storm in a tea cup. That was the issue that almost derailed the negotiations at the end owing to Kissinger's absence from Washington. Kissinger did not receive Rush's request for authorization to agree to the establishment of this consulate general. According to Sutterlin's agenda, this was not supposed to be agreed to unless we got more specific acknowledgment of Soviet responsibility for Berlin. Anyhow, we agreed to it and then Ambassador Rush received this telegram, which I guess Sutterlin had drafted, sent out by my former boss Russell Fessenden who was at that time acting assistant secretary of the European Bureau. It told us that we should stop negotiating and not sign the agreement. Ambassador Rush told me I should compose a message explaining why it was too late to stop, implying that we had already signed. I did this with some pleasure, but paid for this pleasure afterward because the system was displeased at Ambassador Rush and me, but could do nothing to him. He was beyond their grasp. We sent the message and we went ahead to sign. This incident was preceded by the argument about the East German translation, when Ambassador Sauvignard told me he would never sign this thing as long as the U.S. was playing around with the East Germans on the translation of the agreement. But we went ahead and did that.

That was a difficult time because Ambassador Rush was for two days out of action with nervous exhaustion, as was the British counselor. I don't blame them, because the process was really quite grueling. Ambassador Sauvignard used some really choice French foul language to describe the situation. I felt distressed about that, but we went ahead and

finished up our efforts. I called Kwitzinski several times, but he went to the East Germans and Van Well would tell me the results. We didn't completely succeed. For example the East German title of the negotiation is something like Four-Sided Agreement and ours was Four-Powers Agreement. The East Germans didn't want to acknowledge that there were four powers that were responsible for Berlin.

More difficult things came up in the English-Russian translation. An important one was that the Berlin agreement states that the relationship between the Federal Republic and the western sectors of Berlin shall be maintained and developed. This is a very important part of the agreement. In the Russian and East German translations, this word appeared as "links" or "contacts," the same word which would be used for railroad connections, or airplane connections, but not "relationship" which is a political concept. Other difficulties of that kind unfortunately persisted.

The East Germans for different reasons than the French had to be dragged into cooperation. The Russians had to deal with East German leader Walter Ulbricht. He was making public statements saying that the negotiation should be broken off. This was because he did not like the reestablishment or the re-endorsement of four power responsibility for Berlin. The Soviets finally forced him into retirement.

Q: How did you treat it, I mean "the entire area consisting of", or something like that?

DEAN: "The relevant area" and the "area under consideration" were the terms used.

Q: Were there attempts by various groups to upset the negotiations either by challenging or doing something in Berlin or elsewhere?

DEAN: No, we didn't have too much trouble of that kind. Except that afterward, as I mentioned, when Foreign Minister Genscher attempted to set up a new Federal German agency, I believe it was the environmental office, or a section of that ministry, in Berlin. That didn't work. The four ambassadors did meet from time to time regularly to discuss applications of the agreement. It worked well from 1972 when it went into effect, until 1989 when the Wall came down. The passes to the East worked and the German civilian access to Berlin worked. The agreement dealt with a big area neglected by the wartime negotiations on occupation zones and the occupation of Berlin worked. This area was removed as a source of friction, and a potential source of conflict before between the Soviet Union and the Western countries.

Q: I would have thought that you would have run into a certain amount of problem by the Berlin establishment. I think of Eleanor Dulles back in Washington and the people who over the years have been fighting, no more tail gates, do you do this, do you do that, these things have been almost set in concrete.

DEAN: That's where the original resistance was, in the effort to protect all that hard-line minutia of an armed and unstable armistice from tinkering. Then there was also a lot of skepticism about the possibility of a possible outcome. But there was little interference. The Nixon and Brandt governments were for it. Berlin official opinion was very

supportive. Shutz was the mayor at that time. He was very much for it but he also kept his Christian Democrats with him. We did get a few barks from the Christian Democrats in Bonn. After the whole negotiation was over, Franz Joseph Strauss, the Bavarian CSU leader, gave a dinner for Ambassador Rush which he devoted entirely to very pointed criticism of the Berlin agreement, the absence of the term Berlin, and why didn't you do better and so forth. Strauss didn't like the agreement. But he was the super hawk against Russia. However, as you might recollect, he later became an advocate of reconciliation with East Germany and with Russia. He flew his own plane to East Berlin and various other places, preaching the virtue of detente and good relations. But all in all, we didn't get too much resistance.

Q: It was one of those things where the time had come I guess for both sides.

DEAN: Yes. There was some critical examination of the agreement by a few experts but by and large Germans liked it and they thought it was forward movement. And then of course it got picked up in the general development of Ostpolitik and the treaty between Bonn and East Germany, and with Russia. It just seemed to fall into place.

Q: When this was over, were you and your delegation pretty confident that we weren't going to run across any more of these setting up barricades and turning Berlin into THE flash point that might start the big war or something?

DEAN: We thought that was, for various reasons, over. Of course, the issue to which your question leads is whether in particular we thought the Soviet Union and their henchmen the East Germans, would maintain this agreement. In practice, they did. I suppose the East German reluctance was bought off through the advantages of the inter-German German treaty between the FRG and GDR that they didn't want to drop. The GDR did get big, big payoffs and various subsidies, rail subsidies and other things, with hard currency which they couldn't get otherwise. So it was really to their advantage to maintain those agreements including the Berlin agreement. I don't believe it gave rise to any serious problem the entire time until '89, when full freedom of movement for all Germans was finally restored.

Q: What about your colleagues? You have included the Soviets on this, the ones that were at your negotiating level. Do you think there was general agreement that this was a pretty good deal?

DEAN: Kwitzinski is the one I knew the most and I saw him subsequently over the years. He was always satisfied with the agreement as doing the best that they could. I guess he rationalized it as preventing a complete Federal German takeover of the western sectors. I think the Soviets came out less well but after all they did, through this agreement and in the Moscow treaty with the Federal Republic, reestablish themselves as people that we'd be willing to talk to. They did finally get the Conference on Security and Cooperation of Europe which they wanted. They did advance the international standing of East Germany, including in Berlin affairs. I guess by and large both sides should have been satisfied. We were and everyone did say so.

Q: What about the Helsinki Accords which were coming up, were you seeing this? Was everyone keeping an eye on this and saying OK this is step one?

DEAN: Yes. At one point the inner German treaty with East Germany and also the FRG treaty with Moscow was being pushed very hard by Egon Bahr and Willy Brandt, and it looked as though they were going to conclude both before we finished up the Berlin agreement. That was a moment of considerable friction to urge them not to do this and not to undercut our own negotiating leverage because the Russians wanted both of these other treaties. Bahr, I think, always claims that he never had any intention of undercutting the Western position on Berlin, but anyhow he was certainly talking a good game. The three Western ambassadors had a meeting with Willy Brandt and Foreign Minister Scheel, telling them that they didn't think this was a very good idea. There was no further effort to push the two treaties through before the Berlin agreement was concluded.

The NATO Council, too, always insisted that the Berlin agreement come first before any of these other things and certainly before the MBFR, before the Helsinki talks. As it happened, we also held preliminary talks for MBFR in the same year in which the Helsinki conference did actually meet. We maintained rough equivalence there.

My feeling from the late '50s on was that we should shift our policy towards Eastern Europe to a policy of engagement. We should stop trying to undermine these governments as illegitimate, but instead work both with the publics in so far as we could and also with the regimes, in what I then called a policy of engagement and then try to undermine their support by showing the Western example and showing that the regimes couldn't come up to the Western standard of living or of personal freedoms, and step by step reducing the core of active believers in the system until it would fall apart. That's the philosophy with which I approached this whole negotiation and I believe that was Brandt's approach with the Ostpolitik. This approach ultimately led to collapse of the Soviet system.

Q: I picked up from other people that Henry Kissinger at one point had a more pessimistic point of view and that was that the Soviet Union might prove to be too powerful and that this was trying to erect lines of defense or whatever you want to call it. The Soviet Union seemed to be on a roll at that time, that he didn't have quite the faith, you might say, in a democracy versus communism? Did you see that?

DEAN: No he didn't. I know in specific terms he was afraid that the Germans would take us on to thin ice. Maybe he had some more general view of the weakness of Western democracy and about the long-term history of the Soviet system. It is hard to believe, but still he might have.

Q: What about as you were doing this and consulting with the Germans, was there a concern that anything you said to the West Germans would eventually end up through leakage, espionage, into the enemy camp?

DEAN: Yes, that was a repeated risk. But aside from back channels to resolve hard points, it was necessary to have complete openness of exchange with all Western parties in order to operate the system, so we didn't hold back too much.

Q: I would imagine you would have to sometimes imagine that this had to be a factor in which you informed them saying, we're concerned about this because we're not sure we'd be able to get this or something like that? It could leak back and it would mean that the Soviets would press harder on a certain point or something.

DEAN: I don't have any recollection of holding back on specific details for that reason. Our general approach was to be completely open as far as this negotiation was concerned and I think that turned out to be right.

Q: As we end this particular session here, as I've mentioned at the beginning, talking to your colleagues in the Foreign Service who dealt with this thing they all say you've really got to talk to Jock Dean because he was very important in this Berlin negotiation. To understand how a bureaucracy responds, do you feel that your accomplishments (I'm talking about your team and all) were acknowledged by the Department or not? Or was it just well that's fine and let's get on to the next thing or something?

DEAN: That's right, there was considerable reserve. I think a certificate of honor (I've even forget what it was) was delayed for two years because they didn't want to specifically acknowledge any achievement on our part. Particularly how we ended up signing the agreement despite instructions from the Department to stop. But that incident was really because of Kissinger's modus operandi and the fact that he wasn't there to be reached when the moment came. Rush had asked him, he told me, but he received no reply so he said to go ahead. It wasn't that much of a gamble in the sense that Kissinger was the one who called the shots and presuming that he got the general agreement of the president to do this so that if it became a major scandal, presumably he would rescue Rush. But it didn't rescue me from their annoyance. It left me hanging in Bonn without an onward assignment even after the Department had appointed a successor for my job. I sat around despondently waiting for a new assignment and hearing most Germans say what a good job the Western allies had done in Berlin. I finally had to go out of channels and ask Ambassador Rush to get me an onward assignment.

There was also substantive trouble. The Eastern treaties were up for ratification in the Bundestag. The State Department had decided on a policy of strict neutrality in what I thought exaggerated fear of the consequences if we spoke out and the treaties were rejected. But there was resounding silence from Washington. Even the leader of the Christian Democratic opposition, Rainer Barzel, who favored the general line of the treaties and later tried to improve them by carrying on his own renegotiation with the Soviets, asked me, where is Washington? I finally sent a back channel message to Ambassador Rush who produced a very alternate but positive State Department position. The Eastern treaties were ratified. I believe it did some good.

Q: Where had we left off?

DEAN: The next episode is with the MBFR talks.

Q: We're talking about what? What is the time frame?

DEAN: The Department in the personnel sense didn't have any job for me but they did designate my successor. That was another little twist of the knife. Meanwhile, the discussion in NATO about whether there should be a negotiation with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact about conventional force reductions continued. As I returned in 1972 to Washington without any assignment, I went to see Mr. Rush. I had written to him and asked him to do something with regard to this MBFR thing. I felt that since we had started to regulate the political open issues of the Cold War with the Berlin agreement, we should also deal with the military side. I was interested in doing that and participating in that. He finally got me a designation as the head of the task force in Washington developing the U.S. government position for these pending negotiations, then heading the delegation for the preparatory talks which took place in Vienna.

Q: It took place in Vienna when?

DEAN: It was in early '72. In Kissinger's classic style, we had three options that we were trying to agree on with our NATO allies before we got to the negotiating table, so that was being done. Option three was a partial reduction of tactical nuclear weapons which we thought might buy us some more Warsaw Pact reductions. Option one was a straight conventional tradeoff and then option two was a somewhat larger one. We had teams of experts going over to the allies to explain these options. The Pentagon took a fairly dominant position in establishing these options and captained the teams.

We had our first confrontation with NATO on the issue of the status of Hungary. The NATO Council had decided first that they didn't want Hungary in because they knew that Russian forces in Hungary had the job of going into Yugoslavia and then downward into the Balkans if war started and that they weren't really connected with the Western front in a direct way. They had omitted Hungary from the group of countries where we would aim for both local and Soviet reductions. The Hungarians wanted to be included. They wanted to reduce Soviet troops in Hungary. The Soviets played along, knowing what I did not, that Kissinger had agreed with Brezhnev to omit Hungary. In any case, at a late date the NATO Council decided they wanted to have Hungary in, and it reversed its position and our instructions were to include Hungary.

The Soviet Union also suggested that the negotiations take place in Vienna rather than Geneva. We told them that we would be willing to go to Vienna, but this was regarded by the Netherlands and Belgium permanent representatives of NATO as being a sell-out to the Russians. This was the first negotiated issue with the Warsaw Pact and had we caved in, this would be an awful omen for the future. So I had to go to their offices and explain to Ambassador Spierenberg of the Netherlands and the Belgian ambassador who was the longest serving representative to NATO, that this would not ruin our position to meet there and that it would be okay. They seemed to buy that.

Then we had the demarche of the Turks and the Italians. This was rather like the issue of Hungary, who wanted to be a so-called direct participant whose forces would be up for negotiation for reduction. The Turks made a powerful demarche to Ambassador Rush, deputy secretary of State then, that they would withdraw from NATO if they weren't permitted to participate in these talks, and the Italians said the same. We developed this idea that there should be direct participants and what I called observers, indirect participants.

Q: I would think just as you said it, the fact that we were looking at Hungary and saying the troops there are going to go down and essentially would be threatening Turkey, Greece and Italy, all members of NATO as well as Yugoslavia, it seems like a very parochial approach saying it's not in our backyard, it's somebody else's problem?

DEAN: That's true, but we were trying to reduce the central front first where the biggest pressure was and the biggest fear of outbreak of war. However, we soon learned that we had to take care of the flanks, as they were called. In the north the Norwegians were extremely active to protect their interests. We had to agree that if there were reductions, we would have to as part of the treaty obligate the Soviet Union not to just withdraw forces to flank areas in the north and south. Of course these allies were justified in their position, but it was a terrible headache and over the years in particular the Italians were a real thorn in our flesh.

The French had refused outright to participate in the negotiation, saying that it was unsound and also that they weren't going to negotiate as alliance-to-alliance with the Warsaw Pact. They were still protecting their independence in that regard. So we didn't have them there. Instead, we had the Italians with Ambassador Cagiati, who had been the diplomatic aide to the Italian president and was an *extremely* sharp guy. He found every aspect in our position not to his liking and insisted it be corrected before it was discussed with the Russians. The allied group in Vienna became known as the ad hoc group.

Q: The permanent ad hoc group.

DEAN: That's right. Anyhow, those were the issues leading up to the actual beginning of the talks: the status of Hungary and all and I'll have something later to say about that and what its effects were; and the participation of the so-called flank countries, particularly the western ones, and there was Bulgaria and later Hungary on the other side.

Q: Was Romania part of it?

DEAN: No, Romania was not a direct participant.

Q: Was it by inference to be included?

DEAN: Yes. We had the Romanian ambassador in our preparatory talks, Ambassador Constantinescu. Under instructions, he made very energetic efforts to gain status for Romania as a direct participant, which would be in line to reduce its forces. There were

no Soviet forces in Romania. However, the Soviets forced him to back down and Romania remained a “special participant.”

Q: What was your delegation and your personal attitude toward this thing? As you mentioned before this went on for 15 years. Did you think this was a viable thing or was this something that we should try but...

DEAN: I was all for building down the military confrontation in Europe and believed the time had come to make a real try for this with the Soviets to parallel our relative success in building down the political confrontation in the Berlin negotiations. In the minds of the administration, the talks were designed to fend off Senator Mansfield’s push for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe and it did not have any serious interest in moving ahead on this front, certainly not before they finished the SALT talks, which were Kissinger’s main interest. For example, he didn’t want the Germans running out in front on this conventional reduction before he completed agreements with the Soviets. He didn’t want us to advance this so-called option three, which we later did, the proposal for reduction of tactical nuclear aircraft to deliver nuclear bombs, until he had the SALT agreement locked in. He always had a kind of hold back attitude toward MBFR. Maintain allied unity, keep the talks going but don’t do anything in them.

From the Russian point of view, it wasn’t until seventeen years after the start of the MBFR talks that Gorbachev said, yes, we are going to give you the figures and, yes, you may have inspections. The first agreed was in the context of the CSCE confidence building Stockholm talks where the Soviets agreed to on-site inspection of Russia for the first time. Gorbachev sent his reluctant chief of staff, Akhromeyev, to Stockholm. In the first day of the new CFE negotiations the Soviets laid down the data which showed that they did have numerically a lot more than we did, and they accepted the principle which we had been vainly pushing for 17 years, that there would be reductions to an equal level below that of the weaker side and also verification. They gave away the entire game that we had been pushing for in MBFR talks in the beginning of CFE.

Q: But during your time this didn’t happen?

DEAN: During my time, at the time when the Carter administration left and Reagan was just being voted in, in the fall just before the 1980 election, I developed some system with Ambassador Tarasov, the Russian ambassador, that the Pact would use Western numbers for them for the first reduction, but without prejudice to negotiation over further reductions. This could have been a breakthrough, but the Carter administration here shied away from it. It didn’t want to get into a big argument about this issue just before the elections. So that was allowed to drop, except that I had to confess to my colleagues on the ad hoc group that I had been seeing the Russians and working out this approach without telling them.

Q: Was it that in order to get something of this, it really had to be a one-on-one type thing?

DEAN: Yes. The NATO allies all early on started talking with the Russians one-on-one; that was their right to do this. The rule was you could do it but you had to report each occasion and more or less accurately what was said. I had failed to do this on this issue. The allies were not pleased. We had a steering group like the Bonn Group composed of the British, Germans and ourselves developing the Western position. The Italians and Canadians in particular didn't like this. Whenever you have 12 to 15 countries and you try to line them up behind a specific line of negotiation, you almost have to do the preliminary work in a smaller group. I had this Berlin experience behind me so I figured we might try to do something like that in Vienna.

Q: Let's put at the end then, we are talking about you came back in '72 and you were working with this MBFR.

DEAN: For several months then we went to Vienna. It was the beginning of '72 then in the spring we went to Vienna for the preparatory talks. That's what we can deal with the next time.

Q: We'll pick that up the next time.

Today is the 10th of November, 1998. You wanted to say something before we moved to the '72 talks.

DEAN: I wanted to just make a footnote on the discussion of the Berlin agreement. I have mentioned how the word Berlin wasn't in the agreement. But it was in the agreement in the sense that we did record the place where these talks took place which was in the "American Sector of Berlin" in the building of the Control Council and we said that in the agreement. So even when the agreement then spoke of "the relevant area," anyone could figure out where it was.

The basic deal in the quadripartite agreement was that the Soviet Union explicitly accepted continuing responsibility for access to Berlin including specifically civilian access which had been omitted in the wartime agreements. It thus asserted its preeminence over the German Democratic Republic which was making continuing moves to take over that responsibility and pushing the Soviets to get out of business. The latter was an outcome feared by Western countries because it was felt of the GDR that it had less responsibility and more parochial interests – and the U.S. had fewer points of leverage over it.

Second, in return, we gave the Soviet Union an assurance that the Western Sectors of Berlin for which the three Western allies were responsible, were not a part of the Federal Republic of Germany. It was obvious that in the longer run, the Federal Republic of Germany was going to take increasing responsibility for the western sectors and logically should incorporate them in the Federal Republic. The Soviet Union wished to prevent that. In return for stating that the Western Sectors did not belong to the Federal Republic, we got a Soviet agreement to the idea that the relationship between the Federal Republic and the Western Sectors would be intensified. The third thing we got from the Soviet

Union was what turned out to be a much more generous regime for giving passes to visit East Berlin and East Germany for West Berliners who had been then cut off largely for many years. The fourth was untrammelled road and rail access to West Berlin for people from the Federal Republic.

Q: As you look at this, it is 44 years after the war and you still have the Soviets taking responsibility.

DEAN: We wanted them to continue to accept responsibility.

Q: I know we wanted them to continue but you all must have been looking down the path, things were going to change. It just might be that the Soviets might get tired of this.

DEAN: Khrushchev had threatened to withdraw from that responsibility in '61 and turn it over to the East Germans. That was his big threat. At that time, the renewed Berlin blockade and the Cuban missile crisis all came together. That was a time when we came perhaps fairly close to war over Berlin. Yes, we wanted the Soviet Union to continue responsibility because our wartime agreement with them was the source of our legal authority to be in West Berlin. And we wanted them to claim some authority over Germany as a whole, a claim which they were also extremely interested in maintaining because it would give them standing in possible peace treaty negotiations. Peace treaty negotiations did take place at a subsequent time in the four-power talks on German unity with Gorbachev. No one sought to prevent Russia from participating because its participation was essential as well as its agreement to withdraw its forces from East Germany and Eastern Europe.

Q: Wasn't there a certain amount of concern about the fact that you were encasing in ice this war-time thing?

DEAN: That's a good question and a fair question but I believe I wrote afterward an interpretation of this agreement to the effect that it converted the four power responsibility for Berlin, even though its continuation was endorsed by the agreement, to a six power agreement through associating the two German states with the administration of the operation. In fact they largely took over on issues of access to Berlin and of course completely in this issue of giving passes to West Berliners to go to East Berlin. This provided greater stability for the long run because, after all, Berliners were Germans.

Q: I would have thought there would have been foreseeable problems about keeping West Germany from not doing things in Berlin that would amount to exerting their authority.

DEAN: Yes. I mentioned in our last discussion that very soon after the Berlin agreement was put into effect, Foreign Minister Genscher moved to establish the main Federal German environmental office in the western sectors. The Soviets objected very strongly to that and I think he dropped the idea. Genscher was pressing his luck because it was a very conspicuous office and it was obvious that the Russians would react. It would have been better if Genscher had first started with setting up a branch office of it in West

Berlin and then others later. Genscher considered he was developing the relationship between the FRG and Berlin as provided for in the Berlin agreement. The Russians considered that he was moving to incorporate the Western Sectors into the FRG, prohibited by the agreement.

Q: West Berliners were obviously paying taxes. Who collected them, and where did they go?

DEAN: They were paying taxes. However, West Berlin at that time and up until German unification was a very heavy subsidy operation for the Federal Republic. They subsidized businesses to stay there, they subsidized travel to go there, they subsidized the cultural program which is what people went to see, theaters and so forth. Yes, I suppose they did pay some taxes, but they were pretty well absorbed in Berlin itself.

Q: We'll move to 1972. What was the state of the MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force Reduction) talks in '72? You're off to Vienna in the spring of 1972. You were in Vienna from when to when?

DEAN: If my memory of dates is correct, I think we went there in the spring and I stayed for the ensuing eight years. I was in charge of those preparatory talks which turned out to be somewhat less organized than we had hoped. When we arrived in Vienna the Austrian authorities who had volunteered to be the hosts had used big placards advertising the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, a Western designation which the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact rejected because of the implication of unequal reductions that the term "balanced" had come to connote for NATO. They rejected that until Gorbachev started new talks in which they admitted that they had much more equipment in the Warsaw treaty countries than we had in NATO and they agreed to reduce to the level of the weaker which was the principle that we were trying to get across. But at the beginning of the MBFR talks, the first incident was that the Austrian hosts got into a fracas with the Warsaw Pact about this designation "Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions." The second thing was that the Austrian hosts put out, I think, instead of the UK flag, the flag of the Irish Republic which did not score very high with the UK representative.

I believe I mentioned earlier the disagreement over the status of Hungary in these talks. If I haven't, let me just say briefly that as NATO approached the preparation for these negotiations, it originally decided to omit from the scope of the reductions Soviet forces in Hungary, and with them, national Hungarian forces. Hungary wished to both reduce its own forces and preeminently the Soviet forces in Hungary. In any case, as we arrived in Vienna, NATO changed its mind and wanted to include Hungary but the Soviet Union did not agree. Kissinger had privately agreed with Brezhnev that Hungary should not be included in the zone of reductions but he neglected to tell me or anyone of this for many months.

As we first entered the room in the Hofburg that the Austrian authorities had prepared for the opening of the talks, and Foreign Minister Kirschlager advanced to the podium to

address us, half of the delegates were seated and the other half remained standing through the entire performance. The Warsaw Pact delegates were seated, but the NATO delegates were standing to protest the alphabetical designation given us by the unfortunate Austrians. I don't remember which alphabet they used but they had alphabetized all of the participants giving them in this way equal status. NATO considered the status of the various delegates remained to be determined. With NATO complaints in my mind that we had surrendered in accepting Vienna instead of Geneva as a site, I suggested to my NATO colleagues that we remain standing and we did so through the entire address by the unfortunate foreign minister. That was only a symbolic beginning of the Hungary problem.

I guess we could have set aside the issue of status and proceeded to discussions. Some argued that it should be resolved later. The Russians told me that it might be easier to deal with it later on. But NATO was stinging from what they considered to be the defeat of convening in Vienna instead of Geneva and it did not seem a good idea to accept what they would have considered a surrender on this point. The result was that during the whole period when we argued this issue, four or five months, we were unable to have a single official session of the preparatory talks. Until we found out that Kissinger had agreed to exclude Hungary.

Q: For somebody coming at this in another century, here is our Secretary of State making a deal and undercutting what you all then spent the next few months trying to get. Rationalize this. Was he trying to neuter the negotiations?

DEAN: I don't think he was very interested in what happened in Vienna. In any case, what happened was that Kwitzinski, the Soviet deputy negotiator from Berlin, called me and suggested that we get together and talk over the details as soon as we both arrived in Vienna. I told him that I was not the designated spokesman for the NATO alliance. NATO allies were extremely sensitive to the idea of big power dominance and they wanted to keep the United States and the Soviet Union apart, not together, so they had designated the Netherlands representative, Ambassador Brian Quarles, a very fine man, to be their representative. I called Kwitzinski and told him the NATO representative was going to be Netherlands and he said, "Netherlands? What the hell, come over here and we'll start our business." Finally, rather awkwardly, I got the NATO ad hoc group to designate a delegation of two with Ambassador Quarles in charge. The two of us then continued the talks on how to get started.

Q: Was this over the Hungary issue?

DEAN: Over procedural issues and mainly over the Hungary issue.

Q: Was there any quid pro quo about Hungary being left out because France wasn't in? Was that ever raised?

DEAN: Not in that form.

Q: I assume France was not in this?

DEAN: France was definitely not in this. They do not like alliance-to-alliance configurations believing correctly that this would subject them to too much coalition discipline. Later on when the CFE talks, the successor talks, started, they insisted that those be under the aegis of the then CSCE, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to avoid the mere appearance of alliance-to-alliance talks. Ambassador Ledogar spent months bickering with the French over this issue. Status issue were important for them as I had discovered in Berlin.

Anyhow, we continued in stasis for some months until I finally had to resort to a “secret” dialogue” with Kwitzinski. We worked out a formula to the effect that NATO disputed the status of Hungary and reserved the right to come back to it later. We made this formal at a session in the Soviet embassy. The chief negotiator, Ambassador Oleg Khlestov, had arrived by then. Khlestov for many years had been the head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry legal division. He came to Berlin to witness the signing of the Berlin agreement.

At this meeting, at which I was present, Khlestov told the Hungarian ambassador for the first time that Hungary was not going to be a direct participant and was going to be relegated to the sidelines. In other words he had not prepared the Hungarian ambassador, a noted expert on international law, at all for this. The ambassador was extremely put out when Khlestov just told him that this is where you are going to be, without any prior discussion.

Q: Again I have to keep coming back to a Kissinger-Brezhnev verbal agreement or what have you. Do you think your Soviet colleagues were aware of this because at a certain point I think somebody would say to you “what the hell are you talking about?”

DEAN: They never revealed this one to me although Kwitzinski had told me about the earlier back-channel in the Berlin talks, although they must have known. The only way I ever learned about it was when Ambassador Ray Garthoff from the State Department called me up one day and told me that this deal existed; this was after we had sweated our way to this compromise, which nobody liked at all. The NATO countries thought it was a surrender. I remember getting in trouble with Hungarian-American organizations here in the U.S. who naturally had the idea that Soviet forces in Hungary should be reduced and believe we had failed to support them.

We then started our first business sessions. Up to then, all we had been able to do is have walks in the Vienna woods and singing sessions in the Vienna wine taverns, the heurigen, which I did to keep some kind of cohesion and informal discussion of the subject matter going. Nobody liked the situation and the Belgian delegation walked out. They and the Romanians were particularly close because the deputy Belgian representative, Albert Willot, had a great deal to do with Romania and knew the people there. The Romanians wanted to play a bigger role and were rejected, pushed back by the Soviet Union who considered them very unreliable and didn’t want to have anything to do with them or allow them to say or do much.

Q: There were no Soviet troops in Romania.

DEAN: No there weren't, but the Romanians wanted in this force reduction exercise to play a big role and they were not permitted to by the Soviets. At a later time their representative when the proper talks started became the bilateral Romanian ambassador in Vienna and he never played much of a role in it. Ambassador Constantinescu played a big figure in these preparatory talks and tried to push in but was repelled by the Soviets. We thought him interesting.

During the long period that we were unable to have any official sessions, the Belgians and the Romanians became especially vociferous in their annoyance. The Belgians, led by a remarkable man, Ambassador Adriaenssen, who always liked to give the big powers a poke in the eye, withdrew from the allied ad hoc group and we had a breach of allied coherence. I had to go to Brussels to talk to Count Davignon, who was the deputy foreign minister at the time. I had to explain the circumstances and they agreed grudgingly to send back an observer. Fortunately, we were able to resolve the issue of holding plenary sessions within two or three weeks after that, but we almost had a real collision with Belgium because of this Kissinger holding back, I guess you could say ultimately. Again fortunately, the press did not get this story.

The preparatory talks then started and they focused on our insistence that the main negotiations start before the Helsinki CSCE talks started. Khlestov kept trying to reach Gromyko and couldn't get him. Finally the Soviets came through with a date, but in the outcome, the Helsinki talks did start before the MBFR talks started, which we didn't want. The reason we didn't want it was because the American administration considered force reduction talks serious and the Helsinki talks to be detente frippery and unlikely to produce real results. As you may recollect, President Ford when he went to Helsinki in '75 also made some remarks about that issue. He actually banned the use of the term detente in the American official vocabulary.

Q: As you set out working on this mutual and balanced reduction, my impression is that the great source of Soviet military power was its numbers, not necessarily its equipment.

DEAN: True, but the numbers of course were also numbers of equipment. When the talks proper started as I recollect in November-December of 1972, our immediate aim was to bring about an exchange of data between NATO and the Pact on their holdings of major arms because we believed this exchange would document a numerical superiority for the Warsaw Pact. This exchange proved impossible throughout the entire MBFR talks. In the successor CFE talks, the Soviet Union produced that data within a few days of the opening of the negotiations. The data produced by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty countries at that time demonstrated quite conclusively that they had a very large numerical superiority in numbers of equipment. Our theory in MBFR was that if we had an exchange of information, of data, then that exchange would demonstrate this numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact and we could successfully argue then into reducing their overhang, their superiority. That is what happened later, but not in MBFR.

Ambassador Stanley Resor, who had been secretary of the army for a long time, had taken over the leadership of the MBFR delegation. In the first phase program that we adopted in December of 1972, as I recollect, the allies proposed a small U.S.-Soviet reduction. This was because our NATO allies wanted to see the color of the Soviets' money and did not want to reduce their own forces until that happened. They were still extremely apprehensive about the idea of negotiating with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact so we proposed small reductions of both Soviet and American forces in the first phase. For 16 years, eight of them I was there, we could not get figures out of the Soviet Union.

Towards the end of my stay in Vienna, in October, 1980, I did reach agreement with the then head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Tarasov, later the Soviet judge at The Hague International Court, to use Western figures for the first small reduction. The Soviets would make a reservation saying that this did not mean that these figures could be used for further reduction. I think I may have mentioned this before, but by that time, we were close to the Carter-Reagan elections and the Carter administration did not want to get into difficulties for using a compromise proposal that might have been attacked politically, so nothing was ever done to carry that out.

Q: Were you and your colleagues pretty confident about the figures that you were getting about what the Soviets had?

DEAN: That is an extremely good question. It must have been 10 or 15 visits that we paid to the CIA analytical section, which was the one really charged with putting out the numbers on Warsaw Treaty forces. I was shocked to discover that at that time the CIA did not have full or even fragmentary information on actual Soviet units, like divisions and regiments. After many years I think they got the log book of a single Russian regiment and they were extrapolating from that to the entire force. Of course this is something where satellite photography is not much of a help in counting the beds and mess kits and so forth, how many soldiers you've got.

This was after thirty years of Cold War and all-out espionage on both sides. It did show that at that stage in any case (of course it has shown up in other ways) the human intelligence factor was very weak. It also showed that the Soviets in particular, the Warsaw Pact in general, did have excellent security and their security and their secrecy was indeed a military advantage to them, as they very strongly felt themselves. That was a powerful reason why the Soviet military which had the determining voice in this negotiation until Gorbachev came into power, steadfastly refused to break the secrecy and to provide the numbers. CIA analysis of Pact forces estimated their firepower in attack. They were not interested in actual numbers.

Q: Since you want to stop at this point, we want to put down where we are. We talked about the early preparatory talks, Hungary and all. Where should we start the next time?

DEAN: We can start next time with a discussion of our negotiating position and how we maintained allied unity. I described one occasion in which we almost lost it with the Belgians. The Belgians wanted to see some progress in this negotiation. They were one of

the few allies that did and there was a wide span of different views on that subject. Maybe on the next occasion I could describe something of our negotiating position but even more particularly the position of the different allied countries because maintaining cohesion of the allies in this first diplomatic negotiating encounter with Warsaw Pact was essential. Probably most of the allied governments, or many of them, were not especially interested in force reductions at this point, the ostensible main object of the negotiations.

Q: We also want to bring up the change after the Ford administration left and Kissinger left and what effect that had on things too and also obviously the Soviet change as well. The Soviets didn't really change during this period did they?

DEAN: No.

Q: This was late Brezhnev.

DEAN: Yes, that's right.

Q: Today is the 14th of December 1998. You heard where we are.

DEAN: The NATO allies had a very wide range of motivations for being involved in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization participants. The United States had gone into the negotiations in order to block Senator Mansfield's effort to reduce American forces in Europe. Senator Mansfield brought up his resolution for troop cuts in Europe repeatedly. His motivation appears to have been to induce greater burden sharing on the part of the allies or at least to make them take a more equitable part of the burden by, if necessary, reducing American forces but preferably having them pay more of the costs. The Nixon administration at that time was not interested in force reductions in Europe, it was interested in defeating the Mansfield resolution which it did very handily after these negotiations were announced.

Germany had asked for the MBFR negotiations because in particular the German Social Democrats believed that if there was going to be a SALT Treaty and a reduction of nuclear forces between the United States and Russia, Europe too and Germany with it should participate and obtain some of the benefits of force reduction. Britain had a Conservative government at that time and their delegate, John Thompson, was determined to prevent any slippery slope activity and any force reductions. In 1974, with the Wilson government, the attitude became more cooperative. Some of the other participants, I have in mind the Italians, wanted no force reductions and spent their time and effort in the negotiations in preventing any Western moves that might increase Warsaw Treaty interest. Norway wanted some activity but withdrew after it saw that this negotiation had become routinized. Johan Holtz, the later defense minister who passed away after being instrumental in bringing about the Oslo accords on the Near East, was there and so was their state secretary from the foreign ministry. France of course refused to participate, rejecting the idea of the close alliance discipline that would be involved in

the negotiation. Belgium and the Netherlands, like Germany, were interested in a positive outcome, but not at the cost of alliance cohesion.

Turkey was there throughout. At one point, her ambassador was assassinated by an Armenian but their interest in MBFR was to ensure that if there was reduction, the reduced Russian forces did not reinforce forces opposite the Turks. In actuality, the Turkish participation was designed to document Turkey's membership in NATO and its Europeanness as part of its effort to gain ever closer association ultimately with the European Union.

The Warsaw Treaty participants were also rather divided in terms of their interests. At the outset, as I have explained, Hungary wished to reduce its forces and so did Romania. Romania did not have any Soviet forces stationed there but it wanted to cut its own forces. However, they were relegated by the Soviet Union to the category of those who would not reduce. Of the remaining Pact members, Poland played an active role in the negotiations, and East Germany played a negative role; the same kind of role for the Warsaw Treaty that Italy for example played. East Germany wanted no withdrawal of Soviet forces from its territory.

Q: We know in this that Italy was acting from its own perspective. What about the East Germans, was this a role they were assigned or was this one that was congenial to them?

DEAN: No, I think it was from the perception of their own interests. Ulbricht had gone and had been replaced by Honecker. East Germany of course was the main area of Russian deployment outside of the Soviet Union and the East Germans did not want to have troop withdrawal from East Germany. At least that's what they indicated rather indirectly to us because they feared that it would be destabilizing for their control over the East German population. They wanted to keep things as they were.

Q: Before we go on how did we view, vis-à-vis the Mansfield amendment, the contributions of our Western allies?

DEAN: Most of the managers in the United States administration of the NATO enterprise considered that NATO was of sufficient value for U.S. interests to justify the expense it caused to the United States. They were not intellectually convinced that Europeans should do more, as the Congress was. They went through a round of so-called trilateral cuts in the mid-'60s with Robert Bowie, John McNaughton who died in an air crash from the Defense Department, and others. They did come to an agreement providing for increased European support payments and some decrease in American forces in Europe. This action was taken to meet congressional pressures and not because they thought that the existing pattern of burden sharing was intrinsically unfair. I think that, in general terms, this view characterized the administration position. They had to be prodded into the trilateral talks, the main reason being that they saw real benefits to the United States security from the existence of NATO and were more or less satisfied with the situation as it was.

Q: I would imagine there would be a certain amount of comfort for our military leaders and all in the fact that we had a major commitment, that these were troops that we could depend on more and maybe some of the others or something, was that there?

DEAN: Yes, but after all this was still pretty much the peak of the Cold War, and there was considerable continuing apprehension about the possibility of conflict. We were about ten years away from the Berlin crisis that Khrushchev had brought about and from the Cuban missile crisis. Even though the conflict was becoming progressively routinized under Brezhnev, there was still concern about what might happen. As it later transpired after the breakup of the Warsaw Treaty we did discover that, for example, the East German forces were on high alert. They had a very restrictive leave policy and were supposed to be ready to move out within a very few hours. As we discovered after the MBFR talks through the information and data provided by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the Warsaw Pact did have a very considerable numerical preponderance in equipment over NATO. Soviet strategy was apparently to make a dash for the Channel and gain political control before the U.S. could decide to use its nuclear weapons. Yes, American military considered NATO a vital operation and an essential one for American security and I think that although they would have welcomed more effort, more armaments and more units, they were not dissatisfied with what they did have.

Of course the United States at that time (and today) did have a really dominant position in the NATO alliance. I learned that from personal observation at the so-called Bonn Group foreign ministers meetings at NATO, from reporting to the NATO Council on the course of the Berlin talks, and subsequently from the reports made by us for the allied ad hoc group to the council. It was rather clear that the United States was the active leader in the alliance. It benefited on many occasions from the advice of the alliance members which improved its policy and prevented it from making errors but it was the initiator. When you look at the European Union today, you see an acute problem of leadership where Germany, the largest country and potential leader, is blocked by its own history, and will be for a long time, from exercising an active leadership. The consequence is that there is a great deal of floundering and directionless activity in the EU today. The continuation of that situation will maintain American preeminence for a long time to come.

Q: As these talks which were initially designed as you say as almost a response to the efforts by Senator Mansfield and all to reduce the forces, I would have thought that after the initial go around you would begin to realize that this thing had settled into a routine and this would be very difficult to keep your spirits up, your ideas flowing and all?

DEAN: Yes. Of course it was an experiment in terms of multilateral East-West diplomacy. Up to then, the United States had negotiated with the Soviet Union. There had been four-power foreign minister meetings on Germany but there were no sort of alliance-to-alliance talks and the novelty of this sort of framework did take a lot of exploration, discussion and so forth. As a matter of fact we passed through the doors of these negotiations about a thousand or more diplomats and military officers on both sides, who later turned up in all kinds of other negotiations. The resulting standards of comity,

politeness, discussion, as well as personal acquaintanceship served our interests in many other situations.

Q: Was there any change when the Ford administration took over from the Nixon administration and then what happened when the Carter administration came in?

DEAN: I did not register much change. We had had three so-called proposals, options, in our opening position. The so-called option three was to suggest that we would be willing to reduce some of the nuclear capable aircraft that the United States had in Western Europe which was a topic of great interest to the Russians who were always complaining about these forward based systems and their omission from negotiations. Even the Germans complained about that to us at the outset of the Nixon administration where they said, "You are starting these START talks but you are not doing anything about cutting back on the medium-range Soviet missiles in Eastern Europe and in the Western USSR. We want to get some benefit out of these nuclear reduction talks" as they did from the so-called conventional force reduction talks. That's why the nuclear capable aircraft were put in. Kissinger held back throughout his period of office and refused to allow them to be put forward in the MBFR talks because he wanted to be sure that the SALT I Treaty was locked down before this other inducement was put forward. Probably, given his style, he did mention the possibility to the Soviet authorities as a possibility.

I noticed no great difference. Our great problem, one which was never really resolved in that negotiation, was the configuration of our position. We insisted that, before there was any agreement, both sides should produce their full information and it should be discussed, presumably verified. We insisted that the preponderance of the Warsaw Treaty forces in armaments and personnel be verified, be documented. In other words, we insisted that Russia agree in principle to make about 200,000 Pact reductions. We could have said we will have this small initial reduction and if we are talking about a reduction of 20,000 Americans and maybe more Russians, then we will have a data discussion. But we insisted that we should have the exchange of data at the outset before reductions took place and also, normally enough, that a practical system of verification be developed and agreed before any reductions took place.

Q: Given the state of mind of the Soviets at that point, particularly verification and also data, did this seem to be realistic or was this just something we had to have but we weren't going to get it so there you were?

DEAN: We didn't get on-site verification until the Stockholm Agreement around 1987 when Gorbachev made Marshall Akhromeyev go to Stockholm and agree to have three on-site inspections in the Soviet Union in the context of the confidence building talks that were going on there in the Helsinki framework. We didn't have any exchange of data until the early '90s in the new CFE talks restarted by Gorbachev where the Russians did plank down figures on the first day that demonstrated that our thesis was correct that they had many more and so forth, in their own figures and figures which were later on more or less accepted by Western military establishments and served as a basis for CFE reductions. In MBFR, we went around, and around, on this subject without any effect.

The Russian military hadn't the faintest intention of giving us these figures. I finally argued to the Russians that they should use our figures for the first reductions.

Q: Our figures of their forces?

DEAN: Our figures on their own forces. They informally agreed, but this came late in the Carter administration and the administration didn't want to take the political risk of trying to push that through the Congress in an election period.

Q: Did you find your delegation having to keep an eye on the Helsinki accords type, the CSCE I guess it was at that point, and the SALT talks? Were the SALT talks in the lead and you both were following in its wake did you feel, at least certainly during the Kissinger years, or not?

DEAN: Except for Kissinger's reluctance to have anything happen very much, we reported to him in each break two or three times a year about what was going on or not going on in these talks. They were relatively satisfied as long as we maintained allied cohesion, as long as we reported to the NATO Council, as long as the NATO Council was satisfied. NATO had a small operating staff there in Vienna and they merely exchanged messages with the Council. We more or less did our own thing but we did report periodically by writing and in person with teams telling them that we were doing this and we were doing that.

In the later part of the talks I tried to activate the Germans a little bit because Egon Bahr, Brandt's policy man, had turned up in the German Bundestag as chair of the Bundestag subcommittee on disarmament. In the German system they gave opposition parties chairmanships of the committees, and in many parliamentary systems they did that. Anyhow I used to inform Bahr from time to time on the course of the talks and went up to Frankfurt to do it. He would show up, but the discussions didn't have much effect. The Kohl government didn't want to have any trouble with the United States and that was about it. It complained mildly in Washington about these contacts.

Q: You said that on both sides there a lot of people coming in and out of these delegations both military...

DEAN: Yes. These negotiations lasted for 16 years, so there was quite a bit of turnover in delegations on both sides.

Q: Were these in some ways laying the groundwork for later cooperation when the thaw came and the end of the Cold War?

DEAN: Oh definitely. In fact they could not possibly have concluded the CFE treaty in 18 months without development of the concepts, without development of the personal relations, without development of procedures, all that kind of stuff that we did. I believe that is generally recognized. After four or five years, it was a depressingly routinized operation. It was quite clear that the Soviet military had the upper hand, and that they

were preventing any outcome. Every week, there was a so-called informal session rotating among the ambassadors of the participants in which the Western side would prepare talking points representing our position and the other side did that, too. Then we would have a plenary session in which each side, sometimes only one side, would present a short talk and then our press people would brief the press representatives. It was always the same stuff and the same issue. We tried to break down the subject matter into flank security and all different components but nothing really moved the situation forward beyond the data problem except this abortive informal understanding we had with Ambassador Tarasov about using Western data, but that came too late in the game to do any good.

Q: As these talks went on, was there any concern on the Western part about the aging of the Soviet leadership? Toward the late '70s Brezhnev seemed to be less vigorous.

DEAN: Indeed, I witnessed the signature of the START I treaty with Brezhnev and President Carter in Vienna and Brezhnev had to be propped up by a person whom I took first to be his valet but then realized it was Chernenko, who finally received his reward for these services after the death of Andropov. It was the regime of the old men and things were very stultifying and that's what I think set the situation up of course for Gorbachev in many respects.

Q: Was this palpable from your delegations point of view?

DEAN: The Russian delegation would never talk about conditions in Russia. Some of their allies would do so fairly openly but they were pretty circumspect all the way through. You could get some idea of their personal positions. In most cases, the Russian diplomats did not appear to be convinced, committed communists but Russian nationalists, and that was true mostly of the other delegations except the East Germans who did send apparently convinced communists, at least men who were then communists. Later, I met one or two after the breakup and they had a different story.

This was potentially a momentous enterprise building down the huge military confrontation with four million people under arms, the biggest concentration of military forces ever seen in the world, and the most expensive I think, costing well over 300 to 400 million dollars, more than that at its peak. The idea that it wasn't needed, that it was superfluous, that a war was not going to take place, was imminent. But no matter what we offered to do, even to make the first reduction small, symbolically tiny, so it wouldn't have made any difference militarily, we still connected that with the exchange of data. In fact, we presented our data on our own forces, even our data on their forces, in an effort to promote discussion, but we just got nowhere.

Q: Did the introduction of upgraded, new types of equipment, not missiles but tanks and things like that, become a factor? Was there sort of growing confidence on the Western side that our equipment was getting at a qualitative lead, or not?

DEAN: That kind of discussion did take place and it did seem to me personally, looking

at the confrontation, that the Warsaw Pact capabilities were exaggerated in the West; not their numerical preponderance, but their capabilities. However, that didn't play any role in these talks. We didn't compare. We did for example present ideas on how we would go about verifying the size of a given unit which later did get taken over into the CFE talks as their verification apparatus so that was worthwhile. We continued to give the impression to the press and to Western parliaments and to the NATO Council that we were making an honest effort and that the real blockage was coming from the Warsaw Pact. This was a fact and it went on and on.

Nobody wanted to walk away from it and break it off and say this is foolish, we're not getting anywhere, we should try some new approach. This was left for Gorbachev to do and he finally did it. He's the one who closed down the MBFR talks. NATO offered to continue the present talks, or start on a new basis, and he proposed a new basis.

Q: While you were working on this, were the divisions within the Warsaw Pact evident? The Poles and the Russians have never really gotten along.

DEAN: We talked often with the Poles and told them that we thought that Russia was deliberately suppressing the figures or falsifying the figures. I witnessed the Polish ambassador being called in here in Washington as a result of our representations to the Department. He was told that the figures had been cooked that were being discussed although they were never formally presented.

Q: These were figures that the Soviets had presented?

DEAN: Yes, and he was apparently shocked and gave every appearance of it and it caused a lot of heartburn. Yes, Polish relations with Russia were not very good. East German relations were good because of their dependence on Russia.

Q: You were with these talks until when?

DEAN: Our preparatory talks took place in early '72 and I left late in '81.

Q: What happened in December of '79 and all? Did the invasion of Afghanistan change things?

DEAN: Yes it did. The British government had changed again and Mrs. Thatcher was then prime minister. The British ambassador to the talks, Jackson, was very skeptical about the talks anyhow; skepticism was justified given their record but we kept grinding away. When the Russians went into Afghanistan he said, "This is the end, it won't work while this is going on." He was probably right, but anyhow we never had the chance to find out as to whether we could have, while that fighting was going on, concluded some agreement on cutting back Warsaw Pact forces and the talks went on for a decade longer.

Q: Was there the feeling that the Soviets were beginning to draw their forces from Europe into Afghanistan?

DEAN: There was some talk of it, but not too much. My impression is that, although in theory we have access to CIA figures, when we returned here and talked to the Agency representatives, the Russian and Warsaw Pact representatives were getting almost nothing from their military advisors who apparently regarded the negotiations as a period of relatively pleasant duty. The Russians used to return to Moscow at the end of each three month negotiating round ordering up a special train which was loaded with refrigerators and consumer goods and that was clear it was regarded as good duty. They said little and although there was quite a bit of intelligence activity, boring of holes through walls for audio pickup, suborning and all that kind of thing on the part of the Warsaw Treaty countries and the Pact, by Russian intelligence, against some of our delegates.

Q: How did we feel by this time on the American delegation to begin with on the possibility of being suborned? Do you think that the training was such and the preparation and the oversight was such that you felt pretty secure?

DEAN: Well there was one case of which I would rather not discuss the details in which we did have a Polish operation in our delegation. The Germans had a Russian operation against the head of their delegation. They put a listening device in his living room wall boring through from the next apartment in the traditional way. There was some hanky-panky going on. There was no defection from any of the Pact delegations although I would suspect that with this degree of contact that a lot of the Western intelligence organizations were actively trying to recruit but I never heard any complaints or visible signs of it.

Q: Were there any other developments before we come to '82?

DEAN: No, I don't think so. The last development was this effort to work out some deal with the Russians to permit an initial reduction. It didn't work out. I had for several years requested a transfer to some other job and every six months I sent a letter to George Vest, who was then the assistant secretary for EUR asking for a transfer. But nothing ever happened. When the Reagan administration came in they said that all Carter administration arms control delegation heads would be changed, understandably. That didn't happen until late '81 in my case.

Q: I would have thought that at a certain point being a career Foreign Service officer you would have felt that you were kind of out of sight and out of mind?

DEAN: Definitely. It was really the end of the line there and that's why I asked to be changed and shifted but it didn't seem to have much effect.

Q: In late '81, early '82 what happened?

DEAN: I came back here and I finally ended up at the Carnegie Endowment here in town on detail. I retired two years later. Ron Spiers, then the undersecretary for administration

chided me and told me he had another embassy for me in mind the next year but I said, "Thanks very much, I've been waiting around here too long." At some point, self-respect demands you get out of the corridors and find a job elsewhere.

Q: What were you doing with the Carnegie Endowment?

DEAN: I was doing roughly the same sort of thing I am doing here with the Union of Concerned Scientists, analyzing European security developments and related issues. We had the missile crisis, the Pershings and the SS-20s so I wrote a lot about that, and I wrote a lot about Germany. I observed of course the new CFE talks. I followed Gorbachev's course and went to Russia several times for conferences and found that there was life outside the Foreign Service.

Q: What about early on, you were part of you might say the German mafia whether inside or outside looking at this situation which is always looking towards the East, when Gorbachev first came on the scene. What was the reading that you were getting, both your own personal one and from your colleagues?

DEAN: The initial strong reading was that Gorbachev was a fake. That was the predominant administration view, or at least Washington view. I thought that a man who would actually pull back unilaterally sizable forces from East Germany was no fake and at least had some claim to be taken seriously. Then of course I went to the first Geneva meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev as an NGO, non-governmental organization, representative with Admiral Lee, a longtime nuclear disarmer. We set up shop and tried to inform newsmen who were coming to these summits for the first time of what they might expect to see.

It did seem to me that as time went on, as Gorbachev appeared at the UN and made his nuclear disarmament proposal in January 1986, that we had a very different situation on our hands and the question was how to take advantage of it. I don't think that we did adequately do so however. Gorbachev talked himself out of the job from the point of view of the Russian establishment. I was fascinated, they televised his return from Foros in the Crimea after he had been under the supervision of the coup people for three or four days. He showed he still was a convinced communist. He spoke of communism with a human face and that it would still some day prevail. Yeltsin was giving him an awful hard time in these sessions. Anyhow, that was the appropriate end of my activity in that field.

Q: What was your impression sort of from the perspective of the Carnegie Endowment and sort of civilian life you might say of the initial response the type of person who was in the Reagan administration dealing with these matters?

DEAN: I thought the response was very timid from the point of view of the administration and that they could do a great deal better but as we then saw, apparently President Reagan wanted to do better at Reykjavik, but he was reined in by the system, by the bureaucracy, who thought he was going too far. It was a pity that they didn't build on what he proposed there, either the elimination of all long-range missiles which still is

a valid proposition, or on Gorbachev's riposte, the elimination of all nuclear weapons. It is a pity that they didn't seriously negotiate on that, but instead considered that this kind of thing was bizarre.

Q: Did you feel that when the initial Reagan administration came in, many of the people with whom you might have been fighting bureaucratic battles who really wanted to stop disarmament talks and all of that, did they initially seize the ascendancy?

DEAN: Yes. I remember visiting Germany at that time and heard a group of them talk at a conference of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation whose president, Bruno Hech, I knew from earlier. They were triumphing and saying now things are going to be different and totally changed and so forth. Personally, this rhetoric inspired worry and fear. There was a considerable hiatus before the administration started serious business again, but ultimately it moved in that direction. Secretary Shultz, who was a level-headed man, inspired more trust.

Q: How about particularly the German reaction from your colleagues of whom you'd been working so long, did they sort of throw up their hands in horror at the Reagan administration when they first came in?

DEAN: Yes. They were very worried that the administration would be an approach completely out of American character, unserious, or crusading, and they wanted none of these. What the Germans wanted from us I suppose, still do want in one sense, is a consistent level of sober responsible leadership which indicates that we have looked at all the risks, all the possibilities, and have chosen a reasonable middle course. They feared that that would end.

Q: While you were in the NGO and then when you retired, did you find yourself being able to share your knowledge or was it out of sight, out of mind?

DEAN: No, no. I was invited to a lot of functions and we talked about it. There were quite a few discussions then, conferences then, about Soviet diplomacy and diplomatic style and so forth. I was able to pass on what little I had gleaned of these methods over the years.

Q: What have you done with the Carnegie Endowment, just to get a feel for what you've been doing since you left the service in what was it '84 or '83?

DEAN: '84. In the Carnegie Endowment I wrote journal articles. Then I worked on a project on European defense with the Union of Concerned Scientists. Our military advisor at that time was General Lee Butler, the officer who became head of STRATCOM and has since turned into an outright nuclear abolitionist. At that time, however, he was a very sharp and seemingly orthodox staff officer. Anyhow, I moved over to the Union of Concerned Scientist and did disarmament work. I worked on proposals for what later became the CFE talks and I developed quite a few proposals on nuclear disarmament, a subject that I'm still working on. One of my proposals that I did

for the Atlantic Council we sent in and the council sent it to the JCS. General Fogelman and several others wrote that this was the best work in this field that he had seen, so I felt somewhat redeemed.

Q: I've often wondered, we have these various groups like the Brookings, American Enterprise, the Carnegie, and proposals, papers are written. Coming from the Foreign Service having dealt with the things within the government and getting out, what is the role in your perspective of how these things work?

DEAN: The NGOs have three main areas of activity, at least the ones in the arms control field. We work with the administration giving them ideas and concepts. Many of them have already thought of these ideas, but it is often more convenient to pass it around coming from an NGO, than to stick out their own neck for them. We also work with Congress. Congress raises questions with the administration, pushes it on. Then we also do advocacy work with members of the public, write letters, telegrams and e-mails to the President, the Congress, and the Secretary of State. I think we provide a large part, together with the public media, of the intellectual atmosphere, the nurturing medium, in which political issues are discussed and decisions made. On most controversial public issues, the discussion is between NGO's, Congress and the administration.

Q: In some ways, say if the State Department wants to try out something, it would be possible that somebody is letting you know they are thinking in this regard, you would then put it out which would be untainted by coming from...

DEAN: Sometimes, they pick up our ideas and present them as their own. That is okay. The main thing is that the idea circulates. Sometimes, it is the other way around. They circulate within the administration some paper or proposal which they might themselves believe is a good idea but announce produced by an NGO. Often, we are ahead of the curve or of the actual pace of developments and try to look ahead and produce suggestions that will open the way to rational and effective policy. We do not have to do what absorbs the time of most officials – seek to apply current policy and try to make it work. Right now, I've got a program called Global Action to Prevent War which would, if it were put into effect, cut back the numbers of both internal and regional wars in the world. I am engaged in trying to get foundation, government and large private voluntary support for the thing. That's the kind of activity that we're involved in.

Q: From what I'm gather, but I'm not intimately concerned with it, the non-governmental organizations are gradually playing a greater role in the government. Particularly I think the opening was because of humanitarian aid and all...

DEAN: Many fields, environmental for example. Actually defense and disarmament is the area of least interaction with the administration in relative terms even though it is relatively active. That is because this area is supposed to be a security area and one affecting the nation's defenses. Yes, the NGOs certainly are at the UN, they are in every field of humanitarian activity, every women's rights and human rights field. They are the immediate reacting public, the trailblazers and that is a very important role.

The prevailing political science theory is that government, national governments, are losing some of their authority to supranational, multilateral cooperation with treaties, not their ultimate sovereignty but some of the authority. They are devolving it down to federal groups and they are sharing it laterally with NGOs. That's the configuration of the present global system and that was true of all of these UN conferences on women, habitat, and sustainable development, the pattern where governments were represented, NGOs were represented, and multilateral organizations were represented.

Q: One last question, in the field of nuclear weapons and all. We're talking about now 1998 and the Cold War has been over for eight years or so, have you noticed that there is a growing feeling of desire for the abolition of these weapons and that what was sustaining the support of them is eroding considerably now?

DEAN: Yes I think so, but very slowly, and I'm going to make you a present of my latest paper on this subject. There is no large scale enmity between us and another nuclear power now. It looks as though that condition of relative peace will continue for some time. The longer it goes on, the less necessary it appears to have large nuclear arsenals. If, on the other hand, there is some nuclear weapons incident, that too will feed the pressures for cutting back and abolition. The governments of the nuclear weapons states, particularly our own, are thrashing around to justify possession of nuclear weapons. The reasoning is becoming more attenuated. Right now it is rogue state attack by two or three small states.

When the Germans recently talked about no first use in NATO, Defense Secretary Cohen spoke of the general deterrent value of nuclear weapons. Others are talking about the use of nuclear weapons against the attack by biological and chemical weapons. Although an individual missile attack or a terrorist attack using biological or chemical weapons is possible, and in fact was practiced by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan in Tokyo, there is no possibility at the present time of a massive missile delivery of chemical or biological weapons. For this, you would have to use far more delivery systems than you would for an all-out nuclear attack. For an attacker with nuclear weapons, it would be foolish not to use nuclear weapons. The situation today is not comparable with that of the Cold War. We are talking about a small scale attack which might immobilize one or two cities, but not the entire nation. So we are in a totally different realm. If that is the straw that you have to reach at to justify nuclear weapons, then the rationale is not very strong. That is the essential problem.

There is also a further really serious problem of how to get rid of them. The verification apparatus and the other things that are going to have to be part of eliminating nuclear weapons, such as an agreement on the part of the United States to relinquish its conventional superiority or the Russians and Chinese won't play, are going to be very difficult. It will be most difficult to devise a system to ensure lasting verification of the elimination of nuclear weapons. This will require ultimately in my opinion a functioning democratic government in Russia and in China. Those requirements are more difficult than the physical elimination of the weapons. But, in any case, they illustrate that getting

rid of the weapons will be even harder than developing them, so they unfortunately will be with us for quite some time.

My own view is that they should be reduced to a small amount and immobilized by separating warheads from deliver systems, putting them in monitored storage in the owner country territory. That will cut back the dangers of accidental launch and will cut back most of the present dangers of possession of the arsenals. It will give people like Secretary Cohen some assurance against sneak attacks. That seems to me to be about the best that we can achieve in the foreseeable future but that would be very worthwhile.

This effort is part of the larger mission of American foreign policy and American diplomacy, to try to assure that change, which is inevitable, will to the maximum extent possible be peaceful change. This is the mission of our Foreign Service and it has been my job in the Service and to the present.

Q: I guess it's a good time to stop.

End of interview