

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR WILLIAM N. DALE

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Initial interview date: September 19, 1988
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INTERVIEW

Q: Ambassador Dale was born in the District of Columbia in February 1919. He has degrees from Harvard, A.B. in 1940, M.A. in 1942. As well, he finished the Naval Defense College and the National War College, the latter in 1960.

Ambassador Dale served in the US Navy as an officer from 1942 to 1946. He entered the Foreign Service in June 1946, served in years thereafter at Copenhagen, Ottawa, the Department, Paris, while at the NATO Defense College, London, the Department again. Then by that time, he was a fairly senior officer, Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs.

After the War College, Ambassador Dale, by this time an FSO-1, was Counselor for Mutual Security Affairs in Ankara. Then in 1964, DCM in Tel Aviv, back to the Department. Eventually, in 1973, to the Central African Republic as ambassador. Then, Bill, you retired in 1975.

DALE: Yes. This leaves out my experience on the National Security Council staff. It began about 1952 and '53, and then went on into 1953. Before the election, because I was there when President Truman was still President, and then later on during the election, and saw the transition in the staff when Eisenhower became President.

Q: So that was 1952 and 1953. That was after London and before you went off to Ankara?

DALE: No, that was after I had been Canadian desk officer from about 1951, 1952. Then I went into the National Security Council staff in 1952-53, and then after that, to Paris.

Q: There are several things that we're going to cover in this interview, although I'm not going to set any exact agenda for you. But one of the things that perhaps we could start with would be how you became interested in the Foreign Service. Was it while you were a naval officer or while you were at Harvard?

DALE: I had taken some courses in foreign relations as an undergraduate. Then as a graduate student, 1941-42, I took some comparative sociology courses, and those were very interesting. I thought that it would be a very fascinating life to be able to compare cultures according to some of the schemes that I had learned from Professor Merton and other people in that department. Professor Parsons was another one, and Professor Sorokin. I did some of that work as an undergraduate, but most of it was as a graduate

student. So I thought that from the point of view of learning about foreign cultures and societies, it would be a very interesting life. But I did nothing active about it.

I had intended to go back and complete my work on a doctor's degree after the war, but then about the time the war ended and I was stationed at a naval ammunition depot at Crane, Indiana, the depot had a visit from a Dr. Feis, who was an economist or economic advisor in the State Department at the time. He said, "Why don't you take the Foreign Service exams? It's a good time to go in now. They need a lot of people. We have to build up our posts again." He advised me to take the exams up at the Ninth Naval District in Chicago. So I did that. They gave the Foreign Service exams. There weren't very many people taking them. I always think it was because it was just after the war, and they were taking in a great many new officers and the exams were easy that enabled me to get in.

Dr. Feis thought that the kind of interests I had in different societies was a good point to start from, and I'd had a good economic background and a good political background, and it would make for a Foreign Service career that would be of great interest to me and perhaps some little use to the government.

Q: You took the old four-day exam, did you not?

DALE: It went on for several days, and I came back and had an oral exam.

Q: You had several assignments abroad. Were you ever interested in specialized training such as language training?

DALE: Yes, I wanted to go back and finish getting a doctor's degree after I had been to two or three posts. At that time the Foreign Service turned that request down, saying, "It's all very fine, but we're afraid if you get a doctor's degree, you won't stay in the Foreign Service." So they did not approve my request for additional academic work.

Q: So by 1964, when you went to Israel as DCM, you were not really a Middle Eastern specialist?

DALE: No.

Q: An Arabist?

DALE: I'd started out, actually, as a British Commonwealth specialist, because my tutor all during the time I was in college and also as a graduate student was William Yandell Elliott, whose specialty was the British Commonwealth. I tended to take courses, whether they were in politics or sociology, which had some reference to the British Commonwealth, and much of my early writing was on that, Australia, in particular. But the trouble was the British Commonwealth began to fade away, so that after my assignment as Canadian desk officer and then as Deputy Director of British

Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, the office itself didn't last long. The State Department was reorganized, and there was no field of concentration.

So after some thought, I decided it would be most interesting to transfer my interests to the Middle East. I thought that Turkey would make a good beginning for that. Of course, it's important to add that there was also a vacancy in the embassy in Turkey. (Laughs)

Q: That does help, yes.

DALE: It helps a lot.

Q: As counselor of the embassy in Ankara, what were your primary duties?

DALE: That was a very interesting job. The country team concept had been carried quite a long ways in Ankara because of the large number of American military, some 20,000. They represented a lot of different commands. There was the NATO command in Izmir, there was what was called TUSLOG, the logistics group, in Ankara, then there was JUSMAT, the military aid mission in Ankara, as well. Then there were a number of stations along the Black Sea, in particular, which were for information gathering, directed towards the Soviets.

Q: Electronic?

DALE: Electronic information gathering stations. And all kinds of American military were on Turkish territory, doing any number of things. I remember once a man in the foreign office with whom I worked on this question, named Osman Olacy, saying to me, "Look, Bill, your people are doing something or other out at a place called Site 31. What on earth are they doing? There's a great pile of dirt there."

Well, I went out to try to find out what they were doing. It was a terrible job to find out. Apparently, they were digging a hole, and they dug and dug and dug. The idea, I guess, was to see, if they got deep enough, if they could detect nuclear explosions and measure them in some way from the Soviet Union. But I've never been able to confirm that.

I got back on leave at one point, to Washington, and tried to see if there could be some control on the number of American military coming in, so that they couldn't just come in from any part of the American very thriving military establishment and set up business in Turkey, without any controls, without anyone really knowing who was there. So I went to the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Bill Bundy, and he said, "I can't do anything about it."

Q: That's in the Pentagon.

DALE: Yes. "The services run free on this."

Q: The people who were digging the hole were military?

DALE: Yes.

Q: In charge of a lieutenant?

DALE: I could never find out. They weren't telling me either. Consequently, the Turks, with very little resistance from us, said, "We must have a much tighter treaty to see if we can control what it is that the American military do in Turkey. They have *carte blanche* to operate anywhere they want in the country, they do not tell us, and they apparently do not tell you," which was true. They did not. And they did not tell each other, because there was no central point in the Pentagon where these things were vetted.

So the last part of my stay in Turkey was devoted to trying to write an agreement with the Turks, to see if we could arrange for some kind of Turkish control or at least knowledge of what the Americans were doing." We also had, of course, the Status of Forces Agreement to work out, so this was an agreement covering a good many phases of our activity there.

Q: This was in the early 1960s.

DALE: Yes, 1960 to 1964.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

DALE: The first one was named Warren, and the second one was Raymond Hare. Most of the time I was there, Raymond Hare was the ambassador. He was much interested in the military, and he was a lot of fun to work with and for, so that he and I used to do our best together to keep track of what they were doing.

All this was part of the country team, you see, because the head of the logistics group, the general, came to the country team meetings. So did the head of JUSMAT, the military aid mission. The military aid people cooperated very closely with the embassy.

I neglected to mention one large military organization, that was CENTO. We had a good many officers there, and the highest ranking general we had there, who was a lieutenant general at the time, was Robert Porter. The others were mere major generals. The head of the logistics group was what my late wife used to call a "buck general," a mere brigadier.

Q: To continue on Turkey, you've mentioned the embassy problem of coordination. What was the most important bilateral problem between our two nations at the time, bilateral issue or question?

DALE: When I first got there, the only issue we really had at all was the question of the Status of Forces Agreement, and also the activities of the American military. There were

no real political problems between us and the Turks. I suppose you could mention an economic problem, in that the Turks wanted more aid than we felt we could give them. They were getting sometimes about \$100 million a year. We had a large economic aid mission there, as well as a large military aid mission. My job was to coordinate the two together for the ambassador, as well as ride some kind of herd on the military. So the job had a great many aspects in that sense.

For instance, the Turks had a great many men under arms. After the Americans and, I suspect, the Germans, they had the largest force in NATO, but they don't really have an awful lot to do barring a war, which there wasn't. So we tried to work out programs for civic action which would involve the military in such activities as building roads and schools and that kind of thing. That involved both the military aid mission and economic aid mission. So the person in my job could take a lead in activities such as civic action, and that worked out very nicely. The Turks, after initial objections from the military, did agree to do some of that. I think it helped a good deal. So that was a rather large aspect of the work.

Q: It was a hot item at that time in the early '60s.

DALE: Yes, it was.

Q: All around the world.

DALE: Because all these troops were under arms and not doing anything.

Q: Latin America also.

DALE: We had other things, too, which involved both. Then we had the Peace Corps, so we had that to coordinate with the economic aid mission. Altogether, the coordinating work that was done through the country team apparatus was also under my purview and was a fascinating job.

Q: Was there much in the way of what we might call civilian economic relations between the two countries, trade and investment?

DALE: There was not a great deal at that time, Henry. Americans were interested in some metals that Turkey produced. There was very little oil, only a small amount. The Turks themselves were ambivalent about foreign investment. It has always been a problem in Turkey between people who thought the state should control enterprise and that foreign investment should be limited and strictly controlled, and those who thought that you should have more free private enterprise and loosen the rules under which foreigners could come into the country and develop mines and export.

At this time, under Prime Minister İnönü and the Republican People's Party, which was in power for much of it, those who were *étatist* in outlook tended to have the upper hand.

That made it difficult for American firms to come in and under conditions they thought were necessary to make any kind of profit. They had trouble getting dollars out, there were rules on what land you could own, and things of that nature. So there were considerable barriers to American investment.

Q: Who are étatists?

DALE: Those who believe the state should play a very large role in the economy.

Q: État, yes.

DALE: You see, in Turkey, I think now about 50% of the industry which the country has is controlled by the state. At least that was the last figure I saw. It's slightly over 50%, but I think the present Prime Minister, Turgut Ozal, has reduced that. They've gone the other way now towards a freer enterprise. Chromite was one of the things we were interested in.

Q: Our military-political interests in Turkey were fairly substantial then.

DALE: Yes.

Q: Our economic and investment interests were slight?

DALE: I wouldn't say slight. They were significant, but built on future hopes. They were not developed.

Q: Anything else about your senior assignment there?

DALE: I think I should mention one thing, the work of the Status of Forces Agreement. I haven't mentioned that. The Turks are a very patriotic people, and the Turkish flag is to them a very sacred object. American soldiers, when they came into Turkey, were told that, but they didn't always remember it. We had difficulty, a great deal of difficulty with a soldier who, when he first came to Turkey, had been warned to be careful about the flag, he went to a house of ill repute one night, got very drunk. When he came out, he went downstairs. The ladies were standing around in a balcony, which ran on three sides of the building. He saw a Turkish flag and, like laughing in church, he couldn't help but pull it down and threw it in the garbage pail, whereupon the ladies, who were interested in love most of the time, became very patriotic, piled on him, brought in the police, and he was arrested. His defense was very unique. He said, "I saw the flag was falling (because he was pulling it) and I wanted to keep it from touching the ground, so I let it go into the nearest receptacle there was, which happened to be a garbage pail."

So he had a long jail sentence as a result of this, and we thought that was unfair. The Turks, however, are very sensitive on this point, so we had a good deal of political difficulty at first over questions pertaining to the Status of Forces Agreement and

Americans' behavior relative to the Turkish flag, relative to the Black Market, and cases of that nature.

Later on, a genuine issue did come up, and that was over Cyprus. The Americans were trying to keep the Turks from invading Cyprus, and in the end, Ambassador Hare, one of the real feats I've ever seen, the best feats of diplomacy, did manage to talk Prime Minister İnönü out of invading the island of Cyprus. This was in 1964, when the ships were loaded with troops, landing craft were ready. He went into a Cabinet meeting, couldn't get into the room, sat outside, managed to persuade the prime minister not to invade, a real tremendous feat of diplomatic initiative.

Q: How?

DALE: How did he do it? He managed to persuade them that if they did, they would have no support, that it would endanger their tie with NATO, which was very important to Turkey at that time. I guess it still is, but it was extremely important. He told them that it would certainly make it difficult for the United States to continue and on the scale it was and the aid which Turkey needed to develop. Lastly, he said it wouldn't solve the problem at all, because it would tend to isolate Turkey, and they would find they couldn't hold onto whatever they had won, because they would be so isolated from the West. Turkey has a strong desire to be associated with the West, because they need to balance it against the Soviet Union, which for centuries they've looked on as the major threat.

Q: Who did he talk with?

DALE: Prime Minister İnönü. That issue overwhelmed all the other issues by that time. The Status of Forces Agreement, the problem of what the military was up to paled in significance when the Cyprus issue came up.

Q: In this particular diplomatic feat that you're talking about, was Hare operating on instructions, or exactly how did he take this initiative?

DALE: He was operating on instructions, but the instructions were general. He used the instructions to support the pitch he had already determined. I was waiting for him in the embassy, and he was down at the foreign ministry. We were giving a dinner party. I knew the dinner party started. I could almost tell by my watch what course was being served. I got back in time for dessert. By that time, we'd reported back to Washington that our naval attaché, who was stationed in Eskenderun, where the troops were loading, could see the troops filing off the ships, back to their barracks, and we knew that the crisis was over.

Q: That was quite a coup.

DALE: That was quite a coup. That man was good.

Q: When was Cyprus eventually partitioned?

DALE: 1974, ten years later. Later on came other events, such as the famous Johnson letter to the Turks, which was very unfortunate. But this was before that.

Q: You left in 1964.

DALE: Yes.

Q: You went directly to DCM.

DALE: Yes.

Q: Who decided that you were going to go to Tel Aviv?

DALE: I don't know. I'd been in Turkey for close to four years, and little feelers began to come out. It was time for Dale to leave. One was a job that I would have preferred to Tel Aviv, but I didn't get it, Director of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

Q: So in the time-honored fashion, a cable came in?

DALE: It didn't order me. It said, "Would you appreciate a direct transfer of orders to Tel Aviv?"

Q: By this time, you were of such a rank that you didn't get peremptory orders.

DALE: No, it was very nicely done.

Q: So you decided to go.

DALE: Oh, yes, yes.

Q: You arrived there in September 1964.

DALE: Yes. I had home leave.

Q: Who was the ambassador at the time?

DALE: Walworth Barbour, who had been ambassador for some years before that, and was ambassador for some years after that.

Q: He spent a total of ten years, was it?

DALE: Ten or 11 years.

Q: Let me ask you one or two questions. How did you personally view Israel at that time? Had you ever been to Israel before you went there on assignment?

DALE: No.

Q: What was your personal impression? What was your personal outlook?

DALE: At the time that Israel had won her independence, I thought that it would be a good thing for the world if the Jews had a national state of their own. I thought it would give them something to be proud of, and that it would lead to a state where many of the Jewish ideals could be brought to fruition.

Q: So you supported the existence of Israel.

DALE: Yes.

Q: What was your attitude toward the Arab world at this time?

DALE: I really didn't have any. I didn't know anything about it. I was very confused about it. I expect I would have said that the Arab world was a very changeable, undifferentiated mass of new countries which still, being new, had not developed to the point that you could clearly distinguish what pattern they would form.

Q: A little chaotic.

DALE: Yes.

Q: We're going to come to the 1967 War in a moment, and I'm going to ask you some of your departing impressions of Israel and departing impressions of the Arab world later. Let me get on the record, for the interested person, perhaps, some of the relatively minor matters that came up during your first two or three years there--relatively minor, I guess; I'm not too sure. The Premier was Levi Eshkol. He was forced to resign in December of '64 over something that was called the Lavon affair. Do you recall what that was?

DALE: Yes. He wasn't really forced to resign, but he was out of office for eight days.

Q: What was that all about?

DALE: Some years before that, I think about 1953 or '54, the Israeli intelligence, the Mossad, hatched a plan regarding Egypt. They would get some Egyptian Jews to burn some USIS offices in Egypt and some British offices in Egypt.

Q: Such as at Alexandria.

DALE: Yes. They would not presumably get caught. The Americans would think that it was those awful Egyptian Arabs who had done it, they would never associate it with Israel, and that would put a wedge between US and Egyptian relations. The only trouble was that for some reason, very unlike the Mossad, it was a sloppy operation and the Egyptian Jews got caught. No one ever doubts that.

The Israelis treated it very curiously when we were there. They never put it in the papers, because there is censorship in Israel, which you probably know. This was judged to be too militarily dangerous to be known and printed, so it never got much publicity. The object was to keep the publicity out of the American press, which was fairly successful. So people always called it the Lavon affair, but never explained what it meant. Now it's all in print and everybody knows what the deal was about. That, however, was never really Levi Eshkol's fault.

Q: Why was he ousted then?

DALE: That was because Ben-Gurion made trouble for him, but Eshkol did not leave because of that so far as his major career.

Q: The following year, the Ben-Gurion and Eshkol clashes continued, and eventually Ben-Gurion was ousted.

DALE: I think that's oversimplifying it.

Q: Tell me how I'm oversimplifying. That's why I bring it up.

DALE: Ben-Gurion had retired. He only came back in little forays now and then. He was really officially retired. He was down at Sidi Bakr. Eshkol was a successful prime minister. He was there for the Six-Day War, and it went very well from Israel's point of view, to say the least. He didn't clash very much with Ben-Gurion.

Q: Toward the end of 1965, there was something having to do with the US-Jordanian arms deal which got the Israeli political figures up in arms.

DALE: Yes, that was terrible. Where did you find out about that?

Q: I get leads on what was happening from a publication called Facts on File.

DALE: That was a very difficult situation. The United States wanted to get some tanks to Jordan. By this time, the Israeli lobby was powerful. They also wanted to get planes to Jordan. So we planned to have the Germans send the tanks that were obsolescent, really, from Germany over to Jordan. But we had no chance of keeping anything secret from Israel, so the Israelis found out about it and began to raise the dickens.

President Johnson decided they should be punished for this. This isn't official. So he sent over to Israel, to "punish" the Israelis, Averell Harriman and some other people. The group was headed up by Harriman. They came over to Israel and talked, had very secret talks, during which they officially reprimanded the Israeli Government for questioning President Johnson's policy. As a result of those talks, Jordan got the tanks all right, but the Israelis got something they had never had from the United States: the first promise of war planes. That began the steady supply by the United States of aircraft to Israel, which goes on today. So you can see what the "punishment" was.

Q: When Harriman came, was Ambassador Barbour included in the talking groups?

DALE: It's very difficult to remember, Henry. I don't think he had a lot to do with it. I think he reached them beforehand.

Q: I was just wondering whether he was excluded in the fashion of the traveling circus occasionally of Kissinger.

DALE: I see what you mean. No, I think he had as much to do with it as he wanted. There was no strain on that. Bob Komer went with him, a working-level guy.

Q: Bob Komer from Washington.

DALE: He was in Washington.

Q: Komer was something fairly high in the agency then.

DALE: Yes, he was.

Q: This was Johnson's idea of punishing. The tactical aircraft were beginning to be delivered the following year, now into '66. In May the following year, also, the United States also began to provide tanks.

DALE: But I don't believe that was part of this deal. I think we had to do that because we were furnishing tanks to Jordan. The normal pattern is if you furnish arms to an Arab country, the American organization wouldn't get after you, provided you gave Israel more and better. That does not hold now. Now you must not supply the Arabs at all.

Q: Did you know personally Eshkol?

DALE: Yes.

Q: This was a very small country.

DALE: Yes. I went along with Barbour when he talked to him, or visiting congressmen or senators. I remember I went with Senator Kennedy to see Eshkol, and Eshkol thought it was a very interesting thing. So I knew him in terms of being escort officer.

Q: How would you describe him?

DALE: A very easy-going, low-key individual, a good conversationalist who said a great many things which I don't think his American interlocutors understood. But if they'd thought about it, they would have been quite shocked.

Q: He said them in English?

DALE: In English.

Q: Could you give me an example?

DALE: Yes. He told Senator Kennedy that American Jews operated pretty much as a group, and during much of the '30s, "They were pro-Russian because we thought Russia was an ideal country for Jews to live in because it had no barriers on ethnic or racial grounds. We thought that right up into the war period, until shortly after that. That accounts for Rosenberg, Fuchs, and various Jewish spies, who brought atomic secrets from the United States and England to Russia. But then we discovered that Russia wasn't such a fine place for Jews, Stalin, what they did to the doctors, many of whom were Jewish, and things like that. The evidence mounted that Russia was going to support the Arabs at the expense of the Jews, so we have turned against Russia. Now we will do what we can in our worldwide Jewish community to make sure that relations with Russia are kept as difficult as possible."

Now, that's very important, but I don't think Kennedy understood what the man said. I thought it was fascinating. So that is perhaps the most revealing conversation I heard. That was with Kennedy.

I went to see Eshkol with visiting people like Kennedy many times, but that was the only really deep conversation that I recall.

Q: Ben-Gurion.

DALE: Ben-Gurion was retired most of the time I was there. He did not play much of a major role, except in the Lavon affair, and that's because he was a bit guilty. He came to the Fourth of July party, and you know how those Fourth of July parties were. In our case, the ambassador said, "I'm going to enjoy this. You manage it and what you do is you have all the officers lined up, and when somebody comes to the door, they come and say, 'Your name, please? Oh, yes, yes, of course.' And then they take you around and take you out to the garden, where your wife or somebody else's wife is standing around, and you leave

them with the women. Then you go around this sort of endless chain. Then after a certain time, you say, 'Let's reverse the flow.' Then the chain works to take people out."

Q: Very tiring.

DALE: Very tiring. So I had to run that thing for four years. I rather enjoyed it, actually, because I didn't have to stand in the chain.

At any rate, when Ben-Gurion came, I realized that it was going to be fun, because my ambassador did not get along with Ben-Gurion. He disliked Ben-Gurion right to the roots of Ben-Gurion's sparse white hair, and vice versa.

Q: Do you know why?

DALE: No, I do not know why. He just said Ben-Gurion was a very rude, ruthless man, but that wasn't the only rude or ruthless man with whom one has to deal. At any rate, Ben-Gurion was very nice to me, and I thought, "In this case, I'll be sure he has a good time," because I wasn't sure that Barbour would talk to him, because I knew Barbour didn't expect him to come. So I talked to him quite a lot, and he said that he thought that we should begin to think about China, that he saw the future of this world as a Chinese future. He said, "You can't say that that population of over a billion people isn't going to amount to something. It's a drag on the living standards and that sort of thing, but there's going to be genius there, and we're going to find that the 21st century will belong to China." And he talked and talked of China. It was very interesting.

Q: At about this time there was something between the United States and Israel on the subject of the Dimona atomic power plant.

DALE: Yes.

Q: Can you describe our interest in the atomic situation in Israel at this time? This was about 1966.

DALE: Yes. Israel being a small country and having suffered through the Holocaust, was and is taking every single measure it can think of to protect itself and, if necessary, to wage war, offensive, as well as defensive. Some years before I got there, they decided they would have a nuclear weapon. [Shimon] Peres, the present foreign minister, was more or less in charge of that. You see, before the United States got involved with supplying Israel's military needs, the French did. The French supplied the planes, for instance, with which Israel fought the Six-Day War, the Mysteres, that sort of thing. So among the things that Peres did was to arrange for the French to help, to advise, to consult, I suppose to actually do the engineering on the Dimona nuclear plant.

[End Tape I, Side A. Begin Tape I, Side B]

DALE: We had an AEC [Atomic Energy Commission] inspection there in the middle of 1966, several of them.

Q: What was it that we hoped to accomplish or to prevent or to do or whatever?

DALE: The Israelis told us this was a peaceful plant. We did not believe it. We did everything we could, by various means, to find out what it actually was. One of the tests would be whether there was a separation plant in conjunction with the nuclear fuel plant. So we forced, with great pressure--at that time we were able to exert pressure on Israel--on the Israelis to accept an American AEC team to come, as I recall, once every six months. I'm not certain of that, but I think that's what it was.

Well, they didn't get there once every six months. The excuses for postponing the visits were ingenious and multiple, but they had two or three visits during the time I was there. They would bring their equipment. The Israelis have a secure hotel where they put up people they don't want the public to know are visiting the country. They put them up in this hotel.

Q: In Tel Aviv or Jerusalem?

DALE: It's between Tel Aviv and Herzliyya. We also knew what it was, but we didn't ever get into it. So these people would finally get there, they would be shown as little as possible, where they couldn't make very definitive judgments. They never could say that Israel was not making nuclear weapons. I think that's the line they took: "We cannot affirm that there's not a separation plant." Although they couldn't find it. So it got to be a battle of wits.

At the same time, the Israelis did something rather curious. I could never go there, but they let American Jews whom they trusted go, and some of them reported to the United States Government, and they reported that Israel was making a nuclear weapon.

Q: Did they talk to you?

DALE: Some of them did, and some of them talked to other people. Some of them were even State Department people. Because they were Jews, they thought that you could count on their loyalty as Jews.

To go on from there, there was all kinds of evidence that the Israelis were making a nuclear weapon, coming in with some plant, I think it was in Pennsylvania, which Jews owned which was shipping uranium. There was uranium coming from Australia. The ships got switched. Very clever arrangements, but somehow some people traced it. There was a lot of evidence that this was going on. We had a very active physicist as a science attaché, Dr. Webber, and Webber was convinced of it.

So while I was there, I think it was 1966, we wrote a dispatch to the State Department saying that Israel was making nuclear weapons.

Q: Did we view this with alarm, or we not really care too much?

DALE: We viewed it with alarm in the embassy. Barbour hesitated a short time about letting me send the dispatch out, but he did. The CIA man would not take part in the discussion about the dispatch. But with Dr. Webber and the military, I felt we were on safe ground. The military tried to find out, of course, what was going on in Dimona, and our attachés had more flat tires in that area than you ever saw. When you would ask an Israeli what this huge dome was, with this tremendous smokestack way in the middle of the desert, they'd say, "That's the biggest synagogue in the world," or, "This is a new type of textile plant." So you didn't get anywhere talking to them at all.

The British attaché, who was a very clever guy, developed a great interest in butterflies, and he went out and inadvertently, of course, went over the line he was not supposed to go over, and the Israelis caught him chasing butterflies almost up to the building itself. They doubted his interest in butterflies, and he had some difficulty from them.

So our attachés and later on Barbour stopped working with the British or the Canadians.

Q: Why?

DALE: Because he thought our relationship with Israel was so special and so important, that we should not any longer put it through combined with our Allies, the British and the Canadians; we should only act unilaterally with Israel.

Q: That's an interesting point. Is that an evidence of "localitis", or was Barbour, who had been there ten years, was that well-rounded?

DALE: It was prescience, because now that's exactly what's happened. The relationship he foresaw has now occurred. Our relationship with Israel is entirely an independent matter, and in many ways closer than our relationship with the British or Canadians. I think Barbour foresaw this and decided it was the way of the future and was one of which he personally approved.

Q: How did Barbour view Israel?

DALE: When I first came, he was a little bit suspicious. I had come, as I told you, very favorably inclined towards Israel. The first thing he told me when I got there was, "Don't send anything critical of Israel or anything about plans regarding Israel through the State Department's radio communications system. Only do it by personal letter, because Israel has friends in the State Department, and they will report it to the Israeli Embassy." I never thought of that before. It came as a bolt.

Q: Are you sure it's true?

DALE: By now, of course I'm sure it's true, yes, because I've had certain examples of things that have happened. At that time, I was completely confused by it, because it didn't fit the picture I had of Israel as a struggling country, setting up an ideal state. So he was at that time, then, a little bit concerned, but he said something to explain it. He said, "I was sent here by President Johnson, who told me as follows, and you're to follow these orders, as well. He said, 'I don't care what happens to Israel, but I care a lot about the American Jews. Whatever you do in Israel, keep one eye peeled for the American Jews and do nothing which would get them on my back.'" And that was Barbour's policy all the time he was there, and it had to be mine.

Q: The demise of Israel as a nation would get the American Jews on the President's back right away.

DALE: Oh, yes.

Q: So the one didn't go with the other, "I don't care what happens to Israel."

DALE: Oh, no, he just meant he was not interested in Israel. This is Johnson. He was not interested in Israel at all from an ideal point of view, as a place for the Jews and all that. He was only interested in the political ramifications domestically in the United States. Those two things were Barbour's guides, and I adopted them accordingly. From that time on, though I didn't look at Israel quite the same way--with more circumspection.

Q: A less idealistic outlook?

DALE: Yes.

Q: You mentioned to me one time, way in the past, I think, that you knew Moshe Dayan.

DALE: Oh, yes.

Q: He became defense minister just before the war.

DALE: June 1, 1967.

Q: Give me a word description of Dayan.

DALE: He was one of the most complex people I've ever known, one of the few people who could speak good Arabic, Hebrew, and good English. His English wasn't grammatically perfect, but it was very effective. He was a charismatic man. He moved and spoke apparently slowly, but his mind worked so fast and his thoughts were so complex and so compelling, that I've seldom seen a man with the brilliance of expression and brilliance of mind that Dayan had.

I'll give you an example. At one point we had some free scholarships or travel money, I guess you'd call it, Fulbright in origin, to go to see Vietnam. So I asked Moshe if he'd like to go for two or three weeks. He went for four weeks. He said, "Gee, I can write some articles there. That would be fun. I'd love to see how that war's going." So Moshe went off to Vietnam, and when he came back, he said, "Look, why don't you get your friends together. I don't care if they're Americans or Jews or what, but I've got some thoughts. I want to unburden myself." So Moshe came and sat down with his black eye patch and his smile, his forehead always glistened, and began to talk about the Vietnam War. What he really said was, "The Americans are fighting all right there, but it's not their war. The people whose war it is, the Vietnamese, won't fight it. You can't win, no matter what you do without Vietnamese support. For some reason I can't really fathom, the Vietnamese won't fight."

Q: That's just what John Paul Vann was saying about the same time.

DALE: Yes. So he wrote a series of articles on this. We became very close friends. We did a lot of archeology together. He did a lot of things to tease me. One day he said, "Let's get some of your friends from the embassy, and we'll go and look for ancient pots," which he knew I was devoted to, the early Iron Age. So he organized it so that the pretty women went with him, and I got the others and we started out. (Laughs) He was very fond of the women.

We went down and came to a place where the traffic was bad, and then on the other side of this dual highway which was going the other direction, Moshe crossed over and went down the other side. There wasn't any traffic. He didn't care if it was wrong or not. So he went down. He turned and said, one of the women said later, "Bill won't dare do this." And he was right. I didn't. And off we went and had a very nice day looking for ancient pots.

After the Six-Day War, he called up two or three days after it was over and said, "Bill, I've never been to Qumran, where the Dead Sea scrolls were found. Let's go down there. I'll get some military vehicles and stuff in case there's anybody who wants to shoot us, and I want to go and see some of the Arabs there. We can see what we can find in the caves." We didn't find anything in the caves, but it was a fascinating trip.

We stopped at a very prominent Arab house, a great big farm, the Mussaalami farm. Mussaalami wasn't there, but his rather beautiful daughter was there. I didn't know what they were saying, because, as I told you, Moshe spoke excellent Arabic, but what he said he told them, was, "I want you to be able to do business, to start up and buy and sell your produce, and I'll do what I can to help you. But you must not harbor terrorists." A terrorist, by an Israeli definition, is anyone who takes action against Israel.

So those were two occasions. I saw him a great deal. I complained to him unofficially about some things, like the Israeli forces' destruction of Imwas, the place Christ was seen

after He arose from the dead, according to the New Testament. The Israel Army destroyed it during or just after the Six-Day War, and I never knew why. So I complained to Moshe. He looked into it and said it was a mistake. He didn't go anywhere with that, but at least he showed that he cared. (Laughs)

Q: There was a buildup to the war that lasted for weeks, anyway, and then he was appointed defense minister just before. Was that done deliberately?

DALE: Yes. The United States had thought they had extracted a promise from the Israeli Government that they wouldn't go to war. The Israelis did not consider they had made that promise, and they had no intention of putting off going to war within that period, because they didn't think that our plan for what they called the Red Sea regatta, the international regatta, warships going up the Red Sea to test Nasser's claim that he had closed it, the Straits of Tehran, was correct or not. The Israelis didn't think that would work, and they intended to go to war. Once they made up their minds they were going to, they called Dayan back as Minister of Defense. But once they'd done that, that was the signal they were going to war. The only question left was when Dayan would order it to begin.

Q: The embassy didn't see it quite that way at the time.

DALE: At the time, no. We knew they were mobilizing. We would have events such as the British ambassador's daughter coming-out party at a hotel, and you'd give an order to a waiter to bring you a drink, and the drink didn't appear. Another waiter would appear and say, "Would you like something?" And he would disappear as they were mobilizing the forces.

Our consul general, Cliff English, had all kinds of people mobilizing in a vacant field beside his house, and we were able to put together everything everybody had, so we knew that the war would start. But we couldn't tell from the evidence that we had that it would start as soon as it did. We expected it to start any time. As to the reporting, the ambassador wanted to give the impression that we thought it wouldn't start, as long as he could possibly get away with it, because he knew we thought we had a promise from the Israelis.

Q: Who had arranged this promise, Barbour?

DALE: No, it was arranged in Washington, I think between the US Government at a high level and Abba Eban, I believe. Or at least they thought that they had the promise with Abba Eban, and had arranged with Eshkol. So that it came as something of a surprise to us, and Barbour didn't want to undercut that, you see, until it was absolutely necessary by a war started. So it became very important when it started.

So we had our Israeli-speaking officer down at the embassy, John Leonard, listening. I'd set up a command post there. It was a lot of fun doing that. Leonard listened, but

Leonard's Hebrew wasn't all that good. The morning of the sixth came, and planes were breaking the sound barrier, coming and going. They often did that in the past, it was just more intense, because they'd been practicing this thing for months. Finally, the ambassador called and said, "My cook says a war is on. What does the embassy say?"

I felt sort of embarrassed about that. I called John Leonard, and John said, "I don't hear anything on the radio." So I called back and said, "John Leonard (I didn't say we don't think) doesn't think a war has started."

"Well, my cook says that the Israeli Air Force has destroyed the Egyptian Air Force on the ground," which was entirely correct.

Q: Sometimes cooks and taxi drivers are good sources.

DALE: Well, it doesn't speak well for our language program. John Leonard retired and is now a Greek Catholic priest.

Q: He was the only officer we had who spoke Hebrew?

DALE: Someone might have spoken a little bit of Hebrew, but it was his task.

Q: He was the designated language officer.

DALE: He was the designated language officer to take it.

Q: I think in years since, we've had more able linguists.

DALE: He was supposed to be able. But anyway, he wasn't. When the test came, he failed it. It didn't matter very much. When I called up my sidekick in the foreign ministry, Shlomo Argov, who was later shot as ambassador to London, and asked him if Israel had attacked, he said, "Well, there was provocation."

I said, "What was it?"

He said, "I don't know yet. I'll try to find out." But that was a delaying action. There wasn't any. They attacked when they were ready.

Q: Is it true that by this time, embassy dependents had already been evacuated?

DALE: No. No, they were not evacuated. That was left up to me. I'll put it this way. We had evacuated one group of dependents, but I had not evacuated all the wives. That's because of what happened at the time of the Suez Crisis in Egypt. The evacuated wives stayed away too long, and a lot of marriage problems resulted, and everybody got together, involving a lot of secretaries. You probably heard about that.

Q: No, but I think I can imagine.

DALE: So I didn't want that to happen. I evacuated non-essential wives and personnel, then I kept the essential ones, the wives, very important ones, until the last minute. Then I put Tezi Curry, who is now Assistant Secretary, in charge of it. There she was in this American community schoolyard with her slip showing, getting all the Americans on buses. I had a terrible time finding a plane, but I found one eventually, which had had its wing repaired. The pilot said he thought it would hold as far as Cyprus. So on the first day of the war, we evacuated, but not until then. Actually, we couldn't have before because we did not know the war would occur that day, so we couldn't have. It takes a certain preparation. We were all ready. The evacuation plans had been updated. I think we probably evacuated about the right time, except, of course, it turned out that nobody needed to go.

Q: Did the ambassador feel betrayed in any way that the Israeli attack broke out, despite a supposed arrangement?

DALE: No, but he did later before the war ended. His main contact was the American desk officer, Moshe Bitan. Moshe Bitan had told Wally Barbour that Israel realized there was a United Nations resolution for a cease-fire, and Israel intended to obey it, but he said, "We had just a little matter we wanted to clear up on the Syrian front." I was there. Now, the Syrians had not attacked in the Six-Day War, as you probably know. I think they fired a few shots and that's all, not participating. But he said it would only take an hour or two and not to worry about it. So Barbour sent some kind of telegram to that effect.

Instead of that, Israel moved all its troops from the Egyptian front who weren't involved, and the central front, because they were beating the dickens out of Jordan by this time, up to the northern front. The Golani brigade went up to Golan Heights and led a major attack, which was not what Bitan had said. This was also the time of Liberty, which may very well have been attacked for the same reason, but they didn't want us to hear all the orders that were necessary to transfer thousands of men. I don't know that; that's speculation on my part. It's not speculation.

Later on, the ambassador got a hold of Bitan and said, "You deceived me." He was, for him, quite angry. He was always very careful, because he always had President Johnson looking over his shoulder, so he never got really angry. But he was as angry as he ever got.

Bitan said, "Yeah, I deceived you, but the Arabs deceive you more than we do."

Q: When did you find out about the Liberty?

DALE: The Israelis called us as soon as they had finished their attack on it, called the naval attaché, Ernie Castle, and told him that an American ship had been hit by mistake

by Israeli forces, because they thought it was an Egyptian ship. It had a similar silhouette, a Liberty ship. They said, "Don't you want to go out and see if they need any help?"

So Ernie got his lunch, which he had brought to the office--we were more or less living in the office--which was a paper bag, an orange, a sandwich, took out the sandwich, left the orange, and put in a note, "Do you want any help?" And flew over the Liberty, which was sort of listing out there. I'm not sure it was listing; it was almost unguided in the water, smoking like everything. He dropped it on the deck from the helicopter. The personnel of the Liberty waved him away. So Ernie came back a little disconsolate, and said, "They need help like everything, but they won't take it from the Israelis." He didn't realize, nor did the Israelis tell us at the time, that there was a big American flag on that ship. So we didn't know that, and we thought it was a genuine error.

Q: Did Barbour ever become irate about that?

DALE: No. If he did, he didn't show it. He had to be very careful not to show emotion like that which might set the staff, you see, thinking things. So he was very, very quiet about what personal thoughts he might have had. From that time on, though, he was very much more pro-Israeli, from the time of the Six-Day War on.

Q: Why?

DALE: I don't know. He was deceived, they fooled him, the Liberty was not an accident, and he must have known it. Well, he put it this way to me once. He said, "You know, Bill, Israel's relations with the United States is the way of the future. I don't care if the Arabs have all the oil reserves in the world. Our relationship is going to be with Israel, and I'm going to promote it." This was shortly after the Six-Day War. That's all he ever said. I think he saw the strength of the bond between Israel and the United States, which became clear about that time. We did send an awful lot of war material towards the end of that war.

Q: What about your own attitude? You had been there several years by now.

DALE: Yes, I had been there four years. Well, I began, as you know, very pro-Israeli. Barbour told me those two messages that I went into earlier. Then an ambassador from a country which was considered to be very friendly to Israel, Switzerland, said he wanted to come over to see me one day. Barbour didn't see much of the other ambassadors, because he wanted it believed he was on a special status, which, in a way, he was. So they were left to me to entertain. The Swiss ambassador said, "You know, look at this." He had a newspaper in German, the Jewish newspaper. It was the main Jewish newspaper in Switzerland. He said, "I just finished this. It's all about Swiss Jews' relation to Israel. There's not a word in it about Switzerland. I don't think this is healthy. I think it's worse for the United States, and you should begin to think about it." Later on, he got a decoration from the Israeli Government for his friendly reception there in that situation. But you see, really he didn't.

Then the British and the Canadians began to tell me things. Our Army attaché had two Israeli intelligence girls as mistresses, one in the north and one in the south. When he went north, there was one girl. When he went south, it was another.

I began to see the relationship at two levels: one, the kind of level I believed in at first, of ideals, and then the second level, where the United States was being brought into a kind of Israeli net, in which the American Zionists played a very important role, an increasingly important role.

They came to the embassy from time to time. They didn't always, because they didn't need the embassy. They were a pretty self-confident group, the big givers. We used to go to their parties. One time I went to a party with my wife, with a group of these big givers, and they were saying what a wonderful country they found Israel to be, and how nice the Israelis were to them. They said, "You know, it really wasn't all that expensive because the Israeli Government arranges through the various funds that they had. Say we give \$50,000 to Israel. They put down \$100,000, and then we get a deduction of 100,000 on our American tax. In no other country can you take any deduction." So I saw this second level which, to me, was founded in part on plain deceit in order to make the most of their relationship with America. I became very ambivalent about it, and I still am.

Q: Had you, by this time, developed attitudes about the Arab world, in the middle of which you lived?

DALE: The Arab world still seemed to be very disorganized, very incapable of establishing and maintaining a unified stance in any foreign policy type of crisis or situation. I found I could not work up much enthusiasm for them, and I still can't. I've not changed views on that or on Israel.

Q: By the time you left in 1968, roughly that time, the war was over. There were problems of UN resolutions and questions of the West Bank and the refugees and so forth. What were the major bilateral issues that you were dealing with about the time that you left Israel?

DALE: The major one was that at the time of the Six-Day War, a great many more Arabs had been forced out one way or another from the West Bank and from the old refugee camps. We wanted some of those to come back to their homes. We thought that they should, especially family members. We had a great deal of controversy with the Israeli Government, trying to get them, on humanitarian grounds, to accept a large number of the Arabs back who had been forced out in the 1967 War. They did not do that, of course. They let a few back, a very few, enough so they could say they had done something. Because they wanted the land, the houses, just as they did in '48. They did not want embittered people coming back into Israel. That part is understandable.

Q: You were acting in this regard on instructions from Washington.

DALE: Yes.

Q: What was the rationale for taking the part of the Arab refugees?

DALE: We didn't look on it as taking the part of the Arab refugees; we looked on it as a humanitarian matter, that a good many people had been forced out of their homes and across the border. They were victims of warfare, and they left homes and presumably going enterprises in what had been the West Bank. Many of them had also been refugees in refugee camps. We thought that by every humanitarian kind of desideratum, they should be allowed back. They were not necessarily going to make war on Israel; they had lived there before. The Israelis said no, but let a few close relatives back, enough so that we couldn't say they didn't do anything.

There was another issue, and that was the settlements. The Israelis began to put settlements in the Golan Heights and in the West Bank almost immediately. By that time, the United States Government was very firm in its stand that those were illegal under the Fourth Geneva Convention, and that they would make it very difficult to reach a peace. So I think I was the first officer to deliver the protest. However, it was very noteworthy that Barbour would not deliver that. He had me do it, which downgraded it.

Q: And preserved his position, as well.

DALE: Yes. He didn't say it; he just never mentioned it. I did it, reported back that I had done it. The Israelis said, "Yes, we understand your position." This was Shlomo Argov, very polite. And that was that.

Q: I recall at the time, in another part of the world, that Israelis diplomats told me Israel would, of course, return the West Bank, given certain questions of Arab recognition, of course. Was that the position of the foreign ministry?

DALE: There was a brief period when Abba Eban was foreign minister, when I do believe the Israelis would have returned the West Bank almost in its entirety. The problem was that the King of Jordan, Hussein, at that point was in such a state of shock, that he couldn't seem to negotiate, couldn't seem to bring himself to enter into the kind of negotiation it would have taken. So for a period of maybe a couple of months, I think that would have been true. After that, the Israelis discovered they had something there, particularly Jews, and I don't think Jerusalem would have been returned anyway, but the West Bank. There were advantages to be gotten from it, so the position hardened and became consistently harder ever since.

Q: Your departing impression of Israel, then, was this ambivalence that you speak of?

DALE: That's correct. Oh, yes, there was one other element. It became clear before I left that the American Zionist organizations were playing a larger and larger political role in

the United States. I was afraid it might not be confined just to Israel, but would affect our foreign policy with Russia and various other countries, because it was power which would be traded. I began to worry about that, and that concern remains with me, because they go to Israel and they plan more or less what they're going to do when they come back. We saw a good many of those "unofficial ambassadors." They're the ones who Israel can send to the President. The President is really afraid of them, and he would very likely do what they want, more so than if, say, the Israeli ambassador does something. So these people play a very important role, and they constantly go back and forth to Israel. Many of them are dual citizens.

Q: Can you name names, or can you cite a couple of organizations?

DALE: Zionists of America, of course; American Jewish Committee; American Jewish Conference; B'nai B'rith lobbyists were in Israel very often, and I saw them when I came back to Washington a good deal. We were on close terms with them, and they keep track of what goes on in this country, and they go back and forth to Israel. The names are a little difficult now; it's a long time ago. If I think of them, I'll tell you.

Q: Had this gone so far as to sour you on your assignment in Tel Aviv?

DALE: No. Oh, no. It was a very interesting assignment. The individual Israelis I knew, I liked. Most of them were in the Labor party. Many of the people I respected. I respected [David] Ben-Gurion. Barbour did not. I thought he was a great guy. I liked [Shimon] Peres. [Yitzhak] Rabin was a great friend of mine, a close friend, and still would be. I'm going to see some of them next week. I'm looking forward to it. So it did not sour me at all, but it causes concern, because I'm afraid that we may be following a policy which is not of our making, but of Israel's making which guides us in the Middle East.

Q: Still, to this day, 1988?

DALE: Yes, more so. I did a poll at one point, just before the Six-Day War, on this, after the Swiss ambassador came, asking whether they thought Zionism in their countries and Zionist as they saw it working in Israel was good for the countries they represented or not. With one exception, the answers were universally "no." Everyone, I think, felt the same as I did, practically everyone. The one exception was Costa Rica, I think.

Q: When you left in 1968, Barbour was still the ambassador?

DALE: Yes.

Q: And Johnson was still in the White House. He didn't leave until January of 1969. So you were there during this period of time when there was no change in administration.

DALE: That's right.

Q: No change in this policy that you mentioned that Barbour articulated to you, to "keep the Zionist lobby off my back."

DALE: That's right. That came true in all kinds of ways. We were very, very helpful to any American Zionist who came over. We saw hundreds of them, although they didn't all come to the embassy, but those who did. Many of them, I enjoyed them very much, but not this aspect.

Q: How, briefly, did you see the Zionists messing up American policy toward Israel back in those mid-'60s?

DALE: They had a good deal to do under Goldberg in the United Nations, who was a Zionist, with watering down Resolution 242, so that instead of saying, as it does in the French version, "the territory on the West Bank should be returned," to saying, "territory," which has been watered down now to where it means "little of the territory," or perhaps not very much of it will be returned. That was apparently Goldberg's work in the United Nations, and that was a prime example, which all of us felt was a mistake for the United States, because it's never been clear since then. The French version is clear.

Q: Which one is the official one is a question, and that complicated things from then on.

DALE: It has complicated them from then on.

Q: Although, of course, Israel had not agreed to return anything, anyway.

DALE: Well, they returned Sinai.

Q: I take it back. Yes, sorry. I was in Egypt when that was going on. I should have remembered.

DALE: You remember they did return that.

Q: Bill, I'm going to have to stop here simply because of tape. I'm going to ask you, if you will, to let me continue this conversation, if at all possible, when you go off on this trip.

DALE: Okay. I'll try. That's fine.

Continuation of interview: November 21, 1988

Q: This is the second interview with Ambassador Dale. The first interview we had, we discussed to considerable extent your experience in Israel as chargé, a good bit of the time, and DCM, and we talked a little bit about the Six-Day War. I would like to pursue that, if you don't mind going over it again. I'd like to pursue that at some length with the initial question being, how did you organize the embassy or how was the embassy broken down to cope with the crisis situation such as the Six-Day War?

DALE: Crisis situations arise--I wouldn't say gradually--but they do not arise all at once. You have perhaps a week, perhaps two weeks in which the crisis gradually becomes worse. During that time you begin, I think, almost casually to change your organization to fit the requirements of the growing crisis.

In this case, one of the first things we had to do was limit our telegraphic traffic so that no routine or administrative type telegrams would be sent and the wires would be reserved for use in crisis type messages.

Q: Did you keep a telephone line open also?

DALE: We kept a telephone line, yes, but that was of uncertain usefulness, depending on the situation. We also used ham radios at one point. That's how I got in touch with my children.

Q: Who were concerned about your safety, I guess?

DALE: Well, I was concerned about where they were as it was vacation time. And I wanted them to know that we were all right and where to go. And then I had them go to Rome.

Q: Where were they?

DALE: They were in different places in the United States.

So we had first the messages to do, then we had the evacuation plan to put into operation. This became the responsibility, as we organized it, of the consular section. They kept in touch with all American citizens. I'm not now talking about dual citizens. And the consular people implemented the evacuation plan when it became advisable to do so. We gave advice to American citizens to leave well before the fighting started.

As far as embassy personnel were concerned, they went out, as I recall, in two batches. The first batch were wives and children for whom it was quite easy to leave. Then when the fighting actually started, we organized an airlift, with a plane which had just been repaired in Israel. The plane actually had trouble with one wing and they had just finished re-securing the wing to the body of the plane. The Air Force officer who offered the plane, knowing we needed one, said he hoped it was all right and he thought it would get as far as Cyprus. So I called our ambassador in Cyprus, Toby Belcher, and told him we were coming in on a wing and a prayer, and to prepare quarters and food and whatnot for the people who would be coming over. Toby did a splendid job of it, as always.

The person in charge of actually loading the personnel into the buses to go to the plane was Tezi Currie (Schaffer). Tezi, I think, is now Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Economic Affairs. This was her first post and she was said to be the youngest Foreign

Service officer. She spoke something like six languages. Her English was excellent on this occasion, but her slip showed. However, I did not mention it to her.

The organization itself began to develop about a week before the fighting started. We organized the conference room into an operations center and the senior staff was organized into a crisis management team. The officers who had no regular duties at this point, like economic officers, were converted into operations officers and it was their job to keep the operations room up to date, to keep all the telegrams that were pertinent, easily available, let us know when new information came in, keep the map up to date to show us where the fighting was and other such tasks. We had shifts so that the embassy was always manned with enough people so we could handle anything that came up, day or night. Some people slept at the embassy, to begin with, and during the entire crises there were at least a couple of people staying overnight. Bit by bit as the crisis began to resolve itself and the fighting grew less, people were allowed to go home at night. I went home at night after the first couple of nights and brought my driver with me, who spent the night at the house, very unwillingly, because he wanted to be with his wife.

Q: You told me earlier that the ambassador was almost never there.

DALE: The ambassador had been invited by the Israelis to go to their war room in the Department of Defense, which was still located in Tel Aviv, not in Jerusalem where the bulk of the government was located by that time. And Wally Barbour, therefore, spent almost all his time in the Israeli war room. He never explained to me exactly what he did there.

Q: Did he have a line of communication with Washington from the war room?

DALE: As far as I know, he did not. He might have been able to telephone, using Israeli-controlled circuits. But eventually it became difficult to use the phone. When I wanted to get in touch with my three sons and tell them what to do and what was happening to us, I did it by ham radio. And it worked splendidly.

Q: Private individuals who had ..

DALE: Yes, an Israeli friend of mine, who was a ham radio expert.

Q: You knew, or you expected, that the war would be short?

DALE: Yes.

Q: So you never really doubted either the outcome of the war?

DALE: No. There were two factors here. One was the attachés, who knew pretty much what the opposing forces consisted of, and had a high respect for the Israeli military, which was well deserved. They sent in a prediction, which, as I recall, was that if war should break out, the Israelis would have it won at the end of a week, more or less. I had,

myself, been fortunate enough to be taken around the central front by the commander of the central front, General Narkiss, about three weeks before the fighting started.

This had nothing to do with, as far as I know, the fact that the war was imminent. We weren't even thinking about that. It was a long-standing invitation which finally came to fruition at that point. And I went up and down the whole central area and he explained what his troops would do, where they would give a little ground, where they would advance, where there reserves were. In fact, you could see them all along that central front area and he explained what they would do to retake Jerusalem, if the Jordanians were silly enough to attack the Israelis. He explained that they would go along the hilltops on either side of the city and pinch it off and that East Jerusalem, with its holy sites, the Wailing Wall and so on, would fall into Israeli hands. But he did not anticipate that King Hussein would actually attack Israel.

As you probably know, the Israelis did send a message by way of General Bull of the United Nations, to King Hussein, saying, in substance, "If you do not attack, we will not attack you," as the war started. And they also let it be known that they wouldn't consider a few stray shells being landed by the Jordanians for the sake of appearances to be an attack. But the Jordanians attacked at Government House. That was the U.N. headquarters at that point, the old British headquarters. There may not have been a tremendous attack, but it was significant enough so that it gave the Israelis the opportunity, quite justifiably, to repel the attack and take the West Bank.

Q: To your knowledge, when did the war break out? What was your first intimation?

DALE: The first intimation? Oh, that is a sorry subject. We had on watch that night, John Leonard, who was one of our Israeli-speaking officers. He had learned it at FSI.

Q: Yes, now I remember. We talked about that the last time. Give me a brief resumé again.

Well, he didn't catch it, and the Ambassador's cook told the ambassador that the fighting had started. The ambassador called me, I called Leonard and he said, "Oh, I can't hear anything about that on the radio." He is now, as I think I told you, a Greek Catholic priest.

Q: Yes. About your time in Israel and your participation in one of the most significant, brief, sharp clashes that an American embassy was ever involved in. The only exceptions I can think of maybe were the outbreak of World War II in France or something of that sort. Looking back on it now, have you got any thoughts or any lessons perhaps that you've drawn from those days on crisis management? How to deal if a six-day war breaks out on your doorstep? Things that you would have done differently?

DALE: Yes, there is one thing I would have done differently. When I had heard that the fighting had started, I called my contact, Shlomo Argov, in the foreign ministry and asked him whether it was really true that Israel had attacked. And he said, "Oh, the Arabs must

have done something. I think I heard that they fired at us." I took that more seriously than I should have.

Q: Did you report it?

DALE: I reported it. When actually Shlomo, I think, was making it up.

Q: Making it up as he went along?

DALE: Yes, that's right. As a bit of justification. Later on there was no record of any provocation at all.

Q: Let's skip a beat and change the subject, as a matter of fact. You went from there to fairly directly to the Central African Republic as ambassador?

DALE: No, I had a long stretch in Washington.

Q: Doing what?

DALE: First, I was on the Policy Planning Council, in its very bad days. The head of it was a man named Henry Owen, who apparently did not appear to have the Secretary's confidence or attention. In fact, I'm afraid he bored the Secretary.

Q: Who was that, Kissinger, then?

DALE: No, Rogers. So Henry had difficulty gearing into any planning process that the Department was actually doing. We produced a great deal of paper, which as far as I could tell, served no useful purpose whatever. He and his deputy, who was a woman I respected a great deal, an economist, Miriam Camps, were sticklers for perfection, which they should be, and we did draft after draft after draft of these papers. And eventually they would find their way, somewhat late, to the Secretary, who as far as I know, didn't read them.

Sometimes the Secretary would throw a bone to Henry to keep him, I guess, out of his office, and say, "Why don't you do a paper on this or that?" For instance, he asked, "Henry, why don't your people write a paper on what kind of cause or operation could bring all the nations of the Mediterranean--Arabs, Israel, whatnot--together in a common endeavor."

Q: That's a good one.

DALE: That was a great one. So I got that and thought and thought, and there wasn't any. Simply isn't any such thing. So I wrote a paper on why the idea couldn't work. Then unbeknownst to me, Henry Owen, who did not like that for a reply, got somebody else to do it, who came up with the same result. But looking back on it, that was simply

something the Secretary thought of off the cuff to keep Henry occupied. It was a very bad time.

Eventually Henry left. Miriam Camps was acting for a while and then we began to discover that it didn't look hopeful, so one after the other staff members left it like--what would you say?--semi-intellectual rats from a sinking ship, and found other jobs.

So I went to work as Deputy Assistant Secretary in what was called Security and Consular Affairs for several years.

Q: How did you get tapped for an ambassadorship?

DALE: Well, you don't get tapped; you have to work at it. I was told by the Director General of the Foreign Service, Bill Hall, that if I wanted an embassy, "You're in the right rank, that is, a Deputy Assistant Secretary, a group from which they pick ambassadors and that's all right. You just stick with that." "But you've got to increase your usefulness in terms of where you could be sent. I would take French and get a more advanced degree in French."

I knew somebody at the French Embassy who kindly took us on. My wife also took it. She fed us a couple of drinks and we did French until I could pass that exam sufficiently well.

Q: This is not the kind of thing you would go to FSI for?

DALE: I figured I could do it just as well this way without having to get up that early in the morning. Luckily, I proved to be right. I'd had a lot of French before. It was a question of dusting it off. She said we did very well after the first drink. It really loosened things up. But after the second, she thinks things got a little loose. I did that for six months and passed the exam quite high up.

Q: What the FSI, R & S?

DALE: That's right.

Q: You had the rank.

DALE: Yes. Then they said, "What kind of post do you want?" And I thought about it for a while. It always seemed to me it would be very interesting to go to a post which was as primitive as possible, preferably one which only just had a money economy. I wanted to see what that would be like. The Foreign Service of the State Department was very happy to answer that desire of mine and fulfill it completely with the Central African Republic.

Q: So you didn't hold for London, Paris, or Rome?

DALE: I thought I'd let that wait.

Q: How did you find out that you were going to be nominated?

DALE: The head of senior personnel for the Department of Personnel, Archer Blood, told me.

Q: You were confirmed in July of 1973 and you went off to the post, and presented your credentials to President Bokassa.

DALE: Yes.

Q: Was there anything unusual about that presentation ceremony?

DALE: Yes, there was. Not about the ceremony itself, in which I read the prepared remarks, and then afterwards he invited me for an aperitif. I had the idea that an aperitif was a little drink in the bottom of a small glass, but the aperitif that we had was a tumbler full of whiskey, and he drank lots of them. I couldn't keep up. I didn't try, but one of those was about enough to knock me out.

During the course of the conversation we had, he said, "There is one thing you should know. My grandfather was a cannibal."

I said, "Really?"

He said, "Yes, and I have tendencies in that direction."

Well, I thought he was joking. But you know that later on he was found to have been a cannibal, that he ate children, whose parents would not, or could not, afford proper uniforms for school.

Q: Are you making this up?

DALE: Nope. It's absolutely true. That's why he was tried for murder.

Q: Was he tried personally or in absentia?

DALE: No, he is in prison now in the Central African Republic. He was sentenced to death. They did not call it cannibalism; they called it murder.

Q: Give me a word description of him as a person.

DALE: Well, he looked like a grasshopper. Rather small, very tough physically. A man who thought of himself as a combination of great general, tribal chief, emperor, and millionaire. He thought it was quite proper, for instance, for him to siphon off a large part

of the revenues of the state for his private use. He bought estates in France, he bought very expensive cars. At his country place, a place called Bangui, he kept supplies that he would buy, dozens of television sets, for instance. What are you going to do with dozens of television sets? Dozens of heaters, dozens of refrigerators, all kinds of things you could never possibly use. He just bought them, one after the other. If there is such a thing as evil, a positive evil force rather than evil as an absence of good, that man is evil.

Some of the punishments he told me he meted out were just dreadful. For instance, if one of his aides did not do as Bokassa thought he should have done, he would send him abroad for "education" for a term. But when he got back, he would invariably find his wife pregnant, and Bokassa said, "I always let him know who was responsible." That was one of his more favorite punishments.

Q: Why would he let you in on these little tidbits?

DALE: I think he wanted to frighten me a little bit. And it was titillating for him. And as I say, it turned out to be absolutely true, even though I didn't think so at the time. And it made awfully good conversation.

Q: During the course of, say, a week, two weeks, a month, how often did you see the president? How often did you see the foreign minister? How often did you see the prime minister?

DALE: Well, the prime minister was a woman. Nobody ever saw her. She was a figurehead.

Q: Elizabeth Nomecian, is that it?

DALE: Yes. I don't believe I did anything more ever than meet her. She didn't have any function in the government. The foreign minister I saw quite often. I would see somebody maybe four to six times a month. And Bokassa I might see once a month. Usually opening of some American aid project, like a well-family clinic or something of that sort.

Q: Did we have a large aid mission there?

DALE: By the time I left, it began to grow. At the time I got there, the Peace Corps was really only starting. I think there were 60-some by the time I left.

The aid mission chief was a third country national. He was an Iraqi, whom we were sort of bound to take care of after the Six-Day War. But we also had several other people working in schools to teach locals about hygiene. For instance, don't put your well at the bottom of your village, with the houses above it, things of that nature. So we had a growing aid mission. Eventually we had a cattle station for training people how to raise cattle. I suppose there were perhaps ten aid experts by the time I left. I don't know how many had actually arrived, you see.

Q: Were these efforts, for example, the Peace Corps efforts to modernize the people who lived there? Were they well received or were they spinning their wheels or what?

DALE: Well, the Peace Corps, I think, too often tends to have people learn English. So we had some who were just teaching English. I don't know why in the world they would have taught English to these people.

Q: I know one reason. I've seen it around the world myself. It's because that's virtually all that the volunteers are qualified to do.

DALE: That's about it. But we had also some who taught domestic science. That was very useful. Some taught hygiene and that was useful. That kind of thing.

Q: When you arrived in the summer of '73, what was outstanding in the way of issues or problems between our two nations?

DALE: Bokassa was never one to follow American leadership. We would get directives, maybe several a week, especially on United Nations votes. "Go into the government and see if they won't support us on such and such a vote that's coming up in the General Assembly."

I would go in. In the first place it was very hard to find anyone to talk to most of the time. Second, other people might have been in with opposite viewpoints. And Bokassa was very friendly with the Russians.

So we didn't really do very well in the competition with the Russians as regards Bokassa. You see, this was a time when Bokassa made a trade with the Russians. They could use his airport for planes to stop, refuel and whatnot on their way to Angola and Congo Brazzaville and the area to the south where the Russians were helping the forces who were revolting against the South Africans. In return for that, the Russians said they would re-equip his army.

We had no such deal with him, so the issue we had with Bokassa was his support by the Russians and for the Russians.

Q: If you had Russian airplanes coming in and Russian materiel, you must have had a very active defense attaché office.

DALE: We didn't have any defense attaché. It was handled by the other agency.

Q: The Langley agency?

DALE: Yes, we had a couple there that I know of.

Q: They must have been busy.

DALE: They had three people there in the embassy itself, and the communications person. Let's say three or four.

Q: What was our position, and your understanding at that time, on South Africa? The Central African Republic joined with quite a number of other African nations in '73 and voted economic sanctions against South Africa. Did we attempt to take a position on that? Were you instructed to go in and see anybody?

DALE: I think that was before I got there. I don't remember that. What I do remember is that later on there was a secret agreement with South Africa. They were going to put up hotels around the airport and things of that nature, in return for which Bokassa would actually allow trade and wink at South African activity.

Q: Was the agreement implemented?

DALE: With them? Yes.

Q: And the hotels came?

DALE: There is a hotel built and other facilities by the South Africans.

Q: And Bokassa backed off?

DALE: And Bokassa backed off. He didn't personally have anything against the South Africans. I talked to one of his ministers about it, the Minister of Resources. He said, "You may think that the blacks are badly off in South Africa, but if I were in South Africa now, with the training I've had, I'd have a car, maybe two cars of my own, instead of one that Bokassa lets me use once in a while. I'd be a rich man instead of a poor fellow up here in the boondocks. I don't feel so badly about the South African whites and neither do most of the rest of us." And I think underneath, this was the way many were feeling.

Q: They were looking up to them in some sense, in the fashion of, they had succeeded and they would like to emulate their success.

DALE: Yes, that's right. That the blacks were not all as badly off as was portrayed in the media.

Q: A very small post like that, and a small embassy, just as an example, what kind of instruction or problem would you take up with the government and what kind would you delegate to your DCM or other officer?

DALE: It was simply a matter of whether the significance of the instruction seem important enough for me to seek an appointment with, say, the foreign minister or a

deputy, or whether it was one that the DCM could take up at what we would call a desk level, though I don't know that they were very clearly organized in that government.

Q: How big a foreign ministry was there that you dealt with?

DALE: We dealt with very few people. Probably not more than four or five, ourselves. The foreign ministry, I suppose, might have had 30 or 40 people. It's hard to say.

Q: In the foreign ministry there were four or five people with whom you could take up a question of that sort?

DALE: Yes, if you could get a hold of them and if they would keep the appointments, which was not always the case. It was very hard to pin someone down to an appointment. And when you did and made your démarche, he couldn't say anything, because Bokassa had to decide every question in a highly centralized situation like that. And you had no idea what was going to become of your démarche. Usually you never did know.

Q: How did you phrase that when you reported to the Department?

DALE: Accurately. The desk officer had been in Bangui before, so he understood quite well what was going on.

Q: In 1974 you had some oil nationalization questions that arose, airlines and oil distributors?

DALE: Yes.

Q: And further military attachés were forbidden at embassies or something?

DALE: We didn't have any anyway. We just had a fellow who was a CIA station chief. Another CIA fellow who was sort of a consular officer, came in late in my stay, and a communications fellow who was a CIA man, and then a sort of special CIA fellow, who was also doing communications. They were very interested in Russian activities there.

Q: So it didn't matter if military attachés were forbidden or not?

DALE: It had no significance for us. I did miss having Marine guards, because we had an incident once with the Russians.

Q: What was that incident?

DALE: There were something like 200 Russians and very few Americans. The Russians didn't have overly much to do. They got drunk very early in the day. Once I went to see a very rare phenomenon, an American tourist, who was down at the hotel. I got there early because I was going to take him out on a trip. When I got there, there was the Russian

DCM and the counselor and two or three other officers already at the bar, having not their first drink.

At any rate, our CIA chief came in, let's say on Tuesday, I don't know what day it was, and said, "Look, Mr. Ambassador, I would like to bring in the Russian counselor and first secretary tomorrow. I think that they are about fed up with their ambassador and they're fed up with being here and I think I can get some important information on what they are doing here with Bokassa and the airport use trade for weapons. Is it all right if I do that, if I bring them in here?" He said, "I'd like to feed them a little something to drink for this purpose and I'll have them out about 9:00. They start drinking early and I'll have them leave around 10:00 or 10:30. Is that all right?"

I said, "Oh, sure." And I forgot about it, I never thought about it again until I began to hear strange noises out in the corridor.

My secretary came and in and said, "Mr. Ambassador, you've got to do something!"

I said, "Why?"

"The Russians are out there!"

"Well, what's the matter with that?"

"They are playing leap frog up and down the corridor!"

So I carefully did not go out. In came the station chief, very shamefacedly a few minutes later, and said, "I apologize. I overdid the alcohol." (Laughs)

Q: Sounds like the kind of hospitality that the Russians themselves are famous for.

DALE: That's right. The CIA was taking a leaf out of their book.

Q: So the question of oil company nationalization was not a major issue?

DALE: It was not a major issue, not for us. It was important for the French.

Q: French influence was on the wane? Bokassa was trying to get rid of them?

DALE: It was one of his measures for making sure the French influence was minimized, yes.

Q: By the time you left, were there any other major issues that arose in your dealings with the government?

DALE: Well, one was beginning to arise. It turned out that the Iraqi, this third country national, who worked in our embassy, was very, very much opposed to Bokassa. Bokassa was a dictator, a ruthless dictator and a much hated man, as you can see from what I said earlier. Our employee was one of those plotting against him. [Telephone interruption]

Q: You were talking about the Iraqi third country national?

DALE: Yes, that's right. He was one of those plotting against Bokassa. He was seized just after I left and executed.

Q: Bad news to be seized by Bokassa, I guess.

DALE: That was very bad news and led to his quick demise.

A third issue which I should mention is aiding the country. I had a little money, because ambassadors in small countries have a quite a lot of say in how the money is used.

Q: And that's something called an ambassador's fund?

DALE: Well, that's not very big but I had money which was for family planning, for instance. I had money for clinics, things of that nature, and later on for the cattle station, things like that which were small in themselves and not expensive, but in a country which was really not completely yet a money economy, those are very important. So I was able to make a slight difference, which I would not have in a big country with a big aid program, like Turkey.

But the problem was that I had tried to use good contractors and honest people. Bokassa had me in once and gave me a very thorough balling-out. He said, "You're not using the companies I own." Well, I wasn't because I didn't want to help fill his personal coffers.

We had a very bad misunderstanding over that, because I simply would not give way on it. I didn't see how I could justify it to the State Department, or as a taxpayer, justify it to myself.

So at the time I left, I was not on good terms with Bokassa because of the problem of how to help a country when the leader of the country feels he has a right to a part of the aid.

There are many fascinating things about the Central African Republic. The American diamond industry was involved there, Diamond Distributors Incorporated from New York City principally. That was one of our larger endeavors there. We were also exploring for oil in the northern part of the country. I don't know how that came out. There was uranium there. It's a very, very wealthy country in terms of mineral wealth.

Q: Did you see these American activities as potential possibilities for leverage, or did you see them as possibilities for difficulties in your role as ambassador?

DALE: I saw them as possibilities for leverage both ways. They may have been difficulties, but they were more challenges than difficulties. After all, if you let them rest as difficulties, you wouldn't do anything about them. If you could consider them as a challenge and see that both Bokassa can use them and the embassy, then there is something to be gained out of it. So I tried to take that viewpoint. It's an important country in a way. Strategically, it's right in the center in both north and east-west axis of Africa and also it's very rich and still much unknown. It produces beautiful jewel-grade diamonds.

Q: In line with the suggestion you made a few minutes ago off tape, I want to double back to the Six-Day War again. But before we do that, is there anything about your tour as ambassador in the Central African Republic that I should have asked about?

DALE: I think that the State Department, considering that the country was a minor one, gave us very good support. I was very pleased with the support that we got. I was very pleased with the kind of personnel they sent out to the post, and I look on back that as a very happy assignment and one that I think was successful in terms of making a slight difference.

Q: You spent three years there?

DALE: Two years. That's the limit. Medical reasons.

Q: On the crisis management again, how to do diplomacy in a crisis situation, you said there was one other thing that you, looking back now, might have wished you had handled differently on the Six-Day War?

DALE: We tended to focus a great deal of our attention, of course, in reporting back to the State Department, but meanwhile, the fate of the outcome of the war was really being decided in the United Nations. I wish now that I had had more knowledge as to what we were doing in the United Nations, what positions we were taking, and I also wish that we had reported more than perhaps we did on Israeli feelings which might have affected positions in the United Nations.

Q: That's a very particular set of circumstances. Is there any way that you can generalize that? How would this apply to other crisis situations that an American ambassador might find himself in? Is there any applicability?

DALE: I think we should do something of what I did later on, which was to make a sort of elaborate checklist in advance of a crisis, of bases to touch, so that when the crises come you don't neglect a part of the responsibility which devolves upon you.

Q: One other major question I want to ask you, what should be the qualifications of an American ambassador? I'll tell you the context. A non-career ambassador said three or

four years ago that an American Ambassador should be intelligent, should have the full confidence of his President.

DALE: I doubt if President Nixon thought about me a great deal, but I did know him because we had seen him quite a lot in Israel. I think we do need at least the full confidence of the Assistant Secretary. (Laughs) That's very important. Above that level, it depends on the significance of the country. I did see the Secretary of State on occasion. I think you want his full confidence.

Q: Excuse me. We'll stop here and turn the tape over.

[End Tape I, Side 1. Begin Tape I, Side 2.]

Q: You were talking about qualifications for an ambassador.

DALE: Yes, I wasn't being totally serious there. I think the most important thing is to be a good executive. That means managing the embassy well, keeping track of its operation, making sure you can bring all parts of the American Government presence along together. This is especially important in a country with a large military presence, such as Turkey. Secondly, I think you should be able to put forward the American viewpoint when that's necessary on important questions, convincingly, and negotiate as intelligently with the foreign minister or whatever official you are dealing with at that time.

Thirdly, I think you should be able to represent the interests of the country you are in, explain why their positions are as they are, in a way that the State Department can understand them, which is not so difficult, but also other parts of the government. And I think that's very important. So I believe you have those three qualities which are extremely important. I think as time has gone on, the executive function, especially in big embassies, and as we have bigger offices almost everywhere, is of increasing importance. Perhaps the individual diplomacy is a little less important than it was 50 or 60 years ago, before communications were so good. The third element, I think, is becoming more important, if anything, because there are so many preconceived notions among different interest groups in Washington that somewhere there really has to be an objective view of what the situation is, and that is what the embassy has to send in.

Q: You and I have both been away from the Foreign Service for a while, but assuming for the moment we were recruiting for the Foreign Service, what kind of people in junior and mid-level would you be seeking nowadays for the American Foreign Service in the setting of 1988?

DALE: For a long time, as you know, you pursue one rather specialized career in the Foreign Service. It may be consular, it may be administrative, it may be political or economic. I think I would seek out someone with a generalized interest in economics and, if you could judge that, with the potential for an executive function later on. It's very hard to judge, though, at an early stage.

Q: You mean as a type that's particularly needed now in the Foreign Service.

DALE: Yes, but as far as I can see, it's going to be needed for a long time.

Q: Everything else being equal, would you think it's preferable to appoint a careerist to an ambassadorial slot rather than someone from the outside?

DALE: Everything being equal?

Q: Roughly equal.

DALE: I've seen some non-career ambassadors that were excellent because they had had the background in business or government, which was very valuable in the post where they were located. So I'm not one of those who says that a non-career officer can't do it, can't perform the task of an ambassador. But if everything were genuinely equal, I would choose a career officer, because he would have a background, normally, in the region in which we're speaking about, or at least the possibility of good experience in the area where he is being sent, which would not necessarily be true of a non-career. That would be the only variable left if everything else were equal.

Q: I think maybe we will bring this to a conclusion, but I want to ask if you have any general comments you want to make on the Foreign Service as a career or your own career or the practice of diplomacy?

DALE: I think I've already make my remarks about the practice of diplomacy, that I think it involves more of an executive function now than it did 50 years ago, let's say, and perhaps more of a presentation function, to present the United States. You try to represent what its values are, what the country is like, as well as act as an executive. I doubt whether, except in very specialized cases, the actual negotiating on the scene is quite as important as it was, though I have seen it very important in Turkey on occasion.

I enjoyed the career tremendously myself. Looking back on it, it was rather long, neat, tidy, pleasant, and mostly very happy.

Q: Did it always seem that way at the time?

DALE: Almost always. Sometimes when promotions were not coming as fast as I had hoped, it seemed a little dreary, but otherwise, it did.

Q: Thank you very much.

End of interview