Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR RICHARD C. BARKLEY

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
Initial interview date: May 12, 2003

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INTERVIEW

Q: Today is May 12, 2003. This is an interview with Richard Barkley, and this is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. Is there a middle initial in there?

BARKLEY: Yes, a "C."

Q: Richard C. Barkley. All right so, did I mention this is Charles Stuart Kennedy. Anyway, you go by Dick.

BARKLEY: I do.

Q: Let's start at the beginning. Could you tell me when and where you were born, and then we will talk a little about the family.

BARKLEY: Yes, I was born December 23, 1932, in Chicago, Illinois. However the family was living in Rockford, Illinois, at the time. Mother went to Chicago for the birth because my uncle was a doctor.

Q: I was 1928 in Chicago. Let's talk what about the Barkley side, you father. Do you know sort of where the Barkleys came from and then your father.

BARKLEY: Well, so many of us, we are not exactly sure how long ago they came over. Obviously they are of English extraction. My father was born in Denver, Colorado in 1904. His father, I think, was born in Montrose, Colorado. I don't have the full records of that. I don't exactly know the date. But the family had come west from Massachusetts. I don't know exactly when.

Q: What was your family doing in Colorado?

BARKLEY: Well, my grandfather was a salesman for the Great Northern Stove Company. What his father did, I do not know. He died very early, and my father lived with his grandparents in Denver. Grandmother remarried after that, and my father went off to sea as a young man. Although he was too young, he joined the Navy. When they found out, he was released from duty. At that time his mother had remarried and was living in Chicago, so he moved to Chicago, lived at the YMCA, worked first for Western Union and then got a job at the John Hancock Life Insurance Company as a clerk. He worked for the John Hancock Life Insurance Company for the rest of his life until retirement at 63. He died shortly after retirement.

Q: On your mother's side, what was your mother's maiden name?

BARKLEY: My mother's maiden name was Boddiger, Chrystal Boddiger. She was born in 1906 in a little town called Polo, Illinois, which is very close to Dixon, Illinois. Her father was a small time farmer, but he speculated and did day jobs. Anyway she grew up there, and after high school she was a teacher in a little one room schoolhouse near Polo, Illinois. Then she went on to be college, she studied at Benoit College for a year or so during which time she met and married my father.

Q: Your father had not gone to college?

BARKLEY: No. He didn't finish high school on time, but he did finish high school when I was a young man. My mother actually did not finish college until she was 54 years old, when she got her bachelors degree. She became a teacher; she got a teaching certificate and taught on and off throughout most of my life.

Q: Then basically you grew up in Rockford?

BARKLEY: No, when I was born we were living in Rockford, Illinois which I think is the second largest city in Illinois right now. Then my father was transferred, I think it was about 1936 or '37 to Milwaukee. We lived in Milwaukee for seven years and in 1943 he was transferred to Detroit. Housing was difficult to find at that time so my mother, my sister and I lived for a year with my grandfather in Polo, Illinois. Then we moved to Detroit in 1944 and there I went to grade school, high school and then on to Michigan State University.

Q: In elementary school, you were going mainly to the Milwaukee school?

BARKLEY: Well, I started off in the Milwaukee school district. You know I don't remember too much about that. The memories really began very strongly when I lived in this little town of Polo from '42 to '44. A small boy in a small country town is pretty wonderful.

Q: No schooling there?

BARKLEY: I don't think anybody thought about it. They had a fairly good school system, a very strong emphasis on the basics. You had smart kids, dumb kids. You didn't have in those days, gifted and talented and disadvantaged. You just taught everybody. The Detroit school system I think was really quite good at that time. I certainly had no complaints. I remember in high school we had some rather advanced kind of a courses. I did very well in high school. Then of course because we were not a particularly wealthy family, and my sister was two years older, when it came time to go to college, we went to state colleges. I went to Michigan State.

Q: Well in Detroit, do you recall any particular interests that you had in school.

BARKLEY: Oh yeah, like every kid I was interested in sports. I was a little guy, so being interested in sports was not particularly realistic, although I played them with great vigor. But I loved football particularly. I was scrappy but not large enough to be of much use. I went out for football, and when it became clear I wasn't going to excel, I became more interested in my studies, and I did all right. I particularly liked the liberal arts. I recall that I always loved history and literature. I didn't particularly like math. Sounds like a foreign service officer.

Q: Were you much of a reader?

BARKLEY: Always. Our whole family, my mother, even my father were very intense readers. I hardly recall a time through my life that I didn't have a book in my hand.

Q: Was your family where did they fit in the political spectrum? Do you recall? Were they interested in politics in table talk, that sort of thing?

BARKLEY: Both of them came very much out of the middlewestern Republican tradition, which I think was at that time not unusual. There was a large association even in those days with the Civil War. My great grandfather fought in the Civil War. They were certainly as conservative as they came although they were I think forward moving. When they moved t the city, there were some changes, as this certainly seemed to be a more fertile area for democratic activities, with large minority groups and labor unions, particularly in a place like Detroit, which was very strongly democratic. I do recall my father at one time telling me that he had voted for Roosevelt, but he didn't talk very loudly about it. I think throughout that era generally speaking he was a conservative republican, out of tradition more than conviction I think.

Q: What about, you know Detroit from the '30s on had become sort of the goal of many African Americans leaving the south and going up to work in the automobile and other industries and all that. Was your school dominated by African Americans?

BARKLEY: No absolutely not. Interestingly enough the Detroit school system which I grew up in clearly reflected a very broad racial demographic patterns in the city. I lived at that time in what was sort of the extended northwest corner of the city. The center city was much more dominated by African American kids. My school was one of the few that had as far as I know, no African American kids. Today, however, there are no non African American schools. So it was caught up in the transitional phase at that time. Almost all the schools we competed with, however, were very integrated with one or two exceptions, I went to Redford High School. There was another great competitor called Cooley which also had very few black or African American. Almost all the western and central city schools were very largely represented by African Americans, but there were few that were totally African American. There was a mixture. The city was in transition. You pointed out there was a movement of African Americans or blacks as we had called them at one time into the factories of the north. I think it was mostly into Chicago, Detroit and Cleveland. During the war there was a larger influx because the war industries were expanding. The needed the workers etc. It was seen as a great period of opportunity for African Americans, and indeed in the '40s that led into clashes with white workers, and there were some riots.

Q: Yes, in '44 there was a big riot in Detroit wasn't there?

BARKLEY: That's right. Of course the unions were quite active at that time. The Detroit auto industry, particularly Walter Reuther was one of the major organizers, a man of enormous intellect and stature, who came out of more the labor tradition of Europe. There were tensions. There were of course strikes and scabs. I don't remember that party particularly well.

Q: Well did this play at all in the high school?

BARKLEY: Not in high school, no.

Q: Were you pointed towards, I mean did your family sort of point you towards higher education?

BARKLEY: Yes, I think it goes back to my mother's side of the family. Her brother, George, was an excellent student and did very well. He went to the University of Illinois and later on to Harvard. Her maternal uncle was a doctor. Those two were sort of the standard of excellence. Of course we were going through the process of urbanization. I don't think it ever crossed my mother's mind that I would ever stay or go back to the country or anything like that. From the time I can remember it was just sort of understood that we, and most of the kids I played with would go to college. I can't ever recall it being

a stated goal. I remember my father had sort of, I think, idealistic views of what college was, fraternities and all of these things, but certainly there was never any attempt to push me to any particular college. For example there was nothing in our traditions that would indicate that an ivy league college or some grandiose eastern seaboard college would be something that I would aspire to. It was also traditional at that time, that the two professions one looked to when one thought of college was medicine or law. What the other disciplines might have been was something I don't think really crossed their minds. All I knew was my mother didn't want me to become a teacher which I very much wanted to become.

Q: Well, you graduated in 1950. Did the Korean War and the draft play any role at that point?

BARKLEY: Well, it did, although I think a little bit more for my parents than it did for me. Of course they didn't want me to be drafted. I never really thought about it. I was 17 years old which is not really draft age when it came time to go to college. The problem was pretty much taken out of our hands because Michigan State was a land grant college. The first two years, if you go to a land grant college, you had to go to ROTC. Then you would make a selection as to if you wanted to continue in ROTC or if indeed you didn't like it, you could bail out. If you of course did not continue, then your name went to the draft. Well I did continue. I think it was my parent's wish, and it was sort of the standard. We all didn't think about it too much. I don't think any of us particularly loved ROTC, but neither did we dislike it. Anyway I did continue on to senior ROTC in the U.S. Army. After college, a couple of months after college, I went into my officer candidate training school.

Q: Well going back to Michigan State, you were there form '50 to '54.

BARKLEY: That's right.

Q: How did you find Michigan State? You said your father had an idealistic view.

BARKLEY: Well Michigan State at that time was a much smaller school than it is now. I think we had about 7,000 students. It was expanding. Of course there were a lot of students that were coming out of the second world war, the GI Bill. They were ending their university training, so there was great growth on campus. They were building new buildings at a rapid pace with respect to colleges. At both Redford and Cooley which is where most of my friends came from in Michigan, there were almost only two choices it seemed. You went to the University of Michigan, which was a little bit more high falutin', or you went to Michigan State. The choice was made for me by the fact that I had a sister who was at Eastern Michigan at that time, and the tuition at Michigan State was very low. In fact I think it was $89 a semester when I was entered. I always had summer jobs. If fact there is one other tradition of that time. I think most young men at the time worked somewhere in the summer.

Q: What did you do?

BARKLEY: Well, I often went back to this little town in Illinois where I worked in a lumber yard. I worked in a hybrid seed plant, detasseling corn. I did a whole variety of farmer's kind of work. Later on I got summer jobs in factories in Detroit. It was nothing particularly unusual. I remember the income was pretty fair money in those days. Every wintertime I delivered mail at Christmastime.

Q: Well at Michigan State, what were your major courses?

BARKLEY: Ah well, I told you the family ideal was to be a doctor. I had no aptitude, nor interest, but in order to mollify my parents I thought I would take veterinary medicine which was a big thing at Michigan State. I absolutely hated every course that was involved in it. The courses I did love were in what they call the basic college. You got general things like history, literature and fine arts. You did all of these things. I took those subjects and did very well, and pretty soon, I was doing whatever I could to avoid the chemistry and other science courses. Then my second year it was quite clear that I was changing directions. It was a beautiful time in the United States. You had second and third chances in life. So finally I convinced my parents maybe the law. So pre law gave me a great deal of flexibility. You could study history; you could study political science; you could study social studies of all sorts which I really liked, and that is what I did.

Q: What about the social life?

BARKLEY: I was in a fraternity. I pledged a fraternity my freshman year.

Q: What fraternity was that?

BARKLEY: That was ATO, Alpha Tau Omega. All the traditional fraternities were there. It was a time when fraternity life was supposed to be an integral part of college life, and of course it was also a place where you developed friendships. You tended to live in a fraternity house, which became the structure for intramural sports and almost everything else. After I moved into the house, I worked in the house in the kitchen. When I was still in the dormitory, I worked in the dormitory cleaning crew. We cleaned the bathrooms and stuff like that, so I always had a job. I don't want to say that such work was expected, but it was something that every young man took pride in, especially in having an independent source of income.

Q: Well then you graduated in '54. Were you ready for law? I know the military was…

BARKLEY: Well, yes, that was the problem. Before I even applied to law school it was clear I had to serve my two years in the military. But the class that I was in was called in February of '55, so I had to get a job and do something in the interim. I went to work on the bull gang of the Chicago Bridge and Iron Company. They built gasoline storage tanks. I made a lot of money. I got my first car etc. I knew that although I was a college

graduate, everybody knew that it was an interim employment until I went into the military. I went into the army in February of '55. I was sent to Fort Bliss Texas, where I had done my summer ROTC. I was in the artillery. I spent my time there, and then I was assigned to Germany, which probably in retrospect was the beginning of my career. I was stationed at Hanau, Germany, with the 84th Field Artillery Honest John Rocket Battery. It was my first job as an independent kid, I mean in a career way. I, like many people at that time contemplated staying in. I liked the military very much. And of course, it opened my eyes. I saw Europe for the first time. I had dreamed and read about it, but I had no idea what it was like.

Q: Had you taken much of an interest during the time you were in high school and college in foreign affairs?

BARKLEY: Always. Maybe not foreign affairs per-se but foreign countries. I read a lot. I loved European history. When talking about foreign affairs at that time, I must say the focus was very heavily on Europe. Of course, as a child who went through WWII, that is not unusual. When I was in the army, the two areas abroad you were most likely to be sent to were Korea or Europe. Of course Europe is where I wanted to go.

Q: Did you get a chance to go out and around?

BARKLEY: Oh God, I went everywhere. Like my father, I had the wanderlust. Every moment we were free, we drove somewhere. My dad always had to see what was on the other side of the mountain. That somehow became a pattern, and when I was in Europe, of course this was in 1955, '56 that was for the Americans an extraordinarily wonderful time. The countries were still coming out of the war. The dollar was strong. You could travel and do things. Tourist sites were not overtaxed, like afterwards.

Q: I think there was a book written, Europe on $5.00 a Day. That was too much.

BARKLEY: Oh yeah. And of course the military, God bless them, I think they did some things that a lot of people never fully appreciated. They had rest and recreation areas, like Berchtesgaden, and all of these beautiful places in Germany and in Italy, and places all throughout Europe. I drove as far as Rome and Switzerland, several times up into Holland and the Benelux countries and over into France. God it was just a marvelous time.

Q: Other than that I guess you had a military duty. What were you doing?

BARKLEY: I started out I was a surveying officer for this Honest John Battery. The Honest John along with the atomic cannon were atomic capable weapons.

Q: I remember this huge cannon.

BARKLEY: The army developed that. They wanted to get in on nuclear weaponry because that is where the money was. They developed this huge cannon. It had two prime

loaders. It was so big it really couldn't move anywhere. The next thing was rockets. The Honest John was sort of the weapon of choice. It would shoot out to about 25 kilometers and carry a small warhead. At that time, there were six units, Honest John units in Germany. Our job was to close the Fulda Gap which is one of the avenues of approach that the military planners expected the Soviets to use if indeed there was an attack.

Q: I know I was vice consul in Frankfort at the time, and we were supposed to document people. If the Soviets invaded they talked about us documenting people, set up card tables out in the parking lot. You know everybody knew this was nonsense, but we had to have a plan. If I had known you were there, I would have felt much safer.

BARKLEY: For no reason I am aware of. Like Berthold Brecht's wonderful song, "Make a plan no matter how great it is," then make another one, it doesn't matter because none of them work. But you had that little plan. I was there, maybe you were there at the same time. '56 of course is when the Hungarian revolution took place. That was at the same way as the Suez crisis, so things were hot internationally.

Q: That was October of '56.

BARKLEY: The alert status was raised considerably and we would move out on maneuvers. I just hoped to God that the senior officers knew better what was going on than we did.

Q: No it was really a time of crisis.

BARKLEY: Yes, it was really a tense time. I am a child of the cold war actually, I am an adult of the cold war. That was a very indicative of the kinds of problems we were confronting. I guess with the wisdom we have now, we can see that both of those events had led to a whole variety of serious challenges. I am not sure we were that wise at that time. Of course this was a time that Eisenhower was the President and John Foster Dulles was talking about rollback. We never knew exactly what that meant. But when Hungary came off, we were quite nervous whether or not we would do something. Of course at that level of the military we were just trained to salute and do what we were told to do. We had no idea what that was going to be. I remember thinking it would be wise to do nothing at that time.

Q: How did you find dealing with the troops at that time because later during Vietnam there were real problems and military morale was… Did you sort of have troop problems?

BARKLEY: No there was a time of transition. It was quite clear that most of our officers, our senior officers had had experience in either World War II or more immediately in Korea. So there was some experience at the senior ranks, but of course you are a lieutenant, you don't know very much. Neither do you know what the conditions were beforehand, but when I was there of course, and it started in Korea, was the integration of

the military. I mean before that the military was segregated. It was amazing to me in some respects because having come out of a rather, how would you say, provincial background, to be thrown together with kids from all over was really an eye opener. On the other hand there was among most of them not any deep seated prejudice that I was aware of. There were always some black-white problems in those days but they certainly weren't out of hand. I think what was even more interesting of course was that we had the draft at that period of time, but there were so many more draft age kids than the draft needed, that there was a tendency in many areas quite clearly to empty the jails first, and then give everybody a deferment. So we got a lot of problem kids. I must give the military high marks. They handled it pretty well. The officer corps was integrated. We had actually an executive officer at that time who was a young African American, a marvelous young officer. His professionalism as well as his personality did a lot, I think, to defuse what might have been some of the problems. But anyway, you got a very strange mix. You got some draftees that were really trouble making kids. On the other hand, you also got some draftees from universities, so you had a broad range, not only in economic, but in educational backgrounds. I thought it was a wonderful experience. I often told people that if there was one defining moment in my life, it was the United States Army.

Q: For so many of us it got us into a world that otherwise we wouldn't have seen.

BARKLEY: Well that is true. Not only that, it breaks down a lot of your biases because it is just absolutely amazing when you throw people from all of these broad different social strata together and they find out what talents there are at one level or another where you wouldn't expect it. A kid who is not particularly literate but a whiz at taking care of automobiles or something else. It gives, I think, a real window on American society. I have always been thankful that I had a chance to serve.

Q: I had gone to a prep school in and sort of a small men's college and all, sort of a preppy education, and then ended up in four years in the air force as an enlisted man. This was damn good for me. Also, I gained the greatest appreciation for master sergeants. You know, I found out who runs it.

BARKLEY: As a lieutenant, you know that better than anyone else. I mean talk about greening the egg. You are not prepared for almost any of the things they ask of you. Thank god there is some crusty old guy, who calls you sir, and that was about it, and leads you carefully through that morass.

Q: Well the two years '56-'57 or '55-'56?

BARKLEY: I got out in January '57.

Q: What about the law and all that?

BARKLEY: Well in the first place I was never quite sure I was so enamored of it in the first place. It was a way to get out of doing the things I didn't want to do, and to do the

things I did want to do when it came to studying. Anyway I came back, and by that time of course, when you got out of the Army, you were a man. So your parents don't really tell you any more exactly what they expect from you, and I decided that I would go on and study history which I truly loved. I went back to Wayne University. I got the GI bill. It was a great boon. So I got my masters at Wayne University in 1958 in history. I had just some marvelous teachers. Wayne University is a state university but sort of styled itself like the University of Chicago in Detroit, and had a great intellectual kinship with the University of Chicago. It had an extremely good graduate program. When I was there, the language I was taking was German, because I had been in Germany; I was fascinated and started learning it there formally. I had never taken it in a particularly structured way until I took it at Wayne University. My professor of German History at that time was a marvelous woman by the name of Professor Margaret Stern. She convinced me that I should consider going on over and continuing my education in Germany. I said, "Where should I go?" She said, "There is only one place to go, and that is the University of Freiburg" because the greatest historian of the age at that time, Gerhardt Ritter, taught there. He was an elderly gentleman, and any association with him would bring great rewards. I often wondered where I developed the courage, but I did indeed apply. German university at that time had exchange programs. Through her I made the right contact and I was accepted at the university of Freiberg. So in September of 1958 I took what little possessions I had, which was of course not great. I was unencumbered. I was not married.

Q: I was going to say, there was no significant other.
BARKLEY: No, I had no family at that time, or for a whole variety of reasons I won't go into any amorous aspirations. I of course had the usual girlfriend that ended up somewhere else. So I went to the University of Freiberg, and registered there, and I spent the next three years there. Then I found out with a masters degree in history I could get a job teaching at the University of Maryland abroad, which was a program that they had for the troops. So I got on their rolls and I taught about five or six different places in France and Italy and Germany. Each one of them produced enough income so I could continue to live very well. So I continued my studies in Germany. I picked up German quite well and I was functioning well in the language of course. Actually I was sort of shocked by the teaching profession. I expected it to be somehow a little bit more idealistic than it turns out to be. There is a lot of push and shove and in-fighting going on at the university level.

Q: What was your impression, I mean you come out of the American university system through the masters. Here you are at Freiberg. How did you find it as a system?

BARKLEY: In those days the German university had the concept of academic freedom. That is that you don't get grades per-se. Your record, of course, indicated what courses you were taking. At one particular time when you think that you are ready you apply to take the exams. There are a number of exams, the graduation exam, what they call the Staatsexam. Then if you want to go on to a Ph.D. program which I was in, you take Habilitierung. Then if you want to teach in the system you take the next step which is Promovierung. I was in the program which would have led to a doctorate. But I must say the lack of discipline was something that I didn't particularly take to. I took to it on one

hand. I spent an enormous amount of time reading and continuing my reading and doing things. I went to all of my classes and doing those things, but I didn't see really at that time where I wanted to go.

Q: Well did you find, you know the American universities by the time you are up to Ph.D. you are in an awful lot of essentially seminars where you and a few other students are talking to the professors and all that. Was that happening in Germany too?

BARKLEY: No. The concept of a professor in Germany is entirely different. I mean the professor there is as close to a demi god as you can get. He seldom deigned to talk to his students unless they became actually one of his lecturers. It was like you almost were expected to shine his shoes; you did all that sort of stuff. Often of course, that was offensive. But the professors generally would give lectures. The better lecturer he was, the more he filled up the lecture hall. There were, of course, seminars. You would get together with small groups and talk, but mostly at that time the students had a lot of time politicizing among themselves, philosophizing among themselves. It was not exactly what I had expected, but I enjoyed it. Anyway, anticipating your next question, while I was there, I heard they were giving the foreign service exam at the U.S. consulates. I thought that the Foreign Service might be a way out of my dilemma as to my future. I enjoyed life and yet I didn't have the usual forward projections that a lot of people should have as adults. When I was at Wayne, I had a professor of American diplomatic history, who was caught in a time warp, and he told us all that only the sons of the wealthy families ever joined the foreign service. You might have heard that.

Q: Oh I did.

BARKLEY: So although that was one of my ambitions I put it out of my mind because I heard it wouldn't work. And then I found out it was wrong. So I took the foreign service exam in 1960.

Q: Where did you take it?

BARKLEY: I took it at the consulate in Stuttgart. The room was a large room. It must have had over 200 people in it, mostly military people who had taken the language courses. And to my enormous surprise, I passed it.

Q: Well back to the Freiberg experience, what about the politics that were going on there. I mean here is a very good chance to see what the educated class in Germany was doing politically. I would think that one of the things was is Hitler going to come back? I mean the equivalent. Where were these people going?

BARKLEY: Well as you can imagine, the shock of Hitler was still with everybody, and the shock of the war. The student bodies had gone through a great traumatization, and the professors too. There was an inclination to de-Nazify everything. So many of the Nazi professors were bogus anyway. The so-called intellectual elite, I think, never felt at ease.

In fact much of the professorial class had fled. Some of them actually came back to the university after having spent time in exile, many in the United States. Among the students themselves there was then, like now, a very strong social democratic trend in the universities in Europe. They all thought that state control of the economy was a welcome development. I think I was considered to be rather conservative. Most were more radicalized. There was an interesting attitude among many of them towards the United States. On one hand some bewilderment as to the source of American genius. And the other was some resentment of American power. I didn't find any major hostility at all, on the contrary. But the political firmament was very largely socialist I think, although I have to point this out, that the University of Freiberg was a Catholic school. Almost all of the European schools like earlier in the United States had sort of a religious orientation, and Freiburg's religious faculty was Catholic. But most of the students went there regardless of what their religious affiliations. Nonetheless, it was generally a conservative part of the country. Baden/Wurttemberg was always more conservative.

Q: One of the things that has always interested me is how in a way, different Americans and most western Europeans are as students and all. It is very hard to get ideological American students. I mean there is a Marcusa.

BARKLEY: Yes, Herbert Marcusa.

Q: You had Italians quoting him and the feeling that he really didn't have much influence in the United States. I mean we just don't think, subscribe as much to Marxism or any other ism as much as say the Europeans.

BARKLEY: I am sure that has very strong historical roots. Despite everything America is a relatively classless society, or let's say the standards for class are different. Europe has always had a much more rigid caste system than most of us would like to admit, with the possible exception of the Scandinavians and even they had. Germany was always a country with a strong tradition of authoritarianism and class structure. In the United States that wasn't the case. But if you recall, particularly in the Vietnam years when Herbert Marcusa did become actually somewhat of a personality in American radical politics, the Angela Davises and others did indeed pick up the traditional cudgel of the leftist politics. But it has never been an American ingredient. I mean somehow we weathered the depression without going in those directions, probably through the genius of FDR. I think also in, we still had a frontier to conquer, while European countries were largely hemmed in by set borders and driven by entirely different political problems.

Q: Well then you took the foreign service exam when?

BARKLEY: In December of 1960.

Q: How did sort of the East Germany Berlin Wall and all that, well the Berlin Wall wasn't up at that time. How did, at the university in Germany, how did sort of the Soviet threat and East Germany and all, did that play much of a role in thinking or action?

BARKLEY: Oh, yes, I think it did. Of course this is the time of Konrad Adenauer. And Konrad Adenauer, of course, was a Rhinelander whose western orientations were never questioned. He was always fearful actually of the east whether the Soviets or the Prussians.

Q: There was a story that when he took a train over the Elbe he said, "Ach, Asia."

BARKLEY: Yes, he probably could very well have said that. He was of course, a very tough leader. But the West Germans, most of them, I am not talking intelligentsia here, most west Germans understood that they were blessed to be associated with the West. Now the form that that takes is entirely different. When I was there that they were going through the possibility of rearmament, and many of the students were against it, strongly against it, as you can imagine. I remember what I always considered to be one of the more offensive arguments I used to hear there was that the Americans have no intellectual content to add to the world. We do. Let the Americans handle the pig headed military requirements of the alliance and we will add the cultural and intellectual firmament for that. Of course if you ask them what they had done recently in intellectual discourse it became a little foggier because of course, there was not much they could point to. But they thought that they were the land of Schiller and Goethe and Beethoven and Bach, and what did the U.S. have to offer. So I think there was this Eurocentric anti-Americanism among the students.

Q: Well this is on the intellectual side, because we are coming back to Germany later on. Was there any feeling that you were picking up say from the older generation and all about the loss of the Jewish element in German society which seemed when you talk about culture particularly modern culture, this is like taking the salt out of the stew or something like that. I mean it seemed to have been so influential and all of a sudden it was gone.

BARKLEY: Well, of course, one of the problems was it was gone. Certainly the reality of the Holocaust was painful as you can imagine. Many of these kids realized that not only daddy and mommy but grandma and grandpa might have been very actively involved in the kinds of things that were going on. Of course this was a time when Konrad Adenauer made public announcements as to German guilt and the Treaty of London, when the Federal Republic made payments to the State of Israel. Among many the very horrors of the Holocaust led them to believe that some perverse element had snuck in to German history. Most of the students that I knew did not deny that it happened. There was denial, but that was usually among non intellectuals, you know among fairly traditional right wing groups. The culpability and all this of the church too was something that was painful, particularly at a Catholic university. It was not however a subject that I was aware that people were dealing with every day. Indeed the fact that so much of the Jewish community had been eradicated meant minimal Jewish participation in the discussion, although some Jewish professors, of course, did come back. There were a couple of American Jewish students there that I knew. Of course, they were very sensitive on that

issue, and ready to do battle if you will. But it was not a constant drumbeat of concern at that time.

Q: Well 1960, at the end of '60, how did the sort of foreign service side play out?

BARKLEY: Well then I was informed that indeed I had passed the examination. I don't recall that they gave a grade score or anything.

Q: They did give a grade score but…

BARKLEY: I probably wouldn't have known what it meant anyway. But in those days they had three particular elements to the exam. There was a fourth that you could voluntarily take which was language, and I took it in German. Most of the kids did take a language, because most of them were there as language students from the army. I never met any of the kids again and I spent some time talking to them. Then they said we are giving the oral examination this time in Europe, at the consulate general in Frankfurt, in the summer of 1961. So I arranged to go up and take my orals in Frankfort. It was once again serendipitous; I had no idea that this was all going to happen. I thought I would have to somehow go home and take the exam, which would have been financially a burden. So I went up. I stayed with friends of friends who had been in the military, went in, took my foreign service exam. The board consisted of three people. The head of our board interestingly enough was Ambassador Clifton Wharton. Clifton Wharton at that time was our ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Why he got roped into this I only found out later of course, when you are expected to do certain little things. He was an extraordinarily charming man, and I think I am not wrong in saying that he was the first career African American ambassador.

Q: I think he was.

BARKLEY: There were a couple of people. They asked me some questions. I suspect that they were more interested in how I was handling myself than exactly the content of the question, but I think I handled them with some ability.

Q: Do you recall any of the questions?

BARKLEY: There was a question from Ambassador Wharton, and it turns out there had been a real case where he was called to the foreign office and he was accused of defending American aggressive policy towards this socialist country by authorizing an American military flight that had come very close to the borders of Czechoslovakia, which I think is something that in fact happened quite often. And he asked me what should have been the proper response to that. I gave what I thought was a response in retrospect probably not an erroneous one. I said, "I would certainly reject the complaint on behalf of my government. It was clear they knew fully well it was never the intent of American policy as they portrayed it." He said, "Well, that was certainly an acceptable answer, but his was that he would take it under protest and inform our government."

Anyway that is the only portion I do remember. I think somebody asked me about Winfield Scott, "Old Fuss and Feathers" in the Mexican War. I don't remember much more than that. It was a very friendly kind of chat. It all lasted, I guess, no more than 40-45 minutes, after which, to my great surprise, the Ambassador said, "We are recommending you for an appointment as an FSO class 7 instead of the usual class 8." I was given the slightly higher start primarily because I had done military service.

Q: Well had you had any chance prior to this to learn anything about the foreign service?

BARKLEY: No, that is very interesting. You know in the Midwest the foreign service is not a concept that is alive and well, at least in those days. Subsequently when I entered the foreign service and found that over 90% of my class were from one seaboard or another, mostly from the eastern seaboard. The foreign service exam was well spoken of among almost every senior class in the Ivy Leagues, and people knew about it. Certainly it must have been given at Michigan State, but I never heard of anybody taking it. I am sure they just put it on the bulletin board somewhere. One has to realize that at Michigan State the vast majority went to work for Midwestern companies or something like that, and that international affairs at that time was not a particularly current concept.

Q: So when did you come in?

BARKLEY: I came in in February, 1962.

Q: What did you do in the interim?

BARKLEY: Continued on at the university in Germany.

Q: Did you get your Ph.D.?

BARKLEY: No, I didn't get my Ph.D. Excuse me I should say that I continued to teach for the University of Maryland. I just left. I had a job. I was delighted to get it. I wasn't sure where I was going with the other things, so I just went on.

Q: Was there a dissertation in the offing? What was it?

BARKLEY: Well, in German it was Der Einfuss Karl Haushofer's An Der Deutschen Assen-Politik. And Karl Haushofer was the great, at that time, the only German geopolitician who had some influence on eastern policy with the Nazi regime. Haushofer however was never a Nazi and was considered a great nationalist. So I was fascinated by him and that is who I did my work on.

Q: So you came in in 1962.

BARKLEY: Yes.

Q: I think this is probably I will put at the end here a good place to stop, and we will pick this up in 1962 when you entered the foreign service.

BARKLEY: Good.

Q: Great.

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Today is May 22, 2003. Dick, we are at 1962 and you are entering the Foreign Service. What was your class like?

BARKLEY: Well, as I recall, the class size was about 34-35. It was a very interesting composition at that time compared to where we are today. There were four females in the class. But eight people who came from Harvard, a large number. A smaller number from Yale. A number from California, so it was very much the seaboards, the eastern seaboard and the western seaboard that was represented. There were about four or five of us I think, from the middle west or the south, which indicated a geographical composition which I think at that time was not unusual.

Q: How did you find the course itself?

BARKLEY: Well, as I recall, the course went on for about 16 weeks. We had two mentors, the class more or less divided in two. Our group was headed up by a gentleman by the name of Thomas Jefferson Duffield. The other group was, I forget his name exactly, but I think it was Chester Bemis or something like that. They of course, started us off introducing the foreign service, and they had speakers in, and we had a couple sort of field trips and things like that to introduce us to what foreign service life was really like rather than the romanticized view that I think most of us had when we entered.

Q: While you were there and you were asked where you wanted to go, did you have any particular preference?

BARKLEY: Yes at that time, you know this is a very interesting time. It is the time of President Kennedy and the Peace Corps was coming into being. There was a certain romanticism about Africa, Latin America, the developing world. I didn't particularly share that. All of my experience had been in Europe, and I was sort of interested in going back to Europe so I said that I would like to go to a northern European country, and I would like to learn another language, believing then as I do now that the more languages you get earlier, the better you are served. In any event all of us had a wish list very much like what we did later on. Where ever there were spots or places, if there was a language requirement depending on what kind of a language it was, they would either give you the full course or if it were an esoteric language, they would give you half the course. I was assigned to Finland, to Helsinki. So I got about four or five months of the eight month course of Finnish, which began in the spring. No excuse me, it began in the fall, and as

our class entered in February, there were certain gaps to be filled between the start of the language course and the end of our foreign service class.

Q: What would you do?

BARKLEY: They placed us in different parts of the Department. I was put I recall, into INR which won't surprise you. There were always gaps in INR. I worked actually on southeast Asia, primarily on Indonesia. This was the time of Sukarno and things were just beginning actually to build up in Vietnam. The real problem was to come. It was an interesting interlude, but I think at that time I sort of decided INR was not where I really wanted to be.

Q: So in the fall of '62 you were in the State Department.

BARKLEY: Yes.

Q: How did the Cuban missile crisis hit you and your colleagues?

BARKLEY: Well it is very interesting. I recall precisely where I was. I don't remember the exact date. It was obviously in the autumn. I think it was October; I am not sure. A friend of my family's was in town from Detroit attending a convention up at the Sheraton Hotel. They asked me to appear there, and I did. Then there was a statement that the President was going to speak on television. President Kennedy came on and explained what the situation was in Cuba. I think particularly those of us who were in the foreign service were aware this was a big time of testing, and indeed a perilous time. It was interesting to me that all of the businessmen there listened with rapt attention and never understood one thing, and of course went back to what they knew best which was business. A lot of us were I don't think shaken, but very curious. At that time of course, President Kennedy had developed into a rather attractive sort of personality, who captured the imagination of young foreign service officers. Of course we followed that very carefully, but none of us were directly engaged of course.

Q: Well then, how did you find Finnish? I mean this is supposed to be in the languages this is supposed to be pretty far up the line as far as difficulty.

BARKLEY: I think it has been properly ranked. It is a very difficult language. In those days, as you perhaps recall, the basement of the Arlington Towers was the foreign service institute.

Q: Basically a garage.

BARKLEY: It was a garage. And it was cut up into sort of cubicles, there was very little air movement down there, and you would sit in this little cubicle and repeat totally unintelligible sentences until they became slightly intelligible. It was a real fight not only to learn but to stay awake. But I did begin to appreciate the emphasis on a language

program had some great merit. By the time I went out to Finland I could function on a very basic level. Of course it always struck me that if you are going to learn a hard language like that, to only get half of the course might make credit sense but it doesn't make intellectual sense because you are only beginning to progress along the line, and you have got some very basic things, but you really haven't developed any sophistication. Happily in a place like Finland, one of the Nordic countries, the official language was English. So we were able to function very well, and the vast majority of the people, almost everybody in the foreign office and the vast majority in the government spoke English with some facility. The language was really a bear; I will say that.

Q: You were there from what, '63…

BARKLEY: Yes, I was there from March of '63 until March of '65.

Q: What was our embassy like?

BARKLEY: It was a small embassy, a very small embassy. Our ambassador at that time was Bernard Gufler, who was one of the crusty old ambassadors who were still around at that time. He had been minister in Berlin before Finland. The political section was two people. The economic section was two people. I think there were two people in the admin section, one in the consular section. Of course the full complement of defense attachés. The station was sizable because of where it was located. There was a commercial attaché. That is about it. Well we had a cultural attaché and a USIA program, but it was a small embassy.

Q: What were you doing?

BARKLEY: In those days in the training of junior officers, you expected to spend six months in every section of the embassy. Of course, as soon as I landed it became clear to me anyway, the admin counselor had his eyes on me. Of course, the last place I wanted to serve. But I went in and was introduced to the ambassador and had a chat. He found out that I had studied in Germany and that piqued his interest. We discussed what was going on in Berlin and a couple of other things, and he said, "Well I want you to be in the political section." So I ended up in the political section for about eight months. Then I went in to the economic section, mostly connected with the commercial attaché because there were a couple of trade shows going on. That was actually quite fun. I did admin for six months and then six months in consular. Actually it was quite a good exposure to the basic ways an embassy functions. The embassy was small enough that you get a real overview of what was happening.

Q: What was sort of the political situation in Finland at the time, and what was the relationship to the United States?

BARKLEY: Well, Finland was a neutral country actually but it was under enormous pressure from the Soviet Union. It had been following for many years a thing called the

Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line. Basically that was never to pose such a threat to the Soviet Union that they would take counter measures. This all goes back to the historical consequences of the Finnish-Soviet war and all of those things. The Soviets too suffered quite a bit before they were successful in conquering Finland. They never conquered all of it, but they hacked off a huge section of Karelia and incorporated it into the Soviet Union. The United States, of course, was always trying to convince them that they didn't have to cower in front of the Soviets. It was easier for us to say than for them to do. I think they were quite successful in maintaining a remarkable degree of independence. But of course they did that by being particularly careful in not doing anything the Soviets would find disagreeable. The other side actually, the Swedes were doing exactly the opposite. Although their attachments to the west were quite clear, they were still neutral. I think it was self understood at that time that Swedish and Finnish neutrality were part of the peace process and formed a sort of "Cordon Sanitaire" between the two competing powers in Northern Europe.

Q: Was there a pro Russian party in Finland?

BARKLEY: Oh, yes. There was a Communist Party in Finland. That once again goes back to the period of time right after the Russian Revolution. There was a civil war in Finland between the reds and the whites. There was a war actually that the whites under Field Marshall Mannerheim won. There was a lot of bloodletting, but nonetheless, the ultimate result of that was there were still residual parts of the Communist Party. And of course, they had very close relations with the Soviet Union and were sort of part of the political process. Now, they would usually gain 15-20% of the vote but not enough to form a government. There was a social democratic party which was the same basic kind of composition you found in most parts of Northern and Central Europe as a matter of fact.

Q: Were there, you know earlier on there had been a large was it youth peace festival or something in Helsinki and all. Was this still the communist side, were they using this as sort of a showcase of various things while you were there?

BARKLEY: Well when I was there, actually the domestic problems were that the communist party had a difficult time because obviously the Soviet Union was pleased with the policy that was followed by President Kekkonen. Kekkonen was the leader of the Center Party agricultural party. He always had a coalition that basically supported him. So it was a case where the communists, getting their instructions from Moscow, to the extent that they did, and I think they did to a great extent, basically did not directly challenge the president and his policy because the policy lines were similar to theirs. The social democrats had more of a problem. The social democrats was a larger party. They also were trying to steer a course of non provocation towards the Soviets and at the same time to get voters without attacking the basic principles of Kekkonen, which all parties supported.

Q: How did we deal and operate within this system? Were we willing to accept this as the

way it was and not pushing hard?

BARKLEY: Well as you perhaps recall, at the time none of us were terribly comfortable with the so-called neutral countries, although I think they had less problems with Sweden and Finland. There was a certain amount of stability. But there was this neutral bloc that came up, But the bloc was never joined as far as I knew by…

Q: You are talking about the non aligned group.

BARKLEY: Yes and that was of course, Tito and Nasser at that time, Nehru and Sukarno. But the political structure of course changed. The social democrats basically took over after Kekkonen's death. This happened much after I was gone, but we were trying to convince them all the time that you know they could open themselves more to American trade without any problems, but they were still very cautious. They didn't have a vigorous trade relationship with the United States.

Q: How did you find your contacts with the Finns? I would think that every ounce of their being would be towards the west in most of the people you would meet. The west represented the future or not to them.

BARKLEY: Well I think that is true, but on the other hand they were living right next to the bear. That certainly got your attention. I don't think there was any question that their sympathies and indeed their political structure reflect a sympathy, not only a sympathy but a devotion to the democratic principles. But in the hard reality of politics they didn't want to do anything that would provoke the Soviets to take any counter measures. The Soviets had a base somewhere in the south, in Prokala. They would use this to put pressure on the Finns whenever they felt it was necessary. They were monitoring Finland very carefully. Then of course, they had a trade agreement with the Finns that was more lucrative for the Soviets than it was for the Finns, although it was part of the price the Finns paid, I think, to keep their neighbor happy. As a consequence of that you would see on the streets of Finland a lot of Moscowvitches and other Russian cars they could buy for a song actually, because they were part of the trade agreement.

Q: From what I gather we were not an overly active group getting out there and…

BARKLEY: That is true. From what I saw that was certainly true. The station, however, was quite active, because as you can imagine there was a huge Soviet presence. That was of interest in terms of intelligence and things. We were more of a reporting post, and I think did that very well.

Q: Did you find yourself sort of the station was going active let us know if you find somebody who looks interesting or that sort of thing?

BARKLEY: Well there was always the situation where if you encountered anything unique. I happened to have done exactly that with a U.S. trade commission that was there

at the time. We had a rather large trade promotion. And the Soviets came and attended it and wanted to see a lot of things. In the process I met a young man, a young Finn who worked with Soviet import-export group, which of course was usually the cover for KGB activities. He invited me over to talk in his office on a number of things and the Soviets were quite shocked to find me there. I subsequently found out they said I was in the "Rat's Next," which meant the KGB operation there. The station was interested in what I had to say about how big the office was and how it looked. Of course they knew where it was, but they had never been inside. So I blundered into something that was interesting. The other thing that we had which was quite interesting was periodically a Polish or eastern European ship of some sort would put in to Helsinki. There would always be a defector or two who would come out of that. The Finns were of course, under enormous pressure that if indeed they went to the Finnish police or something like that, they would be under pressure to turn them back. So they usually came to people in one of the western embassies. Then the standard procedure was we would put them on a train to Sweden. Once they got up into Sweden, then they would function fairly well. A couple of times, I remember one case they had a Pole who spoke German and he spoke nothing else. I was the only German speaker in the embassy with the possible exception of the ambassador who of course was out of town. They asked me to take him to the train station.

Q: How did you find Finnish society? The Swedes I am told are quite reserved. Are the Finns…

BARKLEY: All the Scandinavians, all northern people, are fairly reserved. The Finns are positively shy, but they are hospitable, very nice people. They come from a rural background mostly. As you know, Finland was for a long time occupied by Sweden. Later on it was an archduchy of the Czar. The Czar was the archduke of Finland. So there was always a great Swedish element in their society. But with democracy there came a push towards more Finnish speakers. It was a country that had two official languages, Finnish and Swedish. Of course, the Finns which were the poorer cousins basically, the Swedes colonized the coastline and in the interior where the Finns were of course, they were fairly agrarian and rather poor. So as they made the transition into an independent society, the Finnish element being so large became of course the most active aspect of the political life.

Q: Did you get up into Lapland?

BARKLEY: Oh, yes. I always try to get around. I did what I think most young foreign service officers did when I went to a country. I found out what literature was available. I read their history and all those things.

Q: Yes, I read the Kalavala.

BARKLEY: The Kalavala. That is the national epic.

Q: I never did figure out what that mill was that the Sonpole or something like that. It

was a magical mill or something.

BARKLEY: You know it is an interesting thing the rhythm of the Kalavala is exactly the rhythm of Hiawatha. Longfellow knew Lönnrot, who was very much the great linguist who translated the Kalavala, actually wrote it down for the first time. It was an oral tradition. He got this rhythm because the oral tradition had two people speaking. One saying one sentence and the other responding. It came along like Hiawatha; "By the shores of Gitchee Gumee, By the shining big sea water." That was a connection that was novel to me. I didn't know that. They had quite a good culture and particularly in architecture and design. Alvar Alto was one of the great architects and Saarinen of course. So there was really a terrific tradition in that area and of course in sports there were famous Finnish runners and skiers and walkers and so on.

Q: Were there any restrictions on talking to members of the Communist Party?

BARKLEY: There were no restrictions that I was aware of or were ever told to me except that of course, you should write down everything that was discussed. That was not only to make sure there was no misuse of the relationship that also that you protected yourself. The problem usually was the communists weren't particularly interested in talking to us. Now they did on occasion if we took a trip anywhere they would be represented in the political groupings that were there. They always were congenial. Most of them I think were continuing traditions and associations that went back to the civil war.

Q: How about when you were in the consular section, did you get a sort of a glimpse of Finnish migration to the United States. I mean historically I mean they had gone to the logging areas and the cold areas too like Wisconsin.

BARKLEY: Unlike other places in Scandinavia the interaction between the Finnish emigrant community and the home country was not particularly active. I knew, of course, a number of people in the United States of Finnish extraction including my aunt. But it was not nearly as aggressive a relationship as it is for example in Norway. There was always a certain amount of humor about the immigrants. They had a hard time learning English with Finnish as a background, but most of them of course, were laborers. Now an interesting thing was that when they emigrated they brought with them their political coloration. During that period of time that I was there, Key members of the American communist party were Finnish. That was not a surprise but that was an interesting development for us. During the time I was there, of course, two major events occurred from my perspective. First was the assassination of John F. Kennedy, I was actually in Sweden when it happened. I remember how horrified I was, and I couldn't get any information because all the papers were in Swedish. I was able to figure out through German more or less what had happened. I returned immediately and of course the embassy was in a total uproar, not knowing exactly what to do. Of course we put out the condolence book and people came by in droves. Kennedy, like in other countries, had touched an emotional vein in Finland. They were honestly impressed with his youth and his vigor and his charm. Of course the assassination was just a terrible thing, terrible

blow. We also along with the Finnish government organized a major commemorative service for him in the cathedral which is in the center of the city. Among my tasks was to usher President Kekkonen and his wife to their seats. A small thing, but for a junior level officer it was quite a touching thing. It was a traumatic time.

Q: I was in Yugoslavia. Actually I was in Austria at the time it happened. I kept trying to find out what erschatzen meant. Was it killed or shot at, you know. It took a little while, but I came back and we had the same thing in a communist country, long lines. You go into a little marketplace in Tusla or something like that and you find little pictures in plastic with Kennedy in them. They would be sold.

BARKLEY: It certainly captured the imagination of the world. It was an amazing thing. President Kennedy's ambassador at that time was Carl Rowan, who was one of the first African American ambassadors to be appointed. Rowan of course was a successful journalist at that time and even more successful later on. He came with his family. That was an enormous thing. The Finns loved him. He had great charm. He also captured their imagination. It was an exciting time.

Q: I would think so. He was one of the sort of bright stars in the…

BARKLEY: He was not only that. He was as you would expect utterly engaged in the civil rights movement. A lot of members of the civil rights movement did appear actually and visited him because he was there. That gave me the unique privilege of meeting some of them. It was a window on a part of America that I had to admit I didn't perfectly understand at that time. Of course he was a highly intellectual man with an enormous sense of humor which played extremely well even in the rather dour atmosphere of Finland. They took to him immediately. He was a remarkable guy.

Q: You were saying one other thing happened.

BARKLEY: Well, the other thing I recall very much was a visit by John Steinbeck.

Q: Oh, yes.

BARKLEY: Steinbeck had just won the Nobel Prize for Travels with Charley. He arrived with his wife. His program was put together by USIS. At that time he just came into Finland as many people did out of the Soviet Union where he had also been feted and wined and dined and of course they were extremely impressed at having him there. I had been trying to get the attention of our cultural affairs officer that they should try to get him to meet with the only Finnish Nobel Prize winner, a fellow by the name of Frans Eemil Sillanpaa. USIS told me that they did invite Sillanpaa to a reception in Steinbeck's honor. But I said, "Sillanpaa is a recluse. He won't leave his home. He lives right outside of Helsinki!"

So there was a little meeting in the embassy, and Steinbeck was there, and I was there

with a friend of mine, Georgiana Prince, who was the financial officer at the embassy. We were very close friends. Somehow he came up and we talked. He asked me, "Do you think we have got a good program here?" I said, "I personally lamented the fact that he wasn't going out to see Sillanpaa, the Finnish Nobel Prize winner." He said, "Well why am I not doing that?" I said, "I am sorry sir, I am not in charge of the program, but if I were in charge of your program, I would put that high on your list." He said, "Well I want to do that. How do I go about it?" I said, "Well you just tell the Ambassador you want to do that." He said, "Should I tell him you said to?" I said, "Oh heavens no." If there is any way to get into trouble it is to go over another officer's head in the construction of his program. Well, he said, "I am going to do that," and he did. They both went out. Carl Rowan looked up and said, "Oh, God, this is tailor made." The visit took place, and I recall always with great satisfaction that it was on the front page of every newspaper in the country, including Kansan Uutiset, which was the biggest communist newspaper there. It was a great coup, and later on when he went home, he wrote about the meeting in the "New Yorker." I always felt that as a junior officer during my tour in Finland, that was the greatest single contribution I made.

Q: Did you get any glowers from the UISA people?

BARKLEY: No, I don't think they ever knew. The only one that knew it was Georgiana who was sitting next to me when we talked about it. I think she told other people, but she wasn't going to go to the USIA and tell about that. That was an interesting thing. Then of course the follow up to the Kennedy assassination, I think the event that took over a large segment of our lives was the showing of the movie, "The Years of Light and Days of Drums." It was an extraordinary movie, a portrayal of President Kennedy's tenure. The embassy showed that around, and of course the organization of it was a major task. It was largely given to me to handle it. I worked on it for weeks and weeks. It was actually a labor of love because it was such an important thing.

Q: Yes. How about sort of on the cultural side. Did the Finns have sort of the same affinity that so many of the countries in Europe have towards American music, jazz, movies, this sort of thing?

BARKLEY: Oh, absolutely. Georgiana, once again my very close friend, was a great aficionado of ballet. Through her, I went to the ballet often and got to know a lot of the ballerinas. For all of them for them the height of achievement was to be selected to go to the United States and study under someone like Jerome Robbins. Classical ballet was one thing, but there was jazz ballet and other things in the United States that really caught their attention. There were jazz clubs all throughout Helsinki. It was a popular art form. The television played a number of American programs. They were subtitled so everybody could watch them easily. There was the usual mass appeal of American culture. But I think jazz was unique, it was a particular period of time, but in the '60s jazz had a particular cache throughout Europe.

Q: Jazz, I talked to someone who was doing cultural work in the Soviet Union later on.

The man who broadcast the Voice of America, the jazz show. You know, stand up crowds everywhere.

BARKLEY: I remember Ray Charles came over while I was there. Oh my gosh, they really went crazy. And of course he is just a marvelous performer, and always made you feel good. You know American culture is often really cutting edge generally speaking I find personally, and a lot of people have a hard time making the adjustments to the new trends. Europeans are much more excited by this. Another thing, many of them, and certainly in this case in Finland, America is still the new country, the one who is making inroads. It is true we didn't have any Shakespeare or Schiller or Goethe, but in terms of modern culture, that is where things were happening. They admitted that, and there was great appeal to them.

Q: Well then in '65, whither?

BARKLEY: Well in '65, in those days the general expectation was that a junior officer would spend two three year tours in two different geographical areas followed by one tour of either two years or more in the Department. So they asked me what geographical areas I would be interested in, and I said, "Latin America." Primarily because I wanted to learn Spanish. Before I departed I was told that I would be assigned to Mexico City in the visa section. I knew precisely what that meant. Although it wasn't the kind of work that particularly appealed to me, I thought it was something you had to go through as a junior officer. I accepted that and said on the other hand I will be in one of the great capitals of the world, so I was looking forward to that. When I left Finland in March of that year I was placed in Spanish training after home leave with the expectation that I would indeed go to Mexico City. I was about I guess maybe a couple of weeks into my language training when I was called by personnel and told that my assignment had been changed, and that I would be going to the Dominican Republic. Well at that time there was a lot of activity in the Dominican Republic. In the spring of that year there were signs that the governing authority would be similar to that in Cuba. There was a certain anxiety that revolution indeed had been exported to the Dominican Republic by the Cubans. I don't think that proved to be historically true but there was certainly some glee in Cuba and other quarters on hearing that. Lyndon Johnson of course said, "That won't happen on my watch." So he sent an OAS force of Americans, joined by some Brazilians and Hondurans to make sure that did not happen. Then he brought in Ellsworth Bunker as his negotiator who turns out successful in settling things down and preparing elections. So it was a revolution there. I remember the man who called me. I don't remember his name, but I remember the conversation. He said, "Well we have changed your assignment; you are going to the Dominican Republic." I said, "Well why did you do that?" He said, "Well you are single, and in Spanish training, and you have got some Spanish. We want a single person down there because it is a dangerous area." I said, "Well, what's being single got to do with it?" He said, "Well if anything happens to you, you know. We don't have to pay so much." Rather direct for this kind of a conversation. I said, "Well, what options do I have?" He said, "Well you can resign." I mean as you can see the man's personnel skills probably lacked something. On the other hand he was telling it as he saw

it. Anyway I looked at it very carefully and decided maybe I will do that, then. So as a result in July of that year, I arrived in a U.S. consulate in the up country of the Dominican Republic in a town called Santiago de los Caballeros. It was a key posting because the northern part of the country had not joined the revolutionaries in the south, and was still under control of the military and pro government forces at that time, although the government had basically fled. There was a certain amount of chaos. So I ended up of course, on the visa line there primarily, but I did other things, too. It was an extraordinarily small consulate. There was a consul. You don't need a consul general, a consul who was, I think, one grade above me. Then there was myself, and then an FSR, a reserve officer who was at that time there on the visa line, and that was it. Then there was a station, a small station of two or three people which was augmented from time to time depending on what the activities were.

Q: I wonder if you could at this point describe the situation, what had led up to where the Dominican republic was at that point.

BARKLEY: About, I don't know how many years previously, I think maybe four or five, Trujillo who had been the long time dictator of the Dominican Republic was assassinated. A triumvirate took over from him. They were many of the people who actually had participated in the assassination. In about April of that year, there had been some change in the government structure. A new president came in by the name of Donnie Cabral. This was way before my time and my understanding of the situation. Then a police officer by the name of Francisco Commanjo Dejo who was a member of the police force led a revolutionary movement against Donnie Cabral. Cabral was American educated at Harvard, I believe. He was somebody that Americans understood. So he made the appeal that we come in and rescue him from impending chaos. Once again, I am sure, he played on traditional fears that this would be a repeat of Cuba. He was persuasive enough to American authorities that President Lyndon Johnson ordered an intervention force. It was organized under the Organization of American States, but basically it was done by the United States. Ellsworth Bunker headed the OAS team. Cabral resigned and then they came up with a provisional president by the name of Hector Garcia Godoy. He was another sophisticated diplomat, and he did a good job, and together with the Americans he organized elections. One of the leaders of the revolution party to the election was a fellow by the name of Juan Bosch. Bosch actually, at one time, had been a president after Trujillo, and was freely elected. But he was an ineffective governor, and was subsequently turned out by a coup d'état. There was a lot of political turmoil before that. In any event, he reappeared and ran for office against an old Trujillioista, a man whose hands weren't quite clean, a man by the name of Joachim Balaguer. So in the autumn of that year when I was there, they had their election. Balaguer won the election and that began the process of stabilization.

Q: You arrived where in this process?

BARKLEY: I arrived in July before the elections. I was picked up at the airport in Santo Domingo immediately by this young vice consul who was eager to have somebody help

him, and taken up to Santiago which was about 105 or 110 miles from the capital.

Q: But in the political process, were American troops gone by this point?

BARKLEY: No, they were still there. Indeed there were still problems up in the north where the military was, they were visited by certain elements of the revolutionary groups who were told they could have free movement as long as they didn't seize power or export revolution. But it wasn't quite that simple. Of course there were great sympathizers throughout the island for the revolution. The sympathizers were those of course who for the longest times had said that now that Trujillo was gone, it was time for someone interested in the welfare of the masses. Many people believed that some sort of revolutionary movement was required to set them on a road to a more equitable society. Of course, some of those groups were exploited. Some were well meaning which is always the case in a revolutionary atmosphere.

Q: Where did this city fit into this thing? Was it an agricultural city or…

BARKLEY: It is the capital of an area called the Cibao which was the northern part of the Dominican Republic. It was agriculturally the wealthiest part of the country. It had always had been an area which produced cattle, tobacco, and something the Dominicans called Fruitas minores, fruits and vegetables, etc. It was a very rich area. There was a lot of cattle. I think it actually provided most of the economic muscle for the country. Of course at the same time a lot of demographic changes were taking place. There was urbanization at a relatively rapid rate, and a large and rapidly growing population. There were enough things to keep things stirred. But it was the one area that was tranquil, except for one memorable occasion where we had a fire fight between some revolutionaries and the local military. Which in fact was a rather horrendous affair because we were right in the middle of it. That case actually was a serious problem for us, because as it turns out our consul was in the hotel and had been seized by the revolutionaries. The phones, happily, were working and he made a call for help. We tried to get American forces up to interpose. Eventually they came, but it took a long time. During that time, we were trying to negotiate between the two parties without any particular muscle except for the claim to talk for the American government. We finally got him out. There was actually a humorous side to the affair, for in the hotel at the same time that the firefight took place were a number of American carnival workers. There were coochie girls and the fat lady and all of those traditional members of a carnival troupe. It was some carnival that worked out of Puerto Rico throughout the Caribbean area. So we had to provide citizen services, first to extract them from the area and then get them out to the airport and make arrangements for an airplane to pick them up, etc. The difficult part was getting them out alive. They were scared to death. We finally were able to do that, for both sides wanted non combatants out of the hotel so they could go after it. When we got them out, the biggest car we had to move them in belonged to the other vice consul. It was an old Pontiac. In that area there were a lot of what the Dominicans called "sleeping soldiers," or speed bumps. They were there to slow down traffic, but also had military purposes to make sure that people didn't rush through the city brandishing guns. So every time we got

to one of those, we all got out of the car because the fat lady was so heavy we couldn't get over the speed bumps. It made it quite a long trip, but was one of those humorous foreign service experiences that made life interesting.

Q: Was there a problem getting a seat on the plane?

BARKLEY: No, we had a large plane brought in, a military plane.

Q: How did you find sort of life there? I mean were you sort of in a state of siege or?

BARKLEY: Well not particularly except for that one incident which lasted a couple of days, it was relatively tranquil. The military and the police there were quite strong, and they could be brutal on occasion. Our consulate was a little out of town. There was really not very much to do. There were two restaurants in town, a Lebanese restaurant and a Chinese restaurant. For bachelors, and there were a couple of us there, that is where we tended to go. There was a sort of commissary facility attached in Santo Domingo but that was a long ways away. We tended to buy things on the market and eat the local produce, and there were sufficient foodstuffs. It wasn't a problem, but there was not much to do during leisure time, so we organized our own. Played a lot of volleyball, and did a lot of things like that. Poker parties, all of those things. Of course it was interesting to me as soon as I landed the consul looked at me and said, "Well, we are delighted to have you here, but you are not at all what we asked for." I said, "Oh, what did you ask for?" He said, "because there is not much to do here, we asked for a family, and it is a safe area up here in the north. We wanted somebody with a wife and maybe small children because he would be bored." I said, "Well you certainly never got that message through to personnel, or if it did come thought they disregarded it immediately because they told me the reason they wanted me is because I was not married."

Q: Well I know going back to '48 when Israel became independent and all, and our consulate general in Jerusalem they stripped it of all the married men and put in bachelors. I mean this is sort of the routine.

BARKLEY: Well it certainly was at that time.

Q: I don't think they could get away with it these days.

BARKLEY: There were a lot of things the department wasn't sensitive to then that they are sensitive to now. Of course the female officers when I came in, if they wanted to get married, they had to resign, which is of course, shocking by today's standards, but it was accepted then. Also an American officer who wanted to marry a non American, he had to submit his resignation which would be accepted depending on whether the woman passed the clearance process. In our class we had no minorities. We had one Cuban American, but he was so Americanized that you wouldn't know it. But there were no minorities represented whatsoever. So it was in some respects an elitist, not representative group that we drew from.

Q: How about the social life of a bachelor with the Dominicans?

BARKLEY: Well, social life for the Dominicans evolved around dancing. They had all these traditional dances particularly the meringue. The problem was that a bachelor could not go out with a decent girl unless she was chaperoned, so that aspect of it was extraordinarily difficult. Occasionally you could work that out. Two girls would go out with two guys with one chaperone, you know. But it was closely watched. That was just part of the expectation and standard of that time in Dominican life. I went to a number of these dances. There were a lot of actually private parties. There were a number of people who had associations with the United States one way or another. So we tied in with a very nice group. It was not an easy life for a bachelor.

Q: Was there any relationship that you would pick up to Haiti? I mean was this the other side of the moon or…

BARKLEY: Well, that was another foreign service experience. Most of the Dominicans for some reason had an incredible fear of the Haitians. I think that goes back to the time of the Haitian war for independence. The Haitians seized the entire island, and of course rape and plunder were common, a very brutal period of time. It drove some people back to Spain and others into the mountains. After the restoration 25 years after that, the Dominicans continued to maintain a fear of the Haitians. Now, of course, a lot of them had Haitian blood as a result of the occupation. But there was a border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. You could go up to an area called Dajabone, on the Massacre River, where actually there had been a massacre of Haitians during the Trujillo period of time. All of a sudden the road ended and there was the forest primeval in front of you. The military was always there, saying, "You can't see them but they are there looking at you." There was a sort of mystical fear. So I decided of course, this is a part of the country I would at least have to look at. I was either stupid or an intrepid bachelor in those days, so I made arrangements to go to Haiti. I caught a plane in Santo Domingo. This was after the country had settled down quite a bit. Port au Prince was an interim stop on the way to Miami. I recall very much getting off at Papa Doc Duvalier's airport. I was the only person to get off the airplane. That should have told me something. I had made arrangements to stay in a little hotel in Port au Prince. I was told that when you get to the airport, you should get a taxi, and hire that taxi for the period of time that you are there. The reason you must do this is that the taxis are all run by the Ton-Ton Macoot, which were Duvalier's thugs. They had the taxi concession. I'll never ever forget what happened. I came out of the airport with my bags. It wasn't hard to find them because they were the only ones that came off the plane. There was a cab in front, and it was a 1954 Chevrolet Del Ray coupe, red on the bottom, white on the top. The reason I recall that so well is because it was identical to the first car I ever owned. A gentleman got out. He was an incredible physical specimen. He just had muscles on muscles. He flashed this million dollar smile and said, "Cab Sir?" He spoke sort of this rough English but certainly serviceable. I said, "Yes, and not only that, could you stay with me for three days? I would like to hire you for three days." He was very pleased. So we got in the cab and he

looked around and said, “What is your name?” I told him. He said, “My name is Racine Wisconsin.” I said, “Surely your name is not Racine Wisconsin.” He said, “Well it didn’t used to be, but none of the tourists could pronounce my name, so I changed it to Wisconsin.” So Racine Wisconsin took care of me for three days, and I want to tell you he was a great comfort during a particularly wild kind of safari. There were other aspects to it, but once again this has nothing to do with my career.

Q: No, but it is interesting to capture the time. What was Haiti like, Port au Prince and all?

BARKLEY: Of course Papa Doc had it in an iron grip. There is no question. I turned up at the hotel, and there was only one other American there. I’ll never forget that. He had never been abroad before. He was in shipping and his task was to come in and inspect the bottoms of an American ship that had come in, had discharged its cargo and was picking up another cargo. So the hulls had to be very carefully scrubbed and washed off to make sure there was no contamination. That was his task. He was scared to death. So he said, “Do you mind if we eat together?” I didn’t mind; there was only the two of us. So next day I went out with Racine Wisconsin on to my tourist rounds. I came back that evening. The man was there; he was absolutely shaken. He said, “I have got to get out of here.” I said, “What happened?” He said, “I was down quayside and we were unloading the cargo of sunflower oil through these rubber hoses. There was a leak in one, and a homeless person who was leaning on the quay saw the leak and put his finger down to see if it was edible and decided it was and started to lick up the sunflower oil that was coming out of this little leak. The guard on the quay told him to stop. The man reached down to do it again and the guard shot him dead on the spot.” You could imagine what a horrendous experience it was. He came back and was absolutely terrified of course, but it seemed to be symbolic that those people who were in power wielded their power and authority in an absolutely ruthless manner. Of course, the city itself was very run down.

Q: Did you go by the embassy?

BARKLEY: I didn’t that time. On another trip subsequently I went to the embassy, but I didn’t that time.

Q: The visa business, I imagine you had an awful lot to do with maids trying to get to the United States.

BARKLEY: Oh everybody tried to get to the United States In the first place the problem was the that the first stop to the United States from the Dominican Republic is Puerto Rico. That was at that time a $45.00 flight round trip. Of course the idea was once you got into Puerto Rico you could go on to the United States. Well during Trujillo’s time, most Dominicans didn’t have travel documents. Of course after he left they opened up and almost everybody got a passport, and were determined to travel. Every Dominican had a passport. They all could afford to scrape together $45.00 somehow. Of course we found out after years that most intended to stay in the States. At the beginning there was a

tendency to be lenient because people had not been out of the country for a long time. We found out that people who were going over for a weekend or 15 days ended up being there years and years. It became a standard thing because it was almost impossible to get a permanent resident visa, so people went as tourists and just stayed. So we had a constant stream of visa applicants, 95% of which were not valid. It was a very difficult task because basically you were the naysayer to all these people, and realizing that all these people who want out, want out because things were impossible for them there. The second thing is that most of the Dominicans that went to the United States did not get into trouble. I mean they were hard working people, and they were decent, but they were in contravention of American visa law. So our work was hard, and how do you determine who is a legitimate and a valid applicant and who is not. At t he same time there was an awful lot of corruption and people kept trying to buy visas, etc. It was quite an experience.

Q: Did you have a lot of Congressional calls or letters saying my good friends want to have this young Dominican come and visit them?

BARKLEY: No, not very much. It was quite clear during the time before I was there that visa fraud was rampant so there was a reluctance to do that. The other thing is that few Dominicans seemed to have had particular contacts in the United States except with other Dominicans. Of course to get congressional attention on that was very difficult. There were other aspects toward our policies in this area. One is that after the election took place, President Johnson ordered a huge aid program to go into the Dominican Republic. So there was an enormous influx of American aid operatives in that area. The start of it was somewhat chaotic as you would imagine. Much of it was very depressing I think. I found it to be so anyway. It is difficult to start programs and so many AID officials tried to take over existing programs so they could show immediate success. Then we had quite a sizable, and extraordinarily capable, Peace Corps group there. So there were two groups of Americans that were involved with development programs.

Q: How were relations with the Dominicans from your perspective?

BARKLEY: Well, Dominicans are delightful people; the vast majority are delightful people, mostly dirt poor, hard working, good citizens basically. Like every country they have at least their share of felons, but actually most were nice people. During certain stages of the revolutionary activities, of course, things were tense in some areas. That died down very quickly. The idea seemed absurd that you would ever be harmed moving around the Dominican Republic. I never had a guard, never even thought of it. Every now and then somebody would yell Maldito Yankee, or damn Yankee, or something like that, but it was very rare. I found people really quite congenial.

Q: Well you were there what, '65 to '67?

BARKLEY: Yes.

Q: Then what?

BARKLEY: Well then I got my next assignment which I always considered somewhat of a payoff for the two years in the Dominican Republic. They sent me to Columbia University to study a year of Atlantic Affairs. So I began at Columbia University in September of 1967.

Q: Atlantic Affairs meant what?

BARKLEY: Well basically the first murmurings of the European Union, that was then the European Community, was going on at that time. The idea was to understand where that movement was going, and particularly what impact it had in NATO and all of the international organizations that linked us into the transatlantic dialogue. There was a very good professor here by the name of Philip Mosley. He was an expert in Soviet affairs but also was quite good actually in almost anything to do with western affairs. I took the traditional program that had to do with modern political science in western Europe.

Q: Was there the feeling, this was '67-'68, that a new Europe was emerging? I mean we are talking about western Europe of course.

BARKLEY: Well, the Schumann plan was pretty active. It was the coal and steel community had been put together pretty effectively. At that time of course we were basically talking about the Benelux countries, France, Germany, and Italy. But it was the first murmurings of what was going on. Of course in political terms NATO was in fact the linchpin of transatlantic dialogue at that time. It was a very interesting period, and of course, we know now that those first beginnings were the building blocks for a much closer economic and political union.

Q: How about you were there I guess May and June of '68.

BARKLEY: Yes,

Q: This was hot stuff, particularly in France, but elsewhere too. I mean…

BARKLEY: Well you know about the student riots in Columbia.

Q: We are talking about May June of '68.

BARKLEY: Actually a little bit earlier than that I believe. There were two student groups that were active. One was SDS.

Q: Students for a Democratic Society.

BARKLEY: Yes. The other one was an African American group. I don't remember what it was called. They were both actually quite aggressive, SDS actually seizing different

buildings and talking over the university. The African American group had a very clear agenda in what they were trying to achieve. They had actually worked out some community support. There was really quite an impressive group of young men with them, and they achieved their goals in negotiations with the university pretty effectively. But the anti war groups, Mark Rudd and company, were much more chaotic. They seized the university, and of course this was the time of quasi hippie culture, but a much more aggressive kind of culture than the earlier hippie movement. They seized actually the university President's office, and proceeded of course to write obscenities on the wall and scream four letter words. It was theoretically an anti war movement, but it was much more than that. It was also an anti social movement and a whole variety of things. The university initially retreated and ceded the campus to the radicals. The New York police then surrounded the campus, but they were not authorized to use any force or anything like that. It was an interesting thing to observe for a foreign service officer because quite clearly there was a lot of social interaction, the police representing upwardly mobile lower middle class Americans, on one hand and the privileged students on the other. When the students found out that the police were being restrained, they started to provoke the police. Well after a couple of days of this, the university authorities decided that they had to clear them out. And of course, the police responded with some vigor because they had been provoked this entire time. It is a little bit like that cartoon where the dog is on the leash and the cat is thumbing his nose at him and all of a sudden the leash is cut. There were a lot of bumped heads. The police came down pretty hard, and some innocent students got caught up in it, as well. A lot of people didn't particularly support the SDS but at the same time didn't like the idea of the police truncheons coming down on people's heads. Anyway they finally re secured the campus. That of course it was fascinating to watch what was going on, because a lot of the activists were due to graduate. They had been expelled, so among their demands came a demand for amnesty of course. I recall that particularly well because of how offended the French radicals were, Danny the Red Conbedit and all of these guys would say you have to pay the price if you are active. Here were the Americans or large segments of them trying to get amnesty so they could graduate. It was a unique American experience.

Q: Did they get amnesty?

BARKLEY: I don't think they did.

Q: You know some of the universities didn't deal well with this.

BARKLEY: I thought Columbia dealt horribly with it. I mean I remember talking to a number of professors about it. By the way I don't know if you remember the name Willis Armstrong. Willis Armstrong was at Columbia as Dean for International Studies.

Q: He has been interviewed. I have interviewed his wife too., his widow, yeah.

BARKLEY: I am sure he had some interesting insights. But I used to tell the professors, you are so expert at telling the American government what they must do, now you are

faced with some relatively minor activity, and you find that you can't do anything. Of course they said, "Look, we are theoreticians. We don't know the first thing about actually running anything." That was interesting. But by and large, they didn't have a program, and they didn't do it well, and the university was basically run sort of in a paternal manner. It was obviously not sufficient. They had never brought the students in. For example they never tapped into the vast majority of students who just wanted to go to class and get degrees. If they had done that, I mean if they had organized, say, some referendum, saying we could either close for the year or we can continue, but if we continue this has got to stop. But they never did that. In some respects of course, I think the radical student groups began to realize that there were no countervailing forces that the university could exploit. It never worked that way.

Q: Well for a foreign service officer I am sure this left a lasting impression on the disruptive ability of a radicalized movement and the inability of something like a university to deal with it.

BARKLEY: Well in my view it proved that the professorial class might not live necessarily in ivory towers, but they are not the people you want in charge of any kind of governance. I mean the kinds of things professors do have very little to do with life other than that of trying to open minds. So I guess from the standpoint of a foreign service officer who is supposed to be constantly subjected to practical matters and how to handle those things, that this idealized campus life left something to be desired.

Q: You are taking Atlantic relations, what about were you able in your classes to take a look at what was happening in France and all?

BARKLEY: Well most of the courses I took were on international organization. They were not particularly focused on one country or another. No I can't say we spent any time particularly on that. Of course that had an impact as it always has had on NATO, what the individual countries particularly what France does. But not that had not become a major part of this course.

Q: Well then after this, it sounds like this Columbia thing was getting you out of the ARA circuit where you might have found yourself…

BARKLEY: Well that was my intention. You know I sort of had ambivalent feelings about that. I really enjoyed my period of time in the Dominican Republic, despite all the problems, and I really did believe that Latin America had been given short shrift in American foreign policy. I continued to believe that to this day. It had something to do with the fact that in those days as you recall, people became experts in one area. The Latin American experts tended to become rather myopic in their view of things. Maybe it is easy to say, but people often got into that area and never left.

Q: Well there are so many countries that you could spend a full career in that. The outside world other than Latin America doesn't have a hell of an impact on Latin

America, but if you are in Europe you are pretty well aware of what was going on, well the Soviet Union being an extension, but also the middle east and other places. And Africa too, but Latin America sort of stands in a certain amount of isolation.

BARKLEY: I think that is right. And then the officers only had to learn two languages, and they were very closely linked, Spanish and Portuguese. But the differences in Latin America from Argentina up through the Caribbean are enormous, just enormous. But anyway you are right. I wanted to get back into Europe.

Q: So after Columbia, whither?

BARKLEY: I was assigned actually to NATO affairs, so the NATO desk which was called RPM at that time, Regional Political and Military Affairs. It was one of the prime desks in European affairs. I came in, and I was not in the political division, but I was in another section of RPM with responsibility for civil defense and things like that. NATO was always struggling to maintain not only its reliability and attraction as a defense alliance, but always looking for additional tasks that would buttress the nations participation in the organization per se. I was involved in civil emergency planning at that time. I remember how bizarre I found it because it was something I didn't even know that NATO was engaged in. But of course, it turned out to be extremely important. What it meant is that any military activity had to be augmented by the enormous strength of the civilian sector. For example if you were moving troops at a time of crisis, you would want to get the merchant marines of these different countries to give assistance, the airlines to be of assistance, to get the railroads to be of assistance. So there were all of these boards and committees under the civil emergency planning committee that were designed actually to buttress any kind of military activity that might arise. Of course it was extraordinarily important but it was not along the traditional lines of political activities that I was particularly interested in.

Q: You were doing this from '68 to '70 about?

BARKLEY: No, actually I did it from '68 to '69. Then came an opening in German affairs. They found out that I had German, and a German background and asked if I would be interested in taking over the political military office in German affairs. That fit in nicely with NATO, and it got me out of civil emergency planning which I thought was not really a direct linkage to where I wanted to go. I ended up in German affairs.

Q: Well on that civil emergency planning, what was your impression? I mean I would have thought that you would be up against organizations that really didn't want to get involved. You know if you are running a railroad it is all very nice, but…

BARKLEY: Well it is interesting. From the American side which of course, is the side we had to coordinate, we had a lot of activities with the Department of Commerce and different Defense groupings such as the maritime affairs and things like that. There was always great curiosity and interest in having an international link. People like the idea of

international affairs. So they would go out there and sometimes with some bureaucratic enthusiasm. Actually to be perfectly honest, I saw a side of American bureaucracy that was quite attractive. There were some very good people engaged, people I would normally wouldn't see. Many, of course, were in the Pentagon, but in other agencies as well. They worked hard. From my perspective it was more interesting to see how the bureaucrats within NATO handled this. For many of them these jobs became sinecures. Of course if you had been engaged particularly with the French and others and watched their bureaucrats move, you had no idea what rigidity is. But these guys became little Napoleons in their own right with enormous power and authority. Many times they would just position themselves so all they had to do was r4eject what anybody else wanted to do. Like bureaucrats everywhere there was an attempt to make yourself extraordinarily important, if you can. So I got a certain taste of European bureaucracy which I found not nearly as forthcoming as American bureaucracy which is also an interesting commentary.

Q: I think there really is a difference in attitude for the most part with obvious exceptions. You get to a certain point in American bureaucracy, you are judging what you have accomplished. Your bosses are always found responsive to public criticism. I don't think in the European context this is…

BARKLEY: Well some are obviously more efficient than others, but the legendary "petit functionaire" can drive you nuts. Most Europeans have those. For one thing bureaucracy has become much more an integral part of European life than it ever did in the United States. People have greater authority for bureaucratic functions in Europe than usually in the United States as you pointed out. Congress and political appointees, who feed in and out of the system, sort of keep you honest.

Q: Well I know as a consular officer I was very much aware of Congressional oversight. I mean I had vast powers of no you can't do this and all that. I realize that yeah that is all very nice except if I get a Congressman on my neck or the ambassador or the State Department get on your back, you try to avoid that because you knew that you were responsible. I don't think the European bureaucrat has that. Their system does not, tier representatives in parliament or whatever you call it, assembly, don't have that same power.

BARKLEY: Well I am sure I digress here a moment but any guy who has been exposed to American consular service particularly protection and welfare is aware that the United States extends to our citizens privileges far beyond those of any other nation on earth. I remember talking particularly to Germans and Italians, who we would have to often take care of because their people had no representation. They were astonished at the things we would do for our people. But I think once again it reflects the kinds of pressures that are exerted in our political system.

Q: I remember when I came into my first job, one of my first jobs in Frankfort was protection and welfare officer. I would respond to Congressional letters and all. I asked some very savvy German ladies who worked at the consulate, "If you had a problem do

you write to your Bundestat member?" They looked at me as though I were nuts. You know, why waste a stamp.

BARKLEY: Exactly right.

Q: That is interesting. Well move over to when you were dealing with what was it now?

BARKLEY: Political military affairs in Germany.

Q: In Germany. Well this would be from '69 to…

BARKLEY: Yes, '69 to '71.

Q: What sort of piece of the action did you have?

BARKLEY: Well because we had an enormous American military presence in Germany, I had quite a bit of action. There was always something going on whether the Germans wanted particular military equipment or whether there were particular things we wanted to have from them or have them do. There was all of the things having to do with the Status of Forces Agreement. It was a very active office.

Q: Well this '69 to '71 was a particularly active one as far as our military was going through a lot of turmoil. This is during the Vietnam war and all of this. It was having its repercussions in Germany. Were you noticing that? I mean morale and discipline?

BARKLEY: Of course you know it was not my task to look at this force structure. That was made up in the Pentagon. But there was a lot of interaction where for example, when there was a draw down in American forces, at the same time there were great efforts to try to get the Germans to fill certain jobs. The Germans of course, way before that time had gone through a rearmament program. At the same time they were trying to divorce themselves from traditional militaristic traditions. But it was a sophisticated and a good force. Of course they also were modernizing. I remember one of the things that was going on at that time was a major competition on the M-1 tank, where the Germans had developed a 120 mm cannon for the tank. In all of the different tests that we had the Germans proceeded to win, and yet American generals were reluctant to put a German gun on the tanks. It got into a sort of a push comes to shove with the Germans threatening to back off from their commitment to buy AWACS unless we honored our commitments on the tank gun. They also were developing at that stage their first fighter aircraft. We had been selling them American aircraft for the longest period of time. So there were a lot of things that were going on, and of course probably from out standpoint the most important thing was maintaining the strategic alliance. Of course the Soviets were constantly challenging us.

Q: How did you find, was the State Department the PM bureau, you must have worked very closely with the Pentagon.

BARKLEY: Well we had very good contacts in the Pentagon, and of course with RPM. Our PM bureau was actually the responsible office that at State. But when you got into particular German things, like burden sharing, was always one of the major problems that we would have. We spent a lot of time on that. There was always an attempt to get the Germans to do more, to pay more and all of those things. It was quite an active office. But at that time the key thing that was going on in German affairs was the election of Willy Brandt and his effort to institute a policy of détente and an eastern policy of trying to reduce tensions with the Soviet Union.

Q: This was the Ostpolitik.

BARKLEY: The *Ostpolitik*. They were already beginning the four power negotiations on Berlin in 1969-'70. That was the major preoccupation of the Germans and indeed of the entire German desk. There was a spin off on all of these things because of course we knew that American military power underpinned almost everything that was negotiable.

Q: Well did you get any flavor? I realize you were imbedded in the middle ranks of this thing, but did you gat any feel for how we felt about the Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt and all of that? Was there a certain amount of nervousness that this might, I mean there has always been the concern that in order to unite Germany, East and West Germany, Germany might become neutral which would take the guts out of NATO.

BARKLEY: Well there was always the fear that Germany would go it alone. Of course the whole Soviet effort was indeed to detach Germany from NATO. The Social Democrats always had more of a sympathy for the east than the CDU did, particularly under Adenauer, who wanted to anchor West Germany even further into the western alliance. So when Willy Brandt became chancellor, there was concern as to where he would go with all of these things. There had always been a deeper level, I think, of emotional commitment between Social Democracy and Communism than many people would like to admit. Although there was great warfare among the two and great hostility among the two, at the same time, they were working with similar views. I mean it was a long time before the Social Democratic Party declared itself a non-Marxist party. So Willy Brandt who came out of that entire era, always had some interest in trying to engage in the east. I think the reason that there was not as much anxiety over this was that the United States was at that time going through its own policy of détente with the Soviets. Of course, U.S. policy had much broader implication because Nixon was bogged down trying to wiggle out of over engagement in Vietnam. He was looking for ways to circumvent that. So although there was greater anxiety in certain German areas, I know a couple of German diplomats who resigned out of protest of the new direction of eastern affairs. But the key that would that eastern policy was the Berlin agreements. Of course in Berlin there could be no agreement without the four powers. The Germans had nothing to do with Berlin. It was still actually an occupied area. So we engaged in the Berlin agreements which took 90% of the time of the German bureau while I was there. It was a fascinating time.

Q: Did you have any piece of the Berlin thing?

BARKLEY: Well I didn't have very much at that time. In German Affairs, there was a Berlin section that did nothing but work on Berlin. There was an awful lot of technical agreements governing our presence there.

Q: What was the Berlin agreement?

BARKLEY: Well the Berlin agreement basically increased the legitimate flow of activities between West Berlin and the West. The problems in Berlin always had been is that there is no agreements in the Potsdam accords as to for example free access because American and British and French sections of Berlin, which were totally within the borders of the German Democratic Republic. That is what led to the Russians of course, trying to isolate the West there. The blockade of Berlin by the Soviets and the subsequent airlift operation was one of the first Soviet challenges to the Truman administration. And of course in that process although the Soviets showed they had an enormous amount of control over the future of Berlin. They took such a political black eye that over time they retreated and guaranteed a certain amount of Western access. But that access was never anchored in any kinds of agreements. The intention was to anchor American rights and responsibilities in Berlin and for Germany as a whole, in an agreement that would guarantee that we would have continued access and freer movement between the two. Part and parcel of that was is that there would be then recognition on the part of the western powers of East Germany. The west Germans for the longest time tried to isolate East Germany and found out that it didn't work, so Willy Brandt tried to change that. He created the idea of two German states, one German nation. That would mean that they would try to regularize the status of East Germany, and we agreed to do that. As a result of that whole thing, of course, sooner or later we committed to establishing a U.S. embassy in East Germany and extended diplomatic recognition to East Germany, excluding Berlin because from our standpoint the four sectors in Berlin were under the direct mandates of the four occupying powers.

Q: Well what was sort of the attitude within the German bureau about sort of recognizing East Germany. Did they feel it was a price worth paying to get a good, regularize things in Berlin?

BARKLEY: I think initially, of course whenever you have change, a dramatic change, in policy there would be some resistance to it. The people who worked on Berlin knew that our vulnerability was such that we would be subjected to constant harassment depending on whatever the Soviets wanted to do. Therefore, the wild cards in that whole thing was East Germany because of course, they claimed they were independent of the Soviets although we knew that they responded absolutely to Soviet pressure. So we wanted to get the East Germans along with the Soviets to be cooperative, on the access to West Germany. So I think many of us saw that if we could come up to an agreement with iron clad assurances that we did not lose anything. Also engagement that East Germany

probably had some benefits. Not everybody agreed to that. I was slightly skeptical myself, although I did not know much about Berlin at that time. Obviously it turned out to be an extraordinarily useful agreement.

Q: Well you know, Berlin was always such a faucet that the Soviets could turn on and off you know. It was the one place I think I always felt that this is where World War Three could start.

BARKLEY: That is true, but after the Berlin blockade it turns out there were many sides to that equation. One of them of course is that the idea of the Soviets could once again try to seize another segment of the west. It was something that you know the West would steel itself against. Of course we were engaged in an East-West propaganda war. There was hardly any better propaganda than to see how successful western sections of Berlin were functioning as compared to the poor performance at that time of the Russian sector. Wheels within wheels.

Q: We;; also there must have been a certain unease in '68 when the Soviets and their allies moved into Czechoslovakia, sort of the Brezhnev Doctrine that showed that this is not a static, the Soviets were not necessarily static. They would move.

BARKLEY: Well that is true. Of course you know the first shot across the bow there had been Hungary in '56. But nonetheless that certainly was true. Of course during that time Berlin was always the area where people sought to try to defuse things without backtracking in any way shape or form from our other things. The Soviets proved to be quite reluctant actually to get too boisterous in Berlin particularly after Stalin's death. But the Berlin agreements were negotiated over a long period of time. In that time American leadership through the entire thing was driven basically by Henry Kissinger and President Nixon, but the real hard work in this whole thing was done by Jonathan Dean who was the U.S. political counselor in Bonn. He did a remarkable job in hammering together an agreement that guaranteed western rights and responsibilities in the city. It turns out to have been a brilliant coup. No one foresaw at that time what the net result would be. But eastern accords followed an agreement between the Germans and the Poles on the border were largely successful. Indeed East-West relations settled down into a more regular routine than had previously been the case.

Q: Well also it led to the Helsinki accords. I mean you can see a direct chain there.

BARKLEY: The Helsinki accords were tied in with a lot of other broader things, the CSCE agreement. There was a lot of resistance to that. It was the idea that we are going to put human rights and the conduct of nations on the agenda, and the realization that the Russians have never honored them at all. The point was much deeper than that. In fact we were entangling Russian behavior in a series of agreements, and each time they violated them it made them look more and more like what they really were.

Q: Well I think this is probably a good place to stop. This would be 1971, where were you

off to?

BARKLEY: Then I was assigned to be the ambassador's aide in Bonn.

Q: Okay, we'll pick it up then.

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Today is June 10, 2003. We are dealing with 1971. You went to Bonn.

BARKLEY: Yes I went to Bonn as the aide to Ambassador Kenneth Rush.

Q: How long were you in Bonn?

BARKLEY: That time? One year.

Q: One year. Let's talk a bit about Kenneth Rush, his background and how he seemed to operate in Germany from your perspective.

BARKLEY: Well this was of course the Nixon administration. Kenneth Rush had been, I understand, a professor of Law at Duke University when President Nixon was there. That is when they apparently met. Subsequently Rush was the President of Union Carbide. He had had no foreign policy experience but obviously a lot of business experience. He landed in Germany I think in 1969. He had been there a year and a half by the time I arrived. My predecessor was John Kornblum.

Q: How did Ambassador Rush use you?

BARKLEY: Because he was not a career officer, he knew very little about the service. I did all of his programming. I did all of his correspondence, all of it. Of course the major activity he was engaged in at that time was the Berlin negotiations, the four power negotiations on the status of Berlin. He knew nothing about the issue at the beginning but he read into it very quickly. His political counselor, Jonathan Dean who was a formidable figure in the foreign service, one of the great experts in German affairs, actually lead the negotiating team. All of the background had been done by the political section. When it came time for a plenary session, the ambassador sat in. I did not sit in on the talks per se. I had to make sure that all of the talking points and everything else he received going into the sessions were clear and understandable. I guess I would say I also somewhat straddled the activities of the political section and the Ambassador's office. And of course, I was his note taker for all of his personal meetings beyond the scope of the four power negotiations themselves.

Q: When you arrived there in '71, how were German-American relations?

BARKLEY: Well this was the time, of course, that the Willy Brandt government come

into effect. U.S. relations towards Willy Brandt, and the Social Democrats generally had been somewhat skeptical regarding their foreign policy intentions. But it turned out that actually this was at the same time there was somewhat of a thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations, a certain effort to reach out to the Soviets and try to negotiate something. Of course it all tied in with Vietnam. The Brandt government came up with a rather new and novel idea which was entirely different than previous West German positions. It was basically a rapprochement with central Europe. The concept was not only to negotiate an improved relationship within Berlin, but also to work out what they called a general eastern policy whereby they would also recognize for the first time the existence of East Germany within the concept of two states-one nation. They also wanted to solidify the boundaries between Poland and Germany which has always been a problem because there are revanchist groups in the FRG that wanted to reclaim German lands far into Poland and of course into East Prussia. So it was a time actually of a great deal of movement. It turns out that German policy and American policy met quite tidily together at that time. It was one of those fortuitous moments I think where things could be done that couldn't have been done probably a year or two years previously.

Q: Well while you were at the embassy, did you pick up any concern that Brandt's aussenpolitik
and our trying to open up détente and all of this was maybe going to endanger our position in Germany and all?

BARKLEY: Oh of course. One of the major concerns all along is Germany might be induced to have a go it alone policy. The elements in the Social Democratic Party that had always been there, certain intellectual elements, indeed promoted the idea of a neutral Germany, which of course was a nightmare for NATO. Western policy was based on keeping West Germany anchored in the West. Willy Brandt didn't have that same devotion to the anchor to the west as we did although Adenauer certainly he was anti communist and had a long history and career in that front. But there was always somehow a feeling in certain circles in the west that Social Democracy was full of fuzzy thinkers, and that indeed they never fully understood what the Russians were about.

Q: I was wondering whether you were hearing within the political section and elsewhere muttering within the ranks.

BARKLEY: Oh absolutely. Well it was not only muttering within the ranks, but also muttering within the ranks of the German government too. A number of people, out of protest for the eastern policy, resigned from the German foreign service. There was, I think, a sense of skepticism, because people couldn't see how we could improve our relationship within Berlin and within Germany as a whole by doing this. In fact it turns out that we could. But that had much more to do with the inherent weaknesses in the socialist camp than probably any furtive design.

Q: Did you get up to Berlin?

BARKLEY: Oh constantly. I traveled with the ambassador, and of course, all the negotiations took place in Berlin. And because of the unique status of Berlin being under four power rights and responsibilities, we always had to fly up with military aircraft. We could have gone I suppose with civilian aircraft but we didn't. So there were always logistical problems. That was part of my responsibility to make sure things went of smoothly.

Q: How about the train. Did the ambassador still use that, his train.

BARKLEY: Yes, the train was still there. The ambassador tended not to use it. For one thing it was not an overnight ride. The minister in Berlin occasionally used it, but it was basically the Berlin Commandant's train. The commandant, within the status of Berlin is something I think that is now increasingly difficult for people to understand. But the fact that after WWII Germany was divided as you know into four military occupation zones with the British, the French, and the Americans in the west and the Russians in the east. That was replicated in Berlin under the general belief that anybody who controlled Berlin would control all of Germany. And of course Berlin was in the center of the Russian zone, before it became East Germany. They could foreclose our operations which they tried to do in 1948 during the time of the Berlin Airlift.

Q: Did you find yourself up against in Berlin, there were people in the foreign service who do nothing but deal with Berlin. I mean there was almost like a religious right of how you dealt with things including how far a tailgate could be let down. You know all sorts of things, and the feeling was that if you gave away anything, the Soviets wee nibbling away all the time. I mean you must not have been looked upon with great pleasure.

BARKLEY: Well at that time as you may recall Stuart, there was a group known as the old German hands. They were people who had multiple tours in Germany, who understood the unique complexity of the place with East and West Germany and Berlin. At the time (1970-'71) that I entered German affairs, it was the heyday of the old German hands. It turns out that even during this negotiation, they were all in place, names like Jonathan Dean and David Klein and Jim Sutherland and Martin Hillenbrand and Russell Fessenden and all these people who had spent their entire careers defining the quality and limits of our relationship with Germany. On the other hand there were in Russia, the old Russian hands who did the same thing. And of course there was a constant sort of engagement of those two groups in trying to understand what was really going on. The only thing is I would say is both of them had their feet planted firmly on the ground as to Russian intentions. Nonetheless, when you started to tinker with previous arrangements that had been there, even if it led to an improvement, which in fact it did, there is always some fear that we would be taken for a ride.

Q: Did you get any feel for the Soviet negotiations during this time?

BARKLEY: Oh yes. The Soviet negotiator whose name was Abrasimov, was a rather

randy but very sly figure. He obviously was closely tied in with the politburo and the ruling elite. They knew precisely what they were doing. And of course like in most negotiations of this sort, the Russians would usually just sit there and say Nyet as we tried to find different kinds of formulas to made sure that our procedures were honored and that they would be promoted in the future. Certainly the driving force of that whole negotiation was Jonathan Dean. "Jock" Dean was just a dynamo and kept at it and kept at it. The negotiations went on several years before they were finally agreed to.

Q: You were the ambassador's aide the whole time…

BARKLEY: The one year I was there. Now the ambassador departed towards the end of my tour in 1972. He was assigned or promoted I guess you could say to be the Deputy Secretary of Defense. So in the spring of 1972, after the negotiations had been almost wrapped up, and would indeed be wrapped up very quickly, he departed. He was replaced by Martin Hillenbrand. I was there through that transition, but I realized I could not be aide for one ambassador and then be aide for another. Besides, ambassador aide jobs are usually one year jobs. You don't want more than that. I had established good personal relations with David Klein in Berlin. He asked me to come to Berlin and work in the mission which I did.

Q: So you were in Berlin from '72 to '74. What was your job?

BARKLEY: I was in the eastern affairs section which was a section that basically monitored what was going on in East Germany. The section had a section head and three officers, actually four officers. Two of them were CIA, however. Three of them were real State Department officers. I was in charge of the domestic political scene in East Germany. Peter Swers was in charge of East German foreign relations. Felix Bloch who became famous later on, was in charge of economic developments in East Germany.

Q: Did you find a different atmosphere in Berlin, in the mission in Berlin than our embassy in Bonn?

BARKLEY: Oh yes, there is always somewhat of a different perspective sitting in Berlin where you think the world revolves around the status of Berlin rather than in Bonn where there were infinitely broader issues to address. It depended of course very much on who the principal officers were at that time. David Klein was a very highly regarded officer in West Berlin. He was the minister in West Berlin. The status of West Berlin was unique in all of the foreign service in that indeed we were actually stationed in an American occupation zone. The ambassador was not only responsible for West Germany but also Berlin. In that role, the commandant in Berlin was his immediate deputy, but he was a military officer. Most ambassadors insisted that all of the political decisions there be in the hands of the minister in Berlin.

Q: Well now, looking at the East German internal thing, how was it in this '72 to '74 period? What was going on there?

BARKLEY: Well, when I arrived in 1972, Erich Honecker was at that time the first secretary of the communist party and for all intents and purposes the dictator, the head of the East German government. He had replaced Walter Ulbricht. Ulbricht was a real toady of the Russians, an old line communist, as indeed was Honecker. Honecker came up through the youth movement which seemed to be one of the natural progressions forward in Soviet style politics. Honecker and his wife were of course, dedicated communists. But at the same time they were looking for position and stature that they didn't have before because they were the new comers on the block at that time. Of course there is no question that Honecker himself was intrigued by the fact that eastern policy would give him a position on the world stage that he never had before. Above all things of course, recognition by major western powers, which he had been striving for his entire life as indeed had most of the East Germans. The idea was that they were trying to create then two individual, particularly distinct, Germanys. So at that time he was particularly curious, and there was a certain opening toward the United States. Now as the officer in charge of domestic affairs in East Germany in the United States, we did not have relations with East Germany at that time. That would flow from the successful completion of the Berlin agreements. And so I was there at a time when certain segments of their government were eager to establish relations. I on the other, was prohibited of establishing direct relations, so there was sort of a coy movement with lower level contacts back and forth. Of course in East Germany everything was state controlled, but there were some units that were more like think tanks. I was also permitted to meet with people from the university etc. They made a number of people available to me. I was the first officer probably ever in Berlin to have that level of semi-official access.

Q: This is tape three, side one with Dick Barkley. Were you able to meet with German officials at a Bierstube and things like that.

BARKLEY: You mean East German officials?

Q: East German officials.

BARKLEY: Yes, actually. We worked out a different series of relations. We would actually meet in the offices of their think tanks, but most often we would go to lunch. We had to go to lunch primarily in East Berlin because many of them had difficulty going west. As I established these relations, however, I recall after about a year, I asked them to come over and have dinner at my home, in West Berlin, and I was astonished that they came. As a matter of fact, David Klein decided this was too irresistible, that he would attend too. So we sat around and we had one of those broad political conversations the Germans love to have. We had rather lengthy and rather fascinating discussions at that time. The question of course was are there any levels of independent thinking on the part of the Germans that would separate them, make them distinct from the Russians. The answer was not a hell of a lot but some. It was actually an interesting time, and some of the people I got to know very well ended up in the higher echelons of the East German government. I was able to re-warm this relationship some ten years later. They were

indeed people who were sort of on the intellectual fast track in East Germany, to the extent that there was such a group. Many of them were particularly interested in the United States. They had only seen the United States from a distance. Most of them were enormously curious. After all we were the super power of the west. Several of them went on then to become members of the East German embassy in Washington when it opened up there. So these were people outside the foreign office per-se, but obviously connected to it.

Q: Well now, just to get the time frame right. When did we recognize East Germany and set up an embassy there?

BARKLEY: 1974.

Q: Were you all on both sides getting ready for this?

BARKLEY: Oh yes. So it was a very active group preparing for the establishment of relations. The whole question really did come down to where we were going to place our embassy and what the status of that embassy would be. As we always recognized East Berlin was not an integral part of East Germany, but the Soviet sector of Berlin, there was a lot of resistance to putting the embassy in Berlin. Some people thought it should go to Potsdam. In fact the administrative capital of East Germany was East Berlin. So we bit the bullet on that. The French and the British had already moved smartly ahead of us to establish their embassies. As they say, both France and England loved Germany so much they were glad there were two of them. We were much more reluctant. One main question is what would we call our embassy? It could not be our embassy in Berlin because that would imply that Berlin was part of East Germany. So we just called it Embassy Berlin. Then came the question of finding an adequate embassy building, and I was tasked with that job. The theory was, and it was certainly one I shared (and helped formulate) is the United States as the superpower of the world, could not establish an American embassy and try to hide. We knew we couldn't compete with the Russians, who had a huge embassy in Berlin, but, we wanted something that was the next best, if you will. So we were able to finally secure a building in downtown Berlin which still actually houses the American embassy in a unified Germany. It was a building that had been built prior to the war. It was quite a lovely building on the Neustadtishe Kirch Strasse. It had until that time part of the East German labor movement called Haus Des Handwerks, which is the craft guild house. When it came time for us to get a building, they tried to give us a whole bunch of junk. I remember looking at the building and asking what was wrong with that one, and they said, "It doesn't belong to us." I recall my conversation with Volker Laetsch who was the guy in charge of the East German side of the negotiations. I said, "It all belongs to you. You are a communist country." "No, no, we are only on the way to communism," he replied. "Well," I said, "Why don't you let the United States government help you along, and you just confiscate that building and give it to us." About a week later he came back and said, "Were you serious?" Now I was somewhat of course, beyond my pay grade, but, I said, "Yes, I think we are." Sure enough they offered the building. Joan Clark came over with the experts from Washington and looked it over, and

that indeed became our chancery.

Q: What were you looking at in East Germany, were you seeing this in the '72 to '74 period, as a viable state? How were things going?

BARKLEY: Well, it had every appearance of being a viable state. It would continue to be viable in terms of our calculations at that time as long as the Soviet Union insisted it be viable. But in fact of course, they were Germans. As they say, if anybody can make a system operate, it is the Germans who will do it. Although it turns out not quite as dynamic as it appeared, compared to all of the other Easter European bloc countries, it really did quite well. It had some inherent difficulties. One is of course, the Russians not only swept everything clean, but they dismantled all of the factories in East Germany and took them back to Russia etc. So East Germany was really a very blighted zone at the end of the war. In the first stages after the war, before the wall was up, there was still a lot of movement of Germans into the west etc. With the construction of the wall, however, the options for the East Germans became very few. They could either continue to be sullen and resist, or they could be sullen and go along with the system, which is what they did. They indeed rebuilt some of the factories. Their productivity was really I think, per capita, the highest in the Soviet bloc. So it was a viable state, but I think our general view of it is where it would go depends totally on Soviet commitment to keep this "jewel" in the Soviet crown alive and well. But in fact of course, it was a great advantage to the Russians because East German efficiency and East German productivity helped the Russian system survive.

Q: What do you think? I mean you weren't really dealing with the economy. In looking at this, were we sort of over impressed by the way things were working? Because I am thinking of a later time when East Germany was absorbed into West Germany, they found, there really wasn't a hell of a lot in East Germany that could stand up to Your western standards.

BARKLEY: Well I think what we discovered later on and what we thought we knew at the time were two different things. When we established relations with East Germany, I don't think there were any illusions that this was a system that was competitive with western systems. But it was a general belief that it was doing relatively well in terms of productivity, in terms of all of the general standards that economists use to measure production or economic success. It was far and away the most successful of the Eastern Bloc. Now subsequently, 15 years later, we realized there was somewhat of a Potemkin village quality to their economy, and that they had been cooking the books etc. But at the time we established relations, the per capita income in Germany to the extent that anybody could properly measure it was almost as high as the United Kingdom. Now it turns out, of course, that those calculations were very faulty, but at that time it was generally believed that was the case. Now, as we subsequently found out, there was a lot there was less than met the eye. Let's put it that way, but there was a general belief that there was a certain dynamic there, and that of course typically the East Germans were the more vigorous practitioners of the communist system all of the other socialist members. I

remember meeting with groups at that time, when the opening took place, from Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc. who used to say to me, sotto voce, that these East Germans are weird. They really believe this stuff! I am not quite sure that was true, but they certainly appeared to.

Q: Well in your time of looking at, watching the East German government, how did you find the hand of the Soviet Union?

BARKLEY: Well, of course I wasn't in the inner-counsels. I don't know what went on, but everybody assumed that indeed the Russian embassy was the proconsul of the country. It was quite clear the Russian military force out at Karlshorst, which was a big one, had a great deal of influence on the East German army, which was quite efficient in terms of armies of that time. I think there was a general agreement on the part, of the leadership of East Germany with respect to the Soviet. They understood fully well, that not only their status but their survivability depended very much on the Russians staying forcefully on their side. So there was an agreement by most of the leadership, the communist leadership that they must kowtow, and they should continually show the Russians they were the "best boys on the block".

Q: Did you get any feel sort of on the street for Russian and German relationships?

BARKLEY: No, not on the street so much, but I did pick it up other ways. A member of the Russian KGB actually approached me and wanted to meet. Of course I was very reluctant to do that, but the station chief and others urged me to do so, so we worked out an arrangement. His name was Leonid Taranachev. He was really quite a charming fellow. We worked out an arrangement that we would meet in the American sector one month, and then the Russian sector another month for lunch. That way actually in the course of about 18 months we exhausted all of the culinary expertise of East Germany. That was a fascinating thing, because he would complain about how the Germans would treat him and his family. They went to a park, or if he went fishing, he was a great fisherman etc. people would not talk to him or would leave when they heard them speaking Russian and things like that. That was his perspective on things. Of course I credit that with the view that I didn't know what it was like. But I certainly never heard of any of the people I talked with, who were probably very cautious to make sure that I never heard of any disagreement with Soviet policy or Soviet Per-se. We got that 15 years later, but at that time you heard almost nothing.

Q: These were a controlled people. I mean self control among other things…

BARKLEY: Well one of the things we found out of course, the state security system, the Stasi were everywhere. So everybody was always looking over their shoulder. It was truly a police state; there is no question about it. The depth of that police state, we only found out when we got access to the Stasi files. The Germans have an incredible penchant for documenting all of their sins. They did this in World War Two during the Nazi period. The Stasi did the same thing.

Q: We had the Berlin documents center I remember when I was there in the 50's. They were feeding off that. I mean we knew everything about everything. Apparently the Stasi would recruit husbands and wives separately to report on each other.

BARKLEY: They certainly had a whole category of people then. The largest group was a thing called the Mitarbeiter or people who collaborated. They were people who were forced to collaborate of course. There were enough pressure points they could bring on the society.

Q: How about you know, looking at labor affairs and all that? Were there any problems there? I mean strikes or anything like that?

BARKLEY: NO, no! They shot their wad in 1954. That one year the unions you know actually tried to force some changes in the way things were done. That was crushed forcefully. Then in the factories they had not only all the traditional mitarbeiters, the Stasi etc, but they had indeed a union structure that was totally tied to the government, and to the fact that almost all of the workers were part of the government military force. The workers could be armed at any particular time in units called Worker Brigades. So the unions were integral parts of the government system.

Q: Did you have any feel for, I mean at that time I am going under the assumption that the thought the Soviets might launch a quick attack on us was no longer uppermost in our minds was it?

BARKLEY: No that came a bit later of course, when the Soviets employed their SS-20 missiles. At that time there was a certain optimism, a measure of détente. It was the time actually where the Berlin agreements were reached. Nobody at that time thought in terms of nuclear conflagration. Of course there was always the whole strategy of mutually assured destruction. But that was not a particularly bad time in terms of East-West relations. Of course it was at the same time that President Nixon was getting into a lot of political difficulty at home.

Q: This is the Watergate time.

BARKLEY: Yes. I remember Tiranachev quizzing me in great detail about what was going on. They were quite fond of Nixon. They thought that he was a realpolitiker, and that they could do business with him. They were unhappy with the trial that he was going through. Of course I knew nothing of all that except what I could read in the Herald Tribune etc. So all I could do of course, is read that back to him.

Q: Did Henry Kissinger come by at all while you were there?

BARKLEY: No, and that was interesting. Of course at the time of the Berlin agreements Kissinger was not Secretary of State. He was head of the National Security Council. I was

fascinated that during the last elements of the Berlin agreements, where it became quite clear that it was American policy was to conclude the agreements favorably, is that Ambassador Rush and others did not communicate with the White House through the State Department but went straight into the White House through a back channel. So quite clearly Dr. Kissinger was keeping Secretary Rogers, who was one of the more forgettable secretaries we have had out of the loop. Rogers seemed to be a perfectly nice man, but was clearly in the dark on the Berlin negotiations. The President and Mr. Kissinger were dealing directly with us in the Embassy on these issues.

Q: Well in being in Berlin, did you get any feel for the great game of spying that was going on? It seems like every other person was working for the KGB or the CIA.

BARKLEY: Oh absolutely. It was just astonishing. I mean they were falling all over each other. It was true I think of all the western groups in they all had their equivalent to the CIA.

Q: MI-5.

BARKLEY: Well but not only that. As you know in the American intelligence system there is also Defense Intelligence and the NSA. There are all these different groups, and they were represented in great numbers. Sometimes they were falling all over each other. I could not begin to assess the effectiveness of how the operations worked. Of course on the East German side, there was not only the KGB but the Stasi. They made us look like pikers when it came to controlling a population. I mean they were perverse but excellent. We knew nothing about that. That wasn't our modus operandi. But, yes, they were everywhere.

Q: Tell me on this effort, spying on both sides, and on our side obviously the CIA had all sorts of agents all over the place. I mean so did the KGB and the Stasi. But were you the recipient of any of these nuggets of information? Where did you get your information you know, to go about your regular job?

BARKLEY: Well there was more general information and perhaps less wisdom available then you would begin to believe. For example we had the CIVIS system that fed in all the reports that came in on the television. I had to read Neues Deutschland which was the official organ. And indeed by reading it I began to understand what let's say the "Newspeak" was in East Germany. You begin to understand a little number.

Q: Was it the prose as it was in other countries, the pros...

BARKLEY: Yes, pretty much. But there was, we had a number of people actually East German. I mean East Germans who had come west that worked in the mission in Berlin as foreign service nationals. They would write their reports on the basis of a lot of information, they would listen to the television or the radio or whatever it was. Of course, like any society, East Germans within their different ministries published a lot of stuff.

Now it was party line, but it did address problems. It turns out subsequently, everybody now knows that we had tapped into the telephone system, so we knew what was going on between party headquarters and the provinces and things like that. It also turns out of course that we weren't able to tap in as effectively as they did. Nonetheless, there was a lot of information. The problem of course, is not always how much information you have but which of it is true or useful.

Q: Were you able to make trips, swing around through your territory of East Germany?

BARKLEY: Well there was only actually one time a year where we were authorized to go outside of the Soviet sector. I was in East Berlin a lot, two or three times a week. Every time was somewhat uncomfortable. If you have every gone through Checkpoint Charlie, you would know why. It was a police state; there was no question about it. The theory when you are in Berlin is if anything goes wrong the first thing you do is call a Soviet officer, because you can't deal with the East Germans because of the status question. But every year we were given not a visa, but a piece of paper that we carried in our passport that allowed us to go to Leipzig Fair. I always went. Usually Felix would go. John Kornblum often came along. He was in the political section in Bonn. We would at that time have a chance to go to East Germany. We did that twice. Then we would take side trips to Wittenberg and Halle and places like that. But we couldn't go to many of the places we really wanted to go. Dresden was a place I think we all wanted to go. Kemnisz, Karlmarxstadt, at that time, Meckenberg all of those places that we wanted to go to, but couldn't. But we did get actually into the Leipzig area, and you could see that compared to West German society, things were still basically pretty primitive. For example, they had organized their agriculture into big farms, the LPG's they called them. Whenever the harvest was due, often they would have to bring in the army or different groups, what they would call Sobotnik to bring in the crops. They would come in and work on the harvest, so it was not an efficient society. You just didn't stop into a cute little café along the way. It wasn't like that at all. It was a rather dreary awful society. Now in the cities like in Leipzig, you could go Auerbach's Keller which is the famous place where Goethe writes about Faust. We did get actually to Jena. That was interesting, once again because of Weimar the Goethe relationship there. The cities were somewhat better. The countryside was still in all pretty sad.

Q: What about your colleagues who were covering this from the French or British point of view. I mean the Canadians and Swedish. Did you sort of get together and…

BARKLEY: Well the only ones we tended to get together a little bit were the British. There was a British woman who was in charge of things. I remember we were somewhat astonished that she truly had sort of a romantic affair with East Germany. To be kind she did not have her two feet on the ground approach the GDR.

Q: She had seen the future and it works.

BARKLEY: Yes, that kind of stuff. I think she was just working overtime to be

understanding. The French weren't particularly active. Even afterwards they weren't particularly active after they established relations. The foreigners who knew the most like the Yugoslavs and others, knew inherently how the system functioned. But I think without sounding too arrogant, that we knew more than any of them. Now the West Germans always had certain advantages and understanding of what was going on. Once relations were established, they didn't establish an embassy because of their concept of two states, one nation, but they established a Permanent Representation. The Permanent Representative had the same status as an ambassador did. Once they got established they knew quite a bit. But much of it of course was because of divided families and all of the other ways that they would pick up information.

Q: How did Felix Bloch work out there? He was accused of being a spy, but he hasn't been prosecuted. He was retired without pension from the foreign service. I don't know any of the details.

BARKLEY: Well this was 15 years later.

Q: There is a strong presumption that what happened was an involvement. But how did you find him at the time?

BARKLEY: Well, actually he was quite a charming but a weird duck. I think he was born in Vienna, and his family came over in the thirties. Although his English was perfect, the rhythm of his English was always somewhat strange. He had a very dry, strange sense of humor, a lovely wife and two children. He was really quiet a congenial colleague. He did establish very good relations with one guy in the East German trade ministry. Johannes Durling was his name. His name came up later on. I got to know him also quite well. But there was certainly at that time no doubt in my mind that he was loyal to the United States. I mean no different than any of my other colleagues. If there was something going on I certainly did not see it. I cannot prove that, but my assumption is that his discontent with his movement in the foreign service surfaced later, and that is when he went wrong.

Q: It seems to be right you know, looking at the pattern, that seems to be when he was DCM in Vienna I believe ten years later. How about sort of within the mission in Berlin? Was there pretty good esprit de corps? Was it fun?

BARKLEY: Oh, I thought it was certainly one of the finest tours I have had. Of course, I thought I had the most exciting work in the mission. There were two other sections in the mission. One was the economic section; the other was the political section on the western side. A lot of them dealt with a lot of the details like stockpiles and all of those things which are important to the viability of Berlin. It was kind of pick and shovel work that I didn't particularly like. Then there were of course people who always worked on status questions. In embassy Bonn for example, we had a Berlin section that was devoted to harmonizing and understanding what was going on on the issue of Berlin. The legal advisor was extremely active, actually produced an enormous amount of paper on what was going on. I can't say it was a uniquely happy mission, but to the extent that there was

any joy, I think it was probably in our section where people got along quite well.

Q: David Klein, what was his background? He was the head of it.

BARKLEY: He was a German hand and a Russian hand as a matter of fact. David was an extraordinarily good officer. He had served in Russia a couple of times and in Germany a couple of times. I don't exactly know what positions they were in, but he was conversant with both societies quite well and easily. He was a good linguist. I mean I tended to agree with his political views on so many things, so quite obviously he was a wonderful fellow.

Q: he was obviously a brilliant person.

BARKLEY: Exactly. Now there was always a little bit of difference. We has such strong personalities in Jock Dean and Jim Sutherland and David Klein that didn't always agree on everything, but they worked together very well. A very professional leadership.
Q: Well is there anything else we should cover in this time?

BARKLEY: Well the only last thing is before I left, we had now gotten to the point where we had identified our buildings, where our Embassy was going to be. I was active in all of that. Finally I got my first instruction which instructed me to actually enter the East German foreign office. I was the first American official to do that. That is particularly interesting because I was also the last 15 years later, but I remember I was required to go in and urge the East Germans to join ICNAF which was the International North Atlantic Fisheries Convention, because the East Germans like the Poles had these factory fishing vessels that would go in and sweep up a lot of fish. I remember I had to go in and talk to, believe it or not, a Dr. Seuss, who was a legal counselor in there. He was a charming fellow actually from Sudetenland. I of course made the demarche that we wanted them to join and become active members etc. He said, "Well you know that is interesting, Mr. Barkley. We have been trying to join for 20 years, and you have always vetoed us." I said, "Well, that was then; this is now. The political climate, the sweeps of things, of history have changed." So they indeed were eager to join, and they did and were quite responsible members for that short period of time, while at the same time these fish factory things of course not only fed a lot of East Germans but they also provided fertilizer and things that were important. So that was sort of the last thing I vividly recall in my East German tour before I was then transferred back.

Q: Where did you go?

BARKLEY: I was actually assigned to INR. Bill Highland had come in. Kissinger had become Secretary of State, and Highland was head of INR. Jim Sutherland convinced me that this was a good place to be against all of my experience to the contrary. So I landed in INR, but I only stayed there a couple of months.

Q: All right, then in '74 you went to INR for about a year.

BARKLEY: No, no. I was there about four months, and I hated it. I was told this was supposed to become some sort of dynamic office engaged in policy formulation. Bill Highland had direct access to Secretary Kissinger and wanted to have ideas so that he could feed it into the discussions he had with the secretary. It turns out that wasn't his interest at all. His interest was being on the inner councils and being an advisor, but he didn't need us. I was bored to tears.

Q: What piece of the action or lack of action did you have?

BARKLEY: I was supposed to be the political-military officer for western Europe. The good thing about it was there was a marvelous naval officer who was there at the same time I was, and a couple of CIA people. I got to know them. But it was from the State Department standpoint, something that all of us have said for years is that INR is a dead end. You don't want to end up there.

Q: Yes, I put my year in, and got Serbian training to get the hell out.

BARKLEY: I know. It is a terrible thing to say because some people did very good work in INR, and some of them were really the unsung heroes of political analysis.

Q: It is partly personality I think.

BARKLEY: It certainly wasn't my bag, and I didn't feel comfortable with it. I tried to do a couple of things which I thought were bold. It wasn't a time for bold thinking. The only thing that actually I do recall that was fascinating, that is because I was still relatively young and still relatively junior, I got on the task force on anything that came up. One of the task forces I got on, this was now 1974, was the task force on Cyprus.

Q: Oh yes, this is July, 1974, when the Greek Cypriots declared union with Greece and the Turks came in.

BARKLEY: The Turks came in in force. In INR you did have access to all of the intelligence flow. Maybe not the highest classification of intelligence flow, but sufficient. It was fascinating to watch the things develop. It turns out of course, years later when I was assigned as ambassador to Turkey, I could draw on that experience because that was still a live issue. When the Turks came in we could watch their progress and how far they went. Up to that time tensions were building, and of course there were at that time the Greeks were in a particularly tough mood. They had just declared a union with Greece. You had George Grivas and Nikos Sampson, they were really crazy. They were slaughtering Turks. It was ethnic cleansing. There was just no question about it. The result was of course the invasion by the Turks and division of the island. So that was a fascinating period.

Q: I would like to pick up a little of the feeling there, because I had just left Greece on the second of July 1974. I was consul general for four years there. Taking one look I was

horrified at what the Greeks had done, this government. I mean I never became a Helenophile or anything like that, but I was wondering whether you found sort of any pro Greek sentiment in the people dealing with this or was the feeling…

BARKLEY: Well at that time there was very little because it was really a brutalization that had gone on at the time or if they were there, they were not present in the task force. You as well as I know that task forces are people that are thrown together usually people that are expendable in other areas. There I was. I don't recall any of that. People were initially fascinated you know. Whenever you are sitting around a military action of this dimension or this nature it is interesting. There was a number of people, I don't know that as a fact, but there were a number of people that showed up like Joe Sisco and others who probably thought that maybe the separation of these two communities in Cyprus was not the worst solution. But as it turned out, of course, the invasion went a little bit further than we thought was justified. And then the Greeks were successful in getting sympathy on their side, which they have maintained until this day.

Q: Next to the Israeli lobby, the Greeks have…

BARKLEY: I only began to appreciate that some years later.

Q: So you left, how did you get out of INR?

BARKLEY: It was fascinating actually. One of my best friends, a classmate, was Charlie Hill. We just sort of ran into each other in the hall, as you often did. He asked me what I was doing, and I told him how unhappy I was. He said, "Oh, I have got the answer for that." He said he was Ellsworth Bunker's administrative assistant in the Panama Canal negotiations, and he was leaving to go up and be a speechwriter for Henry Kissinger, and he was looking for a replacement. He said, "I have found him." So he grabbed me and took me up to meet the ambassador and strongly urged the ambassador to accept me. Charlie and ambassador Bunker went back to Vietnam and were very close personally. I never had that relationship, but I seized this opportunity to get out of INR and I joined Ambassador Bunker on the Panama Canal negotiating team.

Q: How long did you do that?

BARKLEY: I did that for about three years.

Q: Let's talk about, we are talking about still 1974. What was the Panama Canal situation at that time you came on board?

BARKLEY: Well the situation is we have been in discussions with them for some time.

Q: This is the Panamanian government.

BARKLEY: The whole question was of course whether or not the United States would

relinquish ownership, which we had, of the canal and pass it to Panama? It had been the source of great friction in that area for a long time, but it was not, of course, the only source of friction. But it was one source of friction. The idea actually was as long as we talked about relinquishing our total control of the canal, this kept things relatively quiet. I think you could say, but I never saw it so articulated during the Nixon administration and then in the Ford administration thereafter, the idea was to keep talking on the canal's future but not to reach any accord on it. As a result we would go down periodically to Panama to one of the islands, the Pearl Islands in the Pacific, a place called Contadora, and we would negotiate. The negotiation, although it did not reach any kind of conclusion began to define the parameters of what kind of agreement that ultimately we'd reach.

Q: Well what was your job?

BARKLEY: Well I was basically Ellsworth Bunker's man. It was a two man office. We both had secretaries. Actually it was a four man office. He was the ambassador at large responsible for the negotiation of the Panama Canal.

Q: Who was the secretary?

BARKLEY: The Secretary of State?

Q: No I mean did he have Eva Kim with him at that time?

BARKLEY: No. Eva Kim periodically would come see us, but from Vietnam she had gone up into the Secretary's front office. But no, it was Cecilia Lucas. I was basically the ambassador's filter. The Panama desk actually brought all the papers forward, and I made sure that the ambassador got them in good form. The ambassador was elderly, and he needed somebody that he could trust completely, so my job became not only a movement of paper job, but also a sounding board. I never quite established the personal relationship he had with Charlie Hill, which went back to of course a different time, but we became quite close. I made sure that he was taken care of. That was my job.

Q: Did you feel there was a group within the State Department basically the State Department I would say, and please correct me if this, get rid of the damn thing if we can. The military and also the civilians who said we paid for it we worked the canal we are going to keep it. Was there that strain?

BARKLEY: Well like everything Stuart, there were strains, evidence throughout the department, but they weren't uniformly that way. On the whole it was agreed that we do indeed turn over some of the unneeded properties in the Canal Zone over to the Panamanians. But how do we assure that the Canal continues to function effectively? The negotiation was not only for the canal but the Zone, and the Zone was this huge ten mile wide sector of sovereign America basically that divided Panama in two. So how do we do this? How do we eliminate the levels of friction and at the same time maintain the effectiveness of the canal? It turns out that as we got on to the serious negotiations later

on is that was the neutrality provision was essential, in that we didn't want the Panamanians to make a deal with the Russians or somebody else, and depending on who the leadership was. You couldn't really foresee where that would go. The United States had built and maintained the canal for a long period of time would continue to have some say over the neutrality of the canal to guarantee that it was open to all parties. So the neutrality provision became key. But the military had large bases all throughout that area. Many of the bases had been basically abandoned. We couldn't understand exactly why you would want to hold on to those bases if indeed they could be put to more effective use elsewhere. So the military had a group that was absolutely and totally integrated with the State Department on his. Without them, of course, we couldn't have done anything.

Q: Well now, what was the reading that you were getting when you first got involved in this about the Panamanian government? Who was…

BARKLEY: Torrijos.

Q: Torrijos.

BARKLEY: Well Torrijos was a military man who took over power. He was not a stupid man, but like a lot of people of that particular time, he tried to keep a foot in a lot of camps, including the Cubans. He had a fairly effective relationship with Castro. You couldn't say it was an open and democratic society, but it was not a particularly corrosive dictatorship. His negotiators were quite competent, and the represented different groups. I mean he made his decisions on the basis of domestic political requirements. One of the figures who came up when I was there was Manuel Noriega who of course, later on became notorious, and I pictured him as pretty notorious at that time. He was the head of intelligence, and actually was an effective head of intelligence. He knew many times, our positions when he shouldn't have known our positions. But as I said, at the outset, as long as President Ford was president, the idea was to keep negotiating but not to reach a conclusion. That all changed with the election of President Carter.

Q: Well did you feel this? I mean was there a thing of treading water or was it more a matter of not coming to a conclusion but getting things ready for a conclusion, or just not to come to a conclusion?

BARKLEY: No, I think we were beginning to define the elements of an agreement. We were constantly looking at new things and trying to find new approaches. It was the kind of negotiation where you had to decide what you were willing to give up. You aren't going to get anything back from the Panamanians except in terms of guarantees of neutrality and so on. So that is the hardest kind of negotiation because people don't want to give anything up without getting anything in return. But what you were getting of course, was political good will and that it was the instrument of diminishing utility. Now it turns out at that time our assessment of the utility of the canal might have proved to be somewhat wrong. This was a period of time when the land bridge across the United States was more active than the sea lanes going through Panama, because the big liners could

not go through the canal. The largest ships were these Pan-Max ships that could go through the canal. But by that time the port of Baltimore was taking infinitely more goods destined for California than was indeed the Panama Canal. Of course then north slope oil came in and a whole variety of things and the Panama Canal became of more value again. But during that period of time the people who were the most concerned for the canal of course were the riparian powers on either side of the canal in Latin America that used it, the Colombians and the Venezuelans and others. Of course for political reasons they had to support the Panamanians, but they would come through the back door and say, "God don't give them too much", for it is important that you keep this thing running. The fear was if it ever went to the Panamanians, is they would screw it up.

Q: Well this is implicit wasn't it for the whole time. I mean could the Panamanians run it.

BARKLEY: Well of course that was, it was very hard to get a valid answer out to that question because all of the canal was run and operated by the Americans in the Zone. All of the pilots on the canal were Americans. They had a strangle hold on the whole thing. So the matter of training Panamanians to do these things would have taken a certain amount of cooperation on the part of America. I don't think there was any doubt that they could learn. The other question was the canal works on the need for inland water. It works on a system of very little mechanical activity. It is all basically the natural flow of gravity. It is a complex and extraordinarily beautiful kind of construction. The fear was is that the kinds of maintenance schedules and things that were absolutely required to keep the canal going, were not the kinds of things that Panamanians or Latinos might be inclined to do. For political reasons or if the financial burden has become too high, they could say well we won't do the maintenance this month. Then the other fear was, of course, that they would look upon it simply as a cash cow. I mean the amount of money that was taken in tolls was kept under control to make sure it was used. If you increase that then people will, of course, begin to analyze alternative sources of transportation. There were many fears involved in this, and I wouldn't hesitate to say that a lot of them were just skepticism at the Panamanian ability to do these things.

Q: When you were doing this, we are sticking to the Ford period first. Did, were there members of congress who were breathing down your neck?

BARKLEY: Oh yes. Well most of the popular view was against agreeing to do anything on the Panama Canal. The canal has always been, you know, an instrument of pride for American history. Of course Ronald Reagan who at that time was a budding politician was vehemently against it. There were a lot of congressmen and senators who were extraordinarily skeptical. The good thing form the standpoint of keeping our negotiations going both in Panama and in the United States was the enormous stature of Ellsworth Bunker. He was a man that way before Vietnam had negotiated the settlements in the Dominican Republic and elsewhere. He was an extraordinary and highly regarded man, and a man of great dignity and probity. I never met anybody who didn't pay ovations to Ellsworth Bunker. He was an institution at that time, and indeed a great man. No question about it.

Q: How did you find the Panamanian desk in the State Department?

BARKLEY: Well they had some extremely good people. Like every desk in the State Department, some you probably have a higher regard for than others. They were quite active, quite competent. The desk was run by Morrie Bell. Now he was the deputy negotiator. He was a man who had strange tastes and approaches. I don't know whether you know him or not. There was a certain flamboyance in his style.

Q: Morrie Bell?

BARKLEY: Morrie Bell, yeah. But he was very active and he stayed engaged. He I think also convinced the Panamanians that we were serious about doing this.

Q: Was the Panama Canal an issue during the election of '76 when Carter beat Ford?

BARKLEY: A couple of people tried to make it an issue, but I don't recall it as being an over riding issue. I don't think anybody particularly made it a platform in either party. It was clearly not a particularly popular thing for politicians to go out and beat the drums on.

Q: Well was there in the State Department in a way, the feeling "Dammit we have got to bite the bullet sometime and get rid of this thing, because it was always sort of blanketing Latin American relations and that?"

BARKLEY: Well I am sure there were people in ARA who believed that, but you know we were frying very big fish at that time. The Soviet Relationship, the relationship with China, Vietnam, all of those things were preoccupying us. I don't think this was the kind of thing that outside of the regional bureau, drew much attention.

Q: Early on when you were dealing with Ellsworth Bunker, I guess Vietnam had just fallen didn't it when you came in.

BARKLEY: Yes. In '75 it fell.

Q: When you were there, how did this affect him?

BARKLEY: Well of course, he was saddened by it. I recall that whenever he appeared and the subject came up, he always said that he was absolutely convinced that there was an effort on the part of the United States consistent with our history to insure the people of South Vietnam the right to determine their own future, and that the American engagement's essential quality was that. However in the implementation of that policy we got ourselves into a position where the enemy was given a level of sanctuary that we weren't, and it became impossible therefore, to win the conflict. Clearly he had a lot of friends and people there that he had become close to and was saddened by what

happened.

Q: When Carter took over, what happened?

BARKLEY: An absolutely remarkable thing. You know always certain different letters we use to define Presidential Directives. Well when President Carter came in the "PD" became a key part of his administration, Presidential Decisions. The first two Presidential Decisions addressed Latin America, PD-1 was the Panama Canal. PD-2 was Cuba. As you know, President Carter spoke Spanish or some Spanish, was very interested in the region, and thought we had neglected it much too long. I actually was the first in the Department to receive the PD. It was on a Saturday and Ambassador Bunker and I were in alone and they asked us to give a to write up the current status because PD-1 stated that we must solve this problem We sort of looked at each other and said, "These are marching orders, and for us it is wonderful, but how can you look at the world and make this number one in your foreign policy? How can you do that?" We were astonished. So I sat down with the ambassador, we wrote to the White House, explaining the status of the negotiations, where we were, what the principles were behind it, how we were doing. I did most of the writing. This wasn't a particularly difficult thing. It was a cut and paste of everything we had learned and were doing for over a year and a half. We sent that paper forward. Then the White House, I don't know exactly the sequence, I didn't think it was much thereafter, decided they would up the ante on our negotiating by nominating Sol Linowitz to join as the co-negotiator with Ellsworth Bunker. Well Sol Linowitz was an icon in foreign policy. He had always focused heavily on Latin America. He was an extraordinarily successful and competent lawyer and really a dynamic and enjoyable human being. He had great respect and affection for Ambassador Bunker. So he came in, and once White House guidance got out into the bureaucracy, cooperation from the Pentagon and others grew rather dramatically. So our office doubled almost in size. Sol Linowitz brought with him an ex-foreign service officer by the name of Amber Moss, one of the most competent young men I have ever met, as his deputy. We became quite a foursome. We were very close in everything we did. That was the beginning of the new phase which actually led to the negotiations' success.

Q: Well how did this translate into what you were doing?

BARKLEY: Well in the first place as I told you, we had established the parameters of what a successful negotiation would look like. What we had to do was get some enthusiasm out of the Pentagon, and we got that in terms of an ex-general by the name of Welborn G. Dolvin, a marvelous human being. He came over and his job was to jerk around the Pentagon's bureaucracy to make sure the negotiation succeeded, and he did it brilliantly.

Q: It must have been quite a job.

BARKLEY: He put together an extremely good team. He was retired and therefore he wasn't fearful about the next star. He had a high reputation with all of the people in the

Pentagon, and he hammered on their desk. I remember in the past we did brief the JCS. We were debating things with the chairman of the joint chiefs and others, and I remember one of them saying, "Two angry men with a shovel can close that canal." So they were aware of the general vulnerability of the canal. But certainly it was the marching orders form the White House that got them fully on board.

Q: Did Bunker continue on this?

BARKLEY: Yes. I think the last thing that Sol Linowitz would have done would have been to let Bunker leave. He understood that Bunker was a revered figure in American foreign policy, but he also liked him personally, so they worked well together. But as a very sharp lawyer the questioning on our team became keener than it had been in the past. Ellsworth Bunker's avuncular way of behaving, "Let us all try and reason together," became more insistent now. So the line actually of the negotiations became much keener, particularly within our own groups. Then of course, we all went down to Contadora with Sol Linowitz along, in relatively short order we were able to come to an agreement. Of course, the neutrality element of the negotiation was all important. But once we got that, we had an agreement.

Q: Well how was the neutrality element solved?

BARKLEY: Well basically it was solved by the United States and Panama guaranteeing the neutrality of the canal. It was a rather small provision but guaranteed that if anything ever challenged that canal, gave the United States the authority to intervene. It was essential.

Q: Yes,

BARKLEY: I mean if we had given it up and given them total sovereignty without that provision over the future of the canal, almost anything could have happened. We could have been in deep trouble.

Q: Involved in the negotiations of the canal also dealt with the canal zone didn't it?

BARKLEY: Yes.

Q: How did you find, I mean these people were known as being the hardest headed. I mean did you find they were difficult?

BARKLEY: Oh this was very difficult. Of course the constituencies that they had were very limited and very few. To fight the United States government which was sovereign in control of the canal was very hard. But they tried. The Zone you know was not only a de facto colony of the United States, it was a privileged colony, and it had some of the qualities of the old south. By and large, it was a lily white kind of community, and many of them were born there and or came back. It was a self perpetuating community. But to

be perfectly honest, they were extraordinarily good at what they were doing, and they kept that canal going, it was a thing of beauty. It wasn't only a question of their own personal rights and privileges, but it was also a question that they ran that canal more beautifully than you could believe.

Q: Well was there any way, were you working towards, how do you…

BARKLEY: Well you try to grandfather a lot of it. One of the problems was in the construction of the canal years ago at the turn of the century. You know American technology had reached that point where it was possible to do it. The French effort before had failed because technology had not reached that point. It was a remarkable achievement. They brought in a huge number of people from the islands, particularly Jamaica and Trinidad to do the work. As you know people at that time were racked with diseases particularly in the Tropics. They seemed to be hardier and able to handle a lot of that. Those groups ended up in Panama. Once the United States left, the thought that they would be subjected to racial discrimination and things on the part of the Panamanians, not that they hadn't been subjected to somewhat of that on the part of the Zonians, but of course that improved over the course of time as it did in the United States. So that was a huge number of people who were very unhappy about what was going on. They tried to establish alliances with certain groups to make sure that they got guarantees. We tried to do certain things to guarantee certain things, but quite obviously in the last analysis, once you hand over the sovereignty questions, you are putting affairs under Panamanian law. So there was some trauma that went on. Then we established the principles whereby the passing of the canal would be determined by a commission, turning over of the canal by the year 2000. That was inscribed in the agreement.

Q: Well you were with this until the agreement was signed, right?

BARKLEY: No, actually right before the agreement was coming to a conclusion, I was offered a very good job in central European affairs. I desperately wanted to get out of Latin American affairs. I didn't want to get caught there, although I must say I was very pleased by the effectiveness of my colleagues in the bureau. But this was back into where I really wanted to be. So I had the terrible task of trying to break this news to the ambassador who on one hand didn't want to stand in the way of anybody moving on, but on the other hand he became comfortable with certain people after awhile. I was able to recruit Bill Price to replace me. It was literally a couple of months after I left that they actually signed the agreement.

Q: Well then when did you go, we will stop at this point and I will just put at the end here, when did you go to central European affairs?

BARKLEY: Well, it was in the summer of 1977.

Q: Okay, then we will pick this up in 1977.

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Today is July 21, 2003. We are now in the summer of 1977 and you went where?

BARKLEY: I became the deputy director of Central European Affairs. In those days it was the office that was responsible for German affairs. That means West Germany, East Germany, and Berlin, as well as Austria and Switzerland. It was my first largely management job. From that standpoint I was very pleased to get it.

Q: You were doing that from '77 to when?

BARKLEY: To '79.

Q: Well now was there any dispute about why East Germany should be included in with West Germany because East Germany was part of the Soviet Bloc?

BARKLEY: Well it goes back to a bit of the whole burden of our relationship with Germany, not particularly during the time of Willy Brandt. The FRG. had posited this idea that one German nation and two German states. Well obviously to hive off the eastern part of Germany and attach it to eastern Europe would have been unacceptable to the West German. I suspect that had a lot to do with it and quite clearly language demands had a lot to do with it too. In any event, from the time actually that we recognized East Germany, that was 1974, but even before that, I don't recall that it was East Germany but it was the Soviet sector of Germany. It had always been in that office as far as I am aware of.

Q: What were the issues? Well let's take West Germany then East Germany, and then your other things. Let's do West Germany. Were there any major issues?

BARKLEY: Oh, well this was during the time of the chancellorship of Helmut Schmidt. Our President was Jimmy Carter. It became quite clear fairly early on that Mr. Schmidt did not have unbounded admiration from Mr. Carter. There were a lot of personal tensions. As you recall, the Carter administration was marked by a number of things. One of course was its concern about human rights. I think that you can say that although that had always been subsumed under American policy lines, it was writ large by President Carter. Human rights, in my judgment, had many different forms. Human rights of course, in eastern Europe was basically the crushing aspects of totalitarian governments, the communist governments. Human rights in Africa was often more a question of racial quality. South Africa was viewed as white supremacy over the downtrodden Africans, a sort of colonialism. And in South America it almost always was a matter of trying to restrain the Juntas in their exploitation of their own people. So it took a number of different forms. But where it ran sort of crosswise with the Germans is that they were very actively negotiating to get particularly ethnic Germans out of Eastern Europe, and they thought that President Carter's undifferentiating approach hazarded these efforts.

But what became clearly the defining moment for my two years in that office and far beyond was the speech that was given by Chancellor Schmidt to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) in London in which he pointed out the Soviet displacements of the SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe were decoupling, and that there should be an immediate response from the American administration. As you recall, the theory at that time was there had to be comparative kinds of weaponry at all levels in order to tie Europe and the United States into a seamless position whereby the Soviets could divide us. Well, the emplacement of the SS-20 put at hazard all of western Europe, but it did not put at hazard the United States. The initial response from the Carter Administration, particularly Mr. Brzezinski, was that the central systems should be able to cover that front. He apparently did not view that as decoupling; whereas, Helmut Schmidt who was quite a foreign policy and defense expert viewed it 180 degrees in the other direction. That was a very powerful speech he gave. He warned the American administration they were playing with fire with the security of western Europe. That fact basically dominated most of the things we did for the following two years. The seemed to have been actually a growing sentiment or maybe an initial sentiment that continued to grow in large parts of the American administration that Helmut Schmidt was absolutely correct. So we had to devise some way to counteract the Soviet initiative, and indeed we did. That led to the emplacement of Pershing missiles in Germany and shorter range cruise missiles in Italy. It was an issue that led to great friction also within the German political system where the left, which had been developing leftist ideas that the Soviets were ill understood, and that you could negotiate with them. The problems were very strong within Schmidt's own party which was the Social Democratic Party, which always had a sympathetic attitude toward what was going on in eastern Europe.

Q: Did you find, I mean obviously it wasn't at your level, but were you a participant in sort of the people who were concerned with German-American affairs sort of sitting around thinking how do we deal with the fact that Carter and Schmidt hate each other, I mean can't stand each other?

BARKLEY: Well obviously as you say that was far beyond anything that we could control, but you always engage, the embassies are always engaged, in damage control or trying to play down the personal viewpoints, etc. There were no particular issues except that Helmut Schmidt was known to have very strong views and he expressed those views in private. Of course they didn't stay private very long. And it was also quite clear when the obligatory visit between the Germans and the Americans took place. I think one of the real problems was that members of the Carter administration looked at that kind of personal dislike as a lack of solidity and therefore loyalty within the alliance. There were tensions that came out of that. I mean I can't say at all that this was unmanageable. It wasn't unmanageable. Obviously the interests of both countries were so much greater than any kind of personal proclivity. That we were able to control.

Q: Was there any feeling of dealing with the German embassy here in Washington or something. Everybody's trying to make things work even though at the top level…

BARKLEY: Well absolutely. That is what embassies do, they try to rub the burrs of these problems. Of course the German embassy in Washington was very actively trying to point out that American interests and German interests coincided on almost every front, and that they were loyal allies and had been for many years and would be into the future.

Q: How about with East Germany? How were things working there?

BARKLEY: Well we had established relations with East Germany in 1974. They were spending a lot of time just getting themselves settled in Washington, which was not always easy. They had some things that they wanted to buy, and most of the areas were either restricted or zoned and they couldn't buy them. We were not particularly helpful. Our relations were never particularly good with East Germany up until the end. So there was never much sympathy for being helpful to them. They were fully aware that any kind of presence in the United States was probably not going to dramatically affect their position. Nonetheless, for the East Germans, to be recognized by the greatest power in the western world if not in the world, was a moment of considerable prestige for them. So they were very pleased to be here. It was one of those cases where whenever there was an embassy function, I was probably the highest ranking guy that would attend. Clearly I wasn't a very high ranking fellow in the general scheme of things. At the same time it was not a country without some significant economic structure. It turned out to be not quite as powerful then as we thought it was. And they did curry a great number of American businessmen. One of the most successful was David Rockefeller. Exactly what was on his mind I do not know, but I do know that one of the ongoing problems that we had is David Rockefeller in his talks with Cyrus Vance convinced Vance to meet with the East German foreign minister. They met at the United Nations. We were very much against that, and quite shocked that the agreement was made at the highest levels without the knowledge of the desk or the Department.

Q: Well David Rockefeller was a powerful financier wasn't he?

BARKLEY: Well not only a powerful financier but for the East Germans he was also a symbol. What greater symbol of the American capitalist system in action is there than the Rockefeller family? The last thing we wanted to do was to endorse an East German viewpoint that if you can get to the industrialist or the capitalists, the political system will follow. Well it happily turned out that the meeting between the East German Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer and Secretary Vance was a fiasco.

Q: What happened?

BARKLEY: Well there were just no points of communication. The East Germans were not in a position to do anything except to get some prestige out of the actual fact of the meeting. They had nothing to offer. The hope was that within the Eastern European bloc t there would be some wiggle room that one could look at as possible independent tendencies. If you were going to get it anywhere, you certainly were not going to get it out of East Germany.

Q: In East Germany how were we seeing things at that time vis a vis human rights and all that? Were they just being beastly?

BARKLEY: Well they were being as beastly as they had to be. I mean the Wall had been there for a long period of time as a glaring example of the division between East and West. And indeed they still had the automatic shooting apparatuses and the guards that manned that border. It was an inhumane and rather brutalizing kind of system. At the same time they were well aware of the shortcomings in their economy, particularly. The went through a period of time, I think they called it Erneverung which means basically a renewal of their economic situation. It was a restructuring of part of their economy. One of the problems of an economy like that is the government allocates resources, and they don't allocate resources very well. They tried to do certain things and had some minimal success. It was considered to be quite a significant restructuring as far as eastern European models went. But our relationship was never very good. I think Honecker always somehow kept in the back of his mind that his greatest triumph was to be received by the major western powers. It was over ten years before he was properly received by the West Germans, but he always dreamed of sometime being received in Washington, which of course was not likely to happen.

Q: What about you had Austria and Switzerland?

BARKLEY: Well they were basically minor players. It was mostly hand holding in those areas. Switzerland always was an economic powerhouse. Often the Treasury Department had particular interests there because it is a safe haven for a lot of illicit money. The Austrians were of course, working hard to assure everybody that although they were neutral, their western moorings were in place. Those were not troubled relationships. Inevitably however the bureau has the responsibility of taking care of its ambassadors. Those are two embassies that almost inevitably get U.S. political appointees as ambassadors. In this case the two political appointees had some personal controversy attached.

Q: Who were the political appointees and what was attached?

BARKLEY: Milton Wolf was in Austria. A businessman from Cincinnati, Marvin Warner, was in Switzerland. Wolf was actually quite a good ambassador.

Q: We got pretty much involved in the exchange of the Soviet Union?

BARKLEY: Well there was a little bit of that. He was basically you know, a very correct and dignified gentleman who represented us I thought, very well there. That is the Wolf I was talking about.

Q: How did, did you have problems with out ambassador to Switzerland?

BARKLEY: There were some problems. He was like many people. He was a self made man and probably didn't appreciate the fine points of diplomatic behavior. He was single. He had a large active social life. I mean there were points that I think were certainly not very egregious, but were points of irritation for the Swiss government.

Q: Did you get complaints from the Swiss?

BARKLEY: Yes.

Q: What do you do, just pass it along to the White House?

BARKLEY: Well I mean the normal thing is you apprise your deputy assistant secretary and the assistant secretary as to what is going on. They take whatever measures are necessary. I think the White House probably knew about them.

Q: This of course, it is always very hard to remove an ambassador once you have put him in.

BARKLEY: Well I don't think that ever reached that point. It is a little bit like Henry Kissinger's statement about the infighting among professors. The infighting is so great because the stakes are so low. Well when you have got a country like Switzerland and Austria in which our relations are really quite good, the little things tend to matter a little bit more than they should.

Q: Well in '79 whither? Where did you go then?

BARKLEY: Well in '79 it was time for me to go abroad again. A couple of months before I was ready to go, I went through this process of putting my name in for a number of assignments. I saw the then ambassador to Norway in the hall. His name was Louis Lerner. Although I didn't know him, I knew of him. I knew that actually he was looking for a DCM. His DCM at that time was Jerry Bremer, and Jerry was coming back to the Department. So I went up and I saw George Vest who was my assistant secretary and I said, "You know, I saw Louis Lerner in the hall. I guess he is looking for a DCM." He said, "Yeah." I said, "How do you get on that list?" He said, "Do you want to be on that list?" I said, "I would very much want to be on that list." So he called the guy who was the Norwegian desk officer and gave him my name and said, "Follow up on this." I soon got a call saying could I see ambassador Lerner at his hotel. It must have been April or early May. This was in '79. So I went in to see him, and we got along extremely well right away. You can never tell what the personal relationships are going to be, but they seemed to be very good. I mean I liked him enormously. So he looked at me and said, "Are you sure you want this job?" I said, "I very much do." He said, "Well I think you have got the job. I have to do one or two more checks. There are some more people I want to talk to, but as far as I can tell this would be great." Shortly thereafter I was told the job was mine if I wanted it. Those were the days when you could still select your DCM. Lerner was a political appointee. I don't think people particularly cared who he selected

as long as he took a careerist. But he offered me the job, and I took it. So in July of ’79 I landed in Oslo as DCM of the embassy.

Q: You were there form ’79 to when?

BARKLEY: I was there until December

Q: This is tape four, side one with Dick Barkley. Yeah.

BARKLEY: Ambassador Lerner was from Chicago. He ran a number of suburban newspapers, the Lerner chain. Apparently, what I found out subsequently his political relationship was with Fritz Mondale in Minnesota. Now how he made that relationship I don’t know. I think he of course, put some money into the campaign. Lou had also been an AFS student in Denmark, so he had some understanding of Scandinavia.

Q: That is American Field Service.

BARKLEY: Yes, the Field Service. And he was quite competent in the language, maybe not totally fluent but better by far than most Americans who are learning a Scandinavian language. So when President Carter became president, he was appointed to be ambassador to Oslo. He had completed 2 ½ years of that assignment when I was out there and only had another six months to go. As a matter of fact as soon as I arrived there, he went on a rather extended leave, so I was Chargé almost immediately.

Q: What was the government like in Norway at that time?

BARKLEY: Well the government was as it had been for many years a labor government. In Norway they call their Social Democratic Party the Labor Party, the Arbeiterpartie. There had been a number of prime ministers, but at that time Odvar Nordli was prime minister, an absolutely remarkable wonderful fellow, but Knut Frey Denkunk was his foreign minister. Although they were loyal members of NATO, from the very inception of their relationship with NATO, they opted out of any nuclear options, so they were very sensitive about any ships carrying nuclear weapons or anything that might visit their ports. They looked upon themselves as basically a non nuclear member of NATO. Of course that put some burdens on us because quite clearly that large geographical area of Norway bellys up to the North Sea where there is an awful lot of Soviet and allied naval activity. So whenever there was a naval ship visit, there was a certain amount of sensitivity and of course we had the policy that we would never confirm nor deny what weapon systems were on board. And that gave them some heartburn. But other than that, they tried to be quite loyal. Like all Labor Parties at that time or Social Democratic Parties throughout western Europe, there were two basic wings. There was the very liberal traditional wing, and there was also the trade union or conservative wing. The liberal wings also were intellectually driven and often had some sympathy for the socialist experiments going on to the east. Now of course Norway also shares a common border with Russia. Although they have sovereignty over the island of Spitzbergen, or Svalbard,

there was a huge Russian base up there at Barentsburg, which they have worked out some sort of a mutual toleration using the treaty of Svalbard of 1922. So there are enough burdens on our relationship. But going back to our previous discussion, one of our constant burdens at that time is what they call the NATO double track decisions to counter the SS-20 by emplacing in central and southern Europe cruise missiles and Pershing missiles. That was opposed very actively by certain left wing types in the Labor Party.

Q: Well the SS-20 and the gathering in of the straying left of social democrats was sort of a last great sort of communist offensive wasn't it, you k now I mean of a peaceful offensive.

BARKLEY: I would have to think about that a long time Stuart, but it certainly was a last gasp Soviet effort to steal a march on us tactically and strategically. Of course as we now know, the Soviet Union was not in very good shape, actually all of Eastern Europe was not in very good shape. But at that time we didn't know that. The permanence of the bipolar world seemed to be something that we could take for granted. Of course we are all much wiser now after the fact. But there was a lot of particular pressure on that front and if we were negotiating, sometimes the Norwegians would move away from U.S. positions. We had another problem at that time, and that problem went to the heart of the U.S.-Norwegian relationship. It was a question on what we call Prepositioning. A member of the Labor Party who was extraordinarily conservative by the name of Johann Jurgen Holst was at that time the Deputy Foreign Minister and later on was both Foreign Minister and Defense Minister. Together with his counterpart in the Pentagon, in order to show American determination to protect Norway, they planned to preposition equipment for a U.S. marine battalion. The prepositioning would take place in northern Norway, and of course if anything happened, and Norway was threatened in one way or another, the U.S. marines would land, the equipment would be there, and they would be combat ready. This all to our chagrin in the embassy was taking place behind closed doors. We said you just can't pull a program like that off in a democratic society, particularly in a society like Norway. Sure enough sooner or later, the word came out, and there was a major spat in Norway, with great opposition to the plan from parts of the ruling government, although the ruling government was quite obviously the architects behind the whole program. As a result of these objections form the left wing of the Party, the Norwegian government turned to move the prepositioning from northern Norway down to central Norway because northern Norway looked to be too provocative to the Russians. That caused a lot of agony. It was one of those things where the embassy was rather heavily engaged, although I think the rest of the world probably gave it a big yawn. If it was even a byline in the New York Times, I would have been surprised.

Q: How did it come out?

BARKLEY: Well finally they were able to move it out of the area in farther northern Norway, down to the Trondelag which is around Trondheim. That is a prepositioning of about 300 miles further south than it was intended. Of course the Russians found it

irresistible. They couldn't help but fish in that pond, and they were doing it rather effectively. So we were able to finally get through that and it didn't turn out to be as big a thing as I thought. Subsequently I have been told that we were interested in removing the prepositioning and now the Norwegians are very concerned in the other direction that if we do it, it will be a sign of American lack of interest. Of course the scenery has changed a lot, but at that time it was highly sensitive.

Q: Well the Kola Peninsula was a key point for the whole Soviet navy in the Atlantic.

BARKLEY: The Kola Peninsula was a strategic asset. The constant problem for the Soviets was the lack of warm weather ports, and that wasn't exactly one. But they could break through to it most of the time. There was a large submarine arsenal up there. They would slip their sub out north of Svalbard and came down through to the North Atlantic. The Iceland Greenland corridor is one of the key areas for concern for the American navy. So there was a lot of concern about that. The Norwegian navy was extremely cooperative in helping monitor Soviet ship movements with us. It was a very professional outfit.

Q: Well while you were there, were there incidents of Soviet submarines penetrating up the fjords and…

BARKLEY: There was of course, the Soviet submarine that got caught on the rocks in Sweden. It was a Whiskey Class sub, and they used to sort of drolly consider whiskey on the rocks. Of course that caught everybody's attention because of Scandinavia sensitivities. When they saw clearly Soviet ships going in and out of the fjords, they knew how vulnerable they were.

Q: Well while you were there, were we looking at the Soviets as an eminent threat? This is still Carter administration. Were you seeing them as, were we really thinking the Soviets might try to do something?

BARKLEY: Well obviously I can't speak for the president. The administration fairly quickly folded behind the dual track decision of NATO because we were the architects of it, most of its terms, which we coordinated through NATO to reassure our western allies that the Soviets were not going to divide us with this kind of effort. It was an extraordinarily difficult negotiation. You had to negotiate of course with the countries that were going to receive the western missiles. There were large peace movements in Germany, not so many in Italy, so it wasn't an easy thing. Then the negotiation also included a number of things that got us into a little bit of trouble in Norway. There was a thing called forward base systems. Now forward base systems were basically American fighter aircraft which could strike at a whole variety of targets. It had always been part of the Soviet effort to get foreign base systems engaged in any kind of disarmament effort. We would never acknowledge that they were in the same category as ballistic missiles or cruise missiles. The Oslo Labor Party, right in the middle of these negotiations came out for including forward base systems in the negotiations. I remember meeting with one of the more liberal member of their cabinet, Einar Forde who was really quite an

intellectually gifted chap, although left wing clearly. I went to him and I said, "You know on one hand we are delighted that your party has agreed that these negotiations should go forward. ON the other hand, we are somewhat distressed that certain members of your party believe that you should be sitting on the Russian side of the table." He laughed at me a little bit and said, 'Well I don't think it is quite like that." I said, "You know these are very subtle issues. These are the kinds of things that experts get involved with. Why is the Oslo wing of the Labor Party, which is notoriously leftist, getting involved in this? Who are these people?" He gave me a number of names. One of them he talked about was a fellow by the name of Arne Treholt, who at that time was in the United Nations, and was a key advisor to a powerful member of the foreign office by the name of Jens Evensen. Evensen surprisingly came out against the NATO double track decision. It turns out later that Treholt was a Soviet spy. That became more interesting later on because one of the things I was involved in was the negotiation of trades between U.S. assets and East German and European and Russian assets, spy trading. Treholt's name came up rather repeatedly as someone worth trading.

Q: Well how about where does North Sea oil in those days?

BARKLEY: Well North Sea oil by the time I had been there, there had been a long negotiation with the British that centered delineating what part of the sea belongs to Norway had been completed; what part of it belongs to the British continental shelf or whatever. That's where this fellow Jens Evensen earned his high regard for he was the key negotiator for the Norwegians. The line that they finally agreed to, it turned out that on the Norwegian side of the line was where the major resources were, so Evensen came out looking quite like a hero. I don't know whether at that time he had the geological background to really know it was there, but it turned out that way. And of course, the Norwegians at that time did not have all of the expertise to tap into that oil, so Phillips petroleum and other Americans got actively engaged in extracting those resources which later were taken over by a Norwegian consortium.

Q: What about relations at that time I mean form your observation between Norway and Sweden?

BARKLEY: Well you know, the Norwegians and the Swedes have this ongoing competition. It is somewhat humorous. In sporting events, for example, they do get engaged in grit your teeth kinds of competitions. But you know, Norway was part of Sweden since the Treaty of Tilsit in 1814 when Norway was taken from Denmark that had been loyal to Napoleon and given to Sweden who had been part of the allied coalition against Napoleon. The king of Sweden was considered to be the joint king of Norway, although both countries had an independent parliament. The only joint decisions on the parts of the Swedes were in the questions of foreign and defense policy. In 1905 Norway finally declared its total independence form Sweden and got their own king. From that time on, and there was some disagreement about two border provinces. The Norwegians still claim the Swedes stole them from them. It is particularly aggravating because in one of those provinces produced one of the greatest skiers of all time Jan Stenmark. The

Swedes had him and the Norwegians wanted him. But it was not really ever a serious problem. It is a very peaceful border. There are jokes about either side that go on. And of course for the longest period of time, and this has been true throughout Scandinavia, the Swedes were the wealthy members of the Scandinavian community, and they tended to lord it over their weaker and poorer cousins. But now, of course, per capita income in Norway is considerably higher than in Sweden because of North Sea oil. So you know, the tables have turned somewhat.

Q: Well while you were there, did you feel you were sort of out in the provinces of Europe?

BARKLEY: Absolutely not. Oslo was really quite sophisticated. A tiny little town, but it is really rather sophisticated. The lines of communication are excellent. Of course the lingua franca of Scandinavia is English, so we had constant access to publications, a lot of television was in English. I never had the feeling of isolation. Of course during the passing of time, all of the instruments like the airports improved and the links to Europe improved. Of course the American embassies have in the past and I think still do, have a remarkable communications system. You know, if you are a NATO member you are fully aware of 99% of the things that are going on there, so you are able to do your job. Really rather a remarkable development and I give plaudits to the State Department for being able to put that together.

Q: Well when I think of Sweden, maybe a little earlier on in the 60's but on into the 70's, there certainly was not the greatest relationship, the Vietnam War and just different outlooks between the Swedes and the United States. Swedish television was full of crews that would come over and look at the dirt in the United States, portraying everything in a negative sense. At least that is how I had the feeling. Did you get any?

BARKLEY: Well there was a certain amount of that. I think you are referring to the period of time with Olaf Palme who was the Prime Minister, he was clearly critical of the United States. He had been a student here I guess and was somewhat shocked by our civil rights problems. He obviously had no sympathy for our policy on Vietnam. At that time, there were a number of soldiers, usually from Germany but form other areas too, that for whatever reason defected to these countries during the Vietnam war and were given asylum. That certainly was true in Norway as well as in Sweden. Even to this day the problem continues to fester a little bit because a lot of these want to be given immunity so they can return to the United States. I don't know what the status is now, but I can tell you 20 years ago there was no sympathy in Washington for this kind of thing. Then there was the general feeling that the United States had gone about things in the international community in a very negative way. We used to say at that time, and I think it is still marginally true, that Scandinavian indignation grows in direct proportion of the distance of the injustice, from their own shores. Therefore they can get all exercised about what is going on in Alabama and South Africa, but they don't say much about Russia or Poland or any of these other areas where there are some pretty brutalizing things going on.

Q: Well in Norway were we going to get the Norwegians to say nasty things about the Soviet Union?

BARKLEY: No it was never an effort that I was aware of to do that. We did on occasion, you know, try to starch their backbone when the Soviets got into something that was clearly bad. I mean a Soviet plane landed up in Bear Island, which is a Norwegian possession, and the Soviets demanded that they turn it back right away. We told them that your sovereign right is at least to see what that plane is up to. I think they sort of later did it but they didn't feel comfortable about it. The other thing that disturbed the Norwegians was the Vietnam War. It was over in 1975, although it was still stuck in the craw of the left wing and others during the time I was in Norway. But there were other issues that bothered the Norwegians. One of them was that under international law, the nations which pick up boat people that were coming out of Cambodia or Laos or Vietnam were responsible for them. Well of course Norway has a huge merchant marine, one of the largest in the world. The picked up a large number of them, and they had three or four thousand boat people that they had to relocate to Norway. I remember Knut Frydenlund coming to me and saying, "Well you know this is a cold climate. These people aren't going to be happy here. Wouldn't I be better for them to be in Texas or some place like that." Of course, I said, "Well you know, the international rules are quite clear." He said, "Would you ask your government?" I did, and of course Washington wasn't interested. At the same time he said, "How about some of these poor fellows in the anti Vietnam groups that want to go home. Could you take them?" I was also told to instruct him that it would depend of course on their actual status and whether or not they had indeed engaged in something considered criminal in the U.S. So we never resolved those problems. It was interesting to me that they actually approached me on it. But you know, it is extraordinarily easy when you have a very homogenous country like Norway, to be critical on racial and other issues. Their own tolerance for differing communities was not very high. So it was one of those things that we simply could not resolve.

Q: How about the fact we had a Vice President Fritz Mondale of Norwegian ancestry? Was that playing well?

BARKLEY: Oh yes they liked that very much of course. Before I arrived actually, he arrived for a personal visit to Norway, and he went up to his ancestral home which is the town of Mondale of course. I think he was somewhat shaken by the differences that had grown up between the Norwegian community in the United States and the Norwegian community back there. But you know, if you are from Minnesota, Norway is more than a foreign policy issue, it is a domestic issue. Every year, for example, the Sons of Norway, which at that time was the largest ethnic group in the United States, would make a pilgrimage to Oslo, and they would be received by the King. They had a gala dinner which of course, the embassy was expected to attend. It was a fascinating kind of interaction between the two because quite clearly, although these people were proud of their Norwegian heritage, they had come a long way. That meant that most of them spoke very little Norwegian, or whatever Norwegian they spoke was obviously form some little province they might have come from and was not necessarily intelligible to the king or

other Norwegians. It was always a very touching kind of ceremony. So the American Norwegian community, which had always been very proud of its background, is something that the Norwegians looked to as an asset in their relations with the United States.

Q: Well did this come up as far as get my cousin a visa or that sort of thing, or was this not much of a…

BARKLEY: It is really not a problem with the Scandinavians. As a matter of fact most of them don't require a visa to go to the United States any more, I am sure there are those occasions when something like that appears, it was never a major issue.

Q: What about whaling?

BARKLEY: Oh yes. Well, you know, Norwegians have been whaling I guess almost as long as there have been Norwegians. I don't know. It is a question of livelihood for a small but influential number of people in Norway. It is the kind of an issue that is particularly painful for the Norwegians because they do like to strike moral stances. I think it is an issue that they would wish would go away, but basically you can still buy whale meat at the fish markets. So far they have resisted, you know, the international controls, and they have argued, the minke whale, which they hunt is not actually endangered. That is their contention. But it has been a source of some pain.

Q: Have we made any demarches or anything like that?

BARKLEY: I never did. I am sure they might have been made at certain times. I think those go through the international whaling commission.

Q: I was thinking somebody I interviewed a long time ago was ambassador to Chad, and was told to make a demarche about whales. The foreign minister said, "Oh we will be right with you, excuse me. What is a whale? But of course in Norway this was not a joking matter. What about life in Norway? I somehow have the feeling on weekends everybody goes up skis or up in the mountains or to a fjord or something.

BARKLEY: Well the fact is of course, it is quite a prosperous country now.

Q: When you were there…

BARKLEY: When I was there it was very prosperous. To have a home at the seashore for the summer and to have a little hut up in the mountains for the winter was not unusual. Certainly it was not unusual for the upper middle classes of Bergen or Oslo. My wife is Norwegian, and her family has both. There is a place in the mountains and a place at the seashore. In the summer they go to the seashore and in the winter they go to the mountains, skiing. It is an interesting thing because by our standards, the climate is not particularly wonderful up there. But the people are so used to it that they don't allow

themselves to be deterred. They are very much an outdoor people. The best rain gear I ever found was in Norway because you are out in the rain a lot, or in the snow. The spring and the autumn you go berry picking or whatever and of course you could ski up until the Easter holidays. Right outside of Oslo there is a place called Normacka which is really quite a lovely cross country skiing area. They are basically outdoor people. They still seem to treasure their roots, most of them have country kinds of roots, although they have been heavily urbanized recently. Life is quite congenial. The only thing when I was there, was to go to a restaurant was extraordinarily difficult because they were so expensive. They were heavily taxed, and there weren't very many of them, so the idea of coming from a place like Germany or let's say France where the restaurant life might be actually a very doable thing, in Norway it was almost prohibitively expensive.

Q: What about the cultural life? One always things of a lot of the movies that came out of Sweden or other things and all this and books out of Sweden, but you don't hear much about the Norwegian side of things.

BARKLEY: Well the Norwegians are a bit like the Germans. They look at us with some contempt and say where is your Schiller or Goethe. The Norwegians say where is your Ibsen, your Hamsen. There are a couple of other great authors from a couple of hundred years ago. I mean quite obviously Henrik Ibsen is a national treasure. Fortunately the Danes claim him too because he wrote in what was Danish at that time. There are modern writers. They are not particularly well known. I certainly wouldn't want to offend anybody by forgetting which ones they might be. But, of course these are small countries.

Q: No.

BARKLEY: That is also true in television. They simply cannot finance much independent television, so they import an enormous amount of comedies and things from the United States. They have their version of Wheel of Fortune and their version of Jeopardy and all of these things. There has not been an awful lot of cultural creativity recently that I am aware of.

Q: Did Denmark play much of a role? How did the Norwegians look upon Denmark?

BARKLEY: Well the Norwegians like Denmark. They always felt that they had a certain kinship with Denmark, particularly vis a vis the Swedes. Both of them harbor certain attitudes towards Sweden. Of course they were part of Denmark for 300 years until they were taken away and added to Sweden. During that period of time I think there was resentment. The Danes were more urbane and more cosmopolitan, and the Norwegians were rather rough hewn. But when they became independent, their first king was a Dane, Haakon V. So historically I am not aware of any animosity. They like the Danes quite a bit.

Q: What about the king or the royal family? What sort of role do they play when you were there?

BARKLEY: Strictly a figurehead. He was head of state, not head of government. From the time of actually 1905 when they asked the king to come back, it was clear that he would have nothing to do with the actual governance of the country, but he is an important symbol. Just like in Great Britain, he is not only the king, he is the head of the Norwegian Lutheran Church and all of these other things. And of course there have been some changes in kingship everywhere. Haakon survived as king until right after the war. He went into exile in the war. He was a very popular king. His son Olaf who replaced him was extraordinarily popular for many years, and now Olaf's son Harald is king. Harald has married a commoner, as sign that things are changing. At one time that was considered to be quite dramatic.

Q: Particularly when she has a child born out of wedlock.

BARKLEY: No, this is the present son, Haakon Magnus. Magnus also married a commoner, a woman who had a child out of wedlock. That was quite a thing. Not only that, before he married her, he lived with her. For the traditionalist I am sure this was somewhat hard, but I think the vast majority of the Norwegians understand that whether you are a king or not, you are still human, and these things go on.

Q: Well, how about the relationship between Norway and West Germany, particularly there is a lot of history there. It goes back to 1940.

BARKLEY: Well, you are getting into a lot of history here, and it happens to be an area that I am interested in. Before the Second World War, large segments of Norway looked to England as sort of a leader of their futures, and others looked to the Germans. England had always been the draw for the economic and trading classes of Norway for obvious reasons. Germany was always the haven for cultural activities. Almost every Norwegian writer or painter studied in Germany, and so there was obviously some sentiment. But it wasn't the kind of sentiment that there was any sympathy for the German of course, invasion or occupation of Norway. And of course, nowadays if there is a swear word I guess you would have to say it is Vikdun Quisling who as Norwegian Prime Minister during the war was a Nazi sympathizer.

Q: His name became a word for collaborator.

BARKLEY: It is, but I don't think you can find many Americans who can find the origin of the word Quisling any more. It was particularly painful because Quisling in some respects was a quintessential Norwegian military officer. He got the highest marks ever out of the war college. But he took a wrong turn. His ambition obviously got him into some real terrible problems.

Q: Did you find everywhere, how were Germans received in Norway when you were there?

BARKLEY: Well on the one hand of course, they are very wealthy tourists and very intrepid, so they appeared in large numbers. However there is often a German tendency for people to knock on someone's door and say my father was stationed here during World War Two, and I would like to see where he lived. Maybe the levels of sensitivity were not always the highest in that regard. There is a certain ambivalence, but I don't think there is any hatred anymore. The elder generation does not really continue to fight that war.

Q: Well then how did you find having a Norwegian wife?

BARKLEY: Well I met her there. Before we married I was already at a new posting in Bonn. So she wasn't my wife while I was there as DCM.

Q: Well then you were married in while you were in Germany. Well in '81, December of '81, where did you go?

BARKLEY: Well I was contacted by the State Department, a friend of mine, John Kornblum whom I had known for many years, and he said, "Look, would you be interested in taking over as political counselor in Bonn?" Arthur Burns who had been nominated as ambassador there had just arrived. There was a change going on in the summer of '81, and I said, "You know in view of my German background, I would be delighted." Although Political Counselor is not the same as DCM, but it was a higher ranking position. I said, "I would like to do that," however we were without an ambassador in Norway. I was given the position in Bonn but told that I was on hold until an ambassador and DCM replacement appeared. They didn't appear until December of that year. So I had six months that I had to stay on as DCM and as chargé in Norway. In December of that year, I took over the position as political counselor in Bonn.

Q: Who became ambassador in Norway?

BARKLEY: Mark Evans Austad. Well after Ambassador Lerner left, for a year he was replaced by Sidney Rand who had been a good friend of Fritz Mondale's and had been the President of St. Olaf College. Then of course, when the election took place, and Ronald Reagan became president, he tendered his resignation, and left rather quickly. It took almost a year to replace him. I was the chargé for almost a year, February of 1981 until December of 1981. Mark had been ambassador to Finland under Jerry Ford, was of Norwegian extraction and apparently a Mormon missionary at one time in Norway, and he felt a great kinship for Norway and desperately wanted to come. For whatever reason, and there is a lot of rumors going on, none of which I could verify, it took a long time for him to be finally nominated. He arrived in December, and at that time, I left and went to Bonn.

Q: So you were in Bonn through '82 I guess.

BARKLEY: Well actually the beginning of 1982 until 1985.

Q: The ambassador was Arthur Burns at that time?

BARKLEY: Yes.

Q: Could you give a little background of Arthur Burns and how he operated.

BARKLEY: Arthur Burns was certainly the most prominent American I ever worked for. He had been the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board for a good long tenure. He had been Eisenhower's economic advisor. He was an economist of great renown. He obviously was elderly at the time. He was in his late 70's when he was appointed. But he was internationally known. Really I think, the Germans were extraordinarily pleased to have a man of that stature named the ambassador to the Federal Republic. Helmut Schmidt, who considered himself quite an economist, usually had contempt for anybody who couldn't meet his own standards in economics. Well, Arthur Burns not only matched him but trumped him several times. So Schmidt had great admiration for Burns. He was a man of almost intimidating presence. He was just a lovely human being. He had sort of a flinty personality. He didn't suffer fools. I often thought that the worst job I could possibly have gotten was to be his economic advisor at the embassy in Bonn. Happily I was his political advisor, and he didn't claim to know much about the politics, so he did tend to listen to us. He was just an absolutely remarkable figure. Of course, when people came in to see him if they had any inclination to be feisty or combative, that evaporated once they met Arthur Burns. He was just a wonderful representative of the United States.

Q: What was the political situation like in '82 when you got there?

BARKLEY: Well we were going through the final throes of the NATO double track decision we were actually beginning to bring the Pershing missiles into Germany. That was a subject of popular great anxiety.

Q: You were saying Schmidt being an economist.

BARKLEY: Yes. He was concerned about the downward trend in the American economy in the first two years of the Reagan administration. One of my first tasks was to accompany Arthur Burns as note taker in his first meeting with Helmut Schmidt. It was agonizing for me to realize they were talking in a rather high technical terms, terms that I was not particularly familiar with. The art of drafting the memcon was really a challenge but it was a remarkable two hours that we spent. It was quite clear that Schmidt was really an imperial kind of character. He had great intellect. He was confident of his mind and abilities. He didn't cultivate too many people, but he had so much admiration for Arthur Burns it was actually an interesting exchange. Burns never would back down from him on any issue. He didn't feel he had to. It was a very interesting. But the seeds actually of the last elements of the Schmidt administration had been sown. His own party turned against him on the NATO dual track decision. Willy Brandt, who Schmidt had replaced and had gone into retirement, came out and led a frontal assault on Schmidt's policy on the

defense, considering it an unnecessary provocation to the Soviet Union. In the course of the year, Schmidt fought a rear guard action. But the Schmidt government was a coalition government. It was a coalition between the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats. The Free Democrats were represented by Hans Dietrich Genscher who was the foreign minister. He had been foreign minister for many years. Genscher was uncomfortable with the position of the Social Democratic Party and was already beginning to make motions towards the Christian Democratic Union, the leader of which was Helmut Kohl. So tensions had built during this entire time. It built during the party conventions, where there were personal attacks on Schmidt. Schmidt tried to maintain his Social Democratic credentials and fend off what he considered the emotional outpourings of his own party. He was familiar with what was going on, but it became increasingly difficult to control these factions. By the autumn of 1982, he was in deep trouble. Actually Genscher broke ranks with him and entered a coalition with Kohl. The new government was born in September of that year.

Q: How did you find dealing with the social democrats, SPD?

BARKLEY: Social democrats like social democrats and labor party people everywhere are full of ideas. Some of them are cockamamie, but often a lot of creativity comes out of them too. I think they at this time had gone so far, however in accommodation with the Soviet Union that it was very hard to find common ground. At the same time of course, they had been in power for a considerable number of years with Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt. They were looking for new economic models. I remember we put together a group of young economists from the Social Democratic Party who met with Arthur Burns. He had a fascinating lunch with them, and he came out sort of wagging his head and said, "You know they are really off the wall. All of their ideas in practice have no utility." I think that is often what happens when a party has been in power for a long time, a party whose leftist wing was uncomfortable with business policies of Helmut Schmidt. So this was the period of time of many new trends, not the least was the emergence of the Green Party. It had been around for awhile, mostly among college students. It went from pro-ecology to being anti NATO very quickly. In the elections of that summer, they actually went over the 5% barrier, and entered the Bundestag. There were new elements in the Social Democrats who were fearful of losing their liberal base, and they did lose large segments of their liberal base. That sent them into opposition.

Q: How were we looking at the greens?

BARKLEY: I think with great curiosity. Of course we were you are always a little bit aggravated when a party attacks you, or attacks NATO, which was the instrument that maintained Western cohesion for a long period of time. I am totally convinced that it was the glue that tied us all together in the face of Soviet threat. So these efforts were not totally appreciated, but our job as an embassy was to try to understand what was going on. We met with them all. We always had.

Q: The name that comes to mind is Petra Kelly.

BARKLEY: Oh yes, Petra Kelly is a fascinating figure. Her stepfather was a U.S. military colonel. She took his name Kelly, but she developed a terrible contempt for the U.S. military. She established then a personal liaison with a rather prominent German general by the name of Gerd Bastian. Bastian gave a great deal of legitimacy to the Green Movement because of his military background. At that time almost every leftist was concerned about the ecology. The forests were dying in Germany. At that time they were just discovering acid rain and all of those things, and young people were energized. You know it was a powerful appeal. So we tried to get to know them very well. Actually Joschka Fischer, who is now the Foreign Minister, was a highly successful member of the Green Party. I got to know him. He was a very charming fellow, highly intelligent, and of course was on the cutting edge of a new movement. At that time it was a little bit like a combination of don't trust anyone over 30 on one hand, and the idea of power on the other because they wanted to constantly change the leadership of the party in a system where seniority is rewarded, so it didn't work very well. They had been going through a lot of these things, and even to this day, there are two movements, the Realo's and the Fundi's as they are called. The Realo's want to follow a realistic course of constant coalition with the government and the Fundi's think that government is corrupting and therefore they should go back to the radical fundamentals of the Party.

Q: Were we concerned at that time from the Bonn point of view of West Germany somehow or another making a pact with East Germany to unify and become a neutral?

BARKLEY: That had been a concern for a very long period of time. It goes back to the early stages of the Social Democratic Party. And of course the anti NATO elements, not only the Greens but a large part of Social Democracy stayed in that direction. The idea is that a neutral Germany would form sort of a barrier between the warring East-West camps. So senior SPP officials did endorse it. Oskar Lafontaine, when he ran as Social Democratic candidate later on against Helmut Kohl basically espoused this kind of thing. There has always been a certain pacifist vein in Germany that came out of course of the excesses of World War II. I remember when I was a student in Germany, a lot of the kids said, "Well, the military is okay for some jarhead from Texas, but we are too cerebral and too cultured to engage in this kind of thing." You know it was that kind of arrogance. Fortunately it never took root with the vast majority of the German people. The Marxist intellectuals somehow could never find common ground with the laboring class.

Q: Talking of Marxist, ideology in all of Europe seems to have a much stronger strain, particularly Marxist ideology than in the United States. Did you see that? I mean were the teachers…

BARKLEY: There were the Greens, and the Greens had groups that had communist sympathies, I don't know how deep. But there was the kind of Marxists that goes way back to the 70's where the students decided it was time to make a "long march" through the institutions, basically grabbing the teaching positions. They tried this for a long time. Obviously they had some successes like you always do when you have a mass movement

of intellectuals at the universities, but if it was going to catch, it never caught at that particular time. Then with the subsequent development of the collapse of the Soviet Union it really went begging.

Q: What about Helmut Kohl and the CDU? How did we view that, as they were sort of getting ready and assumed power while you were there?

BARKLEY: Well there were always a number of candidates for the Christian Democratic Union, and I remember we tried to make sure that the ambassador met with all of them. A lot of them had been around for a long time and were considered to be really serious candidates. But after meeting with all of them, the ambassador said, "Well, I can tell you categorically that the candidate will be Helmut Kohl, because he has a steadying influence, and he is strong where all of the others have great weaknesses." And of course he turned out to be absolutely right. He came out of Rhineland Palatinate. He was a German Catholic, much in the tradition of Adenauer. He liked Adenauer. Adenauer was also a Rhinelander. These were people who felt that the western moorings of the Federal Republic were absolutely essential to their existence. He was a solid guy, and he had a willingness to stand up and to do certain things. While the Social Democrats were fragmenting over the double track decision he came in 100% behind it. Of course he had the support at that time of Genscher. He was very firm in maintaining the draft, that Germany would continue to meet its military obligations to the West. He was a refreshing beginning, and obviously he was the chancellor for a good long time. I think, in fact, he was chancellor longer than Adenauer.

Q: While you were there did you see any problems about political financing?

BARKLEY: No. That all came out later. In retrospect it always seemed they had enough money to do the things they had to do. The political parties, you have got to realize, were financed by the government. I think probably if you ever look at it, now, it was a huge political issue, but we are not talking about enormous amounts of money. They had a couple of million dollars they had in their kitty to do what they wanted to do to make sure people behaved like they wanted them to behave. But it certainly was not apparent during my period of time '82 to '85.

Q: Was Berlin at all an issue?

BARKLEY: Always. Berlin is always an issue.

Q: Even at this period of time?

BARKLEY: Absolutely.

Q: What were the problems?

BARKLEY: Well the main problem was always the geography of Berlin. Let me back up

a bit. The appeal for me of the Political Counselor's position was that it was the largest political section in the American foreign service. It was divided into five different groups. The external section. The internal section. Political military affairs, which was very big during the NATO double track decision. And the Berlin affairs group. I had all of those. We had 14 or 15 officers altogether, without secretaries. It was a large staff. In Berlin, the problem is so arcane that we had to make sure the ambassador and others knew what they needed to know without burdening them with all sorts of minutiae. It was very hard. We were constantly, trying to adjudicate issues. For example our embassy in Berlin was in the Soviet sector, right? Therefore, it could not engage in any activities with the Soviet sector government. That was the responsibility of our Mission in the American sector in Berlin. All access questions were a matter of coordinating with occupying powers, the French, the British, and the Americans. They met once or twice a week with their German counterparts and they would go through everything. There is an enormous number of things that come up in a city like Berlin. I mean it was the largest city in Germany. Whether it was a matter of making sure that you can get your necessary raw materials into the city, I mean it just goes on and on with the access questions. Now we were somewhat in a better position after the Berlin agreements of 1973. Nonetheless, there was always some nagging problem, and the Soviet knew exactly what chains to pull if they wanted to sensitize us as to our vulnerability. So there was constantly something going on.

Q: Well I would think our embassy in East Berlin would feel sort of subservient to our embassy in Bonn because of you know, they are sitting in a place where if they did something wrong they could really screw things up vis a vis West Berlin.

BARKLEY: But basically we did not have very active relations with the East Germans. There was no question where American political sympathies lie. The Ambassador there was basically in a reporting position, because of the status of Berlin, and because the Embassy, for administrative reasons, was placed in the Soviet sector. We could not have military attachés there, so the Embassy was a bare bones Embassy. It had an agricultural attaché, it had USIS, it had political officers who were trying to figure out what was going on in East Germany as well of course with their relationships, within the Eastern bloc. So the embassy was somewhat smaller than the overwhelmingly large embassy in Bonn. Then we had a very large presence in our sector in Berlin, the U.S. mission in Berlin. So the East Berlin Embassy was very small. But its tasks were also commensurately small. There were certain things it could do and many things it could not do. But at this time actually one of the more interesting issues of my career came up. Our ambassador in East Germany was Roz Ridgeway who was extraordinarily effective diplomat. The only thing is that Roz did not speak very good German. One of the ongoing things that we had was an East-West channel that went back to the Power Able exchange, long time ago. That was a channel of discussions between the East German government and the American government. I was given the task of taking on this channel of communications with the East German lawyer Wolfgang Vogel, who was instrumental in working out, not only the Power Able exchange, but subsequent exchanges as well. We worked out the Sharansky exchange, and a whole variety of other prisoner exchanges. Ss political counselor in Bonn I became his American counterpart. It was a particular challenge because I knew of the

sensitivity of our embassy in Berlin of talking with an agent of the East German government. So every time we met, I would either write or go up and see Roz Ridgeway and debrief her on everything that was going on, make sure that there was no freelancing and that she was fully aware of what was happening. Every ambassador we had in East Germany operated under a series of agreements that we had with the West Germans. One said that if any asylum seeker entered their Embassy we could not expel them. We could never turn anybody over who was a German citizen either of East Germany or West Germany to the authorities. This was an issue of extraordinary sensitivity in the West German government. And of course this was a constant challenge because we wanted to keep our embassy in East Germany open with access to the public without it becoming a point for asylum seekers. That turned out to be a nagging problem. We did not only do prisoner exchanges, Vogel and I, but we would also do personal cases where people would get into the embassy trying to seek asylum, and he would become the negotiator to make sure they were released without prejudice. He worked with his German counterpart who was the State Secretary for Inter German affairs in Bonn, to work out these things to the point that nobody was particularly embarrassed.

Q: Well you get to the point where you are a bunch of rational people on both sides trying to figure out let's take care of this thing without turning it into a propaganda thing or not.

BARKLEY: Well we would like to think that was the case, but inevitably things got dicey. When we got into discussions on a man like Anatoly Sharansky for example. Sharansky obviously was somebody we desperately wanted to get out of Russia, because he had been able to create a constituency of concern in the American government. Any American government that would be able to secure his release would be considered heroes by large segments of the American public. So there was political weight behind all of these things.

Q: How did Sharansky who is a Soviet citizen, end up with a couple of people talking about him in Germany?

BARKLEY: Well because the only agent who would discuss these things with the west was Wolfgang Vogel. The same thing was during the Power Abel exchange where the standards of operations were set.

Q: This was when the pilot of the U-2 and Karl Abel who was a spy in the United States in New York I guess, were exchanged.

BARKLEY: That is right. Either they shot down the U-2 or somehow got hold of Powers and we wanted to exchange him. This was the first effort to do that. The channel they developed that the spokesman for the Soviet Union through the East German government was this independent lawyer Wolfgang Vogel. At that time his counterpart was Frank Meehan who was the political officer in the U.S. Mission in West Berlin. They negotiated this exchange. That was the beginning actually of using Vogel as the conduit for these

kinds of exchanges. The problem was that American assets, most had been recruited either by the Defense Intelligence Agency, many of them based in Germany, were trying to gain access to East Germany, but other areas too. These agents were rolled up almost immediately by Eastern intelligence services, the Stasi of course, or by their Polish or Czech counterparts. We always had an extraordinarily difficult time seizing their assets, identifying them and bringing them to court. So there were a huge number of assets of ours that they had, and hardly any of theirs that we had. The only difference was that in terms of tradecraft, which is the intelligence system's view of themselves, the eastern Europeans and the Soviets would do almost anything to get their assets back, where we didn't seem to care very much about ours. So although there was a disparity in terms of the numbers, they were so desperate to get their assets back that we could usually strike some sort of arrangement.

Q: Well how did the Sharansky thing come up? Was it going when you got there or…

BARKLEY: It was in the background, and the Soviets had refused to consider trading for him. Quite obviously, although he was a political symbol in the west, he was also a symbol of resistance in Russia. Of course for the longest period of time he was considered by the Soviets to be an agent. So we said, "No he is not an agent, he is a civil rights leader." In the last analysis, what we were able to do is say, "If you agree to your definition", we will agree to our definition, and we will get him out. For the longest time the Soviets wouldn't play. It took them awhile to realize there were some advantages from their standpoint of getting him out because he continued to be, through particularly his wife who had gotten out, a thorn in the Soviet side. It took a long time. Actually that was finally consummated after I left in 1985-1986. But Vogel was always looking for the kinds of assets that we had in the West because there were so few, and looking for anybody because we had interest in a number of people, and indeed, just before I left, we did complete a major deal of 26 of our assets that we had for four of theirs, two East Germans, a Pole, and a Bulgarian.

Q: Well in a way you had to be rather sharp traders, let's go out and get some more. You were counting up…

BARKLEY: It sounds a little bit tidier than in fact it was. You know, whenever you would identify somebody, it had to be vetted through, if we held them in the United States. In this case we did hold all of them. You had to vet it through the Department of Justice, the CIA, and the State Department and all of the agencies that may be involved. As you know these agencies seldom agree. So it was difficult to find an asset that was useful. The big breakthrough in the negotiation that I had was when we finally seized an East German agent in Boston by the name of Zehe. He had been lured up there from Mexico City and the FBI grabbed him. Although the East Germans claimed he wasn't a big hitter, they wanted to get him back. They were willing to negotiate actively. Then there was the great disparity between the American political and judicial system and that in Eastern Europe. The Eastern Europeans grab a person that they claim is an asset, they lock him up. We put them on trial, and in a U.S. trial you need evidence, and so the first

thing the East Germans did was to get an extraordinarily capable lawyer in Boston. His name was Silverglade. He found out that the FBI did not have an iron clad case. There was of course the contention of entrapment, and the usual thing. So the East Germans did not want to negotiate if he was going to be found not guilty. There was a long hiatus there to find out whether or not we had some negotiating room or not. We did have a couple of people in custody, a Pole and a Bulgarian and subsequently another East German woman, who was a courier, they were not big fish. But we had sufficient evidence to get them. They were sitting in a federal penitentiary which is not a pleasant place to be. I have gone somewhat far afield but this is one of the major tasks that I was assigned at that time.

Q: Oh no. This is very much what you were doing there. Was there sort of a ritual, a bridge or something where they would appear and walk across?

BARKLEY: Well when we finally made the trade, there was a bridge between Potsdam and West Berlin called the Glienicker Brucke, it was also called Freedom Bridge. It was a bridge that was open and operative but was not open to public traffic. It became the exchange point. It was the exchange point for Powers and Abel and every subsequent prisoner exchange took place there. There was quite a ritual in which it was done. The American side would stay on our side and then they would go out and meet in the middle, and there would be Vogel and the agents, and they would do this exchange.

Q: You found out that once you started getting into negotiations things were carried on, games weren't played at the last moment?

BARKLEY: Well yes, there was always a certain amount of this. One of the problems was that Vogel was an extraordinarily effective fellow. There are books being written about him even to this day. Craig Whitney the New York Times correspondent wrote one called Spy Trader, all about Vogel. It was fascinating. Vogel was a man of his word, and if he said I can do this, he could do it. Our problem was different because we always had to go back and get clearance for everything we did. So we would make an initial agreement pending approval form the American authorities and the German authorities, because the Germans, these are almost all German citizens, also had to agree. Then all of a sudden the Germans would say no we don't want this guy. He works both sides of the fence; we are not going to play that game. Or the Americans would say okay we want to add four more. Or what was more often the case, we would come back and say, "We have got to add four more." He would say, "Jesus, I can't continue to do this. The disparities are already so great." So it was a real horse trading kind of thing, but I was the only U.S. voice. I was the only person who had sufficient German that I could do this. So when other people came over, I was not only the voice, but I was the interpreter. Many of our guys had the authority of their own office but they didn't have the full authority of the United States government. So the whole thing would never have worked if we didn't have someone like Tom Niles, who was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the European bureau, who was marvelous at getting these groups together and hammering out our positions.

Q: One last question on this. How did you find, we have got rather large consulates in Germany. How did you use them and what sort of role did they play?

BARKLEY: We used to have large numbers of consulates in West Germany. We had them in Munich, Hamburg, Stuttgart, Bremen, Düsseldorf, and Frankfurt, that was the biggest consulate I think in the world. Of course we had a mission in Berlin. The one that was probably the smallest and the one that didn't have as much impact was the one in Düsseldorf because it was very close to Bonn. But nonetheless, the Germans had a decentralized government system, and every state wants to have their American representative. So of course the biggest state in the union is North Rhine Westphalia, and Düsseldorf is the capital, so that had a lot of weight. There was always a question, of the use of the one in Bremen. There was a question for a long time whether we neede4d all of those in terms of what they produced. But in fact it became such political moment in Germany that the idea of closing any one at that time was not acceptable. I think the have subsequently closed Düsseldorf and Bremen, but that was after unification and after we opened Leipzig.

Q: Well is there anything else you think we should comment on your thing in Germany?

BARKLEY: Well you know, it was such a fast and active period of time. I am sure there is something. Maybe perhaps the very controversial visit of President Reagan to Bitburg. That was an issue of great public moment in the United States. I actually was the control officer for that visit.

Q: When this thing was being said you might explain what the problem was and how did it impact on you?

BARKLEY: Well the problem basically was every time the president of the United States makes a visit, the local politician tries to use the presidents to his specific advantage. This in the past had not been a serious problem. But when we were putting together the visit for Ronald Reagan, Helmut Kohl had great influence because of his foursquare support of the NATO double track decision etc. Reagan liked him very much, and we wanted to make sure this was a successful visit. Kohl's view of what a successful visit was predicated on a number of factors. One, he had just had an extraordinarily successful visit with Francois Mitterrand at which they joined hands at the Marne, one of the major battle sites of the First World War and prayed together. In other words this was a big moment of reconciliation in which they tried to lay to rest one of the most agonizing elements of European history. They wanted to do something similar with President Regan. So the ambassador and I and the DCM went in to see Kohl's deputy to work out a program.

Q: Who was the DCM?

BARKLEY: Bill Woessner. We went in to see the national security advisor for Helmut Kohl who was basically in charge of the program. He said, "Well we would like him first to visit the Chancellor's home area which is Rhineland Pfalz and we would like him to go

to the Hambach castle, where the first stirrings of German nationalism occurred." That was fine. Then he said, "We would like to go to the cemetery following up on the Mitterrand-Kohl reconciliation." There is one very close to the American air base, also again in Rhineland Pfalz. It was called Bitburg, which of course subsequently became a trade name for people who were unhappy with the president. The problem was is that there were no American grave sites in Germany anywhere. In WWI and WWII we had no U.S. graves in Germany. So there was no Normandy or any place they could go. There was only a German grave site. When we sat there, and we talked about it, I said to Horst Telchek, who was the German national security advisor, after they went through what the chancellor proposed to do, (We have it all on documentation so I can be the hero at this particular moment) I said, "The one thing that would be unacceptable is if there were any SS troops in that grave." He said "I am sure that this will be fine." He didn't go any farther than that. What we subsequently heard is they went back and they told Kohl there can't be any SS there. Kohl apparently said, "But they were all troops. They were all Germans. They all died in battle etc. There is no distinction between the two." For the first time it showed me that Helmut Kohl's judgment was failing, because he should have been fully aware of how explosive the Hitler SS was. So the president's team came in. It was headed by Michael Deaver and a number of other people. They were all extraordinarily effective in photo-ops. They would go to these different places and say, "Yes the president will look god against this backdrop". We can take this picture; we can to that. It is just something that any Presidential advance group goes through and they were very good at it. When we got to Bitburg there was a bad snowstorm. All of the graves were flat in the ground so you couldn't spot what was going on. I remember we got Bill Woessner to tell Deaver that the only concern we have if there is any SS in here. Deaver didn't know what we were talking about. So I don't think it fully registered with him. Anyway they came out with the broad arrangements between the Germans on where the president would go. Then it hit the fan when U.S. journalists went up to Bitburg. The snow had melted and they looked down and they saw Obersturm Bahnfuhrer and so on, who bore these SS titles on the ground. Boy they went ballistic. We had a serious crisis on our hands. I mean a serious crisis on our hands. Thank God we had Arthur Burns because he was able to adjudicate some of the worst aspects of it. Well when it hit him, all of a sudden Kohl was aware that the firestorm was created by his decision. He wrote a letter to President Reagan saying that if President Reagan rejected the Bitburg visit, Kohl's political future was in jeopardy. It was a terribly powerful letter. Reagan said, we have to handle this some way, but I can't disappoint Helmut Kohl. Well by that time Elie Wiesel and American Jewish groups were highly incensed by this terrible blunder and really put pressure on the President. We went to work to try to salvage it. The way it was finally salvaged was to move the President personally as far away as Bitburg without you now jettisoning that part of the program, and then have him go to a concentration camp. So he went to Bergen Belsen where he did a kaddish. Then apparently Washington trying to find a way out of this mess got a call from Matthew Ridgeway who was probably at that time the U.S.'s greatest living soldier. You know the hero of Korea.

Q: And a paratroop commander.

BARKLEY: Yeah and NATO commander I believe. He was a man of enormous stature and he said, "I gather the chief is in trouble and if I can do anything, I will." Well the Germans then came up with General Steinhof who was a man also of great character.

Q: Air force pilot, badly burned.

BARKLEY: Badly wounded. And they shook hands while the president stood far away on the grounds of Bitburg. Of course there were all of these efforts to try to ease the pain, but by that time much of the damage had been done. It was an extraordinarily difficult time. I remember most of the journalists I knew stationed in Bonn, I mean Bill Drozdiak, and Jim Markham, great journalists said that their editors were all over them to come up with some salacious aspects to what was going on, and how bad the Germans really were and the whole thing, so there was enormous pressure on the press too. It was probably one of the ugliest experiences I have ever had.

Q: Well what about the reporters who were there. I am talking about the serious reporters rather than the ones running around with the crisis of the moment, but the serious reporters there. Were they trying to put this into perspective?

BARKLEY: Oh no. They had a scoop here. They had a story. They had pain and suffering. This is shock and awe almost. They were having a wonderful time. Of course they were taking these pictures of the gravesites and then they would do some research on who this guy was, who this SS guy was and what sins he had created. Of course because it took place in a grave area, they were tromping all over the graveyard. There was some talk of desecration of the graves. I don't know about that but certainly the visual media were tromping all over that place to try and get racy stories. All of the journalists I knew, reputable journalists, were somehow I think shocked by their home office demands for more and more stuff. I mean it was already bad enough. But somehow we got through it.

Q: This is tape 5, side 1 with Dick Barkley. You

BARKLEY: Because of Ronald Reagan having spent this difficult time at Kohl's side, he had certain credit to draw on. You and I know that credit can be drawn down pretty quickly in foreign policy. Nonetheless at that time, there was a great sense of gratitude for Regan's courage in continuing what for him was a very painful experience.

Q: Was there at the embassy level and all, and with the White House, was there a lot of finger pointing and trying to find the fall guy and all that?

BARKLEY: Oh yeah, of course. In that case, however, to have someone the stature of Arthur Burns is worth gold. They weren't going to attack him, and he knew perfectly well where the problems were. But it was one of those cases where I don't think they were going to get away with frying any of the young guys, so they just let it go. But there was a lot of talk about retribution. I didn't know where that was going of course, but our record was quite clear. This was where answering the mail and keeping up with documentary

evidence is worth a lot, because it was all there. We had raised a cautionary note and they had disregarded it.

Q: Okay, Dick, we will stop at this point, and we will pick this up the next time in 1985. Whither?

BARKLEY: Well, my reassignment to South Africa.

Q: All right, well we will pick you going to South Africa in 1985.

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Today is July 29, 2003. Dick, in 1985 you are off to South Africa. Where did you go and what were you doing?

BARKLEY: I went as the DCM.

Q: Okay, so that gave you two places.

BARKLEY: I actually had two residences. One was in Pretoria, which was the administrative capital of South Africa, and the second was in Cape Town which is the legislative capital.

Q: You were there from when to when?

BARKLEY: From summer, I think it was early July, 1985 until three years later August, 1988.

Q: Ok, who was our ambassador then?

BARKLEY: When I arrived, our ambassador was Herman Nickel. Nickel had quite a reputation as an analytical journalist. He had worked for Fortune Magazine. He had interviewed Nelson Mandela and a number of key South Africans at different times, and was known for his critical understanding of what was going on in South Africa. My understanding was that he was selected by Chester Crocker who had met him somewhere, was impressed with his intelligence and drive. He had been ambassador there for about two years when I came.

Q: What was the situation in South Africa at the time both domestically how it operated, and how were relations with the United States?

BARKLEY: Well Apartheid was still in place, but it was crumbling around the edges. The National Party, which was the party of the Boers, was in power. The president was P.W. Botha. His party clearly controlled the white electorate. But at the same time a number of systemic changes had already begun. The economy was growing. There was an

attempt on the part of the National Party and P.W. Botha to engage effectively in foreign policy areas. Unfortunately, that usually meant military attacks against the ANC or what they considered to be terrorist groups in Zimbabwe and Zambia. They also were engaged in a low level warfare with the Cubans in Angola. But the bedrock of Apartheid was beginning to fray around the edges. American policy was in the hands of Chester Crocker who was the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, a position he held for an eight year stretch. I arrived there about five years into the Reagan Administration, and Chester Crocker was an advocate of constructive engagement. The idea is that the white minority government was a powerful government. It had a sizable military force. It had a real anchor in the population.. The economy was still quite robust at that time. Crocker thought that you can't wish these people away, basically the Afrikaners. And, as you can't wish them away; the best thing you can do is engage them to convince them that the elimination of Apartheid is not the same as the elimination of the Afrikaner people, which was one of the things they were most concerned about. That indeed, reaching rational accommodation with their neighbors was not a sign of weakness. Also that a robust economy can play to the advantage of all South Africans, because as the economy grows, the base of expertise among the Whites, Anglos and the Afrikaners, was not sufficient to operate that economy efficiently. Therefore a growing economy would willy-nilly empower groups that had no power under the Apartheid regime. P.W. Botha had started to make some accommodations to those realities. There were now houses in the parliament, admittedly with very little power, for colored representatives and for Indian representatives. Botha apparently looked upon those two groups as a bulwark against the overwhelming power of the disenfranchised blacks. So Crocker wanted to engage, but his concept was often misunderstood. This was not engaging the Afrikaners as a legitimate government in order to entrench them in power, but indeed to induce them to change. Despite all of the arguments, political debate that went on in the United States which was sizable and substantial, no group that I knew of, had any goal other than the elimination of Apartheid. How you did it was the point of contention. There tended to be a feeling among many Americans that by punishing people you bludgeon them to the point where their economy is in such dire straits that they give up. Chester Crocker's idea was the opposite. You want to create such a dynamic economy that you bring more and more people into it, and in that process enfranchise them.

Q: Well Congress by the time you got there in '85, hadn't Congress levied some sanctions on that?

BARKLEY: The sanctions came later. Of course this was during the Reagan administration. There were a number of people in the Reagan administration, more specifically in the White House, who actually claimed that the communists were using the anti Apartheid movement to subvert what was going on. There was an East-West dimension to what was going on in South Africa. There is no question that the ANC, was the major opposition against Apartheid. It had been forced abroad or was in prison, and had large numbers of active communists in their ranks. The communist movement in South Africa is extremely interesting. Initially it was, and for the longest period of time, was focusing on organizing white workers because there is a large white laboring class in

South Africa. People like Joe Slovo were obviously whites. But later on they broadened their appeals and began to realize that there was a great disgust with Apartheid generally, and that they could turn it to political advantage. Many of them joined very actively, and some at great personal risk and sacrifice joined the anti-Apartheid movement.

Q: Well what was sort of the status of the embassy in this difficult time when you got there?

BARKLEY: Well interestingly enough when I arrived, Ambassador Nickel had been called back in protest over an incursion the South Africans had made into Zimbabwe. It was to show our displeasure with what was going on, only to find out the South Africans didn't particularly care if we had an ambassador there or not. Then came the question how do we lever him back in while maintaining the integrity of the United States. I landed, at that time and after a short interval after my predecessor departed. I took over as Chargé, and of course as you can imagine, it was entirely new turf for me. It was a rather frantic time. I was trying to get all of the elements of our policy as well as what was going on in the country under some control. In any event, after a relatively short period of time, Ambassador Nickel returned carrying a personal letter from President Reagan to try to encourage P.W. Botha to open himself to more reform. That became the hook on which Ambassador Nickel could return. So for the initial month or so, I was the Chargé.

Q: How did you find you were received by the nationalist government when You got there?

BARKLEY: Well of course, as I was the Chargé I didn't have to present my credentials or anything like that. Most of my initial contacts were with the foreign office. The foreign office was an extraordinarily sophisticated group of people. They were all very well educated. By the standards of that time they were a forward leaning progressive group of usually, not only Afrikaners but a lot of Anglos too. These people were sophisticated and of course most of them knew perfectly well what the American position was. There was always sort of an ambivalence about them. Many of them liked Americans. There was a certain, I think, kinship because as strange as it sounds, the United States also had racial problems and had tried to come to grips with them. Although the races were absolutely different in South Africa. But I did not ever have any problems intellectually. There were a couple of people in the foreign office who were more hard headed than others, but most of the time you had regional or national discourse with them. The problems with the military were somewhat different. We did have meetings with the military fairly often. Once again, intellectually they seemed to be reasonable. They were pursuing their government's policy line, one that we strongly disagreed with. At that time, I think, among most white South Africans, perhaps more among the Anglos than among the Afrikaners, this concept of "the spear in the window", the haunting fear that their security will always be threatened, and the fear that if the black majority takes over, maybe they will treat us like we treated them. So there was a certain fear that could be played on. The thought I think among Chet Crocker and others at the time was if you challenge that fear directly they will go into what they call "lager" which is they will turn in on themselves,

and shut out the world, and things will get even uglier and bloodier. But that if you indeed engage them intelligently and tell them there is nothing really to fear, their future as South Africans would be secure. That of course was a position that Nelson Mandela personally held, reasonable accommodations for all sides could be made without fear. Of course you draw these issues simply but they are complex issues and emotions ran very deeply on all sides.

Q: Well Nelson Mandela at that point was still in jail. You didn't realize the type of man and the thrust he would…

BARKLEY: Well he was in jail, but people were seeing him with some regularity. I remember Helen Sussman, who was one of the foremost leaders of the Progressive Party an anti-Apartheid Anglo party, in Parliament, and an enormously courageous woman, would visit him on occasion on Robben Island. It turned out later that a number of government officials did meet with him fairly often. He wrote letters, of course through a number of people in his family. Now the government would of course selectively publish segments of those letters. But he wasn't totally in lockdown. That was when a number of things happened actually. I remember one of the first things that caught my attention. I hadn't been Chargé more than a week or two, when we got a visit by Steven Solarz, the Congressman from New York. Steven had developed quite a reputation in the foreign service because he traveled a lot. He was extraordinarily well read. He prepared himself extremely well. There were a couple of things of course, that he felt strongly about, and he had the tendency whenever he came to town to demand, not to ask, but to demand to see everyone from the President to the Prime Minister to the Foreign Minister on down. So every time that he appeared there was sort of a cumulative groan. "Oh God, you know, this guy is not the head of government or head of state. He is one of 435 Congressmen; how do we do all of these things." Interestingly enough he is always remarkably successful in getting what he wanted because he put the fear of God into the Embassies and they worked their butts off for him. He also had a number of contacts that usually helped him one way or the other. In any event, he showed up shortly after I arrived. I was still trying to get established. Through a series of intermediaries and the embassy etc. he got almost all the appointments he wanted. So he went in to see P.W. Botha, and I went with him. This was actually my first introduction to the top leadership of the national party and the president of the republic. It was one of the most incredible sessions I have ever attended. Steve had a tendency to try to put people on the stand and grill them. Well the president of a sovereign nation doesn't feel he has to accept that kind of thing, but it was a stylistic thing that he did, and he usually of course, provoked a lot of responses, some perhaps he didn't want and others that maybe were illuminating. So we went in to see P.W. Botha, who turned out to be very large man with rather bulging eyes and bald pate, you know huge arms, a man of physical stature but a man who quite clearly had made somewhat a career out of intimidating anybody around him. In fact he had a reputation even among his people of reducing most everyone that worked with him to tears. Well you can imagine the meeting of these two gentlemen was not going to result in a great deal of harmony.

Q: Sort of like a pit bull terrier against a mastiff or something.

BARKLEY: Yeah, probably a fair analogy. You know the pit bull was out of his turf. Anyway, we went in and sat down and without much further ado, Steve started to fire questions. All right how do you do this; how do you justify this etc? P.W.'s bile rose very quickly and he looked at him and said, "How long have you been in my country?" So we said, "Three days." He said, "Then you must be a very stupid man." Well this is not the kind of language you would expect in these kinds of circles. He said, "You come here and lecture us on how we should behave; you should at least have the wisdom of understanding what you are talking about before you start mouthing off," something along those lines. Steve, who is very quick on the uptake said, "Well Ronald Reagan has never been here, but you listen to what he says." Anyway that was about the high point of this conversation. Shortly thereafter, a really incredible event took place where Steve, who just couldn't give up his inquisitive approach said, "Well when are you going to release Nelson Mandela? After all, he is an icon and a man of great stature and intellectual capacity etc. It would do you great good to do this." P.W. looked at him, narrowed his eyes and said, "Well I am not like you people. I take no pleasure in keeping an old man in prison." Steve looked at him and thought for awhile and wondered what in the world is going on. He said, "Mr. President, you are not talking about Rudolph Hess are you?" (Who at that time was in Spandau prison in Berlin and had been since the end of the war.) He said, "I am."

Q: I would have never thought of that.

BARKLEY: Steve looked at him and God bless him, he said, "When Nelson Mandela is responsible for six million souls of Afrikaners around this country, I will accept that analogy. Until then I will not." Well everybody in that room except, P.W. Botha, had their heads were down scribbling and trying to avoid eye contact. Of course it was a marvelous retort. At that time P.W. got up and said, "It is ridiculous to even talk to you about this. Get out of my office." I had never been in a place where someone actually ejected his visitors. So we went out, and I have to say Steve was courageous but shaken. That was my first introduction to some of the harsh realities of the South African leadership. Shortly thereafter P.W. made his speech which was supposed to be his Rubicon speech that was supposed to open more liberal approaches in the country. He never crossed the Rubicon. He stayed firm.

Q: Was there someone equivalent to the chief of staff or national security advisor or the equivalent thereof? Somebody who would take the hard line of the president and put it in perspective, on the South African side?

BARKLEY: Well interestingly enough the ones I think who put at least the Afrikaner perspective more into focus were the ultra conservatives. Truerneck was a party believe it or not, far to the right, of course of the nationalist party who objected to everything. Furnek was the head of this party. We met with him on occasion. It was interesting because whenever I met with them, John Burrows was along. John was an African

American consul general in Cape Town. The ultra conservatives were actually very fond of him. What we found out later was the one thing that either the nationalists or the conservative Afrikaners most despised were liberal whites, not blacks. It was an interesting thing. But their policy was, in short, "If we went to one man, one vote, we Afrikaans immediately become irrelevant in this country. And this is our country. We created it, and we will not become irrelevant in our own country". So that was basically the line that justified Afrikaner intransigence. It was one that I think was held at a lot of different levels. Now P.W. Botha did have a staff, and many of them would speak with us. Some were quite rational and articulate. The foreign office too basically trying to say, "The line of the government is quite clear, but we are in transition, and when in transition it is not quite clear where we are going to be heading. But certainly the idea is that we will certainly try to come to an accommodation". One of the whole principles of Apartheid, of course, was that every black would have a homeland. Incredibly they created artificial homelands all around, so all of the blacks could claim some sort of nationality of Swana, Swasi, or Zulu. Sotho, they all had homelands. Those homelands had measures of independence but quite clearly they were basically controlled by the South African government. Also they were created out of the least attractive, least arable, parts of the country. So what they did is basically try to create legal reservations to which everybody somehow legally belonged. It was obviously a pernicious kind of design, but theoretically that is the way they justified a lot of things. And they would tell us, talk to the president of Siskei or Transkei or whatever when issues arose in the designated homelands. Soweto was of course outside of Johannesburg, was the largest city in black Africa. It wasn't on any maps at that time. People were theoretically there just on temporary status, but many of them actually were there permanently. Soweto itself like many big cities had slums and some terrible squatters camps but also had a place called Beverly Hills, which had quite lovely homes. The whole country was a contradiction in so many ways.

Q: In the embassy you were still, you had never served there before, so is there a conventional wisdom in that? I can remember when I was in INR dealing with Africa. I had the horn of Africa, but this is back in early 60's, 1960 actually. There is going to be a night of long knives you know when the blacks took over. You know this is what we were all saying. What was the attitude when you got there?

BARKLEY: Well, when I got there, I mean the overwhelming power of the white establishment was everywhere evident. At the same time you could see all of the signs that there was a restive population, and things were not going to improve. The Embassy looked at itself not only as supporters of American policy, and every officer I knew supported American policy, although some somewhat selectively. South Africa, of course was quite different than the rest of Africa. It is the only one (after the creation of Zambia and Zimbabwe) in which there was a white government and there was a sizable and permanent white population. South Africa was also the economic engine of almost all of Africa. The trade that went on between South Africa and the rest of Africa was sometimes sub rosa, because people didn't talk about it, but it was enormous. Without that engine of South Africa, there would be terrible problems throughout Southern Africa.

We are beginning to see that today in Zimbabwe. So the Embassy had a lot of people who knew the situation very well. Many of them had served in South Africa before, but even those who hadn't, like myself, understood that we were actually engaged with a regional powerhouse. That meant that somehow without doing terrible damage to the productive capacity of South Africa, which was as I said, essential to other parts of the region, we wanted to make the transition away from Apartheid into a democratic order. I think everybody was basically committed to that line. Now quite obviously there were a number of people, many of them Americans, who thought maybe South Africa at that time was not the worst possible situation. People used to come in from the neighboring countries and of course, quite enjoy the material wealth that they encountered, because most of the neighboring countries were in real economic straits. But nonetheless, I mean there was never in my experience, any doubt that the American government stood for change. Now the Embassy could do and did do one rather marvelous thing. We became in many respects the only forum in which these different political groupings could communicate. If we had a party or if we had a reception, we insisted on including every part, every segment of that society that we could. Now quite obviously we couldn't take banned people and bring them into the Embassy, but there were huge numbers of people who were in anti Apartheid organizations, such as the UDF, the United Democratic Force, and we would invite them and they would actually meet the parliamentarians from the government or members of the foreign office, and for the only time, have meaningful discourse. The Embassy I think, provided a wonderful service in that regard.

Q: I mean these would be, there was no problem having blacks to the embassy.

BARKLEY: Oh no. As a matter of fact after Herman Nickel left, to emphasize the importance that the United States placed on a colorless society, the President selected an African American to be the new ambassador. It was Ed Perkins. And of course when he was on station, then the outreach was even more effective into the black community. The black community was sometimes confounded by this because they said that having a black ambassador doesn't mean that we like what your government is doing. But nonetheless, there was always an effort. We had a difficult time, and this was the problem that Ambassador Perkins, who was a remarkable man, encountered. So when he took the job, he was under enormous pressure not to do so, because some looked upon this as gimmickry. But Ed Perkins was an ex Marine Corps officer, and when his commander in chief asked him to serve, he was going to do it. He made a number of commitments to bring more and more African-Americans into the Embassy. But when he started to try to recruit them, he encountered the same problems the rest of us did, that most of them refused to go. John Burroughs, our consul general in Cape Town, had served as ambassador in Malawi and was an extraordinarily sophisticated and decent man. He took on this job under a lot of pressure but it was an extraordinary advance for American policy for people to see them there. Nonetheless, even Ed Perkins had a difficult time recruiting black officers.

Q: Well did you find that you were running across, any embassy where there is a controversial problem, you often have somewhat of an age split or a rank split. The

junior officers are all for going out and changing the world, and charging around, and the old fogies at the top are trying to preserve relations and do things in a more orderly manner. Did you run across this?

BARKLEY: Well strangely enough that doesn't speak at all to what I experienced. Right from the top when I arrived, Herman Nickel as ambassador had really great credentials, particularly in the United States. He was personally engaged in the civil rights movement. His view that coincided with Chester Crocker was just posturing on South Africa was not going to get you anywhere. But there was no doubt as to where they stood, that this regime must change. Now that went through the entire fiber and fabric of the embassy. Some people were a little bit more outspoken. Our USIS head was Bob Gosende who had a lot of experience in Africa and was particularly forthright in his views. He was a wonderful officer. But everybody felt this. Now I think perhaps a couple of members of our military mission might have felt a little bit too close to the military in South Africa. The South African military was indeed of course in battle with Castro's troops in Angola. That immediately defined the South Africans as somebody we should appreciate. But also as I am sure you have experienced military people generally have the ability to communicate with each other despite their political orientations. It is the same thing I think you find with most foreign service officers, because your frames of reference are the same. But other than that we had a bit of difficulty one time because one of our military would try to invite the so-called ambassadors from the Homelands to one of their parties, and we had to call him on that and say, "Stop it. That is not our policy. You are not independent here. You work in concert with the United States government." As soon as they were aware of where we stood, that stopped. But sometimes there was a tendency to get wound up in attaché parties and things without thinking what the implications would be.

Q: Well did you get involved with Inkatha party?

BARKLEY: Yes, well, the Inkatha party was almost totally a Zulu party. Mangosuthu Buthelezi was the president of Zululand. There is an historical framework to that. There are many tribes in South Africa. The biggest tribe by far is the Zulu. These are called the Nguni people. The Khosas have a close kinship with them. The Zulus are a martial kind of tribe, with a long history. Everybody knows the Zulu as courageous warriors going back to the time of Shaka, and earlier. But there was always an animosity between Zulu and Khosa. Now interestingly enough Buthelezi was of the royal house of the Zulu nation, Nelson Mandela was a prince of the Khosa nation. The Khosas became much more active in the ANC, the African National Congress, and I think they probably could trace some tribal animosities back there too. Buthelezi was a man of considerable intellectual and organizational gifts. He put together the Inkatha party, which in some respects had a great deal of respect for the Afrikaners because of course they had engaged in battle many times over their history. He was fearful that the ANC would not only seize power but that all of the other tribes would join the ANC and marginalize the Zulus. The ANK tried to organize the Zulus, Buthelezi fought back. Sometimes they also picked on the Indians who were merchants in large numbers in Natal which is where the Zulus

basically lived. So Inkatha had the problem that it was tribal, it was regional, and of course its leadership was royal. People used to say that in view of the size of the Zulu nation, there cannot probably be a solution in South Africa without them, but they are not the solution per se. So there was a unique quality to Inkatha. But of course the Zulus like everybody else had been engaged in the process of urbanization, so there were Zulus in Soweto, and they tended to be loyal to their tribal background, and many of them were Inkatha members. Every now and then there would be real bloodshed. I think that is still going on as a matter of fact. I saw and met with Buthelezi several times. He is a very charming and extraordinary sophisticated English speaking fellow. Most of the black African leadership was educated. It is an irony of South Africa that Fort Hare University was run by Afrikaners. They trained almost all of the people that were active in the anti Apartheid movement, including Robert Mugabe and Nelson Mandela.

Q: How did you find the academic part of South Africa as far as our embassy was concerned?

BARKLEY: Of course you always look to the universities as where the intellectual ferment that is going on. By and large, not surprisingly, the universities had a liberal bent. Often not surprisingly also, many of them were from Anglo backgrounds, like the press itself. But for one or two papers, most of them were considered liberal. You know, liberal in South Africa probably has a different dimension than it does elsewhere, but basically they wanted to see positive change. They seemed to think that the end of Apartheid would mean they would have black leadership, but nothing else would change. Of course that is not true, but everybody, all the whites lived in such levels of prosperity and privilege, that I think many of them looked forward to the future with great anxiety. Most of them, certainly the liberal elements knew they couldn't continue like it was.

Q: What about the coloreds and Indian communities? Were these ones we could have good contact with?

BARKLEY: We had good contacts with everyone. The colored community was particularly strange. The colored community basically was a group of people who had intermarried mostly in Cape province. They were mixtures between traditional blacks and whites and bushmen and Hottentots, some elements including a sizable Malaccan group, which came out of the East Indies. One must remember of course, that Cape Town was just a fueling station for the Dutch East Indian company for a long time, and then was seized later on by the English during the heyday of British imperialism. But there was a large number of people who actually didn't fit in to any of the tidy categories of Apartheid. For a sizable element the only language they had was Afrikaner. English was not their language. As a matter of fact the Afrikaans language came out of these people who had simplified the Dutch and the German and French elements that came in at that time. These people were, I am speaking generally of course, basically afraid of the black Africans who were there in such large numbers. At the same time of course they too had suffered all of the elements of Apartheid, the worst parts of it from the Whites, so they were betwixt and between. The Whites tried to play on their fear of black domination, and

did that to some success. But at the same time, some of the key leaders in the fight against Apartheid, I think primarily of Alan Busak was from the colored community. The Indian population which was very largely located in the Natal or in Durban but they had some of the same characteristics. You know Apartheid is perverse, in it's urge to categorize people, but didn't know where to put people at certain times. For example, they certainly knew the difference in their minds between Afrikaners, or whites and blacks. They had trouble defining those in the middle like coloreds, and Indians. Of course, when Asians started to arrive they even had the category of honorary Whites. It was really perverse. The system was put together with such care that somehow everybody had to be identified.

Q: Well now, were we the only ones? You talk about the embassy being a place where all parties could get together. Were other embassies doing this same thing?

BARKLEY: They were doing it in different ways. The British embassy was I think the closest to the way we were working. Quite obviously the British had a vested interest in what was going on because there was a sizable population came from Great Britain and many of them still carried British passports. Therefore they had a dual problem, not only to represent their viewpoints on Apartheid which was basically what they did in Rhodesia and wanted to do in South Africa. They also had to consider a large number of people who were their citizens. Indeed if there was to be a huge flight from South Africa it would affect them directly. This has happened, of course, in other areas. It was still going on in Zimbabwe. When people pack up and leave, where do they go? They go home. They go to Britain. Well you talk about the injection of a couple of million people, you are talking serious dislocation, so they were very concerned. Of the others, I was naturally interested in the Scandinavians because I knew the Norwegian minister very well. They had different approaches to Apartheid.

The Scandinavian attitudes were very interesting because there was such anger in the Scandinavian countries towards Apartheid and its elements, but at the same time there were interesting trade possibilities in South Africa. Many of them played a double game rather effectively as a matter of fact, where the Head of the Mission, usually a Minister or Ambassador would go through the niceties of talking to the government etc, and then a second person in the Embassy was their contact with the black community. They put a lot of support into the ANC mostly via the ANC abroad. ANC headquarters abroad received an extraordinarily high amount of money to fight Apartheid. And of course as there were certain openings in the community of the Africans in South Africa itself, they got in very closely with people like Winnie Mandela and others who were speaking out more vocally. So they financed these people's activities at a lot of different levels. Particularly the Swedish ambassador and the Swedish DCM were very effective at doing both things. The DCM was an extraordinary, attractive, and engaging woman who fought very hard to make sure that the anti Apartheid movements knew they had a friend in Sweden.

Q: Did you find in observing these groups, the ANC and Inkatha and all that, you know, money was coming from abroad to help them. Did you see a problem of sort of careerists trying to take over and sort of enjoying the fruits of the money but not pushing the cause?

BARKLEY: You know I think most of the anti-Apartheid engagement was at such a level that they could not be purchased off. That doesn't mean that human beings aren't susceptible to a large injection of money. I would meet with the ANC on occasion. I met with Thabo Mbeki in Botswana. These groups would come into Botswana for example, and we would have conferences with them. Afrikaners and others would also attend, so there was a constant exchange. But the problem of the ANC abroad was that more and more of them lost touch with what was actually happening in South Africa. Of course once Nelson Mandela was released and the ANC was legitimized, ANC people flowed back in. There was a certain animosity between those who stayed behind and fought in the trenches and those who lived abroad. And of course the policy of liberation is an extraordinarily complex question. How much pressure do you put on? How many bombs go off? What is the legitimacy between attacking what is obviously an illegitimate system? Those things continued for a long time. But the people that I knew were very courageous in their fight against Apartheid. One of them, Alan Busak, I knew quite well, although he was careful in his relationships with us. Busak was a colored Dutch Reformed minister who was very active in the anti Apartheid movement, and was one of the key leaders of the UDF. He was also a man who could be corrupted by fine things. He always wore suits tailored in Italy and flew first class and stayed at the Georges Cinq and things like that, and he didn't do it on his own dime. It was quite clear. I think he worked on the assumption then and probably even does today is that his courageous engagement in the anti Apartheid movement actually made these little peccadilloes rather minor. Yet I am sure the South African police had documented all of this, where the money had gone, etc.

Q: What were you observing about during the time you were there about the hand of the South African whites through the police force? I keep thinking of some of the things that happened in our south you k now, the redneck sheriff beating up on people. I mean how…

BARKLEY: Oh, yes, I think that what went on in the police stations was absolutely horrible. I mean there is no question about it. I mean the case of Steve Biko is something that took place before I was there. They were always heavy handed. I think one of the things that constantly amazed me is the courage of a number of people who live in that society who also knew perfectly well what the police and the military were capable of, and the courage they showed. One of Steve Biko's friends was Peter Jones who was a guy I knew very well, a colored guy who lived in Cape Town. We got him to the United States against a lot of opposition from his own friends who thought he was being purchased by the Americans. I remember meeting with Peter many times. He was an extraordinarily wonderful man. He said, "You know you go to the United States and there is this simplistic notion of how we live. True I live in what is a colored township, but I live in a very nice bungalow, better than most people in the United States live in." When American blacks found out he was a CPA and that his hobby was not go throw bombs but to go scuba diving they couldn't believe it. But nothing fit into the different pictures that we have of these people. And yet, the courage he showed in meeting his convictions and

continuing to organize against Apartheid was impressive. I think the fact was that all throughout South Africa one saw things that did not fit easily into the American frame of reference. It was very hard sometimes to sort it all out.

Q: I would think that more than in most places where I think they tend to be more pro forma, that our entertainment thing must have been part of a war plan in putting the right people together at different levels and so on.

BARKLEY: Yes, although I think a war plan would be better conducted and better devised. But the fact was that everybody knew that when we gave a party we wanted representatives form every segment of that society. I remember particularly one fellow who came. In fact I think he is in jail now for having committed murder, a fellow named Clive Darby Lewis, very British with the guard's clipped mustache, speaking clipped English. He was a dyed in the wool reactionary. He would meet with these members of UDF, and they would engage him in a rather active shouting match. But inevitable afterwards they would say think you. I never had a chance to talk with this guy before. I don't think that this made a major difference in the government's final decision to give up the system, but it certainly allowed a level of communication that was very rare.

Q: How did you deal with, yes I imagine every politician worth his salt, particularly ones engaged in civil rights in the United States, I am thinking of Jesse Jackson and others, would pop down there from time to time to see things for themselves.

BARKLEY: Well it was very interesting. As I said before, a number of members of the black caucus would show up. They inevitably would be put up at the Carlton Hotel, which is a beautiful hotel in Johannesburg. They would meet with almost everyone. They usually didn't meet with the president. P.W. Botha didn't see them very often, but he did on occasion. But primarily Pik Botha who was the foreign minister would meet with them. What you saw clearly was that for the Afrikaner, the true traitor, and villain, was the liberal white, who was willing to sell out his kinsmen. They understood fully well that whether it was an African American from the United States or whether it was a black African from South Africa, that it was natural for these people to be unhappy with their lot. These are groups that are fighting to maintain some level of control over each other. I remember very well sitting there one time, and the American black caucus were sophisticated people. One of them at one time was Rev. Fauntroy from the District.

Q: Washington, DC. William Fauntroy, yes.

BARKLEY: He is extraordinarily well spoken. He got up and they said at one time when they were talking to Pik Botha, he said, "I understand that you have trouble with the British." Pik said, "Well this goes back to the Boer war when the British instituted the first concentration camps," and went through this entire history. "Yeah, we have some deep seated problems with them. We were treated like second class citizens." Fauntroy responded, "Well then you must know how the blacks feel." Well Pik didn't have a particularly good answer for this, but the answer was, "We well understand how they feel.

But we are not going to become irrelevant in our own country. Later on, just before I left South Africa, we had a visit by Coretta Scott King. Jesse Jackson and others showed up independently. She is obviously an American icon and a wonderfully alert and bright woman. She found that she got caught in the midst of competing black groups, because she thought that she could come in with her stature and meet with any group she wanted to. She decided she would accept an invitation to meet with Buthelezi, whereupon all of the UDF and other groups told her that if she did that, they wouldn't meet with her. So she found out that her ability to harmonize all different groups and meet with all different groups and all of these things was very limited. There was some very deep animosities between these groups. Indeed as they all were black, it was really a dilemma that they encountered.

Q: What were you getting form the business community about, I mean during this '85 to '88 period about how things were developing?

BARKLEY: I am speaking in generalities, but by and large the business community was largely controlled by the Anglos. That goes back to the gold and diamond mines and all of these other things. The Afrikaners came out of a rural base basically. They were farmers and later on bureaucrats and policemen and military etc. But the business community was largely Anglo, and was largely friendly to the progressives which were the anti Apartheid whites in Parliament. Of course there were some extraordinarily big companies. The Anglo-American mining company and a lot of these different groups, and they all of course, were calling for the end of Apartheid. Yet at the same time the leadership in these groups remained Anglo white. They did begin the process when I was there of trying to train and bring highly educated blacks in to the leadership. They were aware indeed they had an international reputation to try to uphold. The value of the Rand, credit, and all of these things depended on good ratings so they very much wanted to be seen as progressive and against Apartheid.

Q: Did you, you mentioned not boycott but sanctions. Did they start during your time?

BARKLEY: They started actually just about a year before I left.

Q: What was the feeling form the embassy about sanctions and how did that work?

BARKLEY: Well in principle of course, Chet Crocker and others thought that sanctions would un-do one of the major elements of constructive engagement, and that is that if you savage their economy, the first people that will suffer will be the blacks. If you expand the economy the first people that will take advantage of it, because they are the majority and people need them, are the blacks. That is a position that was held also by Helen Sussman, who believed that the solution was not actually to ruin the economy but to expand it. So there was a lot of opposition. But at the same time in the United States, politicians move to entirely different drummers. There was a great groundswell of anger over Apartheid, and our inability to get things moving etc. Randall Robinson and the different groups in the United States said, "Well they don't understand anything but the

fist and therefore we must impose sanctions." It developed among a broad majority in Congress that sanctions were not welcome but they were a visible sign of American discontent. Pretty soon, the pro sanction groups in Congress and particularly in the Senate had a vast majority, Republicans as well as Democrats. It was only at the last minute that the White House and basically, tried to stop it. It was the first major defeat of the Reagan administration.

Q: Were you there long enough to feel how the bite was working?

BARKLEY: Well the South Africans had lived with sanctions in a lot of different areas, particularly in military hardware, things like that, for a long time. They had become very adept at evading them. I mean one of the things is they developed quite a good relationship apparently with Iran because they were able to get oil and other things. So they had become quite good at it. But yet I think that you could see primarily that different American companies who might have decided to go into the market or stay in the market changed their minds. So it was starting to bite. Then the fear was that if it bites too much, and if the Afrikaners see the economy going to hell, that the will go deeper into "lager" because they realize the world is against them. Then people saw of course even more conflict coming out of this. As it turned out the sanctions did bite and did hurt to the point where finally the Afrikaners almost yelled uncle. This was after I left and after P.W. Botha was gone.

Q: How about the Israeli connection while you were there?

BARKLEY: Well it is a very interesting thing. There is a long historical background between the Afrikaners and Israelis. Way before there was a State of Israel, there was a belief among many of the Afrikaners which are Old Testament Christians, that they were the last tribe of Israel. When they established their covenant with the Lord, of course, much of it was an eye for an eye kind of covenant. Indeed when Israel became a state, one of the first countries to recognize them was South Africa. And indeed the first official visit from South Africa to Israel was from South African President Malan.

Q: Well were we concerned about a too close a relationship with Israel?

BARKLEY: Well there was at one time a lot of speculation that indeed South Africa was developing a nuclear capability and they had some assistance from the Israelis in this effort. I don't think this was ever shown to be the case. There was no question the South Africans did have this capability. We apparently monitored an explosion in the Kalahari Desert, that nobody could quite explain, and thought therefore that indeed it was a nuclear device. I remember Ed Perkins discussing the issue of nuclear capacity with Pik Botha one time. Pik Botha looked over at him and smiled and said, "Well you know, whether we have it or not, the important thing is for the blacks in Africa to think we have it because it is white man's magic." Now of course the utilization of any kind of nuclear weapon is absurd in the face of it because I mean you know everybody lived together. I think that probably put a stranglehold on their capacity to convince the black majority that

indeed these guys have access to a technology that exceeds our understanding.

Q: Well did you have any feel for what the Israeli embassy was up to?

BARKLEY: No, I think the Israelis kept their nose clean. I knew the ambassador quite well. He was seen but he was not overlay active. It was a very correct relationship. There was a large Jewish population in South Africa, most of them from Lithuania, the vast majority from Lithuania, had been there for many years. In almost every intellectual activity, there was a large Jewish representation as well as in the business world. So they had influence in excess of their numbers. But most of them were members of the Progressive Party, they were active in these things. There were a number of people who left South Africa out of protest. Many of them were living in England, and many of them were living in Israel in the hope that after the end of Apartheid they would come back. We knew a number of people whose children had actually left. Interestingly enough, everybody that left out of protest couldn't wait to get back. Of course, they had to be able to wait until things had changed before they could return in good conscience.

Q: How did you find USIA work, information people? Did they have pretty free reign there?

BARKLEY: Yes. We had a very good group. They were obviously very effective in trying to get information out about where the United States stood on things. We had a cultural program, but quite clearly most American cultural groups would not come to South Africa. That was a form of showing their dislike of the regime. But I think in terms of trying to get the American position out, they were very effective. They were very professional. We had of course a branch PAO in both Johannesburg and Cape Town. They were very good. I was very pleased. As I said, Robert Gosende was the head of it most of the time I was there. He was extraordinarily effective getting American positions out to all segments of the media.

Q: How did you find moving back and forth between Pretoria and Cape Town?

BARKLEY: Well I had the great advantage that my wife and I did not have children then. It was a burden for people who had children quite clearly. At the same time the idea of having two residences, and they were very generous and nice residences was appealing. Both residences were furnished, so what you would have to do every six months is take the pictures off the wall and then re-hang them. After the first move you began to know where things went. It turns out because of ongoing problems in the parliament that we spent a longer time in Cape Town than expected. But the movement of course helped us get to know the country pretty well. Of course we were talking over 1000 miles between Pretoria and Cape Town. It is a big country. In our movements back and forth, I would inevitably try to get down to Bloemfontein or Kimberly or see some of the parts of the country. Between the area was a very vast wasteland called the Karoo, not a total wasteland but it was not very hospitable area. It was a fascinating country, and an extraordinarily beautiful country. Alan Paton writes about, of course not only the traumas

of the country but its incredible beauty as well.

Q: We talk about USIA, what about the CIA/ In some countries the CIA gets in bed with the government and other times it doesn't. It can dominate. How did you find you know I mean obviously this is an unclassified interview, but how did you…

BARKLEY: Well it was not a large station. They were very professional. Obviously they interacted with the intelligence services. As I say they were very professional. They knew perfectly well that the kinds of information that was passed to them usually had a purpose. It was not an active station in the sense that there was any undermining going on. We did have interestingly enough, an AID mission. By any indices we had we should not have had an AID mission because the per capita income of South Africa, even South Africa's blacks was much higher than that of most countries. But the AID mission had a political content. The political content was to show sensitivity towards emerging black institutions and groups. So we did put money into different elements. It was a difficult issue sometimes because some of the groups that had been the most effective in fighting in the anti Apartheid movement also had some Communist affiliations. We always had to be somewhat sensitive to that. Quite obviously it wouldn't have helped out aid program if it had become controversial in the United States. But we had labor programs, we had a number of programs that were really quite effective I thought. Maybe not so effective in development; that is not what we were talking about. But at least in demonstrating our commitment to the anti Apartheid movement.

Q: Well did you find that the Soviet Union was beginning its at least it lost its thrust abroad. It was having many problems of its own internally. This was the Gorbachev era. Was the Soviet Union much of a factor?

BARKLEY: No I don't believe so. I think there were certain people perhaps in Washington that thought there was a constant. I am not an expert on this. I have never spent time in Africa before, what I believe some people were looking for political advantage in Africa, and that every time there was Soviet penetration we had to counter that etc. During the time I was there, Gorbachev was just beginning to come to grips with Perestroika and Glasnost and it subsequently became apparent that the Soviet Union was not able to keep pace with the technological and economic advances of the western world. Soviet policy didn't play very largely here unless you were one of those people who believed the anti Apartheid movement was actively controlled by the communist party. There were some people who believed that, but none of them in our embassy. At the same time you know, it was becoming, not quite as clear as it did later on, that the appeal of the Soviet solution was waning everywhere.

Q: Well then was there any difference in the way Herman Nickels and Ed Perkins operated and used you?

BARKLEY: No. I will say both of them were quite generous. They let me basically run the embassy which of course was the DCM's job. I was looked upon as the executive

officer. There were considerable times when I was the Chargé. Of course every ambassador has a different style. But in terms of working together, both of them were very harmonious. We were there for about a year and a half when Herman left. He had become sort of a lightning rod for the anti Apartheid movements in the United States. He stayed longer than his normal three years. He was a political appointee and could stay longer. He stayed almost four. There was increasing anger over his behavior. Apparently it goes back to a visit by Teddy Kennedy in which Ambassador Nickel gave welcoming comments to him to which he took offense later on. So he was looked upon I think quite unfairly, nonetheless as one of the architects of the American policy against sanctions, therefore against the anti Apartheid movement. It was not at all true, but nonetheless, he began to get that reputation. Ed Perkins had come out after being ambassador in Liberia. Initially it was my understanding they wanted Terry Todman. Todman at that time was ambassador in Denmark. I remember he gave a press conference in which he said he would not even consider going to South Africa unless we changed our policy, which of course made it extremely difficult for the Administration to ask him. I don't know if it was officially ever offered to him or not. Nonetheless I was called finally by Chet Crocker who said, "Ed Perkins will be coming out as ambassador," and he gave me some of his background, and of course it was a very impressive background. Ed came out. He is an imposing fellow.

Q: Very dignified.

BARKLEY: He is a large man. Of course so was John Burroughs. I am of short stature. I usually looked at them at the necktie level. Ed is a man of enormous dignity. It just exudes from him. I remember the presentation of his credentials. He went in and he saw P.W. Botha. Botha was extraordinarily generous to him, and I'd seen as you know, moments when Botha was not generous. Ed obviously knows the foreign service, He knew how to run it. He knew what was going on. He was very professional, and an extraordinarily nice human being on top of all of these other things, as well as intellectually curious. He had spent some time in Africa, and of course was obviously fascinated by the difference between Sough Africa and what he had experienced earlier, and particularly about that special tribe called the Afrikaner. What is that drives these people?

Q: Known as the white tribe of Africa.

BARKLEY: Exactly. No one should ever mistake that these are Africans. I mean there is no homeland that they look to anymore except South Africa and southern Africa. I remember after Ed arrived, walking down the street in Pretoria. You could imagine the interesting looks we got, usually from the black Africans. I mean here was a man not only of enormous size and dignity but was well dressed as well. He said, "You know this looks to me like a little American city in the 1930's." I said, "That is fascinating. It is really accurate from what I can tell." I asked, "What did Liberia remind you of?" He said, "A Mississippi delta city at the turn of the century." Clearly P.W. Botha and Pik Botha liked him but what he represented they were very cautious about. He ran a very good embassy.

He was articulate. He knew perfectly well what should be done and how it should be done. He had a very active social schedule. I remember one of the first things we did was invited him and his wife to Thanksgiving at our residence. We had a very broad group of people including one of the most prominent jurists and a number of the anti Apartheid groups from Soweto etc. I remember he said he had such an interesting time because he encountered people at all levels that were meeting together. If he had met them individually, they would respond differently. But he kept an extraordinarily full schedule. American groups that would come into town were also impressed. Here was a man as I said, of considerable intellectual stature with great presence.

Q: When you left in 1988, in your impression at that time, whither South Africa?

BARKLEY: Well it is very interesting. I was still somewhat concerned that the Afrikaner had not come to grips with the fact that change had to take place. Nonetheless, on the ground astonishing things were taking place. If you walked downtown Pretoria or downtown Cape Town, you go into restaurants, there would be black patrons as well as white patrons, and these were classy restaurants. In the shopping areas, there was a great mix. Something obviously was afoot. But I recall one of his farewell calls that Herman Nickel had with at that time the Minister of Education, F.W. De Klerk who later on became president. He was a man a little bit like P.W. Botha. He was a large man and had great self confidence and presence. I remember that as we left, Herman asked him something about how he saw the future. He looked at Herman and he said, "You know, there are a lot of accommodations we cam, make to the realities of South Africa. But one area we will never bend on is that the Afrikaner people cannot be controlled by anyone else. To the extent that they can maintain their independence and their future, we can accommodate anything. But if that is threatened, then we are prepared to go to war." Well that is quite a statement. Obviously how do you dismantle Apartheid without giving away the privileged position of the Afrikaner. I will never forget that particular observation. And it turned out that he indeed was the guy that actually did break positions on Apartheid secured the release of Nelson Mandela that subsequently led to elections.

Q: ell then you left in July of '88, whither?

BARKLEY: Well in the early summer, I can't tell you exactly what the date was anymore, I received a surprising phone call from the Department of State saying that I had been selected to be the next U.S. ambassador to the German Democratic Republic or East Germany. In those days, you know, there was the ambassadorial committee who was headed by the Deputy Secretary of State, John Whitehead. I was quite surprised by this announcement. I had expressed interest in the job before, and had been told that there was a candidate and it was not me. Nonetheless I found out subsequently that there was some problems with that candidate. Out of the blue somebody suggested my name. There seemed to be a general agreement that that was a good idea in view of my past experience in German affairs. So I got that call. I was of course, enormously pleased. A number of people had asked if I were interested in a number of African assignments, but I really wasn't. I mean after being the DCM in South Africa, I was in an infinitely more

influential and powerful position than being an ambassador in Mauritania or something. I said I was not an African hand and I didn't believe I would do a very good job. So when this assignment came up it was a dream. After we had recognized East Germany, I had hoped to someday serve there as ambassador. Well in those days the expectation was that you would get a call form the President. President Reagan had a personal commitment to call all of the people who were going to be his representatives abroad, and ask them personally if they would accept the job. Although I was a careerist, I had to wait for that phone call. I remember it must have come in June. We were attending the installment Bishop Desmond Tutu, who was not a hero of Ronald Reagan, as the chancellor of the University of the Eastern Cape. So it was an interesting time. I got this phone call. I was gone and came back. They had a number; I made the call. It was amazing, the President appeared on the line almost immediately. He was reading from some sort of thing, but said "I'd like you to be my ambassador to the German Democratic Republic." I said, "I was honored and will do my best there to represent him well." From that moment on, it was then a question of getting confirmation which was a messy process. When we left in August of 1988 we were on quite an optimistic journey forward.

Q: Going back to South Africa before this, Desmond Tutu, did he play much of a role while you were there?

BARKLEY: Well yes. He had of course been given the Nobel Peace Prize and that gave him a great deal of stature. At the time he got it, he was not an archbishop. He was a bishop, but he was later enthroned as the archbishop, the Anglican archbishop of South Africa. Of course we all attended the enthronement in Cape Town. Then he moved up into the white area of Bishop's Court and took over his official residence there. He was a man of enormous stature. He was not happy with American policy. He, most of the time I was there, would refuse to meet with Americans, official Americans, because he was unhappy with our policy.

Q: What did he want?

BARKLEY: He was much more in support of sanctions and the other things, saying we had to show more vigorous convictions. I think the problem that many people had with constructive engagement is that it is predicated on a longer term kind of change. That you know, expanding economies take time. In some respects sanctions is an easier policy because you can show immediately your dislike or disregard for what is going on. The idea of growth and development is a long process, and I think he didn't think there was sufficient time.

Q: Jesse Helms, was he a factor?

BARKLEY: Not during the time I was there, I was not aware he was a factor. He became a factor later on when I was supposed to be confirmed to East Germany, but he was not a factor in the South African area. He had a couple of people that worked for him, one named Bill Christiansen, who was a staffer, who would come out and who was convinced

that the ANC was engaging in some rather nefarious kinds of activities. Indeed he was able to prove quite clearly, the admission came later, that they were engaged in torture and things against other people in their ranks who they considered to be either spies or somebody who was working for the South African government. When they were abroad, they did engage in certain activities that were surely in violation of their charter.

Q: Winnie Mandela?

BARKLEY: Winnie was of course, at that time she was becoming quite a figure. She was the first lady if you will, of the anti Apartheid movement. She moved into Johannesburg, into Soweto. She had a whole group of young people who would do her bidding. She was an extraordinarily attractive woman, considerably younger than Nelson Mandela. People immediately took to her, but she had not had any experience in political life. She went through a couple of bumps in her career, but she had always shown great courage. Then there came a period of time where different groups in the black community were either identified as not being sufficiently anti Apartheid or maybe working hand in glove with the government. There were a couple of cases I think, where they were badly punished or even murdered. There was always an attempt to try to link her and her group to these groups. There were some legal cases that were brought against her for abuse of human rights.

Q: Did you feel that at all yourself or from our embassy were we watching her to see how by dealing with her?

BARKLEY: Well she was a little bit like Tutu. She didn't want to deal with official Americans. I met her actually at the Swedish embassy once, and she was perfectly cordial. She was really quite a socially attractive woman as well as physically attractive. She was very pleasant, and I think that certainly there were some groups that wondered whether or not she had been captured by thuggish elements, and there seems to be some indication that she probably should have shown more judgment at that particular time. I think there was also great respect that she had been through a real hell. They had put her into a township and restricted her activities. She could meet with no more than one person at a time for a number of years. She had borne that with great dignity.

Q: Coming back to the States. What happened? This being ambassador presumptive turned in to being not the most pleasant period of time for a lot of people.

BARKLEY: Well, it was very interesting. In retrospect perhaps more interesting than at that time. At that time it was rather aggravating. I think everybody realizes that the confirmation process on the hill is a messy and unnecessarily painful process. I was among the last group of career ambassadors that was appointed by the Reagan administration. The election was taking place in November.

Q: This is tape six, side one with Dick Barkley.

BARKLEY: We went back in August and took some home leave, and were told that in September I would be sent to the Senate floor for advise and consent. I was working together of course with congressional relations in the Department. Of course this was my first ambassadorship, and I was very excited about that. My wife and I were living at the Guest Quarters on Pennsylvania Avenue. Every time it came time for me to go up on the hill, something intervened. It turns out that quite clearly there was an effort on the Senate foreign relations committee to try and move forward. In fact, Senator Pell was the head of the Foreign Relations Committee at that time, and he tried to move ahead with certain diplomatic assignments, but not others. Basically there were a number of career officers, I think there were three of us. There weren't very many, and a number of political appointments. It was kind of late in the day for a political appointment as the administration was departing. So Jesse Helms was determined to get the political appointees as well as the career appointees through. He was trying to stop any movement until that time. That meant that every time there was a group meeting, it was put off at the last minute. I can't tell you how many times I was in a cab going up to the Hill only to get a phone call saying go back home, it is not going to happen. Then finally in October after a month and a half of maneuvering, apparently Jesse said to Claiborne Pell, "Why should we go ahead and approve your people," that was the careerists. The presumption was that all careerists are democrats. "And if you aren't going to approve our people." Apparently as I understand it; I wasn't there, but as I understand it, Claiborne Pell said, "Well that is the way it is going to be, and we will vote on the others after the election." So believe it or not, I guess Jesse removed his opposition. I was finally confirmed. At my hearing actually only Claiborne Pell was there. Nobody else. So I was confirmed in October I believe. I don't have exactly the date in my mind, along with one or two others. I think I was the last career appointee of the Reagan administration.

Q: Well I think this is probably a good place to stop. We will pick this up in 1988 when you are on your way to the GDR. We will talk about what sort of briefing you had before you went there and what were our policies, and then we will talk about East Germany.

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Today is 11 August 2003. Dick you were at the GDR from 1988 to when?

BARKLEY: 1988 to 2000.

Q: 2000!?

BARKLEY: Excuse me I don't know what I am talking about. Let's back up. I arrived there in 1988, but it was in late November. Then I stayed until 1990, two weeks after the unification.

Q: You were cut off without a base.

BARKLEY: No job.

Q: You know for some people this was a great victory when the Berlin wall came down, but they didn't think about the real repercussions that follow.

BARKLEY: Terrible professional losses. First it was one of the best embassies I have ever served, and second, personally it was the loss of an ambassadorship. They are hard to get to begin with. But I suppose those were the only marginally sad notes in an otherwise happy development.

Q: Well at least you didn't have to leave by helicopter.

BARKLEY: That is true, eating an apple, I recall.

Q: I interviewed John Gunther Dean, and he left Phnom Penh by helicopter. Dick, 1988, you had been confirmed. What were you gathering, you had been obviously involved in the German process, but you had been out of it for awhile.

BARKLEY: Yes, for three years.

Q: How did we view East Germany and all, I mean what was sort of our policy and our thinking?

BARKLEY: Well if we had a view of East Germany it was uniformly negative. The idea of trying to stimulate any policy engagement in that area was always doomed to failure from the start. There were a number of issues, of course, that over the years we had flailed away on. Of course we didn't have relations until 1974, and so by the time I arrived it had been 13 years into things. I was the sixth ambassador replacing Frank Meehan who was probably one of the premier experts in East-west and particularly German affairs. Before him had been Roz Ridgeway, who of course then went on to become Assistant Secretary of State. One of the things we had focused on for a long time was to try and get the East Germans to recognize their responsibilities for the holocaust and for Jewish claims. Of course many of the survivors were still living in the United States, but the whole issue had a much broader constituency in the sense that obviously we felt that the West Germans had met their obligations, or had tried to meet their obligations, and the East Germans had always rejected any responsibility. The East Germans claimed that they too were the victims of Fascism and the very success of East Germany as a state ruled out any responsibility for the holocaust. But that wasn't uniformly true of course, as large numbers of the East German government had been in fact Nazis, so they had just not met their obligation. So we flailed away on that front for a long time. The East Germans of course, were looking for trade advantages. There was some talk at one time, particularly during the earlier stages of Roz's tour, of trying to work out some sort of deal of trade improvements for payments, but it never really came to anything. There was never any constituency that was in favor of any kind of engagement in East Germany. The feeling all along was that we would allow the West Germans to dictate policy in that area, and we would happily follow suit. So when I arrived, although it was an area that I had spent a lot

of time in, there was neither much knowledge about it or any sympathy for it in terms of the American body politic. In fact it was extraordinarily difficult to find anybody who ever had been there, except as a tour from West Berlin.

Q: Checkpoint Charlie.

BARKLEY: Yes, the Checkpoint Charlie thing. Of course the wall went up in '62 and had been one of the constant reminders of the character of communist regimes. Without any question, there was an understanding that East Germany was the jewel in the Soviet crown. That its economy was viewed to be infinitely more successful than that of any of the eastern European countries. They exported an awful lot to the Soviet Union. More importantly the Soviet's advanced to the Elbe via their positions in East Germany, and that is the farthest Russian advance into the center of Europe for a long time. You have to go back to the Napoleonic wars for that one. The GDR also was viewed as consistently loyal to the Soviet Union and all of its major policy lines. Which was true. There were certain variations on that theme, but the fact was there was no constituency in the United States I think that supported warming of any kind of relations or even engaging them very effectively.

Q: In the first place, you said there were Nazis in the government. I mean we were sitting on the Berlin document center which is a tremendous mother lode of material. Did you have pretty good information about some of the people?

BARKLEY: Oh I think so. No question the vast majority were old line communists, who also were engaging in a number of things that were below the belt by civilized standard. But there was an attempt to try and bring some old Nazis in. The fact that it was a political party that was part of a National Front, the Front being of course just that, for the Social Unity Party, the East German communist party. But I think we were very reluctant to use the Berlin document center because so many West Germans were in there and you never certainly wanted to let that out. The German propensity, which we found out was continued by the Stasi, for documenting all of their sins is an incredible thing. So the document center was a very touchy issue.

Q: Well then what did you all, you have the accepting partial responsibility as a German entity for the Holocaust. Did that go anywhere while you were there?

BARKLEY: No. The ministry with which we discussed this knew that this was one of the items of interest to the United States, so they didn't want to shut it down completely. What they wanted to do was make us think they were seriously engaged and try to throw out more kinds of sweeteners with the enticement that sooner or later they are going to come around. But it wasn't only us. The international Jewish committee also engaged with them. Edgar Bronfman met with them and came away convinced that they wanted to do the right thing, whatever that was. American Jewish committees were interested in trying to get them to do something more. It certainly was an issue deeper than just money. We are not talking about a great deal of money, but it was, for International Jewry and for

American participants, I think it was the recognition all of the German people bore responsibility for what had happened. That had to be recognized. There were important psychological dimensions to this whole thing.

Q: Were you and your officers able to get around East Germany?

BARKLEY: Yes, it was rather remarkable actually. There were a number of things that were going on. One is, is that nobody had any illusions about the influence of the American Embassy in East Berlin. Actually I was there when we established relations with them in 1974. We made the decision early on is that after recognition we were not going to hide under a bushel. We were the most powerful nation on the face of the earth, and our embassy should reflect that. No one anticipated trying to compete with the Soviet, who were not only in an Embassy but were sort of Proconsulate, but we wanted to be primus inter pares on all the rest. So we put together a very nice embassy. It was located in downtown Berlin. There was a long discussion whether or not we should this because we never recognized Berlin as part of the German Democratic Republic. But the only alternative was to put it someplace like Potsdam which meant that the administrative problems would be enormous for we would spend all our time on the road going from one place to another. So there was a long discussion on what we would call our Embassy. We called it the American Embassy **to** Berlin. We were not ready to say it was the American **in** Berlin. We were the American Embassy responsible for relations **to** the German Democratic Republic, not **in** the German Democratic Republic. That was a nicety that we followed a little bit more strenuously than the French and the British. But nonetheless we established an Embassy. It did not have any attachés because of the demilitarized status of Berlin. It was almost strictly a political reporting position. We did have, of course, USIS. We had a Commercial Attaché and an Agricultural Attaché, but their responsibilities were not very broad. So mostly it was a political and economic reporting post. Interestingly my move there seemed to coincide with a sudden disappearance of the old German hands. After the embassy in Bonn changed hands in 1985; Richard Burt came in and wanted to make a new start, and not have the burden of all the old guys hanging around. So it happened that East Berlin usually ended up with most of the people with a deep expertise on what was going on in Germany. Frank Meehan as my predecessor had as his deputy, Alan Thompson, who was a very experienced German hand. As political counselor he got Jonathan Greenwald who then stayed on with me. Jonathan and I had served together in Berlin in the 70's. He was very energetic and intellectual kind of an officer. So it turns out that much of the expertise on Germany, historically, was in our embassy in East Berlin. The same thing continued after Richard Burt left, our ambassador in West Germany, and was replaced by Vernon Walters. He had no experience in Germany. So he instituted a lot of procedures that changed the precedents we had established over many years, including, I am afraid to say, he altered the status of our operation in West Berlin. Where in the past, our minister in West Berlin had been in charge of all policy, he changed it so that a lot of the policy decisions were in the hands of the Commandant, a military position, which had been always just strictly a military position. So there were shifts in what was going on in inter German affairs from the stand point of American diplomacy. I landed right at that particular time. I did have long term

effects on how things happened subsequently.

Q: What was your relationship to West Berlin mission.

BARKLEY: Well I am happy to say the minister in West Berlin was Harry Gilmore, who was not only a competent officer but a very good friend. We had very good relationships. Our relationship with Bonn was cordial. We didn't have at the time I arrived, any particular policy problems with them. In time, of course, once East Berlin became the focus of international attention, there was always a little bit of unhappiness in Bonn who was used to being the filter through which everything passed. General Walters was an experienced man at diplomacy, although he had not had any experience in German issues. German affairs were uniquely complex, at that time. You start tinkering with procedures which we had established over the years and you can look for interesting challenges.

Q: I noticed, I was interviewing somebody who was with Vernon Walters around this time. I can't remember his or her name, but was saying Vernon Walters, wonderful storyteller, very experienced and all, but wasn't a deep thinker or somebody who you know, thought strategically. His talents lay in language and…

BARKLEY: Well, he certainly had dramatic talents in language. He was also a man of enormous self confidence. I never witnessed any sense of doubt in his positions. But in terms of what we were engaging in, he certainly didn't have any experience. I think he had considerable experience in places like Brazil. Of course France is the place where he wanted to be. That was his first language, although god, I don't know how many languages he had. He spoke quite good German. He got that from his nanny as a boy. But it was interesting he was a man who really preferred to talk rather than to listen. It was an interesting thing, because you and I know you have to listen a lot.

Q: How did you view the political situation in East Germany? When one looks back in history, a huge slice of what had traditionally been Germany was handed over to Poland and all. Was this anything that was wrangling among the East German population?

BARKLEY: You know that there had been a major adjustment of the territory of Germany as a result of WWII. The partitions of Poland, going way back to Frederick the Great, was such that one was never quite sure whether Silesia was Polish or German. Of course as the very strange position of Eastern Prussia is difficult for people today to understand. In any event we ended up with the Oder, Neisse line dividing Poland and Germany. Nonetheless, what the Mark of Brandenburg then known as Prussia, as well as Saxony and Thuringia were new in the eastern sector. Now those states had been dynamic players in German history, and of course the fact that Berlin, as capital, was the hub of all of Germany. Those post WWII Berlin zones were located strictly within what was the Soviet Sector which became the German Democratic Republic. This is a constant source of problems for us, and indeed it became the bellwether for U.S. relations during the cold war. So it was a very strange composite. It is interesting that once the West Germans decided to recognize the reality of East Germany by introducing its Eastern policy, one of

the first things they did was to work out border arrangements with Poland, to recognizing the permanency of the border. Strangely enough they negotiated the legitimacy of that border although East Germany not them shared it with Poland. The idea met with enormous opposition in the West German refugee groups. But they did all any way. It was dramatic politics at that time. Happily it coincided with our own policy of détente at that time. Nonetheless, East-West relations blew hot and cold as you know. I noticed many times that Poles would show up in East Germany, before and after the fall of the wall, were met with a certain contempt from the East Germans. There is a strange terminology that they used. If they want to put someone down, they call it Polnishe Wirtschaft, which means Polish economy. Which is comparable to our term of "Chinese fire drill". But the contempt for them was quite high. Of course at that time, things were already changing in Poland, so the whole east European scene was shifting. One wasn't quite certain where that was going.

Q: Well were we looking at, as political officers, were we looking at were there sort of unspoken divisions within East Germany? I mean the border people, did they think more differently than the ones to the west?

BARKLEY: If so we certainly didn't spot that. What we did spot, which turned out to be of infinitely greater interest was when I was there, were the first murmurings of Glasnost coming out of Russia. Traditionally the East Germans always looked to the Russians to see which way the wind was blowing. But at the same time the government was unnerved by the prospect of more openness to East German society. They felt they were too vulnerable. Of course what followed after that was Perestroika, and the East Germans had real trouble with that too, claiming that indeed they had instituted Perestroika much earlier. In fact in the 70's they went through a thing called Erneueruna, which means renewal, but the idea was to restructure their economy. In fact of course the activity was never particularly successful although it was more successful there than in other eastern European countries. But nonetheless, it was still basically a command economy, where the Central Committee allocated resources to the economy. Of course there were enormous distortions. We weren't fully aware how deep those distortions were until the Wall came down.

Q: This is one of the things that one can't help. Certainly Soviet hands always ask. I mean we knew the economy was lousy, but we didn't realize, or we just couldn't conceive that it was so poor.

BARKLEY: You know I always said when I was there, that whenever we got visitors it was important to find out from whence they came. If the visitors were coming from Moscow through Warsaw to East Germany, that was one thing. If they went from Paris through West Berlin to East Germany it was another. In other words, coming out of Moscow and Warsaw, East Germany looked like a dynamic economy. Things were infinitely more rational than they were in these other areas. There was the appearances of progress at many levels. And of course international economists were also buffaloed by East Germany's cooking of the books, as we found out subsequently. But I remember in

the 70's when I was watching East Germany, the general feeling was the standard of living in East Germany was higher than the standard of living in Britain. Of course it was all junk. Somewhere along the line the economic indices that international economists use came to that conclusion. There was no question that if you were there over those 15 years you saw progress on a whole number of levels. One of the things I think, that made it very difficult for us to understand what was going on, is the very fact that the East Germans had participated in the 750th anniversary of the founding of Berlin. In preparation for that they put an enormous amount of resources into Berlin. So East Berlin all of a sudden started to look fairly snazzy. We were all somewhat impressed by that. I remember meeting with Hans Brütigam who was at that time the Permanent Representative of West Germany in Berlin. He said, "I have this problem with my analysts. Half of them believe that they are making progress and moving ahead, and the other half don't. But I will tell you just looking around that indeed they have progressed." I came to that same conclusion. It was an erroneous conclusion at many levels, but it was one that I think was generally accepted in 1988.

Q: This happened throughout the entire west looking at the east. I mean you were seeing only one part of it, but we weren't seeing what amounted to a collapse in the economy.

BARKLEY: I think that is true. In some respects they had. They had patched the collapse, put a Potemkin village in front of the collapse and it is very hard. Of course the East German economy was tied very much to the eastern European economy and particularly to the Russians. So a collapse in any of these had obviously impacts on the others. But at the same time, you have to realize that the East Germans had also become rather adept at securing hard currency from West Germany. A lot of that hard currency was put to fairly good use in making it appear that things were better than they were.

Q: Well I am an old Yugoslav hand, and had jealousness a new class pretty much developed in East Germany. I mean was there a communist elite of everybody…

BARKLEY: Well I think at that time too it was something that we often talked about. That the construction of the Wall back in '62, literally gave East Germans two options. One option was to accept it and make the best of things, or the other one was to fight against it and end up in Bautzen prison. The vast majority basically tried to come to grips with these realities because of course the East German government buttressed by the Russians gave them no other options. So a lot of them went to work. After all they were Germans for goodness sakes. They did fairly well in certain areas, but many of them opted out of the political system, and the Wall in many respects delegitamized the East German government. There is something that the East Germans never wanted to acknowledge, but there were large numbers of people who lived their lives fully divorced from political activities. It is what one of the East German, Gunther Gaus, who was the head of Permanent Representation for a long time, called society of Niches, where people lived in their little corners but had no particular reference to anything else. Of course what made it extremely difficult to do anything effectively was the looming presence everywhere of the Secret Service, the Stasi. They had representatives everywhere trying to

ferret out dissidents or whatever. Except for a couple of writers who were quite courageous, most people just kept their mouths shut and did their jobs.

Q: Well the influence of the Stasi, were the Stasi giving you all a rough time?

BARKLEY: Well we knew they were there. What we never quite knew of course is which members. I mean we worked on the assumption that every East German that worked in the Embassy, as a driver or a gardener or whatever, worked for the Stasi. Now whether he was the head of the Stasi or whether he was what they call a Mitarbeiter, somebody that just contributed now and then, we were never quite sure. So there were no illusions on the part of the Embassy. Nonetheless the fact that they work for you made it extremely difficult. So we tried to hire third country nationals at many levels, and we made the interior of our embassies as leak proof as we could by not allowing East German nationals to ever penetrate it. But of course they did. I don't think that they penetrated us any better than they penetrated the West Germans for they were everywhere. The Stasi were an overwhelming presence in this society. It was much like the Gestapo. It was a terrifying presence.

Q: Well did you look upon the Stasi as a political entity? Because the KGB you know, very much a player in the politics of the Soviet Union other than just being a control apparatus.

BARKLEY: The Stasi were run by a fellow named Mielke. Mielke was an old line communist and a brute. I mean he probably engaged in murder for the Communist Party as a youth. The more sophisticated part of the Stasi, the foreign branch was run by Marcus Wolfe. Wolfe became the prototype for the brilliant but somewhat perverted Eastern European intelligence specialist. Indeed he was brilliant. He put together Stasi elements abroad that brought, and particularly in West Germany. They penetrated Bonn almost every level of society. The kinds of reports that went back and forth were really quite complete. It was astonishing what they knew about everybody. It is also astonishing in the final analysis how unimportant it was.

Q: This is the whole idea. This whole intelligence game, well you know when you add it up..

BARKLEY: Intelligence feeds the political apparatus. If the political apparatus fails, the intelligence doesn't help them very much. Yes, it is quite astonishing I think when you see how things actually turned out. But the whole leadership, (Mielke was over 80) the whole leadership of East Germany was quite aged. They had become rather inept at recruiting a younger cadre who were sufficiently imaginative. As we subsequently discovered, when Honecker and others left, the people that followed them really had no idea what was going on. They were the children of the Apparatchiks and they came out of the system and had no idea what the world was really like.

Q: Well you know I have talked to people who have served in Poland from the 70's on.

You know they more or less say they were convinced that there were probably three or four dedicated communists in the whole government, the whole society. How did you find, was communism itself, I mean were the people were fervent communists or was this…

BARKLEY: It is very hard actually to say how fervent they were but certainly they were disciplined. At international conferences the Poles or the Czechs would often come to us, look at the East Germans, and say you have got to watch out for these guys; they actually believe what they are saying. Whether they believed what they were saying or not, they certainly knew what were expected of them. If anyone wanted to find out what the Party was saying, they simply had to read Neues Deutschland, which was the party organ. It was all in there. What was remarkable about the party is how little they actually learned over the course of the years. They kept mouthing all of these Marxist Leninist slogans. One for example, that I recall was their refusal to raise the price of bread because if they did they believed that they would have riots in the streets. So they kept the price of bread so low, it distorted almost everything else in the economy. It came to a point where bread was so cheap that farmers would buy it to feed their pigs. Well this is not a rational behavior in any economy, but it became such an article of faith at the top that the price of bread was the indicator of whether the masses would support you or not, that they couldn't alter it. And that happened throughout. Honecker personally tried in some respects to become a more acceptable, rational leader. He came out of a very traditional Communist background, out of Saarland and of course, went through the Second World War. There is always a lot of questions as to whether or not he stayed true to his faith. But all of these guys came in in 1948, many of them were returnees from Moscow, Communists who left Germany because they were being persecuted and ended up in Moscow. Many of them experienced the horrors of Stalin. Some of them even lost their parents to the purges. But by the time they came back, they were pretty heavily indoctrinated. Ulbricht was one of the first old line Stalinists to return. Nonetheless, Honecker, particularly, wanted desperately to be considered to be a reasonable player, particularly in the West. He consistently tried to maintain a level of engagement that in the last analysis came back to haunt him. But one shouldn't forget that in 1987, Erich Honecker was invited as a State Visitor to West Germany and was lauded at that time as one of the more reasonable Eastern European leaders. Two years later he was considered the last Stalin. So things had shifted dramatically.

Q: My good friend worked for a German woman while he got his doctors degree at Frankfurt University when I was in Frankfurt back in the 50's. One of the jokes, just after the fall of East Berlin, the whole collapse of East Germany was the German government was going to give Honecker an award for keeping East Germany away from West Germany for 40 years.

BARKLEY: Yes, well, of course, there was a lot of that. They are still going through some growing pains on the unification thing.

Q: Did you get any, what were the dynamics, I mean were there any dynamics when you arrived? I mean obviously you arrived just before that most miraculous year of 1989.

When you arrived was it pretty much a static situation?

BARKLEY: Well they were trying to maintain it as a static situation. In other words they were trying to isolate themselves from things that were happening in Hungary and in Poland and in other places. Things were also happening in Czechoslovakia by the way. Certain people were battening down the hatches. The trauma of course was what was going on in Russia. Once Gorbachev realized that the continuation of the Russian system meant that they were becoming increasingly less competitive with the West. You know their economy was in terrible shape. How do you revitalize it? I mean the problem with any kind of command system is that people become corrupted by it. That was certainly true in the Brezhnev era. I mean the only area in which they were able to maintain any competitive levels was in military hardware. They put so much into it that the rest of the economy suffered terribly. So there was all of a sudden Gorbachev faced with his terrible dilemma, how do you revitalize without junking the communist system, and what will be the impact of a revitalization, whether you call it Glasnost, or Perestroika, or whatever, on the other elements of the Soviet economy. In certain areas rather than throw glasnost and perestroika out, they tolerated new movements. They tolerated them in Poland, and in Hungary. The East Germans saw what happened in Poland and Hungary and feared a similar loss of control.

Q: What were you seeing happening? I am talking about early on when you arrived there, in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.

BARKLEY: Well Poland of course already had its dynamic with Solidarnosc which goes back to the early 80's. Lech Walesa was increasingly popular. Jaruzelski came in as sort of an interim figure. He was military figure who was supposed to have the ability to reach out to more nationalistic Poles. It turns out he wasn't very effective in doing that. Many of the things that go on in Poland, elections, etc. were never reported in East Germany. There were a lot of things they were trying to isolate themselves from. What they didn't know at that time, of course, was that what was happening in Hungary would have a dramatic impact in their own ability to maintain control. I presented my credentials in early December. I must tell you I was a little bit anxious. Being the last Reagan career appointee, and a U.S. election coming up with no way to know which way things were going, I wanted to get myself established as soon as possible.

Q: The election had already taken place.

BARKLEY: The election had taken place, but we didn't know where the new administration was headed. Would they want to have their own people? It was quite clear that the careerists were safer than others, but nonetheless, the administration may want to have their own people on station.

Q: So actually it was when the Bush administration took over, it wasn't really that friendly to the Reagan appointees.

BARKLEY: Well I can't address that specifically, but I want to be quite clear, every administration wants to define itself. I don't know that there was any tension. I always thought that President Bush had an extraordinarily high regard for President Reagan. I believe he does to this day. Reagan had deep skills as we all now know. But certainly there was going to be a change in the diplomatic structure, and they were going to get people in who were part of their team, not part of the previous team. But that usually happens among political appointees, in London, Paris, Rome, all of the lovely diplomatic spots. And indeed it did, but it was not an ugly transition that I am aware of.

Q: No, I was saying I thought there was, I mean I have talked to people who felt there was not as friendly a transition as you might think.

BARKLEY: Well I suppose that may have been the case, but I did not feel it where I was.

Q: Maybe that was in Washington.

BARKLEY: No the head hunters were the ones of course, because there were a lot of payoffs. There always is in the political system.

Q: Well anyway you presented your credentials. How did that go?

BARKLEY: I presented them in December, and I was received by Erich Honecker. I had never met Honecker before, but it turns out that he knew quite a lot about me because I had been doing a lot of things in East Germany over the years.

Q: The Stasi.

BARKLEY: The dossier I am sure was quite thick. He was very friendly actually. He was 76-77 years old, looked extraordinarily fit. A little guy. He had a sense of humor. He was inordinately proud of what he had achieved. A little peacock of a man, but he wasn't boastful. He went through a rather extensive litany of what they had achieved. I told him that from the time I first came over in the 70's that East Berlin looked incredibly different. Indeed it had. He was very proud of that. It was slightly an open secret that one of the things that Honecker wanted more than anything else was to be invited as a legitimate head of government to Washington. Well there was no likelihood of that happening. Nonetheless hope springs eternal. And of course if he felt that he could ever be accepted there, after having been accepted in Bonn, his status would be forever imprinted in the history of East Germany. So he was very congenial, but at the same time of course unwilling to make any kind of gestures that would allow anything in terms of forward motion. But more importantly there were no constituencies anywhere in the United States that supported anything like that. But he was very friendly. We had a very long talk. I guess almost an hour. We sat there and chatted about a number of things. As I didn't have any arrows in my quiver, in particular, I talked with him about the importance of getting rid of the Jewish claims issue and that there might be things we could do on the margins in terms of trade. I really had no ammunition. But nonetheless of course it is

always interesting for you to meet the head of government, in this case also the head of state, of a country to which you are assigned. He looked remarkably healthy at that time. I think other journalists who had come over to see him had said the same thing.

They had started to give some interviews to western journalists. I think Jim Hoagland who I have always thought was one of the premier foreign policy analysts met with him. Most of them came away thinking there is not much here. Nonetheless, as I said, he was very cordial. It turns out subsequently that he went out of his way to be quite nice. Shortly after I was there, about three weeks after I was there, they had their annual diplomatic New Years Eve reception. I had picked up a leaf from Louis Lerner's notebook in Norway, and arranged to have a couple of American turkeys brought over to be presented for of course the holidays. I gave one to Honecker and I gave one to Fischer, who was the Foreign Minister. Well the New Year's reception came up and there was a huge group of people and everybody looking around to see who was going to be talking to the top man. I was over chatting with some of my colleagues. Pretty soon the chief of protocol came over and said to me, "Herr Honecker would like to talk to you." Well I think that he had already talked to the Soviets. So the first Westerner he selected was me. Of course everybody, just like Kremlinologists used to do, wondered what is going on here. So I went over, we chatted a little bit. He said, "I specifically wanted to thank you for sending that turkey." He said, "My cook couldn't find an oven big enough for it, and so they had to take it to some restaurant in town. But without question that was the most delicious thing I have ever eaten." I said, "American turkeys are considered to be the Marilyn Monroe of fowl." He burst into peals of laughter at that reference. Of course the whole room sort of quieted down. They were wondering what in the hell is going on between the American ambassador and Honecker. Anyway, he went through the whole thing and it was very nice. We had a nice talk and that was it. But the whole subject material was indeed this Christmas gift. As you can imagine my colleagues all jumped on me afterward and wanted to know what the hell that was all about. I tried to convince them than indeed it was nothing more than a discussion of American turkeys. That was one of the more interesting interludes I had at the beginning.

Q: Did you have contact with the Soviets?

BARKLEY: Oh yes.

Q: How did that go?

BARKLEY: Well the Soviet's name was Kochimosov. He was an old line Soviet apparatchik, who had that I am aware of, no knowledge at all of Germany or anything else. When I was making my calls he was very nice, took me into this cavernous kind of embassy which was typically Soviet with heavily polished floors and very little furniture. We went up to his quarters and he served lunch. We had a very nice time, but it was extraordinarily difficult because he spoke only Russian, and of course I was holding my conversations mostly in German. The interpreter was German to Russian etc. It turned out that his second in command was indeed the guy who really did the work. He spoke very

good German and was a very congenial kind of diplomat.

Q: Well I mean, particularly something like the German mission there, we are talking about the end of 1988, that you would have almost a new breed of Soviet diplomats that was beginning to think differently. Maybe the people to East Germany weren't of that breed.

BARKLEY: Well it was always interesting. During my German exposure, the most sophisticated members of the Russian embassy were always KGB. Some of them were very nice.

Q: Did you meet any by any chance?

BARKLEY: Yes. A guy I used to see a lot of times in West Berlin in 1974 at the request of the Station was a fellow by the name of Leonid Taranichev. He was extraordinarily sophisticated and used to complain about how badly the East Germans treated them. He spoke very good German and moved very easily throughout the other side. There was always the feeling that they didn't have to do what the rest of us did because the East Germans came to them to tell them, or what is my guidance or what should I do. There were clearly arguments going on between the East German government and the Russians on how to handle glasnost and perestroika without releasing here movements that you can't control.

Q: Were you getting good information from your other colleagues and yourself and all about what was going on in the Soviet Union because I mean this was pretty revolutionary.

BARKLEY: What has always astonished me Stuart, is how little western missions know about anything. With the exception of the French and the British, even the Germans are sometimes cut out. These missions do not have the responsibilities that we do. American embassies are almost always the best informed. The kinds of things that we got from Russia and our embassy in Russia was infinitely better than anything that they had been given. Of course nobody in our embassy in Moscow knew exactly what was happening either. After the fact, of course, there are all of these experts out there. But at that time, there weren't. We did know of course the importance for Gorbachev for his reforms to succeed. We also knew that there were a number of people in East Germany, particularly at the universities and the churches, that were hoping that the examples of glasnost and perestroika would be picked up in East Germany. They were constantly told, "no this doesn't pertain to us." It doesn't have to happen here for we have already made the necessary reforms. Of course we didn't foresee what was going to happen. There are a lot of academicians that after the fact tell us we should have but we didn't.

Q: I think this was a major turning point and it happened without all of the professionals looking at this across the board within countries concerned, and it happened without really…

BARKLEY: I think we were caught in the same sort of dilemma that they were. We were children of the cold war and presumed a division along these lines was a rather permanent feature. I never saw anybody in the time I was there who expected the wall to come down. Certainly President Reagan called for it to be taken down, "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this Wall." But the consequences of it were something I don't think any of us were particularly prepared to really envision. And of course the Russians and the East Germans say the Wall will stay as long as the reason it was constructed is there. Honecker was talking about 50 or 100 years. Well he didn't know any more than the rest obviously.

Q: You were talking about the infusion of western money in hard cash into East Germany. I understand the West Germans essentially ransoming a lot of family unifications, getting East Germans coming to West Germany.

BARKLEY: Well one of the most prestigious positions in East Germany at that time was the guy who was in charge of trying to get hard currency into the country. His name was Schalk. A horrible man, but one particularly adept at getting hard currency. It flowed at almost every possible level. One of them was through a large number of people that the West purchased from East German jails. A large amount of money went that way. Large amounts of money went through the churches. Of course ever since Bismarck, German churches have always got their money from the government. So Government money was sent to East German churches for rebuilding and sustaining the churches. However hard currency came in, the task of this guy Schalk was to grab hold of it, absorb it so the East Germans could buy important items for their economy or whatever it was. Of course they made a lot of trade arrangements too. Schalk was known to have ongoing relations with the then President of Bavaria, Hans Joseph Strauss. Large amounts of money were transferred for a whole variety of reasons where the idea was the currency would come back to buy West German hardware or goods. So as the inter German relationship heated up there was a great exchange of money. Then one of the ironies is that West Germans would send a lot of hard currency to relatives in East Germany. The hardest thing was to get hold of that money because of course there was a huge black market in which things would go on. So the East Germans opened up hard currency shops. The people who had relations in West Germany were better off than anybody else. But one of the obligations of communist membership was that you could not accept hard currency from abroad. Members of the communist party were disadvantaged in that they couldn't actually join the fun. So there was a whole variety of different classes of citizenship. Those who had access to hard currency could use the hard currency shops and get all of the western goods.

Q: Did the soviet army play, I mean were they just sort of sitting there, or were they a factor or were they over the horizon as far as…

BARKLEY: Well of course there was a very large and well equipped and well trained East German army. But the East German army was dedicated specifically to Warsaw Pact activities. They also had a very large police force. Then they had the Stasi and a group of

laborites who were armed called the Arbeiterbrigaden. So there were a lot of instruments of control in East Germany. As it turned out they weren't particularly effective. The Soviets of course ever since Hungary and the Prague spring understood that if you are going to crush any kind of a movement there is a huge price to pay. It came quite clear that if they were called upon to do that, that would be the end of Gorbachev's experiment in openness. So the Russian army which was there in force basically stayed in their garrisons almost all the time I was there. They had training exercises, but did not intervene in political development.

Q: Were we able to have attachés? Could we look at, I mean did we see the East German military apparatus as being a power unto itself or…

BARKLEY: There were a number of ways that we did this. One is that out of the occupation zones of WWII came so-called MLMs, military liaison missions. Every one of the occupying powers had the right to keep a military mission in the zone of the others. Our Military Liaison Mission was located in Potsdam, and they had the right to move freely in what was the old Soviet zone of East Germany. The reason the Russians let this continue is they had their own MLM's in the British, French, and American zones. They got a lot of information they wouldn't have gotten normally, so they knew that if they closed this operation down they would lose their access to our information. So our guys moved fairly freely. They did some strange things. I think most of our information came through technical means and we had a general understanding of what was going on. Traditionally military attachés are more limited in their activities in eastern Europe than MLM's would be as we had a pretty good idea of what was going on on the ground.

Q: Well we didn't see the German high command of their military as being a political entity.

BARKLEY: Well the politburo member and minister of defense were political people. The generals that were there obviously were highly trained and loyal to the regime. Kessler was defense minister while I was there.

Q: Well in the Soviet Union the military I gather it was there, it was loyal, but up to a, I mean it was a force to be reckoned with, and any political leader in the Soviet Union had to be very careful around the military.

BARKLEY: I don't pretend to be an expert in Soviet things. I do know of course that they had political commissars that were attached to the military and indeed there had been purges during that the Stalin era. And of course you know coming out of WWII the Russians had a huge army. But Stalin I think really did put the fear of God in them. What the interaction there was I don't know. Quite clearly the Russian body politic maintained a very large and quite effective military force. By definition that would indicate they had some political say in what was going on. Probably not in excess.

Q: But we were never thinking in terms of…

BARKLEY: No we were never thinking in terms of independent Soviet military force in East Germany. Never.

Q: What about we went through the Helsinki accords, and in many ways the most obscure part of this was not the settlement of borders and all that, but it was the freedom of movement of so called third basket which was the seed of much of what happened in Czechoslovakia and other places. Did that have any resonance in East Germany?

BARKLEY: No. I mean the people who were allowed to travel, did the traditional kind of thing. They kept their relatives home. It was a question of hard currency. They didn't get any hard currency unless they had someone. Of course they allowed the travel of all of their senior citizens, hoping they would stay because of course then they wouldn't have to take care of them. But they did allow an enormous amount of travel generally to the East. Every German has the Wanderlust; they just love to travel. That was one of the difficult problems in later days is they all traveled east. They would go to Romania to the Black Sea. Czechoslovakia and Hungary were great destinations. Often they would encounter western tourists there who had much better accommodations because they had the hard currency which these countries wanted. But most all of the tourist travel was east.

Q: What about while you were there the influence of West German media and Voice of America and all that? Were the people pretty well informed?

BARKLEY: The active media was mostly West German. When I was there no Americans were stationed permanently in Berlin. They had stringers there, but reporters covering Germany were all based in Bonn. Of course they came to Berlin, and many of them would try to come over. The West German media was quite active. There were certain standards of behavior that the East Germans expected. There was this one fellow I remember who was with one of the major German channels, Lothar Loewe. He got himself crosswise with the East Germans. He had very good access to large numbers of people in East Germany, but he used the term "shooting people down at the wall like rabbits" or something like that. They wouldn't let him in for awhile. They gave him a long hard time. Of course much of the reportage that was coming from West German were sources who lived close to the wall, and could pick things up but did not have to go into East Germany. Like every other press, there was conservative press, and liberal press, all of those different groups. The more conservative groups were more hard line towards what was going on in East Germany; the more liberals were following SPD lines and claiming that a loosening between the two people was a good thing per se.

Q: Were American tourists able to go into East Germany?

BARKLEY: Every now and then they would come in. They could go through Checkpoint Charlie. There were procedures that were developed over the years. I mean for example, when I went through Checkpoint Charlie, all I had to do was simply flash my passport. They could not touch a diplomatic passport. American civilians could go through and

many of them did. In fact a large number of U.S. military would go through. They would buy bread at a penny a loaf. They also were purchasing a large amount of groceries and things in East Germany. It became an embarrassment actually, but they did that, and they had the right of access under the four power guarantees of free access. So there was a lot of movement back and forth. The guidance was if you get into trouble you must demand a Soviet officer. You could not talk to the East Germans. That would be a form of recognition.

Q: Well then how did things begin to play out when you were there?

BARKLEY: Well, I recall a number of things. During the first couple of months, there was no indication that there was any shifts of any magnitude going on. I spent much of that time making my protocol visits, not only to the diplomatic corps, but also with members of the politburo. It was always fascinating because these are the names of people I knew. But in some respects, the most interesting thing, of course, was to go into the provinces, because you began to realize that that is where the local governors, the local party chiefs actually held sway. So I did a lot of that. I did a lot of things, and I picked up certain things I didn't know. I mean, obviously, there was life beyond the capital, beyond the beltway if you will. Some of it was really quite interesting. They were experimenting in cultural things, for example I met with number of university people. I had a very good staff who set up really very good meetings. It didn't take long for the university types to let you know that the party line was not to their liking. None of them would go so far as to say that, or talk in terms of unification etc., but they were all quite hopeful that Glasnost would be extended to them.

Q: Well, they were followed?

BARKLEY: Yes, by party apparatchiks. I remember going to Mecklenburg and meeting with Werner Eberline. He was an old Soviet émigré whose father had been killed by Stalin. He liked to engage in conversation, but he was rather unbending, although every now and then he would show flashes of insight and humor. It was very useful for me because it gave me a broader feeling of the country other than what you had in Neues Deutschland. I do recall that one of the more interesting things was the so called diplomatic hunt. This is a great tradition actually where the entire politburo and members of the local establishment would go out and shoot rabbits in the outback. It was a tradition, an old German, almost pagan, tradition in that you blow horns for the hunt and you sing the songs of the hunt etc. It was alive and well in East Germany. They invited the diplomats along. I remember it was delayed for awhile, but by the end of January 1989, we all went down to Erfurt. They took us in and they gave us boots and everything. Everything was courtesy of the East German army. The East Germans actually, had developed one of the best shotgun industries in the world at that time. So we were all given shotguns etc, and we had a "minder", a hunter who had dogs and all. It started out the previous night with a big banquet. I remember I sat across the aisle from Schalk. I remember it was the first time I had met him. He was one of those unseen presences in East Germany. In any event we met with lots of them, and they talked openly. It was a

social event; it was not a political event. But obviously at the same time you could see that there was a political pecking order. Not only in terms of who sat at what tables but where people were. The next day we went out and shot rabbits. Actually the organization was quite remarkable. The East Germans were known to be able to do that kind of local organization. For example when we got off the train there was a huge crowd cheering the diplomats. It was interesting to watch because diplomats are seldom cheered. There were these rather silly grins on most of these people's faces as we walked along the tarmac and we were cheered heartily. Anyway the next day first the politburo came out led by Honecker. He could see a number of them were not enthusiastic hunters, but Honecker was. They were all dressed of course in their hunting gear. I noticed that those with the finest headgear were the highest ranked in the politburo. Honecker had this sort of sable Russian hat. It turned out they went over to one section, and then sent the diplomats out into the fields as sort of beaters. We would march across the fields and rabbits would take off. They had been breeding rabbits there for a long time, so there were lots of them. They would run over the hill and who was there, over the hill shooting them as they came down the line but Erich Honecker and his troops. We were slogging through the mud. I remember what a really gory day it was. It was unforgettable in the sense that you were actually thrown together in a sort of ancient ritual and watched these so called modern people engage in this ritual with great joy. I understand that Honecker of course, this will not surprise you, killed more rabbits than anybody else. I am sure the numbers went down depending on the rank of the politburo member. But seldom did you get them all together to watch any kind of interaction along that line. It was clear that Honecker was the boss.

Q: In know that Tito used to have these hunts. These things got a little bit scary because a lot of diplomats weren't very good.

BARKLEY: Exactly. The guy next to me was a Cuban diplomat, and I wasn't sure I felt very comfortable about that. I must say I did not acquit myself particularly well. I was nearsighted in the eye I should have been farsighted in and too proud to wear glasses. So I didn't do very well. I did bring one back. But it was an absolutely remarkable experience. After that I made more calls, but I recall in March of that year, I was out in the garden. My wife and I were walking along. I looked at her and said, "You know, this has been my dream to come here, but this has got to be the most boring country in the world." Well that was not a novel thought. A lot of people talked about East Germany being the most boring country in the world. I was used to a lot more political action where I had been previously. It was all covered up, you know. It got to the point you were trying to pick out little nuggets from people. Of course reading Neues Deutschland, after awhile it got really old. But I had only done that for three months. Well I often look back on that comment, and my wife later often reminded me of it. But another personal thing that happened is for the first time Nina was with child. My wife became pregnant just before we arrived, so we were going through a very interesting thing moving back and forth through the Wall to the doctors in West Berlin. That became obviously a very important element in my life because it was my first child, and an advanced age.

Q: Then out of, it was basically, when did the whole…

BARKLEY: The shift start? It was about April or May of that year. That was when the Hungarians announced that they would open their border with Austria. Word got out very quickly. It was never printed in East Germany, but the West Germans trumpeted this as a major development. Pretty soon there was a trickle across that border of young East Germans whom the Austrians channeled right into West Germany. The flow grew rapidly until it began hemorrhaging. It wasn't that there were so many, there were sizable numbers, but they were the best people, professionals who could get good jobs immediately in the west. We didn't know it at the time, but that was the opening shot.

Q: Could a young professional East German go to Hungary through Czechoslovakia?

BARKLEY: Yes, the only places they could travel were of course within the Warsaw Pact countries. Hungary was one of them. Hungary and Czechoslovakia were two of the most popular tourist destinations, so there were a large number, and of course it picked up. The East Germans knew what was happening but didn't quite know how to stop it. They tried a number of things. First they made representations to the Hungarians and Hungarians said they would try to intercept them before they get to the border, but they didn't. Obviously they weren't putting many resources into it. It would have taken an awful lot to do it. Then they tried to stop people from going to Hungary. They found out that people then simply claimed their destination Czechoslovakia and crossed that border into Hungary without much trouble. So they got the Czechs to close down the border. But there was a constant problem here too. As East Germans only could travel to the east, and many of them were party people, so if you closed down a lot of these things, the party hacks who looked upon this as one of their big privileges got upset. So but that was the start of the hemorrhaging. Now we weren't fully aware of the total impact of this, but as you can imagine, the GDR was different than any of the other countries because there was one Germany, one common language. Also many of them had relatives in the West. They could function very well once they go to the west. Other countries of course had some problems on that front, but there was a particular attraction for the East Germans once they saw there was a way to get out without being shot at the wall. So things began to shift at that time. Then in the summer of that year in June I believe, it was only a month afterward, while the government was trying to come to grips of how to handle this new development that Honecker got ill. It has always been a lot of debate as to what it was, whether he was exhausted or had gallstone problems or whatever. Nonetheless, Honecker underwent medical treatment. After the fact we realized that the system really demanded someone like Honecker around to make the big decisions. So for the longest period of time, a lot of the key decisions were postponed So at a time where there were great shifts throughout Eastern Europe, there was nobody in East Berlin to give guidance.

Q: While this shift was beginning to happen, what were you doing and what were you getting from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and other places?

BARKLEY: We were traveling a lot. There was only a couple of months since I began my tour. I was determined to get down to areas like Leipzig and Dresden where a lot of

West German television didn't penetrate. So I went to as many places as I could. Then it slowly dawned on us that something that had been going on a long time turned out to be more significant than we thought. That was the activities of the churches. The churches had worked out sort of an arrangement with the government that they would not contest its authority if they would be allowed to continue to operate. Of course they were also one of the major sources for hard currency which gave them leverage. Every Monday they held a prayer meeting, which was supposed to be a time for reflection. Some political dissidents, not terribly many, would go to these churches in the provinces and they would engaged in some nascent political discussions. We didn't see it at that time, but the number of people that went to these meetings slowly started to increase. Of course by the end of the summer it was almost a deluge of people that were going to the Monday prayer meetings. But during that entire summer that Honecker was ill, delaying a lot of decision making on the part of the government. At the same time a lot of people were jockeying for positions to replace Honecker. Some of the old line guys and some of the really new figures like Krenz and Shabowski. Nobody that I am aware of at that time was calling into question the viability of the East German government. But in retrospect we look upon that summer hiatus in terms of leadership as a crucial period of time, because lower level leaders were trying to come to grips working with the Czech and the Hungarian issues, and later on with the Poles, to try to solve the tourist problem without aggravating their political bosses. The decision makers were at sixes and sevens. They didn't know what to do. Honecker was not there. Now whether Honecker could have changed it, because he would have been more decisive, I don't know, but quite obviously the political system was not functioning effectively. People were used to the decision-making processing working well. Whether they were right or wrong, people knew what was expected of them. But even political instruments like Neues Deutschland didn't know what to do. The usual policy among the East Germans if there is foreign news that you didn't want to talk about, you didn't print it. For example during that period of time, there was no reporting about the elections in Poland that brought Walesa to power. There was no talk about Tiananmen Square in Beijing. The discussions that were going on were not in the paper about how to handle the outflow of tourists, which was increasing daily. It was the summer time after all. That is when people went on holiday. So they were not addressing a lot of these problems. So they were in some respects put into a box, at a particularly perfect time for those who were against the regime, or who wanted to get out.

Q: You were more I mean in this sort of thing, all one could do is observe. There was nothing you could do.

BARKLEY: No, there were a number of problems that we did have. It was a constant part of life in the foreign service in East German. Occasionally people would try to claim asylum in the Embassy. We had a long standing agreement with the West Germans that we would never turn over any asylum seeker to the authorities. Well what do you do? First thing that you do is contact the West German mission over there and say we have got this problem and how they help us handle it. The next thing you did was you call in Mr. Fixit, Wolfgang Vogel, who not only did major spy trades, but in fact the guy who usually was able to work out some sort of arrangement. The fact that I knew Vogel well

and had negotiated with him for many years helped me a lot.

Q: Call him, "I have got another one."

BARKLEY: Yes, call him in. He would inevitably show up. He spoke with the authorities, but he was not a member of the authorities. Most of the East Germans who were looking for asylum had heard of him. He would work out the arrangements. "If you voluntarily leave in two weeks, I will make sure you get out west." But at the same time you didn't want this to get out because if the word got out, more would just go to the American embassy. We were the only Embassy that had ground level entry, because we wanted East Germans to read in the USIS library. So we were very vulnerable. The numbers entering the West Germany representation grew to the point that they closed it. We came very close to that, toward the end of the summer. So we had those constant problems. Because of my long exposure to Germany, I knew what the regulations and the expectations were. Inevitably American ambassadors who did not know that got into trouble. We had had some incidents that had aggravated the West Germans in the past because other embassies had turned some of them over to the GDR not knowing what to do. So we worked out procedures for this problem. Of course all this predicated on the assumption that we could hold it under some level of restraint or control. But mostly we were engaged in political reporting. I must say I had a marvelous Embassy. John Greenwald ran just a wonderful political section. I had a good economic section, first Reno Harnish was there and then Mike Moser came in later. J.D. Bindenagel was my deputy, one of the great German experts, young, energetic, intelligent. We just had a wonderful embassy. I was very proud too, that more than half were female officers. They were incredible. All of them spoke quite good German. They moved very well in the society. It was just a first rate team. I remember people in Washington saying we are getting pretty good stuff here. Well they didn't know yet what they were really going to get. They were going to get great stuff.

Q: So I mean when did things begin to boil up in Czechoslovakia and the West German embassy and all that?

BARKLEY: That happened during the summer. Once again there was no decision making. The Czechs closed their border with Hungary. The East German asylum seekers decided they would descend on the West German embassy in Prague instead. I have never been there, but I was told, it was a large embassy with a huge garden. People started to come in, and of course because of the German policy they could not turn them away. Sooner or later the numbers started to increase. By September, there were thousands of them there. They set up campsites on the embassy grounds. The numbers kept coming. They didn't know what to do. They were in terrible shape. I was fearful that the same thing was going to happen in our embassy. Shirley Temple Black was our ambassador in Prague. In fact a couple of people did come there, and she tried to turn them over to the Czech authorities. I thought the West Germans would go ballistic. She finally began to coordinate with the West Germans, but we had some painful moments there. Well then once the West Germans turned to Wolfgang Vogel. Now this was a black eye for the East

Germans too. You have got to remember the East Germans at that time focused most of their attention on the 7th of October, which was the 40th anniversary of the creation of the German Democratic Republic. They wanted that to be a major success. They did not want the embarrassment of foreign problems like the FRG embassy in Czechoslovakia. You can imagine, the West German press found out very quickly, and although the Czechs were trying to be helpful to the East Germans, the word was out, and it was an embarrassment. It turns out although the press didn't know about it, much the same thing was happening on a smaller scale in Warsaw. If people couldn't get into Czechoslovakia, then they went to Warsaw. So the East Germans were trying to control this by controlling the borders without aggravating their colleagues in the East. They had an impossible task. Well by the end of September, Vogel was successful in negotiating the transfer of these people by train to West Germany. It was important for the East Germans that this train go through East Germany. So they went on a closed train. It sounded a little like smuggling Lenin into the Helsinki Station. At the same time while this was going on, the numbers of people going into the churches on Monday was increasing dramatically. All of a sudden people sensed that something dramatic was taking place, as did we. We didn't know where the hell it was going, and we were quite fearful that it would produce a crackdown.

Q: One of the occurrences that could happen, I mean this is the entire cold war that you and I lived through was that all hell might break loose in Berlin, I mean people getting in a mob like the '53 situation or something, and the West Germans couldn't stand it if they were put down brutally. All of a sudden World War Three should start there. Was this in your minds?

BARKLEY: Well at the time the permanence of the wall did not seem to be in doubt. I would like to tell you yes, we spotted that, but we didn't. The wall was still standing firm. The police and the automatic shooting operations there were still working. That is why, in fact because of this not only the wall but there was a dead zone between East and West Germany. It was not only the wall that snaked around Berlin. Those were formidable obstacles. That is why people thought they could evade that and escape the other way. Then when they found out that the eastern route was also closed, they in desperation tried the Western Embassies.

Q: This is tape seven, side one with Dick Barkley.

BARKLEY: Well there was no question at that time that the East German authorities had remarkable instruments of control. The problem was that there was no general understanding of what was going on. But at the same time the courage and the determination with which people were trying to get out was a major surprise. And the ones that were staying were in fact making their displeasure felt through the church meetings and incipient demonstrations. During this entire time, the whole emphasis as I said, of the East German government was to have a successful celebration of their 40th anniversary. The presumption being is after that is over "we will show these guys what is going on". But they wanted to be a showcase at that time for the reasonableness and the advancement, and the success of the East German government over that 40 year period.

But something unusual was clearly afoot. Just before the end of September, I had planned to visit Shirley Temple in Prague. My sister was visiting then, so we decided to drive to Prague staying the first night in Dresden. It was about the first or the second of October. I am not exactly sure. Meanwhile I had my staff visiting church meetings in Leipzig and Dresden.

Q: Were they attending these…

BARKLEY: Yes absolutely. They were a marvelous bunch of people. Most of them were young. At that time that played into our hands, because I think the authorities were so strained in trying to watch so many different things that the last thing they were going to worry about were our junior officers, or where they were going to travel.

Q: It must have been exhilarating for your officers.

BARKLEY: Those kids were wonderful. Jon and J.D. had organized the staff so that they would cover the country. I just happened to be our guy in Dresden that night. So I told Nina and my sister, I am just going to take a short walk to see what is happening. It turns out this was exactly the night that the train of asylum seekers out of Czechoslovakia was roaring through Dresden on its way to West Germany. People in Dresden didn't know that. They found out about it later. Some of them apparently had relatives who did know however and they went down to the train station. But basically the train shot right through. I was crossing the bridge across the old river at that time taking my usual evening walk. You know the old foreign service officer getting out there to see if he can tell what is going on. There were a large number of people crossing the bridge. As I walked across, all of a sudden I looked down and saw on a road that went under the other side of the bridge, a long column of Volvo trucks full of police. They obviously expected something. I don't know whether it was connected with the train or whether it was the weekend activities. Little groups were beginning to appear everywhere. No one was quite certain who they were. There were young people just looking around. I remember right next to me was a man and his wife pushing a baby carriage. As they watched the deployment of the Volvos, they looked and said in German "as ist nicht Schoen". In other words, this is not at all nice to see this. I paid attention to what was going on. You know having served in South Africa you feel when there is a certain electricity in the crowds. These were really very normal people, but they were clearly unhappy at what they were seeing. One almost had the feeling they were steeling themselves for something. So I crossed over and saw the staging area over by the Zemperoper, which is the major opera area. My sense was that the police didn't know what to do either. They were probably there to stop any large groups of getting out control or whatever. I walked through that part of the town for awhile, and decided I had to return to Berlin. Something clearly was happening in this country. Dresden is one of those areas remote enough from Berlin that western TV was not available so they were responding to something different. I said to Nina, my wife, "You know, we have got to get back to Berlin. Something serious is happening out here in the country." Meanwhile we were getting reports out of Leipzig and other areas that the police were deploying there too, that they were looking around for

trouble. So it was time to get back. Of course a week later was the 40th anniversary celebration. Well it was fortunate I did get back. There were new movements in the country among average people which had not previously been involved. Indeed it turned out that we even had a major problem in our Embassy. One of our officers, inadvertently I think, probably naively, let a number of people into the Embassy who said they just wanted to talk to the consular officer. Well as soon as they got in there, they demanded asylum, and we ended up with 17 people right before the major celebration. So we got Vogel involved in that. Of course the Embassy wasn't prepared to feed these people, so we had to bring food in from the outside. They were there for a number of days. Word got out to the press, and through Vogel and the Foreign Office I was trying to get them out without getting too much publicity, which would draw more of them. We were forced to close the Embassy during that period of time. They heard about it in Washington. They said, "Can't you keep the embassy open?" I said, "Do you want me to abandon the Embassy? I can do that. Do you want me to execute a burn? But if we open the doors it is going to be a repeat of what went on in Czechoslovakia." So the Department came in with one of those Solomon like decisions, "Keep the embassy open but don't let any asylum seekers in."

Q: I was wondering, you have a consular section, and I assume you are issuing visas and all.

BARKLEY: Not many but yes.

Q: And a USIS operation there. How do you keep people, I mean either they come in or they don't.

BARKLEY: Well that is the problem I had with Washington. And you know, Washington doesn't like to be faced with this kind of problem either. The British and the French were apartment kinds of Embassies that were on the fourth floor someplace, and they could button down very quickly. We were a ground floor, open, library. So we had a real dilemma. So we had to shut the doors. We in principle kept the embassy open, but for all intents and purposes nobody went in and out. Vogel only did us a great service. He not only got these people out, but also all of these people assembled in front of the embassy trying to get in and couldn't. He got their names because we weren't allowed to do that or the police would pick them up. But Vogel got all those people out. He somehow got all of their names and got them out. Once again it was because the regime didn't want a black eye right before the anniversary. It was a remarkable period of time.

Q: Were you feeling that this 40th anniversary really I mean in a way once it was over, all hell was going to break loose. I mean was this your feeling at the time, or was this in retrospect?

BARKLEY: Well at that time we were trying to get through each day as best we can. When you have 17 people in your mission with little children trying to bed them down and take care of them, while the negotiating their release, it took all of our energy. I was

at the foreign office or with Vogel all the time. We got it resolved. But I think nobody saw clearly how things were going to develop after that. We knew that on the 40th anniversary that Gorbachev was going to come to town. That was an important visit. What would he say? What would he do? Would he turn and say well you know East Germany is our great ally and we will trust them to do whatever they want to do, even if the result is the end of glasnost and perestroika. East Germany was a very key segment of their empire. We were not quite sure how all that was going to go. I am not sure that Gorbachev.

Q: I think I am just looking at the time. This might be a good place to stop. We will stop here and we are moving into October, and we are moving up to you told about events before, and things were simmering and Czechoslovakia. We were turning away, you essentially shut down the embassy to avoid getting a refugee problem. So we are coming up to the 40th anniversary. Gorbachev is coming, so we will pick up developments then.

BARKLEY: That is a good place to do it.

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Q: Today is 26 August 2003. Dick so Gorbachev is coming. Was the embassy hunkering down? Did you ever feel all hell is going to break loose, or what were you thinking? I mean how did things develop at the time?

BARKLEY: Well I am not sure we thought all hell was breaking loose. We certainly knew things were moving. The 40th anniversary was, for the East German government, an absolute priority event. As we talked earlier, they had done everything to make sure that they entered that event without any particularly onerous things hanging over them. They had agreed to get all of the demonstrators and asylum seekers out of the West German embassies in Poland and Czechoslovakia. They helped us actively to get out a number of people who were seeking asylum in the American embassy. It was going to be for them at least, a symbol that indeed East Germany was a living and going concern. But they also did not want to be under censure from the West for their immediate behavior.

Q: I was thinking, at this time, what was happening? Were the East German border guards killing people at the border and all that, or had that kind of petered out?

BARKLEY: The border, of course, was an extraordinarily long border. I mean it is not only the Wall, that went around Berlin, but there was a dead strip everywhere between East and West Germany. They would have automatic shooting devices at many points along the borders. So it wasn't a matter that necessarily a human being had to press a trigger or anything. Of course those areas were mined. It was a most dangerous thing to cross over if indeed you were inclined to try, and I believe most of the East Germans knew that. It is hard to believe because within a very short time that was all thrown into question. In any event October 7 was the 40th anniversary for the creation of German Democratic Republic. They attempted to round up all of the socialist nations and powers

to celebrate as they did periodically. So the Social Unity Party (SED) mobilized all of its considerable resources to make this a success. Actually the guests came in from all throughout eastern Europe. Many of the names were new, but some were old. Of course the key guest was Gorbachev. Quite clearly he was more than primus inter pares, he held sway over the whole affair. Zukoff came from Bulgaria; Jaruzelski came from Poland, and Hacik came from Czechoslovakia, Ceausescu came from Romania. It was a huge gathering. The only two that I recall during evening celebration, that were not from that bloc per se were Daniel Ortega from Nicaragua, and Yasser Arafat, the head of the PLO. So it was a notorious gathering at that particular time. The ceremony was a two day ceremony with speeches the first day and a gala dinner the second. Of course the entire diplomatic corps was invited.

Q: Did we send fraternal greetings or do anything like that? I mean that must have been a little tricky.

BARKLEY: Excuse me, to do what?

Q: You know when you have an occasion, usually you…

BARKLEY: Oh no, we did not send any greetings. No, I don't think it ever crossed anybody's mind. I was instructed to attend of course, as were all of the diplomatic corps accredited to East Germany. The first day was mostly speeches. The two speeches that everybody was watching was Honecker's and more importantly, Gorbachev's. Gorbachev was in a clearly difficult position because he had espoused both Perestroika and Glasnost. Those were concepts not welcomed by the East German government. Gorbachev's speech as you would have expected showed his complete confidence in the ability of the East German government to handle its problems, but it did make a general reference that is important, to look forward and to embrace reform. Honecker's speech was rather standard, what they had achieved and all. He didn't challenge Glasnost or Perestroika, but he rather indicated that it was something that the East Germans had already embraced earlier, something we had discussed earlier too. If you looked at the speeches with hindsight, it was clear that Gorbachev was saying he could not back off of his reform measures. They were essential to his survival. The East Germans were saying well we are not going to embrace them because they are going to undermine our survival. Of course we didn't know what was going on in the inner councils. There was clearly tension, that played out later.

Q: Well on the inner councils because this is a disparate group of people, Ceausescu and the others involved. Did we have any people who were kind of telling us what was happening in the inner councils?

BARKLEY: Well of course we picked up different rumors and things. As far as I know, whatever would have been going on in those councils would have probably played back to their capitals, and that is where you would have picked it up. It was nothing that we particularly picked up, but although we had already heard murmurs from the different

embassies in all the countries that were participating. They always reflected the positions of the governments involved. The Hungarians of course, had already made rapid strides towards reform, and indeed had opened their borders. The Poles did the same line. There had just been an election in Poland that was never mentioned actually in the East German press. The Czechs were still hard line. Romania and Bulgaria were unique cases. I am not an expert in Romanian politics but obviously the cult of personality had gone very far with Ceausescu. But we were of course particularly concerned with the interaction between the East Germans and the Russians. The Russian Embassy was of course very closed mouthed. They didn't tell us an awful lot. Debate was certainly opening up in East Germany. But even at that time this one particular event, the 40th anniversary had everybody so preoccupied, that there weren't as many rumors as immediately thereafter. In any event, the second night, which was the actual anniversary, the evening events were particularly important. It started out in almost the traditionally old German tradition with a Fackelzug, or torchlight parade. The major mobilizations were organized by the Free Democratic Youth, led by Egon Krenz, who was the crown prince of the politburo. They marched in their blue uniforms down Unter Den Linden with great joy. Just watching that, you wouldn't have thought that there was anything particularly wrong with what was going on. Of course that cloaked great discontent at the grass roots level. But it was a unique evening and certainly nothing I had ever experienced before. The limousines of the diplomatic corps pulled up after the major guests had disgorged. We walked up the steps of the Palast der Republik, the major gala hall, if you will, in which the ceremonies took place. After my wife and I got out, and were walking up the steps, a slightly tardy Daniel Ortega arrived. He came up almost the same time we did. Of course I was somewhat surprised to see him, not because there was any doubt about where he stood, but that indeed he should be considered to be one of the honored guests. The importance of that played itself out a little bit later. In any event, we came in, there were a number of gala tables, and were artistic events going on. It was a banquet. I sat at a table with a number of diplomats. Every one of the tables had a prominent member of the politburo there. Of course I had met almost all of them in my initial calls. At out table was Joachim Herrmann who was the politburo member responsible for propaganda and information, and a real hard liner, although that evening he was rather gracious and charming. Then of course the other politburo members were scattered around. The head table, which was most fascinating, had Gorbachev and Honecker and all of the princes of the Eastern European governments there, including as I said Yasser Arafat and Daniel Ortega. I watched a couple of the more ambitious young guys, particularly Gunther Shabovsky who was the head of the Berlin Communist Party. He was quite clearly discontent because he wanted to be at the head table and was not. He was moving around trying to engage in what was going on. It was rather bizarre. And from what one could tell, there was a certain comradery going on. Later on after the meal they sat down and things became closer and the whispers became more hushed. But I recall one of the more important things was to watch Daniel Ortega engage the East German Minister of Defense because it was quite clear that the Soviets were beginning to curtail their military support, and you could see that he was trying to get the East Germans to fill the void. I am sure there was an enormous amount of politics going on, but it was remote from our table. But just to sit there, and of course once again with that great advantage of hindsight, to see a host of

people at a table who in a relatively short order would all be gone from power, with the sole exception of Yasser Arafat. A rather remarkable period of time. When we left it became interesting. They had parked our cars a few blocks away, and they asked us if we would be kind enough to walk to them because it was impossible to organize the exit in any orderly fashion. I was walking along with a very good friend, the Finnish ambassador and our wives. There were huge crowds out and of course they were waving and cheering. I don't know, I am not exactly sure that this is true but as I passed they cheered very loudly, and I don't think it was because I was the American ambassador, but because I have a bald head very close to that of Gorbachev. Of course where ever Gorbachev went, they were cheering him loudly and asking him to extent to East Germany the reforms he was instituting in Russia. We got to our cars after this rather remarkable evening, and we were on our way back to our residence. On the way there was a cross section near Prenz Lauerbergs which is an area in Berlin known to harbor free thinkers or artistic types, to the extent they existed at all.

Q: Kind of the Hyde Park?

BARKLEY: More or less. Imperfect as the comparison is, but nonetheless we saw little groups of people out on the corners. We had never seen that before. There was that milling around of people who were uncertain of exactly what to do, but you had the impression they were not happy with what was going on. That was, of course, all behind the scenes, while the gala was celebrated. There were huge sighs of relief from the East German government that they had gotten through this ceremony relatively unscathed. But what we saw on the way back were knots of sullen people, usually close to the churches which were the sanctuaries for most of the protest movement. So there was still a lot of murmuring going on, and a number of people who rather openly tried to seize on Gorbachev's visit to appeal to Gorbachev to get behind a reform movement in East Germany. In any event it was a totally remarkable evening. One I have thought back on many times.

Q: Did Gorbachev leave right away?

BARKLEY: No, he was there a couple of days. Obviously he had intense discussions with the GDR leadership as we found out later. The discussions were along the line of is the new generation prepared to challenge the old boys who were determined to hold rigidly on to things. Was there an opposition among the younger people actually to challenge the East Germans, and did they have the gumption actually to attach themselves to Gorbachev and would Gorbachev endorse their efforts? One must remember that Gorbachev himself represented the rather new generation from that which was represented mostly at that table, with the exception of course of Poland and Hungary. All of the old line bosses were not inclined to change very much. It was what they knew and they were afraid of instability. A lot of this played itself out in subsequent weeks. We couldn't see in the inner councils. Actually one of the people that I looked to for a lot of sort of inner kinds of discussion was the Yugoslav ambassador, Milan Predojevic, who was a rather congenial fellow and of course was still viewed as a brother socialist.

Therefore they fed him a different line of discourse than they would to an American ambassador, who was the traditional arch enemy. I began to see there was an awful lot of interaction and discontent at the local party levels that played itself out. In any event, it turned out that the 40th anniversary was the last hurrah for the GDR. From then on things began to change dramatically and quickly. The next couple of months were almost a fog of activity where it is still hard to sort out what went on at any particular time.

Q: Well at this time in October, 1989, was anybody pointing and saying this house of cards may come falling down? I am talking about from the official Washington, INR.

BARKLEY: No. Of course after the fact as you can imagine, there were a lot of people who said well if you had listened carefully to this one passage in my speech, you would have seen that I foresaw that. That is a lot of crap. Nobody knew exactly what was going on. It is only the pontificators who later on thought that they saw some things going on. Obviously if you were a scholar, I guess, and you are looking at the sweeps of history, it would seem that Gorbachev and perestroika and glasnost and the sheer inability of the Soviets to compete along a whole variety of lines was the problem. You could have probably foreseen some movement, but most people didn't see it then, and we didn't see it then. We knew things were happening. East Germany, as you know, is the gem in the imperial crown of the Soviet Union. That it would be on the cusp of a true radical movement was barely believable.

Q: Well what about Poland? I mean here in a way Poland was really a major player in that area, and it was sort of going in its own way at this point.

BARKLEY: Well that is true, and the election in Poland in that spring in which Lech Walesa did very well, was not even reported in the East German press.

Q: He didn't attend the…

BARKLEY: No. Jaruzelski who was president. Jaruzelski was a military man. I am not an expert in Polish history. He was considered a more liberal figure, but he was still a military man and I am sure did not look upon what was going on there as anything that the Soviet would tolerate beyond certain points. The East Germans never had a particular affinity for Poland anyway, as I am sure you are aware. Not only is there an historical precedent there, but their chief patron, their main patron at every level was of course, the Soviet Union. But right after the 40th anniversary, you could see things were beginning to pick up steam. The Monday evening prayer services that had started to get many more participants all throughout the country, particularly in Dresden and Leipzig, but also in Berlin. The numbers increased rather dramatically. It seemed to be every week the numbers almost doubled.

Q: What was happening at these prayer meetings? Was it just a gathering, sort of a silent protest; was there agitation or…

BARKLEY: Well of course, the ministers in essence offered their churches to the protest movements. The church had a long historical relationship with the East German government. The Lutheran and Reformed churches were the only two major protestant churches in that area. There was a small but very active Catholic community, but largely it was in the Lutheran churches where these people met. The idea was of course to comfort people who had trouble on their minds. They would come to the church and receive solace from the misery. Well the things that were on their minds of course were political change. The government at that stage did not want to be seen cracking down on the Churches, particularly with the world focusing very much on what was going on. And so they allowed these things to go on. The religious community became the assembly point for the reform movement. I think it is important to realize that at the time, nobody was talking about reunification. The students were talking about a letting up, an ability for them to speak openly, more Perestroika, or more Glasnost if you will. Restructuring was something I don't think preoccupied most people. But certainly Glasnost, the ability to criticize, which had been denied them so long was something which particularly attracted the younger generation. I mean there had been a passing of the torch, although the leadership apparently was not aware of that. Younger people of course had access to the western media, and they knew what was happening, and they were unhappy. They were becoming a little bit more courageous. Of course, once they realized that the church was a safe haven, they gathered there.

Q: Were you making contact with church authorities?

BARKLEY: Oh yes. Our people were out. Many of them attended the church meetings. There was at that time a lot of discussion. Of course the whole concept was they would get together and pray. One of the things they prayed for was an opening of their lives.

Q: Well you know one looking back on the church in Germany under the third Reich, its role wasn't very positive. Again they were public servants and tended to be rather unchallenging to Hitler. I mean those that did get killed, Mithoffer and others.

BARKLEY: Well I don't want to get too much into the history of this, but of course the Catholics did sign a Concordat with Hitler. The Lutheran church and others basically went along, although there were people like Mithoffer and Nedermeyer, a lot of very strong church leaders, who were horrified at what was going on and became victims of the Nazi regime. So there is a mixed bag, but the fact was that Germany per se had begun to consider theories of the church under socialism quite early. Even Paul Tillich later on discussed this. But there was an early agreement on the part of the church that they would not challenge the regime; they would render to Caesar. In East Germany, particularly after the events of the early 50's, the government forced an incredible crackdown. Strangely enough, the Church under direct pressure usually shows a fiber that it doesn't when it is not challenged. So as it turned out there were a large number of clerics that were concerned about the ways and means of the Communist Party. But they had made their peace with it, and indeed had their political instruments, particularly in the CDU, which as a party had become sort of a running dog of Socialist Unity Party. But there was

always within the church, a number of people who agonized over the moral problems that a communist regime posed for them

Q: You know looking at it at that time, what would you say were the things that particularly rankled with those, not the extreme liberals, but those that wanted a change? What were the things they really wanted?

BARKLEY: Of course they would have liked to have had a much freer press. They would have liked to have been able to publish and read and do things without any censure or penalty. Revolutionary movements don't clearly define what was going on. This was not a revolutionary movement in the sense that there was a Lenin based Marxist oriented kind of thing. There was the yearning of people to be free I think, and the recognition that things were moving very quickly in the world, and they wanted to be part of what was going in the world. I mean the explosions in the information age had just begin at that time, and was making itself known. Once again in retrospect, in hindsight, we could see that they had access to information, and that access to information fed aspirations, we were not as fully aware of.

Q: Were we doing anything, I am thinking about the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and all that. Was there all of a sudden looking at and seeing this opportunity for sort of throwing gasoline on the fire or anything like that?

BARKLEY: No I don't think so. East Germany was of course, a unique case. With one little exception, East Germans had total access to West German television and radio etc. So they knew what was going on in the world. West German television of course, particularly in the area of the news is extraordinarily complete and active. So there was a great knowledge of what was going on. I mean you could not for example, sit in East Germany and not know that the border was opening in Hungary. You found that out, not through Voice of America, I don't know how many people listened to it, but my guess is if they ever did a survey there were very few. Most of our emphasis in Voice of America was to Eastern Europe because, the West Germans had so thoroughly covered what was going on in East Germany. We had Radio Free Berlin which was of course, independent radio that had been, started by the Americans and was in the hands of USIS for awhile in Berlin. It was extraordinarily well listened to. We actually did not control the content of that, but there was a general uniformity of views coming out of the western press everywhere as to what was going on in the world, and the East Germans got that. That made it very interesting when I was traveling round and talking to people. One of the persons that I met that October actually was Hans Modrow who was destined to play a key role. He was Party Secretary in Dresden. Dresden was one of those areas which could not easily receive western news. In my discussion with him, I asked him, "You know theoretically you are in the valley of the blind as East Germans say, and yet from what I understand, people are leaving here as rapidly through Hungary as anywhere else." He said, "I didn't think it was a question of that. It was a question of discontent, that people were looking for a way out." The traditional line was there was a seductive quality to western reportage that was luring these people away. I am not sure he believed that, but

that is what he said. In any event things began, particularly in the Monday night meetings, to develop dramatically On the 15th October I had a personal engagement that was for me also very instructive as to what was going on. Our daughter, who had been born in August, was to be baptized. I was determined that she be baptized in Pankow at the village church. So we got hold of the church leader, the superintendent, a man by the name of Werner Kuchel who turned out to have played quite a role in subsequent events. He was really a rather remarkable fellow, not particularly remarkable in the sense of Germany, but for me he was. For 600 years his family had preached in the church in Pankow. He was delighted to be asked to baptize my daughter. We invited a number of people, many members of the government and, of course just friends to attend. It turned into quite a political baptism. In fact what I didn't know was the Pastor Kuchel's son had been one of those who had gone through Hungary and was now in West Berlin. They would wave to each other across the wall like many other people did. But it lent a very personal grievance to his view of what was going on. We had this all on tape. It is very interesting to revisit it occasionally. He basically said this wall must go. Of course this was three weeks in advance of what really happened, but it was a fascinating experience for us to sit there. Of course he did the proper rites; he blessed my child and baptized her, but in the process the commentary that went back and forth was rather pointed. So things were beginning to happen. In any event, shortly thereafter, I was called back to Washington. They saw things were moving. I believe our embassy reporting was as good as you will ever find. It was remarkable, we had just wonderful people. They were covering everything from the church meetings to what was going on at every level. So on the 18th of that month I flew into Washington. While I was in the air, little did I know that Honecker had been challenged by his own party, and he had resigned. So I got off the airplane in Washington, and I was met by Peter Ito who was head of the East German desk. He said, "Well what do you think about Honecker's resignation?" Of course I knew nothing about it. I said, "Oh my gosh." He said, "Yes," and predictably the torch was passed to Egon Krenz who was sort of the heir apparent and had been for a number of years. But it was clearly indicative of a major challenge within the party, and it had much to do with the follow up to the 40th anniversary.

So there I was in Washington, while things clearly were moving in East Germany. Official Washington was not only reading our reportage but of course the western press also was focusing on what was going on. Reporters were there in large numbers to cover the 40th anniversary. So all of a sudden there I was in Washington and believe it or not, there was great interest in me. So my normal call on the usual suspects was increased rather dramatically. I didn't meet with the secretary but I spent a lot of time with Bob Zoellick who was really a breath of fresh air, an extraordinarily bright young man who worked for Baker. I spent a lot of time at the White House with Bob Blackwell who at that time who was in charge of European affairs. Nobody saw clearly what was actually happening, but they were curious to get together with me to see whether I could shed some light on things. Of course I could shed light on what was happening on the ground better than anything else that they had had because I had been there. Clearly Washington was beginning to pay attention.

Q: What were you imparting to these people?

BARKLEY: Well what I was imparting was not only that there is regime change but other movements afoot. Of course we didn't know exactly where things were going. We didn't know what the survival chances of the Party were, but we saw no signs at that time that unification or the demand for unification was on the horizon. In fact that never even entered the discussion. I think we were so basically children of the cold war that the idea of unification of Germany was just not on our agendas. But it was certainly clear that things were happening on and after all what had gone on in Hungary and Poland, it seemed contagious. Where it would head, no one knew. The presumption all along was because of East Germany's unique position that allowed the Soviet Union to expand its influence to the Elbe for the first time in history, there probably would not retreat from that. Although one was aware there was so much movement in the Soviet Union itself, and in the eastern bloc nations, one couldn't see clearly where this was headed. At that time I began to get my chatter down a little bit to explain what was going on in the different outlying areas, who some of the personalities were that we should pay attention to. We did know of course that among the younger groups, the ambitions were not limited to Krenz, but from people like Shabovsky and Modrow and others. Of course it became clear very shortly, I was in Washington about a week, and I must say our embassy continued to do a good job in reporting things. It was clear that there were people within the SED after the fall of Honecker, who were looking upon this as an opportunity to gain more influence. Some of them were the old boys actually. The question was whether the younger generation would hold firm. Then we began to see cracks in the institutions. That was within the grass roots of the Social Unity Party. I think the fact that Honecker left and a large number of members of the old line politburo were changing led Krenz to call for a new party convention to discuss the future. That instilled in the grass roots a certain courage to say well if things are changing, we want to be part of it. We don't want to be the people who are retarding change. So there became a large number of people out of the Social Unity Party who began to sympathize with some of the demands of the reformers, not knowing precisely what that would be. But at a minimum level of political pluralism and openness that they didn't have at that time. We saw that beginning to happen when even Krenz would show up to address a bunch of people and be booed. This never happened before. The party was particularly noted for its internal discipline. Obviously what was happening was the Central Committee was desperately trying to send out guidance to the new leadership as to how to regain control of what was happening. It also became quite clear that Krenz did not represent a particularly sympathetic figure. Although he was only in his late 40's, he had been so associated with the Honecker regime that he was not looked to as a sign of change.

Q: He wasn't a Gorbachev.

BARKLEY: Oh no. I got to know him a little bit. We had met on a few occasions. He was somewhat better than his reputation. He was basically a child of the system and he voted for the system, and he expected the system to continue, and that he would naturally become the head of things. In his view that was preordained. Anyway it became clear that

there were a lot of things going on underneath him that he did not understand. It also became clear that he couldn't control them. In any event, in the plenum, they came up with some newer faces and some older faces. But the grass roots of the party began to reject them and reject them actually at the grass roots level. Several people were given key party positions in the provinces who immediately had demonstrations against them. It was clear things were changing rapidly. By the end of October, everybody in the Party from the old guys who were trying to hold on, to the younger guys who were trying to seize control, to the grass roots who were not going to be blamed for the past as rigid rejecters of reform. No one saw clearly where this was headed. But one of the more interesting developments, and it turns out the key, was that Hans Modrow, who was always looked on as a reformer and against Honecker, and had spent all of his life in the provinces, was named the Prime Minister. He replaces Willi Stoph. Under Willi Stoph the position had no power. The power really was in the Party and the Politburo and the Central Committee. Modrow turned that around. He became indeed the symbol of change. So things happened and happened rather dramatically, with people like Modrow and Shabovsky now in charge. Interestingly, I had a meeting with Shabovsky at the end of October. I went in with Jim McAdam who was one of the few university professors who had focused on East Germany. We had an absolutely remarkable discussion in which he blamed the Russians for not being able to handle reform, and handle it efficiently. Shabovsky's wife was Russian and his relationship with the Russians was essential to success. His performance was especially remarkable. I remember him saying in a very Germanic manner, we tried to tell the Soviets how to reform their industry, but they wouldn't listen. Then I remember he said, "Everything they have done since then is Mist und Kaese." Which means cheese and manure, or junk. If they had listened to us right along, we never would have gotten into this fix. This was remarkable kinds of statements coming from a guy who held a position of great power in the party. What he was clearly doing was reaching for the laurel wreath. He and a number of other people were beginning to speak openly in heretical tones, and things were beginning to move. I remember as we left, we were walking out, and one of his young assistants came with us and he said, "You know, even Mr. Shabovsky hasn't the faintest idea what is happening. We have files full of reports on what we should have done, and nobody would read them." So you began to see that even blind loyalty at that high level was beginning to break.

Q: Well you have this remarkable thing where it seems that every other person was reporting on the other person in that society with the Stasi and all that. I mean was one getting the feeling that all this wonderful security apparatus really wasn't getting the picture?

BARKLEY: It is an interesting comment because I doubt if there was ever a secret service or security system as efficient as the East German Security office. The head of it was Erich Mielke, an octogenarian, a mean, mean old man. But he clearly had lost a lot of his stature although he hadn't lost any of his meanness. The Stasi of course had two major tasks. The first was to maintain an iron grip on what was going on inside East Germany. The other one was in foreign affairs. In foreign policy the Stasi was really quite efficient.

The major focus of course was penetrating the West German government, which they did to a fair-the-well. The head of the operation was Marcus Wolfe. Marcus Wolfe, among the intelligence community, was considered to be the top spy in the world. I mean he was a faceless kind of figure, but indeed the efficiency with which he ran that operation was remarkable. Yet despite the fact that they had dossiers on everybody, and indeed, as we subsequently found out, hardly any East German had not been compromised, and in the last analysis it didn't mean diddly. Somehow the sweeps of history cannot be checked by a security system in a modern day in which the flow of international information is constant.

Q: Were we looking, seeing these things going, were we doing the things that you know, embassies kind of do. They go over and look for mobilization you know, martial law coming along according to the ministry of, the defense minister whatever they called it there, seeing if windows were lit up late at night, the usual thing.

BARKLEY: For one thing we had a very small embassy. The construct of the American embassy in East Berlin was entirely different from that of a traditional embassy. Policy decisions regarding the status of Berlin made that made it very difficult for us to have a normal embassy. For example, we did not have any military attachés, because we did not recognize East Berlin as part of the German Democratic Republic. I was ambassador **to** the German Democratic Republic, not **in** the German Democratic Republic. These are important status questions. The second thing of course is that we never looked to East Germany for a productive relationship. We actually recognized them as part of the eastern policy of the West German government, but we were never enthusiastic about it. So we were a classical reporting post with a very small embassy staff, which we mobilized as best we could. The things that were going on, however, so exhausted us. We had young people going off to the churches and around the country to make sure that what was happening in Berlin was not the only part of our reportage. We were using whatever sources we had, and for a long time a lot of people were reluctant to meet with us except at Ambassadorial level where they just basically spouted platitudes. But to find out actually what was happening, such as access to the Stasi headquarters and to the military compounds outside of the city were very limited. So no, we did not do the lights on kind of thing. It turns out of course that the Stasi headquarters lights were on, but what they were doing in there was something we weren't quite sure of. Much of it I am sure was a burn, and lot of others were wondering how best to secure their own futures. With respect to the military dimension, it too was complicated. The East German army, which was quite efficient, was totally dedicated to the Warsaw Pact, much as the West German army was dedicated to NATO. So they were not part of the security apparatus that the government could call on. What they would normally call on were the vopos, the police force, which was huge. Or they would call on the Stasis which was basically an intelligence group. But they also were large. And they had the workers brigades, which were the organized laborites that had played a key role in crushing the revolution of 1954. So they had not necessarily looked to the military. If it had ever come down to it, what we were concerned about was the idea of another Prague spring or what happened in Hungary in 1956 where the Russian military would give orders to the East German

military and together they would crush any dissent. As it turned out because of Gorbachev's policies in Russia, the idea of going for a military solution would be the end of his reform policies, and so it turns out the military were never looked upon as an option at that time.

Q: Were you seeing another sign of cracks in all of a sudden people who had been aloof and sort of party members beginning to sidle up to you or your colleagues and saying I have always been a friend of the west and you know sort of preparing?

BARKLEY: Well yes that was happening at a lower level. One of the fellows who had the best insight was Wolfgang Vogel, the spy trader who had played an instrumental role in not only getting the asylum seekers out of our embassy but of the German embassies in Warsaw and Prague as well. He had an enormously important role at that time. He was a confidante of Honecker, so even before Honecker fell we had gotten some reports from him, but most of them were with a sigh that said, this guy doesn't understand what is coming at him anymore. He means well. He wants to see a rational transition of power to the next generation. He isn't ready to do it yet, and feared that showing too much wiggle room, or too much ankle, at this time would only embolden those people who are out to cause mischief for the East German government. So he was a pretty important source of information at higher levels. He had a remarkable way of telling the truth without implicating himself in what that truth might mean. A major skill in that business. And of course the willingness with which Shabovsky and others would meet with us. Just about this time actually Marcus Wolfe came out of the woodwork with a major criticism against the direction the past the government had gone. Some thought he had future ambitions. Most of these ambitions you have to keep in mind, were still within the context of a reformed East Germany, not in the context of a united Germany. That didn't come until January. We are still now stuck in October and the beginning of November.

Q: I mean a united Germany for all these people I mean they wouldn't be able to participate would they, you know be accepted in a united Germany.

BARKLEY: Well the first place of course in a rather persuasive way, the East German policy thinkers would say, "Well if we just ape West German institutions, with multiple parties etc, there is no reason to have a distinct East Germany. Therefore a distinct East Germany must have different institutions and traditions; it must be guided by, of course, the traditional Communist Party. That doesn't mean that you can't do things a different way, but it is absolutely essential for world peace that we continue to be an entity." Well I am not sure that the fineness of that point was captured by objective people who were looking for a better life.

Q: How were things going then? I mean you were meeting with Shabovsky and others, I mean was anybody telling you, yes, the Russians are no longer part of the game or something like that?

BARKLEY: Oh, no, we weren't there yet by a long shot. That was part of the end game;

it wasn't part of the beginning which is where we were at this time. And of course the Russians would never have told you if they knew. For the Russians too, it was important that reform took place, but that it take place within the confines of Soviet interests. There was no defined Soviet interest at that time. They wanted reform but they never defined it in terms of changing the balance of power, which indeed is what we were talking about in subsequent discussions. But nonetheless, the situation in East Germany itself, the chaos in the transfer of power from Honecker to Krenz and Krenz's clear inability to either foresee or control what was happening became more and more apparent. That is when of course in November the crucial time. In November when the new Modrow government was trying to figure out how they could handle the continual rupturing of people from East Germany seeking asylum in the west, that there became the big meeting on the ninth of November which became, of course, one of the major days in western history.

Q: I just got an E-mail from J.D. Bindenagel. I mentioned I was interviewing you. He said, "Be sure to have him talk about the ninth of November.

BARKLEY: Well that is where we are now. By the way, at the same time that the new communist party in East Germany was going through its growing pains, there were the beginnings and initial rumblings of new parties and new political formations. People who had come out of the church groups were finally emboldened to organize themselves politically.

Q: Was there any mention of the Helsinki accords and agreements at this point?

BARKLEY: No, that was a fine point that was lost. The thought that there will be no violent changes of borders which came out of the Helsinki accords, was really a matter of domestic politics at this time. But new groups formed, like the New Forum, and then there was the beginning of a new SPD, Social Democratic Party of East Germany. There were young leaders that were coming out, people we had not heard of before. So there was rumblings towards new political structures. Of course, the West Germans were monitoring things. There was no panic, but a total preoccupation with what is happening here in the other Germany. So on November ninth Shabovsky had a press conference. It was a rather unremarkably uneventful press conference for a long time, to the point where I gave up watching it on television, got in my car and drove home. I didn't see anything new coming out of the whole thing. By the time I got home I immediately put on the news. During that interim, Shabovsky was handed a piece of paper where he announces that forthwith, or in a very short period of time, there will be no travel restrictions on East German citizens between East and West Germany and East and West Berlin. The question was asked at that time, what does this mean. He said, "Well just what I said. Everybody will have a right to a visa. You can get that visa. There will be no exceptions and they can move back and forth." One of the journalists said, "Does that mean immediately?" He looked at the paper and said, "Yes, that means immediately."

Q: Where was the paper coming from?

BARKLEY: It was obviously passed to him by members of the politburo who had been meeting to discuss how to handle this constant rupturing of people trying to leave through eastern Europe. They didn't know a way to stop them. So basically they thought instead of trying to stop it and get the Czechs and everybody else to do the dirty work for them, which they were not inclined to do, is that they would seize the nettle and say, okay, we'll control it from here, but everybody will have that right. The idea was of course to try to reassure dissident elements that nobody was going to be disadvantaged by being a GDR citizen. You won't have to sneak out through the back door, for "we are strong and self confident", which they were not. Nonetheless, so for the first time they said that. Of course it hits the western press. The western press of course which is watched by all the East Germans, said that as of immediately people could go back and forth between the borders. Well the evening was hardly over when groups were going down to take a look at the wall and see what the hell was this all about. Pretty soon, literally within hours, there were huge groups at Checkpoint Charlie at Bornholmer Strasse, the normal east-west checkpoints, to see what was going on. Well what we didn't particularly know at that time was how this would play out. How would the border guards handle this? Well subsequently we were informed that they were told for God's Sakes don't shoot anybody and don't do anything, and if they push you, get out of the way. Well at Bornholmer Strasse and other places, people simply said, "We want to go across, can we go?" They said, "Ok, go ahead." Try to imagine a couple of checkpoint guys sitting there looking at huge mobs of people and wondering Jesus, what are they going to do. I can't shoot; I have been told not to shoot. What do I do? So of course all the cameras were there and they started to go through. And of course it was jubilation. People saying, "This is wannsinn, it is crazy. I can't believe this. This is crazy, I don't know what is happening here." They started going back and forth, and that was the end. From that moment on, the guys at the border just threw up their hands and lifted the gates. What happened at Bornholmer Strasse was repeated at Checkpoint Charlie. Well of course all of our guys were trying to get down there and try and see what is going on. The mobs by that time, every Trabant in East Germany was on the roads to go to the border and see what was happening. The roads were clogged; you couldn't get anywhere.

Q: This was not just Berlin but the whole East German..

BARKLEY: Well the whole focus was Berlin at that time but it would have been East Germany as well. Once, all of a sudden, the major gates, particularly Checkpoint Charlie opened, there was no holding it. Anyway that was basically the beginning of the end. Pretty soon before you knew it, people were hammering on the wall. It was the death knell of the wall after 28 years. An astonishing development.

Q: You know there was talk about sort of a decision either open it up or let's really crack down. I mean was that even, by November ninth, was that even within the politburo a question of let's declare martial law or something and bring out the troops?

BARKLEY: Well I think if they were going to declare martial law and bring in the troops, it would have had to happen earlier than this. By the time this event had taken place, the

discontent in the country was evident. We are talking about hundreds of thousands of people coming out of the churches and marching in Dresden and Leipzig and other places, and of course the huge numbers in Berlin. Subsequently I remember Vogel telling me that the word within the government that a group of people that had mobilized were willing to die to test the borders in Berlin. I don't know if that was true or not, but certainly the message flashed around. All Shabovsky had to do was make one or two statements and they lost control. Now that doesn't mean that they still didn't have the authority or the ability to do something, but I think the fact was is that almost all of the instruments of authority realized something was happening and questioned whether or not they could control it. I don't know. Certainly the Russians went further and further into their Kasernes (bases). The Russian army was not to be seen. Things obviously caught the world by surprise. I mean you could have foreseen the continuing of this asylum seeking problem for a long time before it really broke. Once again we can look back and say well we should have known but we didn't. I mean we are not talking about the vast majority of East Germany. This is a country of 16 ½ million people. Whether they mobilized five or eight percent of them, it was incredible. Still the vast majority were not active. And of course the instruments of repression themselves, one doesn't know at this time whether or not they would have responded or how they would have responded. Were they once again ready to have blood in the streets? Clearly Gorbachev wasn't ready to have blood in the streets.

Q: So what were you…

BARKLEY: You can imagine how this hit Washington. You know how Washington responds in times of unexpected political challenge or change. And of course we were the only constant reporters. The press was there, but the press was basically doing a quick and dirty on immediate events and not what does this really mean. We were doing a pretty good job of keeping at least the bureaucracy up to date on what was happening. At the same time of course, poor Harry Gilmore, our minister in West Berlin, was also trying to do things because of course the West German government was not quite prepared for hordes of East Germans descending on them. And nobody in Bonn seemed to be prepared for it at all. I think Kohl was in Poland at the time. Genscher showed up very quickly, he of course was the coalition partner with Kohl, and he spotted a political opportunity and started making speeches, you know about freedom and free movement and all of that. Kohl charged into town to try to take the mike away from Genscher. But they weren't sure what this meant either. None of them were talking about unity. In fact two months later, the West German government was offering a Community of Treaties that would link the two countries together, but unity was not on the table. It just wasn't part of the agenda. So Washington then went back and forward, and you can imagine every talk show in the world wanted to have the President or the Secretary of State or the National Security Advisor. So on the 10th, I get a call telling me that Nightline was looking for a speaker for the 11th, the next day. "The Secretary wants you to take this on." Well you don't have to be a particularly sophisticated foreign policy observer to realize that I didn't know the secretary, and they were throwing me into the breech. That is not so dangerous. The ambassador can always be denied. One can always say, "He is not speaking for the

government". So anyway, I didn't quite know how to handle the whole thing, and when you are talking to Ted Koppel you are not talking to a slouch. I mean this guy is one of the foreign policy commentators who actually does his homework. So that evening I went on Nightline. I guess it was a 15-20 minute segment, I don't know. He asked a lot of questions, about the period that led up to this. Even at that time we knew better than anybody else what was happening. I got my line of chatter down a little bit, and so we went through what was actually happening, so I answered that the best I could. Then I remember, and I don't know how I came up with this, but at the very end he said, "Well what are the long term implications of this.?" They are asking me a question that nobody else knew the answer to, and what are you going to come up with. So I said, "I think the long term implications are that the East German people will never agree to be ruled without their consent again" something along those lines. Anyway I weathered the storm and I got through it. I got nice calls from Washington on how it was handled. Of course at that time you know this was an event of gigantic magnitude. Everybody seems to recall the pictures of the guys on the wall with hammers beating it down. It was an absolutely remarkable moment in history. It was a great privilege to have been there.

Q: Were you concerned at the time, or was anybody mentioning that we really didn't want to have a bunch of American politicos coming around and pontificating and saying we did this and that sort of thing. I mean was that…

BARKLEY: Well you know that is like asking the tide not to rush in. As you can imagine right after the wall, the number of senators and congressmen, and their staffers that descended on us was just enormous. Each one of them wanted to identify themselves as being there and tell their constituents that not only were they there when the wall came down, but their policy lines had led to this wonderful event. It is what American policy is all about. In terms of policy makers in Washington, they were obviously more careful. Thank God, they were more careful. They clearly saw that things were happening here, and did not want to add fuel to the fire until they knew in what direction things were headed. So there was interminable discussions as to what this all meant and where it was going. Nonetheless, very early on, the President and the Secretary of State made statements that indicated that the future of Germany and freedom looked like it was moving ahead. We would certainly welcome and endorse a thing like this. Meanwhile Congress continued to visit. I did as many briefings in the two week period of time as I had ever done in my life. We discussed the implications and what all of this meant, and you know what East Germany was. Many of these people had no idea what East Germany was, except that a Wall ran through Berlin. They began to realize that indeed this was a large nation, and was a nation that within the definition of Eastern Europe had a rather successful economy, and was a key player particularly in the Soviet analysis of things. So things were happening at a very intense level. Whenever CODELS come, you know, it is usually a nightmare for an Embassy. In this case it was not a nightmare particularly for us because everybody stayed in West Berlin. It was a nightmare for Harry Gilmore and the Mission in West Berlin, who had to take care of these people. Basically they would come over and it was our task to get them to meet with as many officials as we could. At that time, a large number of people were willing to talk to CODELS because they wanted to

be seen as not the hard line, Stalinists that Honecker later on was identified with. So we were able to do a good job of handling these people. We didn't have to bed them down which made it a lot easier. Sometimes it was hard. A lot of American congressmen and senators, it is a terrible thing to say, are prima donnas. Often when they arrived they were not particularly attentive to the East Germans they met. I remember Stanley Hoyer came with a group and was about two hours late getting there. We had important people lined up and desperately trying to ask them to stay on. They said, "But I have got to get out on the street. I can't do this." Then Hoyer came in and didn't even say thanks for staying. It got to be really pretty heavy going. Once he got there he was fine. But the discourtesy was something that some people didn't appreciate, including yours truly. But by and large you know, most American senators and congressmen are pretty impressive people. It is an easy thing to take shots at them, but most of them really wanted to know what was happening and what was going on.

Q: Well during this time, you know obviously the world had gone upside down. Could you talk to East German officials? Was everybody kind of wandering around in a daze or what?

BARKLEY: As you know the first line of contact for every Embassy is the foreign office. The foreign office changed dramatically with the fall of the wall. You know, these guys had been hard liners all of a sudden were just the voices of sweet reason. It was remarkable. They were all saying, "We know things have to change. Let's reason this together." Well we all knew that what the foreign office said in the past and so it now was not terribly important. We were spending infinitely more time in trying to get to know who the new players were. Not only who were the new players in the government were, but who were the new players in these other groups, Neues Forum, etc. The new SPD, all of the national front parties were changing, declaring their independence from the SED. They were jettisoning all of the old types too and new people were coming in, people we didn't know. We were trying to get to know them. We were a very busy group. Our problem wasn't that we didn't have anyone to talk to; our problem was that we had so many people to talk to that we tried to find a useful format. It is extraordinarily difficult.

Q: During this were you seeing, was there a possibility were we concerned about a violent reaction someplace, I mean hard liners taking over or assassinations or anything like that?

BARKLEY: Well I think that was always lurking in the back of your mind. I don't think it was assassinations so much. What was truly lurking in everybody's mind was the historical precedent of the Prague Spring. Whether or not finally Moscow would wake up and say, "Oh my God it is out of control" and say reform and openness be damned we cannot allow this to get out of control. And so we were constantly paying attention to what the Russians were doing. We had some fairly good contacts in the Russian embassy. Not the ambassador, I mean he was a hopeless old man. Really one of the last Stalinists. I don't think he ever understood what Gorbachev was about, but he had some good young people. They were willing to talk. What they kept saying is of course, it will be ok, it will

stay under control etc. I don't think they knew any better than any body else. There must have been an enormous heartburn in the Kremlin at that time as to what all this meant. I had the distinct impression that Washington was particularly concerned abut doing nothing to provoke a Soviet reaction. Extraordinarily responsible behavior. And of course at this time the President and the Secretary had begun to develop very good relations with the Russian leadership, not only Gorbachev, that went back during the Reagan years, but the Secretary of State Baker had become extraordinarily close to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. At the same time every other country in the world was taking an assessment of what this all means. The key people who had to make that assessment were those with specific responsibilities for Berlin and Germany as a whole. I am talking about France, England, the United States and Russia.

Q: This is tape eight, side one with Dick Barkley.

BARKLEY: Intellectually the idea of German unification was embraced by statesmen with greater enthusiasm depending on how close they were to Germany. I remember the French used to say they loved Germany so much they were glad there were two of them. Not quite as intense but equally concerned was Great Britain. Over the course of the 20th century they had some very rough experiences with the Germans. For the longest period of time of course, the U.S. said that the idea of a whole, free and unified Germany, was a good thing. But we of course sat across the ocean and were not that close to it. I can't speak for the Russians, but the Russians had rather difficult relations with Germany too for a long time. So everybody was watching what was going on with a certain amount of heartburn.

Q: I have to say that during the whole time, I am a creature of the cold war. World War III if it were going to start, was going to start by mobs tearing down the wall and something happening in Berlin and the Soviet army coming in and we would get involved. I mean you know this is sort of the classic scenario, and I mean you were reaching it but without some of the elements being the army coming in. Were people talking about this?

BARKLEY: No, but we are both children of the cold war. I recall all the war gaming we used to do was focused on the fear of a renewed Berlin crisis. Of course Berlin had been sort of the bellwether of our relations with the Russians for a long time. You would always look to where the flashpoints in east-west relations existed. Someplace like Thrace a miscalculation by the Bulgarians and the Greeks and the Turks or whatever could occur. Over the course of the years certain stability on the borders had been reached. You know part of the West German policy was to recognize the borders, the post war borders with Poland and with other countries, and indeed they did that. So the borders were not as volatile as they had been at one particular time. As much as we hated the Wall and the controlled strip between East And West Germany, it did lead to a measure of stability and predictability. What it didn't do of course, is illuminate the problems that were going on, on the eastern side of the border, and that is really what was playing out now. The general dynamic of western society which had become so appealing to the east led to attempts to restructure a system that was broken. That was what got us into the position we were in at

that time.

Q: Were you getting the, you mentioned the French and the British and the Soviet powers. I mean they all had this Berlin thing which in a way was more on Harry Gilmore's side I guess. I mean were you consulting with your fellow ambassadors to try to figure out swapping information?

BARKLEY: In East Berlin, we had a monthly meeting with the British and the French ambassadors and the West German permanent representative. At the beginning it used to be that the West Germans basically told us what they saw happening, because they had resources far in excess of anything we had. We would add bits and pieces. As the time went on, of course they were no better informed than the rest of us, but we did talk. The French ambassador, she was not particularly active, or did not seem to be very concerned one way or the other. I think she had a very small staff. The British ambassador was typically good and also very typically articulate. But I think everybody began to realize as things unfolded that the American embassy was the best. I am very proud to say that. We had wonderful people. We organized in a remarkable way, won with the limited resources we had.

Q: Were you given any additional help at this point?

BARKLEY: No, we never got any augmentation. We never asked for any. Washington was very pleased and very praiseworthy of what we were able to do. Anyway, as the Wall went down, I remember Jonathan Greenwald, a wonderful officer who was my political counselor had planned on home leave, and I think he wanted me to say to him oh Jon, you can't go. But maybe it is the old foreign service in me, and I said, "No, you have earned it, you should go. We will fill in somehow," and his deputy Imre Lipping took over. He was also a brilliant officer, and he had excellent young officers with him. By that time, J.D. Bindenagel was our DCM. He was marvelously well organized and made sure that the coverage of the country was as complete as it could be. I was very impressed. They had everybody out, everybody who spoke some German and even those who didn't. We even had communicators traveling in different areas to report back on what was going on. We had the agricultural attaché, we had the USIA. They were all over the place. I was fortunate to have the remnants of the old German hands. I had clearly the most experienced Embassy in terms of German affairs. Also a lot of young talent that was eager and willing to get out and go. They were fantastic. So we were everywhere to the extent that we could be, and we didn't need anymore help, and no one even thought about it. Interestingly enough, what was happening n the rest of Germany, I had the advantage of having remarkably talented and experienced people. In Bonn, with very few exceptions, they were all new people. Many of them had no experience in Berlin affairs. Our ambassador was Vernon Walters who was a prominent policy expert. Most of his experience had been in attaché duty in different places. He was a linguist of remarkable talent. Harry Gilmore had some German experience, but most of his experience had been in the Slavic areas, Hungary and Yugoslavia. He was a very level head, but the real German expertise was in my Embassy. I think that worked out to my good fortune. I am

sure there were a whole variety of reasons for it, but for the first time our embassy in East Berlin was the focal point of coverage in Germany. Bonn, I am sure, was unhappy with that. They thought that Bonn was the center of where American interests should lie.

Q: What was happening to, you opened up the wall, and everybody is jumping around and all that, but is this a real hemorrhage or is this going in, taking a look, coming back? What was it?

BARKLEY: Mostly the latter. West Germans very quickly came up with the concept of Begrussungsgeld which is welcoming money. Anybody who entered into Germany for the first time got 100 Marks. The idea was these people come into Germany, they look around, West Berlin, they see all these wonderful goods, but they don't have any money. So everybody who came through could apply for 100 Marks, which is about 60 bucks at that time. The West Germans did this. Of course it was a real drain on their treasury, but they did realize that this was a moment of great historical significance. So a lot of people came over; they would buy things, and they went back home. After all that is where their homes were. There was no place for them to stay. We began to see then the first sign of people who had no intention of emigrating or going to West Germany. I mean there were still a lot of those people too, but those are the younger people. The vast majority of people went back to their jobs and they went back to their homes. They went back with a load of bananas or oranges or whatever it was they needed at that particular time, or dishwasher soap. There was a whole variety of things they were particularly interested in. What you saw, however was constant movement back and forth, but it wasn't only one way. It went in both directions. As a matter of fact the day after on the 10th I drove down and with flags up on the limousine and demonstratively went through Checkpoint Charlie. We got a lot of cheers as we did that. The day after, we went down to another checkpoint, I don't know if it was Heinrich, Heinestrasse, or something like that, on foot, and we walked across. There were just swarms of people going in both directions, but when it came time to come back, the Vopos stopped me because I didn't have an East German identification card. I showed them my diplomatic passport and they finally let us through. So there was a lot of movement back and forth. The police on both sides were trying to get control somewhat. They didn't want to get it out of hand. But by and large, the movement was free and open. It came in both directions, and the vast majority of East Germans went back home, because I think they were confident they could go out again.

Q: But this shows the confidence that once it happened, it happened.

BARKLEY: It is astonishing in view of their history that they continued to go back, because a lot of people would look upon this as a one time opportunity. But you could see the regime at the Wall had lost all semblance of control. The people were going to come back. You can't even begin to visualize the streams of people that were going, mostly to the west. As soon as they got their money, and some of them always had a little bit of West German money, they would ride them in subways and things that they never had been able to do before. They were playing out the fantasies of a life that had been frustrated by their incarceration in the past. It is an interesting topic.

Q: The S-bahn was working then?

BARKLEY: Well it always had been working, but it had stopped at the border. Very quickly one of the things they tried to do was to re-open the subway, the S-bahn on both sides of the city border. That took awhile to get the technical ability to do that. In any event, the next major thing from my standpoint came in December when we were told that James Baker was coming to give a major speech in West Berlin. This is the first time he has been to Berlin. After what is going on, what he says was going to capture world attention and be an indication of the course of American policy. So of course we began to prepare for his visit. By December of course, the whole question of whither East Germany and whither Germany per se was beginning to preoccupy us a bit more. So we did a scene setter for the secretary, basically on where we saw things going. I sent in a cable saying that the secretary should consider visiting East Germany. In view of the fact that the United States had unique responsibilities for inter German relations, and under the Potsdam accords we had responsibility for Germany as a whole, and for Berlin, I said, that, we still are the key player on this issue. Kohl was coming at the end of December or early January. His trip had been announced. Mitterrand is coming before that, so we had western cover for a Baker visit. It seemed to me that the United States should not be hiding, but should be seen to be engaged in the process of reform, and that it would be very good if the Secretary would agree to go over and meet with Hans Modrow in Potsdam. As you can imagine, these kinds of recommendations don't always solicit responses. We heard nothing further. This was shortly before the Secretary arrived. Before he arrived, he did do something that was really quite remarkable. He took our scene setter cable and released it to the press. It was a cable that had been largely drafted by J.D. Bindenagel, but we all worked on it, and I though very well captured what was going on. I had never seen before a secret cable released to the press. In any event we were preparing for his visit and simultaneously with his visit we had a CODEL, headed by Richard Gephardt. I arranged to have a dinner for Richard Gephardt on the 11th of December. He had a number of high-profile people with him and I was able to get some fairly high ranking East Germans including Deputy Prime Minister Krystal Luft, who was an attractive woman who came in with Modrow and others and was rather forward looking. I got a call that said that the Secretary, who was giving his speech on the 12th would like to have a meeting of his in-country team in West Berlin at his hotel on the evening of the 11th. He had his team with him from Washington which included Bob Zoellick and Margaret Tutwiler, and all of these close confidantes. Harry Gilmore would be there, and Ambassador Walters would be there from Bonn, and I would be there representing the Embassy in East Berlin. So my wife did traditional foreign service wife duties sitting in for me for the dinner while I was on my way to West Berlin to meet with the Secretary. I had never met the Secretary before. I wasn't quite sure what I was prepared for, although from what I had seen he was obviously a charming intelligent fellow. Well we came in, and he came up to me and introduced himself, which was not necessary. He said, "I did something I have never done before. I released this cable you sent to me to the press." I said, "Yes Mr. Secretary, I am aware of that. I read it in the press. It read just as well the second time as it did the first." Well he looked at me and I

am not quite sure whether he thought I was pretty cheeky or whatever it was, but he smiled a bit and sat down. Anyway, the meeting started, and it turns out to have been perhaps one of the more important meetings in my career because it had a lot to do with where the United States saw its position in what was going on. I recall he started the meeting by looking at Dick Walters, because the Soviets had just called for a meeting of the Berlin group which was one of the few instruments that they had available to pressure the West on events. We did not want to buy into that meeting from a policy standpoint unless it was to discuss Berlin issues. So we agreed to do that under limited terms. I remember the Secretary looking at Ambassador Walters and saying, "Okay, I understand the political scenery, but what legal rights do we have in this whole situation?" You have to remember that Dick Walters had never served in Germany, he had never learned to arcane aspects of Berlin. Although he spoke good German, he had no background in German affairs. He said, "Well we don't have any legal rights." Well that was something that I just simply couldn't let go, so I said, "Excuse me Mr. Secretary, we do indeed have legal rights." I said, "Under the Potsdam accords of 1945 and subsequent accords. Indeed our rights are inscribed in the United Nations charter. I gave them the pertinent UN articles as well. The Secretary looked at me and said, "What have we got here? Does somebody actually know what is happening?" I think right away at this time he thought he had better listen; for this guy seems to know what is what. Well it was clear that I had just exposed my entire career. All of a sudden I was the only one present that had learned this unique quality of inter German Berlin affairs. As you can imagine I don't think Ambassador Walters was very pleased with me. But it was something that was essential to be clarified. Then we opened the discussion and he said to me, "I would like to hear what you have to say Dick, about what is going on." Well I had been briefing Congressmen for the past three weeks, so I had a line of chatter that flowed. I gave the briefing as best I could. I must say, I was really on that night. I don't know why, but it came out very nicely. You could see he was very interested in what was going on. Afterwards they asked a couple of questions. If I didn't know the answers, I said so. Then the Secretary looked at me and said, "Well do you think I should go over and see the chief?" I said, "Well Mr. Secretary it was a recommendation that I made earlier. I think it would be very helpful if you did. After all, many of our allies are already lining up to come over and meet with the new government. I can't see where this would be a hazard for you." I said, "However if you do that, there are several things that we would certainly recommend. One is that you inform the West Germans and get their approval before you do this, and second that you agree only to meet in Potsdam because of the status of Berlin. We can not do it in Berlin. Third that you use this occasion to impress upon Modrow etc. that the elections being planned for this spring would be free, fair, open, secret ballot, along traditional western lines of a democratic election." He said, "Well I got your cable, but we thought the Russians might misread this and their military might take to the streets." I said, "Well, all of our indications are, and indeed it has been publicly stated by the Russians, that they will not do that, that they are going further into the Kasernes and don't want to be involved at this time."

Q: For somebody reading this, Kasernes is the German term for barracks.

BARKLEY: That is right, the barracks. Anyway we discussed it further. Nothing was decided, the Secretary thanked us and left. Meanwhile Harry Gilmore said, "Dick, you got a moment?" So I said, "Sure." So Harry and I sat together. Harry had a unique problem in Berlin that affected all of us. The problem was is that the Commandant in Berlin who was a military officer, usually a two star officer, was in a very strange position. He is in charge of the 5,000 military forces we had in Berlin but was to stay away from politics. And although he was the personal representative of our ambassador in Bonn, the ambassador almost always briefed the commandant and said that political advice comes exclusively from the Minister in Berlin who was Harry Gilmore. Ambassador Walters never understood this and never told the Commandant that political decisions were in the hands of the Minister and implied that the Commandant was his representative in all things. So the Commandant was getting very active in politics that he did not understand and was causing us a lot of trouble. And poor Harry was getting no support at all. He looked a little bit to me for solace and understanding as he was going through the difficult task of trying to put political judgments into a situation he had lost control of. That is what he wanted to talk about. We had a good talk. Harry is a very bright guy. As I was leaving a secretary came up and caught me as I was going out of the Intercontinental Hotel and said, "Do you have a moment to see Margaret Tutwiler? I said, "Absolutely I have a moment to see Margaret Tutwiler." So we went back upstairs, and there she was. She said, "You know, I know Jim Baker very well, and I am telling you that after your discussion up there, he very much would be interested in following your advice and going over and seeing Modrow." I said, "Well that would be wonderful." She said, "I want you to come in here and talk to him." Well I had never been in the inner sanctum before in my foreign service career, but I really liked the Secretary, and thought we had, had a good exchange in our meeting. I came in and he said, "Come on over here. We have got to talk." Dennis Ross and Bob Zoellick and Margaret Tutwiler were there. Susan Baker who I did not know, came up and asked if I wanted a drink. I thought she was a secretary. I didn't treat her as properly as I should have. But anyway it was a very congenial atmosphere. We sat down and he said, "Let's go over this again." I gave all of the reasons why I thought it was important for the Americans to be seen to be engaged in something in which we had such deep interests and that I thought the risks were minor as long as we double checked with the Germans. I would recommend doing this. "Well I will go and talk to Brent Scowcroft." So he gets on the phone, and I hear his conversation. He was feeding back what we had discussed basically. Obviously Scowcroft said okay but, you do not go into Berlin. I remember the secretary saying, "Of course you do not do that. There is a status problem here. We will go to Potsdam." Which of course is exactly what I was feeding back to him, so I was pleased with all of that. He came back and he said, "Well I think we are going to try and do this. Can you set it up?" I said, "I am sure I can set it up." He was giving a speech the next day at one or two o'clock, an important speech, so the only time frame he had to put this together was about four or five o'clock that afternoon to met with Modrow. It was difficult administratively but I said, "I think I can do this." He said, "Meanwhile I will get in touch with Genscher and we will see how it goes." Well he did get in touch with Genscher who as I suspected said, "Oh that is a good thing. You should do this," because Genscher and others wanted to do it too. Of course the Secretary would only be the first and it would give them a little bit of cover for

whatever they wanted to do. I returned to my residence that night to set up the activities as the CODEL dinner was just coming down to a conclusion. As I walked in they were having dessert. Of course they were enormously curious as to what was going on. I mean I remember I came and they all stood up and said it was good to have you here. I am sure you had a good meeting etc, and what they wanted to know is what was going on. Well I said, "It was a very good meeting." I took Krystal Luft who was the Deputy Prime Minister and said, "Do you have a moment madam, I would like to speak with you." I brought J.D. in who was at the dinner. I said, "The Secretary is willing to meet with Modrow tomorrow in Potsdam. I thought this would be of great interest to the East German government as it was to the American government." I remember her looking at me and a smile crossed her face and she said in German "das ist eine sehr gute sache" which means "This is a very good thing. We will do this." She gets on the phone and talks to Modrow. He said, "Fine. I will make my schedule clear. We will meet in Potsdam. The foreign office will set it up for us." So I turned to J.S. and said, "Ok, J.D. it is in your hands." He mobilized the admin section, got hold of the Intercontinental Hotel and all of the other places we knew we were going to meet, and the boys went to work. They were marvelous. About an hour and a half later J.D. called and said, "It is from the foreign office. They want to talk to you about the meeting." So I said, "Okay." I knew him personally. He said, "We will meet at the Cacillien Hof," which as you might recall was the site for the Potsdam agreements. I said, "No we will not meet there. This is not a meeting that is to recreate historic imagery. This is a new meeting." He said, "No that is where we will meet." I said, "Well then, call the meeting off." Well you can imagine I was speaking without any authority, but I did it anyway. He came back and he said, "Fine. We will meet at the Inter-continental Hotel." But they were making a last minute pitch to put an historical spin on this, add Russians into the mix etc. So I then let the Secretary know the meeting was on. They were extraordinarily impressed that we could do this so quickly, as indeed was I, but it just turned out that we had the right people at that dinner party that could smooth the way. So it was all set for 5:00 the next day. I had told the Secretary that if you do meet with this government, you need to meet with church leaders to counterbalance the idea that you are only meeting with one side, the church being the representative of all of the dissident elements that were now coming out of the woodwork. He said, "Absolutely we will do that." We got hold of the Church leaders who also were extraordinarily pleased to meet with the Secretary in Potsdam. Well I went to bed. I woke up the next morning and the news was flashing all around that the Secretary was going to go to Potsdam. Margaret Tutwiler announced it to the press. The press asked, "Well why are you doing this?" The said, "Ambassador Barkley made a persuasive case for this, and we thing it is the right thing to do." Well, she was doing everything that she should to protect her boss in case anything went wrong, and guess who was going to be first in the firing line. That was fine, that came with the pay-grade as far as I am concerned. So the next day around noon, I went over to meet with the Secretary before the meeting. By the way I was extraordinarily impressed with Margaret Tutwiler who was a woman of incredible sensitivity and intelligence, and she had, believe me, the ear of James Baker.

Q: I have interviewed her, a rather long set of interviews with her. She is a person I have

never met anybody who has such a focus on the job at hand.

BARKLEY: Well I am sure the story she has to tell would hold several volumes. Nonetheless, she was obviously instrumental in this whole thing taking place. So when I arrived in Berlin, every journalist that I knew, and I knew a lot of them, as well as western journalists, spotted me and descended. I had no comment. Knowing that anything I said would probably have been twisted. Anyway the Secretary gave a gang busters speech. It had been written I think, largely by Jim Dobbins and others, but he captured I think, the mood that the United States welcomes multiple viewpoints and democracy and all these other things. Anyway it was a great speech. After the speech it was time for our meeting in Potsdam.

Q: How do you get to Potsdam without going into Berlin?

BARKLEY: Well, there is a bridge called the Glienicker Brucke, the Bridge of Freedom, which used to be the site where we made all the spy exchanges. It was the only direct access from West Berlin into Potsdam, but it had been closed to traffic, except for official traffic. By that time of course, the East Germans had totally mobilized everything. The secretary asked me to accompany him. He said, "You know I have never been in Berlin before," so as we went through I pointed out some things, having spent a large share of my life in East as well as West Berlin. We got to the bridge, and it was dusk. It really was sort of an eerie kind of scenery because that part of Potsdam had not been particularly developed, and the lights didn't shine brightly. We got to the bridge and there were the East German police all lined up. They waved us right through. This was a new experience for me too, going through that area and being welcomed by the other side. As we got on the other side of the bridge, the limousine stopped and the doors opened. The secretary's scheduler Margaret and Margaret Tutwiler got in and sat in the jump seats. On our way over the Secretary was asking me once again what points we should cover in our meeting, and we went through it. He had a little note pad. I mean all of our position papers go for naught; at the last minute it is word of mouth. We went through the commitment from Modrow towards free and fair elections etc. No impediments to the organization process of the political parties, secret ballot, the usual things. Anyway as soon as they jumped in, Margaret took over. It was a remarkable thing. She looked at the Secretary and she said, "Mr. Secretary, this is the first real breakthrough you have made in your Secretaryship. You are the first secretary ever to visit East Germany at a crucial time. This is a serious moment. When we get out and speak to the press I don't want any smiles or laughter, only somber attitudes." It was absolutely remarkable and wonderful how much she was in control of not only the agenda but making sure that he got it right. I just sat there with my mouth agape. I looked at him and he was paying very close attention. We get there; she jumps out, and I looked at him and said, "Mr. Secretary, is she always like this?" He said, "Absolutely, I couldn't live without her." He got out. He performed perfectly. Of course as we came in Modrow was at the door and welcomed us. We went up and had our meeting. It was mostly the Secretary and his staff and on equal number of East Germans. Of course there was nobody in the diplomatic corps except myself because it was Eastern Turf. I was told subsequently there was a nervous moment when everybody went up and

sat down because they served tea. One of the waiters looked remarkably like Egon Krenz. I didn't see that, but they told me afterwards there was a very nervous moment that "Oh my God, we are being set up." I didn't at all think that would happen because Modrow and Krenz did not get along, and obviously Modrow was taking control and Krenz was eclipsed. We had a very good meeting. The secretary had his notes and made every point very clearly. He is a very articulate man, very thoughtful. Modrow handled it very nicely and was obviously pleased that the Secretary of State of the most powerful nation in the world was there. We got every commitment the Secretary wanted. So it was an extremely good meeting. Afterwards we went over to the church and met with the church figures. That was also a very good meeting.

Q: Did the East German officials have any problem with the church officials, I mean meeting then? Did they understand?

BARKLEY: No. I told them precisely what we were doing. I think after they tried that one thing with the Caecilian Hof they knew I was prepared to call off everything. For them that was a minor sacrifice. So we had no problem with that. We met with them. One of the church leaders was a fellow by the name of Schotle who is now the minister president of Bandburg. We had a very good discussion. The Secretary of course was curious as to their views on what was happening and how things were going. So it was a good meeting all in all. After that, we returned to West Berlin.

Q: Now to sort of put the nail in the edifice or something, did the secretary say I have the assurances of the…

BARKLEY: Oh well of course as soon as we got back we drafted this up and forwarded to Washington all of the assurances. I don't recall exactly what Margaret did at that time. You know that is a very good question. It is one I don't have the answer to.

Q: Well I assume that somewhere or another you want to make it…

BARKLEY: Oh absolutely. I mean the report is that yes the Prime Minister indeed is committed to free and fair elections. I think that was the long and sort of it. But certainly, you know you are absolutely right. He had to come out of it looking good. He was satisfied and she was satisfied with the meeting, and so indeed we came out of it well. Of course I had recommended it, but it had worked out very well, and they were pleased. It is important I think that Genscher was pleased. I am not sure about Kohl because Genscher was the Secretary's counterpart. Kohl I think would have liked to have been the first there. That was precisely my point. But however we had been so foursquare on supporting Kohl in whatever happened in Germany, more so than anybody else, in fact, and without qualification. He had no complaints although subsequently I heard that he would have liked to have been the first. He wasn't going to be the first anyway. Mitterrand was going to precede him.

Q: Did you get any feel from or about Vernon Walters, about being upstaged?

BARKLEY: Well it was quite clear that he wasn't particularly pleased. But on the other hand, he saw that the future was moving back again towards Bonn. We always had a cordial relationship, but it was never a particularly warm one I would say. I mean he wasn't a career officer. He came out of the political establishment. There were tensions clearly between Walters and the Secretary that I was unaware of until later on. Walters had made some statements that Washington considered unhelpful about the pace of unification and things like that, way ahead of the issue. When Washington was doing their best not to humiliate the Russians, Walter's comments were considered unhelpful. Subsequent to that meeting however I will say that he did get hold of his Commandant and told him to make sure that he did nothing about checking with me first. So subsequently we had some very direct discussions on that. I told the Commandant that the importance of discipline at this particular moment in history could not be underestimated.

Q: This brings us a point that follows soon later on, with the fact that the President of the United States, the Secretary of State handled this whole situation extremely well, without putting I mean you had keeping the Soviets from feeling disrespected or something of this nature.

BARKLEY: Well you know there are moments in history where you look at your leadership and say "Thank God they are there". This was certainly one of them. In my experience, the first George Bush, the one we are addressing now, had an absolutely uncanny feel for foreign affairs. Of course he had long been in foreign affairs. He had been our ambassador to China and head of the UN and CIA, so he knew the international scene very well. The Secretary obviously was an uncommonly intelligent man, and of course Brent Scowcroft. It was really quite a remarkable team. They saw the winds of change and they had an idea on how to handle it. Of course the Secretary as I said, had this relationship with Shevardnadze and the President with Gorbachev. They met constantly on all of these things, and fully understood is this is not the time to be fainthearted.

Q: You were saying they were a remarkable set of people.

BARKLEY: Well not only that. The Secretary had, from my perspective, an inner group of advisors who were also extraordinarily gifted. Both Bob Zoellick and Dennis Ross are two that come to mind, and you know by thoughts on Margaret Tutwiler. So it was really an excellent Department. I was extraordinarily fortunate, first to be there when all this happened, and second to have people on the receiving who were uncommonly wise and judicious. It was great fortune. Everything came together nicely for once.

Q: Well we will pick this up the next time, the secretary of State James Baker has finished his being in Potsdam and all, and we will talk about how things were, you know your contact with the East Germans went and how things developed after that.

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Today is 3 September 2003. Dick, in the first place, while all these things are going on, you had you officers out around, I assume all over East Germany and all. What were they picking up? I mean were they feeling the world had turned upside down. You know from the German contacts, particularly the party apparatchiks and all that.

BARKLEY: I'd like to go into that, but before we do, I would like to put in a side bar to the Secretary's visit. I thought about this, primarily to show how the department functioned at certain levels at this time. Before the secretary left, he asked me if there is anything else that we should be doing in East Germany which would serve American interests at that time. I said, "Yes I thought there was. I thought it would be an extraordinarily important symbolic gesture if we were able open up some sort of diplomatic office in Leipzig. First, of course, to reward Leipzig for being the center of the opposition, particularly from the church standpoint, and secondly to endorse the developments that had taken place there. On top of that," I said, "no matter what happens, the Leipzig area will become at one point, the economic engine of that part of Germany." He said, "Well send me a note on that." I said, "Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, if I send a note to the State Department on that, the mattress mice will eat it up before it gets any consideration, because there are limits on the number of diplomatic missions we might have. He looked at me and said, "No, no, you have to do this the right way." I said, "Oh, what is the right way?" He said, "Send a personal message to Margaret Tutwiler outlining the reasons to do this, and she will take care of it." Well quite obviously this was bypassing the bureaucracy, something that I was not trained to do. On the other hand, I was also trained that the bureaucracy will indeed sidetrack some important initiatives unless it is brought to the attention of higher levels. So after he left, I went back, and I wrote what I thought was a persuasive cable to Margaret pointing out that the Secretary asked me to do this and these are the things that I think we should do. I never heard anything more until that Spring, when Congress appropriated funds for the State to open a Consulate in Leipzig. It subsequently opened. They sent in Todd Becker, who was an old German hand and a very capable officer. As I understand, the Mission is still open in Leipzig, despite the fact that they have closed a number of other Consulates and Consulates General in Germany. I think it has probably very much shown its value. But what was particularly intriguing to me is how to get things done at a particular level. It certainly worked. Ok, now back to your question about what we were picking up from our people throughout the country.

Q: And Leipzig would of course fit into that.

BARKLEY: Yes, we were covering the terrain. Guys were on the move all the time. We mobilized our staff. Jon Greenwald who had been on home leave was now back and energized by what was going on, and I think saw clearly, maybe for the first time that reform was not possible but that revolution was the order of the day. A lot of things had happened however in Berlin. Modrow getting a lot of pressure from his rank and file out in the provinces, and as I might have said earlier, the Socialist Unity Party was determined not to be the villain in this piece. And there was a lot of pressure on the old

guard to move. That pressure became so pointed that Modrow organized what he called a Roundtable which was a group of a number of people who were unhappy with the way things were going. These were Church people, people from the Neues Forum and other groups that had sprung up. Actually they sort of shared power, and they all did this primarily because most of them, and certainly the church leaders, predominately believed that Modrow was really the last chance for an orderly transition, and if he went it could revert back to the old boys. The idea of a crackdown, or at least of Soviet acquiescence for a crackdown, was at that time not far fetched. So Modrow had broadened the scale of his government. By this time Krenz had resigned and had been replaced by Gregor Giese who was a human rights lawyer at that time and a man of some prominence. His father was the State Secretary for Religious Affairs and known to be liberal in a rather rigid system. So things were changing quite dramatically, but quite clearly the Party was in disarray, and that is what we were picking up. But what we were also focusing on of course were the new groups that were coming out of the woodwork. One of the more prominent ones and the ones that we all presumed would have quite a good future was an East German version of the SPD. They were a bunch of young men who were born and bred in the idea that somehow socialism was the natural order of things. They looked to the western model of the Social Democratic Party, which of course had shucked off its Marxist moorings. We were trying to follow up on them, although they were quite elusive because they were trying to evade the Stasis, which was still out there looking for people. We were not quite sure what their future would be, but we began to establish contact with them and with people in the Neues Forum. We also began to look at what were previously the National Front Parties. There was a total change in all the leadership of the National Front Parties, and those parties began to reconstitute themselves along the lines of their western counterparts. The one of course, that ultimately proved the most successful in doing this was the CDU. There had been a CDU in East Germany but it had been totally under the thumb of the communist party. It had been run by a particularly egregious fellow, who was also dumped unceremoniously as a fellow traveler and had been replaced by another human rights lawyer by the name of Lothar de Maziere, a name that would become more important as time went on. The same thing happened in the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany. Their leader, Gerlach, who had not been the worst by a long shot, nonetheless he lost his influence. They all began to try to establish contacts with their partners in West Germany, and they did that very successfully. It became evident in late December and early January that the movement not only in the streets but within the political apparatus as well. The first and foremost I think one would have to look and say the CDU in the West Germany had done the best job of assisting their now sister party in East Germany. They poured money into it and a lot of expertise. But more importantly, even in the sham political structure the East Germans had before, the National Front Parties had an organization. And that organization proved to be particularly valuable. The new East German SPD did not have an organization.

Q: It had been taken over by the Social Unity Party?

BARKLEY: Exactly the Social Unity Party absorbed all of these. All the socialist parties were brought into the Unity Party which was the Communist Party that was in total

control. So they found themselves with an enormous amount of public sympathy but were losing the race in terms of organization. We began to notice in our visits that when they went to the Social Unity Party offices they were usually little walk-ups in some dimly lit apartment house. They didn't even have copying machines. They didn't have any of the things that would allow them to organize well.

Q: So what was the CDU doing and SDP? I mean were they sending people carrying copying machines? What kinds of things were happening?

BARKLEY: Well as I said, the other parties did have a nascent structure. They did have copying machines. They did have all of those things. They just used them previously in the cause of the communist apparatus. But the SBD didn't have any of that. During this entire time there was an enormous amount of maneuvering among the great powers. Right after the wall came down and after Genscher appeared to be the first one off the mark in lauding what was going on in East Germany, and foreseeing a wave of future changes, Kohl attempted to recapture an initiative within his own coalition. Kohl came up with the ten points program which foresaw a long five-ten year period where some sort of unity would occur. His Ten Points called for a contractual relationship between the East and the West Germans. It is important to remember at this time that hardly anybody in East Germany, to my knowledge, was talking about unification. What they were talking about was democratization and reform and openness. Things began to change however. During this entire time, the West was particularly attentive to what was happening. The French and the British were obviously more concerned about the possibility of a united Germany and feared things were moving too fast. Also there was the presumption that the Russians were too. After all the GDR was really the crown in their emporium. It was hard at that time to foresee where things were going to go. Of course Russia itself was in terrible disarray, as was Eastern Europe. President Bush was meeting with Gorbachev at that time. They met in Malta. Of course he had enunciated quite earlier that whatever happened to Germany it had to happen peaceful, and that Germany had to stay as member of the NATO alliance. The West Germans and the British and the French moved a little bit more deliberately. Indeed Mitterrand and in December Kohl visited East Germany and began what became actually part of a national campaign. Kohl even at that stage was not talking about, or urging, unification fearing the reaction on the part of the Russians. The United States as we pointed out earlier had established the position very early that self determination in Germany had long been a policy of the United States and there was nothing to fear and we would endorse it.

Q: What about the 300 pound gorilla, and that is the large numbers of Soviet troops sitting on East German soil? I mean were people talking about what to do about them?

BARKLEY: Oh certainly. The fear was they would be unleashed. There would be another Prague spring or something like that. It was quite clear that was the force that would authorize it, and if it did authorize it the East German army, which was totally dedicated to the Warsaw pact, would also engage. Up until that time, the only forces of order the East Germans had, which were formidable, were the VOPSP, the Stasis and the Worker

Brigades. But they were never brought into the play, primarily, we discussed earlier Gorbachev's entire policy of Glasnost and Perestroika was on the line, and if they did clamp down, that would be a sign that his future was over too. So he was in political irons. There were certain things he could not do. At the same time of course, the Soviets were intent on trying to reassert themselves and in the process do whatever they cold to invoke Four Power rights and responsibilities for Berlin and Germany as a whole. They indeed right before the secretary's visit had called for a meeting of the four power consultative process on Berlin. We didn't bite on that, and of course nobody wanted to get involved in that issue. No one thought that the Western Powers were going to try to determine Germany's future by a diktat. I don't think that was at all in the cards. It wasn't in the cards as far as the United States was concerned. Things began to get most interesting because others began to pick up the pulse of what was going on in the country at large. I should add at this time the western press had zeroed in, and so of course they were all over East Germany too. So people were moving in different directions; reports were coming out.

Q: I assume you were, I mean it would be part of the tour for them to come by and talk to you.

BARKLEY: Oh yes, they would come by the embassy. I met usually with the commentators but not particularly the reporters. USIS was busy trying to help, but they were moving fairly independently throughout the country.

Q: Well did you feel you had been on a tightrope? I mean you had to be very careful about what you said and all this, not to get too far ahead or be too standing out or something when things are happening?

BARKLEY: Well I inherently believed that, but I also inherently had the duties of talking for the press. In that sense this reluctance served me well. You know a lot of ambassadors can't let a microphone pass by. I always thought there was very little to gain and a lot to lose by addressing the press. So I let the press people, particularly in Washington, take care of that. Of course, West Berlin was a magnet for a lot of people because living was so nice there, so a lot of people would station themselves there, but more began to move throughout the country. There were some anxious moments. But first time, actually in early January, we began to look at the real possibilities of some sort of step up in the pace towards unification. A lot of things began to happen. The election that had been called initially for May by Modrow was moved up to March 18, because he didn't think he could contain the situation for a five month period of time. So March 18 actually became a critical time where all of a sudden the government had committed itself for the first time in its history to a free and fair election. You can't say that the East Germans weren't organized. And they did indeed organize this election very well. Of course at the same time the SED had been reconstituted now as the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), because they were in the election too. They became very nervous. There was some speculation at the beginning that they would poll up to 30-35% of the vote because so many people were indeed indebted to the party for their own status. So at many different

levels there was a lot going on. While we were looking at how to engage in this process, I got a call in early January from Jim Holmes from the Policy Planning Staff. He said that they are fully aware of our legal obligations under the Potsdam accords, and knew that any final negotiation on the future of Germany had to include the four victorious powers. So they came up with a formula, and he wanted to spin it by me. We were on a secure line to the extent that it worked, I don't know. He said, "What do you think of a four plus two kind of negotiation?" The four being the allied powers who had the specific legal obligation and the two being East and West Germany. Well I said that something along that line would obviously be necessary, but it is incredibly important to make sure this was in harmony with West German thinking. After all West Germany had to be the principal player as this thing moved forward. The idea was booted about and found to be a good idea, at least a good idea to float with the West Germans. I don't know who exactly, but I think it was Baker raised it personally with Genscher. Genscher said, "The formula is backwards. It should be two plus four instead of four plus two." In other words allow the two Germanys to make the decisions as to where they want to go, and then discuss it with the allies on how that can be accomplished. So a lot was going on. As we used to say at that time, the East German video was on fast forward.

Q: Did you have a chance to talk to Modrow during this time?

BARKLEY: I did not. It was a delicate balance. It was one of the things that actually we had to be careful about. My standpoint, and the standpoint of the embassy, was to be seen as forward looking, not backward looking. We had indeed met with Modrow, with Baker, and the idea was once again to strengthen his hand going in to this transition phase. It was something that the church also endorsed while Baker was there. We did that, and after we did that, we didn't want to be seen to do anything that would be seen as tipping our hat to the guys in power. We were talking about a transition to get them out of power. So I deliberately stayed away with one exception. There was a lot of maneuvering that was going on politically, and some of the things smacked again of the Communist Party playing dirty tricks, sabotaging different groups in their efforts to mobilize their voters, etc. It became fairly well known in the press that this was going on. I got a call from Baker who said, "What is your view on this?" I said, "Well you know, there is a lot of political maneuvering going on. I think I should go see Oskar Fischer," who was probably the least damaging and the most natural figure for me to see, because he was the Foreign Minister and had been Foreign Minister for a long time. So I went in to see him, and I said, "You know there are a lot of press reports, and we have had them confirmed; you guys are doing a lot of things that are not consistent with free and fair elections." I remember very well, he looked at me and he said, "We know how to handle our people." I said, "Mr. Minister, that is exactly what you told me six months ago, and that is not an acceptable answer." I said, "If these procedures don't stop, our government, who has commitments from your government that there will be free and fair elections, will make open criticism of what is going on." He said, "Oh, we don't want that." I said, "Well I think then it has to stop." Now, I can't say it stopped everywhere, but it did stop most places.

Q: What sorts of things were going on?

BARKLEY: Well primarily the thugs were going in and breaking up people's rallies and things like that, the usual intimidation that the system had become quite adroit at applying. I don't remember exactly what the particular issue was, but it was quite clear that within the Social Unity Party there were certain elements that were trying to do things to their advantage. At the same time, for the first time actually, it was in January, a political party, the CDU, that was running came out for immediate reunification. To the great surprise of everyone it was Lothar de Maziere who was the new head of the CDU.
Q: Had he come across your radar before or not?

BARKLEY: Some of our guys had met him. He had been working actually the Gregor Giese on human rights. No one was quite aware actually that he was an active member of the CDU. I think that he was probably a nominal member, and he kept probably his distance form some of these unsavory characters that were in the leadership then. But when all of the rank and file jettisoned the leadership, of course they looked around for somebody, and he was selected. De Maziere was a very skilled first violinist in a number of symphony orchestras, and a lawyer who had emphasized human rights to the extent that was possible. You were working within East Germany within margins on that front, but some were working more assiduously than others. He worked, as I said, with Gregor Giese who was at that time known to be quite an activist defending human rights groups. So a lot of these people were somewhat new to us. The SPD recruited a lot from the clergy. A number of people later on became members of the transitional government after the election. Most of those were in the SDP. Many of them were wore the traditional uniforms of rejection. The ministers often were bearded and never wore a necktie, sort of a man of the people, slightly hippie kinds of people, but at the same time with great moral courage. Of course later on, when they came into the government they tended to shave, wear neckties and behave in a somewhat different way. But as soon as one of the political parties raised the flag of unity, a lot of things changed. Then out in the streets and among the groups you started to hear people yelling an old phrase, "Deutschland Einig Vaterland", which means Germany One Fatherland, which of course was the call for unity. The streets had a whole number of phrases. At first it was "we want to get out of here". Later on "we are staying". Then of course we want reform. And then this one, Germany our fatherland, was the ringing endorsement that scared a lot of people actually because it was reminiscent of the Prussian driven unity themes that go back over 100 years. It was an extraordinary time. Then certain things began to happen that showed the greater depth of the depravity of the previous regime. That is, is that many of the new faces in the new political system, particularly in the SPD, dossiers started to be released that showed they had worked for the Stasis at one time or another. This hit particularly a young fellow by the name of Wolfgang Schnurr who was in the CDU and another guy by the name of Ibrahim Boermer who was supposed to be the head of the SPD. In the old system if you did anything, the Stasi had a file on you. If they knew you, they had a file on you.

Q: Was the Stasi trying to destabilize these new parties?

BARKLEY: They obviously were trying to throw a question on the heroism of the new leadership, and indeed that worked. For a lot of the people, a Stasi file is something that was sort of hanging over everybody, and still is. To this day there is a lot of anxiety as to what those files contain. But a couple of these people, particularly young men who I think were trying to get ahead of the system, and had embraced the concept of democracy, had their reputations rather effectively tarred because of their past. They didn't deny their participation, but they tried to explain it in terms that East Germans understood. I don't think very many people in the West understood. That was of course, the overwhelmingly heavy hand of the Stasis. Anybody who had a relative or wanted to travel or wanted to do anything, had to have an interview. That interviewer would most inevitably pull out something that labeled the guy as a cooperative witness or something like that. And of course the Stasis methods came back to haunt a lot of people. Many Stasi personal were paid by the report, which meant that there was a lot of room for creativity, and a lot of people were putting in those reports things of some questionable value. On the other hand, there is no question, as far as an effective secret service went, they were without peer at that time in finding and documenting almost everything that went on in their own society. A rather sick kind of achievement.

Q: Were you seeing any reflection on the overseas operation of the GDR? I mean they had established very good security apparatuses in places like Libya and other places. I mean were they beginning to pull back, or were we seeing things as far as sponsoring rest and recreation places.

BARKLEY: Well it was extraordinarily difficult for us because we hardly anywhere had cordial relations with their Embassies. I do recall that when I went back in October in 1989, I went to see my East German counterpart in Washington. He was very curious. He didn't know what was happening. He didn't know what he should be saying for Honecker had just passed from the scene. The new administration had not gotten their instructions out, so these guys were flying solo. But they were beginning to become very open about the previous system, that the previous government had not been responsive to the people and they needed to do more things within the system to open it up. That happened everywhere. Quite obviously while the system was changing at home, the direction from the foreign office I think was the last thing people were concerned about. But what was interesting, and this was actually more towards the future was, as you pointed out, there were a number of areas where the East German foreign service was quite competent. Areas where you would expect that to be the case where there were sister parties or communist regimes in power. They had very good Chinese language capabilities. The same was true of certain Arabic areas. They were not all fools. Some were extraordinarily competent. Of course they were always looking over their shoulder at who was the commissar. In every embassy, there was always one. Of course they had to march to the tune of the Party. As it turned out I don't think any of them actually survived in the new united German foreign office. But of course I am getting ahead of myself. The Embassy of course was particularly active in trying to keep up with what was going on, but also we were beset with rumors of dire things happening. The economy was collapsing; people

were not working, all of this sort of thing. Many of these reports were directed from West Germany and some of them reflected different political agendas. We used to get a lot of reports out of the mayor's office in West Berlin which were reported by Harry Gilmore about what was happening, because of course Berlin was particularly vulnerable being surrounded by East Germany. But it also was quite clear the mayor, Momper, was trying to get the federal support. Momper, being a social democrat, was trying to get the federal government to make more funds available to him in case things came up. So he had his own agenda to try and feather his nest for whatever possibilities might occur. We had people all out in the country, and we were usually able to confirm or deny such rumors. It is a somewhat delicate problem, when you are in the foreign service, and there is reports of chaos etc. It is often hazardous to naysay those reports because if indeed something does happen, it looks like you don't have your finger on it. But I said, we are going to report things as we see them. This is what we are going to have to do. And we basically rejected almost all of these reports. People were still going to work during the day, and they were working until the time off in the evening. Certainly there were still a lot of young people that were leaving but that has been going on for several months. Indeed it did turn out, and Modrow mentioned this to both the West Germans and the Russians, that the East German economy was not robust but was basically a Potemkin Village. It was all façade and there was very little behind it. Nonetheless what is there was there and had been there for a number of years, and it continued to function. I think that was particularly true of the older workers who had their families to feed. So there were constant rumors. In this entire period, nothing was absolutely certain. Anything could have happened. At the same time the administration's policy is of doing nothing to scare or to try to humiliate the Russians was very wise. The last thing we wanted was to provoke them in the wrong direction. So we were hypersensitive during this particular time. Up until the time of unification I was trying to convince everybody that his was the time to maintain our discipline, not deviate from past practices, but to hold onto them. After all, playing games at this time could come back to haunt you.

Q: You know you are a disciplined foreign service officer brought up in the practice of diplomacy. There are lots of people sitting here in Washington today who want to get photo-ops and have George Bush dancing on the remnants of the Berlin wall. I mean the political apparatus doesn't think the way we think.

BARKLEY: Well happily I think it largely did. After all the president was meeting with Gorbachev. He knew perfectly well how sensitive these issues were, and part of the instructions that came out in this whole thing is that we are not talking about a western victory here. We are not crowing about the inevitable victory of the western system. We believed it; we believed it all along, but there are times not to say it. Certainly the President permitted Congress to have its day as you talked earlier. I mean hardly any member of congress didn't appear sometime to stand by the wall and tell his constituents that he was there. So there was a continual numbers of people, and of course during that period of time, both the Mission and the Embassy were leading around these people. One of the more interesting developments was Ambassador Walters' interview with the press somewhere. He said "Unification, is coming; and coming quickly." Of course he was

accurate, but it was the wrong thing to say, and it sent up warning signals. Gorbachev apparently complained to the President. Kohl was extraordinarily upset because these words are incendiary. We got through that. Indeed the Secretary said that Ambassador Walters was giving his own personal opinion and did not reflect that of the United States government. That is just the kind of censure that you might get if you get out on a limb. But it just showed at that time how extraordinarily delicate things were, and we all knew it.

Q: But also we had people in place who understood how delicate it was.

BARKLEY: Well I think that is right. Nonetheless, nothing was a given. This was a time of turmoil, and out of turmoil, a whole variety of miscalculations can take place. I thought that the general discipline that we showed, we were rewarded for. It wasn't everywhere. We can get into that at a different stage. But in any event, the elections, the campaign went ahead, without undue difficulties.

Q: This is the March 18…

BARKLEY: The March 18 election. By the end of February, early March, western politicians entered the fray very aggressively. Kohl would show up in Dresden and make campaign speeches. The leader of the Social Democratic Party in West Germany was Oscar Lafontaine, who was from the far left wing of the Party and indeed was trying to pick up the pieces of a party that was in terrible disarray ever since the rupture between Brandt and Schmidt. Lafontaine was a sign of SPD desperation. The more he campaigned of course, the more his party lost in West Germany. In East Germany the Social Democrat's lack of organization and the fact the Social democrats had a long ongoing cooperative program with the communists they were caught in a maelstrom. Of course this didn't set well with the populists when it turns out that they were turning against that policy and indeed trying to get voters to agree with it. Nonetheless, at the beginning the presumption had always been that East Germany's natural political instincts would be for Social Democracy, for a number of reasons. One is is that the Christian Democratic Union of West Germany had its origins in the Catholic Church, the old Center Party. There had always been a large clerical function there. The division of Germany between Catholic and protestant which had a long history, meant that most of the protestants were actually in the east, in what was Prussia, Saxony, and Thuringia. This was the area where Martin Luther was particularly active. So the presumption was that Social Democrats had a natural affinity towards protestant groups, and therefore the eastern Germans would go back to their roots and embrace them. That did not turn out to be the case. What they voted for was unification. It became quite clear that the CDU and Lothar de Maziere had clearly tapped into the real sentiments of the East German people. Now how deep those sentiments went is something that people are still trying to sort out. But it was quite clear that the East Germans basically wanted the economic miracles of the west, and they thought that by unification, they would get them.

Q: Were polls being taken showing which way things were going?

BARKLEY: Oh yes, but they were very inexact. For one thing the telephones in East Germany, which pollsters tend to use were not very effective. Large numbers of people didn't have them. There was still a reluctance on the part of large numbers of people to speak openly. I mean after all it had been a long time. I think the polls proved quite accurately that at the beginning the SPD started off with an advantage, but that advantage slipped very quickly. In any even, Modrow kept his word. In any event they went to the polls on the 18th of March. There was an overwhelming victory for the CDU.

Q: Were there international observers?

BARKLEY: I don't know but a lot of West Germans were there. It had become almost a West German domestic kind of party. I mean Jimmy Carter wasn't there, but there was general agreement that the election was fair.

Q: That type of thing.

BARKLEY: Nothing like that. But strangely, there was no criticism in the press about irregularities. The election went off remarkably well. To everybody's great surprise, not only did de Maziere win, but the overwhelming sympathies by that time had changed to unification. Now during all of this time, there were the traditional meetings of NATO and the EEC etc. People were trying to sort out the new realities. The West Germans, particularly Genscher was particularly adroit at this period of time. For example very early he went to Moscow to reassure them that what was going on would not harm their relations. There was a lot of talk of course as how the West Germans could square the circle by staying in NATO and not do so to the disadvantage of the Warsaw Pact. Genscher kept meeting with Shevardnadze and other leaders. I can't prove this but I think he understood very clearly that almost by definition with unification, NATO would change dramatically. But the idea was at that time is that we would not endorse a neutralization of Germany or a detraction from the systems that had worked so well up until then.

Q: Well this of course had been a great fear of the unification of Germany. Take Germany out of NATO which would…

BARKLEY: The Russians had sort of dangled that lure in front of Bonn for a long period of time.

Q: Well let me just stop. This is tape nine, side one with Dick Barkley.

BARKLEY: Well the Russians had rather consistently tried to lure the West Germans into neutrality, saying that unification was not out of the question as long as it did not pose a military threat etc. These were shorthand for trying to lure them, knowing that Germany was the most powerful industrial and financial entity in western Europe. For a long time they tried to lure them out of NATO, they tried it with bluster; they tried it with

favoritism etc. But the policy that had been enunciated earlier on by Adenauer stayed in place, and that is that the connection of West Germany to the west would not change. Of curse that was the case, and the point that President Bush was trying to emphasize is that you cannot loosen these moorings. And indeed Kohl, and for a long period of time other political parties, had tried to anchor Germany into the European Union. Of course at that time the European community was a way to make sure there was no going it alone. So for a long time, the FRG had this double policy of trying to alleviate some of the pressures in inter German relations but at the same time anchoring that Germany into a broader European concept. It is something that they continue to do to this day. But the Social Democrats had been the author much earlier of the eastern policy which attempted to build down some of the suspicions and tensions in central Europe without losing those moorings. At the time it seemed like they were trying to square the circle. Well it turns out that they did. But it wasn't all that certain at that time. So it was an enormous change over what had happened in the past. But back to Genscher. He went to Moscow early on and Moscow was quite unhappy I understand with what he had to say. Of course he was in coalition with Kohl and it was important to know that there not be any divisions within that coalition although there clearly were personal differences. Both Kohl and Genscher were trying to strike stronger positions within their own parties. In early January the Germans did something extremely wise. Kohl went to Moscow, and he brought with him a gift, several hundred million dollars worth of foodstuffs, particularly meats. The idea was to show to the Russians, who were in dire straits, that there were great commercial advantages to a future relationship with a united Germany, especially in view of western Germany's booming economy. So there was an awful lot of things going on, and words didn't really mean what they used to mean. Staying in NATO? what is NATO? what is NATO's future? whither Germany? what does a united Germany mean? When will it become united? how will it become united? All of these things were still up for grabs. But it became quite clear after the election that all of a sudden unification was in full swing. De Maziere had put together a broad-based government. He brought in the Social Democrats and others. It was basically a transitional government, transitional phase that lasted until unification. Transitions are not automatic. You are going from one thing to another. You are sure where you started off, but you are not sure where you are going to end up, so we were not quite clear on that. But meanwhile the idea was to keep American policy in line. Thank God it was a period of time which I personally thought was very much in synchronization with what the Secretary and the President were trying to accomplish. It didn't happen automatically. For example, at the celebration party of the March 18 elections, a couple of our officers were in West Germany and were told by a couple of military officers who were at the same party, that the commandant had ordered Checkpoint Charlie to be torn down. And not only to be torn down, but there would be a ceremony surrounding its closure. Well when I heard this my antenna went up. I feared that this is an attempt to humiliate the Russians at a particularly sensitive stage. So I nosed around to try to find out if anybody knew anything about it. It seems to have been something initiated personally by the Commandant. He had been given a freer hand by Ambassador Walters than previous Commandants had. I am not even sure that Harry Gilmore was fully aware of what he was doing, but he was becoming extraordinarily active. He showed up in West Berlin at the city hall, which was against all of the

standards and procedures that we ever had. We did not recognize the existence of the East German control of East Berlin. We had pictures of him drinking Skoal and Brudershaft, Brotherhood with the Mayor a major political blunder. All of these things in shocking violation of our policy. I sort of lost it and I got hold of Washington and said, "do you guys know what is happening here." When they found out, they were shocked, and they said there would be no movement of Checkpoint Charlie until we have a time to make sure that it is not portrayed in a humiliating way for the Russians. It did turn out indeed that there was a large ceremony, in June in connection with one of the two plus four meetings that took place in East Germany by Checkpoint Charlie. It was quite an interesting ceremony. Well shortly thereafter Ambassador Walters heard that there was a lack of discipline and control on West Berlin and made sure that nothing was done without checking first with me. That improved things a lot although I was somewhat shocked to find out that the Commandant had made an official trip to East Germany, which was also way beyond his portfolio and certainly should not have happened without the Embassy knowing about it. Probably if we had known about it, we wouldn't have let it happen. So there was a lot of attempt to recapture some level of control. Now I am not going to say that any one of these things would have reversed the course of history, but it would have probably made it much more difficult to make that transition as smoothly as we did. Meanwhile of course, as soon as the election was over, following up on his policy declarations Lothar de Maziere made his first gestures towards the West Germans. They worked out a situation where some economic aid started coming in, and it was determined that the West Germans would take over the East German economy and the East Germans would exchange East German marks for West German marks on a one to one basis. This, of course, was extraordinarily enticing to the East Germans. So in July of that year, after the first of July, the exchequer was taken over by the West Germans. That had an impact on us as a matter of fact, and I have to retreat a little bit to another thing that was going on. It became clear that our Embassy's mission in East Germany had a short time frame. We knew that with unity of course there would only be one Embassy, and it was quite clear that the Embassy would be the one located in Bonn. So we were going to be phased out. Well, Washington had very little experience in phasing out embassies of this dimension. One of the first things I thought of is that a unified Berlin could be the capital of Germany and was where the U.S. Embassy would sit. The Mission, sat together with the military, over on Clay Allee in West Berlin, but that clearly wasn't going to be our future mission. The best building we had in the city was the building we were in. It was the finest building in Berlin outside of the Russian embassy itself. We had an agreement with the East Germans that we could buy the building we were in, which we were presently leasing, including my residence and all the residences of my staff for six million dollars. Now that was a real steal, no question. So I put my what I refer to as "a blood in your hands" cable to Washington saying unification is on its way, that don't know exactly when it will happen, but we should move right now to secure the properties, these prime properties, for our future Embassy. We did have claim to our old Embassy property on Pariser Platz in the East-West no man's land, but it would take forever to have that built. In the meantime we need property. We have these properties which are in excellent shape. They have all been refurbished, and we can get it all for six million dollars. I said something to the effect purchasing those facilities on the

open market would probably cost close to a quarter of a billion dollars. I think I turned out to have been a little bit too optimistic on that. I said the American people would never understand if we did not move smartly to do this. Well as you know these are the kinds of cables that Washington hates to receive because it might find itself in the public sector somehow and it would be an embarrassment if they hadn't addresses it. It is also the kind of cable that demanded action.

Q: All well within your calculations.

BARKLEY: Well of course, I knew precisely what it would do. I also knew precisely that every group would try and put the blame for lack of action on somebody else, but at some point the Secretary of State and others would have to decide. Now when the Secretary was out during the June 2-4 negotiations, I said, "I think we should buy all of this." He said, "Oh absolutely." So this bomb also hit Washington, and they went to work. To give the people credit, the American bureaucracy does not work quickly. A friend once said, "It is like a bear on roller skates. It doesn't skate very well, but it is a miracle that it can do it at all." But actually they went to work. Now they had to get Congressional approval. They had to do a thousand things. They had to take the funding from some place else and get the funding elsewhere. And they did it. I think I received the answer six months later, the first of July, to go in and tell the East Germans that we wanted to move ahead on this deal and the money was available. I went into see Marcus Meckel who was the Foreign Minister at that time, and he looked at me and said, "I am sorry it is too late. We just turned our exchequer over to the West Germans." Well as you can imagine, after all that was happening the West Germans were saying we will be eternally grateful to us, etc., I thought well, the best we can do is to try to bring this up and see if the West Germans as a successor state would honor the obligations of the previous East German government. Well in short the answer was we are grateful, but we are not stupid. So we never made the deal. Now I can't tell you how much money between now and then has gone into the new Embassy but clearly an enormous amount.

Q: Well when did you, I don't mean a precise date, but when did you all sort of put yourself into unification mode?

BARKLEY: Oh our mode became quite clear in January, as soon as De Maziere made it a platform, we knew it was going to happen. We didn't know exactly when it was going to happen, but we knew it was going to happen. Of course, we had an inkling all along that something was happening. We didn't know at what pace it would go, but that it would happen quickly became clear in January, and by March, by that time the two plus four meetings were going on, and they were making great headway. Every now and then I, some of the people that showed up at the meetings of course were old line people from the Russian foreign service who raised all sorts of objections. But it was happening, and it was happening beyond them. What the negotiations did was basically confirm the realities on the ground. And of course the new East German government and the West German government got together. It was not a meeting of equals. I mean quite clearly what we were not talking about was unification in the traditional sense. It was more of an

anschluss, where the West Germans absorbed East Germany. None of the East German institutions were designed or contemplated to continue to exist after unification took place. So there was nothing actually the East Germans brought to the table except economic demands and appeals for the rapidity of the process.

Q: Were you taking at this time, were your officers taking a second look at the East German economy and beginning to see it for what it was?

BARKLEY: Oh yes. It was a rather remarkable thing. The head of the East German economy was Gunther Mittag. Mittag was, in his own way, a perverted genius. Of course it was a command economy. The Party decided how it would spend its money. And like most command economies it didn't work very well, even though the East Germans were better at it than most. The problem was is that when it came time for allocating resources, for investment, they were almost always misplaced. They would come up with a favorite project. All of a sudden they wanted to be competent in computer technology, so they would put money into that. But if they put money into that, they took it from someplace else. So the economy never dictated its own pace. It was dictated from above. But almost more importantly the statistics that were accumulated which were essential to understanding how any economy functions, turned out to be almost all to be cooked. But they were cooked by a particularly skilled bureaucrat. It became quite clear that it was all façade and nothing behind it. Once it became apparent to the highly skilled German economists, who had been looking at this for a long time, our boys caught up very quickly. Because of course we had an extraordinarily small office. We had three people in our economic section. Middle grade officers, extraordinarily good officers. I have always thought that American economic officers should not be architects, but engineers. Basically they are trying to tell you what is going on, not how to create something. To that extent of course, the East German economy was not transparent. We didn't know. We weren't the only ones. I mean the West Germans had no better view of what was happening than we did. We found out very quickly. And of course, one of the first things that became clear during the political campaign was how politically astute West German leaders were. Lafontaine kept saying that the GDR was in terrible shape and that to exchange currencies one for one would bankrupt the West. It would take years to get this straightened out, he claimed. He was accurate in some respects, but his politics was flat. Kohl said, "Oh yes, we will do the right thing. Your savings and things will be secure. The currency will be one to one." Well you can imagine how much East Germans thought about that when it became a matter of political discourse. So there was a total mishandling of this on the political front by the SPD. And Kohl decided to force the move, and it turns out it was a stroke of political genius, although the West is still paying a big price for it.

Q: Well then you know once the economy is taken over by another country, I mean that is the ball game.

BARKLEY: Yes, it was over. The game was over. The four power talks were basically finished by the end of June, 1990. Thereafter a couple of things happened which were

particularly interesting. First, the Bush administration invited Lothar de Maziere to Washington for a working visit. What is really ironic is that less than two months after he was elected, he achieved something that every East German official had been trying to achieve for 40 years. Of course the fact that he was a democratically elected leader and had pledged himself to unification had a lot to do with it. So I went to Washington for that meeting.

Q: What was your impression of the man, by the way?

BARKLEY: He was very shy kind of man. He spoke very quietly. I don't think he had any great pretensions. De Maziere was one of the oldest Huguenot families in Berlin. There were a number of de Maziere of great stature, one of them in the West German military. He was very cultured as I say. He was first violinist in a number of symphonies at one particular time. As a lawyer, particularly a lawyer for human rights, he was quite competent. He was a Christian in a certain sense, which is not unusual in East Germany. The protestant church in East Germany was in quite good health, maybe because it had been under such pressure that it had to rise to that occasion. A lot of people used the church for solace and support. He certainly was not a braggart; he was a rather modest man. Like a good lawyer, he did not seem to be in doubt about what he was doing was right. He was an attractive fellow. He had attended I remember, a dinner party I had for a group of senators. He sat next to Richard Lugar. I was at the same table. This was way back in December, and nobody knew that his future was going to be. I remember he sat at that table, and a number of people were trying to make sure that if he didn't speak English, we were trying to interpret for them. It was hard going to keep him engaged. He didn't have that personal dynamic that everybody thought of as a future political leader. In any event, he did go to Washington. He was received by the President. The President gave a very gracious luncheon for him. After the luncheon I remember it was particularly touching. The President brought in a string quartet. He said, "I know Mr. Prime Minister, that you are a musician. I thought you might enjoy this." They were really wonderful, and he did enjoy it. You can imagine a man from rather humble East German background, coming as the representative of his country, the first and last one to visit Washington, and the glorious reception that was organized at the White House on his behalf. He was overwhelmed. It was a working luncheon. The President, Brent Scowcroft, Baker and others were all there. It was a very nice affair. Ironically he decided that he wanted to lay a wreath at the tomb of the unknown soldier. So we went up to Arlington, and he laid the wreath, and they played not only the Star Spangled Banner, but the East German national anthem which was I think the first and only time it was ever played on American soil. Once again it was a bizarre feeling that this was actually happening. Then at the end of that month, the next two plus four negotiations took place, this time in Berlin. The negotiations were of course headed by Foreign Ministers and the Secretary of State. The sherpa work was done largely by Bob Zoellick on our side and Dieter Kastrup on the West German side. For some reason things were a bit delicate. I, of course, had no place in these proceedings, except that it was on my turf. So the Secretary asked me to attend as part of his staff, and I did that. So it was the only meeting of the two plus four that I sat in on. I had the impression that things had already been ironed out between the West

Germans and the Russians. There was a little bit of byplay, but basically there wasn't very much. The Russians made a couple of efforts to put clauses in that would vitiate a lot of the agreements. I remember Baker rose to the defense of the West Germans, and during this entire time Genscher sat rather stone faced and unconcerned. I had the feeling, "You have got this made already Herr Genscher. I don't know how you did it, but I am sure you did." It was on this occasion too they had the solemn removal of Checkpoint Charlie as a symbol of East-West discord. It was done very nicely. All of the participants made sure it wasn't done to humiliate Russia, but naturally celebrated on all sides as a victory of the human spirit. So things were at that stage on automatic pilot. Then the whole question was how do we wind down our Embassy. One of the things that all of us in the Embassy were slightly worried about was that the entire psyche of the East Germans had changed over 40 years. We were fully aware of that, and we were also fully aware there would be an awful lot of trauma once this whole thing took place. That was not a view shared at all by our Embassy in Bonn. They focused primarily on taking over the Embassy and us getting out of there. I had long talks with Dick Walters who was quite appreciative of the difference in the different areas, and I got from him the commitment that my key officers at least would stay on to help them with the East German aspects of operations. So I felt a little bit better about that. He appeared extraordinarily helpful and sensitive to what was going on. Interestingly enough the closer we came to the first of October, the day Germany would be formally united, the more Embassy Bonn began to exert itself. As Ambassador to East Germany, I was not included in those things. In fact there was some problem whether or not Ambassador Walters was going to be invited. It was an interesting time. There was a certain amount of administrative chaos. I kept waiting and waiting to hear from Washington as to what was I supposed to do. As you can imagine I had a wife and a young child, and we were somewhat anxious as to the future. I heard nothing. So sometime in August or September I called in to the Department. I didn't want to cable. I called and I said, "Hey guys, what do you want me to do here? I mean how do I close this down? How do we do this?" There was a silence on the other end of the phone. It became quite clear they hadn't thought of that at all. They said, "What do you think?" I said, "Well I think that I have to disappear. Give me two weeks after unification is formally declared, to pack up and get out, and I will be gone. There will be no fanfare; I will just disappear. My officers, I think they should stay until the next summer because they have kids in school and things like that. I have talked to Ambassador Walters and there would be a transition so they can be employed in different things and helpful in the transition etc." They said, "Sounds good." So that turned out more or less the way it was. So basically I wrote my own orders. So on that rather glorious day, October first, I was nowhere to be seen, and I watched it on television and realized that this is a major political event, one that I never thought I would see. I was extraordinarily delighted on one hand, but somewhat saddened by the loss of what I considered to be one of the best Embassies I had ever served with. Two weeks later we got on a plane and flew back home. It turned out that indeed despite Ambassador Walters commitments to take care of my officers and make sure that they would be involved in the transition, that did not happen. They were all moved out of their offices forthwith and Embassy Bonn moved in.

Q: What about the staff of the embassy, the nationals?

BARKLEY: First there was a huge exodus of the Stasi officials who were trying to come out of this whole mess with something. Those who had been in touch with our intelligence people very quickly made arrangements to pass a lot of files to us. I think those files were passed earlier in the game rather than later. It then became quite clear, what we knew all along, was that the East German members of our staff, foreign nationals all had been compromised. A local in the GSO, who was really quite clever, was indeed the head of Stasi operations in the Embassy. As was our gardener and everybody else. They were under enormous pressure. They wouldn't have gotten the jobs if they hadn't done it to begin with. But when we started to get third country nationals to man the telephones and certain things that had a little bit more delicacy. We felt a little bit more comfortable with them. One was a Turk, believe it or not, and several members of the staff were Turkish. We had Australians, Israelis, everything except German nationals. Many of those stayed on. They were hired by the new people because they knew the systems pretty much. I think all of the East Germans were jettisoned.

Q: How did this work? I mean we had this mission in Berlin, Harry Gilmore. We had an embassy and a good building and all that. What happened, well let's take your staff, your officers DCM and all that. Where did they go? What happened?

BARKLEY: Well the key staff had residences. The only person who immediately left was myself. Of course they shut down the residence. They didn't seem quite sure how they were going to man the future embassy in Berlin. In fact one of the ongoing discussions at that time was would the future capital of Germany be Berlin or would it stay in Bonn. After so many years of saying that Berlin was the capital, the original capital and would be the future capital of a united Germany, the idea of keeping Bonn seemed unrealistic. It appealed to a lot of people who didn't want to go to a major municipality, and Berlin had some baggage from the Hitler era. Nonetheless, they finally decided to go to Berlin. But that transference took a long time. Even the West German government didn't come in immediately. The West Germans like the Americans, had a lot of facilities in West Berlin. Ambassador Walters had a residence in West Berlin, a very beautiful one in the Spechtplasse. The minister had also a very nice residence, so we had a large number of residences in West Berlin to draw from. In fact they were so much more comfortable and more commodious than those in East Germany, that that is where most of them stayed. But the transference of the embassy up came in stages. Nonetheless, Jon Greenwald was immediately given sort of a sabbatical and he went off and wrote a book called Berlin Witness, a very interesting book on that period of time. J.D. Bindenagel was my DCM. Within a week of my departure he was told to vacate his office and they gave him a cubby hole somewhere down the hall. It was somewhat of a humiliation. So all of my efforts to try and make sure there was a rational transference of power didn't work out. Apparently the Bonn Embassy decided that after I was gone, they would go ahead and take over the whole operation, which they proceeded to do. Most of our officers were transferred out, and fairly quickly. Some of them had been holding on. They had their transfer dates that summer which is the normal cycle of course, and some of them had already left, but those were not replaced. I was not particularly happy when I found out what went on. Of course it was no longer my business except that I thought I had commitments on it. I thought

more could have been done to make sure that our coverage, particularly of East Germany, which was going through some very serious growing pains, would stay in place. There didn't seem to be much sympathy for that viewpoint in Bonn.

Q: Well then what happened to you?

BARKLEY: Well once again they didn't know what to do with me. I came back to Washington. Of course I was on TDY status for awhile, and tried to get my family settled. It took awhile. Then we decided we would buy a house. To be perfectly honest I decided this would be it for me because you know, I was a Minister Counselor, and I had had my embassy. Of course there were a lot of people who wanted Embassies. So when I came back I had the usual meetings. I actually met with the Secretary. It turns out, though I didn't know it then, that the secretary had written to members of his staff, saying he wanted me to be given a good future assignment. That, of course, helped enormously. That alerted the powers that be. I had very long talks with Larry Eagleburger who asked what I wanted to do. I gave him a couple of thoughts of Embassies that I knew were coming up. Larry had this marvelous style you know; he is very candid. I said that I heard Harare was coming up, Zimbabwe, and that having been in South Africa, I thought that would be a very interesting posting. Of course, the African bureau already had their own candidate. I didn't know that. I expected it was the case. I remember he said, "Dick you just want to go to Harare and sit pool side and relax." "Now you think alright, you are high on everybody's agenda but in a couple of months we will have forgotten you, and there will be nothing coming." I said, "Yes, Larry, that thought has crossed my mind." He said, "Well I am sure that is not going to happen." Anyway after awhile I was given one of these strange assignments to do some research on some area over in the Pentagon. I don't know exactly what it was anymore. It was a holding pattern. So a couple of months later I was told that Mort Abramowitz, who was our ambassador in Turkey, was coming out a year earlier to take over the Carnegie endowment, and that my name had been put forward for that assignment. Well of course I was ecstatic. I knew nothing about Turkey except what I had done in NATO. Indeed I had been part of the task force on Cyprus in 1974. But it was such a major post of course I was flattered, but I didn't quite believe it would happen. But within a certain period of time it was confirmed that was what they had in mind. Of course you go through that extraordinary procedure that only Americans go through, that you have to first get the approval form the White House. Interestingly enough, with few exceptions, Turkey has never been a posting that political appointees want. So it tends to go to careerists. I think it was because of the reputation of Ankara as being an inhospitable place. But anyway I had to go through this process of confirmation by the Congress. It took a long time. I came out in October and I was almost a year before I went off to Turkey. During that time I took some Turkish language training. I did a lot of traveling. I got my home leave. They gave me things like that. I bought a home and settled in. We bought our home in February, and I got my orders in March. In September I was confirmed. I was off to Turkey in November of '91.

Q: Good heavens. Well we will pick this up, this is a good place to stop. We will pick this up when you are off to Turkey in November of '91. However I would like to talk to you,

but we will put this next time, about what you learned about Turkey and sort of what were you carrying in your briefcase when you went out to Turkey. I mean what were the issues you were going to be dealing with, and what were you getting in Washington and finding out about Turkey while you had plenty of time to do your work.

BARKLEY: Okay, great.

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Q: Today is 12 September 2003. Dick, "91. Let's talk about what you found out about Turkey because it took awhile to get going. What was the situation vis a vis the United States and also the internal government of Turkey that you heard before you got out there?

BARKLEY: First of course it is an area in which I had no experience whatsoever. My only exposure to Turkey had been through NATO councils and third country activities. So it was not an area that I was familiar with. At the same time I had developed over the last ten years of my career, certain administrative capabilities I thought, and so the idea of going into a large mission didn't deter me. But the facts on the ground were still somewhat vague in my mind. I spent a lot of time trying to prepare for that.

Q: How did you do that?

BARKLEY: Much of it the traditional foreign service way of reading everything you can get your hands on and trying to figure out what was going on staying current. Of course you had total access to the desk as to what was happening at that time. Obviously it was a time in some respects that our relations with Turkey had seldom been better. In that sense I was extremely fortunate to be arriving right after Turkey's active participation in Desert Storm. When I say active participation, not so much the matter of troops, but as a matter of absolutely total support. One of the first things that President Bush, the elder, did was to contact a man who had been a friend for a long time. Turgut Ozal, the President of Turkey. And Ozal supported him completely after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. He did a number of things, and it cost him a lot to do it, it proved just the tip of the iceberg as we found out later as to costs. He closed down the pipeline that Iraq had into Turkey and into the Mediterranean. He ordered troops south. It took quite awhile for those troops to get there actually. The Turkish army was large but at that time quite unwieldy. He of course supported the President totally in every other aspect. He made Turkish land available for American troops and planes. I don't know the exact historical record on this development, but he was certainly one of the very first to support President Bush completely in his effort to get Iraq out of Kuwait. At the same time there was a lot going on in Europe. We talked for the last couple of hours on what was happening in Germany. Germany was reuniting of course at the same time Russia was beginning to fragment. The fragmentation of Russia had an awful lot to do with Turkey because the Soviet Union had extended its rule all the way into the Caucasus. In sum, the whole eastern border of Turkey was faced by the Soviet Union. Of course, there was also the deterioration in the

Balkans because of the breakup of Yugoslavia. So there was an enormous amount of uncertainty on all of their borders. To the South with Iraq and Syria and Iran, all states that we had condemned as state sponsors for terrorism. Of course the Caucasus in the East and then to the north and west was the chaos in the Balkans, so there was enormous unrest. But at the time I landed there, Desert Storm had successfully concluded. There had been as a result of Desert Storm as you recall, a number of groups, particularly the Kurds in the north of Iraq had raised up in revolt against Saddam, and Saddam turned on them with a vengeance. Part of the result of that was an enormous refugee flow into Turkey. Turkey had to handle that problem. It was an enormous human right problem to bed them down etc. The border area there is very mountainous and very remote and very hard to get to. As a result of that President Bush and members of the coalition announced a no fly zone in Northern Iraq which we monitored and controlled actually out of Incirlik, Turkey, which is a large American base near Adana.

Q: You were saying at the same time…

BARKLEY: At the same time Kurdish separatists in Turkey were exploiting the situation to ratchet up a lot of guerrilla activity in the southeast provinces of Turkey where much of the Turkish population are ethnic Kurds. Prior to the war Iraq had been one of the major trading partners of Turkey, and much of that trade was focused in those provinces in the southeast. So the devastation of their economy as a result of the war allowed those guerrilla movements to thrive. They had sanctuary in the northern part of Iraq. Their headquarter operations were run out of Syria, which of course has always had hostile attitudes towards Turkey, or at least wanted to keep the relations unbalanced. So there was a lot of chaos at that time. Chaos which continued. So when I arrived in November, personal relations between the United States and Turkey were at an all time high, but there were enormous numbers of problems elsewhere, and eventually they had bilateral implications.

Q: Well again before you went out, what about the two groups that would have had interest in your going. One is the Greek-Americans; the other is the Armenian-Americans. Did they get to you?

BARKLEY: Well there was an interesting bit of byplay on both counts. It was somewhat shocking to me. I was not unaware of the historical animosity between Turkey and Greece and Armenia. But the strength of the lobbying groups within the United States was something I wasn't totally prepared for. An interesting thing had happened actually on Greek Turkish relations. In Thrace in northern Greece, there is a sizable number of Turkish Muslims. There has always been some volatility I think in the situation there, but before I went, there had been an effort on the part of the Greek government to exert new controls over the Muslim groups in Greek Thrace. They eliminated the elective Mufti and put in an appointed mufti. There were counter demonstrations on the part of the Greek Islamic community. They were set upon by a whole variety of Greek groups, mostly young vandals. The Muslims were beaten up rather badly. That kind of pressure seemed to be rather endemic to that part of the world. Nonetheless, there was a Turkish response.

One of the things that is totally predictable is anything that erupts in Greece against Turkey, there will be a response. So nationalist groups assembled in Istanbul and demonstrated in front of the Fenner, which is the home of the Greek Orthodox patriarch. This set off alarm bells in the Greek community in America. One of the first things that sort of sobered me as to the situation there was a letter from Archbishop Jacavos from New York. It was really quite a plea. The letter was addressed to the Secretary of State saying we must stop these kinds of pressures on the Patriarch, which he called the Patriarch of Constantinople by the way. Constantinople disappeared in 1453 after the Turks conquered the city. Nonetheless at the end of the letter I remember one particular phrase that said, "Beware, the barbarian is again at the gate, this time in western attire." Quite obviously, infinitely more heat was generated than light out of this whole situation, but it showed indeed the power of the Greek community. Then we started getting phone calls from different groups that were sympathetic toward them. They were quite obviously orchestrated. Exactly how much, I don't know. It was something that came up in my hearings. Of course on the foreign relations committee was Senator Sarbanes who as an American Greek was sensitive to them. So that was the first shock that we had on the Greek side. Meanwhile, of course, Armenia was declaring independence and trying to recreate itself. The Armenians for a long time had organized different terrorist groups worldwide against the Turks. One was called ASALA. They basically targeted Turks, including many Turks in the diplomatic corps. They gunned down the Consul General some years ago in Los Angeles etc. So there was always among the Turk a certain not only anxiety but anger toward this Armenian group which we, by the way, had labeled as a terrorist group. Nonetheless ASALA had a lot of sympathy in large segments of the Armenian Diaspora in the U.S. And of course then, as it was becoming independent, one of the first things the Armenians did, wisely they took a leaf out of the Israeli notebook, and they went to work with their lobbyist groups and support groups in the Untied States to support Armenia. And they did get some support. But one of the things Armenia did which was always somewhat difficult for me to accept, and yet I had to realize that is the way it was going to be, is name as the new Armenian Foreign Minister an American citizen. He of course was acting as Foreign Minister for a foreign country but maintained his American citizenship. His name was Raffi Hovannisian, and he came from a prominent California family. So it just shows you there was this nexus between the American, Greek and Armenian communities with respect to Turkey.

Q: Well I have to say you are talking about the first time getting exposed to this, I spent nine years in the Balkans, five years in Yugoslavia and four years in Greece. They learn these hatreds and all from their mother's milk and at their father's knee, and the churches of course foster this as we keep seeing. Well anyway, when you went out there, what were you getting from your military colleagues, from the sort of Pentagon briefings.

BARKLEY: Well first is in Turkey where I had for some time a large American military mission. It has been out there a long time, but now we had a huge American presence, primarily air force. So I got all of the briefings at that time about their relationships with the Turkish military. Military to military relations have always been extraordinarily good. We, of course, were always interested in where the Turkish general staff was on any

particular issue, and of course the Turkish General staff had carved out for itself since Ataturk times a position of being the guardian of the Ataturk revolution. There were always the overtones that they had political interests, that they would allow the politicians to go only so far but if they strayed from the western moorings that Ataturk had proscribed. So the Turkish general staff was a powerful element. I recall just before I got there a member of the European Union had gone through and had done a study on the situation in Turkey and had come to the conclusion that the government was weak, but the state was strong. Basically what he was saying is the government parties tend to fragment in every different direction, but the state, which was in the hands of a large military component, was extraordinarily strong and kept Turkey basically grounded on its Ataturkist roots. It is sort of hard for Americans I think to understand exactly the role of the Turkish military. One of them is that every Turkish young man goes into the military. I think regardless of the politics of most Turkish people, they have an affection for the military which is sometimes actually at odds with their political desires for greater democratic movements. The United States liked the military because it is extraordinarily professional. Many of them had trained in the United States. Of course the largest of the military components of the military in Turkey is the land forces. But the Turkish air force had always insisted on buying and flying solely American airplanes. The navy, which was quite small, but nonetheless quite proficient was quite closely tied to the U.S. navy. So there had been very close ties. Those play out in different ways. One of the things I can say is during my entire tenure, the American military had been particularly sensitive to the importance of Turkey. Obviously having enormous responsibilities not only in the Med but for that segment of a world which had become increasingly volatile, our military components all understood the strategic as well as the regional importance of Turkey.

Q: Were we getting anything from the NEA bureau, actually Turkey of course is in the European bureau. Sort of a stepchild of the European bureau.

BARKLEY: This goes back historically into the organization of the United States State Department. If I am not wrong, in the mid 50's early 60's the State Department placed Turkey into Southern Europe, an office that is basically Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. Part of the reason was is the Turks had expressed often their unhappiness with being grouped into the Middle East. They considered themselves part of Europe. They wanted to be a part of Europe.

Q: That actually came over in '74.

BARKLEY: Oh is that when?

Q: Yes, because I had been in Greece. It came over just about the time the Cyprus thing blew up in '74 almost, and it was …. I mean you know somebody had expressed that somebody had defecated in the marble halls of the European bureau. What is this? Two brand new allies and they are ready to fight each other. This just didn't happen in the European bureau.

BARKLEY: Well it was always difficult in the European bureau. People looked at southern Europe with, oh my goodness, is that where we want to be. It was in many respects very much where you wanted to be because action was going on. The problem was grouping those three countries together that the bureau…

Q: Well also at one point Iran was in there.

BARKLEY: Oh was it?

Q: Yes, the Greeks, Turkey and Iran and Cyprus, but nobody paid much attention to it.

BARKLEY: Well, Turkey came much later for me and I didn't much understand the previous organization.

Q: Well anyway were you getting things either from the desk or the CIA about currents within Turkey that were disquieting?

BARKLEY: Actually by the time I arrived, many of those reports, particularly about fundamental Islam in Turkey had been shelved because of our preoccupation with what was going on in Iraq. Not only in Desert Storm but our preoccupation with what was going on in that region generally. It seemed indeed the Turks had fundamentalism under control. It is my understanding that from the time Ataturk appeared on the scene, even as he was celebrated as the Gazi, the military hero and as the leader of a new nation, and a republic, there have always been between ten and fifteen percent of the population that had been disquieted by his assaults on Islam. Whether you would call them fundamentalists or not, I don't know, but they certainly did hold very closely to fundamental tenets. They had always been there, and I think they certainly are there today maybe in somewhat stronger force, but there are many reasons for that. In 1991 our concerns about Turkey in that front were not clearly evident. All of the things that were going on had a regional character to them. Besides that, Ozal was probably the strongest Turkish leader since Ataturk. He had done a lot of things to the country that no other leader was prepared to do. He opened the economy to the west. He was an economist. The economic scene in Turkey at the time I arrived was particularly favorable. Certainly there was hyperinflation, but at the same time there were very high rates of growth. The economy was buzzing along very nicely, so there weren't any pf these particular problems in 1991 that began to appear a year or so afterwards. Everybody was quite optimistic about where things were going.

Q: Were you there from 1991 to when?

BARKLEY: Until 1994, December of '94.

Q: Well once you arrived so what were you doing?

BARKLEY: As soon as I arrived I went through the normal introductory procedures etc. I wasn't there very long before I presented my credentials. It was much shorter than has usually been the case which I think indicated how important the United States was to Turkey. Actually I had put off my arrival because there was an election going on. Of course the appearance of an American ambassador right in the middle of an election is the last thing you want.

Q: Yes.

BARKLEY: We of course let that play out, and the election brought into power Suleyman Demirel who had long been a political figure. I think this was the seventh time he had been designated Prime Minister. He formed a Coalition government with the old Ataturkist party, the Progressives, with Mr. Inonu who was the son actually of Ismet Inonu the old colleague of Ataturk. The president was Turgut Ozal. They represented three different parties, but they were all very much in the western camp. They were more progressive. There were some lines between them, some were conservative, some were progressive etc. Nevertheless, there had been hardly any murmurs coming out of the Islamic camp at that time. It is true that in that election the Islamic groups joined together with some other disparate kinds of groups, on a common ticket so they could get over the 10% parliamentary hurdle. So they were represented in a very small way in the parliament. Nobody at that time actually considered them particularly troublesome. But then I presented my credentials to President Ozal. President Ozal was an interesting figure. He had been Prime Minister. He had made his career in international finance. He had been a member of the World Bank. After the military coup of '79 he was asked to form a government, the first civil government after that coup. He showed great energy as Prime Minister. Then he decided he would move from the Prime Ministership into the Presidency, which had been somewhat of a more symbolic office. But he fueled it with an awful lot of energy and his party was still in power and the Prime Minister tended to listen to him. So he was President with and extraordinary level of influence, above and beyond that of a normal presidency. So of course when I went in to see him, we were all extraordinarily curious as to what he was going to say. We naturally discussed mutual U.S.-Turkish interests at that time. He was particularly interested I think, because I had just come out of Germany. He told me, "You know, with Europe being at a level of uncertainty with German unification and with the Soviet Union disintegrating, it is ever more important that the United States be anchored into Europe. To that end I will do whatever I can." There will be natural forces in Europe, particularly in Germany that would begin to question an American presence. But while they were careening around in political uncertainty, Ozal was determined to anchor the United States as best he could. He explained the immediacy of his action in Desert Storm as part of that effort. And of course this showed a level of statesmanship from an American standpoint that was very welcome. From that period of time until his death a few years later, he followed that policy line accurately. This was still during the administration of George Bush the elder. I was pleased of course as ambassador there to discover the professionalism, the policy professionalism in the administration was extraordinarily high. The President would occasionally call Ozal and the President had a policy that within 24 hours of any personal

call to any foreign leader, the ambassador would get a full report. Now believe me, as you well know, that was very much appreciated. So during the last years of the administration of President Bush, I was extraordinarily well informed as to what was going on at the upper levels.

Q: Were you ever able to use the call to go to the State Department and say I wonder if the President could call, I mean or was this, the calls came out of the President's office or were you ever able to sort of get one of those calls?

BARKLEY: Actually from the time I was there, there were no issues that I actually flagged that said the president must inform President Ozal. President Bush was extraordinarily professional in foreign policy. He understood that those personal relations which had served him so well during Desert Storm were things he had to curry. Of course, Ozal was not shy. Whenever he saw fit he would lift the phone and call the President. For me the remarkable thing was that I was always informed of it. Now you can imagine any Ambassador who is fully aware of these things has greater influence in the government because then you usually knew even more than the Turkish government did. Which of course is a position everyone is after whenever possible. So I must honestly say I was an unabashed admirer of the way that administration conducted foreign policy. President Ozal periodically went for medical checkups in the United States during which time he would stop by the White House. Of course most ambassadors would loved to have been there at that time, but as those meetings tended to be very irregular, we never knew exactly when that was so I never did attend any of those meetings. But the Bush-Ozal personal relations were extraordinary, and brought us enormous rewards.

Q: Well now just looking as you did the map, and you look at Turkish borders particularly to the north, I mean here Turkey has been living in threat of the Soviet invasion. Were the Turks going through the same thing that really the United States and the NATO countries are doing, what are we doing now? I mean…

BARKLEY: Well of course, there was enormous confusion as to where all this was going. I think Americans have a sort of a sketchy feeling about the Balkans. I mean just the word Balkanization has entered American terminology, it indicates inherent ethnic chaos. But for some reason we have never transferred the same thing to the Caucasus which if anything is infinitely worse than the Balkans. So a "Caucasusation" if there is such a word, would be worse than a "Balkanization". Well both of those were on the borders of Turkey. They had to be attentive to that. In the Caucasus three countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia that had become independent and were groping their forward. These were areas where the borders and the ethnic grouping were extraordinarily scrambled. It is something that the United States didn't seem to be sensitive to. One of the things we were sensitive to was Armenia because of the Armenian Diaspora and the influence of the Armenian groupings in the United States.

Q: Also Georgia because of Shevardnadze.

BARKLEY: Well that was a personal relationship particularly with Baker. Shevardnadze didn't immediately enter into that picture. He entered into it somewhat later. But I recall when I was out there, that I read one of the first cables that indicated the United States was contemplating how we would handle the newly independent countries from the Soviet Union. The first cable I read indicated that we would establish an embassy in Armenia from which we would cover Azerbaijan and Georgia. I though you don't have to be a genius to know that that is a recipe for disaster. So I weighed in and said, "You know from this perspective that simply will not work." My perspective was from Turkey, but I thought somebody had to weigh in. It was a typical State Department kind of thing, how can we do this all on the cheap, because establishing an embassy in each one of these countries would be an enormous undertaking. Well finally they indeed they did decide they would send embassies to each one of these countries. Maybe I was still too wrapped up in what was going on in Germany, but I thought I should send in a personal analysis of what things in Turkey we should be attentive to. I focused on Armenia saying that I thought it extraordinarily important for our future relations with Armenia to concentrate on our relations with Turkey, who indeed was the Western access door for the Armenians. I suggested in this cable what we could do to accelerate fruitful exchanges between the new government in Armenia and Turkey. I pointed out that all of these new nations had subscribed to the CFCE regulations, that there would be no border changes by force etc. I said, "I think we should anchor that, and it would help us a lot if the new Armenian government would censure ALALA and distance itself from the terrorism against Turkey, a particularly neuralgic point with the Turks." And that indeed they also renounce their claim to the five eastern provinces of Turkey which the Armenians had historically claimed. It was one of those irredentist claims which are particularly nasty because they overlap with claims from Kurds as well as everybody else. The Turks obviously weren't prepared to bargain with this kind of thing. But the issues were very tense. Subsequently, I can't remember exactly when it took place, but Secretary Baker raised these issues with Raffi Hovannisian, the American Foreign Minister of Armenia, who dismissed them out of hand and said they weren't going to give Turkey a "blank check" for the future, something like that. I saw right there that these problems were with us to stay, particularly among American Armenians. But one of the things that we were able to do very early on was to convince the Turks that a gesture towards Armenia was important. The Armenians were in a very bad fix. They were running out of wheat. They didn't have enough to feed their people. So in an effort to use the situation to reduce the tensions, we convinced the Turks to send wheat to Armenia. I went and I saw Suleiman Demirel who had become actually quite a good confidante. He understood the situation, and he said, "It will be done." Now the problem was that the trains that would carry these things, couldn't cross the Armenian border because the tracks were different sizes. Nonetheless, over the terrible objections of a number of Turkish labor groups who were not particularly fond of the Armenians to begin with, he did this. As we didn't have the wheat readily available, we convinced him to take it out of his own stocks, promising that they would be replenished by either American or European wheat, which never totally happened. I began to realize that commitments to Turkey were always relative. Nevertheless, the Turks I think, took a rather courageous stand to do this only to discover that much of the wheat ended up in the Nagorno Karabakh which was a contested area in

Azerbaijan largely populated with Armenians. Armenian forces were engaged in a warfare and a cleansing of the Azeris out of Karabakh to add it to Armenia proper. Which over the course of time didn't quite happen. It happened Defacto but not Dejure. And of course that was the kind of thing that the Turks simply could not take. So they curtailed all of their shipments. Then of course there was at that time a CNN team in the Caucasus.

Q: CNN being…

BARKLEY: American news.

Q: It was American based but an international news TV network which was watched worldwide.

BARKLEY: Right, and in 1992, they happened to be in Armenia. Of course they were covering what was happening elsewhere. They witnessed actually an Armenian massacre a number of Azeri village. Of course if it is on CNN, it is on the American consciousness, and also was on the Turkish consciousness. Well the Turks went ballistic at that point, and they were furious of course because the Azeris were as close as you can get to Anatolian Turks. So we had a real problem controlling that. They didn't blame the United States; I can't say that, but they did of course indicate that this was indicative of the kinds of problems that were endemic at that time in the Caucasus. Then we opened up negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, led by Jack Maresca. We did try and get with the Russians and others, the so-called Minsk group, to try and get the Nagorno Karabakh situation addressed diplomatically. So that was going on, but at the same time the ethnic cleansing continued in that area with a very brutal way.

Q: In a way, looking at the map and looking at Armenia, way off in the Caucasus, and you think about the Armenian people who really went to the United States, they really came from Turkey, and many from the western part at least sort of the Mediterranean part of Turkey. Was there any line, did you see, between those Americans who identify themselves as Armenians with this little state stuck up in the Caucasus which is very far from what had been their home.

BARKLEY: Well as we pointed out earlier, the historical memory in this area is not always accurate, but it is active. There is a tendency towards the virtuous in arguing your side. You are right, the vast majority of people who suffered under the last gasp of the Ottoman Empire were the Armenians that were living actually in Turkey. There was a huge Armenian population in Turkey at that time. They had been there for centuries and they had always been treated with a measure of tolerance as had almost all of the minority groups. One of the things I had to learn very early on is that when we talk about human rights in the United States, we talk about racial or ethnic groups. When the Turks talk about human rights, they talk about religious persuasion. There are only three minority groups that were recognized in Turkey in the Ottoman Empire and later on by the Turkish Republic. They were Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Jews. Those three groups, all of which had prospered at particular times in the Ottoman Empire had no love

for each other, for they were often competitors. They tended to be intellectuals and business men and they tend to compete in different areas. It was extraordinary. Of course, all o f them still have active remnants in Turkey. I spent some of my most delightful hours with the Greek Patriarch Bartolomeo. The Armenian Orthodox Patriarch, I only saw once. He had a flock, mostly in Istanbul of 60,000 people, who are still there. It is a large and vibrant community there. The Jewish community which now is much smaller. In the 17th century Istanbul was the largest Jewish city in the world. Many of them have gone now to Israel. But there still is a very vibrant community. There is no love lost among those different groups however, even today. So it was a different world, and you had to begin to think in somewhat different categories when addressing the situation. The Greek situation of course was particularly prominent because there are many Greek Americans, several prominent in the United States Senate and Congress.

Q: Those that know say that know say that next to the Jewish component in American political life, the Greek one is right there.

BARKLEY: Oh I think that is probably right. In the first place they have been very successful. They are very well organized. They seem to have a particular devotion to their heritage, and of course, they have been successful in American political life, which is very important. American senses of right and wrong depend on these particular groups in American political life. I know when I went out, just before, after I got to my hearings, I met with Senator Sarbanes whom I respect enormously. I had gotten to know him quite well in East Germany. He was always very professional. He told me to establish good relations with the Patriarch. He considered it is very important. Interestingly enough, right after that meeting I went back to the office only to discover that the previous patriarch had died. So I was able to call the Senator and alert him before anybody else heard the news, I think he appreciated that. Then came the question of electing a new one. There are enormous problems with all of these things. One is that any new Patriarch must be endorsed by the Turkish government under the Treaty of Lausanne. The Patriarch must also be a Turkish citizen. There are not many now in the seminaries, the seminary in Turkey has been closed for a number of years. So the question of who would be the new patriarch was still open. The Turks happily kept their hands off, and they let Bartolomeo II who is a man of enormous stature and decency. So that worked very well. But throughout my tenure, you are always looking over you shoulder at angry Greek American or Armenian Americans who had some grievance that usually went back hundreds of years.

Q: What about Cyprus?

BARKLEY: Cyprus is seen by American and by Turkish somewhat differently. At the time that this decision was made on Cyprus, the Prime Minister who was Bulent Ecevit, who is still a very active political figure in Turkey. I met with him very early on. He is western educated. He speaks extraordinarily beautiful English, and indeed writes poetry in English as well as in Turkish. He is an exceptionally sophisticated Social Democrat, but without the international bent of Social Democracy. He is very nationalistic. He is one

who, after the failure of the London conferences, authorized in ’74 the use of Turkish troops. The Turks tend to look upon the operation in Cyprus as having saved the Turkish community on Cyprus, from extinction. They look upon this actually as a victory. The rest of the world looks at it somewhat differently. In that sense, the Greek Cypriots have been extraordinarily successful in publicizing their positions, and the Turkish Cypriots have not. But the military operation in ’74, went in initially to save the lives of the Turkish community, or stop them from being cleansed from that area, and of course to eliminate Enosis. Of course they ended up doing that. They also ended up getting rid of the colonels who endorsed Enosis at that time. In the process they went further and occupied almost half of the island. Of course that was received with great censure in the international community, to the extent that nobody extended recognition to the new Republic of Northern Cyprus except Turkey. We have been struggling with that situation ever since.

Q: Well how much did you during this ’91 to ’94 period, how did you deal with Cyprus? Did this keep coming up on your plate?

BARKLEY: It would periodically come up. We always had a Cyprus coordinator, somebody who was working with United Nations. The United Nations proposal on Cyprus was actively supported by us. In some respects you began to thing we had almost taken it over from the UN. The Cyprus coordinator would periodically come out and visit Greece and Turkey. There was a requirement that a report be made to Congress on the progress made. Ralph Denktash had been the leader of the Turkish community from way before the 1974 operations. He was so traumatized by the events of ’74 and fearful that they would come up again he never seriously considered the UN attempt to resolve the problem. What we were looking for was some sort of federal status under the United Nations charter. But Denktash always was successful in handing out the lure that something might be possible. All of the time I was there and actually for almost ten years since, the Cyprus coordinator always sends in his reports and is always hoping for some sort of resolution.

Q: Is the Cyprus coordinator an American?

BARKLEY: Yes.

Q: I always wondered about, it almost you know, I sort of figured this is sort of a sop to the Greek American community. You know, nothing is going to come of it, or maybe someday. How did you feel about this?

BARKLEY: Well I think most of us knew there was a charade going on. I mean I think this is a problem, an intellectual problem, Americans tend to look at a problem as something that must be solved. Other people look at problems as something that should be managed. Those are two different things. I think there is a tendency on the part of the United States to see that in everything we do we can come to some reasonable solution, but I don’t think we were dealing with reasonable players. On top of that of course, in the

course of years the Greek community in Cyprus had become quite prosperous. The had of course, all of the advantages. I mean not only a very enterprising population, but they also had international recognition. For the Turks in the northern part who usually were better educated than the Turks in Turkey had economic difficulties. Those difficulties were of course increased by the lack of international ability to trade except through Turkey.

Q: Were you under any pressure to try to get something from the Turks about…

BARKLEY: Oh, yes, there was always somehow a facile belief in the United States, it was astonishing, that the Turks could just deliver on Cyprus. But what we never seemed to understand is the emotional aspect, that Denktash was a greater hero in Turkey than he was in Cyprus. To try and force a solution over Denktash it was politically impossible for any Turkish politician. Now I must say while I was there, several times, President Ozal, said, "You know you must put increasing pressure on us." He wanted to solve the Cyprus problem in the worst way. He believed as indeed did many of us, that Turkey had lost so much international credit over this issue, and that it had become actually the tail wagging the dog as far as Turkish interests were concerned. Still, Cyprus was a situation that even he couldn't address effectively using his considerable influence in Turkish foreign policy. The same thing was true of Demirel and Inonu. You know, all of my talks with them, they were reasonable and said we must do something, but they were not going to toy with an idea that it could lead them to lose their own influence and power in Turkey. A very emotive issue.

Q: This is tape 10 side one with Dick Barkley. Was there you know on the Israeli-Palestinian problem, I think most people can see there is a solution. Eventually settlers out of the west bank, Palestinians have fixed borders and learn to live within this and stop the bombing. But was there a sort of general consensus of what the Cyprus situation, how it should be resolved if the political will was there?

BARKLEY: Well it is interesting that you bring that up particularly today in view of the fact that the Palestinian situation doesn't look so rosy. It is an interesting thing. I was there right after, of course not only Desert Storm but a couple of years after the Oslo accords which brought a certain amount of optimism in the hearts of both the Israelis and the Palestinians that something could be done. An interesting thing I thought because having served in Norway, I knew a bit about it. One of the reasons the Oslo accords succeeded at this came out was that it was done between Palestinians and Israelis without the knowledge and participation of the United States. The reason I think is as soon as the United States enters the picture every nation wants to have the United States on their side. That was their focus more than anything else, more than addressing the issues. I think that was somewhat true of Cyprus. I remember Hikmet Cetin, who was the Foreign Minister under the Demirel government, came to me after I was there about a year and said, "You know, we really have to address this issue. There is no reason in the world why Cyprus should be any different than the Middle East. If they can come up with Oslo accords, we should be able to do something. Our thought is that we should get an independent player to try to act as an intermediary in this thing. Do what the Norwegians had done in the

Oslo accords. I would like to ask you to ask you government if they would endorse such a move." I said, "You know, Mr. Cetin, this is a personally view, but the reason Oslo was successful is because the United States did not know about it. I will certainly ask my government and inform them of what you are saying, but maybe you should be thinking along some other lines." So I asked our government whose response was absolutely predictable. No, No, hold on to the United Nations plan and keep the Cyprus coordinator etc. So I told Cetin that we believe the important thing is to hold onto the program we have got. Now between you and me that was the kind of answer that was almost predictable when the United States gets involved. We had our interests already engaged. The idea of going to Poland or somebody else and saying can you take this on for awhile, which is basically what the Norwegians did, was a non starter from the beginning. What is interesting to me is that the officials in Turkey were looking for ways to try and address the issue more effectively. They had been fully aware that the way it had been done up until then was not going anywhere. Here we are ten years later still struggling with the problem.

Q: Well how about the problems during the time you were there Yugoslavia was going through much of its agony. I mean the Turks were the colonial power the occupier of that area at one time. In fact all the Yugoslavs if nothing else blame everything that happen3d, t least while I was in Yugoslavia, particularly, they said, if the elevator didn't work, they said, "If you had been 500 years under the Turkish yoke, your elevators wouldn't work either." I mean you know this is, how did the Turks react?

BARKLEY: You are absolutely right, the Turks had sort of an ambivalent position with their historical relationship with the Ottoman Empire. As you can imagine, they constantly refuse to believe it was quite as venal as portrayed in the past. That is particularly so in places like the Balkans which was one of the key areas of the Empire's expansion. There were sensitivities involved, and they knew that. But they had sensitivities too. One should remember that an enormous number of Turks actually trace their origins to the Balkans, particularly those in Ismir and the western parts of Turkey, Ismir and Istanbul, had large populations that came out of Bosnia and Albania, areas which had always been key supporters of the Ottoman Empire. And, of course, Bulgaria to this day still has a large Turkish population. So there was deep concern about what was happening. And when things deteriorated in Bosnia, particularly as discussions things developed along religious lines (there was a large Islamic population in Bosnia) Turkish sympathies were totally with those people who were taking it really in the neck, the Muslims. It was an extraordinarily ugly period of time. I think it is however endemic of empire that it provided the excuse for any group that is unhappy, to go back historically and say it is because of the Turks. The Arabs feel that way, certainly most Balkans feel that way. Greeks feel that way. The Turks have enough self confidence that they don't overly worry about this. They are used to it. At the same time of course, if it comes down to what they consider a slur on their national honor, they can get very aggravated. Throughout the entire development in the Balkans, President Ozal kept saying the only nation who has sufficient influence to stop the bloodshed was the United States. Ozal spoke very persuasively to groups of U.S. Congressmen on that issue in my presence.

Yugoslavia began coming apart in September of 1990. Secretary Baker went to Belgrade then and gave a speech saying that rampant nationalism would lead to disaster for the region. He was almost booed off the stage. I think he left with the feeling a "plague on all of your houses".

Q: He was also the one that said we don't have a dog in that fight.

BARKLEY: You are right. Basically, as Bismarck said. "Yugoslavia is not worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier." I think there was a general feeling that it was a horror to get involved. At the same time the United States was gearing up in '91 for a presidential election campaign. I don't think there was any inclination to take on any more foreign policy activities.

Q: Did the Turks identify at all with the Islamic group in Bosnia?

BARKLEY: Absolutely. I member I used to get quite a bit of grief during that period of time. All of these horrific pictures were coming out of these camps. These boys looked so emaciated; it was reminiscent of the concentration camps in Germany. Awful pictures. We were aware of course that there had been systematic expulsions, rapes and murders of Bosnian boys and girls, primarily by Serbs. But the Serbs and the Croats were also at swords points. That goes back longer in history than I could possibly remember. They would come to me all the time and say, "Would the United States allow this if these people were Christians? Or if they were Jews?" Well how do you answer that? But at the same time there is no question where the sympathies of the American people lie. As you know both France and Germany engaged in a rather futile effort to do something in that area. It only showed indeed their political impotence.

Q: Well I think this was a time when the Europeans said let us take care of this. This is a European matter, and we were delighted

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BARKLEY: Well that is true, of course until we saw the results, which were a disaster.

Q: I think it serves as a lesson to us that you cant, rightly or wrongly, this western European group can't really produce.

BARKLEY: Well also it is hard to keep all of the events of that time in mind. During the Presidential campaign, Clinton campaigned on the idea that we must do something about this terrible thing in Bosnia, and that we can not allow this kind of thing to go on, and the United States must engage. So there was a certain amount of sympathy during that campaign for the kinds of arguments heard out of the Clinton-Gore camp. Then as you perhaps know right after the election, there was an attempt on the part of the State Department and the Defense Department to get the allies in line for an American engagement along the lines of the political commitments made during the campaign. I think this has all been written up rather effectively by Elizabeth Drew and others, but as I understand it, the President read Robert Kaplan's book "Balkan Ghosts" and decided the

situation was too fraught with danger. So he decided to pull back on that commitment. And it was actually not until many years later that Richard Holbrook brokered the Bosnian agreement. By then there have been almost a quarter million deaths in and around Bosnia. I have always considered American dithering at that time to have been almost criminal.

Q: Well what about the Kurdish situation? Was that something that was on your plate?

BARKLEY: Oh yes, all the time. As I said, the Kurdish population which 20 years ago was very heavily located on the border between Iran, Iraq, Armenia, and Syria, had begun an out migration into Turkey's large cities. There were large groups soon in Istanbul, Ankara, Ismir. The Kurds began their own sort of voluntary Diaspora out of traditional Kurdish areas. But even traditional Kurdish areas in Turkey as well as Iraq and Iran were not homogenous. It was what we used to call a measles chart of different groups where there always Turkmen among the groups and a whole variety of Arabic Sunni, Shia and Alewi. Nonetheless, the situation in Turkey became more interesting because 20% of the population began to spread around the country. Many of them also went to Europe, primarily as guest workers in Germany. Of course they soon became relatively prosperous. While they were outside of Turkey, many of them organized in support of the PKK which was the regional terrorist organization that raised the flag of the insurgency in Turkey. Now much of the insurgency took place there on the border with Iran as I pointed out earlier. The Turkish economy in that area had been devastated, and these groups preyed on that to recruit not only the unemployed, but to work on the general dissatisfaction of the population. The group never had an agenda that was particularly clear. Of course they did have the grievance that they were unable to use the Kurdish language in public life. That had been a policy that the Turks had applied for a long time, sort of like the one language problem that we are facing in the United States now with Spanish. They tried to force Turkish onto the population. They were relatively successfully, but most of the Kurdish population still used their own language at home. I found out subsequently that the different Kurdish groups spoke differently, and that a northern Kurd in Turkey would have a hard time communicating easily with a southern Kurd in Turkey. It was interesting that Abdullah Ocalan who was the head of the PKK actually used Turkish as the language of command.

Q: Was he captured while you were there?

BARKLEY: No, that happened afterwards. It was well known that he was in Syria and that one of Assad's sons was a good friend of his. The Turks knew exactly where they were. In fact several Turkish journalists went down and interviewed him. Of course there was an attempt not to give him too much publicity on the part of the Turks, but he did indeed use bases in Syria and was able to infiltrate a lot of arms into southern Turkey over the Syrian border with both Iraq and Turkey.

Q: Were these a threat to you?

BARKLEY: Not that I am particularly aware of. Of course I lived with several security threats. Many of them at that time originated out of groups of Iranians who were living in Turkey. Large numbers of them left Iran when the Ayatollah came in, and some terrorist groups went with them. They had gone after a number of Israelis in turkey. When I arrived, a sergeant in JUSMATT, which was the American military grouping, there he had his car bombed. He had died just before I arrived. Subsequently bombings, several of them were focused on Israeli diplomats as well as Egyptian diplomats, had a lot to do with efforts to reach peace in the Middle East. Whenever there was any progress, some terrorist in Turkey would blow up a bomb. Several Israeli diplomats died in the bombings. I remember visiting the Egyptian who was in a car when a bomb went off. His windows were open only half way, so he only lost his legs. Nonetheless I had the opportunity to visit him in the hospital. Almost all of those had some sort of connection with what was happening in the Middle East.

Q: Well we had this enclave that we were protecting with the start of Operation Provide Comfort I believe.

BARKLEY: Yes.

Q: Did that, did you get involved with that? This was an Iraqi enclave that kind of more or less we had helped establish.

BARKLEY: Well, it was an attempt actually to allow the Kurds, particularly those who had fled into Turkey, to return to their homes. We declared basically a safe zone, telling the Iraqis to stay out of this zone, and if they don't we are going to respond militarily. We sent a small group down into that area. It was called Operation Provide Comfort. Although the Turks referred to it as "Hammerforce," which had been the original term for the operation until people realized that probably wasn't a very sophisticated way of getting people on your side. So Provide Comfort became a major success story and it allowed the Kurds to return into northern Iraq. The small military group there at Provide Comfort was never more than 10-15 people, and with a U.S. colonel in charge. When I first came there it was a Colonel Nabb. There were two very strong groupings in the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq. There was the Barzani group and the Talibani group. They were about equally divided. Many of them had great suspicions about each other. I mean the Kurds are factious. They are willing to kill each other on points of principle. So it was a difficult time. At the same time the PKK was using the chaos in northern Iraq to mount a lot of cross border operations. The Turks were extraordinarily concerned about this. No sooner had I arrived actually than they picked up that radio reports of American helicopters bringing food and clothing to people who were extremists in different parts of northern Iraq. Part of these groups, according to the Turks, were members of the PKK. Well you can imagine what kind of reaction there was in Turkey that Provide Comfort was indeed supplying food and comfort to PKK operatives. The difference was, I don't think our guys could spot the difference between one Kurdish group and another. They saw people who were hungry so they fed them. That is when I said, "From my standpoint you would be very wise to have a Turkish officer with you on every flight to make sure

you are not doing something that you can't handle." That began to help the situation a little bit. But there always was the suspicion that we were down there to create a Kurdish state. We were "nation building" in northern Iraq, and the results would be total unrest not only in Turkey but in Iran. Typically the Syrians were fishing in troubled waters. That is why they were supporting the PKK.

Q: Well in a way I mean this suspicion, it might not have been our policy, but it had the some of the elements of creating the sort of defacto state.

BARKLEY: Well I think that is true. Once they established their own government and had parliamentary elections the first element of an independent government were in place. The Turks were extraordinarily unhappy with this development. We said, "They have to get their lives back into order, and without some semblance of government, they are not going to be able to do that." We actually got all of the Kurdish players to say independence was not their goal, but that they wanted to be part of an independent, a democratic Iraq. Whether they believed that or not, I can't tell you. But all I know is that it was a constant problem. The Turks then found out that the PKK was able to mount all kinds of attacks that could no longer be handled by the police, so the army was called in. Now counterinsurgency is extraordinarily nasty, and the PKK wanted to provoke as much nastiness as they could. So they assassinated a large number of civilians. They focused very much on teachers and other groups that were vulnerable. The Turkish military tried to crack down. It wasn't long, predictably, before we were on their case for human rights violations. Of course it wasn't long before groups like the Armenians and Greeks were saying "there they go again, just out slaughtering decent people". Well it wasn't that way at all. It was an extraordinarily nasty kind of business. It cost them an enormous amount of treasure, not only financial but in terms of human life. At different levels, over 40,000 people died. That is a lot of people. When you talk about less than 3,000 at the Twin Towers disaster. The Turks were a little upset at the international community who was censuring them. They look upon it, of course, as a situation directly attributable to their loyalty to western policy in Iraq. Of course our effort to make sure, right after Iraq, that Turkey didn't suffer unnecessary financial harm didn't really develop very much. We did get the Kuwaitis to give them some commitments on financial assistance, and they got some, but they didn't get anything at all close to what they were spending on problems that came out of their participation in Desert Storm.

Q: Did Iran play much while you were there? Was that a…

BARKLEY: Well there was a tradition, and it continued while I was there, that the Turks periodically pay a state visit to Iran. They had solidified their border more or less, although there was an enormous amount of smuggling and things that have always gone on between them. There was some economic exchange, but not nearly to the level of what there was with Iraq. They would go and come back and give us a readout as to what their meetings meant. I am not an expert on Iran, but the Turkish assessment was is that Tehran was facing a serious problem because the young population was expanding to such an enormous level, and their economy had nose dived after the Islamic revolution.

Q: What about while you were there the rise and the development of fundamentalism? Was this something, you know, one things of, one was hearing at that time about things like the head scarf in schools and all that. I mean what was happening?

BARKLEY: Turkey has always had a difficult problem coming to grips with their past. Turkey as you perhaps know, is the only secular state that has a majority Islamic population. And of course that is inscribed in their constitution, and they abide by it very strongly. The military watches it particularly keenly. There have been attempts at one during the time of Ozal and before, to try and bring Islam more into line with democratic order. They allowed a number of schools to open with Islamic cirriculae. Theoretically they were watched very carefully by the government to make sure they were not endorsing traditional Islamic programs such as the imposition of Sharia law. Nonetheless, there was a growing Islamic sympathy, I think, while I was there, and it had a lot to do with issues far beyond Turkey, not the least what was happening in Bosnia. A certain feeling that, okay, we are not out to impose Islam on the rest of the world, but the world can not just treat Islamic people you know, with disdain. So there was a certain sympathy throughout, particularly throughout the time of Bosnia that said that indeed Western bias is poisonous and will come back and haunt us. There was increasing sympathy among Islamic groups. Now Islamic groups had coalesced under a group called REFA which was the prosperity party. REFA had a number of quite adept politicians. Erbakan was the leader of that party, and he subsequently formed a coalition government. So there was an increased feeling among Islamic communities that the international community closed their eyes to not only violence against, but disregard for Islamic peoples. At the same time a very interesting thing was happening. It happened actually from the time right after I arrived there. In the wake of Desert Storm, the U.S. put together a Middle East peace initiative. The Turks very much wanted to participate in it. They had of course, among their population a certain sympathy for the Palestinian cause. At the same time they always had a very loyal and active Jewish community in Turkey. Well the only two countries in southeastern Med, that were devoted to principles of democracy and modernization were Turkey and Israel. I remember one particular case early in my tenure, I had developed some close personal relations with the military, primarily because I stayed away from political discourse. I remember talking to Haus Burhan who was the head of the Air Force at that time. I said, "Haus, it would be very wise for you to look upon alternatives particularly if European and Americans become upset with your policy for whatever reason. Have you thought of Israel?" He said, "Oh yes." Well shortly thereafter he told me that his Israeli counterpart have just visited. The Israelis for a long time had been interested in Turkey for strategic as well as historical reasons. That was the beginning actually of a relationship that is going on to this day between the Turkish and the Israeli militaries. At the same time the government, right after the Middle East peace process began, upgraded their diplomatic relations with Israel. Shortly thereafter Cetin visited Israel and was received very warmly by the large sizable Turkish-Israeli community there. So things began to warm up. It soon became an article of faith that Turkish-Israeli relations were extraordinarily important to both of their countries. They were afraid to label it a strategic relationship, because there was some domestic resistance

to that, but in fact it was. They began to hold joint military maneuvers, some of which we joined in on. We were a little cautious on how to handle this, we understood it was a good thing but thought there could be some downsides to it too. But I think that during my time there this was one of the really positive developments that took place, the warming and thickening of Turkish-Israeli relations.

Q: What about relations with Syria, I mean how were the Syrians viewed at that time? Assad was the…

BARKLEY: Assad of course is an extraordinarily duplicitous fellow. One of the first things I had to learn in that area was that the regional players would look you right in the face and lie. Not that the Americans and the Europeans can't put spins on things, but a flagrant kind of falsehood is something that you tried to avoid. I remember the Turks were always trying to get us to tell the Syrians to stop supporting the PKK. My answer was "What do you do yourself? I mean you have relationships with these guys." So the Turkish Minister of the Interior at one time went over, talked to the Syrians and said, "You know we really have concerns because the PKK leadership is here in Damascus." The Syrians looked at him and said, "Who are these people?" I mean it was just absolutely incredible to hear that kind of shameless dissimilation. The Turks said, "Well we have not only pictures of the guy, but we can give you his address as well." The Syrians said they would look into it and of course did nothing. It wasn't until after I left that the Turkish military decided that they had had enough, and they moved military forces into Hatay province which is on the border with Syria. The Syrians finally got the message and asked Ocalan to leave. That was the beginning of the end for him. As you perhaps know, he found asylum, initially in Greece and then the Greeks gave him asylum in Kenya where he was finally picked up by Turkish commandos, which was extraordinarily embarrassing for Greece. This occurred after I had departed Ankara.

Q: Well what about during this time the Soviet Union was breaking up. I know it because I spent three weeks in Kyrgyzstan just about '94. It was obvious that the Turks were looking on the creation of these Stans as an opportunity to spread the influence of Turkey. What was happening?

BARKLEY: That is true. Turks claimed that there was no better model for an Islamic nation than the Turkish model, the Ataturk model if you will." Which embraced both modernization, and western orientations. So they tried to establish a number of policy lines to address these issues. Now of the new Stans, the ones that had large Islamic populations were Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. They all spoke some sort of Turkish language, although some were quite distinct. Except for Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, it was hard to understand what an Anatolian Turk was saying. Nonetheless, they all had a Turkish background. So the Turks decided to bring in numbers of students from all of these groups to train at Turkish universities. They also expanded their military presence and tried to put some money into different programs. At the same time the Turks told me that the most of the money that flowed into those areas came from Saudi Arabia for mosques and Islamic schools. The Saudi variant of Islam is

considerably less secular. So Wahabi elements were quite active in that area, and indeed provide a certain amount of nuisance value. We Americans were just trying to get our feet on the ground in that area at that time. It was an area where we were politically blinded for centuries and never been particularly interested in. But in principle we tried to encourage the Turks because as I said, their brand of democratic Islam was something we endorsed. They did make some advances; they had some reverses. I remember meeting a couple of groups that came from these areas. As you can imagine, before the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was only one ambassador in Ankara. Afterwards there were multiple ambassadors. They were all seeking some sort of relationship with the United States, so I got to know almost all of them. Almost all of them came out of the communist apparatus that the Soviets had in place for many years.

Q: Well I mean you really were in an extraordinary place, because when you think about it, we just had a border tour of the horizon as they say. Turkey at that time was really in the center of things. Was this sort of pepping the Turks up or sort of discouraging them?

BARKLEY: We would say to them, and they understood and agreed, that they had gone from being the southern anchor of NATO into being a regional power. They said, "You know we are in a Bermuda triangle here between the Balkans and the Caucasus and the Arabic and Persian countries to the south. Whatever came out of this area was not going to be particularly good. Therefore levels of stability should be appreciated here in Turkey. Now the Turks of course, always looked upon things like the Kurdish problem and elsewhere as part of regional Balkanization, which they were determined to resist. Of course, it was a messy business. As we talked earlier, there were high levels of human rights violations on both sides, and a huge amount of violence. Of course those ethnic groups that were not particularly friendly to the Turks anyway were not willing to be tolerant of these things. I mean I spent as much time trying to say you must follow humane practices at all times. I remember the military telling me if they didn't follow humane practices, they would have solved the problem long ago. "The reasons the insurgency is still going on is we have got kid gloves on, to make sure that our western friends know we are trying our best." It was extraordinarily messy. And as you can see by this discourse we jumped all over the place in three years. There was no really sort of chronological order in which you could put things.

Q: How about on the economic side? What were American-Turkish economic relations?

BARKLEY: The Turks, of course, would like to have had the United States give them trade advantages, but the things the Turks were particularly competitive in were things like textiles, which are extraordinarily difficult in the United States and subjected to all sorts of quotas and restrictions. They wanted the quotas increased and things like that. There was resistance in the United States to do that. We were always about five or sixth in line as trading partners. The biggest trading partners were always France and Germany and Switzerland, actually a lot of trade. And of curse for political reasons, more than economic reasons, we strongly supported Turkish efforts to join the European Union. The European Union for its own political reasons were not very enthusiastic about this

although we kept saying the political realities are that you better try to find a friend in Turkey rather than shut them out. It had been a long odyssey from the beginning until they were finally given status as a customs union with the EU (European Union). But full membership, they keep being pushed further and further down the line by the Europeans. It is quite clear the Europeans have no interest at all in adding an Islamic based nation into the mix.

Q: What about you were there during an election when George Bush senior lost and was replaced by Bill Clinton.

BARKLEY: Yes.

Q: Did you, was there a change? How did that work from your perspective?

BARKLEY: Well of course we had gone from an administration that had been extraordinarily active in foreign affairs, to a new administration that seemed to view itself primarily as a domestic administration. There is always a certain gap while the new people took over. The people that did come in of course tended to be known to some of us because they were part of the earlier Carter administration: Secretary of State Warren Christopher of course, and Tony Lake as head of the NSC. We weren't quite sure how any of this would shake out. It turns out that Ozal, very quick off the mark decided that he immediately wanted to get the measure of this new administration. After the election, the first U.S. group to visit were three congressmen. We usually didn't get many congressmen and senators because Turkey was often a problem for their domestic constituents. The group that came out was headed by Richard Gephardt. He had with him Dan Glickman and Robert Torricelli from New Jersey. I think Glickman was from Kansas. I am not quite sure. He later on became Secretary of Agriculture in the Clinton Administration. They were well received. A dinner was given for them by Demirel and they were received by Ozal. Ozal, of course, was extraordinarily effective in presenting regional foreign policy problems. Demirel was just very congenial and told them that Turkey always looked to the United States as a firm and loyal friend. The meeting with Ozal was extraordinarily good. After that meeting it became clear that he was determined to meet with Clinton. Well it is always hard with a new administration to you how get in the door. Ozal arranged to have a medical meeting either in Florida or in Texas. Then he showed up in Washington and sort of beat on the door. I mean protocol never deterred Ozal. Of course we were all desperately trying to get them to agree to a meeting. For me it was instructive how this took place. Everything I tried in Washington got no response at all, none. Whether the stuff was even being read I don't know. The State Department was also at sixes and sevens, not quite sure what to do. I am sure the desk was doing its best, but was not getting any response from the White House. Subsequently I discovered that indeed that the White House staff finally did agree to see Ozal for a half hour. He showed up, and President Clinton who was notorious for not watching the clock too closely was late. After he arrived and they had coffee and started to talk. Clinton was absolutely fascinated by what Ozal had to say. Ozal, God bless him, was marvelous at this kind of presentation. So I guess to the horror of his staff, after about a half hour, Clinton said,

"This is much too interesting to break off." He said, "Bring us more coffee." So it went on for a good long time. I am not exactly quite sure how long. It was also somewhat of a wake up call for me too because I had gotten used to getting readouts on every kind of serious meeting from President Bush and his staff. That stopped completely. I got no resonance at any time when I was there from the Clinton administration. So I don't know what went on. Whenever there was a big meeting there was a policy to disinvite the American ambassador. That was the position I was told, that Tony Lake took. I don't know if that goes back to his time with Kissinger or not, but I was basically shut out for the rest of my tour. What I found out, I found out more by chance and through readouts from the Turks. So the situation had changed 180 degrees. Now from what I was able to hear, I believe President Clinton had extraordinarily well honed strategic sense. However whatever he decided always passed first through the filter of domestic politics. Several groups in the White House were not particularly friendly to Turkey, although the president was. In any event, that was of course in January of '93. In April of that year, quite unexpectedly Ozal passed away.

Q: Was this sudden?

BARKLEY: Well he had had some health problems, but nobody expected it. He looked tired. In any event Prime Minister Demirel decided he wanted to be president. Of course he was in a better position I suppose to go after that. But the immediate problem for us was to make sure that we have high U.S. representation at the funeral. We tried desperately to get Washington to look at this. We knew the president couldn't come. The natural inclination in view of the size and importance of Turkey would be that the vice president could come or maybe actually the first lady, whomever. We got shot down on all of those fronts. Apparently there was great effort in the Department to try and get someone special. Certainly that was true on the part of my ex-DCM, Mark Grossman who was working for Secretary Christopher. But for whatever reason they couldn't come up with anyone. Of course it is times like this that countries pay attention to how important the U.S. response is. Finally, Washington discovered that Jim Baker was traveling in the region. The Department asked if he would head the American delegation as ex-Secretary of State. He agreed to do that. Clifton Wharton, who was the Deputy Secretary of State joined him. It was a delegation with Mort Abramowitz and a couple of other people, but it was certainly not a high level group. Nonetheless, Secretary Baker knew "God and the world" as they say in Germany. Everybody knew him and respected him highly, so he did a good job, but I think that among members of the Turkish government there was a level of bitterness.

Q: Could you get across the duties of your people. I mean that is pretty tricky.

BARKLEY: It is very difficult. I haven't addressed that. The vice president said, "I don't do funerals, or something like that." He actually did them I guess for the King of Morocco and royalty. I don't know, I can't tell you what it was that went into their thinking. But it was of course something that would haunt us a little bit among key levels of the government, particularly in the foreign office, for they had a great affection for

Ozal and his wisdom. Ozal had, of course, gone the extra mile for the United States so many times. Now we did try to get ex-president Bush which would have been a natural, but it turns out that exactly on that day he was opening his library in Midland, Texas, so you can imagine he had scheduling problems. Baker came out with this group, and we went through the program. We also had a whole variety of high level meetings there which Secretary Baker did not participate in because he was not a member of the government. Most of that was taken up by Secretary Wharton, who did a very nice job, but he was new to the office and was not at all read in on the area. But during that period of time we met with a whole number of people including Ter Petrossian who was the President of Armenia. That was an interesting session. But Ozal's death put the whole political scenery in Turkey into disarray. There was a huge realignment within the ruling parties. The new leader of Demirel's party was a woman by the name of Tansu Ciller, a young, U.S. educated, extraordinarily beautiful young woman in her early 40's. Then the coalition partner, the Progressive People's Party, Mr. Inonu, also stepped back and he was replaced by Murat Karayalcin who was at that time the mayor of Ankara and an up and coming young man. So the whole political scenery had changed. The only real long time familiar figure from the old political party was Demirel who became President. A couple of the other historical figures were still around including Ecevit himself. Who later on parleyed this confusion into political advantage. In any event, one of the first things that the new prime minister wanted to do, was to visit the United States. So once again we went to work, and once again it was an extraordinarily unrewarding kind of effort. We made the point there was a western oriented, western educated female, the first female head of the secular government of modern Turkey. All the things that we should be not only appreciative but endorse and support, stressing that it was important for her to see the President. If she didn't see the president, she would take serious political licks back home and might not be able to survive. We got no response, no response, I mean no response. She was on the phone to me all the time and was working through her ambassador in Washington. I know they did everything they could to try but they couldn't get through the White House. So she came to me and said, "I don't know what to do. I have to see the President. If I don't see the president, I can't go." But at the same time her program began to coalesce as it does at a time like this. So she took a fling and went. It took some courage on her part. Then I was told that a meeting indeed was put together. I got that from the State Department, and once again I had no idea what went on. I mean ideally once again, the ambassador should be called back. I was on the phone saying, "Look, this is the Prime Minister, the Head of Government. I think I should be there." They said, "No, this is one of the new policies of the administration. No ambassadors are invited to the meetings."

Q: Did you feel the hand of Tony Lake there?

BARKLEY: You know I can't really tell you. Many of the people I knew in Washington thought this was a policy that Tony Lake had put in place. I wasn't there; I can't tell you that. But I did know that I was not invited. Of course then you had to go through the diplomatic nuances and all the other stuff, because quite obviously I went from a position where I was the best informed person in turkey on American policy to one where I had no

idea whatsoever. It was astonishing. But from what I understand it was an extraordinarily good meeting. The President, once he saw her, and saw that not only did she speak perfect English, but was extraordinarily beautiful, he apparently developed an instant rapport. They addressed a number of issues. From what I understand, one of the things that she did bring up is the Turks had been very interested in getting air refueling tankers for their military to increase their military reach, particularly to the east. We hadn't been able to get an answer there, and she brought that up and a number of other issues and seemed to have gotten a very positive response from the president. Upon her return, it just turned out there was a diplomatic reception, and she was there, and she asked me to come over and see her. She said, "You know I saw the President. We had a very good meeting. Besides that Mr. Ambassador, I won't need your help anymore." I don't know if this was a slam at my inability to help her before or not. She said, "No the president has given me his personal telephone number, and said if I ever had any needs I should call him directly which I intend to do." I have no idea if she ever did that. I have reason to believe from other comments later on that she did perhaps often. But I had no idea what the contents of those meetings were. I do know that she subsequently told a number of Congressmen that she was cross with the president because he had made a number of commitments to her that had not panned out. So I was flying blind for the rest of my tenure. It was most uncomfortable.

Q: How did you evaluate Ciller as a political figure during the time you were there?

BARKLEY: Well she was infinitely more attractive to a western audience than she was to a Turkish audience. Both she and Karayalcin represented a generational transition. They were well educated. They were the heads of political parties that had some stature and some influence. It was our belief that indeed they had made the transference from an old leadership to a new leadership, and that they were all positively inclined to the west. It turns out that although that was true, they were also extraordinarily inept politically. Ciller, who was a trained economist, thought that she could dictate economic developments. In March of 1994, she tried to curtail the interest payments that banks were making for long term loans which of course led to an immediate flight out of the Lira into Deutschmarks and Dollars and caused a terrible economic crisis, one they never got over. Although she survived up until my departure, it was clear that Turkey was on hard, hard times. Things that happened during the few years I was there, they had gone from a time of buoyancy and economic expansion to a full fledged insurrection in the southeast and economic dislocations of a serious nature. Things were obviously unhappy times.

Q: What about the unification of Germany which you were intimately acquainted with? Germany had always been sort of the Berlin to Baghdad connection, you know that Turkey had always been very favorable to Germany and vice versa. Turks have gone to work. Did the unification play any impact on Turkey?

BARKLEY: Not appreciably, not while I was there.

Q: I was wondering about their money and the fact that the Germans became self

absorbed and all that.

BARKLEY: No, but there was a constant problem. The Germans had enormous sympathy at different levels in Turkey. Turkish guest workers had gone there in huge numbers, and many of them had become very successful and remitted a lot of money to Turkey. But at the same time there were domestic problems in Germany with Turkey. For example, trying to absorb the number of Turks coming in. The Turks wanted to have dual citizenship; the Germans resisted. Also their concept of a guest worker is they did not stay permanently. In fact, the Turks did stay permanently.

Q: Some in third generation.

BARKLEY: But among the working class for example, although the language, the most popular western language among intellectuals was English or French, among the working class it was German. Huge numbers. You could go to almost anywhere in Turkey and encounter German speakers, which of course, made it easy for me because we were able to communicate. So there was a great deal of sympathy, but there were problems. For example, the problems that Turkey is going through with the Kurds replayed itself out in Germany. Also fundamentalist groups found fertile ground in Germany to expand their efforts. And all of these groups were able to send enormous amounts of money into their particular causes in either Turkey or surrounding territory. The PKK was largely financed by German marks. The same thing was true basically of the Islamic party in Turkey. In fact I was told the Islamic party in Turkey denominated their own party coffers in deutschmarks, because that is where they got so much of their money. So there was a huge playoff between the two countries. We were constantly trying to get the Germans to put pressure on the PKK which of course used extortion among other things to get money out of people in Germany, to stop it and to censure them. They were reluctant to do that, thinking that it would cause domestic unrest. So the relationship was an interesting one. Of course many Germans did not support Turkey's ascension to the EU. Not least of course Helmut Schmidt who many times was know to have met with Giscard d'Estaing and to have agreed Turkish culture did not fit into the European pattern. So it was active and somewhat tense relationship. At the same time it held great promise.

Q: Well then you left there in 1994. How did that come about?

BARKLEY: Well it was the end of my tour. Once there was a change in administrations, I was always sort of looking over my shoulder to see if anybody else was going to be coming in.

Q: Who took your place?

BARKLEY: I was replaced actually by Mark Grossman. Mark had been my DCM when I arrived. He had been DCM under Mort Abramowitz, and I inherited him. He is one of the most competent foreign service officers I have ever met. I was extraordinarily pleased of course. He had something that I didn't have of course, in that he had a personal

relationship with Secretary Christopher and understood really what Washington was all about. I must say by the time I left, I think Washington was beginning to get their ducks a little bit better in a row on foreign policy. But it was a very slow process.

Q: Well then what happened to you?

BARKLEY: Well then I was informed quickly that unless I was promoted into the ministerial ranks as a career minister, that my time in the foreign service was drawing to a close. That was fine. I had had a very good run. It was time to pass the baton, which I did.

Q: So what have you been doing since just briefly.

BARKLEY: Well of course I went through the normal mustering out program, which I did. A couple of companies asked me to do different things. But really the most interesting thing happened when a group in Washington asked me to help put together an exhibit of Ottoman art. So we put together a little foundation, a non profit foundation called the Palace Arts Foundation of which I was the president. We went to the Turkish government with the proposal for a traveling exhibit of the art of the Tokapi Palace, and we did that. The year 2000 and the year 2001. It was a great critical success. We began to realize that nobody in the United States knows much about Turkey. If we could get them to the exhibit, they were enthralled. But we didn't get the numbers that we would have liked, but it was still very reputable as far as art exhibits go. It did put us on the map in a number of areas, the numbers of people we got were certainly reputable. It increased interest in Turkey to the point where there was a big increase in the travel directly connected to the exhibit. Of course the Turks have always said if people get here they will like us. Which is basically true. So that had some effect. But at the same time it basically opened at the time when there was a dip in the American economy which is never good for art. We barely got through that. And since that time basically we have been looking for other kinds of programs but nothing particular has come up. We have a couple of irons possibly in the fire but nothing very good. That exhibit was a glorious exhibit. We got among other things the Topkapi dagger which was the subject of a major movie.

Q: Oh, yes, I was thinking the movie, with Melina Mercouri.

BARKLEY: Yes, but I will tell you the most interesting thing is of course you and I remember it, but the young generation that go to museums had no idea what we were talking about. So sometimes we get caught in a time warp and don't realize it until much too late.

Q: Okay, will I think this is a good place to stop it. I thank you very much.

End of interview