

# Climatic factors as determinants of International Migration

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# Climatic factors as determinants of International Migration\*

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## Abstract

In this paper, we examine environmental factors as potential determinants of international migration. We distinguish between unexpected short-run factors, captured by natural disasters, as well as long-run climate change and climate variability captured by deviations and volatilities of temperatures and rainfall from and around their long-run averages. We start from a simple neo-classical model, which is augmented to include environmental factors at origin in the form of amenities. We then test the model using a panel dataset of bilateral migration flows for the period 1960-2000, the time and dyadic dimensions of which additionally allow us to control for numerous time-varying and time invariant factors. Using our primary specification, having accounted for other well documented determinants of migration, we find no direct impact of climatic change on international migration in the medium to long run across our entire sample. These results are robust when further considering migrants returning home. Conditioning our regressions upon origin country characteristics, we find evidence that shortfalls in precipitation constrain migration to developing countries from those which rely more heavily upon agriculture and spur movements to developing countries from those with fewer groundwater reserves. We further use the rate of urbanization as a proxy for internal migration and find strong evidence that natural disasters beget greater flows of migrants to urban environs.

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# 1 Introduction

Climate change remains at the vanguard of the international development policy debate. The Stern Review (2007) while analyzing the economic impact of climate change emphasized the global consequences of inaction, the need for a coordinated international response and the fact that developing countries will likely suffer disproportionately. This final point was also stressed in the first UN intergovernmental report on climate change, which further stated that "the gravest effects of climate change may be those on human migration as millions will be displaced" (IPCC 1990). Myers (1996) counted some 25 million 'environmental refugees' in 1995 alone and forecast some 200 million by 2050 (Myers 2002). Although the term 'environmental migrant' is perhaps not a useful distinction to make (Castles 2002), these estimates nevertheless highlight the magnitude of possible future movements that might at least in part be driven by environmental change. Despite these dire predictions, surprisingly few papers examine either the direct or indirect impacts of environmental factors on international migration. This article contributes to the literature by examining, for the first time, the overall (macroeconomic) impact of the effects of climate change on international migration in a panel of global bilateral migration flows.

Climate change manifests itself in many guises and may impinge upon migration in myriad ways. These include extreme weather phenomena and variability in temperature and precipitation (Boko et al 2007). Marchiori et al (2011) advocate two channels, (one direct, and the other indirect), via which these types of climatic factors beget international migration. The direct channel relates to a change in amenities at origin, or else to changes in non-market costs such as a higher incidence of disease (Patz et al 1996). The indirect channel instead refers to climatic variation in rural economies which leads to increased pressure to migrate to urban environs. This in turn, results in downward pressure on urban wages thus creating greater incentives for emigration abroad. In either case, the effects of climate change most affect the rural poor in developing countries, exactly those which are least able to self-insure or adopt alternative coping strategies to deal with the onset of climate change.

Piguet et al (2011) emphasize two main, interconnected arguments, which arise from the global climate change debate. Their first pertains to the fact that identifying environmental factors as the sole cause of migration may never prove possible, since complex interactions exist between climatic change and other categories of deterministic factors; economic, social (and/or cultural), political and demographic. Societies already vulnerable in some sense therefore, will likely be disproportionately challenged by the onset of climatic change, with the rural poor arguably affected the most. Recent studies for example, show that a one degree rise in temperature in any given year translates into a reduction of annual economic growth of 1.1% points (Dell et al 2008), or else a fall in per capita GDP of 8.9 percentage points (Dell et al 2009); approximately half which may be reduced by 'adapting' to the environment, through migration, changes in fertility rates or mortality. Furthermore, Barrios et al (2010) provide evidence that sub-Saharan Africa would have reduced the gap in per capita GDP (by between 15-40%) vis-à-vis the rest of the developing world should no decline in rainfall have occurred in

this region after 1960. Since climatic variations affect both individuals' incentives to migrate, together with their ability to do so; disentangling migrants' primary motivation to migrate, whether it be forced or voluntary, i.e. identifying economic incentives from environmental 'push' factors, proves impossible. At the macroeconomic level, the best we can do is to assess the relative *direct* impact of climate change and climate variability on international migration, having accounted for all other classes of determinants. Since macroeconomic studies examining climate change often suffer from selection and omitted variable biases (Lilleor and Van de Broeck (2011)), the inclusion of all main classes of determinants together with the implementation of a far more rigorous empirical specification are undoubted strengths of the current paper.

Piguet et al's second argument relates to the political framework in which any environmentally motivated migration flows may occur, and upon how destination countries' should receive 'environmental migrants'. These authors argue that the composition of future migration flows will largely resemble those currently observed, at least from the perspective of developed receiving nations. While their detailed discussion of how such migrants might be received is not directly relevant for the current work; their argument nevertheless serves to highlight the key role of destination country migration policies as determinants of bilateral migration flows.

This paper is most closely related to the wider discourse on climate change and the macro-economic literature on the determinants of international migration, both areas of which have been remarkably understudied. Climate change no doubt has heterogeneous impacts across countries (Black et al 2011) which are a function of the socio-economic idiosyncrasies at origin, and which in turn determine individuals' vulnerability to climate change. As a result, many existing studies have reached alternative conclusions in a variety of differing contextual settings. Munshi (2003) for example, finds a statistically significant and positive correlation between emigration from rural Mexico to the United States and low rainfall at origin. Similarly, Barrios et al (2006) find rain shortages significantly increase migration from rural areas across Sub-Saharan Africa, but not in other parts of the developing world. As argued by Marchiori et al (2011) this in turn led to increased international migration from across the continent. More broadly, Afifi and Warner (2008) find that a number of variables which capture environmental degradation are positively correlated with increased numbers of international migrants. Conversely, Findlay (1994) in the case of Mali, finds that episodes of drought led to decreased number of migrants due to the tightening of credit constraints, the result of rising food prices; especially to other African countries and to France. Finally, Kniveton et al (2008) provide evidence of the opposite relationship between rainfall and out-migration. In the context of international migration from two Mexican regions, they find (in the case of Durango) that greater amounts of rainfall lead to increased numbers of emigrants to the United States.

The evidence concerning the effects on migration of unexpected climatic phenomena is also mixed. Piguet et al (2011) highlight a weight of micro-level studies which conclude that such phenomena result in short-term internal migrations, as opposed to long-distance or international movements. Indeed, Paul (2005) finds evidence that the 2004 tornado in north-central Bangladesh resulted in no migration whatsoever. However, a growing body of macro-level

literature instead finds a positive relationship between natural disasters and international migration; see for example Reuveny and Moore (2009) or Drabo and Mbaye (2011). Naudé (2008) finds only very weak evidence of any link between natural disasters and migration however, arguing instead that conflicts at origin exert a far greater influence. Halliday (2006) instead finds that earthquakes significantly reduce migration from El Salvador to the United States. Doubts persist however, as to the validity of the econometric approaches adopted in many of these macro-level studies.

Environmental determinants have remained wholly absent from the macro-economic literature. In two of the earliest contributions (of the latest wave of migration research), Hatton and Williamson (2001, 2003) focus on the demographic and economic determinants of international emigration rates from Africa, and more broadly from various countries across differing historical periods, respectively. Using emigration rates at origin (and/or at the destination level) tends to mask the fact that the migration process is extremely heterogeneous across both sending and receiving regions. Rather the implementation of data at the dyadic level allows accounting for the peculiarities between the two countries such as distance, diasporas and cultural proximity that also play important roles.

Pedersen et al (2008) investigate the extent to which selection and network effects foster bilateral migration flows for 27 countries of the OECD.<sup>1</sup> They are unable to provide conclusive evidence of selection effects, which they examine indirectly by investigating the signs of the coefficients on the interactions of the share of tax revenue collected at destination with varying origin country income levels. These authors argue this might be due to restrictive destination country migration policies, which these authors fail to account for explicitly. This matter is taken up in more detail in Mayda (2010) who again investigates the OECD as the destination region. A dummy variable is constructed which captures changes in destination country migration policy. The results show that when destination migration policies become less restrictive, positive 'pull' factors are found to exert a larger influence on bilateral emigration rates (as when compared to the sample average). Unfortunately, the role of migrant networks is omitted from the analysis, which might explain some of the low coefficients of variation obtained.

More recently, papers have better emphasized the underlying theory. Based on the income maximisation approach (Roy, 1950; Borjas, 1987), Grogger and Hanson (2011) and Beine et al. (2011) investigate the determinants of the size and composition of migration patterns at the world level, again using the OECD as destination countries. Grogger and Hanson (2011) analyse migrant stocks, and focus in particular upon the role of the wage differential between the origin and the destination of migrants. They omit the role of migrant networks although some historical diasporic component will likely be captured by their measures of colonial links. Beine et al. (2011) instead analyse migration flows in the nineties and the extent to which diasporas have contributed to shaping these flows; while abstracting from explicitly

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<sup>1</sup>The focus on the countries of the OECD as destinations in the majority of studies is a consequence of the general paucity of global migration data.

modeling the role of wage differentials. Both of these studies use cross-sectional data however, which necessarily restricts the scope of their analysis. In arguably the most comprehensive study to date, Ortega and Peri (2009) again draw upon the income maximisation approach to investigate the causes (and consequences) of international migration to the OECD in a panel which includes explicit measures of migration policy. These authors utilize the panel dimensions to their fullest, since they employ both destination (time invariant) and origin time-varying fixed effects to account for a multitude of unobserved factors which might otherwise be driving any observed relationship. Unfortunately, environmental determinants are omitted from their study.

The aim of this paper is to reconcile the various innovations from across the literature, to test the overall impact of environmental change on international migration using a previously unexploited panel dataset of international migration. We augment a traditional neo-classical utility maximisation model of migration to incorporate environmental factors in the context of 'amenities' at origin. We consider the onset of sudden climatic phenomena, which are largely unexpected, in addition to long-term changes in both temperature and rainfall. Recognizing the multi-dimensionality of individuals' decision to migrate, we incorporate variables to account for economic, demographic, social (and/or cultural) and political factors which existing studies have shown to be important determinants of international migration. We also account for the role of immigration policies and welfare systems in receiving countries.

To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to investigate the impact of long term climate change on international migration at the dyadic level and the first to estimate the impact of natural disasters and changes in temperature and precipitation simultaneously. More generally, our paper is the first macroeconomic study to examine the determinants of international migration using a model grounded in micro-economic theory, whilst also accounting for all classifications of determinants. Importantly, our panel includes countries of the global South as both origins and destinations. The omission of nations of the relatively poorer global 'South', results in the most significant proportion of international migration being completed omitted from analysis. From a sending perspective this is particularly important in the context of climate change because agriculture remains more prevalent in poorer societies. It is also crucial to account for Southern countries from a receiving perspective, since climatic migrants from developing countries often cannot afford to pay the migration costs involved in long-distant emigration to countries of the relatively more affluent global 'North'. The expansive dataset of 166 destinations and 137 origins, therefore allows us to better capture the heterogeneous impacts of climate change across countries and over time. We exploit the longitudinal dimension of the migration data to control for unobserved heterogeneity of different types to provide long-run estimates of the effects of climate change around the globe. Having controlled for differences between countries, we then examine global patterns by conditioning our regressions on particular country characteristics, for example the availability of natural water sources or the relative importance of the agricultural sector at origin.

Using our primary specification, we find no direct evidence of climate change, climate variability or of natural disasters on international migration in the medium to long run across our

entire sample. These results are robust when further considering migrants returning home. Further conditioning our regressions upon origin country characteristics, we find evidence that shortfalls in precipitation constrain migration to developing countries from those which rely more heavily upon agriculture and spur movements to developing countries from those with fewer groundwater reserves. We further use the rate of urbanization as a proxy for internal migration and find strong evidence that natural disasters beget greater flows of migrants to urban environs.

## 2 Theoretical background: the income maximization approach

Our theoretical foundation is derived from the income maximization framework, which is used to identify the main determinants of international migration and to pin down our empirical specification. The income maximization approach was first introduced by Roy (1951) and Borjas (1987) and further developed by Grogger and Hanson (2011) and Beine et al. (2011). The recent advances further consider migrants' choice of moving to potentially all destinations and yield pseudo-gravity models which can be readily estimated. One of the main strengths of the income maximization approach is the ability to generate predictions in line with the recent (macro-economic) literature on international migration. By grounding our empirical specification in a theory with a well proven track record, we also address one of the main shortcomings of the macro level climate change literature, which generally adopt looser, ad-hoc specifications. This model has been successfully applied to analyze the specific role of wage differentials (Grogger and Hanson, 2011), the significance of social networks (Beine et al. , 2011 a and b) and the brain drain phenomenon (Gibson and McKenzie, 2011).

Our model comprises homogeneous agents who decide whether or not to migrate, and then their optimal destination should they have decided to move. Agents therefore maximize their utility across the full set of destinations which includes the home country as well as all possible foreign countries globally. An individual's utility is log-linear in income and depends upon the characteristics of their country of residence as well as the costs of moving incurred as part of any migration. The utility of an individual born in country  $i$  and staying in country  $i$  at time  $t$  is given by:

$$u_{ii,t} = \ln(w_{i,t}) + A_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

where  $A_i$  denotes country  $i$ 's characteristics (amenities, public expenditures, employment opportunities) including climate and  $\varepsilon_{i,t}$  is a iid extreme-value distributed random term. The utility related to migration from country  $i$  to country  $j$  at time  $t$  is given by:

$$u_{ij,t} = w_{j,t} + A_{j,t} - C_{ij,t}(\cdot) + \varepsilon_{j,t} \quad (2)$$

where  $C_{ij,t}(\cdot)$  denotes the migration costs of moving from  $i$  to  $j$  at time  $t$ .

Let  $N_{i,t}$  be the size of the native population in country  $i$  at time  $t$ . When the random term follows an iid extreme-value distribution, we can apply the results in McFadden (1974) to write the probability that an agent born in country  $i$  will move to country  $j$  as:

$$\Pr \left[ u_{ij,t} = \max_k u_{ik,t} \right] = \frac{N_{ij,t}}{N_{i,t}} = \frac{\exp [\ln(w_{j,t}) + A_{j,t} - C_{ij,t}(h)]}{\sum_k \exp [\ln(w_{k,t}) + A_{k,t} - C_{ik,t}]}$$

The equilibrium bilateral migration rate between  $i$  and  $j$  ( $N_{ij,t}/N_{ii,t}$ ) is given by the following expression:

$$\frac{N_{ij,t}}{N_{ii,t}} = \frac{\exp [\ln(w_{j,t}) + A_{j,t} - C_{ij,t}(\cdot)]}{\exp [\ln(w_{i,t}) + A_{i,t}]} \quad (3)$$

where  $N_{ij,t}$  is the number of migrants in the  $i$ - $j$  migration corridor at time  $t$ . Taking logs, we obtain an expression giving the log of the bilateral migration rate between  $i$  and  $j$  at time  $t$ :

$$\ln\left(\frac{N_{ij,t}}{N_{ii,t}}\right) = \ln\left(\frac{w_{j,t}}{w_{i,t}}\right) + A_{j,t} - A_{i,t} - C_{ij,t}(\cdot) \quad (4)$$

Expression (4) allows us to identify the main components of the aggregate bilateral migration rate: the wage differential in the form of the wage ratio ( $\frac{w_{j,t}}{w_{i,t}}$ ), the factors at destination  $A_{j,t}$ , factors at origin ( $A_{i,t}$ ) and the migration costs between  $i$  and  $j$ ,  $C_{ij,t}$ .<sup>2</sup>

Migration costs,  $C_{ij,t}$ , are in turn themselves a function of components of various dimensions and we assume separability in these costs. They depend upon factors that are dyadic and move over time such as networks, which are captured by the stock of migrants from  $i$  living in country  $j$  before the migration process takes place and which are denoted by  $M_{ij,t}$ . Migration costs are also contingent upon factors that are dyadic but time invariant, such as distance ( $d_{i,j}$ ), contiguity i.e. if countries share a common border ( $b_{i,j}$ ) and linguistic proximity ( $l_{i,j}$ ). Migration costs also depend upon factors specific to the origin country but which are constant over time ( $x_i$ ), for example geographic location. Finally, migration costs include factors that are destination specific, either constant over time ( $x_j$ ) or else time-varying ( $x_{j,t}$ ). Leading candidates for these latter factors include destination countries' migration policies and the benevolence of the welfare state at destination, which Borjas (1987) termed the 'welfare magnet effect'.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Note that Black et al's (2011) categorisation of deterministic factors which include push, pull and intervening factors is appropriately captured in expression (4)

<sup>3</sup>Alternatively we could have drawn upon the recent theoretical framework developed by Anderson (2011), who derives a structural gravity model of migration analogous to his (second) seminal contribution on the use of gravity models in the context of international trade (see Anderson and van Wincoop 2003). Their key additional insight, in the context of goods, is that trade between pairs of countries depends not only upon the barriers between themselves, but also upon the various barriers of both countries with the rest of the world, termed multilateral resistances. Should both country's multilateral resistance increase with the rest of the world therefore, then both countries have greater incentives to trade relatively more with one another. Arguably humans, (even homogenous ones!) should not be treated as objects/goods since they are free to make their own choices. Nevertheless, the key insight in these authors arguments likely holds in the context of international



Putting everything together, our cost function may be expressed as:

$$C_{ij,t} = c(M_{ij,t}, d_{ij}, b_{ij}, l_{ij}, x_i, x_j, x_{j,t}) \quad (5)$$

Push factors at origin are collected in  $A_{i,t}$ <sup>4</sup>, and these comprise; political variables ( $Pol_{i,t}$ ), demographic differences across origin countries ( $Dep_{i,t}$ ) and environmental factors  $E_{i,t}$ . The expected theoretical sign of the political regime at origin is unknown, *a priori*. This is due to the fact that while repressive political regimes might increase residents desire to leave, they typically also increase the costs of migration. It might be extremely difficult for residents living in a dictatorship to obtain authorization to leave the country for example. Foreign diplomatic representation also tends to be less important in such countries, which in turn significantly raises the costs of obtaining a visa for emigration candidates.

To capture demographic push factors at origin, we implement the total dependency ratio. This is calculated as the total population aged less than 15 or over 64, divided by those of working age. A higher total dependency ratio therefore, indicates the presence of fewer workers to support both the young and the elderly, either directly or else through the tax system. Conversely, a lower dependency ratio suggests instead, that greater numbers of working age people exist at origin, which are in some sense more free to emigrate abroad. Other variables typically used to capture demographic push factors at origin include the lag (by 20 years) of the birth rate, which is purported to capture a cohort effect at origin, or else the share of young people at origin, typically those aged 15-29, since it is this cohort which typically exhibits the greatest propensity to migrate abroad (see Hatton and Williamson (2001, 2003)). Typically, we would expect a rise in either of these variables to ultimately beget further migration. Both of these mechanisms are captured through the total dependency ratio however, since an increase in either the lagged birth rate or else greater numbers of those aged between 15-29 in the current period, lead to reductions in the total dependency ratio.

As far as our environmental factors are concerned, we draw upon a similar taxonomy as Piguet et al (2011), who distinguish between two main types of factors. First, we consider short-run factors, i.e. completely unexpected natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. Those events tend to drive people out of their regions within a short period of time and with a sense of urgency. Second, we capture what we can consider to be long-run environmental factors, which comprise long run deviations or variations in both temperature and precipitation around their long run averages.<sup>5</sup> In contrast to natural disasters, these

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migration. We opt to use the utility maximisation approach since it has proven itself in numerous applications. Conversely, Anderson's theory in the context of international migration remains untested. However, it is important to note that our inclusion of destination time-varying fixed effects will completely account for any multilateral resistances in receiving countries (see Feenstra 2004), which is arguably the most important aspect in the context of international migration given destination country migration policies.

<sup>4</sup>Note that given the focus of our paper, we do not devote specific attention to factors at destination ( $A_{j,t}$ ). The panel dimension of the data allows our capturing the role of those factors through the inclusion of dummies combining the  $j$  and the  $t$  dimension. See the following section for details. By construction, their imposition also captures macro economic effects over time, which are typically captured with separate time dummies.

<sup>5</sup>This taxonomy is akin to that favoured by Lillioer and Van de Broeck (2011) when distinguishing 'climate

environmental factors are (partly at least) expected by agents. We may therefore write our expression for amenities at origin as:

$$A_{i,t} = A(Pol_{i,t}, Dep_{i,t}, E_{i,t}) \quad (6)$$

### 3 Estimation

#### 3.1 From theory to estimation

Combining equations (4), (5) and (6), whilst assuming separability in migration costs and including an error term, leads to the following econometric specification :

$$\ln\left(\frac{N_{ij,t}}{N_{ii,t}}\right) = \ln\left(\frac{w_{j,t}}{w_{i,t}}\right) + A_{j,t} - A(Pol_{i,t}) - A(Dep_{i,t}) - A(E_{i,t}) - C(M_{ij,t}) - C(d_{ij}) - C(b_{ij}) \\ - C(l_{ij}) - c(x_{j,t}) - c(x_j) - c(x_i) + \epsilon_{ij,t} \quad (7)$$

This specification therefore models bilateral migration rates, i.e. the number of migrants from country  $i$  in country  $j$  as a ratio of natives from  $i$  who have chosen to stay at home.<sup>6</sup> Since our primary focus is upon environmental changes as push factors of migration, we use appropriate fixed effects and dummies to capture the impact of destination specific factors and time-invariant origin factors. We first use fixed effect  $\alpha_{j,t}$  that are specific to each destination and each period. These capture the role of amenities at destination  $A_{j,t}$  as well as the role of destination specific cost variables  $c(x_{j,t})$  and  $c(x_j)$ . Crucially, these variables capture migration policies, which remain largely absent from much of the existing literature. The availability of data capturing migration policies, or lack thereof, has been a recurrent issue in the empirical macroeconomic literature devoted to international migration. The panel dimension of our data allows circumventing this problem and significantly lowers the risk of misspecification. Time-invariant origin specific push factors  $A_i$  as well as time-invariant origin related costs variables  $c(x_i)$  are captured by origin country dummies  $\alpha_i$ .

Substituting in (7) leads to the following estimable equation:

$$\ln\left(\frac{N_{ij,t}}{N_{ii,t}}\right) = \beta_1 \ln\left(\frac{w_{j,t}}{w_{i,t}}\right) + \beta_2 \ln(1 + M_{ij,t}) + \beta_3 \ln(Pol_{i,t}) + \beta_4 \ln(Dep_{i,t}) + \beta_5 \ln(E_{i,t}) \\ + \beta_6 d_{ij} + \beta_7 b_{ij} + \beta_8 l_{ij} + \alpha_{j,t} + \alpha_i + \epsilon_{ij,t} \quad (8)$$

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change' from 'climate variation'. Note that we do not consider the effects of rising sea levels which are predicted to result in large numbers of 'environmental migrants', see Black et al 2008

<sup>6</sup>Note that this specification differs from the one of Beine et al. who analyze migration flows  $N_{ij}$  using country fixed effects allowing to control for  $N_{ii}$ . The ability to recover  $N_{ii}$  from our data allows us to work on a specification that is more closely related to theoretical equilibrium bilateral migration rate.

Given the size of the parameter space involved in equation (8), it is important to adopt some parsimonious specification in terms of observable controls. Therefore, with the exception of environmental factors, for which we allow a detailed inspection, we choose a limited number of key indicators which we believe capture the main fundamentals that drive the observed patterns of international migration. We therefore include variables which capture the wage differential ( $\frac{w_{i,t}}{w_{j,t}}$ ), network ( $M_{ij,t}$ ), political determinants at origin ( $Pol_{i,t}$ ), demographic factors at origin ( $Dep_{i,t}$ ), physical distance ( $d_{ij}$ ), shared borders ( $b_{ij}$ ) and linguistic proximity ( $l_{ij}$ ).

### 3.2 Econometric issues

The estimation of equation (8) is at first glance straightforward. Indeed, OLS estimation is feasible but is likely to yield inconsistent estimates of the coefficients. One of the main reasons for the inconsistency is the presence of a high proportion of zero values in the dependent variable  $N_{ij,t}$ , i.e. the bilateral flows. The presence of those zeros generates two important biases in OLS estimation. First, since equation (8) is a pseudo-gravity model in a double log form, the presence of zeros leads to the exclusion of many observations. If the country pairs with zero flows have a different population distribution compared to pairs with positive flows, this exclusion generates the usual selection bias.

The second bias is more subtle and has been clearly identified by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006). They show, in particular, that if the variance of  $\epsilon_{ij,t}$  depends on the covariates of  $\frac{N_{ij,t}}{N_{ii,t}}$ , then its expected value will also depend on some of the regressors in the presence of zeros. This in turn invalidates one important assumption of consistency of OLS estimates. Furthermore, they show that the inconsistency of parameter estimates is also found using alternative techniques such as (threshold) Tobit or nonlinear estimates. In contrast, in case of heteroscedasticity and a significant proportion of zero values, the Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator generates unbiased estimators of the parameters of (8).

As a result, we use the PPML estimator to estimate model (8). This model generates consistent estimates even when the underlying distribution is not strictly Poisson, i.e. in cases of over-dispersion. We therefore calculate robust standard errors to ensure appropriate t-statistics result.

## 4 Data

### 4.1 Migration data

The resurgence in migration research has arisen in large part due to the proliferation of available datasets on bilateral migration. This paper draws upon Ozden et al (2011), which details bilateral migration stocks between 226 origin and destination countries, territories and dependencies, which correspond to the last five completed census rounds, 1960-2000. Drawing

upon the largest depository of censuses and population registers ever collated, the authors pay particularly close attention to the underlying problems encountered when making migration statistics comparable. These include the alternative definitions of migration, how countries variously code their census data (together with how aggregated origin regions recorded in censuses may be disaggregated), the varying years in which censuses are conducted, the changing of borders of nation states over time and cases where census data are missing altogether.

The resulting database therefore addresses the prior lack of migration data for developing countries as destinations, whilst also greatly expanding the number of time periods to which the data pertain. This proves important, not only because South-South migration dominates global migration in levels, but also because climatic change disproportionately affects those in developing nations. Moreover, since liquidity constraints are more likely binding in relatively poorer nations; any international migratory response to climate change is more likely to be regional - most likely to neighbouring countries - as opposed to the countries of the OECD, the only countries for which, until very recently, longitudinal data were available (see for example Docquier and Marfouk 2006). The panel dimension of the data proves particularly important in the context of an empirical examination at the global level, since it allows controlling for a plethora of time-varying and time invariant factors, across a broad spectrum of countries for which data are unavailable. In other words, we can meaningfully control for myriad unobserved factors which might otherwise confound results.

To ensure consistency across countries over time, we implement the version of the data which is merged to the aggregates of the United Nations (see Ozden et al 2011). Two key issues remain with regards the way the data are implemented in our empirical model however. Although the underlying data relate to migrant stocks, we proxy migration flows by differencing these data for contiguous census rounds. The first key issue relates to the large number of zero flows which appear in the data. To highlight the significance of this issue, Table 1, shows the proportions of zero values for each decade from the underlying migration database. Although the proportion of zeroes declines over time, around half of the observations are still zero in each decade. In the absence of an appropriate estimator the presence of these zero observations would clearly result in a selection bias.

Table 1: Proportion of Zero values in the underlying migration data

Decade	Pct
1960	62
1970	59
1980	56
1990	51
2000	47
Source: Ozden et al (2011).	

The second issue arises as a consequence of our differencing the data. Inevitably, negative

migration flows result, when bilateral migrant stocks decline over time. This might be due to migrants returning home, moving on to a third-party country or death. Since no data exist on return migration, chain migration or bilateral migrant mortality rates, our approach is two-fold. In the first instance, we take only positive flows as our dependent variable. For the sake of robustness however, we re-calculate our migration flows assuming that all negative flows constitute return migration. In other words, we sum our initial positive flows between countries  $i$  and  $j$  and the absolute value of the negative flow from  $j$  to  $i$ .

A final issue is to recover  $N_{ii}$  from the data to compute bilateral migration rates.  $N_{ii}$  involves the number of natives from  $i$  having chosen to stay at home. This might be recovered from population data provided we can subtract the total number of immigrants in country  $i$ . This can be computed from our migration data as  $\sum_{j=1}^J N_{ji}$ .<sup>7</sup>

## 4.2 Environmental factors

Our short-term environmental factors are captured through a natural disasters variable, which comprises: droughts, earthquakes, extreme temperatures, floods, storms, volcanic eruptions, epidemics, insect infestations and miscellaneous occurrences. These data are obtained from The International Disaster Database, which is compiled by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters.<sup>8</sup> This variable is simply calculated as the total number of natural disasters in a given decade.

To capture long-run environmental factors, we use precipitation and temperature data obtained from the TS3.0 dataset, created under the auspices of the QUEST-GSI project, and obtained from the Climatic Research Unit of the University of East Anglia. The original observations correspond to high-resolution 0.5\*0.5 grids and are collected on a monthly basis. Area weights are used to aggregate the data to the country level. Annual observations are then calculated as the average of monthly observations and decennial observations as the means across years.

While the impact of these variables have found to vary across localities, uncertainty also remains with regards the most appropriate way of formulating these variables for use in our model. Measuring precipitation and temperature in absolute levels may not be appropriate since this formulation fails to adequately capture migratory responses to changes from the norm in climatic conditions. Rather these would pick up whether migration is more prevalent from rainier or warmer countries. This is unlikely to prove useful since tropical countries, for example, are more likely to be poorer on average. Any significant results would instead likely capture part of the effect of GDP per capita at origin, which in turn would be highly correlated with our measure of wage differentials. Instead, we calculate the long-run mean average and standard deviation of both temperature and rainfall at the country level over

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<sup>7</sup>Note that only a full bilateral migration matrix allows to do that. This explains why Beine et al. (2011) who rely on the Docquier and Marfouk (2006) database are not able to compute  $N_{ii}$ .

<sup>8</sup>See: <http://www.emdat.be>.

the twentieth century. We then formulate the rain and temperate variables, both as (positive and negative) deviations of country decadal averages from the long-run average; or else as the degree of volatility of these climate measures. Volatility is calculated as the absolute deviation of a country decadal mean (of either temperature or rainfall) divided by the long-run standard deviation of the corresponding variable over the hundred years of the twentieth century. We refer to these terms as anomalies throughout the remainder of the paper.

### 4.3 Remaining covariates

The remaining covariates come from a variety of sources. The wage differential is proxied as the log of the ratio of per capita GDP in destination and origin. These data are taken from an updated version of (what is described in detail in) Gleditsch (2002), which represents an extension of the Penn World tables (Heston et al 2011). Our migrant network or diaspora variable, is again taken from Ozden et al (2011), and is defined as the bilateral migrant stock in the beginning year to which a flow corresponds. Measures of geodesic distance, contiguity and linguistic proximity are taken from Head, Mayer and Ries (2010).<sup>9</sup> The language dummy, takes the value one should at least 9% of both populations in a country-pair speak the same language. Demographic conditions in sending countries are captured using the total dependency ratio at origin; these data are taken from the United Nations World Population Prospects database (2010). Since migration policies are included in the model through destination country time-varying fixed effects, our last variable captures political push factors from origin. This is calculated as the sum of the number of episodes of international violence at origin over the ten-year period to which a particular flow corresponds, with the exception of the last year. For example the number of episodes for 1990-1999 are summed and then equated with the flow from 1990-2000. These data are obtained from the Major Episodes of Political Violence database of the Center for Systemic Peace.<sup>10</sup> Once all of the data are merged, 137 origin and 166 destination countries remain, a full list of which can be found in Appendix 1.

## 5 Results

### 5.1 What the model does (and doesn't do)

High frequency migration data are only produced by a very limited number of countries globally. Adopting a truly international perspective therefore, necessarily involves a trade-off between geographic coverage and the frequency of observations, which in our case are observed decennially. It is important to understand the consequences of this sacrifice. It is not likely that we will capture seasonal or temporary migrations. Instead our results will yield the

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<sup>9</sup>These can be downloaded at: <http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/gravity.htm>.

<sup>10</sup>See: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm>.

average effects of climate change both over time and across countries. These will also be the overall impact, so if a particular variable has a heterogenous impact across different countries, we will only detect the net impact.

Nor does our model say anything as to the composition of migration flows, i.e. as to migrants' status, since we assume agents are homogenous. The underlying migration database captures migrants of all ages and education levels as well as both genders, but focuses upon an economic concept of migration. To this end the authors strived to remove refugees from the database whenever possible, the result of which is that refugees in developed countries *are* likely captured in the data but conversely refugees in developing countries are not. Since our approach draws upon the dyadic nature of the data, which indeed is one of its strengths, there is simply no remedial measures which can be taken to add back in the refugees that have been removed.<sup>11</sup>

In summary then, our model examines the impacts of both short and long-run climate change on medium to long-run changes in international migration. According to Piguet et al (2011) the weight of existing evidence suggests that 'rapid onset phenomena' result in short-term internal displacements as opposed to migrations further afield for longer durations. Whereas we tend to associate international migration with migration over long distances, this might not necessarily be the case. In regions with porous borders, such as Africa for example, the costs of crossing an international border might well be lower than an internal migration over longer distances. On average however, due to the increased costs of obtaining passports and visas, we can assume that this conjecture generally holds. Moreover, they argue that many of those affected by such events return home quickly to begin rebuilding their lives. These authors therefore argue that slower onset phenomena, i.e. gradual and sustained changes in the environment over time, will likely result in longer-term migration, from which we might also infer, migration over greater distances. As previously argued however, the macro level literature paints a very different picture. Naudé (2008) for example, argues that the correlation between natural disasters and migration will be even stronger than the links between migration and long-term climate change since such unforeseen events give little time for people to adapt.

## 5.2 Unconditional effects

Table 2 shows the results of estimating equation 8. Two measures of long-run climatic factors are considered. The first examines the deviations of rainfall and temperature from their long-run average, positive and negative deviations in both rainfall and temperatures. The second instead examines the volatility of rainfall and temperature by dividing the decadal means by the long-run country averages, termed anomalies. For each specification two regressions are estimated. In all regressions, both types of fixed effects are included, i.e. origin country fixed

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<sup>11</sup>Although the UNHCR produce bilateral estimates of refugees over time their data are incompatible with ours for two reasons. Firstly, their data begins in 1970, such that we would have to drop one quarter of our observations should they be included. More importantly however, the refugees are removed from the original database by applying the totals provided by the United Nations Population Division (see: <http://esa.un.org/migration/>), which are incompatible with those data which the UNHCR produce.

effects  $\alpha_i$  and time-destination fixed effects  $\alpha_{j,t}$ . In each regression, short-run climatic factors are captured by the number of natural disasters during the decade in the origin country. Columns (1) and (2) reports the results with anomalies, i.e. deviations of decadal means from long-run averages and divided by long-run standard deviations. Columns (3) and (4) report the absolute deviations. Columns (1) and (3) present results relating to positive temperatures and negative rainfall. Columns (2) and (4) instead present the results for negative temperatures and positive rainfall.

**\*\*\*Table 2 about here\*\*\***

The coefficients are elasticities or semi-elasticities such a 1% change corresponds to an equivalent percentage change of the dependent variable equal to the size of the coefficient. For example a 1% rise in the wage ratio between origin and destination is associated with a positive increase in bilateral migration flows of about 0.33%. For the dummy variable such as common language, the corresponding coefficient can again be interpreted as a percentage change only this time for switching the dummy from zero to one.

Overall, the regressions explain more than 60% of the variation in the observed migration flows. This ensures a very good fit given that the migration rates are very heterogenous across corridors. Given the breadth of our sample and the fact that our independent variable is proxied by the difference in migrant stocks, the  $R^2$  are deemed reasonable. The coefficients of all of the explanatory variables, with the exception of those which capture long-run environmental change, are highly significant and in the expected direction. The coefficients are also very stable across the various models. Higher wage differentials, a larger diaspora, a lower dependency ratio at origin, shared linguistic roots, contiguity and more frequent episodes of international violence all beget higher migration flows. Conversely, the larger the distance between origin and destination, i.e. the greater the migration costs, the lower, on average, are the associated migration flows.

It might be desirable to give a flavour of what the estimated elasticities of the other covariates imply. Starting with the wage ratio, the value of the third quartile of the distribution of the wage ratio is about 3. This means that between countries characterized by such a difference, an increase by 0.3 in the wage ratio will lead to an increase of 3% in the migration flows between the two countries. Similarly, an increase of 10% in the diaspora abroad will lead to an increase of about 4% in the flow of new migrants over the next ten years. The obtained elasticity of the network effect is slightly lower than the one estimated by Beine et al. (2011) which is about 0.65. Nevertheless, Beine et al. (2011) include only OECD countries as destinations, giving important weight to South-North migration. It is expected that migrants involved in this type of migration will heavily rely on networks. Interestingly, our subsequent subsample analysis focusing on migration to the global South (Table 6) yields elasticities which are much closer to those obtained by Beine et al. (2011). Common language is also found to be an important determinant. Compared to pairs of countries with similar conditions, countries having a common language in common experience migration flows higher by 0.5%. The presence of international violence at origin is a strong push factor as reflected by the



estimated elasticity. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that this concerns only a small set of countries, since more than 90% did not have any episode of this kind over the last forty years under investigation. Finally, the negative effect of dependency ratio seems in line with the fact a younger population has a higher propensity to migrate, all else equal.

Turning now to the environmental variables, the unconditional results yield no statistically significant results whatsoever, either concerning long-run or short-run factors. These regressions capture the average impact of the explanatory factors on migration rates over time and across countries. On the face of it, in line with some previous microeconomic findings such as Munshi (2003), we might expect that both rain shortfalls (and high temperatures) might provide an additional motivation for residents to become migrants. The insignificance of the response to environmental factors can give rise to various alternative explanations.

First, we should be aware that the environmental variables capture only the direct impact of climatic factors on international emigration. To the extent that climatic factors decrease the income in origin countries, climatic factors will lead to a higher wage differential over time, which in turn is found to lead to more emigration. This is supported by the significant and stable elasticity of emigration with respect to wage differential. Therefore, the absence of a direct effect does not rule out the existence of some significant indirect effect going through economic incentives.

Second, the results here only concern international migration. As argued by Black et al (2011), these are exactly the same factors which might in turn result in lower incomes from which people have to pay to migrate. This is especially the case in poor countries. In other words, although residents may choose to become international migrants, they might not have the resources to actually move. If liquidity constraints are binding, internal migration to less affected areas within the same country is a valuable option. This means that people still move but actually cannot afford to cross the border. This case is not captured by our data although we investigate this possibility in an extension.

This interpretation in turn calls for some additional inspection allowing for some heterogeneous response across origin countries to climatic events. Generally speaking, one possible interpretation of the results is that our estimation mixes up cases that are very different from one another. If there is some impact of climatic factors, this will depend on one or several factor(s) shaping the sensitivity of people to the climatic events. Unconditional regressions would therefore be unable to uncover the heterogeneity in the response.

A third line of reasoning concerns the frequency of our observations, which are decennial. The literature suggests that unexpected climatic shocks likely result in more temporary migrations as opposed to long term climate change or variability which instead result in more permanent migrations. It is quite possible therefore that migrants *are* directly impacted by climatic change and variability as captured by our variables, but are not picked up in estimation due to their returning home. Without more detailed microeconomic or bilateral migration flow data, this hypothesis is impossible to test for however.

### 5.3 Heterogenous effects

Heterogeneity of responses can be related to several dimensions. First, the impact of climatic factors might depend upon initial climatic conditions. Some rise in average temperature might be particularly detrimental in already hot areas. Likewise, shortages in average rainfall will particularly affect those countries with poorer access to natural water sources. We therefore use two conditioning climate variables. The first relates to temperature. We consider hot countries as ones over the median of the world temperatures (about 22.7 degrees). The second instead relates to the presence of groundwater. We use the same classification. Countries are classified as having fewer groundwater reserves if they fall below the median of the world groundwater distribution.

Another way to view heterogeneity is to distinguish countries' geographical location. Climate change does not affect countries equally. Countries closer to the equator are often reported to be disproportionately affected by climate change. They also tend to be poorer compared to countries from the northern hemisphere. Distance to the equator has been used as an instrument for factors such as institutions in empirical studies of growth. Accordingly, we interact the long-run climatic factors with a dummy that takes the value 1 should a country lie below the median latitude to test whether the impact of temperature and rain anomalies depends upon location.

A final conditioning scheme is the economic structure. One might expect that the share of the agricultural sector in the economy will affect the sensitivity of the country to climatic events. Farmers and people living in rural areas are often mentioned as those most affected by climate change. The same holds for fishermen. As such, we use interaction terms between climatic factors and a dummy variable which takes the value one should the share of agriculture in total GDP be greater than the median.

**\*\*\*Tables 3 and 4 about here\*\*\***

The results are reported in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 gives the results using anomalies involving excess temperature and rainfall shortage. Table 4 reports the findings using anomalies involving rain excess and colder temperatures. In each table, column (1) gives the results conditioned by temperature. Column (2) reports findings conditional on a country's agriculture share. Column (3) reports the results conditioned on the presence of groundwater and finally, column (4), reports the results with latitude as the conditioning variable.

The results in tables 3 and 4 do not support any significant direct impact of either short-run or long-run climatic factors on out migration. Whatever the conditioning scheme, positive or negative rain or temperature anomalies do not seem to lead to more migration. Beyond the comments provided above, one possible interpretation of these results is that climatic impacts are far more complex than can be captured by a single dimension. In fact, it might be possible for instance that excess temperature will lead to more emigration only in some particular context, say for instance in middle income countries (so that candidates to migration can cover migration costs) with specific initial climatic conditions and in which the agriculture share is

significant. Such circumstances are difficult to capture using observed variables corresponding to all those dimensions. As an alternative, we continue with our conditioning strategy, but in this case we split the sample based on whether the destination countries are from the countries of the relatively more affluent global 'North' or alternatively from the less wealthy global 'South'.

## 5.4 Sub-Samples, Migrations to the Global 'North' and 'South'

In this section, we continue with our conditioning scheme from the preceding section and continue by further splitting our sample; restricting the regressions to include destinations from the countries of the global 'North' or 'South'.<sup>12</sup> The results for the countries of the 'North' are presented in Table 5, while Table 6 presents the results restricting migrations to the countries of the global 'South'.<sup>13</sup> The results demonstrate marked differences between the forces which shape migration to the North and South. All of the determinants tested previously are important for migrations to the North, with the exception of contiguity and the environmental variables. In comparison with the sample average however, network effects are less important. This reflects the fact that compared to the global sample, migration to the North features more skilled agents (Docquier and Rapoport, 2011). Skilled migrants have been found to be less sensitive to networks than unskilled migrants (Beine et al., 2011, McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010). In contrast, wage differentials are found to exert a higher role, which is consistent with the main incentives of migrants coming to OECD countries. The elasticity of the wage ratio is more or less 25% higher than the one obtained with the whole sample. The coefficient on distance is around one, while the coefficient of contiguity is not significant. This reflects that migration to the North involves moves over longer distances. The point estimates on the shared common ethnic language are around twice as large when compared to the sample average. Once again, this reflects the importance of skilled migration for which knowledge of languages proves important.

These results are in stark contrast to those for migrations to the global South. In this case, we find no statistically significant effect of wage differentials, shared linguistic roots or international violence. We do however, find a strong and positive effect on international migration of sharing a common border, reflecting that South-South migration involves moves over shorter distances. In the case of migrations to the global South however, we also find some statistically significant impacts of long-run environmental change. Across the sample of origin countries which rely more heavily upon agriculture and which experienced negative volatilities

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<sup>12</sup>The countries of the global 'North' are taken to be those that remained affluent over the period 1960-2000. These include Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Canada, the USA, the EU-15 and the countries of the European Free Trade Association.

<sup>13</sup>These tables only present the results analogous to those presented in Table 3. In other words, we abstract from deviations which involve excess rainfall and colder temperatures. For the sake of brevity we also do not provide unconditioned results across both restricted samples. The coefficients obtained from these latter regressions may be obtained from the authors although the results are not significantly different from those presented in Tables 5 and 6.

in rainfall, the century average precipitation was 125mm, while the average rainfall in 2000 was 118mm. A 10% rise in this negative volatility, which is equivalent to a decrease in average rainfall across the decade 1990-2000 of approximately 1mm, is associated with a decrease in international migration to the countries of the global South of  $(2.41-1.14=)$  1.27%. This result is similar to those origins which are conditioned upon the initial level of groundwater, only this time the signs are reversed. Across the sample of countries which have fewer water resources, the century average precipitation was 89mm, while the average decadal rainfall across the decade 1990-2000 was just 80mm. A 10% rise in this negative volatility, which is again equivalent to a decrease in average rainfall across the decade 1990-2000 of approximately 1mm, is associated with an increase in international migration of  $(3.82-1.37=)$  2.45% to the countries of the global South. In both tables, across all the various specifications, we again fail to find any affect of natural disasters on international migration.

**\*\*\*Tables 5 and 6 about here\*\*\***

## 5.5 Robustness check: adjustment for return migration

In the benchmark estimations, we have made a particular choice regarding the dependent variables, i.e. bilateral migration rates. Indeed, we have excluded from the sample negative flows and have estimated our models on a sample including only zero or positive flows. Negative flows are obtained as a result of a negative variation in migration stocks. Decreases of bilateral migration stocks can in turn reflect particular processes regarding demographic developments. One is the combination of significant death rates of some old diasporas which are not fully counterbalanced by new migration flows. Another development is return migration that outweighs the arrival of new migrants. Ideally, one should account for those flows since return migration actually reflects the impact of push factors at destination or the reduced attractiveness of destination countries over time.

While there is no direct way to account for return migration and deaths, we provide a robustness check based on one particularly extreme hypothesis. We recompute the bilateral migration flows assuming that decreases in migration stocks totally reflect the return of migrants to their origin country. We add the opposite value of the negative flows between country  $i$  and country  $j$  to the observed migration flow between country  $j$  and country  $i$ . Using the new bilateral migration flows, we re-estimate model (8). We follow the strategy considered in sections 5.2. and 5.3. again considering therefore any unconditional response in addition to interactions conditional on various country characteristics (equivalent to table 3). The results are reported in Tables 7 and 8. Regarding the role of the other covariates such as wages, networks, distance and the factors at origin results are extremely similar to those of the benchmark regressions.

**\*\*\*Tables 7 and 8 about here\*\*\***

The robustness checks yield interesting results. We find that the results peculiar to the impact of natural disasters are quite robust with respect to the benchmark results. We do not find any impact of natural disasters on international emigration. With regards the role of long-run

factors, the coefficients are of a similar magnitude and in the same direction as those presented in table 2, but in some cases are now statistically significant, thereby assigning a modest role to excess temperatures as push factors. Further conditioning our results on origin characteristics we find no conclusive evidence of climatic change, climatic variation or of natural disasters upon international migration.

## 6 The internal migration hypothesis

The previous results give little support to the hypothesis that long-run climate changes and natural disasters have spurred significant international migration. While we find some role for those phenomena under some particular circumstances, the overall impact remains very limited. In any case, our results question the idea that climate change could create a big rise in the number of international environmental refugees. In particular, we show evidence that environmental factors play little role compared to economic, political and demographic variables. Does this imply that climatic factors do not increase people's mobility? The answer is not necessarily in the affirmative. One possibility is that people affected by adverse climatic changes or by disasters move internally rather than internationally. This possibility might be particularly relevant in developing countries in which people are likely to be financially constrained. If climatic changes tend to depress income, then liquidity constraints might prevent people to move internationally since international migration costs are significantly larger. In that case, they might favour internal migration.

In this section, we investigate whether there is empirical support for a relationship between climatic factors and internal migration in our sample. A direct test in the previous econometric frameworks we relied upon is nevertheless impossible, since no data on internal migration is available for all countries for the period of our investigation. Data on migration within the same country definitely exist in some countries. Data on interprovincial migration flows in Canada is for instance available over a 20-year period. Nevertheless, at the world level, there is no data on internal migration which is comparable across countries and over time.

One alternative way of capturing internal migration is to use the evolution of urbanization of countries. The idea is that internal movements of people, dominated by rural to urban migration, leads to an increase in the urbanization rate. This idea has been implemented by Barrios et al. (2006) who look at the impact of climatic change on the pattern of urbanization in sub-Saharan African countries. Those authors look specifically at the role of the change in rainfall, which in a context of structural shortage of water, leads people from rural areas to migrate to cities. Their sample comprises developing countries although the authors focus upon sub-Saharan African countries. We extend Barrios et al. (2009)'s work by looking at the role of our climatic variables for the complete sample of countries over the full investigation period. We account for the traditional determinants of the urbanization process identified in the empirical literature (see for example Davis and Henderson, 2003). The controls include the level democracy, the level of income, population density at the country level as well as

openness.<sup>14</sup> In its synthetic form, the estimated relationship takes the following form:

$$\ln(Urb_{i,t}) = \beta_1 \ln(X_{i,t}) + \beta_2 \ln(E_{i,t}) + \alpha_t + \alpha_i + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (9)$$

where  $X_{i,t}$  includes the controls of urbanization of country  $i$  at time  $t$ , and  $E_{i,t}$  includes as before the environmental factors. The model includes country fixed effects and time dummies to control for time-invariant country specific factors and country-invariant time specific factors respectively. The model is estimated for two samples over the full period (1960-2000) again using decennial data. The first sample includes all countries, while the second only includes developing countries only. Since the inclusion of  $X_{i,t}$  significantly reduces the number of observations due to missing data, we start with the full model but also present the results of more parsimonious specifications. Regarding the long-run climatic factors, we implement those which capture excess temperatures and rain shortages, as in Tables 3 and 5.<sup>15</sup>

The results of Table 9 provide some interesting insights. First, the process of urbanization is found to be significantly different between developed and developing countries. This is not surprising given the importance of factors such as income or the industrial development. With respect to sensitivities of internal migration (as proxied by urbanization), there are also some significant differences. Climatic factors turn out to play little role at the world level, i.e. when mixing up developed and developing countries. Neither the long-run volatilities in temperature and rainfall, nor the occurrence of natural disasters appear to be robust determinants of rural-urban migration. In contrast, for developing countries, natural disasters turn out to increase urbanization, even when accounting for its traditional correlates. The positive elasticity of urbanization to the number of natural disasters is consistent with the fact that people from rural areas affected by natural disasters tend to primarily migrate to the cities of their country. This is consistent with the fact that potential migrants from developing countries favour domestic destinations that involve lower migration costs, in turn implying that liquidity constraints might be binding for a significant number of potential movers. Our results also provide evidence that these internal movements are often more permanent than some of the micro-economic literature suggests.

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<sup>14</sup>Democracy exerts an ambiguous theoretical effect on urbanization. On the one hand, more democracy lead on average to fewer restrictions on people mobility, favoring urbanization. On the other hand, wealth is more evenly distributed in democratic countries, allowing for the development of small and medium cities as opposed to the concentration of wealth in a few major cities. Population density tends to favor urbanization as less land is available to people to settle in rural communities. Openness tends also to favor urbanization through the economic development of the country.

<sup>15</sup>We obtain similar results with excess of rain and negative deviations of temperature as well as with volatility measures in the sense that we do not find any significant effect. These results are available upon request.

## 7 Conclusion

In this paper we first derive a simple utility maximization model, which incorporates environmental change in the context of 'amenities' at origin. We then test this model using a previously unexploited panel dataset of bilateral migration flows, which cover the period 1960-2000. We account for all classifications of determinants and additionally implement origin specific and destination country-year fixed effects to account for numerous unobserved factors. To date, this is arguably the most sophisticated macroeconomic model used to assess the effects of climate change on international migration. We find little to no support for any long-run relationship between either short-run or long-run climatic change on international migration. These results are robust when further considering migrants returning home. While our findings are certainly at odds with the macro-level literature, our findings offer support to much of the micro-level climate change literature which instead argues that the environmental change tends to result in more temporary internal movements.

Further conditioning our regressions upon origin country characteristics, we find evidence that shortfalls in precipitation constrain migration to developing countries from those which rely more heavily upon agriculture and spur movements to developing countries from those with fewer groundwater reserves. We further use the rate of urbanization as a proxy for internal migration and find strong evidence that natural disasters beget greater flows of migrants to urban environs and our results suggest that at least some of these movements are more permanent than previous results suggest. Overall, our results show that climate change and climatic variations have little impact upon long-run international migration. Our results do not however serve to deny that climate change has any affect whatsoever. Rather, no direct impact is found, suggesting that environmental changes influence international migration through other channels, for example through wage differentials.

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## 9 Appendix: list of countries

### 9.1 Destinations (166)

Afghanistan Albania Algeria Andorra Angola Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Australia Austria Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belgium Belize Benin Bhutan Bolivia Botswana Brazil Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros Congo Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Costa Rica Cote d'Ivoire Cuba Cyprus Denmark Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Fiji Finland France Gabon Gambia Germany Ghana Greece Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti Honduras Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran, Islamic Republic of Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kenya Kiribati Korea, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Republic of Kuwait Lao Peoples Democratic Republic Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Luxembourg Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Marshall Islands Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Micronesia, Federated States of Mongolia Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nauru Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Norway Oman Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Samoa San Marino Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia and Montenegro Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Solomon Islands Somalia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Suriname Swaziland Sweden Switzerland Syrian Arab Republic Tanzania, United Republic of Thailand Togo Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Tuvalu Uganda United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States of America Uruguay Vanuatu Venezuela Viet Nam Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe

### 9.2 Origins (137)

Afghanistan Albania Algeria Angola Argentina Australia Austria Bahrain Bangladesh Belgium Benin Bhutan Bolivia Botswana Brazil Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros Congo Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Costa Rica Cote d'Ivoire Cuba Cyprus Denmark Djibouti Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Fiji Finland France Gabon Gambia Germany Ghana Greece Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti Honduras Hungary India Indonesia Iran, Islamic Republic of Iraq Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kenya Korea, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Republic of Kuwait Lao Peoples Democratic Republic Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Mali Mauritania Mexico Mongolia Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Norway Oman Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia and Montenegro Sierra Leone Singapore Solomon

Islands Somalia South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Swaziland Sweden Switzerland Syrian  
Arab Republic Tanzania, United Republic of Thailand Togo Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia  
Turkey Uganda United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States of America Uruguay  
Venezuela Viet Nam Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe

Table 2: Impact of climate on migration: unconditional results

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	-4.130*** (1.234)	-4.102*** (1.223)	-4.167*** (1.226)	-4.151*** (1.288)
Wage ratio	0.319** (0.150)	0.326** (0.153)	0.325** (0.152)	0.338** (0.148)
Distance	-0.766*** (0.090)	-0.764*** (0.089)	-0.767*** (0.091)	-0.765*** (0.091)
Network	0.398*** (0.044)	0.399*** (0.043)	0.398*** (0.045)	0.399*** (0.046)
Common Language	0.460*** (0.136)	0.459*** (0.136)	0.461*** (0.136)	0.458*** (0.138)
Contiguity	0.409** (0.166)	0.409** (0.168)	0.409** (0.168)	0.409** (0.171)
Dependency	-0.013** (0.005)	-0.013** (0.005)	-0.013** (0.005)	-0.013** (0.005)
International Violence	0.379*** (0.092)	0.374*** (0.092)	0.381*** (0.091)	0.372*** (0.091)
Natural Disasters	0.062 (0.084)	0.072 (0.089)	0.059 (0.089)	0.057 (0.085)
Rain Deviation/Anomaly	-0.003 (0.058)	0.025 (0.039)	0.007 (0.042)	0.037 (0.055)
Temperature Deviation/Anomaly	0.040 (0.0453)	0.018 (0.055)	0.049 (0.037)	-0.004 (0.040)
Origin country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Destination-Year Dummies ( <i>jt</i> )	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# observations	62,234	62,234	62,234	62,234
$R^2$	0.626	0.628	0.626	0.625

Dependent variable: decadal bilateral migration rates. Estimation period: 1960-2000.

Superscripts \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively.

Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.

Table 3: Conditional impact of climate on migration: excess temperature and rain shortage.

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conditioning	temp	agricult	water	latitude
constant	-4.175*** (1.213)	-4.080*** (1.255)	-4.137*** (1.233)	-4.121*** (1.229)
Wage ratio	0.320** (0.150)	0.340** (0.154)	0.298** (0.152)	0.314** (0.150)
Distance	-0.766*** (0.088)	-0.765*** (0.089)	-0.768*** (0.089)	-0.766*** (0.089)
Network	0.400*** (0.043)	0.399*** (0.043)	0.398*** (0.044)	0.398*** (0.044)
Common Language	0.456*** (0.132)	0.456*** (0.133)	0.460*** (0.135)	0.459*** (0.135)
Contiguity	0.400** (0.163)	0.409** (0.164)	0.406** (0.165)	0.408** (0.165)
Dependency	-0.013** (0.005)	-0.014** (0.005)	-0.013** (0.005)	-0.013** (0.005)
International Violence	0.405*** (0.092)	0.394*** (0.092)	0.387*** (0.092)	0.382*** (0.092)
Natural Disasters	0.061 (0.084)	0.047 (0.087)	0.062 (0.084)	0.068 (0.084)
Rain Anomaly	-0.069 (0.082)	-0.026 (0.087)	-0.027 (0.069)	-0.014 (0.061)
Temperature Anomaly	0.089 (0.061)	-0.005 (0.058)	0.053 (0.057)	0.041 (0.047)
Rain*condition	0.145 (0.098)	0.061 (0.106)	-0.026 (0.090)	0.172 (0.112)
Temperature*condition	-0.106 (0.094)	0.114 (0.093)	-0.026 (0.090)	-0.005 (0.125)
Origin country Dummies ( $\alpha_i$ )	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Destination-Year Dummies ( $\alpha_{jt}$ )	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# observations	62,234	62,234	62,234	62,234
$R^2$	0.630	0.629	0.625	0.626

Dependent variable: decadal bilateral migration rates. Estimation period: 1960-2000.

Superscripts \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively.

Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.

Table 4: Conditional impact of climate on migration: temperature shortage and rain excess.

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conditioning	temp	agricult	water	latitude
constant	-4.117*** (1.201)	-4.239*** (1.192)	-3.940*** (1.214)	-4.073*** (1.227)
Wage ratio	0.352** (0.156)	0.324** (0.155)	0.357** (0.155)	0.328** (0.154)
Distance	-0.764*** (0.087)	-0.765*** (0.088)	-0.763*** (0.085)	-0.764*** (0.088)
Network	0.400*** (0.042)	0.399*** (0.043)	0.400*** (0.041)	0.399*** (0.043)
Common Language	0.453*** (0.133)	0.461*** (0.135)	0.456*** (0.132)	0.458*** (0.136)
Contiguity	0.410** (0.166)	0.405** (0.167)	0.414** (0.165)	0.409** (0.167)
Dependency	-0.013** (0.005)	-0.012** (0.006)	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.013** (0.005)
International Violence	0.382*** (0.092)	0.395*** (0.094)	0.328*** (0.098)	0.374*** (0.092)
Natural Disasters	0.054 (0.096)	0.065 (0.091)	0.078 (0.088)	0.072 (0.089)
Rain Anomaly	0.064 (0.052)	-0.006 (0.048)	0.010 (0.039)	0.029 (0.040)
Temperature Anomaly	0.034 (0.076)	0.057 (0.079)	0.056 (0.067)	0.019 (0.057)
Rain*condition	-0.099 (0.080)	0.064 (0.072)	0.085 (0.110)	-0.093 (0.125)
Temperature*condition	-0.048 (0.086)	-0.084 (0.088)	-0.200* (0.112)	-0.025 (0.088)
Origin country Dummies ( $\alpha_i$ )	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Destination-Year Dummies ( $\alpha_{jt}$ )	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# observations	62,234	62,234	62,234	62,234
$R^2$	0.630	0.629	0.636	0.628

Dependent variable: decadal bilateral migration rates. Estimation period: 1960-2000.

Superscripts \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively.

Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.



Table 5: Conditional impact of climate on migration, to the countries of the Global North: excess temperatures and rain shortages.

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conditioning	temp	agricult	water	latitude
constant	1.245 (1.405)	1.504 (1.412)	1.447 (1.415)	1.318 (1.411)
Wage ratio	0.500*** (0.194)	0.556*** (0.196)	0.554*** (0.192)	0.523*** (0.193)
Distance	-1.098*** (0.099)	-1.100*** (0.098)	-1.103*** (0.099)	-1.102*** (0.099)
Network	0.173*** (0.037)	0.173*** (0.037)	0.170*** (0.038)	0.172*** (0.037)
Common Language	0.941*** (0.180)	0.930*** (0.178)	0.943*** (0.182)	0.938*** (0.180)
Contiguity	0.460 (0.317)	0.465 (0.315)	0.483 (0.323)	0.470 (0.319)
Dependency	-0.013* (0.007)	-0.015** (0.007)	-0.014* (0.007)	-0.012* (0.007)
International Violence	0.467*** (0.101)	0.474*** (0.104)	0.442*** (0.101)	0.465*** (0.103)
Natural Disasters	0.084 (0.108)	0.029 (0.114)	0.045 (0.105)	0.058 (0.109)
Rain Anomaly	-0.071 (0.072)	-0.075 (0.074)	0.028 (0.060)	-0.049 (0.084)
Temperature Anomaly	0.119 (0.075)	0.015 (0.080)	0.068 (0.067)	0.039 (0.081)
Rain*condition	0.136 (0.097)	0.180 (0.113)	-0.148 (0.097)	0.084 (0.102)
Temperature*condition	-0.180 (0.125)	0.096 (0.128)	-0.059 (0.141)	0.044 (0.123)
Origin country Dummies ( $\alpha_i$ )	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Destination-Year Dummies ( $\alpha_{jt}$ )	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# observations	11,393	11,393	11,393	11,393
$R^2$	0.685	0.687	0.679	0.684

Dependent variable: decadal bilateral migration rates. Estimation period: 1960-2000.

Superscripts \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively.

Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.

Table 6: Conditional impact of climate on migration, to the countries of the Global South: excess temperatures and rain shortages.

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conditioning	temp	agricult	water	latitude
constant	-7.997*** (1.392)	-7.622*** (1.376)	-7.515*** (1.375)	-7.852*** (1.382)
Wage ratio	0.150 (0.175)	0.109 (0.178)	0.068 (0.181)	0.124 (0.175)
Distance	-0.467*** (0.087)	-0.468*** (0.087)	-0.479*** (0.086)	-0.468*** (0.088)
Network	0.573*** (0.039)	0.572*** (0.039)	0.571*** (0.039)	0.573*** (0.039)
Common Language	0.140 (0.119)	0.142 (0.117)	0.143 (0.117)	0.145 (0.119)
Contiguity	0.272** (0.116)	0.277** (0.116)	0.265** (0.117)	0.275** (0.117)
Dependency	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.013* (0.007)	-0.013* (0.007)	-0.011 (0.007)
International Violence	0.126 (0.241)	0.096 (0.244)	0.110 (0.238)	0.097 (0.241)
Natural Disasters	0.001 (0.097)	-0.020 (0.094)	-0.032 (0.093)	-0.008 (0.096)
Rain Anomaly	-0.028 (0.067)	0.114* (0.061)	-0.137* (0.070)	0.071 (0.066)
Temperature Anomaly	0.009 (0.078)	0.007 (0.060)	0.008 (0.064)	0.035 (0.059)
Rain*condition	0.061 (0.093)	-0.241** (0.105)	0.382** (0.129)	-0.166* (0.099)
Temperature*condition	0.007 (0.105)	0.012 (0.094)	0.035 (0.095)	-0.044 (0.096)
Origin country Dummies ( $\alpha_i$ )	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Destination-Year Dummies ( $\alpha_{jt}$ )	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# observations	50,841	50,841	50,841	50,841
$R^2$	0.833	0.835	0.834	0.834

Dependent variable: decadal bilateral migration rates. Estimation period: 1960-2000.

Superscripts \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively.

Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.

Table 7: Accounting for return migration: unconditional results

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	-5.438*** (1.186)	-5.379*** (1.181)	-5.405*** (1.152)	-5.562*** (1.212)
Wage ratio	0.344** (0.161)	0.363** (0.163)	0.355** (0.160)	0.372** (0.162)
Distance	-0.792*** (0.080)	-0.789*** (0.079)	-0.792*** (0.080)	-0.791*** (0.080)
Network	0.413*** (0.036)	0.414*** (0.036)	0.413*** (0.036)	0.415*** (0.037)
Common Language	0.551*** (0.134)	0.546*** (0.134)	0.552*** (0.133)	0.545*** (0.134)
Contiguity	0.0120 (0.156)	0.011 (0.156)	0.012 (0.155)	0.011 (0.158)
Dependency	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.017*** (0.005)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.016*** (0.005)
International Violence	0.376*** (0.086)	0.361*** (0.085)	0.373*** (0.084)	0.361*** (0.085)
Natural Disasters	0.021 (0.078)	0.034 (0.079)	0.022 (0.078)	0.018 (0.078)
Rain Deviation/Anomaly	0.003 (0.059)	0.039 (0.038)	-0.015 (0.042)	0.088* (0.052)
Temperature Deviation/Anomaly	0.082* (0.042)	-0.031 (0.052)	0.079** (0.035)	-0.041 (0.039)
Origin country Dummies ( $\alpha_i$ )	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Destination-Year Dummies ( $jt$ )	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# observations	71,696	71,696	71,696	71,696
$R^2$	0.579	0.576	0.579	0.578

Dependent variable: decadal bilateral migration rates. Estimation period: 1960-2000.

Superscripts \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively.

Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.

Table 8: Accounting for return migration: conditional impact

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conditioning	temp	agricult	water	latitude
constant	-5.542*** (1.162)	-5.420*** (1.217)	-5.549*** (1.176)	-5.455*** (1.183)
Wage ratio	0.299* (0.155)	0.352** (0.165)	0.263* (0.155)	0.350** (0.162)
Distance	-0.791*** (0.079)	-0.791*** (0.080)	-0.794*** (0.080)	-0.791*** (0.080)
Network	0.415*** (0.035)	0.413*** (0.036)	0.413*** (0.036)	0.413*** (0.036)
Common Language	0.544*** (0.130)	0.548*** (0.134)	0.552*** (0.132)	0.551*** (0.134)
Contiguity	0.007 (0.153)	0.013 (0.156)	0.009 (0.154)	0.012 (0.155)
Dependency	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.016*** (0.005)
International Violence	0.404*** (0.085)	0.383*** (0.086)	0.378*** (0.085)	0.392*** (0.086)
Natural Disasters	0.031 (0.076)	0.012 (0.079)	0.035 (0.075)	0.031 (0.078)
Rain Anomaly	-0.084 (0.078)	0.003 (0.088)	-0.033 (0.064)	-0.014 (0.062)
Temperature Anomaly	0.113** (0.055)	0.057 (0.053)	0.059 (0.048)	0.086** (0.044)
Rain*condition	0.174* (0.094)	0.003 (0.103)	0.103 (0.097)	0.212* (0.110)
Temperature*condition	-0.070 (0.084)	0.072 (0.084)	0.068 (0.086)	-0.065 (0.122)
Origin country Dummies ( $\alpha_i$ )	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Destination-Year Dummies ( $\alpha_{jt}$ )	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# observations	71,696	71,696	71,696	71,696
$R^2$	0.585	0.579	0.581	0.577

Dependent variable: decadal bilateral migration rates. Estimation period: 1960-2000.

Superscripts \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively.

Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.

Table 9: Internal migration and environmental factors

variables	Full sample			Developing Countries		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
constant	0.913*** (0.258)	2.311*** (0.121)	2.230*** (0.096)	1.419*** (0.295)	2.044*** (0.117)	2.186*** (0.097)
Nat. Disasters	0.028 (0.017)	0.016 (0.015)	0.054*** (0.013)	0.045** (0.020)	0.035** (0.016)	0.070*** (0.014)
Rain shortages	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.019 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.008)
Excess temp	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.015* (0.008)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.009)
Pop. density	0.034*** (0.005)	-	-	0.013* (0.007)	-	-
income	0.034 (0.020)	-0.012 (0.016)	-	0.061*** (0.023)	0.033* (0.016)	-
democracy	-0.0012** (0.0005)	-	-	-0.0010** (0.0005)	-	-
openness	0.0009* (0.0005)	-	-	0.0009* (0.0006)	-	-
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# observations	570	828	1010	468	713	895
$R^2$	0.955	0.939	0.933	0.951	0.939	0.932

Dependent variable: log of (urbanization rate). Estimation period: 1960-2000.

Superscripts \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively.

Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.

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