extended-abstract

Investigating the Characteristics of One-Sided Matching Mechanisms: (Extended Abstract)

Authors:

Hadi Hosseini,

Kate Larson,

Robin CohenAuthors Info & Claims

AAMAS '16: Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems

Pages 1443 - 1444

Published: 09 May 2016 Publication History

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Abstract

For one-sided matching problems, two widely studied mechanisms are the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) and the Probabilistic Serial Rule (PS). The induced outcomes of these two mechanisms are often incomparable and thus there are challenges when it comes to deciding which mechanism to adopt in practice. Working in the space of general preferences, we provide empirical results on the (in)comparability of RSD and PS and analyze their economic properties.

References

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A. Bogomolnaia and H. Moulin. A new solution to the random assignment problem. Journal of Economic Theory, 100(2):295--328, 2001.

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H. Hosseini and K. Larson. Strategyproof quota mechanisms for multiple assignment problems. arXiv preprint arXiv:1507.07064, 2015.

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Index Terms

Investigating the Characteristics of One-Sided Matching Mechanisms: (Extended Abstract)
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences
    1. Economics
2. Computing methodologies
  1. Artificial intelligence
    1. Distributed artificial intelligence
      1. Multi-agent systems

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Published In

AAMAS '16: Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems

May 2016

1580 pages

ISBN:9781450342391

General Chairs:
Catholijn M. Jonker
TU Delft, Netherlands
,
Stacy Marsella
University of Southern California, USA
,
Program Chairs:
John Thangarajah
RMIT University. Australia
,
Karl Tuyls
University of Liverpool, UK

In-Cooperation

SIGAI: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence

Publisher

International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

Richland, SC

Publication History

Published: 09 May 2016

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Extended-abstract

Conference

AAMAS '16

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AAMAS '16: International Conference on Agents and Multiagent Systems

May 9 - 13, 2016

Singapore, Singapore

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AAMAS '16 Paper Acceptance Rate 137 of 550 submissions, 25%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 1,155 of 5,036 submissions, 23%

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Relaxing strategyproofness in one-sided matching