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extended-abstract

Digital Good Exchange: (Extended Abstract)

Published: 09 May 2016 Publication History

Abstract

Over the past decade, computer-automated barter exchange has become one of the most successful applications at the intersection of AI and economics. Standard exchange models, such as house allocation and kidney exchange cannot be applied to an emerging industrial application, coined digital good exchange, where an agent still possesses her initial endowment after exchanging with others. However, her valuation toward her endowment decreases as it is possessed by more agents.
We put forward game theoretical models tailored for digital good exchange. In the first part of the paper, we first consider a natural class of games where agents can choose either a subset of other participants' items or no participation at all. It turns out that this class of games can be modeled as a variant of congestion games. We prove that it is in general NP-complete to determine whether there exists a non-trivial pure Nash equilibrium where at least some agent chooses a nonempty subset of items. However, we show that there exist non-trivial Pure Nash equilibria for subsets of games and put forward efficient algorithms to find such equilibria.
In the second part of the paper, we investigate digital good exchange from a mechanism design perspective. We ask if there is a truthful mechanism in this setting that can achieve good social welfare guarantee. To this end, we design a randomized fixed-price-exchange mechanism that is individually rational and truthful, and for two-player case yields a tight log-approximation with respect to any individually rational allocation.

References

[1]
D. J. Abraham, A. Blum, and T. Sandholm. Clearing algorithms for barter exchange markets: Enabling nationwide kidney exchanges. In Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pages 295--304. ACM, 2007.
[2]
S. Barberà and M. O. Jackson. Strategy-proof exchange. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 51--87, 1995.
[3]
Y. Liu, P. Tang, and W. Fang. Internally stable matchings and exchanges. In AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 1433--1439, 2014.
[4]
S. Luo and P. Tang. Mechanism design and implementation for lung exchange. In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 209--215, 2015.
[5]
A. E. Roth, T. Sönmez, and M. Ünver. Kidney exchange. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(2):457--488, 2004.

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Published In

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AAMAS '16: Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems
May 2016
1580 pages
ISBN:9781450342391

Sponsors

  • IFAAMAS

In-Cooperation

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International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

Richland, SC

Publication History

Published: 09 May 2016

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Author Tags

  1. barter exchange
  2. congestion games
  3. digital good exchange
  4. mechanism design

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  • Extended-abstract

Funding Sources

  • Natural Science Foundation of China Grant
  • Tsinghua Initiative Scientific Research Grant
  • China Youth 1000-talent program
  • National Basic Research Program of China Grant

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AAMAS '16
Sponsor:

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AAMAS '16 Paper Acceptance Rate 137 of 550 submissions, 25%;
Overall Acceptance Rate 1,155 of 5,036 submissions, 23%

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