research-article

Exploring indirect reciprocity in complex networks using coalitions and rewiring

Authors:

Juan C. Burguillo,

Siang Yew ChongAuthors Info & Claims

AAMAS '14: Proceedings of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems

Pages 669 - 676

Published: 05 May 2014 Publication History

Abstract

It is generally known that cooperation can be achieved in complex real-world interactions that are not limited to direct interactions only. In particular, cooperation can consider prior interactions with other players, i.e., indirect reciprocity. Moreover, coalition based mechanisms have shown to facilitate cooperation among self-interested agents. Also, research on games over dynamic topologies has found empirical evidence showing that partner switching leads to cooperative behavior. In this paper we present a new mechanism to improve cooperation among self-interested agents placed in a complex network. Our mechanism is based on three main pillars: indirect reciprocity, coalitions and rewiring. Thus agents play against each other an indirect reciprocity game where they can create coalitions to share information about agents' reputation or change their personal network (social contacts). Altogether, we explore the conditions to enhance cooperation in complex networks. Finally, in our experiments we determine how, by using our mechanism, cooperation is improved in our reputation-based game, and how topology highly influences cooperation in our scenario.

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Cited By

Smit MSantos FLarson K(2024)Learning fair cooperation in mixed-motive games with indirect reciprocityProceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.24963/ijcai.2024/25(220-228)Online publication date: 3-Aug-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.24963/ijcai.2024/25
Santos FMascarenhas SSantos FCorreia FGomes SPaiva AElkind EVeloso MAgmon NTaylor M(2019)Outcome-based Partner Selection in Collective Risk DilemmasProceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3306127.3331873(1556-1564)Online publication date: 8-May-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3306127.3331873
Pinheiro FSantos FAndre EKoenig SDastani MSukthankar G(2018)Local Wealth Redistribution Promotes Cooperation in Multiagent SystemsProceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3237383.3237500(786-794)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3237383.3237500
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Exploring indirect reciprocity in complex networks using coalitions and rewiring
1. Computing methodologies
  1. Artificial intelligence
    1. Distributed artificial intelligence
      1. Multi-agent systems

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cover image ACM Other conferences

AAMAS '14: Proceedings of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems

May 2014

1774 pages

ISBN:9781450327381

General Chairs:
Ana Bazzan
UFRGS, Brazil
,
Michael Huhns
University of South Carolina, USA
,
Program Chairs:
Alessio Lomuscio
Imperial College London, UK
,
Paul Scerri
Carnegie Mellon University, USA

Sponsors

IFAAMAS

In-Cooperation

SIGAI: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence

Publisher

International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

Richland, SC

Publication History

Published: 05 May 2014

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AAMAS '14

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AAMAS '14: International conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

May 5 - 9, 2014

Paris, France

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AAMAS '14 Paper Acceptance Rate 169 of 709 submissions, 24%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 1,155 of 5,036 submissions, 23%

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Cited By

Smit MSantos FLarson K(2024)Learning fair cooperation in mixed-motive games with indirect reciprocityProceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.24963/ijcai.2024/25(220-228)Online publication date: 3-Aug-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.24963/ijcai.2024/25
Santos FMascarenhas SSantos FCorreia FGomes SPaiva AElkind EVeloso MAgmon NTaylor M(2019)Outcome-based Partner Selection in Collective Risk DilemmasProceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3306127.3331873(1556-1564)Online publication date: 8-May-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3306127.3331873
Pinheiro FSantos FAndre EKoenig SDastani MSukthankar G(2018)Local Wealth Redistribution Promotes Cooperation in Multiagent SystemsProceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3237383.3237500(786-794)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3237383.3237500
Santos FLarson KWinikoff MDas SDurfee E(2017)Social Norms of Cooperation in Multiagent SystemsProceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3091125.3091472(1859-1860)Online publication date: 8-May-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3091125.3091472
Konorski J(2016)Trust dynamics analysis of CTR scheme subversion under virtual anonymity and trust-unaware partner selectionProceedings of the 18th International Conference on Trust in Agent Societies - Volume 157810.5555/3054117.3054122(54-64)Online publication date: 10-May-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3054117.3054122

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