research-article

Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings

Authors:

Jason D. Hartline,

Robert Kleinberg,

Azarakhsh MalekianAuthors Info & Claims

SODA '11: Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms

Pages 734 - 747

Published: 23 January 2011 Publication History

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Abstract

We give a simple reduction from Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism design to algorithm design in settings where the agents' private types are multidimensional. The reduction preserves performance up to an additive loss that can be made arbitrarily small in polynomial time in the number of agents and the size of the agents' type spaces.

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Hosseini HPathak SLarson K(2024)Strategic aspects of stable matching marketsProceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.24963/ijcai.2024/893(8077-8085)Online publication date: 3-Aug-2024
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Derakhshan MRyu EWeinberg SXue EKleinberg RSaban DBergemann D(2024)Settling the Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent ItemsProceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3670865.3673627(420-446)Online publication date: 8-Jul-2024
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Cai YOikonomou AVelegkas GZhao MMarx D(2021)An efficient ε-BIC to BIC transformation and its application to black-box reduction in revenue maximizationProceedings of the Thirty-Second Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms10.5555/3458064.3458145(1337-1356)Online publication date: 10-Jan-2021
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Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings
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Published In

SODA '11: Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms

January 2011

1785 pages

Program Chair:
Dana Randall
Georgia Institute of Technology

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Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics

United States

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Published: 23 January 2011

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SODA '11

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SIGACT

SODA '11: 22nd ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

January 23 - 25, 2011

California, San Francisco

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Overall Acceptance Rate 411 of 1,322 submissions, 31%

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Hosseini HPathak SLarson K(2024)Strategic aspects of stable matching marketsProceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.24963/ijcai.2024/893(8077-8085)Online publication date: 3-Aug-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.24963/ijcai.2024/893
Derakhshan MRyu EWeinberg SXue EKleinberg RSaban DBergemann D(2024)Settling the Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent ItemsProceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3670865.3673627(420-446)Online publication date: 8-Jul-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3670865.3673627
Cai YOikonomou AVelegkas GZhao MMarx D(2021)An efficient ε-BIC to BIC transformation and its application to black-box reduction in revenue maximizationProceedings of the Thirty-Second Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms10.5555/3458064.3458145(1337-1356)Online publication date: 10-Jan-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3458064.3458145
Gonczarowski YWeinberg S(2021)The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-dimensional Revenue MaximizationJournal of the ACM10.1145/343972268:3(1-28)Online publication date: 22-Mar-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3439722
Cai YZhao M(2019)Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via dualityACM SIGecom Exchanges10.1145/3331033.333103717:1(39-53)Online publication date: 7-May-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3331033.3331037
Hartline JTaggart SKarlin AImmorlica NJohari R(2019)Sample Complexity for Non-Truthful MechanismsProceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3328526.3329632(399-416)Online publication date: 17-Jun-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3328526.3329632
Braverman MMao JWeinberg SCzumaj A(2018)On simultaneous two-player combinatorial auctionsProceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms10.5555/3174304.3175451(2256-2273)Online publication date: 7-Jan-2018
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Rubinstein AWeinberg S(2018)Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue MonotonicityACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/31054486:3-4(1-25)Online publication date: 1-Oct-2018
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Niazadeh R(2017)Algorithms versus mechanismsXRDS: Crossroads, The ACM Magazine for Students10.1145/312373624:1(20-23)Online publication date: 14-Sep-2017
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Dughmi SHartline JKleinberg RNiazadeh RHatami HMcKenzie PKing V(2017)Bernoulli factories and black-box reductions in mechanism designProceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing10.1145/3055399.3055492(158-169)Online publication date: 19-Jun-2017
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Testing Incentive Compatibility in Display Ad Auctions

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