Trend Micro Incorporated United States of America

Transfer Impact Assessment – Philippines

Data exporting entity: **Trend Micro US Incorporated**

	Part 1: Know Your Transfers	
A. Assessment of the data importer		
1.	Who is the importer of the data (the "***data importer***")? *Please provide their name, contact details and any other information you consider relevant.*	Trend Micro Philippines
2.	What does the data importer do? *Provide details of the product or service they will provide.*	*Provide technical product support services; customer backend support for Managed XDR and delivery of pattern solutions to threat escalations.*
3.	Where (in what country or countries) will the data importer process the data?	Philippines
4.	Is the data importer a group company?	☒ Yes ☐ No If no, is the data importer: ☐ A public authority ☐ A private enterprise (i.e. a company)

		☐ A not-for-profit
5.	*Why will the data importer process the personal data?* *Please explain what processing activities the data importer will perform.*	To provide support services and act as customer backend support for the Managed XDR service. *Customer information is used to confirm entitlement and license validity and contact information is used for follow-up activities for tech support activities.* *The Trend Micro Managed XDR (MDR) performs detection, analysis and response for Trend Micro Managed Services customers, and is performed via follow-the-sun (24/7/365) operations. We provide 1) critical alerting and monitoring, 2) live response, and 3) threat hunting services."*
6.	*Why are these transfers necessary? Could the processing instead be conducted in the EEA (European Economic Area) (for EEA data) or UK (for UK data)?*	*Data that is stored in system (AWS/ Salesforce in US) is accessed by engineers in the Philippines to provide the support services as described in more detail above.* *Managed XDR data is stored in Microsoft Dynamics 365 and Azure Sentinel. to provide managed detection and response service.*
7.	*Has a DPIA been conducted for the data importer's processing?* *If no, why not?*	☐ Yes, a DPIA has been conducted and is available at [give details]. ☒ No, a DPIA has not been conducted because processing is not "high risk" within the meaning of Art 35 GDPR
8.	*Will the data importer onward transfer the personal data to other third parties? If so, please complete the table to (i) identify all such third parties and their location; (ii) identify why they will receive and/or process the personal data; and (iii) confirm whether Transfer Impact Assessments have been carried out in each case and where those Transfer Impact Assessments can be found (e.g., internal document management system number)?* Note: Both "transfer" and "onward transfer" include remote access. Onward transfer can be to the same or another third country.	☐ Yes ☒ No If yes, please provide details below: <table><tr><th>Third party recipient details (including name and location)</th><th>Why will it process the data?</th><th>Where will it process the data?</th></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></table>

9.	*If there are onward transfers to <u>other third parties</u>, please confirm whether Transfer Impact Assessments have been carried out in each case and where those Transfer Impact Assessments can be found (e.g. internal document management system number)?*	N/A – no onward transfers ☐ Yes, TIAs have been conducted and are available at [give details]. ☐ No, TIAs have not been conducted because [give details].
B. Assessment of the data transferred		
10.	*What categories of data are being transferred?*	Consumer: Customer name, social media username, email address, phone number, home/billing address, birthday, IP address Corporate: contact information, company info such as name, email address of contact and telephone number of contact, product info CoreTech: company name
11.	*Does the data include communications contact information such as telephone numbers, email addresses or physical addresses?*	☒ Telephone numbers (used by all team except CoreTech) ☒ Email addresses (used by all teams) ☒ Physical addresses (for consumer customers only)
12.	*Does the data include telephone, email or other wire or electronic communications content?*	☐ Telephone content ☒ Email content (related to the services) ☐ Other wire or electronic communications
13.	*Does the data include special categories of data?*	☐ Yes ☒ No If yes, which categories of special category data: ☐ Racial or ethnic origin ☐ Political opinions ☐ Religious or philosophical beliefs ☐ Trade union membership ☐ Genetic data

		☐ Biometric data used for unique identification
		☐ Health data (including physical and mental health)
		☐ Data about sex life or sexual orientation

14.	*Does the data include data about criminal convictions and offences?*	☐ Yes ☒ No If yes, please explain why: [Give details, if applicable]
15.	*Is the data otherwise inherently sensitive (e.g. banking data, social security data) or likely to be of interest to government security or surveillance authorities (e.g. social media data)?*	☐ Yes ☒ No If yes, please explain why: [Give details, if applicable]

16.	*Will this be a 'one-off' transfer or an ongoing series of transfers?*	☐ One-off	☒ Ongoing
17.	*Approximately how many data subjects' personal data will be transferred? If it is impossible to estimate numbers due to volume, please reply "Large scale transfer".*	Large scale transfer - Not possible to approximate as it depends on number of customers and queries.	

		Part 2: Identify the transfer tool relied upon
18.	*Is the transfer being made to an importing territory or organisation that benefits from a European Commission adequacy decision (or, for UK data, adequacy regulations issued by the UK Secretary of State)?* *I.e. is it made to: Andorra, Argentina, Canada (commercial organisations), Faroe Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Japan, Jersey, New Zealand, Switzerland, United Kingdom or Uruguay?*	☐ Yes ☒ No If Yes, please note that it is <u>not</u> necessary to complete the rest of this form.
19.	*Is the transfer made on the basis of "appropriate safeguards" under Article 46 - i.e. reliance on EU Standard Contractual Clauses, Binding Corporate Rules, or similar? If so, please specify which safeguards will be relied upon.*	☒ SCCs ☐ BCR ☐ Approved code/ certification – please specify which: [Give details, if applicable] ☐ Other – please specify: [Give details, if applicable]
20.	*Is the transfer made in reliance upon a derogation under Art 49? If so, please specify which derogation is relied upon and why.*	☐ Explicit consent from data subjects ☐ Necessary for the performance of a contract with the data subject (or the implementation of pre-contractual measures taken at the data subject's request) ☐ Necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract concluded in the interest of the data subject ☐ Necessary for important reasons of public interest ☐ Necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims ☐ Necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of other persons, where the data subject is physically or legally incapable of giving consent ☐ the transfer is made from a publicly-available register ☐ The transfer is not repetitive, concerns only a limited number of data subjects, and is necessary for the purposes of compelling legitimate interests provided

		the supervisory authority is informed of the transfer. Legal team must be consulted.
		Please indicate why you are relying on the above derogation:
		[Give details, if applicable]

![TREND MICRO logo]

	Part 3: Is the transfer tool relied upon effective in light of the circumstances of the transfer?

| *21.* | *Has the importing territory implemented legislation or executive powers that enables government authorities access to data exporters' personal data e.g. for surveillance, intelligence, national security, criminal law enforcement and other regulatory purposes, whether through the data importer or telecommunication providers or communication channels?*

Please provide an overview of each of these applicable laws, regulations and practices as well as a description of how authorities in the importing territory can rely on them. | ☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Somewhat

Please provide details:

The Philippine Constitution of 1987 allows exceptions to the right to privacy, which means that data (incl. personal data) can be accessed under the following conditions:

Article III, Section 2 provides that a <u>search warrant may be issued upon probable cause</u>, personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Article III, Section 3 provides that the privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of a competent court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

Therefore, before conducting a search or seizure, the law enforcers must first obtain a warrant with the proper court.

Case law (*Veridiano v. People*, G.R. No. 200370 (2017)) has also provided for exceptional circumstances where searches are reasonable even when warrantless: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) consented warrantless search, (3) search of a moving vehicle, (4) search of evidence in plain view, (5) stop and frisk, (6) customs search and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances

Besides this general legal regime, the Philippines has enacted **specific laws** (<u>as detailed below</u>) **that enable law enforcement authorities and military personnel to obtain access to data**, including personal data being processed in the Philippines and held by private organisations.

In addition, the powers of government authorities **enable them to request / access data stored in the EEA but which are accessed by individuals located in the Philippines**, as long as the person or entity sought to be enjoined is subject to the jurisdiction of the Philippine government. These specific laws (both surveillance laws or sectoral laws) are the following: |

- **Republic Act (R.A.) No. 11479 or the "The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020" (ATA)**

This Act and its implementing rules allow law enforcers or military personnel, subject to the restrictions described below, to have access to, read, collect, or record, any private communication, conversation, discussion, data, information, or messages in whatever form, kind or nature. More precisely, the ATA allows law enforcers and military personnel, upon written order of the Court of Appeals, to secretly conduct surveillance activities, intercept and record communications, collect and record any form of data or information that may be exchanged between individuals (sender or recipient). They may use any mode, form, kind or type of electronic or mechanical equipment, device, or technology to achieve this purpose. These surveillance activities can take place where these are (i) between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organisation or (ii) between designated persons as defined under the Human Security Act, such as those identified as terrorists, or (iii) from or to any person charged or suspected of committing any of the crimes punishable under the ATA (such as crimes of terrorism or crimes of conspiracy to commit terrorism). The ATA covers any form of communication, including electronic communications, which may be involved in the service. Thus, the recipient's processing activities could fall within the scope of these powers, even though the persons under surveillance will not be made aware of it.

The ATA applies to persons that may be outside of the Philippines if the acts punishable under the ATA are found to have been committed within the Philippines, or under certain conditions, e.g., against Philippine nationals or the Philippine government. Individuals and organisations located in the Philippines who have access to the data, even if stored in the EEA, may also be subject of and will be bound to comply to a court order that may be issued against it.

- **Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. 4200)**

Under this Act, while it is generally prohibited for any person to secretly tap, intercept, or record private communications between individuals, the law provides for an exception when any police officer has obtained a court order to perform such wire-tapping, interception or recording upon written application and showing that there is reasonable ground to believe that the persons involved in the private communication (i.e. the recipient or the person with which he is communicating)

has committed or is about to commit crimes against national security such as the crimes of treason, espionage, rebellion, and sedition.

- **Cybercrime Prevention Act (R.A. No. 10175)**

Under this Act, law enforcement authorities, upon securing a court warrant with the regular or other specialised regional trial courts, may also require any person or telecommunications service providers to preserve, disclose or submit subscriber information, traffic data, or relevant data in its possession or control in relation to the prosecution of a crime committed through a computer network or the use of electronic communications devices (Sections 12 and 13). This Act covers all crimes defined and penalised under the Revised Penal Code, and other special laws, if committed by, through, and with the use of ICTs.

Under Section 13, service providers are required to preserve the integrity of traffic data and subscriber information for a minimum period of six months from the date of the transaction. Likewise, service providers shall preserve content data for six months from the date of receipt of the order requiring its preservation. Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six months under certain conditions.

The Rules on Cybercrime Warrants provides for the procedure by which law enforcement authorities shall apply for the warrants. In addition, any evidence procured without a valid warrant or beyond the authority of the warrant shall be inadmissible for any proceeding before any court (exclusionary rule under Section 18 of this Act). Upon issuance of the warrant, Section 15 allows law enforcement authorities to, within the time specified in the warrant, conduct interception and (i) secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium, (ii) make and retain a copy of those computer data secured, (iii) maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data, (iv) conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage medium, and (v) render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer or computer communications network. Section 11 of this Act mandates that law enforcement authorities are required to submit timely and regular reports including pre-operation, post-operation and investigation results and such other documents as may be required to the Department of Justice for review and monitoring.

		Insofar as the telco or ISP provider of the data recipient may be subject of such investigation or court order involving a cybercrime, then access to its data might potentially be made available to law enforcement authorities.
22.	***European Essential Guarantees for Surveillance Measures - Guarantee 1:*** *Is any such government access defined by clear, precise and publicly-accessible rules and legislation?* *I.e. is access to the transferred personal data and further use of such data by public authorities in the importing territory based on clear, precise and accessible law as to its scope and application (as opposed to the discretionary powers that authorities may have)?*	☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Somewhat Please provide details: The advice above sets out the specific laws that regulate government access to data in the Philippines. **While such access is provided for by laws that are publicly available, it may have a large scope under these acts as the conditions provided for by these acts have been drafted under broad terms**. For example, under the **ATA**, surveillance activities can take place where these communications are from or to any person charged or suspected of committing any of the crimes punishable under the ATA. In addition, the **Cybercrime Prevention Act** covers all crimes defined and penalised under the Revised Penal Code, and other special laws, if committed by, through, and with the use of ICTs. Traffic data and all the relevant data in the possession or control of the service provider, in relation to the prosecution of such crimes (incl. content data) must be preserved for six months and obtained by law enforcers. In addition, the scope and modalities of the **Anti-Wiretapping Act** are rather broad.
23.	***European Essential Guarantees for Surveillance Measures - Guarantee 2:*** *Is any such government access proportionate and limited to legitimate objectives (e.g. a public interest objective)?* *I.e. is the government's/public authorities' power to access the transferred personal data limited to what is necessary given the purpose and justified by the public interest at hand? Are the requirements indiscriminate for the given purpose and organising mass access on a generalized basis? (e.g. bulk surveillance)*	☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Somewhat Please provide details: The purposes of government access are set out in the specific laws, as explained above. Under these acts, government access seems to be justified by the public interest at hand (except for the **Credit Information System Act**, which does refer to any particular public interests to have access to said data). While no "bulk" surveillance seems to be allowed by law in the Philippines, the volume of data collected and intercepted under the **Cybercrime Prevention Act** may be relatively large, as explained above, which can **indicate that government access may go beyond what is strictly necessary in this case**.
24.	***European Essential Guarantees for Surveillance Measures - Guarantee 3:*** *Is any such government access subject to any independent judicial oversight mechanism(s)?*	☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Somewhat Please provide details: **Yes (subject to limited exceptions)**

I.e. is there any independent, effective and impartial mechanisms to approve and/or review government access and further use of the accessed data by public authorities (e.g. by a judge or another independent body)? Does it apply to access measures that are carried out in secret (if any)?

• **Approving government access**

As described above and generally, an application for a warrant to conduct a search or seizure, or other actions authorized to be performed by law enforcers, must be made prior to effecting such search, seizure or other actions. However, warrantless searches and seizures can be carried out subject to the conditions listed above (see the answer to question 1 of this Part 3).

In addition, the specific laws that authorise government access require law enforcement authorities or personnel to go to court to obtain a warrant or an order:

1. Under the **ATA**, law enforcers or military personnel cannot conduct surveillance activities without a lawful order from the Court of Appeals. They are likewise obligated to file an application with the Court of Appeals for the issuance of an order to compel telecommunications service providers or ISPs to produce customer information and identification records. In case of failure to secure the authorisation from the Court of Appeals prior to the conduct of any surveillance, the law enforcer or military personnel may be held liable under the ATA and may be punished with imprisonment of up to 6 years.

2. Under the **Cybercrime Prevention Act**, law enforcers must secure a court order.

3. Under the **Wire-Tapping Act**, law enforcers must demonstrate reasonable ground to obtain court order to be able to perform such wire-tapping, interception or recording.

4. Under the **Secrecy of Bank Deports Act**, the conditions to access the concerned data do not require obtaining a court order, unless in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials.

5. Under the **Anti-Money Laundering Act**, the AMLC must obtain a court order after having demonstrated a probable cause.

6. Under the **Credit Information System Act**, disclosing credit information to entities other than Credit Information Corporation requires a court order.

		• **Reviewing government access**
		Under Philippine law, where there is an <u>allegation that any government branch or instrumentality has exceeded or acted beyond the scope of its powers, the courts may exercise their power of judicial review</u> to not only settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine if there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. This power has been granted by the 1987 Constitution (Article VIII Section 1).
		As explained above, law enforcement authorities may have an <u>obligation to report</u> to the courts or provide some explanation under the specific surveillance laws (i.e. the **ATA** and the **Cybercrime Prevention Act**). However, these reporting obligations do not seem to cover the other acts that are mentioned above.
		In addition, <u>criminal complaints</u> can be filed against law enforcers under the **Anti-Wiretapping Act**, the **Cybercrime Prevention Act** and the **Data Privacy Act**. Criminal courts can review offenders' acts under these surveillance laws.
25.	*European Essential Guarantees for Surveillance Measures - Guarantee 4: In respect of any such government access, are there sufficient safeguard(s) for UK/EEA individuals? In particular consider:* *(A) Effective legal remedies available to individuals and enforceable rights* *Which legal remedies are available to the individuals whose personal data are accessed by authorities in the importing territory? Do individuals located in the UK/EEA have a right of redress in case of access by public authorities to the transferred data? Can individuals effectively exercise their data protection rights (e.g. right of access, right to rectification and to erasure) in the importing territory?* *(B)Effective legal remedies available to the data importer subject to government access* *Which legal remedies are available to the organisation based in the importing territory in the event of an access by authorities? Can it challenge the request and/or refuse to comply with the access request? Is there any public or known case law relating to a situation where a data importer in the importing territory*	☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Somewhat Please provide details: • **Individuals** - Individuals have a right of redress in case of access by local public authorities to the transferred data and in case of abuse and the following legal remedies: <u>Writ of habeas data</u> Individuals can a file a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, a procedural law issued on January 22, 2008). This is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy, life, liberty, or security is <u>violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee</u>, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party. A writ of habeas data requires a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of such right. The petition may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has

opposes to a government access order or challenged the scope of such order and if so, what was the outcome?

(C) Other relevant factors

Is there anything else that is relevant to the risk of access in the importing territory (e.g. any reason or indication that authorities would have a special interest in accessing personal data originating from the UK/EEA)?

jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner. It may also be filed with the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan (i.e. a special appellate court) when the action concerns public data files of government offices.

Lodging a complaint before the National Privacy Commission.

o The NPC may receive complaints, institute investigations, facilitate or enable settlement of complaints, adjudicate, and award indemnity on matters affecting any personal data. Under Section 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the NPC, the NPC, on its own initiative, or individuals who are the subject of a privacy violation or personal data breach, or who are otherwise personally affected by a violation of the Data Privacy Act, may file complaints for violations of the Data Privacy Act.

o Any individual who is not personally affected by the privacy violation or personal data breach may:

1. request for an advisory opinion on matters affecting protection of personal data; or

2. inform the NPC of the data protection concern, which may in its discretion, conduct monitoring activities on the organisation or take such further action as may be necessary.

• The decision of the NPC shall become final and executory 15 days after the receipt of a copy thereof by the party adversely affected. A motion for reconsideration may be filed within the same period. Any appeal from the decision of the NPC shall be elevated to the Court of Appeals.

Civil damages

Under Article 32 of the Civil Code, a civil suit for damages may be filed against a public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs the rights and liberties of another person, including the right to be secure in one's person, house, paper, and effects, against unreasonable search and seizures, and the privacy of communication and

correspondence. Whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages and for other relief. The indemnity may include moral damages and exemplary damages.

A criminal complaint for violations of the **Data Privacy Act** may also be filed against the relevant government authorities. Sections 25-32 of the Data Privacy Act define the acts which are deemed unlawful or penalised, which include unauthorised processing, accessing due to negligence, improper disposal of, processing for unauthorised purposes of personal and sensitive personal data, unauthorised access or intentional breach, and malicious or unauthorised disclosure. Where the offender or the person responsible for the offense defined under the Data Privacy Act is a public officer in the exercise of his or her duties, an accessory penalty consisting of disqualification to occupy public office for a term double the term of the criminal penalty shall be applied (Section 36).

If the interception or surveillance is committed through the use of computers or electronic devices, then a criminal complaint for violation of the **Cybercrime Prevention Act** may be filed against the responsible law enforcers or military personnel.

For illegal wiretapping or interception of private communications, a criminal complaint for violation of the **Anti-Wiretapping Law** may be filed against the responsible individuals or law enforcers.

Under the ATA, unauthorized or malicious surveillance by authorities will be punishable by 10-year imprisonment and all data that were maliciously procured will be made available to the aggrieved party.

- **Data protection rights** - **There are some limitations**. Chapter V of the Data Privacy Act recognises the right to access, the right to rectify and the right to erasure or blocking. However, as mentioned above, the Act does not apply to "*information necessary in order to carry out the functions of public authority which includes the processing of personal data for the performance by* (…) *regulatory agencies of their constitutionally and statutorily mandated functions*". Residents of foreign jurisdictions (including the EEA countries) should still be able to exercise their rights as

data subjects under the Data Privacy Act – to the extent that the data processing is conducted in the Philippines.

- **Data importers' rights** - As a general rule, an organisation based in the Philippines cannot refuse to comply with a request from public authorities. As an exception, if the court order is found to be invalid or if there is an abuse, the organisation can resort to the following remedies:

1. File a petition or motion before the appropriate court.

   a. Motion to Quash the Warrant. Where a warrant was erroneously issued, respondent may move to quash the warrant and suppress the illegally seized evidence.

   b. Provisional Remedy for Preliminary Injunction. Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to refrain from doing a particular act or to require the performance of a particular act. It seeks to preserve the status quo until merits can be heard. The applicant must establish the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected, a material and substantial invasion of such right, an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage, and that no other ordinary, speedy and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction or irreparable injury.

   c. Appeal, Petition for Review. Additionally, pursuant to the rules regarding judicial appeals in the Rules of Civil Procedure, judgments or final orders from quasi-judicial agencies such as the Philippine data protection authority may be appealed to the Court of Appeals through Rule 43, and may then be elevated to the Supreme Court via Rule 45.

   d. Petition for Declaratory Relief. Declaratory relief is an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order, regulation, statute and for a declaration of his rights and duties therefrom. In case no breach has come to the

organisation yet but a breach is foreseeable, the order can be questioned through a petition for Declaratory Relief.

   e. <u>Petition for Certiorari</u>. If the request made by the law enforcement authority was made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the request may be questioned by a Certiorari, Prohibition or Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

2. If the data recipient suspects that communications are being unlawfully intercepted or kept without legal ground, it can file a petition before the appropriate court for the issuance of a <u>writ of habeas data</u> (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, a procedural law issued on January 22, 2008), which is a special writ that enjoins the act complained of, or orders the deletion, destruction, or rectification of the erroneous data or information, e.g., those obtained by the law enforcers or military personnel, and grants such other relevant just and equitable reliefs to the aggrieved person or entity.

3. A <u>criminal complaint for violations of the Philippine Data Privacy Act</u> (R.A No. 10173) for unauthorized collection and processing of data may also be filed by the aggrieved party against the responsible law enforcers or military personnel if there is no ground for the surveillance or access by such parties.

4. A <u>criminal complaint for violations of the Cybercrime Prevention Act</u> may also be filed against the responsible law enforcers or military personnel in case the surveillance is unauthorized and is committed through the use of computer or electronic devices.

<u>A criminal case for violations of the Anti-Wiretapping Law</u> may be filed against law enforcers who secretly wiretap or intercept private communications without first obtaining a lawful court order.

- **Case law** - Philippine courts adhere to the doctrine that actions taken by government officers in the performance of their official duties should be presumed valid. Because of this, there is a general tendency for Philippine courts to rule in favour of government law enforcers as the application of

the doctrine would require nothing short of clear and convincing evidence to overthrow the presumption. Nevertheless, there are certain cases where private parties have won against the government.

In *Rodriguez v. Arroyo*, G.R. No. 191805 (2011), the Supreme Court upheld the grant of the writ of habeas data in favour of an individual who was identified as a member of a terrorist organisation and was later abducted by military personnel. In that case, the petition for habeas data was filed upon the release of the individual to prevent military personnel from unlawfully collecting information about him and his whereabouts. The Supreme Court held that the individual was able to prove through substantial evidence his allegations in the petition and that as a result of the issuance of the writ of habeas data, he may be granted access to the database or information, enjoin the surveillance complained of, and have the erroneous data or information deleted or destroyed.

- **Other factors** - Philippine government law enforcers take special interest in information about individuals or organisations that are part of the UN Sanctions List in relation to its obligation to maintain peace and order in the country. However, local counsel is not aware of any reason why or any indication that government law enforcers will take special interest in accessing personal data originating particularly from the EEA.

26.	*Has the importing territory entered into any international commitments regarding data protection, does it adhere to any international instrument on data protection standards that are legally binding (e.g. Convention 108, Convention 108+)?*	☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Somewhat Please provide details: The Philippines does not adhere to any international instrument on data protection standards. **However**, since 2020 it is a member of the APEC Cross Border Privacy Rules System, which is a government-backed data privacy certification that companies can join to demonstrate compliance with internationally-recognised privacy protections
27.	*Is the rule of law constitutionally recognised, are there laws that establish the rule of law in the importing territory?*	☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Somewhat Please provide details: The Bill of Right of the 1987 Constitution enshrines the rule of law in the Philippines. It also protects human rights and fundamental freedoms

28.	Is the right to privacy/data protection recognised as a human right or fundamental right?	☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Somewhat
		Please provide details:
		"Zones of privacy" in which individuals can expect to have some privacy are protected in Article III of the Constitution and its Bill of Rights). The Supreme Court delivered a few landmark cases where it recognised the constitutional foundation of the right to privacy. For example in *Disini v. Secretary of Justice* (G.R. No 203335, February 11, 2013), it asserted that "*within these zones* [of privacy], *any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a 'constitutional right' and 'the right most valued by civilized men', but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, 'no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy' and 'everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks*'".
29.	Is there an independent supervisory authority that is responsible for: • ensuring and enforcing compliance with the data protection rules with adequate enforcement powers? • assisting and advising individuals in exercising their data protection rights? If that is the case, please briefly explain the role of this authority.	☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Somewhat
		Please provide details:
		The DPA is patterned after the GDPR and is implemented by an independent body called the **National Privacy Commission** (**NPC**). Under Section 7 of the Data Privacy Act, the NPC was created to administer and implement the provisions of this Act, and to monitor and ensure compliance of the country with international standards set for data protection. Under Section 8 of the Implementing Rules and Regulation of the Data Privacy Act, the NPC is an independent body. Sections 7 of this Act and section 9 the Implementing Rules and Regulations set out the functions of the NPC:
		1. issuing compliance or enforcement orders,
		2. awarding indemnity on matters affecting any personal data, or rights of data subjects,
		3. issuing cease and desist orders, or imposing a temporary or permanent ban on the processing of personal data, upon finding that the processing will be detrimental to national security or public interest, or if it is necessary to preserve and protect the rights of data subjects,
		4. recommending to the Department of Justice the prosecution of crimes and imposition of penalties specified in the Data Privacy Act,

		5. compelling or petitioning any entity, government agency, or instrumentality, to abide by its orders or take action on a matter affecting data privacy,
		6. imposing administrative fines for violations of the Act, the Implementing Rules and Regulation, and other issuances of the NPC.
		Please also see above the response for *European Essential Guarantees for Surveillance Measures - Guarantee 4* above for a description of how the NPC can assist individuals.
30.	*Is there a comprehensive data protection framework applying to government authorities, including rules that restrict transfers of personal data to third countries to ensure that the personal data transferred continues to benefit from the level of data protection available in the importing territory?*	☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Somewhat Please provide details: • **Government authorities – No**, The Philippines has enacted R.A. No. 10173 or the "Data Privacy Act of 2012" (DPA), which requires data controllers and processors to adhere to the data privacy principles of transparency, legitimate purpose, and proportionality and requires them to implement security measures for the adequate protection of personal data. The Data Privacy Act has Implementing Rules and Regulations that have been issued by the National Privacy Commission. However this law does not apply to "information necessary in order to carry out the functions of public authority which includes the processing of personal data for the performance of the independent, central monetary authority and law enforcement and regulatory agencies of their constitutionally and statutorily mandated functions" (Section 4(e) of the Act). The Data Privacy Act provides that the processing of personal data shall be lawful where it is necessary in order to respond to national emergency, to comply with the requirements of public order and safety, or to fulfill functions of public authority which necessarily includes the processing of personal data for the fulfillment of its mandate (Section 12(e) of the Data Privacy Act). In addition, the Data Privacy Act does not prevail over the Security of Bank Deposits Act and the Credit Information System Act.

		• **Not really.** The Data Privacy Act contains no express cross-border data transfer restrictions. However, according to Section 21 of the Act, data transfers are governed by a principle of accountability. Controllers are responsible for personal data under their control or custody, including data that has been transferred to a third party and they may use contractual or other reasonable means to provide a comparable level of protection when the data is transferred to a third party for processing.
31.	*Is the data importer potentially within the scope of the importing territory's governmental security and surveillance powers? Please explain.*	☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Somewhat Please provide details: • Yes, insofar as the data importer will be located in the Philippines, then it will be subject to the jurisdiction of the Philippine government, which can exercise security and surveillance powers in accordance with local laws. However, the data importer should not be specifically targeted if there are no reasons that could trigger the interest of local authorities.
32.	*In terms of the practical application of these laws, are there any practices in force of public authorities in the importing territory or any publicly reported precedents that, regardless of the content of its formal laws, involve unnecessary or disproportionate public authority access to transferred personal data or otherwise adversely affect its protection or the ability of UK/EEA individuals to exercise their data protection rights, or conversely ?*	☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Somewhat Please provide details: • We are not aware of any such practice or precedent. We are also not aware of the Philippine government particularly targeting UK/EEA individuals to gain access to their personal information. Insofar as the NPC has been conducting investigations on data breaches, we understand that the NPC has only been concerned with investigating conduct that tend to violate data protection rights and has never requested access to personal information that has been transferred between entities.
33.	*Is the data importer aware of any <u>other</u> applicable laws in the importing territory which could constitute an obstacle to its ability to comply with appropriate safeguards (e.g. its obligations under Standard Contractual Clauses or BCRs) and, in particular, ensure an essentially equivalent level of protection for the data transferred?* *E.g. are there any legal prohibitions on data importers informing exporters of a specific request for access to data received or restrictions on providing general information about requests for access to data received or the absence of requests received?*	☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Somewhat Please provide details: • We are not aware of any other applicable law that may specifically prevent compliance with contractual clauses meant to provide protection for data received by a Philippine data processor.

34.	*Can the data importer confirm whether it has or has not received requests for access to data from public authorities in the past and that it is not prohibited from providing information about such requests or their absence?*	☒ Yes, the data importer confirms it has never received any such requests and is not prohibited from providing information about such requests or their absence. ☐ No, the data importer is prohibited from providing this information.
35.	*Is there good reason to believe that relevant and problematic legislation will not be applied, in practice, to the transferred data and/or data importer?* *This assessment should be, based on the above and also take into account the experience of others in the same sector and/or related to similar transferred personal data and additional sources of information that are relevant, objective, reliable, verifiable and publicly available?*	☒ Yes, there is good reason to believe that the problematic legislation will not be applied, in practice, to the transferred data and/or this data importer. ☐ No, there is reason to believe that the legislation will be applied, in practice, to the transferred data and/or this data importer. Please provide details for this assessment: [Give details] •

Part 4: Identify the additional safeguards taken to protect the transferred data[1]

	Technical measures
36.	***Encryption at rest***: *Is the data importer storing encrypted data for backup or other purposes that do not require it to have access to data in the clear?* *(EDPB Supplementary Measures Guidance: Use Case 1)*

☒ Yes ☐ No

If Yes, please confirm which (if any) of the following applies:

☒ The identity of the data importer is verified

☒ Encryption is applied before transmission

☒ The encryption algorithm, key length etc. are state of the art and robust against by public authorities' crypto-analysis, taking account of resources available to them.

☒ The encryption strength and key length take account of the specific time period during which data confidentiality must be preserved

☒ The encryption algorithm is implemented correctly by properly maintained software without known <u>vulnerabilities</u>

☒ The software's conformity to the algorithm specification has been verified e.g. by <u>certification</u>

☒ Keys are reliably managed (generated, administered, stored, if relevant, linked to the identity of an intended data importer, and revoked) e.g. in accordance with NIST 800-57[2]

☒ Keys are under the sole control of the data exporter or an entity trusted by it in the EEA or in a jurisdiction offering essentially equivalent protection (e.g. adequate country)

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[1] This Part 4 only needs to be completed if personal data is being transferred to a non-adequate country that does not have essentially equivalent protection and the transfer is not in reliance on an Article 49 derogation.

[2] https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-57-part-1/rev-5/final

| 37. | **Pseudonymisation before transfer**: *Will the data be pseudonymised before transfer?*

(EDPB Supplementary Measures Guidance: Use Case 2) | ☒ Yes ☐ No.

If Yes, please confirm which (if any) of the following applies:

☒ The data been pseudonymised so that it can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject, nor be used to single out the data subject in a larger group without the use of additional information

☐ The additional information is held only by the data exporter and kept separately in a Member State, or by an entity trusted by the data exporter in the EEA or an essentially equivalent jurisdiction (e.g. adequate country)

☐ Disclosure or unauthorised use of that additional information is prevented by appropriate technical and organisational safeguards

☐ The data exporter retains sole control of the algorithm or repository that enables re-identification using the additional information

☒ The data exporter has established by thorough analysis of the data, taking into account any information that the public authorities of the importing territory may be expected to possess and use (e.g. through requests to other service providers or use of public information), that the pseudonymised personal data cannot be attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person even if cross-referenced with such information |
| 38. | **Encryption in transit:** *Is the data encrypted while transiting third countries without essentially-equivalent protection on its way to a data importer in a country whose public authorities can access data in transit?*

(EDPB Supplementary Measures Guidance: Use Case 3) | ☒ Yes ☐ No

If Yes:

☒ Transport encryption is used with state of the art encryption protocols to provide effective protection against active and passive attacks with resources known to be available to the public authorities.

☒ The data exporter and data importer have agreed on a trustworthy public-key certification authority or infrastructure.

☒ Specific protective state-of-the-art measures are used against active and passive attacks on sending and receiving systems providing transport encryption, including tests for software vulnerabilities and possible backdoors.

☒ Personal data is encrypted end-to-end on the application layer using state-of-the-art encryption methods |

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☒ The encryption algorithm and key length etc. conform to the state-of-the-art and can be considered robust against public authority cryptanalysis taking into account their resources

☒ The encryption strength and key length take account of the specific time period during which data confidentiality must be preserved

☒ The encryption algorithm is implemented correctly by properly maintained software without known vulnerabilities

☒ The software's conformity to the algorithm specification has been verified e.g. by certification

☐ Keys are reliably managed e.g. in accordance with NIST 800-57, by the data exporter or an entity trusted by exporter under a jurisdiction offering essentially equivalent protection.

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Protected recipient: *Will the data be transferred to a data importer specifically protected by the importing territory's laws, e.g. under medical or legal confidentiality?*

(EDPB Supplementary Measures Guidance: Use Case 4)

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☐ Yes ☒ No .

If Yes:

☐ The importing territory's law exempts a resident data importer from potentially infringing access to data held by that data importer for the given purpose, e.g. by virtue of a duty to professional secrecy applying to the data importer,

☐ The exemption extends to all information in the possession of the data importer that may be used to circumvent protection of privileged information (keys, passwords, other credentials, etc.)

☐ The data importer does not engage a processor in a way that allows public authorities to access the data while held by the processor, nor does the data importer forward the data to another entity that is not protected, on the basis of Article 46 GDPR transfer tools

☐ The personal data is end to end encrypted before transmission with a state of the art method guaranteeing that decryption will not be possible without knowledge of the key (end-to-end for the whole length of time the data needs to be protected

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		☐ The decryption key is in the sole custody of the protected data importer, and, possibly, the data exporter or another entity trusted by the data exporter located in the EEA or an essentially equivalent jurisdiction, and appropriately secured against unauthorised use or disclosure by state of the art technical and organisational measures
		☐ The data exporter has reliably established that the intended key corresponds to the key held by the data importer
40.	**Split or multi-party processing:** *Will the data importers be involved in secure multi-party computation ("**MPC**"), whereby two or more independent processors in different jurisdictions will process the data without the data content being disclosed to any of them, i.e. the data is split before transmission such that no part an individual processor receives suffices to reconstruct the personal data in whole or in part, with the data exporter receiving the processing results from each of the processors independently and merging them to produce a final result which may constitute personal or aggregated data?* *(EDPB Supplementary Measures Guidance: Use Case 5)*	☐ Yes ☒ No . If Yes: ☐ The data is split into two or more parts each of which can no longer be interpreted or attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information ☐ Each part is transferred to a separate processor in a different jurisdiction ☐ The processors optionally process the data jointly, e.g. using secure multi-party computation, such that no information is revealed to any of them that they do not possess already ☐ The algorithm used for the shared computation is secure against active adversaries ☐ The data exporter has established by thorough analysis of the data, taking into account the missing pieces of information that public authorities of data importer countries may be expected to possess and use, that the parts transmitted to the processors cannot be attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person even if cross referenced with such information ☐ There is no evidence of collaboration between public authorities located in the respective processor jurisdictions which would allow them access to all sets of personal data held by the processors and enable them to reconstitute intelligible content where such exploitation would not respect the essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subjects ☐ Public authorities of importing countries do not have the authority to access personal data held by processors in all jurisdictions concerned.

41.	**Transfer with access to data in the clear:** *Will the data be transferred to a data importer processor in a third country that requires access to data in the clear to provide its service/perform its functions?* *(EDPB Supplementary Measures Guidance: Use Case 6)*	☐ Yes ☒ No . Please give details: [Give details] [**Note**: *If Yes, and in practice the data importer territory's public authorities are empowered to access the unencrypted transferred data beyond what is necessary and proportionate in a democratic society, the EDPB's view is that no technical measures can prevent that access infringing on data subjects' rights.* *Note that the EDPB does not rule out that further technological development may offer measures that achieve the intended business purposes, without requiring access in the clear.*]
42.	**Remote access to data:** *Will the data be transferred (or direct access permitted to data) unencrypted without pseudonymisation because it is required in the clear in the data importer territory for business purposes? E.g. HR data or customer support.* *(EDPB Supplementary Measures Guidance: Use Case 7)*	☒ Yes ☐ No . Please give details: [Give details] Support case handling process/systems will not have access to the data except for the customer's email address which will only be accessed by system when the support team are replying to provide the analysis result of the case to the submitter. [**Note:** *If Yes, and in practice the data importer territory's public authorities are empowered to access the unencrypted transferred data beyond what is necessary and proportionate in a democratic society, the EDPB's view is that no technical measures can prevent that access infringing on data subjects' rights.*]
Contractual measures		
43.	*Does the contract contain terms requiring implementation of any of the specific technical measures set out above (as applicable)?*	☐ Encryption at rest ☐ Pseudonymisation before transfer ☐ Encryption in transit ☐ Protected recipient ☐ Secure multi-party computation (MPC)

44.	Does the contract contain contractual obligations providing for transparency regarding access to data by public authorities in the data importer territory? Tick any of the following that apply in the contract.	☒ Requirement for the data importer to provide information on data importer territory's laws/regulations allowing public authority access to transferred data, particularly for intelligence, law enforcement, administrative and regulatory supervision, to best of the data importer's knowledge/belief based on its best efforts
		☐ If no laws govern such access, requirement for the data importer to provide information and statistics from data importer's experience or reports from public sources on public authority access to transferred personal data in this type of situation (e.g. this regulatory area/sector; type of data importer)
		☒ Information on measures taken by the data importer to prevent access to transferred data
		☐ Sufficiently detailed information on all requests for access the data importer has received over a specified period of time (e.g. year), including requests received, data requested, requesting body, legal basis for disclosure, and to what extent it disclosed the data
		☐ Details about whether and to what extent the data importer is legally prohibited from providing any of the information listed above
		☐ An obligation on data importer to notify any changes to the above
		☐ Certification by the data importer that (1) it has not purposefully created back doors or similar that could be used to access the system and/or personal data, (2) it has not purposefully created or changed its business processes in a manner that facilitates access to personal data or systems, and (3) national law or government policy does not require it to create or maintain back doors or to facilitate access to personal data or systems or for it to hold or hand over the key (plus penalties/termination right for breach of this obligation, possibly compensation to data subjects)
		☐ Audit/inspection right for the data exporter, including remote access to logs, to verify if data was disclosed to public authorities and under which conditions, e.g. by providing for short notice and mechanisms ensuring rapid intervention of inspection bodies and exporter's right to select them

		☐ Requirement for logs/audit trails to be tamper proof and regularly transmitted to the data exporter, distinguishing between normal business access and access under orders/requests?
		☐ Even if data importer territory is essentially equivalent, obligation to inform exporter promptly of inability to comply with contract if situation changes e.g. changes in data importer territory's legislation/practice; with specific time limits/procedures for suspending transfers and/or terminating the contract and return/deletion of transferred data before authorities' access and if possible before the change Is implemented, and mechanism to authorise data importer to promptly secure or return data or delete/securely encrypt without awaiting instructions if a set threshold is met (with regular testing), and possibly monitoring/audit rights with penalties and right to suspend/terminate
		☐ Warrant canary if data importer territory's law allows, i.e. an obligation on data importer to regularly publish (e.g. at least every 24 hours) a cryptographically signed message informing the data exporter that as of a certain date and time it has received no order etc to disclose personal data, with secure private key or multiple signatures needed or issue by a person outside the data importer territory
45.	*Does the contract contain obligations to take certain specific actions? Tick any of the following that apply in the contract.*	☒ Commitment to review, under data importer territory law, the legality of any order to disclose data, notably the scope of requesting public authority's powers, and to challenge the order if, after a careful assessment, data importer concludes there are grounds for challenge under data importer territory law, including seeking interim suspension of the order until the court decision, and obligation not to disclose requested data until required under applicable procedural rules and to provide the minimum amount of information permissible based on a reasonable interpretation of the order
		☐ Commitment to inform the requesting public authority of the incompatibility of the order with the safeguards in the Article 46 GDPR transfer tool and the resulting conflict of obligation (which must have helpful legal effects in the data importer territory), and to notify as soon as possible the data exporter and/or the competent EEA supervisory authority, insofar as possible under data importer territory law.

		☐ Require that intelligible data transmitted for business purposes may be accessed only with express/implied agreement of the data exporter and/or data subject to a specific access (e.g. requests for voluntary disclosure)
		☐ Oblige the data importer and/or the data exporter to notify promptly (or as soon as any national restrictions are lifted, with best efforts to seek waiver of prohibition to disclose) the data subject of a request or order, or of the data importer's inability to comply with the contract (to enable data subjects to seek information and redress, including compensation for the disclosure.
		☐ Obligations on both data importer and data exporter to assist (or procure assistance to) the data subject to exercise rights in the data importer territory through ad hoc redress mechanisms (if the country provides for redress including against surveillance) and legal counselling.
Organisational measures		
46.	Are relevant internal policies, organisational methods, and/or standards applied or imposed on the data importer? Tick any of the following that apply.	☒ Adequate internal policies exist with clear allocation of responsibilities for data transfers, reporting channels and standard operating procedures for formal or informal requests to access the data (especially for intragroup transfers), including appointment of a specific team (IT, data protection and privacy experts) to deal with requests that involve personal data transferred from the EEA; notification to senior legal and corporate management and to the data exporter upon receipt of such requests; procedural steps to challenge disproportionate or unlawful requests; and provision of transparent information to data subjects.

☒ Training is in place for personnel in charge of managing requests for access, periodically updated to reflect new legal developments in the importing territory and EEA, including on EU requirements as to access by public authorities to personal data, in particular Article 52 (1) Charter of Fundamental Rights, raising awareness of personnel by assessment of practical examples of public authorities' data access requests and by applying the Article 52(1) standard to the practical examples, taking into account data importer territory legislation and regulations applicable to the data importer (developed where possible in cooperation with the data exporter). |

47.	Are there transparency and accountability measures regarding public authorities' access to data? Tick any of the following that apply.	☐ The data importer documents and records requests and responses provided to access requests (see Contractual measures above), including legal reasoning and actors involved (e.g. if the data exporter has been notified and its reply, the assessment of the team in charge of dealing with such requests, etc.); and these will be made available to the data exporter.
		☐ The data importer regularly publishes transparency reports or summaries regarding governmental requests for access to data and the kind of reply provided, insofar publication is allowed by local law.
48.	Has data importer implemented confidentiality, audit and escalation measures governing transfers of, and access to, data? Tick any of the following that apply.	☒ The data importer has in place strict and granular data access and confidentiality policies and best practices, based on a strict need-to-know principle, monitored with regular audits and enforced through disciplinary measures, focusing on data minimisation with technical measures to restrict access (it might not be necessary to transfer certain data e.g. restricting remote access to EEA data for support, or when service provision only requires transfer of a limited dataset and not the entire database).
		☒ Development of best practices to appropriately and timely involve and provide access to information to the data protection officer, if any, and to legal and internal auditing services on matters related to international transfers of personal data, before the transfer is effected.
49.	Is there evidence of adoption of standards and best practices by the data importer? Tick any of the following that apply.	☒ The data importer has in place strict data security and data privacy policies, based on EU certification or codes of conducts or on international standards (e.g. ISO norms) and best practices (e.g. ENISA) with due regard to the state of the art, in accordance with the risk of the categories of data processed.
50.	Has the data importer implemented any other measures? Tick any of the following that apply.	☒ The data importer has adopted and regularly reviews internal policies to assess suitability of implemented complementary measures and identify and implement additional or alternative solutions when necessary, to ensure that an essentially equivalent level of protection is maintained.
		☒ The data importer has provided commitments not to engage in any onward transfer of the personal data within the same or other third countries, or suspend

		ongoing transfers, when an essentially equivalent level of protection cannot be guaranteed.

Part 5: Overall Risk Assessment		
Reviewer assessment		
51.	Please provide your overall conclusion of the risk of this transfer:	In view of the assessments of the data importer, the data importer territory, the nature of the data transferred and the appropriate safeguards implemented by the data importer, and in particular the lack of previous access requests and good reason to believe the relevant legislation will not be applied in practice to the data importer, the risk of proceeding with this transfer is low
52.	Please provide details of any risk mitigations measures recommended prior to transfer:	N/A. No further measures required at this stage – the position should be revisited on the next assessment date.
DPO assessment (if any)		
53.	Please provide the DPO's overall conclusion of the risk of this transfer:	In view of the assessments of the data importer, the data importer territory, the data transferred and the appropriate safeguards implemented by the data importer, the risk of proceeding with this transfer is low risk.
54.	Please provide details of any risk mitigations measures recommended by the DPO prior to transfer:	N/A

Document Control/Version History

Revision	Modified by	Date	Comments
1.0	Lianne Harcup	24.06.22	Template Created
2.0	Lianne Harcup	14.06.23	Review no changes implemented apart from update assessment date.

| 3.0 | Lianne Harcup | 13.06.24 | Review undertaken and additional information added around Trend Micro's Managed XDR offering.

Change of review date. |

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