



Building Trust in Public Institutions

Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions in Brazil



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Foreword

Brazil is one of the biggest democracies in the world, and the largest in Latin America. Yet, as in many other countries, Brazilian democracy faces challenges that include stark inequalities, high unemployment, rising prices, and the need for evolving regulatory frameworks to keep the pace of rapid technological advances. Brazil is also grappling with the effects of climate change: the country is home to the Amazon rainforest, a crucial source of biodiversity threatened by environmental degradation. These are exacerbated by underlying domestic challenges including corruption and, more recently, heightened political polarisation and the spread of mis- and disinformation, as evidenced by the riots in Brasilia in January 2023.

Trust in public institutions is essential for democracy and will be key to helping Brazil effectively address these challenges. Yet, around seven in ten Brazilians think that public institutions are not working in the public interest and trust in government and public institutions has reached an all-time low, according to data collected in April 2022. Focusing on building public trust could help bring about a cultural shift within the public administration, strengthen the legitimacy of public institutions and nurture social cohesion.

Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions in Brazil emphasises the importance of making public institutions more responsive through the systematic use of user-centred design of policies and services and ensuring that all public services use “feedback loops” to address citizens’ input. The report also recognises the potential to further institutionalise participatory practices, enhance collaboration and reduce fragmentation among public agencies and levels of government, by investing in the technical capacity of the civil service and integrating long-term thinking into policymaking. Finally, it stresses the need to develop a holistic approach to public communication, instil a culture of openness and strengthen the integrity system. In doing so, Brazil could ensure that its public governance is more resilient and sustainable and can adapt to the changing needs of society.

Brazil’s past public governance efforts have served as a significant example for Latin American countries in areas such as civil service reform, open government, and digital government. By carrying out this study, Brazil becomes the first country in Latin America to set trust as a key policy objective and driver for public sector improvement, paving the way for other countries in the region to undertake a similar analysis.

This report is the result of close collaboration between the OECD and the Comptroller General of Brazil ([Controladoria-Geral da União](#) – CGU) and was carried out together with an Integrity Review of Brazil. It draws on quantitative information collected in April 2022 through the OECD Trust Survey carried out in Brazil and benefits from comparative data gathered through the 2021 OECD Trust Survey in 22 countries, including two OECD Latin American Members, Colombia and Mexico. In addition, it relies on insights provided in around 40 interviews with government officials, civil society representatives and academics in Brazil, as well as input provided by minority leaders from the Amazon region who took part in in-depth focus interviews. This report is the fifth country study in the OECD series “Building Trust in Public Institutions” following Korea in 2018, Finland in 2021, Norway in 2022 and New Zealand in 2023.

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Executive summary

Trust is an important indicator to measure how people perceive the quality of, and associate with, government institutions in democratic countries. Governments can strengthen trust through having reliable institutions which are responsive to people's needs and expectations, as well as political processes and public policies that follow the principles of openness, integrity, and fairness. In turn, trust leads to greater compliance with policies, nurtures political participation, strengthens social cohesion and builds institutional legitimacy.

In line with trends throughout Latin America, trust in government and public institutions in Brazil has consistently declined in recent decades (Latinobarometer 1995-2020, Gallup World Poll), hindering inclusive and sustainable growth and social cohesion (see Chapter 1 of this report). The COVID-19 crisis exacerbated this trend.

According to the OECD Trust Survey carried out online in Brazil in April 2022 as part of this study, only one quarter of Brazilian people (25.9%) reported high or moderately high levels of trust in their federal government, a larger share than those who reported high or moderately high trust in local government (19.6%) and the civil service (23.6%). Similar to results observed in other countries, Congress (14%) and political parties (7.6%) were the least trusted among the institutions considered. Vulnerable groups – the poor, the young, people with lower levels of education, and those with economic or security concerns – have the lowest trust in public institutions and feel most strongly that the political system does not work for all.

Drivers of trust in Brazil also vary according to the institution and level of government considered (see Chapter 2), suggesting the need to adopt different strategies in different areas to correctly target policies and reforms to build confidence. For example, the most important drivers of trust in the federal government in Brazil are perceptions of the government's ability to address long-term challenges such as climate change, and fairness in providing services. Levels of trust in local governments are most influenced by whether people feel they have a say in community decisions and their satisfaction with administrative services. Finally, trust in the civil service is predominantly influenced by perceptions that civil servants treat everybody fairly and that people's inputs in public deliberations are reflected in policymaking.

In a global context marked by multiple crises and complexity in recent years, Brazil will need a better understanding of what drives trust in public institutions if it is to effectively respond to current and future governance challenges. Setting public trust as an explicit policy objective will be key, especially to overcome policy implementation gaps and high levels of institutional fragmentation, while preserving Brazil's hard-fought achievements on a number of public governance practices. Shifting from control-based to trust-based relations among civil servants, elected officials and public institutions would also help people feel trusted by institutions, leading to constructive interactions and reductions in negative perceptions and improving political attitudes. This is not an easy task but could act as a tipping point towards meaningful change in the country.

By carrying out this study Brazil becomes the first country in the Latin America and the Caribbean region to reflect in an in-depth analysis based on evidence and people's feedback, how to set trust as a policy objective and place public trust on the public sector's improvement agenda, investing in different initiatives to build trustworthy relationships between people and institutions. This report contributes to these efforts, providing a thorough analysis of the main drivers of trust in government in Brazil and identifying opportunities to strengthen it.

The opportunities identified in this report can be grouped into six areas: 1) improving the delivery and responsiveness of public services; 2) enhancing foresight, planning and preparedness to address long-term challenges; 3) enhancing communication and engagement between government and population; 4) strengthening public integrity and reducing perceptions of corruption; 5) promoting fairness across public institutions; and 6) improving the measurement of trust in public institutions and its drivers to build a robust evidence base. The table below summarises the main findings and areas of opportunity of this report.

Main findings	Areas of opportunity
Improving the delivery and responsiveness of public services (Chapter 3)	
<p>Satisfaction with public services is comparatively low in Brazil and unequal among population groups. For instance, in April 2022, 30% of Brazilian respondents were satisfied with the education system and 32% with administrative services, compared with 58% and 63%, respectively, in 22 surveyed OECD countries.</p> <p>Satisfaction with services is a key driver for trust in local government in Brazil, and levels of trust in local government (20%) are lower than trust in the civil service (24%) or the federal government (26%).</p>	<p>Increasing targeted communication and awareness-raising campaigns to inform citizens of their rights and how to access public services directly.</p> <p>Revisiting the allocation of responsibilities and co-ordination mechanisms among levels of government to deliver public services and ensuring resources are commensurate with the levels of responsibility allocated.</p>
<p>People's perception of government responsiveness is a challenge for Brazil, as for many OECD countries. Most people are sceptical about institutions adapting policies and services based on their feedback. Only 36% of Brazilian respondents believe that services would improve if people complained and 32% believe that policies would be adapted.</p>	<p>Systematising user-centred design of public services through guidance and support from the centre, and pilot user-centred initiatives targeting high-impact life events.</p> <p>Continue strengthening feedback loops by ensuring satisfaction indicators are analysed in conjunction with performance indicators and by improving data integration to ensure the government has a holistic view of its users' needs.</p> <p>Ensuring that vulnerable population groups have the opportunity to provide feedback to the government and that their feedback is properly analysed.</p>
<p>Innovation is not seen as widespread in the public sector - only 28% of Brazilian respondents believe the public administration would implement innovative ideas to improve public services. Perceptions of the civil service's capacity to innovate is an important driver of trust in local government in Brazil.</p>	<p>Promoting a widespread "culture of innovation" across the public service and enhancing training in public sector innovation.</p>
Enhancing foresight, planning and Brazil's preparedness to address long-term challenges (Chapter 3)	
<p>In April 2022, only 23% of the Brazilian population expected the government to be prepared to tackle a new pandemic. There is room to enhance crisis management, risk management and emergency preparedness as important factors behind people's trust in public institutions.</p>	<p>Reviewing and adjusting mechanisms for dealing with risks to better manage unexpected and new types of crises. The revision could seek to guarantee flexibility at the local level combined with the capacity to co-ordinate among different sectors and to integrate new stakeholders in order to cope with all foreseeable and unforeseeable hazards. It could also enhance emergency planning by reviewing the warning system and implementing modernised crisis communication tools.</p> <p>Improving planning capacity by formalising and strengthening the role of the centre of government, streamlining national priorities and incorporating new tools into future-oriented exercises across the administration.</p> <p>Building a robust and transparent strategic foresight framework for the identification of problems through better use of evidence and stakeholder engagement</p>
<p>Only slightly more than one quarter (27%) of Brazilians expected their data to be exclusively used for legitimate purposes if shared with government, below both the OECD average and values for Mexico (45%) and Colombia (34%). Brazil has however made strides to regulate the personal data processing by private or public entities to ensure the privacy of data subjects.</p>	<p>Enhancing security and investing in privacy-preserving technologies, coupled with robust ethical standards and regulations.</p> <p>Clarifying the scope of responsibilities and criteria for data sharing and strengthening interoperability across government agencies.</p>
<p>About one quarter of the population expect business and regulatory conditions to remain stable, although over half of the population are willing to formally register any new business.</p>	<p>Reducing the regulatory burden imposed on firms by simplifying license requirements and rolling out one-stop shops for setting up new firms.</p>
<p>As of April 2022, when the OECD Trust Survey was implemented,</p>	<p>Building trust by encouraging green behaviour and informing citizens about</p>

Main findings	Areas of opportunity
the perceived ability to mitigate climate change was the single most important driver of trust in government. However, only 40% of Brazilian respondents were confident that the government would reduce greenhouse emissions in ten years' time.	how climate policies work and whom they affect, as well as promoting their involvement in the decision-making process.
Enhancing communication and engagement between government and population (Chapter 4)	
Brazil has long been a regional leader in mainstreaming transparency, yet only one-third of respondents (35%) – less than in other LAC countries-- believe that information about administrative procedures would be easily available, which is a significant driver of trust in the civil service.	Adopting a comprehensive approach to transparency, by proactively communicating the relevant information and data to people and providing guidance on how to access public information. Developing initiatives to strengthen inclusive communication.
Voter turnout in Brazil is high (around 80% for national elections), and federal and subnational governments have established innovative tools to promote political participation. However, when asked in April 2022, most Brazilian respondents were sceptical about whether they could have an effective political voice and meaningful engagement. Only one in three believe they could influence community decisions and only one in five believe the government would adopt ideas provided in public consultations, both important drivers of trust in public institutions.	Developing and strengthening participatory initiatives that incentivise and support political engagement, in particular reaching out to the most vulnerable groups and ensuring their representation in participatory engagement. Enhancing feedback and communication with people about how their views are considered in policymaking, potentially offering considerable improvement in trust levels.
The Trust Survey carried out in April 2022 finds that one-third (35%) of people in Brazil are confident in their ability to participate in politics, similar to the OECD average, and 61% believe initiatives for collective action in their community would succeed. Yet, political parties, the institution that ensures people's interests are represented in decision-making, are the least trusted institutions.	Improving people's attitudes about their ability to participate proactively in politics by sharing more information about political processes and opportunities to influence policies. Reinforcing political participation through measures such as participatory programmes in schools and strengthening political parties, for example by democratising candidate selection procedures or decision making.
Strengthening public integrity and reducing perceptions of corruption (Chapter 4)	
Perceptions of public integrity in Brazil are lower than perceptions of responsiveness, reliability, fairness, and openness. Most Brazilian respondents (60%) believe that public employees would accept a bribe for speeding up access to services, similar to the share in other Latin American countries.	Investing in providing integrity guidance for civil servants and training to support ethical leadership. Strengthening co-ordination across agencies and levels of government to mainstream integrity policies. Continuing to develop a whistle-blower regulation to lay the foundations for a regulatory framework.
Promoting fairness across public institutions (Chapter 4)	
Over a long period, Brazil succeeded in decreasing income inequality. Nevertheless, when consulted in April 2022, Brazilians reported high perceptions of unequal treatment and inequalities. According to the OECD Trust Survey, few people (19%) believe their application for government benefits would be treated fairly and the perception of fair treatment of applications is a significant driver of trust in government.	Increasing efforts to tackle structural inequalities and ensuring fair social and economic treatment of all population groups in political processes and in the interaction with public officials, for example by providing inclusiveness training to public officials and publishing data and results on population subgroups for an open debate.
Most people in Brazil are sceptical that public employees would treat all people equally, regardless of their economic status (62%) and their gender, ethnicity or sexual orientation (52%). At the same time, perceptions of fair treatment regardless of economic or demographic status are the most important drivers of trust in the civil service.	Investing in building a more diverse public workforce, aiming at greater representation of underrepresented groups. Extending this opportunity to all levels of government that are beyond the reach of federal agencies would be beneficial
Upgrading the measurement of trust to build a robust evidence-base (Chapter 2)	
The OECD Trust Survey finds that perceptions of reliability, fairness and openness are significant drivers of people trust in the federal government, civil service and local governments.	Regularly collecting data on the drivers of trust to monitor the evolution of trust, and to identify where to invest to preserve and strengthen trust in public institutions.
People with lower incomes, and lower levels of education, young people, and those with security concerns have consistently lower levels of trust in institutions.	Ensuring that survey samples are representative of the diversity of the population, by combining socio-economic characteristics. This would allow systematic analysis of the differences within and across population groups.

1 Trust and public governance in Brazil

This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of country-specific features that may affect public trust in Brazil. It delves into factors such as levels of inequality, interpersonal trust, as well as years of democratic experience, while examining the government's management of the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on trust. Moreover, it emphasises the importance of establishing trust as a deliberate policy objective and introduces the analytical framework that underpins this study.

People's trust in public institutions and the ability of these institutions to deliver according to their mandate can reinforce each other. Public institutions and social norms that encourage collective behaviours and create a stable and predictable environment may be a prerequisite for trust. In turn, trust improves compliance with public policies, reduces transaction costs, nurtures political participation, generates legitimacy and strengthens social cohesion (Putnam, 1993^[1]; Rothstein, 2000^[2]; Bergman, 2009^[3]; Güemes, 2016^[4]; Brezzi et al., 2021^[5]).

However, this does not mean that trust is an intrinsic or effortless outcome for modern democracies, and a certain amount of healthy scepticism can even lead to better policies if people's feedback is acknowledged and there are a range of mechanisms to keep the government accountable.

Public governance in Brazil has had a contrasting record over the past three decades. In the first decade of the 21st century, Brazil succeeded in pulling millions out of poverty thanks to robust economic growth, stabilisation of the country's finances, effective social programmes and growing demand for Brazilian commodities. Extreme poverty fell from roughly 15% in 2001 to a historic low of less than 4% in 2014 (Ferreira De Souza, 2022^[6]) and more than 30 million Brazilians rose from low-income to middle-income groups (Fausto and Fausto, 2014^[7]). These successes have to be set against insufficient service quality, recurring fiscal challenges and a tremendously fragmented political apparatus (World Bank, 2018^[8]; OECD, 2022^[9]). Despite championing a number of innovative approaches to meeting public governance challenges, Brazil still has to overcome gaps in their implementation. With a looming decline in the share of Brazilians of working-age, and a growing ageing population the country urgently needs to build on its earlier momentum to generate greater and more inclusive growth and to invest in its institutional capacities.

Making public trust an explicit policy objective could be crucial to navigating these challenges while preserving Brazil's hard-fought gains. As the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated, trust can help countries successfully handle complex crises where compliance with government public policies is key. In November 2022, OECD countries formally acknowledged the importance of "placing public trust at the centre of policies to deliver better for people and reinforce democracy" (OECD, 2022^[10]).

Yet, in line with trends across Latin American countries, public trust consistently declined during the last decades in Brazil (see Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2). As in many other countries, the COVID-19 crisis has only exacerbated this trend. This report discusses the reasons for this decline and the potential remedies, highlighting the main factors that affect trust in government in Brazil and identifying how policy and public governance mechanisms could reinforce them.

The analysis in this study relies mainly on the data collected through the OECD Trust Survey, carried out online in Brazil in April 2022. At the time of the survey, the country was still grappling with both the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and rising inflation, a highly polarised political environment during the presidential campaign for national elections and increased tensions between branches of government. The political and economic context when the data were collected has undoubtedly had an influence on the trust levels. Indeed, historical data indicate that the share of the public expressing trust in the government in Brazil and in Latin American countries has fluctuated significantly over the past 30 years, although remaining, on average, at around 30%. Major peaks in public trust are observed after national elections and the beginning of economic cycles (see Chapter 2), underscoring the importance of the wider context to people's perceptions and attitudes.

Trust in government depends on many factors, at both the individual and societal levels. The OECD Framework on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions together with the OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions (OECD, 2017^[11]; Brezzi et al., 2021^[5]) focus predominantly on governments' competence and values as the determinants of trust in public institutions, but also consider cultural and political drivers, and governments' capacity to meet global and intergenerational challenges. Both the framework and the survey provide innovative analytical and measurement tools to enable governments to better serve their citizens and allow a thorough assessment of people's perceptions and evaluations of public institutions, as well as the relationship between these variables and levels of trust.

Brazil is the fifth country to undertake an in-depth study on the drivers of trust in public institutions, after Korea (2018), Finland (2021), Norway (2022) and New Zealand (2023), and the first Latin American and non-OECD country to do so. Brazil is therefore taking a pioneering role, becoming the first country in the region to reflect in an in-depth analysis based on evidence and citizen feedback, about how to set trust as a policy objective and place it on the agenda for public sector improvement.¹ A government that sets trust as a policy objective clearly acknowledges that trust can affect policy outcomes (Box 1.1). It also considers how different initiatives might affect trust and help build trustworthy relationships between people and institutions. As the framework and the survey were originally developed for an OECD context, to ensure they reflected the country's priorities and were fit for purpose for the specific national and regional context, these two tools have undergone a comprehensive and collective review process. This study also paves the way for future analysis in other Latin American countries, as it already benefits from comparative evidence collected via the inaugural 2021 OECD Trust Survey (OECD, 2022_[12]), including two Latin American OECD countries, Colombia and Mexico.

Box 1.1. Trust and public governance

Public trust has been heralded as crucial for public governance. It has a positive impact and supports interactions between individuals, organisations and institutions. For instance, research has found it increases the acceptability of reforms and their likelihood of success (Heinemann and Tanz, 2008_[13]).

The COVID-19 pandemic provides one of the most recent and compelling examples of the effects of trust on public governance and policy results. Using data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and policy stringency from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker, Bargain and Aminjonov found that the efficiency of mobility reduction policies significantly increased with trust. People in high-trust regions reduced their mobility related to non-necessary activities significantly more than low-trust regions, showing better compliance with national health policies which in turn slowed the growth of the epidemic (Bargain and Aminjonov, 2020_[14]). Regression models' predictions calculate that an increase in trust to levels close to the 75th percentile might have reduced global infections by 12.9%, and research in 177 countries shows that higher levels of trust in government were associated with higher vaccine coverage (Bollyky et al., 2022_[15]).

A trust-based model of public sector management in the civil service places the emphasis on autonomy and mission-related tasks, rather than on reporting and performance measurement. For instance, in Norway, trust is a key element of the political-administrative culture and citizens have faith in the capacity of their civil servants to use public resources and implement qualitative policies (Haugsgjerd and Seggaard, 2020_[16]). In 2022, Norway put in place its *Trust Reform*, an initiative to adjust public sector management practices and strengthen collaboration among stakeholders, placing greater emphasis on the knowledge, experience and capacity of civil servants.

In turn, governments' confidence in their citizens' knowledge and experience begets willingness to consent and reciprocity (Cook, Hardin and Levi, 2007_[17]). Understanding trust as a two-way street has the potential to turn a vicious cycle of scepticism and dishonesty into a virtuous cycle of cooperation and participation (OECD, 2021_[18]). As such, government reforms and improvements in policies and services can have a large impact on rebuilding trust in government.

Source: (Bargain and Aminjonov, 2020_[14]; Bollyky et al., 2022_[15]; Haugsgjerd and Seggaard, 2020_[16]; Cook, Hardin and Levi, 2007_[17]; OECD, 2021_[18])

This report examines the complex relationship between public trust and democratic governance in Brazil. Carrying out the OECD Trust Survey in Brazil has provided new comparative evidence on how citizens experience and evaluate their government and public institutions in terms of their responsiveness, reliability, integrity, openness and fairness. These data are complemented by evidence on relevant Brazilian initiatives and policies gathered through in-depth interviews with key national stakeholders held

between March and June 2022 and a focus group with minority leaders from the Amazon region in July 2022, so as to provide a full picture of key public governance areas where the government can act in order to regain public trust and improve people's lives.

The report is organised as follows: this first chapter presents an overview of country-specific features that may affect public trust in Brazil aside from the competences and values of government institutions, including the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. It discusses the relevance of making trust an explicit policy objective and introduces the analytical framework constituting the basis of the study. Chapter 2 shows the results and main trends regarding levels of trust in public institutions in Brazil, as well as findings on the most statistically significant drivers of trust in federal and local governments, and the civil service, based on the results of the OECD Trust Survey. Chapters 3 and 4 dive into the survey results on the drivers of trust in public institutions, against the background of Brazil's relevant policies and initiatives, with Chapter 3 concentrating on competence and Chapter 4 on values. These chapters compare Brazil's results and policies to other countries' experiences and identify its public governance strengths and specific challenges. They identify the opportunities for improvement and provide the basis for a whole-of-government and whole-of-society reflection on how to strengthen trust and democratic governance.

1.1. Overall drivers of public trust in Brazil

Brazil has emerged as a strategic leader for sound public governance at the regional and global level. The country boasts the largest economy in the region and the eight largest in the world, with a GDP per capita of USD 8 860 (IMF, 2023^[19]). Part of the BRICS group of countries and the G20, it has played a leading role in regional and international organisations and has become the OECD's most engaged key partner over the last two decades (OECD, 2021^[20]). As the Latin American country with the largest population (215 million) and territory, it has a unique set of public governance challenges and regularly provides valuable policy experiences and insights on innovative approaches to address economic and governance challenges (Box 1.2). Brazil has made particular strides in the areas of civil service reform and open and digital government.

Brazilian bureaucracy is a top performer in terms of quality and efficiency in Latin America (Evans and Rauch, 1999^[21]; Güemes, 2019^[22]). According to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Civil Service Development Index, Brazil's federal civil service has one of the highest scores in the region (65 out of 100 points, compared to the regional average of 38). The civil service is undergoing an ongoing process of professionalisation, based on merit criteria, there are many safeguards against nepotism; and civil servants' technical skills have continuously improved (Cortázar Velarde, Lafuente and Sanginés, 2014^[23]; Souza, 2017^[24]). Indeed, 59% of Brazil's public sector workers have a tertiary education, compared to the global average of 47% (World Bank, 2023^[25]). Brazil was also one of the first countries to establish a national public sector innovation award (OECD, 2019^[26]) and encourages regular mobility schemes for civil servants in subnational units to promote the exchange of knowledge and build capacity across the public administration.

In addition, Brazil is one of the founding countries of the Open Government Partnership (OGP), which demonstrates its leadership and long-standing commitment to building open government, lasting for over a decade. Many Brazilian open government initiatives, such as the 2004 creation of the Transparency Portal, the more recent *ParticipaMaisBrasil* and *Fala.BR* platforms, as well as municipal participatory budgets first implemented in 1989, have inspired other countries and made Brazil a leader in this area (OECD, 2022^[27]). Furthermore, since 2015 the federal government has been moving towards a digital public sector and governance. It has done so by setting policy priorities and advancing initiatives to enhance connectivity, interoperability, open government data and citizen-driven service delivery (OECD, 2018^[28]). According to the 2019 Open Useful Re-usable Data (*OURdata*) Index, Brazil is a top-performer in making data available and ensuring its usability, scoring substantially above the Latin American average

and slightly above the OECD one. By 2018, access to the Internet had been extended to 72% of its population, compared to 50% in 2013 (OECD, 2020^[29]).

Box 1.2. Some leading initiatives to address economic and governance challenges in Brazil


- The 1988 Constitution, also known as the “Citizens Constitution”, is exceptionally progressive in the social area. It comprises a broad set of obligations towards citizens, such as the provision of free education and healthcare for everyone.
- In 2003, Brazil put in place the *Bolsa Família*, a conditional cash transfer programme aiming to support families living in poverty or extreme poverty and expanding access to education and health service. As the largest programme of its kind in the world, it became a model for several countries.
- In 2007, Brazil established the Ethics Management System of the Federal Executive Branch (*Sistema de Gestão da Ética do Poder Executivo Federal*- SGEP), and in 2021, it established the Public Integrity System of the Federal Executive Branch (*Sistema de Integridade Pública do Poder Executivo Federal*- SIPEF). Both initiatives are key to strengthening integrity policies and ensuring their mainstreaming in the Federal Executive.
- In 2011 Brazil adopted its Law 12.527/2011 on Access to Information. The legal framework has a very broad scope: everyone can access information, and it covers all material held by or on behalf of public authorities.
- In 2017, Law 13.460/2017 established specific rights and mechanisms for users to participate in the delivery and evaluation of public services, as well as the creation of councils of users as formal and permanent mechanisms for citizen participation.
- In 2019, Brazil revamped its better regulation efforts with the introduction of the Law of Regulatory Agencies (Law 13.848/2019) and the Economic Freedom Act (Law 13.874/2019). These legal documents set the foundations for the adoption of tools such as the regulatory impact analysis (RIA) and define the obligation for public consultation of regulatory proposals in the regulatory agencies.
- In 2021, following Law 14.133/2021 it a unified registration system was created, available on the National Portal for Public Procurement (*Portal Nacional de Contratações Públicas*- PNCP). It allows unified registration of bidders but also facilitates public access to the register.

Source: (Fausto and Fausto, 2014^[7]; OECD, 2021^[30]; OECD, 2022^[27]; Centre for Public Impact, 2019^[31]), in-depth interviews carried out in occasion of this study during June 2022.

Despite this broad range of sound governance initiatives, Brazil has historically been a country with low-to-moderate and declining levels of trust, similar to trends in other countries of the region (Figure 1.1 and Figure 2.2). Trust tends to be a volatile measure and people regularly change their beliefs and perceptions, so trust in government and other public institutions has naturally varied over time, mainly following economic and electoral cycles. For instance, following the commodities boom in the early 2000s, Brazil experienced a peak in levels of trust, with 51% of the population reporting having confidence in the national government. Conversely, following the impeachment and Dilma Rousseff’s removal from office, trust in government dropped quickly, reaching an all-time low of 17% in 2017. According to the Gallup World Poll, in 2022, 39% of people in Brazil reported having confidence in the national government. This share was similar to the Latin American and the Caribbean average and still below the levels of trust reported prior to the 2008 global financial crisis (OECD, 2020^[32]).

Figure 1.1. Confidence in the national government in Brazil is close to the regional average

Share of respondents who indicate confidence in the government in 2022 and its change compared to 2011



Note: Data refer to the percentage of people who answered “yes” to the question “Do you have confidence in your national Government?”. The percentage points change since 2011 is shown with yellow dots.

Source: Gallup World Poll, 2023.

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
1.1.1. Levels of interpersonal trust are low in Brazil, fuelling general scepticism

The academic literature suggests that there is a strong reciprocal link between interpersonal and institutional trust. Although there are still no conclusive results about the causal direction between these two types of trust (Denters, Gabriel and Torcal, 2007^[33]), socially trusting individuals tend to be politically trusting (Zmerli and Newton, 2008^[34]). For instance, a study in Australia concluded that if people trust their family and friends, they would have higher trust in their local and national representatives and government (Job, 2005^[35]), and another study using data from the European Social Survey in Finland found that interpersonal trust had also a strong impact on all levels of political trust (Bäck and Kestilä, 2009^[36]). At the same time, other research postulates that there is a reciprocal relationship between interpersonal trust and institutional trust (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005^[37]). The mechanisms through which the two types of trust influence each other appear intuitive: interpersonal trust may be high in places where people can be confident that institutions will function impartially and effectively in the event of a conflict. In turn, trust among people promotes co-operative behaviour and curbs opportunistic exchanges, reducing incentives for free riding, and thus having a positive impact on the provision of public goods.

Brazilian people, as with most Latin Americans (OECD et al., 2021^[38]), are not only sceptical about public institutions, but also report strikingly low levels of trust for each other (Figure 1.2). According to data from the Latinobarometer, in 2020, only 4.7% of people in Brazil declared they could trust most people, the lowest share in Latin America. This is in line with previous studies (Power, 2009^[39]). In a recent report by the IDB, the especially high correlation between interpersonal and public mistrust in Latin America is also explained by the high levels of inequalities and low levels of social cohesion in the region (Scartascini, 2022^[40]).


Figure 1.2. Interpersonal trust in Brazil is lower than in most countries in the region

Share of respondents who indicate trust in other people in Brazil and LAC, 2020



Note: Figure shows the share responding “One can trust most people” to the question: “Generally speaking, would you say that you can trust most people, or that you can never be too careful in dealing with others?”.

Source: Latinobarometer, 2020.

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
1.1.2. High levels of inequality in the region may be driving low levels of trust

Low levels of trust could be linked to persistent inequalities in Brazil, and more generally in Latin America (Figure 1.3). Brazil is marked by a high degree of income inequality (48.9 on the Gini Index), above the average in Latin America (45.3) (OECD et al., 2022^[41]) and around 70 million Brazilians still have family incomes below twice the minimum salary (Fausto and Fausto, 2014^[7]). The richest 10% of Brazilian people have an average income per capita over 50 times that of the poorest 10% (World Bank, 2022^[42]), and there is a widespread perception that these deep inequalities need to be remedied (Reis, 2015^[43]). After significant declines in income inequality following the commodity boom, poverty reduction has decelerated in Brazil in recent years –as it has in other Latin American countries. The country, together with the region, remain among the most unequal in the world (OECD et al., 2021^[38]).

High levels of inequality create sharp divisions in society and fuel social discontent, which structurally undermines social capital and public trust (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005^[37]; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002^[44]). Indeed, the academic literature has long argued that economic equality is the strongest determinant of interpersonal trust and when “inequality increases, the belief that we have a shared fate—we are part of the same moral community—becomes untenable” (Uslaner, 2004^[45]). Furthermore, in highly unequal societies, individuals become more concerned about their economic status, which encourages competition and reduces incentives for cooperation. A study using data from the General Social Survey found that in years in which income inequality was particularly high, people in the United States displayed lower levels of trust (Oishi, Kesebir and Diener, 2011^[46]). The dynamics between inequality and trust go both ways. For instance, low levels of interpersonal trust were found to affect inequality by undermining support for redistributive policies (Bergh and Bjørnskov, 2014^[47]). These elements suggest that trust is crucially affected not only by individual but also by collective experiences.


Figure 1.3. Low levels of trust are associated with high levels of inequality

Gini index of income inequality of a country (X-axis) and percentage of people who reported having confidence in other people (Y-axis)



Note: This scatterplot presents the Gini coefficient for 2021 or the latest available year on the X-axis. The Gini coefficient is a standard measure of inequality representing the income distribution of the population within a given country. It takes the value of 0 when all households have identical income and 100 when one household has all the income. The Y-axis presents the share of respondents who responded “yes” to the question “Do you have confidence in other people?”.

Source: Gallup World Poll (interpersonal trust) and OECD Income Distribution Database and World Bank Poverty and Inequality Platform (Gini coefficient).

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1.1.3. Public governance and institutional settings in Brazil have a significant impact on trust

Policy settings, institutional arrangements and public governance processes can contribute to raising levels of trust. Long-standing academic research has found the performance and reputation of institutions to be important factors contributing to trust (Bouckaert, 2012^[48]; Van de Walle and Migchelbrink, 2020^[49]).

Brazil’s levels of trust and its failures to capitalise on its sound public governance initiatives may be explained by the limitations of its existing initiatives and institutional features. For instance, in-depth studies on several public governance aspects have found substantial room for improvement, in particular in implementation, and that the territorial and administrative organisation of the government is a cross-cutting challenge (OECD, 2018^[28]; OECD, 2020^[50]; OECD, 2022^[51]; OECD, 2022^[27]). As a federal country, the federal government, states, and municipalities in Brazil share responsibilities, competences and resources, which make policy and service design, delivery and evaluation more complex, especially when coupled with persistent and large regional disparities (OECD, 2013^[52]).

Indeed, federalism combined with other features of the Brazilian politico-institutional environment, such as a highly fragmented multiparty system and coalitional presidentialism,² have tended to generate centrifugal effects and fragmentation of power (Galvacante and Gomide, 2016^[53]; Samuels, 2008^[54]). While checks and balances were explicitly designed to limit abuses of power, promote consensual decision-making through power-sharing and enhance horizontal accountability, they carry a number of risks. In particular, these characteristics could generate challenges to governability, most importantly because they multiply veto powers. Such veto powers can be an obstacle to consensus-building and increase opportunities for corruption (Tavits, 2007^[55]). One result may be incremental and slower policy changes. These veto powers

can also make it more difficult for voters to attribute clear responsibility for government performance to a given party, hindering their ability to hold governments (and parties) accountable (Angelova, König and Proksch, 2016^[56]).


Chapters 3 and 4 of this report, address specific public governance aspects related to the government's competences (Chapter 3) and values (Chapter 4), investigating their role as key drivers of public trust. Before diving into those, it is worth also considering that Brazil is a relatively “young” democracy (Center for Systemic Peace, 2021^[57]), which can affect people's political attitudes (Box 1.3) and make it difficult to establish the rule of law throughout the territory (Fausto and Fausto, 2014^[7]).

Box 1.3. Democratic experience and public trust in Brazil

According to the academic literature, in long-standing democracies, the prolonged experience with democratic institutions, the existence of stable values and norms of interaction between citizens, and the existence of spaces for political participation are conducive to the development of institutional trust (LETKI and EVANS, 2005^[58]; Letki, 2018^[59]). In these political systems, trust in institutions overall and support for democracy are more likely to be internalised and somewhat detached from the performance of a given government or institution. In other words, citizens are more likely to separate their evaluation of specific governments from their attitudes towards the political system, the regime and institutions. In more recent democracies, where citizens have limited experience of democratic institutions, the performance of institutions and governments matters a great deal (Letki, 2018^[59]; Catterberg, 2006^[60]). Indeed, the data show a correlation between age of democracy and trust (Figure 1.4).


Figure 1.4. Trust in government is associated with a longer history of democracy

Number of years a country has been democratised (X-axis) and percentage of people who reported high or moderately high trust in their government (Y-axis)



Note: This scatterplot presents the number of years a country has been democratised against the share of respondents who reported high or moderately high trust in the national government (“On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the national government?”). “High or moderately high trust” corresponds to responses of 6-10.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>) and Polity Project (<https://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>)

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Most countries in Latin America have only had a few decades of undisturbed democratic rule (Hagopian and Mainwaring, 2001^[61]), and commitment to democracy is only loosely established among their populations (Cohen, Lupu and Zechmeister, 2017^[62]). In Brazil, military intervention in politics was a key component of political behaviour during the 1950s and early 1960s (Carvalho, 2019^[63]), and though the most recent re-democratisation effort formally ended in 1988-89, this former authoritarian rule can still influence political attitudes and values. During interviews carried out for this study, researchers emphasised that Brazilians' attitudes, such as strong support for statism, are linked to long periods of authoritarianism, and that is also why Brazilians generally associate the figure of the president with the state.

According to Carvalho, the development of citizenship in Brazil was the inverse of the historical process in Western democracies as social rights preceded all other rights (Carvalho, 2002^[64]). They were first implemented during Vargas' government (1930-1945), during a period of suppression of political rights and limitations on civil rights. Civil rights only became effective during the most recent transition to democracy, along with the renaissance of political rights. Citizenship rights were handed out by political elites and government authorities, rather than being demanded by people, which has affected the efficiency and representativeness of the political system (Fausto and Fausto, 2014^[7]). This unique sequence is thought to affect the nature of citizenship in Brazil, in particular the way Brazilian people relate to their government and institutions.

1.2. Brazil's response to COVID-19 and its impact on trust

The COVID-19 pandemic has affected countries throughout the world and required direct government intervention to control the disease and its socio-economic impacts. Government responses have varied significantly in both scale and effectiveness. Their success in limiting the public health and economic consequences of COVID-19 have partially hinged on their ability to leverage public trust to increase the effectiveness of public health interventions. Many of the key policies and interventions deployed to curb the effects of the pandemic, such as lockdowns, mask mandates and vaccination campaigns, required a high degree of compliance, which is likely to increase where there is confidence in the public authorities' advice. Countries with higher levels of trust in government had lower infection rates, even when adjusted for other factors (Bollyky et al., 2022^[65]). At the same time, more effective public responses to the pandemic might be expected to result in higher levels of trust in government.

1.2.1. The COVID-19 pandemic in Brazil was marked by low levels of trust

In 2020, Latin America became the epicentre of the pandemic mainly due to its rapid spread in Brazil, which was ranking second in deaths worldwide at the time (Castro et al., 2021^[66]). This happened despite Brazil's reasonably well-structured universal healthcare system (Barberia and Gómez, 2020^[67]; Algan et al., 2021^[68]). The *Sistema Único de Saúde* (SUS), established in 1988, is the largest publicly funded healthcare system in the world, reaching more than 150 million people. Together with other initiatives, such as the *Estratégia de Saúde da Família* for primary healthcare, it has proved quite effective. For instance, over the past two decades, infant mortality rates have decreased by 60% and life expectancy increased from 70.2 years in 2000 to 75.9 years in 2019 (OECD, 2021^[69]).

Despite its robust public healthcare and their positive perceptions prior to the pandemic, experts have evaluated the Brazilian government's reaction to the COVID-19 outbreak quite negatively. A study analysing how fast countries adopted strict social isolation measures shows that Brazil delayed the longest in the region (Rebouças Batista, Domingos and Lins, 2020^[70]). This is backed up by another study based on data from state health offices carried out between February and October 2020, which concluded that the country's response to the virus was too slow, highly uncoordinated and reproduced existent inequalities (Castro et al., 2021^[66]).

The political crisis concerning the management of the pandemic contributed to conflicts between subnational and federal executive governments³ and was fed by widespread mis- and disinformation campaigns with anti-science narratives. Brazil is one of the countries where trust in scientists has decreased the most during the pandemic – falling even further than trust in government (Algan et al., 2021^[68]). The pandemic appears to also have entrenched polarisation, with ideological preferences becoming predictors of trust. For instance, data from a national survey carried out by the *Instituto da Democracia* show that respondents who supported the president tended to believe more false statements, such as that the pandemic could be fought by chloroquine or that the virus was created by a foreign government.⁴ Another study in the country found that although scientists were the most trusted source of COVID-19 information amongst Brazilian people, trust in official sources varied widely according to political ideology. Individuals towards the right of the political spectrum on average placed more trust in the federal government, while those with left-leaning tendencies tended to distrust the federal government in favour of the World Health Organization and news media (Meneguello and Porto, 2021^[71]). Further, while only one-third of respondents correctly identified misinformation about COVID-19, those on the political right were significantly more likely to hold misinformed beliefs (Rossini and Kalogeropoulos, 2021^[72]). In this regard, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, levels of trust might have become more dependent on ideology and political alignment.

In contrast to many countries, where there was a surge of trust in government during the first months of the COVID-19 outbreak (Brezzi et al., 2021^[5]), governance of the pandemic negatively and sharply affected Brazilians' levels of trust in the government (Meneguello and Porto, 2021^[71]). The president's approval ratings dropped by nine percentage points⁵ and Brazilian people's confidence in their public health system was also negatively affected. A study based on data from a cross-sectional online survey implemented in 2020 showed that in Brazil, two-thirds of participants (66.3%) trusted the health system, but confidence was significantly higher among those with private health insurance (Giordani et al., 2021^[73]). Moreover, these effects could be long-lasting. The OECD Trust Survey found that only 23.1% of respondents in Brazil believed the government would be prepared to handle a future pandemic, and findings across OECD countries show that positive perceptions about government preparedness are positively correlated with trust (Figure 1.5).

Figure 1.5. Positive perceptions about government preparedness are associated with higher trust in government, and vice versa

Share of respondents reporting high or moderately high trust in national government (Y-axis) and share of respondents who consider it likely that government institutions will be prepared to protect people's lives in the event of a future pandemic (X-axis), 2021-2022



Note: Trust in the national government corresponds to responses of 6-10 to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust your national government?”. For Mexico and New Zealand, trust in civil servants is used in lieu of trust in the national government as respondents were not asked about trust in the national government. Confidence in the government’s pandemic preparedness corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10 to the question “If a new serious contagious disease spreads, how likely or unlikely do you think is it that government institutions will be prepared to protect people’s lives?”. OECD presents the unweighted average of responses across countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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1.2.2. The pandemic nevertheless highlighted some strengths which Brazil can build on to foster more trust

Despite this somewhat gloomy picture, the pandemic also brought to the fore some of the factors underpinning the resilience at the core of Brazilian public governance and democracy. First, Brazil was quite successful in terms of vaccination rates, despite the polarisation generated by the unique political and global context. Although starting after the United States and countries in the European Union, Brazil’s vaccination rates overtook those of the United States in November 2021, capitalising on Brazil’s long history of successful vaccination campaigns (de Souza e Silva and Araujo, 2022^[74]). A study analysing the effect of trust in the government on social distancing measures in Brazil during the COVID-19 pandemic found that trust in government positively affected and explains people’s adoption of such measures, suggesting that the *bond between government and society, developed through citizens’ trust in government, contributed to more effective combatting of COVID-19* (da Silva et al., 2021^[75]).

Moreover, people’s trust in each other was markedly higher during the pandemic than in the pre-2020 period. According to Gallup World Poll, in 2020, 14% of Brazilian respondents reported trusting people in their neighbourhood (and Figure 1.2). If sustained, this may imply a positive legacy. In addition, a study carried out by São Paulo University and qualitative research found that in the initial stages of the outbreak support for others and solidarity rose among Brazilian people (Petra et al., 2022^[76]).

In addition to this resurgence of interpersonal trust, the courts played a crucial role in the effective management of the pandemic. The Federal Supreme Court was able to strike down provisions that

restricted the publication of COVID-19 governmental data, based on the constitutional right of Access to Information (Meyer and Bustamante, 2021^[77]). The court demanded that public servants follow scientific and technical criteria when designing and implementing policies. It allowed the states and municipalities to base their health measures on technical and scientific data collected by them, and not just those collected by the federal government. The same principle allowed states and municipalities to restrict the circulation of people to avoid the spread of the virus.

Furthermore, Brazil has seen a decline in support for military intervention in politics between 2018-2020, and an improvement in the evaluation of public institutions. For instance, according to data from the *Instituto da Democracia*, levels of mistrust in the Congress fell by around ten percentage points.⁶ The fact that the judiciary and legislative branches exercised checks and balances on the executive during the pandemic, may have reinvigorated positive perceptions of horizontal accountability and avoided deepening a democratic crisis among the Brazilian public (Avritzer and Rennó, 2021^[78]).

1.3. The OECD approach to understanding the drivers of trust in public institutions

In acknowledgement of the importance of trust for public governance, the OECD has worked to support countries in enhancing trust in public institutions for over a decade. After the 2008 global financial crisis eroded trust in governments, with profound implications for countries' democratic foundations, countries at the 2013 OECD Ministerial Council Meeting called for “strengthen[ed] efforts to understand trust in public institutions and its influence on economic performance and well-being”. Following this call, the OECD built a conceptual framework – the OECD Framework on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions – and statistical guidelines for measuring the drivers of trust in public institutions.

The OECD defines trust as “a person’s belief that another person or institution will act consistently with their expectations of positive behaviour”. This implies that trust offers a key shorthand for information used in social interactions and implies that others, individuals or institutions, will as act as expected, either in a particular action or in a set of actions (OECD, 2017^[79]). Trust in government, therefore, would imply that citizens expect their governments to fulfil their mandate, with integrity and competence, acting in pursuit of the broader public interest.

The analytical framework was proposed after a thorough review of the literature to operationalise alternative measures of trust in public institutions and to link the policy discussion on trust more closely to an actionable reform agenda. People’s attitudes have been weak predictors of their actual behaviour, so, the framework assesses the “trustworthiness” of institutions rather than trust in institutions per se. While trust has been commonly captured by measuring attitudes, trustworthiness is traditionally associated with expectations about future behaviour. Building “trustworthy” institutions is something that governments and policies can affect.

Trust is an intangible but key societal asset, so essential it can only be ignored when it is widespread. Yet, trust is also fragile: while it takes time to establish, it can be lost quickly. It may be based on experience, and as such is often subjective, based as much on interpretation or perception as on facts (OECD, 2017^[79]).

Following long-standing academic research (Bouckaert, 2012^[48]; Van de Walle and Migchelbrink, 2020^[49]), the OECD framework mainly focuses on two broad components of governance to guide public efforts to recover trust in government institutions:

- competence, which seeks to capture the degree to which institutions are responsive and reliable in delivering policies and services;
- values, which include the degree to which institutions operate with openness, integrity and fairness.

In addition to the country-specific impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, the global health and socio-economic crisis also led to a reflection on the analytical framework on the drivers of trust in public institutions. The pandemic took place amidst ongoing concerns about the ability of democratic governments to address globalisation and digitalisation, steer the needed green transformation of societies, and maintain social cohesion in the face of growing political polarisation. The framework has therefore been reviewed with the aim of addressing and guiding public efforts to recover trust in government during and after the crisis. The review used a consultative process⁷ to unpack the links between public trust and democratic governance, to help countries identify effective responses to shocks and strengthen their democratic governance models to tackle major challenges. As a result, the OECD Framework on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions (Table 1.1) also focuses on building back more inclusively – e.g. by taking into account socio-economic, political and cultural differences, and generating buy-in to address challenging, long-term, intergenerational issues, like climate change (Brezzi et al., 2021^[5]).

Table 1.1. OECD Framework of the Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions, 2022

Levels of trust in different public institutions		
Trust in national government, local government, civil service, parliament, police, political parties, courts, legal systems and intergovernmental organisations		
Public governance drivers of trust in public institutions		
Competencies	<i>Responsiveness</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide efficient, quality, affordable, timely and citizen-centred public services that are co-ordinated across levels of government and satisfy users. Develop an innovative and efficient civil service that responds to user needs.
	<i>Reliability</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Anticipate needs and assess evolving challenges. Minimise uncertainty in the economic, social and political environment. Effectively commit to future-oriented policies and co-operate with stakeholders on global challenges.
Values	<i>Openness</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide open and accessible information so the public better understands what government is doing. Consult, listen, and respond to stakeholders, including through citizen participation and engagement opportunities that lead to tangible results. Ensure there are equal opportunities to be part of and participate in the institutions of representative democracy.
	<i>Integrity</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Align public institutions with ethical values, principles, and norms to safeguard the public interest. Take decisions and use public resources ethically, promoting the public interest over private interests while combating corruption. Ensure accountability mechanisms between public institutions at all levels of governance. Promote a neutral civil service whose values and standards of conduct uphold and prioritise the public interest.
	<i>Fairness</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improve living conditions for all. Provide consistent treatment of businesses and people regardless of their background and identity (e.g. gender, socio-economic status, racial/ethnic origin).
Cultural, economic and political drivers of trust in public institutions		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Individual and group identities, traits, and preferences, including socio-economic status; interpersonal socialisation and networks. Distrust of and disengagement from the system. 		
Perception of government action on intergenerational and global challenges		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Perceptions of government commitment to and effectiveness in addressing long-term challenges. 		

Source: (Brezzi et al., 2021^[5])

Finally, the experience of the pandemic and the tangible effects trust had on governance outcomes highlight the need to better understand the different roles of mistrust and distrust to inform and strengthen governments' trust-building strategies. Mistrust implies that vigilant and well-informed people base their evaluations on what public institutions deliver (Devine et al., 2020^[80]). In fact, mistrust and critical citizens are key for the functioning of democracies. Critical citizens are more likely to engage in political activities and make public representatives and officials accountable for their work.

Conversely, distrust is associated with a heuristic response based on intrinsic beliefs or biases, which do not reflect actual performance but instead endemic cynicism and expectations of betrayal (Thomson and Heinz, 2019^[81]). Distrust reflects suspicious attitudes towards others, and the belief that the other is untrustworthy. It is often driven by moral and normative behaviours that may be affected by misinformation and not solely by government actions (Devine et al., 2020^[80]). Cynicism and distrust may fuel disengagement and nurture populist responses that can, in turn, undermine democracies.

The OECD framework and the survey derived from it provide guidance on measuring trust, and how to monitor it over time and analyse the factors that may drive it in the future. As such, it could prove instrumental in making governments more accountable to their citizens.

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Notes

¹ Colombia and Mexico participated in the inaugural OECD Trust Survey, implemented in 22 OECD countries in 2021-2022. Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico, the four Latin American OECD countries, will also participate in the 2023 OECD Trust Survey. In addition, Chile is carrying out a similar in-depth study on drivers of trust in public institutions in 2024.

² According to the *Electoral Index* dataset, Brazil has one of the largest number of political parties in the world (Gallagher, 2023^[82]). During interviews carried out as part of this study, experts pointed that a large number of parties, which is partially a consequence of flexible electoral rules, makes governability possible but very “costly”: coalitions are heterogenous, negotiations and bargaining frequent and this could have negative impacts on trust.

³ On one side, the federal government favoured a more centralised kind of federalism in terms of decision-making and decreased federal funding; on the other hand, in face of federal inaction, governors and mayors acted with more autonomy in fighting the disease (Rebouças Batista, Domingos and Lins, 2020^[70]) (Abrucio et al., 2020^[83]).

⁴ <https://noticias.uol.com.br/colunas/a-cara-da-democracia/2021/05/25/dados-mostram-a-relacao-entre-o-bolsonarismo-e-a-desinformacao-na-pandemia.htm>

⁵ Covid-19 has given most world leaders a temporary rise in popularity | The Economist <https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2020/05/09/covid-19-has-given-most-world-leaders-a-temporary-rise-in-popularity>.

⁶ <https://www.institutodademocracia.org/blog/categories/a-cara-da-democracia-no-brasil>.

⁷ The consultative process was entitled “Building a New Paradigm for Public Trust”, and engaged over 800 policy makers, civil servants, researchers, data providers and representatives from the private and non-profit sectors across six webinars between 2020 and 2021 (www.oecd.org/fr/gov/webinar-series-building-a-new-paradigm-for-public-trust.htm).

2 Trust in public institutions and its main drivers in Brazil

This chapter presents the results of the OECD Survey on the Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions conducted in Brazil during April 2022. It provides a detailed analysis of the main drivers of trust in the federal government, local government and the civil service. Where possible, the chapter provides meaningful and insightful comparisons between trust levels in Brazil and other surveyed Latin American OECD countries, as well as OECD average, offering valuable context to the findings.

This chapter presents the results of the OECD Survey on the Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions (OECD Trust Survey) carried out in Brazil, after considering the adjustments made to the original survey that was carried out in 22 OECD countries at the end of 2021 (OECD, 2022^[1]). It then provides an overall analysis of the main drivers of trust in the federal government, the local government and the civil service, which is expanded in Chapters 3 and 4. Where possible, it compares results in Brazil with trust levels in other surveyed Latin American OECD countries, and the OECD average. While this chapter relies predominantly on data compiled through the OECD Trust Survey it also makes use of relevant secondary sources when discussing factors underpinning public trust in Brazil and in Latin America.

The analysis in the study relies mainly on the data collected through the OECD Trust Survey, carried out online in Brazil in April 2022. At the time of the survey, the country was still grappling with the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, while experiencing rising inflation, a highly polarised political environment during the presidential campaign for national elections and increased tensions between branches of government.

2.1. Measuring drivers of trust and the OECD Survey

The OECD Trust Survey is a new measurement tool for democratic governments seeking to improve public governance and reinforce trust. It is the first cross-national investigation dedicated specifically to identifying the drivers of public trust across levels of government and across public institutions (OECD, 2022^[1]). The results of the inaugural OECD Trust Survey, implemented in 2021 in 22 OECD countries, provide a cross-national stocktake of the complex relationship between public trust and democratic governance and constitute a baseline to inform policy making in various areas of public governance.

The 2021 OECD Trust Survey (Box 2.1) has been the subject of extensive reflections and testing since 2017. It has been revised and expanded based on methodological suggestions and empirical lessons reflected in the OECD Guidelines on Measuring Trust (OECD, 2017^[2]); the TrustLab project (Murtin et al., 2018^[3]), a consultative process “*Building a New Paradigm for Public Trust*” that took place through six workshops during 2020-2021; the updated conceptual Framework on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions (Brezzi et al., 2021^[4]); in-depth case studies conducted in Finland, Korea, New Zealand and Norway (OECD/KDI, 2018^[5]; OECD, 2021^[6]; OECD, 2022^[7]; OECD, 2023^[8]); and discussions held at the OECD Public Governance Committee in 2021 (GOV/PGC/RD(2021)) and at the OECD Committee for Statistics and Statistical Policy in 2020 (SDD/CSSP(2020)).

Box 2.1. The inaugural 2021 OECD Trust Survey

The 2021 OECD Trust Survey carried out by the OECD Directorate for Public Governance had significant country coverage. There were around 2 000 respondents per country in the 22 participating countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom. These large samples facilitate subgroup analysis and help ensure the reliability of the results.

Most countries were surveyed in November-December 2021, with a few surveys taking place in January-February 2022.

The surveys were conducted online by YouGov, national statistical offices (in the cases of Finland, Ireland, Mexico and the United Kingdom), national research institutes (Iceland) or survey research firms (New Zealand and Norway). The survey uses a non-probability sampling approach, based on ex ante country-level quotas representative of the population by age, gender, level of education and region. This type of sample construction was the most feasible option for the OECD Trust Survey given its simplicity, timeliness and lower cost of implementing the survey, which took place in the same period in a large number of countries. The quotas were derived from national estimates of group prevalence based on probabilistic surveys, census data or administrative data.

The survey process and implementation were guided by an Advisory Group comprised of public officials from OECD member countries, representatives of National Statistical Offices and international experts.

Source: (OECD, 2022^[1]; Nguyen et al., 2022^[9])

The OECD Trust Survey's measurement approach focuses on situational questions (OECD, 2017^[2]). Rather than typical behavioural questions, the survey does not ask respondents about individual behaviour but rather on the conduct they expect from a third party, in this case a public institution, a civil servant or a representative political figure. A battery of 15 core questions assess the trustworthiness of these third parties in alignment with the competence (responsiveness and reliability) and values (openness, integrity and fairness) expected of public institutions as included in the OECD Framework on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions (Box 1.4 in Chapter 1).

The OECD Trust Survey uses an 11-point scale for the response choices on questions about levels of trust and drivers of trust, following reviewed best practice and applications in country studies. The questions on trust use a numerical 0-10 scale with verbal scale anchors, as this allows for variance in responses, increases overall data quality and complexity, and facilitates translatability across languages. The scale offers more nuanced analysis, allowing respondents to provide a "neutral" response that other surveys do not.

2.1.1. Ensuring the analytical and measurement tool is fit for purpose in Brazil

The OECD Trust Survey as implemented in Brazil (Box 2.2) includes the core questions on drivers, in order to ensure comparability of data, as well as additional questions introduced to capture some specific aspects of Brazil, and more generally of Latin American countries (find the complete questionnaire in Annex B).

To ensure that the analytical framework and the survey address the most relevant drivers of trust in public institutions in Brazil, the OECD set up an Advisory Group, comprising academics, policy makers, representatives from statistical offices, international organisations and experts, which discussed the context-specific factors that may have an impact on trust, and proposed adjustments to the survey questions and modalities.

Box 2.2. Methodological notes: The implementation of the survey in Brazil

The OECD Trust Survey in Brazil was implemented online by Netquest using a sample of 4 140 respondents between 7 April and 6 May 2022. The average response time of the questionnaire was 19 minutes.

Survey respondents were residents in Brazil aged 18 years and over. 3 723 respondents were part of Netquest's own online panel; and 417 from a partner company. The partner company's panel ensured that the survey was sent out to and answered by a sufficient number of people with low levels of education.

The survey sample is representative of Brazil's population by education, age, gender, residency in the five main Brazilian regions, and socio-economic groups (Critério Brasil/ABEP),¹ following the distributions of the most recent *Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística* (IBGE) Census (Table 2.1). Post-stratification weights were used in the analysis to ensure the sample was fully representative.

Table 2.1. Composition of the weighted sample by gender, age, region, level of education and socio-economic category

	Groups	%
Age	18-29	30.5%
	30-49	38.9%
	50+	40.6%
Gender	Female	50.7%
	Male	49.3%
Education	Low	52%
	Medium	33%
	High	15%
Region	Norte	8.6%
	Nordeste	7.6%
	Sudeste	41.9%
	Sul	14.3%
	Centro- Oeste	7.6%
Socioeconomic Category	A	2.8%
	B1	4.6%
	B2	16.4%
	C1	21.6%
	C2	26.1%
	D-E	28.5%

1. The Brazil Economic Classification Criteria (Critério Brasil-ABEP) classifies households in five groups (A-E) estimating the purchasing power of urban individuals and families. It assesses access to public utility services, householder's education and possession of several amenities (such as bathroom, dishwasher, freezer, etc.) (ABEP, 2021). For some analysis in this report and in order to aggregate results categories are grouped.

Note: The survey's drop-out rate was 11%. One caveat to highlight is that the survey sample is not representative by state. Therefore, it does not present data or allow analysis at the state level, which is of utmost importance given regional disparities in the country.

Source: Netquest, 2022

After taking discussions held by the Advisory Group into consideration, and also making several methodological revisions (such as of the wording of questions), the trust survey questionnaire included six additional questions piloted in Brazil (Box 2.3).

Box 2.3. Questionnaire revisions

Country and context considerations underscored by the Advisory Group:

- In Brazil, as is the case more broadly in Latin America “clientelist” relations could be widespread (Rocha, Souza and Araújo, 2019^[10]; Koster and Eiró, 2021^[11]). Clientelism involves a personal dependence that is based on the mutual exchange of favours between two people who control unequal resources (Medard, 1976^[12]). It affects people’s perceptions about government, as they often tend to link the provision of public goods with social or political brokers.
- Informality is a key challenge in Latin America which hinders tackling poverty and addressing inequality, thus undermining people’s trust. According to the latest Latin American Economic Outlook, on average, almost half (45.3%) of people in Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC) countries live in a household that depends solely on informal employment, and 21.7% live in households with formal and informal workers (OECD et al., 2022^[13]).
- During the early 1990s Brazil became a regional exemplar of social participation, but political participation has fallen significantly in the last decade (Avritzer, 2017^[14]). Participation encourages the sense of having a stake in collective endeavours; civic-minded citizens participate more frequently and tend to have higher levels of trust than passive citizens (Almond and Verba, 1963^[15]; Prats and Meunier, 2021^[16]).
- Several studies have documented how the use of social media has a key impact on people’s political attitudes and behaviour in Brazil (Duque and Smith, 2019^[17]). The lack of regulation and the speed with which information spreads increase the risks of mis- and disinformation. For instance, in 2018, 32% of Brazilians reported trusting social media for news¹ and around half of voters reported being informed by social media during 2018 election.² In a survey of 41 countries, Brazilian Internet users aged 14-64 ranked second only to Filipinos in the amount of time spent online daily (We Are Social, 2019^[18]).
- Latin America is often portrayed as the world’s most violent region. Brazil, along with three other LAC countries (Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela), together account for one-quarter of all the murders in the world (Muggah and Aguirre Tobón, 2018^[19]). Exposure to criminal violence is likely to erode both interpersonal and institutional trust. Trusting others entails taking a risk that might be increased or reduced depending on certain individual and societal-level characteristics. Thus, the sense of insecurity that prevails in countries like Brazil, where violence and crime abound, represents an important impediment to the development of trust (Delhey and Newton, 2003^[20]).

Table 2.2. New questions included in the OECD Trust Survey in Brazil

Section in the questionnaire	What is being measured?	Question piloted
Integrity	Relevance of clientelist relations to access public services, and beyond electoral periods.	Do you consider it important to know someone who would help you to access public goods and/or services, for example, to receive social benefits, to obtain a place in a public school or a medical appointment?
Reliability	Levels of economic informality (to analyse if perceptions about general business conditions are related to people's behaviour)	If you were to open a business today, would you apply for the Brazilian National Registry of Legal Entities (Cadastro Nacional de Pessoas Jurídicas – CNPJ)?
Participation	Perceptions of success of collective action (addressing participation at collective level and beyond institutional means)	Many pavements and streets in the city are in bad condition. Imagine that the government will give funds for maintenance to neighborhoods where residents get 500 signatures on a petition. How likely would it be that the moderators in your neighbourhood would be able to collect the 500 signatures?
Background questionnaire	Criteria used to gauge the trustworthiness of information (to analyse its relation to sources of information, and mis- and disinformation risks)	When you read, see or hear a news story, what are the three most important aspects for you to decide if the news story is trustworthy?
Background questionnaire	Perceptions of (in)security	Speaking of the neighbourhood where you live and thinking about the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, a little safe, a little insecure or very insecure?

Some lessons learned:

- The responses to the question addressing economic informality had contrasting results to other questions on reliability. One possible reason is that people are asked about themselves instead of their perceptions about public institutions and they tend to be more positive and less likely to report that they would be willing to break the law. In future survey questionnaires, this question would need further revision and reformulation.
- The question addressing perceptions of (in)security was found to be significant for trust in local government. This is an important question to keep in the questionnaire, although it would be worth exploring if the wording of the question, i.e. referring to people's neighbourhoods as opposed to their country, may have affected the results.
- The perceived importance of social contacts for accessing services has a strong and negative association with trust. Respondents who attach more importance to contacts for accessing goods and services have lower trust in all institutions. Similarly, the more willing someone is to register a business, the higher their trust in all institutions (strong positive relationship).
- Feelings about the likelihood of success of collective action in the form of a petition in respondents' neighbourhoods is also strongly associated with trust. Generally, the results on perceptions of clientelism and perceptions of collective action are closely aligned with the academic literature and previous research. However, the question used different response options and different response scales compared to the main set of questions of the OECD Trust Survey, which uses a 0-10 response scale, and it would be relevant to test whether this had an impact on the results.
- The survey questionnaire also includes questions about respondents' access to services and the quality of their housing's environment to infer respondents' living situation. Water access matters for trust in political parties and news media. However, the quality of the road at the respondents' home is not associated with perceptions of trust in institutions, except for trust in international organisations, which is likely to be driven by other factors.

1. Reuters Institute and University of Oxford, Digital News Report, <https://www.digitalnewsreport.org/interactive-2018/>.

2. Datafolha Institute, <https://datafolha.folha.uol.com.br/>

The revised version of the questionnaire could serve as a first step, paving the way to extending the trust survey to other Latin American countries. Since the 2008 global financial crisis, public trust has continued to fall in Latin America, and the political scene in the region has been marked by numerous demonstrations and social unrest. In 2022, less than four in ten (39%) Latin Americans trusted their government and close to eight in ten (77%) believed that a few powerful groups governed their country for their own benefit (World Gallup Poll 2022; Latinobarometer 2020). Extending the OECD Trust Survey in the region would provide actionable evidence to inform and sharpen national and regional dialogues about how to enhance trust and advance on the reform agenda for Latin America.


2.2. Results of the OECD Trust Survey in Brazil

2.2.1. Trust in government in Brazil aligns with other Latin American countries but is below the OECD average

Unlike in many other countries, more respondents in Brazil trust the federal than trust the local government and the civil service. According to the OECD Trust Survey, one-quarter of Brazilian respondents (25.9%) reported having high or moderately high trust in their government, while 57.8% reported low or no trust and 11.5% were neutral (Figure 2.1).¹ The proportions of people with high or moderately high trust or neutral trust is slightly higher than in Colombia, but below OECD averages. Fewer respondents reported high or moderately high trust in the local government (19.6%) and the civil service (23.6%) in Brazil, both below the corresponding OECD averages. In many OECD countries, local governments and the civil service inspire more confidence than national governments, probably because they are perceived as closer to people. In fact, civil servants are usually characterised as the human face of public institutions (OECD, 2021^[21]). At the same time, public opinion experts interviewed for this study highlight that in countries with presidential systems like Brazil, people tend to associate the government with the president. This can mean that he or she may serve as the reference point for people's evaluations of public institutions and explain the higher levels of trust in the federal government. The comparatively low trust in civil servants may reflect cultural bias and negative prejudices –*buropobia*— towards public officials (Güemes, 2016^[22]), as well as perceptions of a lack of integrity of civil servants, corroborated by some cases of corruption (IPEA, 2019^[23]).

Figure 2.1. Unusually, Brazilian respondents are more likely to trust the federal government than local government or the civil service

Share of respondents indicating different levels of trust in public institutions in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and the OECD average, 2021-2022



Note: Figure presents responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the national government, local government, civil service?”. “High or moderately high trust” corresponds to responses of 6-10; “neutral” to a response of 5; “low or no trust” to responses of 0-4; “don't know” was a separate answer choice. OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).


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Trust is influenced by a variety of factors, some linked to the context of when the survey took place, others reflecting economic, social and political outcomes of governance, as well as underlying cultural or societal factors. The OECD Trust Survey was implemented in April 2022 in Brazil, at a time when the COVID-19 pandemic was relatively controlled and vaccination rates in the country were comparatively high. However, people’s perceptions of public institutions at the time were likely to be affected by rising inflation, as well as by national elections, and the presidential campaign and high levels of political polarisation which resulted from it. In particular, electoral alliances were being formalised, one of the candidates with the highest popular support among voters had decided not to compete and tensions were running high between the judiciary and executive branches over electoral rules and political campaigns.

Historical data beyond the immediate time when the OECD Trust Survey took place show that levels of trust in the federal government in Brazil have fluctuated widely in the past three decades (Figure 2.2). Patterns of public trust in Brazil overall coincide with those in Latin America, but with peaks at election times (e.g. 2003, 2006 and 2010). In general, trust in government in Brazil increased between 2003 and 2010, during the period of economic growth, the commodity boom, and widespread expansion of social protection programmes. A sharp decline between 2010 and 2018 coincided with regional changes in the political orientation of governments (the end of the “pink tide”, as the period of prevalence of left-wing governments was known) and also a period of political instability in Brazil, including corruption scandals, the *Lava Jato* investigation (see Chapter 4) and Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment in 2016, coupled with the end of the commodity boom. Trust levels increased in 2020, although they have not yet recovered to the levels of previous decades.

Figure 2.2. Trust in government in Brazil has mostly tracked regional levels, with deviations coinciding with key political events

Share of respondents who indicate trust in the national government in Brazil and LAC average, 1995-2020



Note: Figure presents responses to the survey question "Please look at this card and tell me how much trust you have in each of the following groups/institutions. Would you say you have a lot, some, a little or no trust in? The National Government". Percentages show the aggregated responses of "a lot" and "some" trust in the national government.

Source: Latinobarometer, 1995-2020.

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
2.2.2. Levels of trust vary across institutions but are generally low in Brazil

Although in general Brazilian respondents have low confidence in their institutions and other people, their responses vary widely when asked how much they trust different public institutions. On a scale of 0-10, with zero meaning no trust at all and ten complete trust, average trust levels are below three for all the institutions considered, except the police and other people.

In line with patterns of trust observed in other countries surveyed through the OECD Trust Survey, the police are the most trusted institution in Brazil (39.9%) and political parties (7.6%) the least trusted (Figure 2.3). Political institutions, such as the Congress, and government ones, such as the civil service, tend to be less trusted than law and order institutions (OECD, 2022^[1]). Although the aggregated concept of "police" ensures cross-national comparability, it may not fully capture the complexity of law enforcement institutions in Brazil, with multiple police forces with diverse mandates and cultures (see Box 2.4).

Figure 2.3. Even the most trusted institution, the police, are trusted by less than half of Brazilian respondents

Share of respondents who indicate levels of trust in public institutions in Brazil, 2022



Note: Figure presents responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the institutions?” “High or moderately high trust” corresponds to responses of 6-10, “neutral” to a response of 5 and “low or no trust” to responses of 0-4; “don't know” was a separate answer choice. OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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Box 2.4. Trust in the police

According to the OECD Trust Survey, on average across OECD countries, as well as in Brazil, the police enjoy the highest levels of public trust among public institutions. These findings may seem somewhat disconnected from the incidents of police brutality and the movements protesting police misconduct reported in recent years across many surveyed countries. According to research, these events should have a strong negative impact on trust in the police, as media coverage is the primary source of information people have on the police (Mawby, 2013^[24]). As with the other public institutions included in surveys, responses on trust levels towards the police may reflect a variety of diverse aspects such as personal experiences, performance and evaluations about specific parts of the institution, or individual values and expectations about the role fulfilled by the public institution.

In general, institutional trust is rooted in a broad understanding of the role and nature of the institution rather than personal experiences. Indeed a minority of people tend to have direct experience with the police; for instance, in England and Wales just under 26% of people reported to have some kind of contact with the police from April 2019 to March 2020 (Office of National Statistics, 2022^[25]). Moreover, the personal experiences people do have tend to convey little information about police intentions and characteristics.

Data on trust in the police also may not fully capture the complexity of law enforcement institutions in a given country, as some countries have multiple police forces with diverse mandates and cultures, and the aggregated concept of “police” does not allow respondents to provide different evaluations. For

example, in Brazil, there are multiple types of police with different mandates, responsibilities and coverage -i.e. the state "military police" forces are tasked with public order, while "civil police" are responsible solely for crime investigation-. However, data from the OECD Trust Survey, as with most existing cross-country surveys, do not differentiate between types of police.

The comparatively high levels of trust in the police may also result from the inherent feature of constitutional democracies where the political elements of government are separated from those providing public goods, with the latter serving public purposes like security and welfare. Unlike more political institutions, police forces benefit from broad agreement within the public about their commitment and operate over a sustained period of time (Warren, 2017^[26])


Levels of trust in the institution are therefore most likely to change due to long-term processes or major events, and will be relatively immune to short-term factors, although once a change of direction is underway, it might be difficult to halt or reverse (Bradford and Jackson, 2010^[27]). Factors that may undermine institutional trust include single incidents of malpractice, perceived changes in levels of police visibility, perceived declines in availability and readiness to intervene, and increasingly widespread ideas that the police do not treat everyone equally (Bradford and Jackson, 2010^[27]).

Finally, it is worth highlighting that although trust in the police is generally high, it tends to be unevenly distributed, and may thus obscure important variations across socioeconomic status, region of origin, or racial and ethnic background (Van Craen and Skogan, 2014^[28]; Tyler, 2005^[29]). These variations may be context-specific and tied to the country or region's unique history and political background. For instance, Caicedo's (2021^[30]) research found that Latin Americans' trust in the police is affected by their class, opinion on governance, and perception of corruption, with lower trust among indigenous people. In Brazil, people who do not identify themselves as part of the white population report lower levels of satisfaction with the police (de Oliveira Junior, 2011^[31]).

Results from the OECD Trust Survey echo findings from other similar surveys previously implemented in the country, and find that Brazil is in line with general trends in the region (Figure 2.4). The most recent data available from Latinobarometer (2020) show that, on average across Latin American countries, the police are the most trusted institution while institutions of a political nature, such as political parties or the national congress are the least trusted. The exceptions to this regional trend are Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Venezuela. Results in these countries could be explained by factors including changes at the political regime level, that is, those that involve changes in electoral systems, party systems, fundamental rules or the political community beyond governments (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2023^[32]; Corrales, 2023^[33]). Uruguay is the only LAC country in which more than three in ten respondents reported trusting political parties or the national congress. The country has the highest voter turnout levels in the region and one of the most stable party systems (Piñeiro Rodríguez and Scrollini Mendez, 2019^[34]).

Figure 2.4. Trust varies across institutions in LAC

Share of respondents who indicate trust in public institutions in Brazil and LAC countries, 2020



Note: Figure presents responses to the survey question "Please look at this card and tell me how much trust you have in each of the following groups/institutions. Would you say you have a lot, some, a little or no trust in?". Percentages show the aggregated responses of "a lot" and "some" trust in selected institutions. Data for trust in the National Congress only available for 2017.

Source: *Latinobarometer*, 2020.


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According to the OECD Trust Survey, the third most trusted institution in Brazil was the news media. About one third of Brazilian respondents (28.2%) reported trusting the media, a higher share than for the courts and the legal system, or the Congress (Figure 2.3). These proportions are similar to those in Colombia, while in contrast, on average across OECD countries, respondents are highly sceptical about the media (the second least trusted of the nine institutions measured). This result for the news media supports academic research highlighting how the media have played a key role in the cultural and political landscape of Brazil over the last two decades (Porto, 2009^[35]). This dynamic nevertheless carries some risks, most notably the possible "spectacularisation of politics" (Edelman, 1991^[36]).

More than half of Brazilian respondents (56.5%) reported regularly using social media as a source of information on politics, 11 percentage points higher than the average across OECD countries (45%). While 48.8% of Brazilians considered "having the source of news cited" as a key criterion for judging the trustworthiness of information and 41.3% "knowing the publishing organisation of the story", respondents using social media are less likely to consider either of these as key to trustworthiness than those reading newspapers (Figure 2.5). In contrast, users of social media are more likely than newspaper readers to value whether the "news has been widely commented on" as a criterion for trustworthiness. These results may indicate that social media users may be less willing to verify information or be able to detect disinformation (Allcott et al., 2020^[37]; Smith, 2019^[38]). Recent guidelines to regulate content of social media platforms could facilitate the spread of mis- and disinformation, as well as polarising content (OECD, 2023^[39]).

Figure 2.5. Newspapers readers and social media users rely on slightly different criteria for gauging trustworthiness

Share of respondents mentioned mention criteria for news trustworthiness by use of newspapers and social media, 2022



Note: Figure presents responses to the survey question 'When you read, see or hear news, what are the three most important aspects for you to decide if the news is credible?'. Presents all answer options and share of respondents who mentioned each of the six possible responses. Figure is disaggregated by respondents' use of newspapers and social media, based on the survey question "Which of the following media do you use to obtain information about politics and current affairs at least once a week?".

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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Around one-third of Brazilian respondents (34.6%) said they trusted other people in 2022, the item with the second highest level of reported trust in the country (Figure 2.3). This result may be interpreted with a degree of optimism as a positive outcome of initiatives to promote solidarity and a sense of community that were launched during the COVID-19 pandemic. Historically trust in others in Brazil has been lower than in most Latin American countries (see Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1).


2.2.3. More vulnerable groups –those with lower income, less educated and younger-report lower levels of trust

Trust levels vary between population groups, and trust divides appear to replicate social and economic inequalities. According to the results of the OECD Trust Survey in Brazil, young people, respondents with low levels of education, and those living on low incomes report lower levels of trust than other groups in the country. As these vulnerabilities tend to be combined together (Camargo and de Hollanda Guimarães Ferreira, 2000^[40]), when they shape the structural political attitudes and behaviour of those who are (or feel) excluded and marginalised, this risks eroding social cohesion and citizenship (OECD, 2021^[6]).

Brazilian respondents with greater purchasing power (those included in "Group A" according to *Critério Brasil*) trust the federal and local governments and civil service more than those in lower groups. More than one-third of people (36.1%) with the highest purchasing power (upper class) reported high levels of trust in the federal government, compared to 22.6% of those with the lowest purchasing power (Figure 2.6). Similarly, there is a trust gap of over ten percentage points by purchasing power for local government and of 20 percentage points for the civil service.

Figure 2.6. Trust is higher among people belonging to a higher social class

Share of respondents who indicate high or moderately high trust in public institutions in Brazil by socio-economic status, 2022



Note: Figure presents the responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the institutions?”. “High or moderately high trust” corresponds to responses of 6-10. “BRA mean” presents the weighted average across all respondents in Brazil. Socioeconomic status (SES) is based on household’s purchasing power following the Brazil Economic Classification Criteria (*Critério Brasil-ABEP*), which assesses respondents households’ access to public utility services, education and possession of several amenities. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.


Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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Similarly, trust in public institutions also varies according to educational background (Figure 2.7). In Brazil, trust in government among those with a university degree is 9 percentage points higher than among those with below upper secondary education. However, gaps related to differences in education levels are relatively small, compared to those related to purchasing power, with the striking exception of a difference of over 20 percentage points in trust in the civil service.

Figure 2.7. People with low levels of education tend to trust public institutions less

Share of respondents who indicate high or moderately high trust levels of trust in public institutions by education in Brazil, 2022



Note: Figure presents the responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the institutions?” “High or moderately high trust” corresponds to responses of 6-10. BRA mean presents the weighted average across all respondents in Brazil. High education is defined as ISCED 2011 levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as bachelor’s, master’s or doctorates, and low education refers to below upper secondary attainment. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).


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The fact that differences in level of trust in the civil service are particularly pronounced – both by purchasing power and education – could be linked to a widespread perception of a lack of fairness (see Chapter 4), and the pervasive impact of unequal treatment of the most vulnerable Brazilians.

Finally, there are also significant trust differences by age consistent with findings from OECD countries. In Brazil, there is a 12 percentage point gap in trust in government between the younger and older cohorts (Figure 2.8). This could relate to the fact that globally, young adults have higher unemployment rates and that, according to recent research, 20-24 year-olds were the population group in Brazil who experienced the highest income loss during 2014-2019 (-17.76% compared to a national average of -3.71%) (Neri, 2019_[41]). Young people were also disproportionately hit by the economic consequences of the pandemic: in 2021, job losses were concentrated globally among young and temporary workers (OECD, 2021_[42]), which could have increased their concerns about future economic prospects. However, an important and maybe optimistic difference to highlight is that young Brazilians report significant higher levels of trust in the Congress and political parties than older cohorts. Younger generations who have grown up in a democratic system may have more positive perceptions about politics and political institutions. In any case, this result can be an opportunity to further invest in policies that aim to strengthen democratic values and civic education in schools.

Figure 2.8. Trust in public institutions differs markedly by age

Share of respondents who indicate high or moderately high trust in public institutions in Brazil by age, 2022



Note: Figure presents the responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the institutions?” “High or moderately high trust” corresponds to responses of 6-10. “BRA mean” presents the weighted average across all respondents in Brazil. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue. Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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
2.2.4. Economically, politically or physically insecure respondents are less trusting of public institutions

In addition to objective socio-economic indicators, people’s own perceptions of their vulnerability also matter for trust in government. Brazilian people who feel economically vulnerable report lower levels of trust across public institutions. Among respondents who reported being concerned about their household’s finances, around two in ten trust their government, compared to almost four in ten of those who are less concerned about their financial situation, a wider gap than for differences according to income or social class. This is of key relevance given recent academic research that relates economic expectations to political behaviour. According to a study using German household panel data, adults who have not reached the socio-economic status that might have been expected given their childhood background tend to vote less frequently or, if they do vote, do so more frequently for radical parties than for mainstream ones (Kurer and van Staaldin, 2022^[43]).

In a similar vein, those who feel powerless and without a say in government decision making are also understandably less trusting of public institutions. More than half of the respondents (53%) who believe they have a say in what the government does trust the federal government, compared to only 18.5% of those who do not believe they have a say (Figure 2.9). This 34-percentage point gap is one of the largest trust divides in Brazil. Perceived political inequalities seem to have as pervasive an impact on trust as economic inequalities. Respondents who were not politically aligned with the government in power also reported lower levels of trust in government, a finding which is consistent with results in other OECD countries (OECD, 2022^[1]). Yet, people who reported they were politically aligned with the government consistently reported lower levels of trust in other public institutions (Figure 2.10), in contrast to results in other Latin American and OECD countries. These findings could suggest political alignment with the government in power was related to negative attitudes towards other public institutions which might exercise checks and balances on any potential abuses of power by the government.

Figure 2.9. People who feel they have a say in what the government does trust all institutions more

Share of respondents who indicate high or moderately high trust in institutions in Brazil, by whether they feel they have a say, 2022



Note: Figure presents the responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the institutions?” “High or moderately high trust” corresponds to responses of 6-10. Trust responses are disaggregated by perceptions of having a say (6-10) and not having a say (0-4), based on the survey question “How much would you say the political system in Brazil allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?” Differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 95% significance level for trust in the police; and are statistically significant at the 99% level for trust in the rest of the groups and institutions included in the figure.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).



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Figure 2.10. Levels of trust vary between those who see themselves as politically aligned with the government and those who do not

Share of respondents who indicate high or moderately high trust in institutions in Brazil by political alignment with the government, 2022



Note: Figure presents the responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the institutions?” “High or moderately high trust” corresponds to responses of 6-10. Trust responses are disaggregated by whether respondents are politically aligned with the government, based on giving the same response options to the survey questions “In politics, people usually talk about “left” and “right”. On a scale where 0 is left and 10 is right, where would you place the national government?” and “In politics, people usually talk about “left” and “right”. On a scale where 0 is left and 10 is right, where would you place yourself?”. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level.


Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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Finally, perceptions of insecurity matter for trust in public institutions, hindering long-term planning and increasing social barriers for the most vulnerable. People who are less concerned with “being attacked or assaulted in the neighbourhood they live in” have more trust in national and local government and the civil service (Figure 2.11). The gap between the two groups is widest for trust in the local government: only 15.6% of respondents with security concerns say they trust the local government, compared to 25.5% of those who feel safe in their neighbourhood.

Figure 2.11. Those who feel safer tend to have higher levels of trust in public institutions

Share of respondents who indicate high or moderately high trust in public institutions in Brazil by feeling of security, 2022



Note: Figure presents the responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the institutions?” “High or moderately high trust” corresponds to responses of 6-10. Trust responses are disaggregated by whether respondents feel insecure or safe, based on the survey question “Speaking of the neighbourhood where you live and thinking about the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, a little safe, a little insecure or very insecure?” “BRA mean” presents the weighted average across all respondents in Brazil. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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2.3. The drivers of trust in public institutions in Brazil

This section focuses on how public governance affects public trust in the federal government, local government and the civil service in Brazil. Using observational data to establish a causal relationship between public governance drivers and trust is complicated. Causal relationships between drivers and trust are likely to move in both directions, and many variables may not be observable. Notwithstanding this caveat, this section presents the results of an aggregate analysis on the drivers of trust to measure which aspects of people’s perception of government reliability, responsiveness, integrity, openness and fairness have a significant effect on their trust levels (Box 2.5). Therefore, the results in this section provide a general indication of which policy areas would produce the greatest dividend in terms of trust in the federal government, local government or the civil service. This section also provides an assessment of the efforts required to achieve these gains, based on how Brazilian respondents judge the institutional performance tied to the various public governance drivers.

Based on the results of the trust survey and interviews with national stakeholders carried out for this study, Chapters 3 and 4 go on to provide detailed evidence on the relationship between trust and people's perceptions of government reliability and responsiveness (Chapter 3) and of its integrity, openness and fairness (Chapter 4) and discuss actions that the country can take to enhance trust.

Box 2.5. Notes on the model for the drivers of trust in public institutions

The results presented in this section are based on three logistic regression analyses for establishing the main drivers of trust in the federal government, local government, and civil service in Brazil.

- Based on the OECD Framework on the Drivers of Trust, respondents' perceptions of the responsiveness, reliability, openness, integrity and fairness of government and public institutions are expected to be the main drivers of trust in the three institutions (federal government, local government and the civil service). Trust in each of the institutions is recoded as a binary variable (low or no trust: 0-4 and high or moderately high trust: 6-10). Neutral responses (5) and "don't know" are excluded. The analysis operationalises government competencies and values through 15 variables, measured on a 0-10 response scale and standardised for the analysis. The model also includes six further variables: internal political efficacy, external political efficacy, satisfaction with administrative services, the perceived relevance of knowing a broker to access public services, willingness to formalise any new business and confidence in the country's ability to tackle environmental challenges.
- All the drivers of trust are included in the three baseline regression models and those which are not statistically significant are deleted (stepwise deletion process). The results in this section show all the significant drivers of trust in the three institutions.
- All models include survey weights and control variables for individuals' socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, education, social class and region of residence), interpersonal trust, perceptions of economic and physical insecurity, and whether the respondent voted for the parties in government. Missing data are excluded using listwise deletion.

Technical interpretation

The statistically significant drivers are shown as average marginal means. The technical interpretation of the effect of government effectiveness to reduce greenhouse emissions on trust, for example, is that one standard deviation increase in the perceived likelihood that the government is effective is associated with a 10 percentage point increase in trust in the federal government. Or – taking into consideration all other variables in the model – all else being constant, moving from the typical citizen to one who is one-standard-deviation more satisfied, results in a 10 percentage point increase in trust in the federal government in Brazil.

The analysis of the drivers of trust in Brazil suggests four main results:

- First, the determinants of trust differ for different institutions, suggesting different policies might be needed to build or strengthen trust in the federal government, the local government or the civil service.
- Second, government fairness – either expressed as people's perceptions of fair treatment of their applications to social benefits or about civil servants treating them equally regardless of their income – is a key driver of trust in both the federal government and the civil service. This result underscores the relevance of policies and initiatives aiming at tackling inequalities in the country, not only in economic terms, but also ensuring equal access to services, as a first and basic function of the state.

- Third, and linked to the previous finding, satisfaction with administrative services is a significant driver of trust in the local government and the civil service. This supports the argument that this is an area where improvements are needed to enhance trust in Brazil.
- Finally, perceptions about government openness and participation, especially the feeling that one's own inputs are considered, or confidence in one's own ability to participate in politics, are crucial drivers of trust in all public institutions. This suggests that strengthening initiatives to make people feel heard and ensuring they can voice their views could significantly improve levels of trust in Brazil.

2.3.1. Trust in the federal government

The main drivers of trust in the federal government in Brazil are perceptions related to its reliability, fairness and openness. The matrix in Figure 2.12 shows the main drivers of trust in government and how people perceive them. Points closest to the green top right corner highlights drivers with possible high trust gains, that would require less investment, as the starting points of how people currently perceive these drivers are already higher than the others.

Brazilians' confidence in their government's ability to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (reliability) has the largest effect on trust in the federal government (10 percentage points). Despite many ongoing initiatives in this area, few people (39.6%) are confident in the government's effectiveness at addressing such long-term challenges as climate change. There is a great deal of room for improvement in this area that would yield large increases in trust. Improving public perceptions of the country's capacity to tackle climate change could also include a renewed public communication strategy (see Chapters 3 and 4).


An increase in people's confidence that they would be fairly treated when applying for social services and benefits would similarly have a large effect on trust in federal government (6 percentage points). Currently, around one-third of Brazilian respondents reported being satisfied with the fairness of treatment in this area; thus this is another area where investment would bring a large pay-off in terms of trust.

An increase in respondents' confidence that their views would be considered in public consultations would have a similar effect on trust in government (4.7 percentage points). However, very few people currently feel heard in such areas (21.5%) and investment in making them feel listened to would require considerable effort to yield the potential trust gains.

People's confidence in business conditions remaining stable (reliability), and their willingness to formalise any new business (reliability), as well as confidence in their own ability to participate in politics (internal efficacy) are the other three relevant drivers of trust in the federal government in Brazil. Around one-quarter of Brazilian respondents perceive business conditions as predictable – with a potential trust gain of 4.4 percentage points – and more than half are willing to formalise any new business (potential gain of 4.1 percentage points). More than one-third of Brazilian respondents are confident in their own ability to participate in politics, and moving from the typical respondent to one slightly more confident could increase trust in government by 2.8 percentage points. Levels of internal efficacy are closer to OECD average than all other “starting points”. This result may suggest that providing people with information about political process, allowing them to better understand how politics works, could be crucial to increasing trust.

Figure 2.12. Perceptions of effectiveness in reducing greenhouse emissions and fairness are the most important determinants of trust in the federal government

Percentage point change in trust in federal government in response to improvements in selected variables (left Y-axis) and shares of the noted variable (right Y-axis, represented by dot), 2022



Note: The figure shows the most robust determinants of self-reported trust in federal government in a logistic estimation that controls for individual characteristics and self-reported levels of interpersonal trust. All variables depicted are statistically significant at 99%. Only questions derived from the OECD Trust Framework are depicted, while individual characteristics such as age, gender, education, which also may be statistically significant, are not shown. The X-axis shows the share of the population that answered the question positively (6-10 on a 0-10 response scale). Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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2.3.2. Trust in the civil service

Perceptions that public institutions treat people fairly, and are open and willing to receive inputs from the public are the main drivers of trust in the civil service in Brazil. Improving people's perception that civil servants would treat people equally regardless their income (fairness) would yield a 7.4 percentage point gain in trust in the civil service, and there is broad room for improvement in this area, as very few Brazilians (19.1%) perceive institutions as fair (Figure 2.13). People's confidence that their inputs would be taken into account in public consultations also shows a significant impact (4.9 percentage points). This is another area where Brazilian institutions are lagging, with only 2 in 10 respondents feeling heard. These results point to the importance of greater investment in making people feel they are not left behind (whether economically or politically) if aiming to enhance trust in the civil service.


Two other drivers of trust in the civil service are also related to openness and participation: ease of access to information on administrative procedures and people's confidence in their ability to participate in politics. Improving perceptions about how easy it is to access administrative information is associated with an increase of 3.5 percentage points in levels of trust in the civil service. Although the starting point on this measure is higher than for the other drivers discussed above (34.9%), it is low compared to other Latin American countries, despite Brazil's multiple initiatives to promote transparency (see Chapter 4). People's

confidence in their own ability to participate in politics has a similar starting point and would yield a similar trust gain in the civil service (3.7 percentage points).

A final driver of trust in the civil service in Brazil, not surprisingly, is people's satisfaction with administrative services. About one-third of Brazilians are satisfied with administrative services in the country (they expressed levels of satisfaction with administrative services between 6-10 along the 0-10 scale), and further investment in increasing citizens' satisfaction would yield a potential trust gain of 3.7 percentage points. Although it seems intuitive that satisfaction with administrative services would be an important driver of trust in the civil service, the size of this impact is relatively small compared to other drivers, as well as compared to average results for OECD countries (OECD, 2022^[11]). The results of the econometric analysis suggest that investing in activities related to the underlying values guiding actions and procedures would be of greater relevance to improving trust in the civil service than those related to actual results or outcomes by themselves.

Figure 2.13. Perceptions of equal treatment and openness are key to explaining trust in the civil service

Percentage point change in trust in civil service in response to improvements in selected variables (left Y-axis) and shares of the noted variable (right Y-axis, represented by dot), 2022



Note: The figure shows the most robust determinants of self-reported trust in civil service in a logistic estimation that controls for individual characteristics and self-reported levels of interpersonal trust. All variables depicted are statistically significant at 99%. Only questions derived from the OECD Trust Framework are depicted, while individual characteristics such as age, gender, education, which also may be statistically significant, are not shown. The x-axis shows the share of the population that answered the question positively (6-10 on a 0-10 response scale). Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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2.3.3. Trust in the local government

In contrast to the results for the federal government and the civil service, competence plays more of a role in explaining trust in local government in Brazil. Apart from perceptions about opportunities to voice views in community decisions, which is the most significant determinant of trust in local government, all other


significant drivers are related to the reliability and responsiveness of government (Figure 2.14). Improving people's perceptions about being able to have a say in community decisions would improve trust in local government by 5.7 percentage points, but this improvement would require considerable effort given Brazilian respondents' low perceptions on this aspect (see Chapter 4).

Satisfaction with services is the next most important driver of trust in the local government in Brazil, which could be related to the federal structure of the country. Local governments are responsible for education, healthcare, policing and a myriad of other services. An increase in levels of satisfaction with administrative services could yield a trust gain of 5.4 percentage points. Similarly, investment in people's confidence that innovative ideas would be adopted to improve service delivery would also have returns on trust in local government (4.5 percentage points). However, fewer Brazilian respondents are currently confident about capacity for innovation in public services (27.9%) than are satisfied with the delivery of administrative services (31.8%). Therefore, greater investment in improving innovative capacities may be required to yield potential trust gains.

The final relevant driver of trust in the local government is the government's preparedness to fight future infectious diseases (reliability) with a potential trust gain of 4 percentage points. This is a very topical point in the context of the pandemic, and the potential for future crises. Considering the comparatively low levels of satisfaction on this aspect – only one in five respondents perceive the government as prepared – Brazil would need to invest considerably in preparedness for to affect trust levels (see Chapter 3).

Figure 2.14. Openness and satisfaction with administrative services are the main drivers of trust in the local government

Percentage point change in trust in local government in response to improvements in selected variables (left Y-axis) and shares of the noted variable (right Y-axis, represented by dot), 2022




Note: The figure shows the most robust determinants of self-reported trust in local government in a logistic estimation that controls for individual characteristics and self-reported levels of interpersonal trust. All variables depicted are statistically significant at 99%. Only questions derived from the OECD Trust Framework are depicted, while individual characteristics such as age, gender, education, which also may be statistically significant, are not shown. The x-axis shows the share of the population that answered the question positively (6-10 on a 0-10 response scale). Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

2.3.4. Comparative analysis of the drivers of trust in public institutions in Brazil

Figure 2.15 shows average responses of people expressing confidence in government's responsiveness, reliability, openness, integrity and fairness.

Figure 2.15. Perceptions of public responsiveness are the highest among Brazilians, and integrity the lowest

Share of respondents in Brazil expressing confidence in government reliability, responsiveness, openness, integrity, and fairness (average across survey questions), 2022



Note: Figure presents Brazil's average of "likely" responses across questions related to reliability, responsiveness, integrity, openness and fairness (see OECD Trust Framework in Chapter 1). The questions used to assess these five dimensions are included in Chapter 3 (responsiveness and reliability) and Chapter 4 (openness, integrity and fairness); the whole questionnaire can be found in the Annex.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).


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Table 2.3 summarises the results of the analysis on the drivers of trust in the national government, the local government and the civil service in Brazil. Yellow cells indicate that the variable is a statistically significant driver of trust in the corresponding institution, while a positive sign (+) in the cell flags which institution has the largest coefficient of the three for that variable.

Table 2.3. Drivers of institutional trust in Brazil

	Trust in federal government	Trust in local government	Trust in civil service
Drivers of Trust			
Fairness: Fair treatment of applications			
Fairness: Treat rich and poor equally			
Openness: Account for public consultation views			(+)
Openness: Voice views in community decisions			
Openness: Access to information on administrative procedures			
Reliability: Confidence in reducing CO ² emissions			
Reliability: Stable business conditions			
Reliability: Preparedness for a new contagious disease			

	Trust in federal government	Trust in local government	Trust in civil service
Reliability: Willingness to formalize business			
Responsiveness: Satisfaction with administrative services		(+)	
Responsiveness: Adopting innovative ideas			
Internal political efficacy: Confidence in ability to participate			(+)
Personal characteristics			
Age	(+)		
Education			
Security concerns			
Political alignment			
Interpersonal Trust			(+)

Aspects related to openness and participation, especially meaningful engagement, and internal efficacy have a slightly higher relative effect on trust in the civil service than on trust in government. In contrast, satisfaction with administrative services has almost twice the coefficient for trust in the local government than for the civil service, which may be linked to institutional settings and the federal structure.

When considering specific personal characteristics that were used as control variables, only interpersonal trust is consistently significant across all institutions, showing a high correlation between public and interpersonal trust. These findings are in line with previous research (Keefer and Scartascini, 2022^[44]) and further highlight the need to set trust as an explicit policy objective. Political alignment with the government only shows significance for trust in federal government. In addition, age – in particular being older – also has greater explanatory power for trust in federal government.

Finally, holding a university degree is significant only for trust in the civil service, while perceptions of insecurity are only significant for trust in the local government. This last finding could be again linked to the different functions and responsibilities allocated to different levels of government.

2.3.5. Opportunities to upgrade the measurement of trust to build a robust evidence base

This section summarises key results and presents guidance on how Brazil could upgrade how it measures trust and build a robust evidence base.

- The OECD Trust Survey finds that perceptions of reliability, fairness and openness are significant drivers of people trust in the federal government, civil service and local governments. As part of its mandate to perform internal control, the Office of the Comptroller General (*Controladoria-Geral da União*, CGU) could:
 - Regularly collecting data on the drivers of trust to monitor the evolution of trust, and to identify where to invest to preserve and strengthen trust in public institutions.
- People with lower incomes and lower levels of education, young people, and those with security concerns have consistently lower levels of trust in institutions.
 - Ensuring survey samples are representative of the diversity of the population, by combining socio-economic characteristics. This would allow systematic analysis of the differences within and across populations groups.

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Note

¹ Results for levels of trust in the federal government from the OECD Trust Survey are slightly below to those reported by Gallup in 2022 (39%). This difference could be explained by the fact that in the World Gallup Poll the wording of the question “Do you trust the government?” is slightly different, and it has a binary answer “yes or no”; while the one included in the OECD Trust Survey offers an eleven-point scale, allowing for a more nuanced response.

3 Trust and competence in Brazil

This chapter focuses on perceptions of government competence in Brazil, particularly in terms of responsiveness and reliability. It underscores the pivotal role these perceptions play in shaping public trust. In Brazil, trust in the local government and civil service is driven by perceptions of responsiveness, while trust in the civil service is strongly influenced by perceptions of reliability. The chapter proposes a range of strategies to preserve and enhance institutional trust in Brazil. These include aiming for more accessible and responsive public services, robust long-term planning, and achievement of climate mitigation objectives.

Perceptions of the competence of government institutions are a crucial determinant of overall trust in government. Competence implies institutions are capable and effective at carrying out their activities, that is, they deliver according to expectations (Nooteboom, 2007^[1]). When they do not meet expectations, levels of trust are strongly and negatively affected (Kampen, Van De Walle et Bouckaert, 2006^[2] ; Christensen et Laegreid, 2005^[3]). The OECD Framework on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions identifies competence as one of the two dimensions of public governance determining public trust, which can be further broken down into responsiveness and reliability (see Box 1.4 in Chapter 1).

In Brazil, perceptions of responsiveness are significant drivers of trust in the local government and civil service, while perceptions of government reliability are a particularly significant driver for trust in the civil service (see Chapter 2). In addition, Brazil's federal government has historically played a key role in fostering economic and social development, and there is widespread support for statism (Bresser Pereira, 1998^[4] ; Ban, 2013^[5] ; Milanez et Santos, 2015^[6]). Such attitudes nurture high expectations of government competence, which can be difficult to satisfy. Indeed, evidence from the OECD Trust Survey suggests a mismatch between Brazilians' needs and expectations, and their public institutions' ability to anticipate and respond to them.

This chapter reviews people's perceptions of responsiveness and reliability in Brazil in relation to current policies in the country and good practices in OECD and Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries. People's satisfaction with public services is comparatively low in Brazil, and inequalities between population groups remain high. There are widespread feelings that services lack responsiveness among the Brazilian population, fuelling the disconnect between people and institutions, and hindering trust. Similarly, Brazilian people are quite sceptical about the government's reliability, and lack of certainty matters for trust. To enhance public trust, the government needs to bridge existing gaps in access to services among population groups, to ensure wide and equal reach of policies and, most importantly, to anticipate and adapt to future needs.

The analysis in this study relies mainly on the data collected through the OECD Trust Survey, carried out online in Brazil in April 2022. At the time of the survey, the country was still grappling with both the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and rising inflation, a highly polarised political environment during the presidential campaign for national elections and increased tensions between branches of government. The political and economic context when the data were collected has undoubtedly had an influence on the trust levels. Indeed, historical data indicate that the share of the public expressing trust in the government in Brazil and in Latin American countries has fluctuated significantly over the past 30 years, although remaining, on average, at around 30%. Major peaks in public trust are observed after national elections and the beginning of economic cycles (see Chapter 2), underscoring the importance of the wider context to people's perceptions and attitudes.

3.1. Responsiveness

The first dimension of government competence within the OECD Framework on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions is responsiveness, which reflects a core objective of any public administration: to serve citizens and deliver what is needed as expected (OECD, 2017^[7]). The OECD Trust Survey assesses two aspects of the responsiveness of government operations. First, its ability to provide efficient, quality, affordable, timely and citizen-centred public services that are co-ordinated across levels of government, respond to people's expectations and satisfy users. Second, its ability to operate an innovative and efficient civil service that responds to user needs.

The OECD Trust Survey asks the following three questions related to government responsiveness:

- If many people complained about a public service that is working badly, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that it would be improved?
- If there is an innovative idea that could improve a public service, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that it would be adopted by the responsible [public agency/office]?
- If over half of the people clearly express a view against a national policy, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that would be changed?

It also asks citizens about their satisfaction with public services, and if they have had a recent experience with them:

- How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with public schools in Brazil?
- In the last 2 years, have you or one of your children been enrolled in a public school in Brazil?
- How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the Unified Health System in Brazil?
- In the last 12 months, have you or anyone in your household used the Unified Health System in Brazil?
- How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the quality of administrative services (such as requesting an ID card, a passport or a certificate from the tax authority) in Brazil?

3.1.1. Despite progress in the quality and coverage of public services, satisfaction remains low and unequal


Satisfaction with public services is comparatively low

A responsive government implies public institutions are well attuned to the needs of the population they serve and have the means to fulfil their expectations. Some aspects of responsiveness, in particular satisfaction with public services, are key drivers of trust in the civil service and local government in Brazil (Figures 2.13 and 2.14 in Chapter 2).

According to the OECD Trust Survey, Brazilian people are less satisfied with the performance of public services than those surveyed across LAC and OECD countries (Figure 3.1). Of the services covered by the survey, respondents were least likely to be satisfied with public education (29.7% of Brazilians satisfied) and administrative services (31.8% satisfied). In comparison, 36% of respondents in Colombia were satisfied with the education system and 44% with administrative services. In OECD countries the figures were 58% for public education and 63% for administrative services. Healthcare fares slightly better in Brazil, where 32.7% of respondents are satisfied with its unified healthcare system (*Sistema Unico de Saúde* – SUS) compared with 28% in Colombia and 62% across surveyed OECD countries.

Figure 3.1. Satisfaction with education and administrative services in Brazil is lower than in Colombia and surveyed OECD countries

Share of respondents who are satisfied with services in Brazil, Colombia, and OECD average, 2021-2022



Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the questions 1) “On a scale of 0 to 10, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with public schooling in Brazil?”; 2) “On a scale of 0 to 10, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the SUS (Unified Health System) in Brazil?”; and 3) “On a scale of 0 to 10, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the quality of public services in Brazil (for example: requesting an identity document, passport or a certificate from the federal revenue service)?” “Satisfied” corresponds to responses of 6-10, “neutral” to a response of 5 and “dissatisfied” to responses of 0-4; “don’t know” was a separate answer choice. OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.


Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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These findings are consistent with those from regional studies, which also point to comparatively low levels of overall satisfaction with public services (OECD, 2020^[8]). According to Gallup World Poll data, in 2022, Brazil performed slightly below the LAC average for satisfaction with the availability of quality healthcare, and well below the LAC average for satisfaction with the education system or the schools (Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2. Satisfaction with the availability of quality healthcare and the education system are slightly below the regional average

Share of respondents who are satisfied with public services in Brazil, LAC countries and averages who are satisfied with the healthcare, education and city the live in, 2022



Note: Figure presents the share of respondents answering “satisfied” to the questions 1) “In the city or area where you live, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the educational system or the schools?”; 2) “In the city or area where you live, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the availability of quality healthcare?”; and 3) “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the city or area where you live?”

Source: Gallup World Poll, 2022.

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Expectations towards the state in Brazil are partially shaped by a robust legal and regulatory framework. Indeed, Article 6 of the Federal Constitution establishes broad social rights, including the right to education, health, work, housing, leisure and social security, and Article 205 further enshrines education as a duty of the state and the family. More recently, Law 13.460/2017 includes equality of treatment and prohibition of any kind of discrimination among the basic rights of citizens.

Brazil has made significant improvements in the reach and quality of its public services in recent decades. For instance, over the period 2001-2018, completion rates rose from 90% to 95% in primary education, from 67% to 86% in lower secondary education and from 44% to 67% in upper secondary education (OECD, 2021^[9]). In contrast to many other countries in the region, the country did experience a modest rise in satisfaction with education services, from 57% in 2010 to 64% in 2022 (Figure 3.2). Brazil also has the highest share of spending on social benefits among LAC countries, at 36.7% of total government spending (OECD, 2020^[8]). The federal government has made significant efforts to increase access to public services among the most vulnerable groups through programmes such as *Bolsa Família* and *Estratégia de Saúde da Família*. The most recent Digital Government Strategy 2020-2022 also reflects efforts to make the government more accessible to the people and more efficient at providing services. According to government figures, 104 federal agencies and entities already offer 73% of their services in a digital or partially digital version, adding up to 1 666 public services in total (Government of Brazil - Casa Civil, 2022^[10]). Despite these improvements, and the ambitions laid out in the legal and regulatory framework, the low levels of satisfaction recorded by the survey suggest access to and quality of services still fall short of Brazilians’ expectations and standards.


Satisfaction with public services is very uneven across population groups

The OECD Trust Survey found varying levels of satisfaction with public services among different population groups for all three services surveyed – administrative (Figure 3.3), healthcare (Figure 3.4) and education (Figure 3.5). Previous research across OECD countries finds that around 81% of changes in people’s satisfaction levels is related to changes in the objective performance of services (Baredes, 2022^[11]). Identifying which segments of the population are dissatisfied with which services, and for what reasons, could provide clues as to how the government might remedy gaps and ensure greater satisfaction across the whole population.

Levels of satisfaction with administrative services and healthcare in Brazil vary according to socio-economic status (SES), levels of education and other demographic factors, such as age. For instance, 45.7% of respondents belonging to the upper class reported being satisfied with administrative services, compared to 28.2% for those belonging to the lower class (Figure 3.3). Similarly, 42.3% of respondents with a high level of education suggested they were satisfied with healthcare compared to 27.8% of those with low levels of education (Figure 3.4). Less economically privileged individuals might need more support from the state through a variety of channels, and thus have more frequent and complex interactions with administrative services (IPEA, 2019^[12]). This evidence also supports findings of a recent OECD Review of Health Systems in Brazil which found poorer health outcomes and lower quality of care were more prevalent in economically vulnerable municipalities in the North and Northeast regions (OECD, 2021^[13]).

Figure 3.3. People with a low socioeconomic status and those with a low level of education are less satisfied with administrative services

Share of respondents in Brazil who are satisfied with public services by age, education, gender, socioeconomic status and region, 2022




Note: Figure presents the responses to the question "On a scale of 0 to 10, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the quality of public services in Brazil (for example: requesting an identity document, passport or a certificate from the federal revenue service)". "Satisfied" corresponds to responses of 6-10. BRA mean presents the weighted average across all respondents in Brazil. High education is defined as ISCED 2011 levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as bachelor's, master's or doctorates, and low education refers to below upper secondary attainment. Socio-economic status (SES) is based on household's purchasing power following the Brazil Economic Classification Criteria (Critério Brasil-ABEP), which assesses respondents households' access to public utility services, education and possession of several amenities. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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Figure 3.4. People with a low socioeconomic status and those with a low level of education are less satisfied with the Unified Health System

Share of respondents who are satisfied with health care in Brazil by age, education, gender, socioeconomic status and region, 2022



Note: Figure presents the responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the SUS (Unified Health System) in Brazil?” “Satisfied” corresponds to responses of 6-10. BRA mean presents the weighted average across all respondents in Brazil. High education is defined as ISCED 2011 levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as bachelor’s, master’s or doctorates, and low education refers to below upper secondary attainment. Socio-economic status (SES) is based on household’s purchasing power following the Brazil Economic Classification Criteria (Critério Brasil-ABEP), which assesses respondents’ access to public utility services, education and possession of several amenities. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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Moreover, minority group leaders interviewed for this study highlighted that although there have been efforts to expand universal services, and some progress has been made, the people they represent still have limited access to such services and perceive public institutions to be disconnected from their local realities (Box 3.1).

Box 3.1. In-depth interviews with minority leaders from the Amazon region in Brazil

As part of this study, three rounds of focus groups interviews were carried out with minority leaders from the Amazon region in Brazil. The focus on the region follows specific suggestions from experts interviewed as part of this study, as well as from the Advisory Group for the Trust Survey in Brazil, underscoring the difficulty in ensuring this population group were represented, and as an alternative to the online survey as a way to reach this population. This research strategy collects views on specific topics to be elicited and is an efficient way to get input on what leaders think, while also understanding why they think as they do, allowing in-depth meanings and group processes involved in their experiences to be explored (Denzin et Ryan, 2007^[14]).

Nine minority leaders were identified together with a country expert, supported by information and contacts provided by the Igarapé Institute. They included indigenous representatives from social movements (such as the *Movimento de Mulheres do Campo e Cidade*) and organisations – *coletivos* – such as *Maria-Maria* or *Sapato Preto*.

The structured interviews were organised around three broad topics: 1) how citizens access the state institutions and public services; 2) improvements needed and current challenges that communities face in accessing the state and representing the demands of their members; and 3) how minority groups perceive state institutions and public services.

The leaders were asked to describe how the sectors of the population they represent access different government institutions and public services. They tended to agree that direct access to government institutions and public services is limited. Civil society organisations and community leaders are described as playing a key role in mediating the population's access to state services and institutions: "Organisations are a bridge to access government institutions and public services. They represent the people. We have great partners today. Individual people would have a lot of problems to access the state. But these organisations help, they defend minorities". Yet, despite the existence of an extensive network of local organisations, the leaders reported that these organisations often lack the resources and support they need to effectively represent the demands of the population.

The leaders also identified areas for improvement in the relationship between minority groups and the state, although they recognised that there have been significant advancements in the reach and quality of public services related to health and education: "In the past, some of these services simply did not exist. Now the services are there. The challenge is how to access them efficiently".

Finally, state representatives and institutions were clearly perceived as both disconnected from local realities and incompetent to deal with the demands of the population. Consequently, trust in state and government institutions is very low, as described by one minority leader: "There is no decent access to services like education and health. There is no justice. How can we trust institutions if we denounce conflict, crimes and threats, but the state does absolutely nothing to resolve them? There is a complete lack of credibility."

Source: In-depth interviews with minority leaders.


Some of the patterns of satisfaction with administrative services may be also linked to the unequal uptake of digital public services. Brazil has a stark digital divide due in part to issues of access, but also of digital literacy. In a 2021 survey, the Regional Centre for Studies on the Development of the Information Society found that 90% of individuals with a high level of education used e-government services, compared to 50% of those with a low level of education and 30% of the illiterate population (Centro Regional para o Desenvolvimento da Sociedade da Informação, 2021^[15]). The same survey found a 42 percentage point difference in the use of e-government services between individuals with a high (96%) and low income (54%). Minority group leaders interviewed in the context of this study also described how the lack of investment in technology hinders the population's access to public institutions. For instance, one leader noted that the digital transformation further excludes those in remote areas of the country, where Internet and phone services are precarious.

When it comes to the education system, the OECD Trust Survey finds that the population groups with more direct experience of public schools (Figure 3.6) are more satisfied with the public education system than those with less direct experience. This might explain why results from the OECD Trust Survey show that patterns of satisfaction across population groups are slightly different to those related to healthcare and administrative services: only 25.4% of those belonging to the upper and upper-middle classes are satisfied with public schools, compared to 33.3% of the lower class (Figure 3.5). Likewise, 23.5% of Brazilian respondents with a high level of education reported being satisfied with public schools, compared with 31.5% of those with a low level of education.

Despite these higher satisfaction levels among disadvantaged respondents, Brazil's public schools do face general quality issues, and socio-economic disadvantage remains a major barrier to success in Brazil's education system. In the 2018 round of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), 43% of students in Brazil scored below the minimum level of proficiency (Level 2) in reading, mathematics and science while the OECD average was 13% (OECD, 2019^[16]). Socio-economic disadvantage may be a significant driver of low performance in Brazil, explaining 14% of the variance in PISA reading scores, compared to the average of 12% across the OECD. Advantaged students outperformed their disadvantaged peers in reading in Brazil by 97 points, compared to an average gap of 89 points across the OECD (OECD, 2021^[17]).

Figure 3.5. People with high levels of education and those with higher socioeconomic status are less satisfied with public schooling

Share of respondents who are satisfied with public schools in Brazil by age, education, gender, socioeconomic status and region, 2022




Note: Figure presents the responses to the question "On a scale of 0 to 10, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with public schooling in Brazil?". "Satisfied" corresponds to responses of 6-10. BRA mean presents the weighted average across all respondents in Brazil. High education is defined as ISCED 2011 levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as bachelor's, master's or doctorates, and low education refers to below upper secondary attainment. Socio-economic status (SES) is based on household's purchasing power following the Brazil Economic Classification Criteria (Critério Brasil-ABEP), which assesses respondents households' access to public utility services, education and possession of several amenities. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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Figure 3.6 Respondents with low levels of education, lower socioeconomic status and from the northern regions reported more experience with public schools

Share of respondents who have experience with public schools in Brazil by age, education, gender, socioeconomic status and region, 2022



Note: Figure presents the responses to the question "In the past 2 years, have you or one of your children been enrolled in a public school in Brazil?". Share of respondents that answered "yes". BRA mean presents the weighted average across all respondents in Brazil. High education is defined as ISCED 2011 levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as bachelor's, master's or doctorates, and low education refers to below upper secondary attainment. Socio-economic status (SES) is based on household's purchasing power following the Brazil Economic Classification Criteria (Critério Brasil-ABEP), which assesses respondents households' access to public utility services, education and possession of several amenities. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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3.1.2. Improving satisfaction with public services could increase trust levels


As Chapter 2 found, improving satisfaction with public services is an area with great potential to increase trust in Brazil, particularly in the civil service and local government. This section reviews three aspects that Brazil could consider addressing: improving the responsiveness of services in a context of rising expectations, tackling perceptions of inequity in access to public services and identifying the most effective balance in the governance of public services across levels of government to reduce territorial disparities and improve effectiveness.

Enhancing government responsiveness in a context of rising expectations

Governments are operating in an increasingly complex and fast-paced environment with growing expectations from people, who in turn are sceptical about their government's ability to adapt to changes, improve and innovate (OECD, 2022_[18]). People's perception of government responsiveness is a challenge for Brazil and for many OECD countries (Figure 3.7). Results from the OECD Trust Survey show 36.1% of Brazilian respondents believe services would improve if people complained, close to the OECD average of 40%. Likewise, people are also sceptical about the responsiveness of public policies themselves: 31.4% of Brazilian respondents believe a national policy would change if a majority were against, compared to 37% in Colombia, 45% in Mexico and 36.5% in surveyed OECD countries.


Figure 3.7. Perceptions of responsiveness in Brazil are close to the OECD average

Share of respondents reporting different levels of perceived likelihood of changes to a poorly performing public service or an unpopular policy in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and the OECD average, 2021-2022



Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the questions 1) "If many people complained about a public service that is working badly, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that it would be improved?" (left); and 2) "If over half of the people clearly express a view against a national policy, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that would be changed?" (right). "Likely" corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10, "neutral" to a response of 5 and "unlikely" to responses of 0-4; "don't know" was a separate answer choice. OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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
Brazil nevertheless faces some unique challenges in building a public administration that is more responsive to its inhabitants' needs. Over the past two decades the government has had to contend with expanding basic services such as sanitation and water, while managing rising expectations across its population linked to the country's remarkable growth. For example, in polls carried out in 2003, Brazilians named basic subsistence issues such as unemployment (31%), hunger/misery (22%) and violence/crime (18%) as the country's "main problem" (Datafolha, 2003^[19]). By 2021, respondents were naming health (24%), unemployment (14%), and the economy (12%) as the country's primary issues (Datafolha, 2021^[20]). The shift in citizens' priorities over time underscores the need for the government to remain responsive to changing needs and expectations while continuing to expand basic services to the most vulnerable.

Moreover, Brazil faces significant challenges in delivering public services to its citizens. The country has a large and diverse population, coupled with a complex and decentralised government apparatus and disparities in service provision across its states (OECD, 2013^[21]). These make it difficult to meet the diverse needs and expectations of citizens effectively (OECD, 2020^[22] ; World Bank, 2021^[23]). This tension became apparent in June 2013, when Brazilian people took to the streets to protest a rise in public transport fares and more broadly expressed their pervasive discontent with public services (Singer, 2013^[24]).

The OECD Trust Survey also found unequal perceptions of government responsiveness across Brazil's territory and different socio-economic groups, supporting the evidence presented in the previous section (Figure 3.8). While close to four in ten Brazilian respondents in the North and Northeast regions believe that services would improve if they complained, this drops to 34% in the Southeast and South, pointing to existing economic and fiscal disparities across Brazilian states. There is also a significant gap in perceptions based on socio-economic status: 42.2% of respondents from the highest socio-economic class feel that services would improve if they complained, compared to only 34.2% of those from the lowest. These findings highlight the need for the Brazilian government to address the unequal perceptions of government responsiveness to better tailor services to people's needs.

Figure 3.8. Men, people with high levels of education and those with a higher socioeconomic status are more confident public services would improve if people complain

Share of respondents who indicate they think complaining is likely to improve public services in Brazil by age, education, gender, socio-economic status and region, 2022



Note: Figure presents the responses to the question “If many people complained about a public service that is working badly, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that it would be improved?” “Likely” corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10. BRA mean presents the weighted average across all respondents in Brazil. High education is defined as ISCED 2011 levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as bachelor’s, master’s or doctorates, and low education refers to below upper secondary attainment. Socio-economic status (SES) is based on household’s purchasing power following the Brazil Economic Classification Criteria (Critério Brasil-ABEP), which assesses respondents households’ access to public utility services, education and possession of several amenities. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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To further improve the responsiveness of public services in Brazil, the government could consider prioritising and consistently employing user-centred design of public services and policies, while continuing to invest in feedback loops.

User-centred design focuses on user needs and experiences instead of emphasising the public administration’s own division of labour and administrative boundaries. This approach to designing public services and policies has not been systematically deployed in Brazil, and remains relatively experimental and ad hoc. At the central level, some efforts were made in conjunction with “innovation labs” (Cavalcante, 2019^[25]) and some initiatives were developed at subnational level but remain stymied by administrative boundaries. For instance, in 1997 the State of Sao Paulo created one-stop shops across 16 municipalities as part of its *Poupatempo* reform, bringing together many different authorities in charge of the delivery of personal documents and other administrative tasks in the same location. However, the effectiveness of this initiative has been limited as it did not cover federal services (Fredriksson, 2015^[26]).

To shift towards a more systematic user-centred approach to the design of public services, bodies within the centre of government (CoG)¹ could start by providing guidance on how to approach user-centred design and co-creation. In the United Kingdom, this is done through the Service Standard (Government of the United-Kingdom, 2023^[27]). Brazil could also begin by targeting a limited number of high-impact “life events” to ensure the services associated with them are user-centric (Box 3.2).

Box 3.2. Customer experience centred design in the United States

On 13 December 2021, President Biden signed an Executive Order entitled, Transforming Federal Customer Experience and Service Delivery to Rebuild Trust in Government. Thirty-five of the nation's highest impact service providers were identified due to the scale and impact of their public-facing services, to raise the standard of users' experience across government. These service providers are subject to the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-11 Section 280 activities including an annual enterprise-wide customer experience capacity assessment and action plan, focused improvement efforts for designated services, customer feedback collections, and public reporting.

Collectively, more than ten agencies across government have formed interagency teams to improve the public's experience during the following five moments in people's lives:

- approaching retirement
- recovering from a disaster
- navigating the transition to civilian life following military service
- birth and early childhood for low-income women and their children
- facing a financial shock and becoming newly eligible for critical support.

Teams will develop success measures that will be used to demonstrate improvements in the delivery of services during these life experiences.

Source: Signature Trust Initiative, shared with OECD's Public Governance Committee.

Governments around the world are also increasingly using feedback loops for continuous public service improvement to ensure they are responsive to citizens' needs. OECD experience suggests that successful feedback loops are built on a few key elements. First, governments need to establish channels for citizens to provide feedback and to gather objective performance information tied to the delivery of the services in question. These channels can be online or offline and they can take a variety of forms. Governments then need to ensure that the feedback is collected in a structured and standardised manner and is acted upon. Finally, the loop is closed by communicating with citizens about the actions taken in response to their feedback. Box 3.3 gives an example of the use of customer feedback to improve services in France.

Brazil is increasingly moving towards a continuous improvement approach to public services. Its legal framework has recently enshrined several mechanisms to help ensure citizens' complaints and experiences can influence service design. Law 13.460/2017 establishes clear quality standards through the establishment of user service charters, as well as mechanisms for feedback and improvement through the creation of Councils of Users and the framework for the assessment and improvement of public services. In 2019, the Office of the Comptroller General (*Controladoria-Geral da União*, CGU) established *Fala.br* – a single platform where people can request information and provide feedback (including complaints, ideas for administrative simplification and compliments) about public services from the federal, state or municipal government (OECD, 2022^[28]).

To bolster these efforts, Brazil could put in place some safeguards to ensure it has a holistic view of citizens' needs and their preferences. Although Law 13.460/2017 states that an annual satisfaction survey will be used to evaluate public services, these results will need to be systematically complemented by performance indicators measured directly by the administration (Box 3.3). Moreover, given that the government has the ability to gather feedback through a wide variety of sources (yearly surveys, *Fala.br*, social media, councils of users, etc), it will be important to ensure these information and data do not remain in silos and can be used effectively for self-diagnostic exercises.

Box 3.3. Services Publics + in France

France's *Services Publics +* (SP+) programme aims to support the continuous improvement of public services, focusing on the user experience to develop closer, simpler and more efficient public services.

The cornerstone of the SP+ initiative is transparency about the efficiency and quality of the services. It aims to facilitate reporting on the results of the administration's work and the evaluation of its staff, but also focuses on ensuring that users' expectations are at the heart of the daily work of public services, managers and staff. Quality and satisfaction indicators are displayed on the Public Services + platform (www.plus.transformation.gouv.fr/recherche-de-resultats) as well as in the public service locations that receive users, and are used for internal diagnosis to improve services.

Two types of indicators

The results on the platform reflect both user satisfaction, i.e. the quality of service assessed by the public, and service performance, i.e. the quality of the service provided by the administration. This is reflected in two types of indicators:

- Satisfaction indicators, measured by surveys: overall satisfaction, satisfaction with the quality of the reception, clarity of the response provided, etc.
- Performance indicators, measured by the administration: telephone pick-up rate, average response time to e-mails, proportion of files processed in less than X days, etc.

Source of the data

The indicators measured and displayed are intended to be in line with the priority expectations of users (speed, accessibility, personalisation, etc.) in their relations with public services and with the SP+ commitments. The data are measured as close as possible to the user at the local level, and updated as regularly as possible (year N-1 at least).

Each one of the public services involved in the SP+ programme produce published data. For example, the national police force calculates the average response time of the *police-secours* after an emergency call (a performance indicator); the tax authorities measure the satisfaction rate of users who have requested an appointment (a satisfaction indicator).

Source: (France - Direction Interministérielle de la Transformation Publique, 2019^[29]); (France - Direction Interministérielle de la Transformation Publique, 2022^[30]).


Finally, work to improve responsiveness could also benefit from a dedicated focus on identifying any issues faced by those social groups with lower average satisfaction levels or who experience worse outcomes. To enable this, the data collection must allow for sub-group analysis. Upstream public bodies should also strive to ensure all groups are making use of existing feedback channels. Despite efforts – such as the campaign *Não fique em silêncio* (do not keep silent) – not all population groups in Brazil, especially the more vulnerable, are aware of their right to complain. Some might avoid reporting an issue due to fear of reprisals, especially when complaining about corrupt practices or discrimination. In order to ensure that all citizens feel empowered to demand better services, more proactive measures could be taken to increase people's awareness of their rights. Such efforts could include meeting people in their local communities, or appearing regularly on radio or TV shows for Q&A sessions with citizens. Complaint systems should take into account the needs of different social groups and be accessible by people who do not have access to the Internet, even in an era of rapidly developing computer literacy.

Providing more equal access to high-quality services

Pockets of dissatisfaction with public services in Brazil may be explained by a widespread perception that access to high-quality services is unequal and reflects structural inequities in Brazilian society, as well as territorial and fiscal disparities (OECD, 2013^[21]). Results from the OECD Trust Survey find that around two-thirds of respondents (64.6%) believe that contacts are important to access public goods or services, and only 21.9% felt that an intermediary was not needed (Figure 3.9). A recent survey of civil servants carried out by the World Bank found that those beliefs were well-founded: 58.7% reported witnessing some unethical practice during their career in public service, most commonly using one's position to help friends or family, and bending the rules under pressure from further up the hierarchy (World Bank, 2021^[31]).

Figure 3.9. Most Brazilians believe having a contact is important for accessing public services

Share of respondents in Brazil who indicate that relationships are important or not important for accessing public services, 2022



Note: Figure presents the distribution of responses to the question “Do you consider it important to know someone who could help you access public goods and/or services, for example, receive social benefits, obtain a place in a public school or a form to attend a medical centre?” “Important” represents the aggregated responses of “very important” and “important”, and “not important” represents the aggregated responses of “not at all important” and “unimportant”; “don’t know” was a separate answer choice.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

StatLink  <https://stat.link/4ha8rx>

These results reflect the differences in access to services for individuals in different social and economic situations, and suggest that individuals without direct contacts face substantial barriers in accessing public goods and services. Some will therefore need to resort to the use of “state brokers”. Brokers use their connections with politicians and bureaucrats to help more vulnerable people access state benefits, such as school admissions, subsidised healthcare, electricity and welfare programmes.


Interviews held with minority leaders for this study lend further credence to the idea that state brokers play a role in accessing public services in Brazil, by providing information, resources (such as transport) or contacts (Box 3.1). While state brokers may empower communities and play a role in increasing democratic responsiveness (Berenschot, 2018^[32]), they can also perpetuate inequality of access to services. State brokers may demand bribes or kickbacks from citizens in exchange for access to public services. This creates a situation where those who have more money have better access to public services.

Brokers also may give preferential treatment to individuals or groups based on factors such as ethnicity, religion or political affiliation (Nunes et Lotta^[33]).

Furthermore, access to services in Brazil is also characterised by a two-tier system; the public and private sectors in Brazil are deeply interwoven with many essential services, such as healthcare, education and transport provided by both (OECD, 2021^[34] ; OECD, 2021^[13] ; Raymundo et al., 2015^[35]). In some sectors, this has led to a situation where those who can afford to pay for private services receive better quality services than those who rely on the public system, helping to entrench a system where the more vulnerable groups in Brazilian society have less access to high-quality services. For instance, a recent OECD Review of Education in Brazil found students from public schools scored significantly lower than those from private schools, indicating a difference in quality between the two sectors. In contrast, results from other LAC countries surveyed, such as Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and Peru, did not show a significant difference in quality (OECD, 2021^[34]). Likewise, Brazilians who have private health insurance (25%) were found to have greater access to healthcare services and better health (OECD, 2021^[13]). These differences are apparent to people in Brazil: according to the 2020 Latinobarometer, 49% of Brazilian respondents trust public hospitals while 63% trust private clinics (Figure 3.10).

Figure 3.10. More Brazilian people trust private clinics than public hospitals

Share of respondents who trust the public hospitals and private clinics in Brazil and LAC, 2020



Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the question “Please look at this card and tell me how much trust you have in each of the following groups/institutions. Would you say you have a lot, some, a little or no trust in? [Public Hospitals/Private Clinic]”. Percentages show the aggregated responses of “a lot” and “some” for each country. LAC refers to the unweighted average across LAC countries.

Source: Latinobarometer, 2020.

StatLink <https://stat.link/76cfg1>

Several steps could be taken to improve equality of access to public services in Brazil. The government could increase targeted communication and awareness-raising campaigns to inform citizens of their rights and how to access public services directly. The civil society organisations and community leaders who currently play a key role in helping populations access to public services could help the government to design and disseminate these campaigns. Such initiatives can help ensure all groups feel empowered and are effectively reached and engaged through means and languages that they use. Canada's co-creation approach to public communication during COVID-19 could be a good example to follow (Box 3.4).

Box 3.4. Co-creation approaches to public communication in Canada

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Government of Canada developed new ways of engaging with influencers, opinion leaders and community representatives to better understand the concerns and expectations of specific demographic groups and minorities and co-create targeted and tailored messages.

Confronted with challenging times, these new approaches responded to evidence and feedback pointing to the need to adapt communications for groups that are difficult to reach or have less trust in government messages but needed to be rapidly and efficiently addressed during the crisis.

As well as translating resources and developing ads about the government's COVID-19 response in different languages distributed through a variety of channels, the government strengthened relationships with leaders of minority groups or communities. For example, they co-developed national and regional communication campaigns with indigenous leaders and equipped them with the necessary skills and information to respond to concerns and expectations and give feedback to the government.

Evidence from these COVID-19 initiatives shows that co-creation approaches result in culturally appropriate products and support messages that are more likely to reach and be trusted by all groups, increasing the impact of crisis communications. Building on this experience, the Canadian government plans to further use and institutionalise such development and co-creation processes in future public communication strategies and activities.

Source: (OECD, 2021^[36]).

In addition, public employment management practices could evolve to promote more equal access to services. Brazil is widely considered to have one of the most merit-based and professionalised civil service in the LAC region (BID, 2013^[37]). Yet, although efforts to promote merit-based recruitment have been successful at the federal level, they remain limited at the subnational level, particularly in municipalities and states. For instance, a recent study found that alternation in power (that is, a change of municipal government) was associated with significant increases in the number of party members working in the municipal bureaucracy, with employment rising more in senior positions (Brollo, Forquesato et Gozzi, 2017^[38]). Another study highlighted that alternation in power at the municipal level was related to a decrease in the quality of education, as civil servants in the area were replaced with less competent ones (Mitra Akhtari et al., 2022^[39]). An effort to systematise and improve merit-based recruitment at all levels of government, in particular municipalities and states, could therefore help improve equal access to quality services in Brazil. It could be modelled on existing successful initiatives, such as the *Transforma Minas* programme launched by the Minas Gerais State in 2019 (Minas Gerais, 2021^[40]).

Balancing responsiveness and equity in the quality of public services: The challenge of multi-level governance

Satisfaction with public services seem to follow a slight geographical pattern in Brazil. According to the OECD Trust Survey, respondents from the North have the lowest satisfaction levels with administrative services (Figure 3.3) and healthcare (Figure 3.4). Patterns of satisfaction with the public education system are different, with the more affluent Southeast showing the lowest levels (Figure 3.5).

Yet, territorial disparities revealed by objective indicators are even starker than differences in satisfaction levels would suggest. For example, premature mortality rates from noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) have fallen in the South, Southeast and Central-West regions, but have remained constant in the North and risen in the Northeast, the least developed regions (OECD, 2021^[13]). Rural North and Central-West regions recorded below-average early childhood education enrolment rates (OECD, 2021^[17]).

The complexity inherent in multi-level governance in a federal and decentralised system generates challenges in many countries. Decentralisation can help governments tailor service delivery to local needs and offer more opportunity for citizens' input into service design and delivery. However, when decentralisation arrangements are not effectively designed, they can generate fragmentation and/or duplication in government activities, as well as increasing inequalities in quality and access between territories (OECD, 2019^[41]). In Brazil's federal context, where many public services are delivered by states and municipalities, intergovernmental relations are an important element of the broader institutional environment that affects the quality of public service delivery. Two mechanisms could help Brazil balance this tension: 1) clarifying responsibilities and co-ordination mechanisms between levels of government; and 2) ensuring responsible bodies are given the financial means to deliver and can rely on effective equalisation mechanisms and regional development policies (OECD, 2019^[41]).

Clarifying responsibilities and lines of accountability in specific policy areas could be pivotal to finding this balance between equity and responsiveness. The issue was raised during debates on the constitutional amendment proposal 188/2019² which oversees the decentralisation of resources, but a general consensus on clearly defining government relationships has yet to emerge (OECD, 2020^[42]). A striking example of this tension relates to public education³. At present there is no national system to co-ordinate and distribute responsibilities for public education. The federal government has typically enacted top-down policies which may have inhibited efforts to respond effectively to local realities. The 2021 Education Policy Outlook of Brazil (OECD, 2021^[17]) suggests education outcomes in Brazil would benefit greatly from more clearly defined responsibilities and relationships between levels of government. The OECD provides guidance on the criteria needed to ensure that the responsibilities of different levels of government are clear (Box 3.5).

The resources available to different levels of government should ideally be enough to meet the responsibilities allocated to them. The funding of subnational responsibilities in Brazil tends to be rigid and leaves little room for manoeuvre (OECD, 2020^[42]). The new fiscal regime approved by the constitutional amendment No. 95 of 15 December 2016⁴ imposes a 20-year period of fiscal consolidation, including in primary sectors such as health and education. Historically tax and own-source revenue have made up a smaller share of municipal revenue than transfers from the central government and state (Government of Brazil - National Treasury, 2021^[43] ; OECD, 2020^[42]). This imbalance in financing sources can lead to underfunded higher-level mandates, and thus weaken service provision.

Box 3.5. Clarifying responsibilities between levels of government: The OECD criteria

In 2019, the OECD published *Making Decentralisation Work: A Handbook for Policy Makers*, which provides an overview of current trends in decentralisation, including the design and implementation of decentralisation reforms. The report identifies guidelines for making decentralisation work and promoting regional and local development.

One of these guidelines is the clarification of the responsibilities of the different levels of government, in order to help decentralisation take hold and function properly.

There are eight essential criteria that a government can use to ensure that the responsibilities of different levels of government are clear:

1. A clear delimitation of the hierarchy of legislative acts: a Constitution, national legislation and decrees and agreements.
2. A division of powers where functions are shared, e.g. who sets policy? Who sets the standards? Who is responsible for monitoring? Who is responsible for funding, etc.
3. The establishment of institutional mechanisms for shared functions and sub-functions, such as consultation, burden sharing and conflict resolution mechanisms.
4. Decentralisation of sub-functions within each function.
5. Empowering subnational governments to adopt integrated approaches to local economic development.
6. A separation of decision making for capital and operating expenditures;
7. The authority to hire, fire and set the terms of reference and day-to-day management/supervision of its own employees.
8. The separation of decision making between the different levels on planning, policy and finance.

Source: OECD (2019^[41]), *Making Decentralisation Work: A Handbook for Policy Makers*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/g2g9faa7-en>.

Capacity gaps at the subnational level can also generate significant bottlenecks for effective public service delivery, resulting in missed opportunities to access federal programmes and resources (OECD, 2020^[42]). In Brazil, the federal government implements programmes to address social and economic issues, but subnational governments may struggle to access information about these programmes due to limited resources, bureaucratic hurdles, or inadequate communication. Differences in resources, both in quantity and quality, available to municipalities, lead to wide regional disparities in Brazil (Azzoni et Haddad, 2018^[44]). These regional disparities could be addressed through the use of fiscal equalisation systems, which aim to correct imbalances among subnational governments and foster equity across territories (OECD, 2020^[42]; OECD, 2019^[41]). OECD countries could offer examples of ways of avoiding compounding inequalities and enabling levels of government to successfully deliver the services for which they are responsible (Box 3.6).

Box 3.6. Overview of equalisation systems in OECD countries

Fiscal equalisation aims to reduce disparities in fiscal capacity and expenditure needs among sub-central governments (SCGs). This is achieved by redistributing financial resources from wealthier governments to those facing higher costs or lower revenue capacities, either vertically or horizontally. The objective of equalisation transfers is to provide comparable levels of public services at similar levels of taxation across SCGs and to enhance the relative fiscal autonomy of jurisdictions with fewer resources.

The OECD Fiscal Federalism 2022 Review outlines a number of selected good practices, including:

- **Regular reviews by an arms-length body, with input from SCGs.** Representative examples include Australia's Commonwealth Grants Commission and India's Finance Commission.
- **Implementing a representative tax system** can avoid linking taxation choices to equalisation receipts. It is a common feature of many equalisation systems and is often linked to the average tax rate across all SCGs in countries such as Australia, Canada and Germany.
- **Clearly linking equalisation entitlements to SCG per capita income, rather than factors that can be directly influenced by policy choices.** Sweden's equalisation system provides a clear example of this practice, relying on per capita income as the primary measure of revenue potential and objective measures of cost such as demographic profiles.
- **Using inter-governmental transfers outside of the equalisation system to achieve well-defined policy goals, while equalising transfers remain non-earmarked.** For example, in Australia, the Commonwealth Grants Commission noted that the challenges faced by indigenous communities could not be adequately addressed by equalisation alone.
- **Rewarding SCGs for increasing their own revenues while maintaining redistributive systems.** Countries with horizontal equalisation systems, such as Sweden and Germany, allow SCGs with above-average own-source revenue to retain some of their additional tax income according to a progressive schedule.
- **Assessing cost equalisation may be possible via subnational performance benchmarking.** For instance, Italy's sophisticated approach to the measurement of public service outcomes may allow the effect of cost equalisation to be observed.

Source: (OECD, 2021^[45]).


3.1.3. Enhancing the civil service's capacity to innovate could help meet changing expectations

Government responsiveness is largely dependent on the public administration. As such, it is strongly linked to civil servants' capacity to identify citizens' needs and to innovate in the design and delivery of services so as to match their needs and expectations.

According to the OECD Trust Survey, only 27.9% of Brazilian respondents believe the public administration would implement innovative ideas to improve public services, compared to an average of 38% across the OECD and 37% in Colombia (Figure 3.11). This perception highlights a core challenge for the Brazilian administration, as governments which lack the capacity to innovate remain more vulnerable to the unrelenting pressure of change and volatility. As expectations of government change, so too will the public service to maintain trust and legitimacy. Efforts to challenge this perception could thus lead to important trust gains (see Chapter 2).

Figure 3.11. Only one-third of Brazilian respondents expect public agencies to adopt innovative ideas to improve services

Share of respondents reporting different levels of perceived likelihood that a public agency/office would adopt an innovative idea that could improve a public service in Brazil, Colombia and OECD average, 2021-2022



Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the question “If there is an innovative idea that could improve a public service, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that it would be adopted by the responsible [public agency/office]?” “Likely” corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10, “neutral” to a response of 5 and “unlikely” to responses of 0-4; “don't know” was a separate answer choice. OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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A recent study of the innovation system of the public service of Brazil underscores how some historical factors, such as legalistic tendencies and an institutional bias towards control may hinder innovation (OECD, 2019^[46]). As in other countries in Latin America, public service initiatives tend to be set out in laws and decrees rather than policies (OECD, 2019^[46] ; IPEA/ENAP, 2018^[47]). Civil servants must then navigate the complex intersection of these laws and decrees, which may generate unclear messages and entail high transaction costs. These historical patterns will be obvious to citizens and would thus inform their perception of the public administration’s capacity to innovate. In addition, those interviewed for this study mentioned the perceived rigidity of the system as a barrier to innovation, underscoring the limited autonomy of the civil service to implement and deliver of services, exacerbated by a lack of stability in senior positions.

Efforts to promote a widespread “culture of innovation” across the public service could help to counteract this perception of a rigid bureaucracy unlikely to innovate. Public servants may be less likely to innovate if they fear that their attempts will be seen as mistakes or bad performance instead of rewarded by their organisations. Decision makers should thus consider trade-offs and try to balance the need for control and oversight with the promotion of a culture for innovation (Flemig, Osborne et Kinder, 2016^[48]). The Institute of Brilliant Failures in the Netherlands provides a compelling example of how to shift the culture around mistakes and bad performance (Box 3.7).

Box 3.7. Learning from failure in the Netherlands

The Institute of Brilliant Failures in the Netherlands was established in recognition of the importance of embracing risk-taking activities and experiments, showcasing learning and experiences, and learning from failures and successes. The institute runs an annual Brilliant Failure award for projects that were well prepared but resulted in unexpected outcomes. It ultimately seeks to shift attitudes towards risk and failure and create opportunities to learn, leading to better outcomes. Changing the culture around risk, experimentation and failure is a necessary step on the journey to building innovative capacity – learning from risky projects, which sometimes fail, is critical for any government to achieve its full innovative potential. Openness to failure and risk taking within the leadership is an essential first step.

Source: (OECD, 2022^[49]) Institute of Brilliant Failures (2022): <https://www.briljantemislukkingen.nl>.

The National School for Public Administration (*Escola Nacional de Administração Pública*, ENAP) does have in place the LIDERAGOV programme, which places a specific focus on building innovative processes and adopting management models oriented to delivering better services focused on citizens. The programme is currently selective and limited to the federal government (ENAP, 2023^[50]), but civil servants across the country and at all levels of government could greatly benefit from its expansion, or a version of the programme tailored to their needs. Innovative skills could also be streamlined across the administration through mobility programmes, as was the case in Canada (Box 3.8).

Box 3.8. Canada's free agent programme: Embedding innovation into regular practice

If public sectors wish to attract and retain motivated and skilled individuals then they need to provide them with the ability to creatively make a difference. Canada's Free Agent programme demonstrates the complexity of embedding innovation into regular practice. While the Free Agent programme is based on a model that identifies "innovators" who possess specific attributes, participants could work in a project-based manner and be deployed across the system based on demand.

The first Free Agents programme was launched in 2016 in Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) as a two-year pilot. Because many different types of work could benefit from the model, NRCan's Innovation Hub chose not to choose a specific background or skillset for Free Agents. Instead, the Innovation Hub developed a set of attributes and behaviours that the Public Service innovation community considered valuable for innovation and problem solving in their organisations. These attributes formed the basis for the pilot screening process. Candidates who successfully demonstrate these core attributes are offered lateral deployments to positions in a special unit of the NRCan Innovation Hub. This lateral deployment model allows for flexibility in the selection process and assessment methodology. Deployments do not need to have clear priorities or undergo a traditional competitive appointment process. Furthermore, NRCan has removed the usual hurdles from hiring departments: the Free Agents are hired by and work for NRCan but are deployed elsewhere. Hiring departments can give two weeks' notice if the agents do not fit the purpose or the team, while the agents themselves enjoy job security with NRCan. The programme has now outgrown the single department in NRCan and is being scaled up.

The programme provides the possibility of expanding the capacities of the existing system within the boundaries of legacy systems. The involvement and integration of the "innovators" into projects could help demonstrate that innovation is a core part of everyday business. However, the programme also risks reinforcing the idea of an "innovator class".

Source: (Kaur et al., 2022^[51]); (OECD, 2018^[52]).

3.1.4. Opportunities for improving the delivery and responsiveness of public services

This section summarises key results and presents potential policy avenues Brazil could consider to improve government responsiveness and strengthen public trust in the country.

- Satisfaction with public services is comparatively low in Brazil and uneven across population groups. For instance, in April 2022, 30% of Brazilian respondents were satisfied with the education system and 32% with administrative services, compared with 58% and 63%, respectively in surveyed OECD countries. Satisfaction with services is a key driver for trust in local government in Brazil and levels of trust in local government (20%) are lower than trust in the civil service (24%) or the federal government (26%). To tackle these issues, Brazil could:
 - Increasing targeted communication and awareness-raising campaigns to inform citizens of their rights and how to access public services directly.
 - Revisiting the allocation of responsibilities and co-ordination mechanisms between levels of government to deliver public services and ensuring resources are commensurate with the levels of responsibility allocated.
- People's perceptions of government responsiveness is a challenge for Brazil, as for many OECD countries. Most people are sceptical about whether institutions would adapt policies and services in response to feedback. Only 36% of Brazilian respondents believe that services would improve if people complained and 32% that policies would be adapted. To move towards more responsive services and policies Brazil could:
 - Systematising user-centred design of public services through guidance and support from the centre, and pilot user-centred initiatives targeting high-impact life events.
 - Continue strengthening feedback loops by ensuring satisfaction indicators are analysed in conjunction with performance indicators and by improving data integration to ensure the government has a holistic view of its users' needs.
 - Ensuring that vulnerable population groups have the opportunity to provide feedback to the government and that their feedback is properly analysed.
- Innovation is not seen as widespread in the public sector – only 28% of Brazilian respondents believe the public administration would implement innovative ideas to improve public services. Perceptions of the civil service's capacity to innovate is an important driver of trust in local government in Brazil. To counteract this perception the Brazilian government could:
 - Promoting a widespread “culture of innovation” across the public service and enhancing training in public sector innovation.

3.2. Reliability

The second component of government competence in the OECD Framework on the Drivers of Trust in public institutions is reliability, which encompasses three inter-related aspects of government functioning. These are 1) anticipating needs and assessing evolving challenges; 2) minimising uncertainty in the economic, social and political environment; and 3) effectively committing to future-oriented policies.

To capture this dimension the OECD Trust Survey includes the following three questions:

- If a new serious contagious disease spreads, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that government institutions will be prepared to protect people's lives?
- If you share your personal data with a government department, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that it would be exclusively used for legitimate purposes?
- How likely or unlikely do you think it is that the business conditions that the government can influence (e.g. laws and regulations businesses need to comply with) will be stable and predictable?

Considering the high levels of informality in Brazil, following discussions with the Advisory Group leading this report (see Box 2.3 in Chapter 2), the survey also includes an additional question about whether or not people are willing to register and formalise potential productive activities. There are several elements to this question that make it relevant to the Brazilian context. As well as knowing and understanding the procedure for registering a business, doing so entails exchanging information with the authorities and becoming eligible for benefits or liable for taxes. People who are willing to register a business may have confidence in the reliability of these agreements, see them as beneficial (i.e. their satisfaction with what they receive leads to social engagement), perceive that no one is favoured over others or benefit at their expense (e.g. no one is getting greater benefit from not registering), and trust the effectiveness of enforcement of penalties for not registering (OECD/CAF/ECLAC, 2018^[53]). The question is formulated in the following way:

- If you were to open a business today, would you apply for the Brazilian National Registry of Legal Entities (Cadastro Nacional de Pessoas Jurídicas, CNPJ)?⁵

Finally, the survey asks respondents how confident they are that Brazil will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the next ten years, to gauge people's perception of government commitment and effectiveness in tackling environmental challenges.


- How confident are you that Brazil will succeed in its policies to reduce the negative effects of climate change (such as deforestation, fires, floods, etc.) in the next ten years?

3.2.1. Reliability is consistently low across indicators in Brazil

Some aspects of reliability have been found to have great potential to influence trust in public institutions in Brazil, in particular the civil service (see Chapter 2). However, public confidence in government reliability in Brazil is comparatively low. Less than a quarter of Brazilian respondents expect their government to be prepared to protect people's lives if a new infectious disease was to spread; less than in Colombia (31%), Mexico (48%) and the average across 22 OECD countries (56%) (Figure 3.12). Although the share is consistently low across population groups, there is greater confidence among men and those with higher education and higher socio-economic status about the government's ability to protect people in the event of an outbreak of a future infectious disease (Figure 3.13).

Figure 3.12. There is room to improve all aspects of reliability

Share of respondents reporting different levels of perceived likelihood on aspects of government reliability in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and OECD average, 2021-2022




Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the questions: 1) "If a new serious contagious disease spreads, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that government institutions will be prepared to protect people's life?"; 2) "If you share your personal data with a [public agency/office], how likely or unlikely do you think it is that it would be exclusively used for legitimate purposes?"; and 3) "How likely or unlikely do you think it is that the business conditions that the government can influence (e.g. laws and regulations businesses need to comply with) will be stable and predictable?" "Likely" corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10, "neutral" to a response of 5 and "unlikely" to responses of 0-4; "don't know" was a separate answer choice. OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

StatLink <https://stat.link/hki82b>

Figure 3.13. People with a higher education and men are more confident in government preparedness for future infectious disease outbreaks

Share of respondents who indicate they think it likely government is prepared for a future disease in Brazil by age, education, gender, socio-economic status and region, 2022



Note: Figure presents the responses to the question "If a new serious contagious disease spreads, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that government institutions will be prepared to protect people's life?" "Likely" corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a 0-10 scale. BRA mean presents the weighted average across all respondents in Brazil. High education is defined as ISCED 2011 levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as bachelor's, master's or doctorates, and low education refers to below upper secondary attainment. Socio-economic status (SES) is based on household's purchasing power following the Brazil Economic Classification Criteria (Critério Brasil-ABEP), which assesses respondents households' access to public utility services, education and possession of several amenities. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

StatLink <https://stat.link/8zokbn>

The comparatively small share of the population who consider the country to be prepared for future pandemics is most likely to have been influenced by some perceived governance failures in the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, such as lack of emergency planning, misleading and contradictory governmental communication, and structural disparities in health access and infrastructure (see Section 1.3 in Chapter 1). Many of these elements could be taken into consideration as lessons learned. Brazil could build on successful examples – such as Korea's crisis management plan, or Portugal's communications strategy during the pandemic – to prepare better for the future (Box 3.9).

Box 3.9. Country examples of planning and communication during crisis

Korea

Korea's response to COVID-19 was based on three pillars: testing, contact tracing and treating. However, informed by lessons learnt from the management of previous disasters and infectious diseases, the government acknowledged that these were not enough alone to tackle the pandemic. It involved various stakeholders in its response and developed a co-ordination body within government which included representatives from different ministries as well as from the 17 provinces and major cities. One of the key elements considered in the governance of epidemic management was to revise the protocols of the disaster management system to clarify roles and responsibilities between the central and local governments.

Portugal

In January 2020, following the outbreak of COVID-19, Portugal established a special Task Force for Prevention and Control of the Pandemic with the main objective of developing a plan to prepare for and respond to the pandemic.

Communication was one of the main priorities of the Task Force, and crucial in all stages of government's response to the pandemic. The government's COVID-19 Communication Strategy had four main objectives: to generate trust in vaccination, improve health literacy, fight fake news and misinformation, and monitor public perceptions and obstacles to vaccination, including through social media.

This strategy targeted a broad audience including health professionals, the media, vaccination priority groups, citizens, influencers, and public and private partners. It was supported by a comprehensive set of concurrent actions, such as the dissemination of regular and detailed information on the advancement of the vaccination programme; regular press conferences with well-prepared speakers and public administration officials; the systematic identification of fake news and education of the public about it; and information and education campaigns on COVID 19 and its differences from among other respiratory infectious diseases.

Two years after implementation, the plan was evaluated, and the most important outcomes of Portugal's Pandemic Strategy were:


- an improved system to monitor risk perception by the general public
- a reinforced and more effective vaccination plan, targeting the most vulnerable
- a new set of health recommendations for infection prevention
- improved communication approaches by the Health Authorities
- more transparency from policy makers and public administration officers and increased trust in public institutions
- new evidence on policy impacts and citizens' behaviour
- reinforced partnerships with academia, stakeholders, civil society and influencers.

Source: (OECD, 2023^[54]).

Slightly more than one-quarter (27%) of Brazilians believe that data they share with government entities will only be used for legitimate purposes, below both OECD average and results for Mexico (45%) and Colombia (34%) (Figure 3.12). This perception also varies across population groups (Figure 3.14).

Figure 3.14. Younger people are more likely to feel that personal data would only be used for legitimate purposes

Share of respondents who say they think it likely personal data would be used legitimately in Brazil by age, education, gender, socio-economic status and region, 2022



Note: Figure presents the responses to the question "If you share your personal data with a [public agency/office], how likely or unlikely do you think it is that it would be exclusively used for legitimate purposes?". "Likely" corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a 0-10 scale. BRA mean presents the weighted average across all respondents in Brazil. High education is defined as ISCED 2011 levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as bachelor's, master's or doctorates, and low education refers to below upper secondary attainment. Socio-economic status (SES) is based on household's purchasing power following the Brazil Economic Classification Criteria (Critério Brasil-ABEP), which assesses respondents households' access to public utility services, education and possession of several amenities. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

StatLink  <https://stat.link/vpcjb3>

As with many of the statistics presented in this case study, low initial levels of interpersonal and institutional trust may undermine the authorities' ability to successfully implement policies that require people's buy-in and compliance (Nguyen et al., 2022^[55]). Brazil has, however, made strides in regulating the processing of personal data by private or public entities for ensuring the privacy of data subjects. The government pushed a General Data Protection Law (*Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados -LGPD*) that was enacted in 2018 (Law 13.709). In addition, in early 2022, the Congress amended the constitution⁶ making personal data protection a fundamental citizen right (Camara dos Deputados, 2022^[56]). The amendment establishes that the federal government will be exclusively responsible for the protection and processing of personal data and information. This regulation could have the advantage of avoiding different treatment by state and municipal governments. Some concerns remain over the fact that the Data Protection Agency (*Autoridade Nacional de Proteção de Dados*, ANDP) is linked to the president's office. The absence of an independent data protection regulator was not only against international practice but seen as having the potential to undermine trust in personal data management by government entities (Laranjeira de Pereira et Guimaraes Moraes, 2022^[57]). A provisional measure was adopted in June 2022 that granted the ANDP independence (including administrative and budgetary autonomy) from the presidency. However, for the measure to become law will still require legislative approval by both chambers.

There are also challenges in reconciling the application of the *LGPD* with initiatives designed to reduce the administrative burden on people dealing with the authorities by enhancing data sharing and interoperability among public bodies at the federal level, as such initiatives are based on the creation of different data sharing levels. According to the presidential decree regulating these matters (Decree 10.046/2019)⁷ it remains up to agents within the respective public bodies to decide which data correspond to each "level of secrecy" and whether or not they can be shared. Neither the sensitive nature of personal data nor the purpose of the transfer are regarded as criteria for sharing data across institutions (Laranjeira de Pereira et Guimaraes Moraes, 2022^[57]). In addition, the press have exposed high profile cases such as the sharing of data from the National Transit Department (DENATRAN) with the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) which have received public attention. While this agreement was finally abandoned, such cases often reduce trust as they cast doubts on how public bodies intend to use private data. Enhancing security and investing in privacy-preserving technologies will remain essential to building trust, as well as clarifying responsibilities and the criteria for data sharing across government agencies in alignment with constitutional rights and the *LGPD*. Brazil could further benefit from strengthening interoperability across public institutions by implementing consistent and open standards for data formats and structures and supporting the use of measures such as common identifiers and programming semantics when collecting, sharing and publishing data (OECD, 2018^[58]).


The third question on reliability in the survey asks about perceptions of the stability of those business conditions which are under the control of government (Figure 3.12). Just one-quarter of Brazilians (25.1%) expect this to be the case, which is below the share in Colombia (35%) and the OECD average (42%). In general, Brazil could do more to lower barriers to starting and expanding a business, particularly in some sectors. Starting businesses can be perceived as complex and burdensome, while the provision of services by professionals such as accountants, architects, engineers, lawyers, notaries and real estate agents are still subject to a range of regulatory constraints that limit competition and risk hampering innovation and productivity (OECD, 2022^[59]).

Remarkably, when asked about formalising a potential business, 56.9% of respondents stated that they would be willing to do so (Figure 3.15). As with every result based on perceptions, willingness is just the first step, before moving to action when the necessary conditions are in place. This result could signal that a majority of Brazilians have enough confidence in public institutions to formalise a business, and perceive it could be beneficial. However, this is not the case for all segments of the population; there are stark differences across socio-economic groups. Those with lower socio-economic status and less education are less willing to register their potential business (Figure 3.16). This might reflect that decisions on whether to register a business are also dependent on its scale and visibility. Still, the extent to which some underprivileged segments of Brazilian society would be willing to play by the rules depends on whether they perceive institutions to be reliable, their satisfaction with public services and the overall benefit they believe they can obtain by participating in or fulfilling their obligations to the state. If Brazilians are dissatisfied with their government and the services it provides, they are more likely to justify not registering their business and this may also be reflected in other types of behaviour, such as cheating on taxes (OECD/CAF/ECLAC, 2018^[53]).

Figure 3.15. The majority of Brazilian respondents express willingness to register a business

Share of respondents who are willing to register a business in Brazil, 2022

■ Likely ■ Neutral ■ Unlikely ■ Don't know




Note: Figure presents the responses to the question "If you were to open a business today, would you apply for the Brazilian National Registry of Legal Entities (*Cadastro Nacional de Pessoas Jurídicas – CNPJ*)". "Likely" corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10, "neutral" to a response of 5 and "unlikely" to responses of 0-4; "don't know" was a separate answer choice.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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Figure 3.16. The willingness to register a business is higher among people with a higher education and higher socioeconomic status

Share of respondents who are willing to register a business in Brazil by age, education, gender, socioeconomic status and region, 2022



Note: Figure presents the responses to the question "If you were to open a business today, would you apply for the Brazilian National Registry of Legal Entities (*Cadastro Nacional de Pessoas Jurídicas – CNPJ*)". "Likely" corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a 0-10 scale. BRA mean presents the weighted average across all respondents in Brazil. High education is defined as ISCED 2011 levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as bachelor's, master's or doctorates, and low education refers to below upper secondary attainment. Socio-economic status (SES) is based on household's purchasing power following the Brazil Economic Classification Criteria (Critério Brasil-ABEP), which assesses respondents households' access to public utility services, education and possession of several amenities. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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Accordingly, it is important for the country to continue its efforts to reduce regulatory burdens imposed on firms. Brazil has started to tackle red tape by streamlining licensing and permitting procedures for businesses and by deploying a programme to digitalise public services, with over 4 000 procedures available online (OECD, 2022_[59]). Existing efforts to review the burden of regulations are a step in the right direction, but they are not yet co-ordinated. By bringing the different initiatives under a single umbrella policy, Brazil could improve the benefits for citizens and businesses. Despite this progress, excessive regulation still means firms have limited incentive to become more productive. Comparative indicators on product market regulation show that regulatory burdens and market entry barriers in Brazil are among the world's highest (OECD, 2020_[60]). There is room to further simplify licence requirements for starting a company and reduce the administrative burden, for example by pursuing the roll out of one-stop shops for setting up new firms and the wider application of the "silence is consent" rule for licences. These would be important steps to increase productivity levels in Brazil (OECD, 2020_[60]).

3.2.2. Enhancing longer-term planning could improve perceptions of reliability

Achieving reliability requires adopting a longer-term perspective for policy making and ensuring that guiding instruments are properly tied to resources or linked to the policy-making cycle. If people perceive that public institutions have a clear roadmap, that there is coherence and consistency across policies, and that plans go from wishes to implementation, they are more likely to place their trust in public institutions.

Brazil is among the LAC countries with a well-rooted tradition of using planning as a strategic tool for defining priorities and setting up policies (OECD, 2022^[61]). Historically, it has been estimated that centralised planning assures both the security and wellbeing of the nation. A dual focus on national security and economic progress has driven the government to intervene in the national economy (Edelman, 2018^[62]). Planning is seen as a way to facilitate decision making by linking inputs and means to specified outputs (Mello e Souza, 2012^[63]). In a country of continental dimensions, planning is essential to integrate a development narrative and provide a cohesive vision to the nation as outlined by policy priorities set by the government (Bercovici, 2022^[64]).

The *Plano Plurianual* (PPA) 2020-2023 is the current document laying out the federal government's vision through directives, objectives and goals for four years. While institutionalised national planning in Brazil has evolved over time (Box 3.10) some authors argue that its history of planning has been marked by frustration and failure in the face of changing reality, and the mismatched provision of adequate financial resources to implement the plans (Mello e Souza, 2012^[63]). The incipient medium-term spending framework does not really incorporate a medium-term perspective into the allocation of resources. The absence of any stable medium-term fiscal planning leads to excessively short time horizons for decisions about revenue and expenditure during the preparation of the draft budget (Tollini, 2021^[65]). Plans have also been criticised for a lack of elaboration of programmes and projects and limited co-ordination among different goals.

In this regard, in order to improve trust levels, Brazil could consider strengthening its planning function by streamlining national priorities, further enhancing co-ordination across the different bodies and instances in charge of implementing them, and improving the connection between the national development plan and its spending tools. Brazil could also improve the effectiveness of its prioritisation and strategic planning apparatus by building a more robust and transparent framework for identifying problems through better use of evidence and stakeholder engagement (OECD, 2022^[61]).

Box 3.10. Key milestones of planning in Brazil

The first modern planning instrument was developed by the Administrative Department of Public Service (DASP) in 1939 as a five-year special plan of public works and improvements for national defence.

In 1946 the constitution defined the term “plan” as arising from the necessity of rationalising the acts of intervention of the federal government. The national council on the economy was established and with the support of the DASP formulated a new and broad national plan for public health, food production and distribution, transportation, and energy. It moved economic development towards human resource development if not social development.

In the midst of political turmoil, in 1961 a 20-year projective plan, a five year or short-term plan and an emergency plan were presented to congress. These were never implemented but paved the way for planning over a long-term horizon (Edelman, 2018^[62]).

The 1967 ratification of the Extraordinary Ministry of Planning and Economic Coordination institutionalised national planning. The promulgation of five-year national plans was tied to parallel programmes of public investment, creating a system of national planning.

In 1971, the first national development plan was enacted and in 1972, the federal planning ministry was transformed into the Secretariat of Planning of the Presidency.

Following important transformations to the public sector in the mid-1980s, a reorientation of the national bureaucracy affected the planning function. In 1987, the Secretariat of Planning and Coordination was separated from the presidency and subordinated to and within the Ministry of Finance. If planning had

ever previously led finance, after that the opposite was the case. By 1990, the economy, finance and planning ministries were combined into a single entity.

In 1992 national planning was re-incorporated into the office of the president in the Secretariat of Planning, Budgeting and Coordination, with full responsibility for the formulation and budgeting of regional and national development plans, and in 1996 the pluri-annual development plans were launched as a series of instruments that laid out a four-year vision for the nation, regional axes, states and municipalities.

From 2003 national planning was directed towards the implementation of a series of social programmes and co-ordination across different levels of government. From 2016, the focus of national planning steered away from social programmes. In 2018, the ministries of Finance, Planning and Industry, and Trade were merged to create the Ministry of Economy.

Source: Authors adapted from Edelman (2018^[62]) and other sources.

As well the national development plan, there are other tools which could be used to embed a longer-term perspective into policy making and integrate it into the work of the public administration. Examples such as the future reviews carried out by the Finnish Government or the Long-term Insights Briefings adopted by the New Zealand administration could be powerful tools to strengthen a longer-term perspective in policy making within the Brazilian administration (Box 3.11). Decentralising the process of building broad planning strategies and incorporating the views of line ministries and other public agencies could also be a powerful approach.

Box 3.11. Examples of forward-looking instruments for policy making in selected OECD countries

Future reviews in Finland

The future reviews of the ministries outline Finland's key questions for the years ahead. Their purpose is to assess situations and developments in society and examine issues for political decision making. The aim is to generate public debate and provide information for forthcoming elections and government formation talks.

Long-term Insights Briefings in New Zealand

Following the enactment of the Public Service Act 2020, Long-term Insights Briefings are a new government initiative requiring agencies to develop and share insights on the trends, risks and opportunities that affect, or may affect, Aotearoa New Zealand. Chief executives of government departments are required to publish a briefing at least once every three years. However, the Long-term Insights Briefings are not government policy. The value of the briefings is the opportunity to identify and explore the issues that matter for the future wellbeing of the people of New Zealand.

Policy Horizons in Canada

Policy Horizons Canada is a federal government organisation that uses foresight to help the federal government build stronger policies and programmes in the face of an uncertain future. It does so by 1) analysing the emerging policy landscape, the challenges that lie ahead and the opportunities opening up; 2) engaging in conversations with public servants and citizens about forward-looking research to inform their understanding and decision making; and 3) building foresight literacy and capacity across the public service.


Source: Authors based in several sources.

3.2.3. Delivery on mitigating climate change is the single most important driver of trust in government

The disconnect between planning and implementing policies undermines belief in public institutions' capacity to deliver on their promises. For example, there is a 25 percentage point gap between the share of people who believe that the government should prioritise tackling climate change (64.7%) and those who think that that the country will succeed in reducing its GHG emissions (39.6%). This gap is 10 percentage points higher than the average in OECD countries (Figure 3.17).


Figure 3.17. There is a 25 percentage point gap between those who think that tackling climate change is a priority and those who think that the government will succeed

Share of respondents who say government should prioritise climate change and who have confidence in their country's ability to reduce emissions in Brazil and OECD countries, 2021-2022



Note: Figure presents the responses to the questions 1) "On reducing your country contribution to climate change, do you think the government should be prioritising a lot more, more, about the same, less, or a lot less?" and 2) "How confident are you that your country will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the next 10 years?" The share of those saying the government should prioritise climate change represents the aggregated responses of "a lot more" and "more". "Confident" represents the aggregated responses of "somewhat confident" and "very confident". OECD presents the unweighted average of responses across countries. Finland, Mexico, New Zealand and Norway are excluded (or partially excluded) from this figure as comparable data were not available.


Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

StatLink  <https://stat.link/p4nbr5>

This result is important for Brazil since confidence in government capacity to reduce GHG emissions is the most relevant driver of trust in the federal government (see Chapter 2). This topic has been also highlighted as a main concern by experts interviewed for this study, while deforestation in Brazil's Amazon rainforest reached a record high for the first half of 2022, according to Brazil's national space research agency (Reuters, 2022^[66]). Figure 3.18 shows no significant variation in confidence by region, indicating that this is a common concern throughout the country.


Figure 3.18. There is higher confidence that the government will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions among the older population and people with a higher education

Share of respondents who have confidence in their country's ability to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in Brazil by age, education, gender, socioeconomic status and region, 2022



Note: Figure presents the responses to the question "How confident are you that your country will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the next 10 years". "Confident" represents the aggregated responses of "somewhat confident" and "very confident". BRA mean presents the weighted average across all respondents in Brazil. High education is defined as ISCED 2011 levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as bachelor's, master's or doctorates, and low education refers to below upper secondary attainment. Socio-economic status (SES) is based on household's purchasing power following the Brazil Economic Classification Criteria (Critério Brasil-ABEP), which assesses respondents households' access to public utility services, education and possession of several amenities. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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As part of the Paris Agreement, Brazil pledged to reduce its emissions by 43% compared to 2005 (World Bank, 2018^[67]) and has updated its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) twice since 2015. Although its most recent update in March 2022 is more ambitious than its 2020 update, it remains weaker than the original NDC submitted in 2016 (CAT, 2023^[68]). This trajectory is symptomatic of climate policy's vulnerability to political volatility in Brazil. People's lack of confidence in the government's ability to tackle climate change could thus be explained by the instability of the legal and strategic frameworks which surrounds it. More recently, the country has experienced some positive developments in its fight against climate change and environmental degradation. In July 2022, the Supreme Court declared the climate fund must be reactivated, and recognised the Paris Agreement as a human rights treaty (CAT, 2023^[68]). Moreover, Brazil has developed sound legislation on environmental information, water and waste management, and biodiversity, although further efforts are needed to translate legal provisions into effective practices (OECD, 2021^[69]).

Despite these positive developments, Brazil's policies and practices fall below OECD standards in other areas. A recent study found that Brazil had "failed to correct problems with environmental impact assessment (EIA) or strengthen the integration of environmental considerations into public policies and plans". It also pointed deficiencies in its implementation of the polluter-pays principle, integrated pollution prevention and control, and the environmental performance of public facilities (OECD, 2021^[69]).

In addition to bridging these gaps, in order to decrease emissions and limit warming to 1.5°C, Brazil will need to reverse its current trend of weakening climate policy. It will need to develop frameworks and institutions that are “durable by design” and be able to endure over a long period of time and ride out changes in the political economy. In the Brazilian context, these efforts should notably be focused on the forestry sector and the country’s long-term energy plans (CAT, 2023^[68]).

Indeed, Brazil’s GHG emissions in 2021 had their fastest rise in almost two decades, with emissions from deforestation the main source of the increase (SEEG, 2021^[70]). In 2009, Brazil committed to reduce deforestation in the Amazon by 80% from 1996-2005 levels. In 2012, the country had succeeded in reducing its deforestation rate by 84% compared to 2004. However, since 2013, deforestation rates have been rising due to a series of policy and legal setbacks, and recently reached historically high levels (Silva Junior et al., 2020^[71]). While current laws and protections have proved capable of reducing deforestation in the past and should be retained, they will only be effective when coupled with stronger enforcement to combat illegal deforestation, which will require additional resources (OECD, 2020^[60]). Achieving the country’s ambition to reduce GHG emissions will also require a reassessment of Brazil’s long-term energy plans, which currently point to an expanded role for gas and oil in the coming decade (CAT, 2023^[68]).

Recent OECD research also advances some broad actions which governments could use to mitigate climate change (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2022^[72]). It recognises that while policies to address climate change have been historically difficult, three types of actions are possible:

- encourage green behaviour through infrastructure investment and subsidies
- assess the relevance of compensatory mechanisms for disadvantaged sectors
- inform citizens about how climate policies work and who they affect, and promote their involvement in the decision-making process (Box 3.12).

Box 3.12. Citizen and stakeholder engagement for climate action

Governments typically deploy a patchwork of structures to engage citizens and stakeholders in the decision-making and policy development process for climate action. Dialogue alone is not sufficient to generate meaningful participation and is typically embedded in an institutional framework to structure and leverage these exchanges. These initiatives can be categorised as follows:

- **Stakeholder engagement platform tied to a supranational commitment or event:** For instance, the Peruvian government established a united platform for national civil society actors ahead of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of Parties hosted by the Peruvian Government in 2014 – Grupo Peru COP20 – to develop common positions and co-ordinate collective advocacy around the negotiations. This loose civil society platform continues to collaborate and inform national climate policy today. More recently, some countries have launched dedicated stakeholder consultations with the aim of actively developing and revising their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Vietnam, for instance, has expanded its existing donor climate change co-ordination group to create a more inclusive, open, and strategic NDC Implementation Platform.
- **Permanent stakeholder engagement platforms embedded in the national or local climate governance framework:** In several countries, stakeholder involvement for climate purposes is already institutionalised in the governance framework with the introduction of climate-dedicated institutions to ensure their sustained involvement and scrutiny over time. This is the case in France through the creation of a National Council for the Ecological Transition, gathering representative interest groups.

- **Citizen assemblies:** the growing traction of climate citizens' assemblies is another promising signal of governments' intention to broaden traditional democratic governance instruments, serving as potential prototypes for longer-term infrastructure to engage citizens in national policy making. The multiplication of arenas for citizen-led participation, consultation or deliberation, at both local and national levels provides better evidence of their efficacy and potential limits. Well-known pioneer examples of citizens-led committees include Climate Assembly UK, France Citizens' Convention on the Climate as well as other national-level climate assemblies introduced in Austria, Denmark, Scotland and Spain. Such deliberative arenas can facilitate collective discussions on highly complex issues. This was the case for the UK Climate Assembly for instance, where citizen members recommended that the United Kingdom's path to net zero emissions by 2050 must be underpinned by education, choice, fairness and political consensus.

Source: <https://climateactiontransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Stakeholder-Participation-Assessment-Guide.pdf>; <https://www.climate-kic.org/opinion/five-ways-of-meaningfully-involving-citizens-in-climate-action/>; (Rüdinger et al., 2018^[73]).

3.2.4. Opportunities for enhancing foresight planning and Brazil's preparedness to address long-term challenges

This section summarises key results and presents potential policy avenues Brazil could implement to improve reliability and strengthen public trust:

- In April 2022, when the OECD Trust Survey was implemented, only 23% of the Brazilian population expected the government to be prepared to tackle a new pandemic. There is room to enhance crisis management, risk management and emergency preparedness as important factors behind people's trust in public institutions. Brazil could:
 - Reviewing and adjusting the mechanisms for dealing with risks to better manage unexpected and new types of crises. The revision could seek to guarantee flexibility at the local level combined with the capacity to co-ordinate among different sectors and to integrate new stakeholders in order to cope with all foreseeable and unforeseeable hazards. It could also enhance emergency planning by reviewing the warning system and implementing modernised crisis communication tools.
 - Improving planning capacity by formalising and strengthening the role of the centre of government, streamlining national priorities, and incorporating new tools into future-oriented exercises across the administration.
 - Building a robust and transparent strategic foresight framework for the identification of problems through better use of evidence and stakeholder engagement.
- Only slightly more than one-quarter (27%) of Brazilians expect their data to be exclusively used for legitimate purposes if shared with government, below both the OECD average and values for Mexico (45%) and Colombia (34%). Brazil has however made strides to regulate personal data processing by private or public entities to ensure the privacy of data subjects. In light of this, Brazil could:
 - Enhancing security and investing in privacy-preserving technologies, coupled with robust ethical standards and regulations.
 - Clarifying the scope of responsibilities and criteria for data sharing and strengthening interoperability across government agencies.
- About one-quarter of the population expect business and regulatory condition to remain stable, although over half are willing to formalise a potential business. Brazil could:
 - Reducing the regulatory burden imposed on firms, by simplifying license requirements and rolling out one-stop shops for setting up new firms.

- The ability to mitigate climate change is the single most important driver of trust in government. However, when surveyed in April 2022, only 40% of Brazilian respondents were confident that the government would reduce greenhouse emissions in 10 years' time. Brazil could aim to:
 - Building trust by encouraging green behaviour and informing citizens about how climate policies work and whom they affect, as well as promoting their involvement in the decision-making process.

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Notes

¹ The OECD defines the CoG as the “body or group of bodies that provide direct support and advice to heads of government and the council of ministers, or cabinet” (OECD, 2018^[74]). In Brazil, a broad array of institutions reports directly to the president of the republic. Brazil’s presidency comprises six different institutions: the Civil Cabinet of the Presidency of the Republic (“*Casa Civil*”), the Secretariat of Institutional Relations, the General Secretariat, the Personal Office of the President of the Republic, the Institutional Security Cabinet and the Social Communication Secretariat.

² See Proposta de Emenda à Constituição n° 188, de 2019 <https://www25.senado.leg.br/web/atividade/materias/-/materia/139704>.

³ For instance, states and municipalities have direct responsibility for the delivery of education, and at times directly run schools at the same education levels. Municipalities primarily delivering early childhood education and care (ECEC), primary and lower secondary education, and states primarily delivering lower and upper secondary education.

⁴ See Emenda Constitucional No 95 de 15 de Dezembro de 2016, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/emendas/emc/emc95.htm.

⁵ The CNPJ is the Brazilian National Registry of corporations, partnerships, foundations, investment funds, and other legal entities, created and maintained by the Brazilian Federal Revenue Service (*Receita Federal do Brasil*).

⁶ Amendment number 115 of 2022.

⁷ At the time of drafting, there are two constitutional actions before the Supreme Court questioning the decree. The first (ADPF 695) objected to the application of the decree for national security purposes and requested that the Court nullify the SERPRO-ABIN agreement. The Court stated, in a preliminary ruling, that it would assess the constitutionality of the decree’s application for national security purposes. The second proceeding (ADI 6.649) disputes the overall constitutionality of Decree 10.046/2019, under the reasoning that the instrument as a whole is a threat to the constitutional right to data protection. In both cases, the Court is yet to deliver a final decision.

4 Trust and values in Brazil

This chapter examines people's perceptions of government values in Brazil, specifically related to openness, integrity and fairness, comparing them against current policies and good practices in OECD and LAC countries. Notably, Brazilians exhibit a greater level of skepticism towards their government's openness, integrity and fairness compared to its responsiveness. The chapter emphasises that, in Brazil, perceptions of fairness and openness serve as vital drivers of trust in public institutions, particularly for the civil service and the local government.

Prioritising a cultural change within public governance towards openness, integrity and fairness would enhance people's trust in public institutions. Indeed, the literature highlights that when it comes to public trust, processes – the way policies are designed and implemented – are as important as policy outcomes (Van de Walle and Migchelbrink, 2020^[1]; Brezzi et al., 2021^[2]). Openness, integrity and fairness are interconnected and mutually dependent public governance values (OECD, 2017^[3]; OECD, 2022^[4]). Open government promotes more transparent policy-making processes, enhances government accountability and fosters more citizen and stakeholder participation in public decision making (OECD, 2017^[5]). Inclusive and accessible governance increases loyalty, co-operation, positive perceptions of political leaders and trust in public institutions. Finally, public integrity policies and practices improve people's perceptions of their government's trustworthiness and legitimacy (OECD, 2017^[3]).

In Brazil, perceptions of fairness and openness are key drivers of trust in public institutions, in particular for the civil service and the local government (Chapter 2). Brazilians are more sceptical about their government's openness, integrity and fairness than its responsiveness (Figure 2.17).

This chapter reviews people's perceptions of openness, integrity and fairness in Brazil in the context of the its current policies and good practice in OECD and LAC countries. The analysis in this study relies mainly on the data collected through the OECD Trust Survey, carried out online in Brazil in April 2022. At the time of the survey, the country was still grappling with both the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and rising inflation, a highly polarised political environment during the presidential campaign for national elections and increased tensions between branches of government. The political and economic context when the data were collected has undoubtedly had an influence on the trust levels. Indeed, historical data indicate that the share of the public expressing trust in the government in Brazil and in Latin American countries has fluctuated significantly over the past 30 years, although remaining, on average, at around 30%. Major peaks in public trust are observed after national elections and the beginning of economic cycles (see Chapter 2), underscoring the importance of the wider context to people's perceptions and attitudes.

Brazil is often described as an open government pioneer. However, the public's perception of its openness is not quite as positive, and it continues to face challenges when engaging vulnerable groups in the policy-making process and communicating effectively. There are widespread feelings of unfairness among the Brazilian population, and perceptions of fairness matter for trust in public institutions and political inclusion. Brazilians, like many other Latin Americans, also raise concerns about public integrity. Such concerns exacerbate feelings of unequal treatment and the perception that the system is not working in the same way for everyone. Responding to these concerns will be crucial if people in Brazil are to feel their political voice is heard and that they are able to participate in politics.

4.1. Openness

Open government refers to a culture of governance that promotes transparency, integrity, accountability and stakeholder participation. Active and inclusive open government transforms how the public administration interacts with stakeholders and citizens (OECD, 2017^[5]).

Building on the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Open Government (OECD, 2017^[5]), the OECD Framework on the Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions measures three key aspects of openness. First, the survey measures the government's capacity to inform the public about what it does and improve transparency.¹ Second, it assesses whether the public are consulted and whether the government seeks feedback from citizens and stakeholders. Third, the survey looks at the government's response to people's ideas and views and whether it includes such feedback in its policy design and implementation.

The OECD Trust Survey included the following three questions to measure perceptions of these elements of openness in Brazil:

- *If you need information about an administrative procedure (for example obtaining a passport, applying for benefits, etc.), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the information would be easily available?*
- *If a decision affecting your community is to be made by the local government, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that you would have an opportunity to voice your views?*
- *If you participate in a public consultation on reforming a major policy area (e.g. taxation, healthcare, environmental protection), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the government would adopt the opinions expressed in the public consultation?*

At the intersection of government openness and civic action, the OECD Trust Survey includes questions on people's ability to understand and influence politics (political efficacy) and on forms of political engagement. All these aspects of political engagement and people's voices in politics are included in the analysis of this chapter:

- *How much would you say the political system in Brazil allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?*
- *How confident are you in your own ability to participate in politics?*
- *Over the last 12 months, have you done any of the following activities? Please tick all that apply.*

Finally, the OECD Trust Survey included a specific question for Brazil on people's perceptions about how successful collective action might be in their neighbourhoods, addressing their sense of having a stake in collective endeavours beyond political participation:


- *Many pavements and streets in the city are in bad condition. Imagine that the government will give funds for maintenance to neighbourhoods where residents get 500 signatures on a petition. How likely would it be that the moderators in your neighbourhood would be able to collect the 500 signatures?*

4.1.1. Brazil is a regional leader on transparency, but public information is not perceived as being easy to access

Brazil has long been a regional leader on transparent public governance (Figure 4.1) and is one of the founding members of the Open Government Partnership (OGP), committed to promoting transparent, participatory, inclusive and accountable governance (OGP, 2021^[6]). Transparency initiatives have played a crucial role in Brazil's open government agenda and its past four OGP action plans have placed a strong emphasis on transparency. These initiatives have helped support subnational governments to meet their access to information obligations, establish a federal open data policy, and promote active transparency in environmental and health matters (OECD, 2022^[7]). One key aspect of government transparency is "freedom of information", which encourages citizens to ask for information and also requires governments to provide information proactively (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2022^[8]). In 2011 Brazil enacted the Law on Access to Information (Law 12.527/2011) requiring public institutions to provide information to citizens online, and since 2016, the country has enforced a time limit for government agencies to respond to requests for information. In parallel, Brazil has introduced a range of digital tools, such as the Federal Access to Information System, allowing the implementation of the Access to Information System and Open Data Portal.

Figure 4.1. Brazil performs well among Latin America countries on the open government agenda

Open Government ranking in Brazil and LAC countries, 2022



Note: Figure presents the country scores of the open government dimension of the Rule of Law Index. This dimension measures publicised laws and government data, rights to information, civic participation, and complaint mechanisms. The World Justice Project collects nationally representative samples in a mix of face-to-face/online surveys and local expert interviews in each country. All country scores are normalised to a range between 0 (weakest adherence to the rule of law) and 1 (strongest adherence to the rule of law) and component scores are aggregated using simple averages. LAC (31) refers to the unweighted average across 31 LAC countries.


Source: WJP (2022), Rule of Law Index.

StatLink  <https://stat.link/1nsrhd>

Despite these these initiatives and tools, the OECD Trust Survey finds that people have low expectations about the openness of public institutions (Figure 4.2). Only around one-third of surveyed respondents in Brazil (34.9%) believe that it would be easy to find information about administrative procedures – and 44.3% believe it would be difficult – compared to 51.4% expecting it to be easy in Colombia, 71% in Mexico and 65.1% on average across OECD countries.


Figure 4.2. Around one third of Brazilian respondents are pessimistic about the ease of finding information out about administrative procedures

Share of respondents indicating different levels of likelihood that they could easily find information about administrative procedures in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and the OECD average, 2021-2022



Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the question “If you need information about an administrative procedure (for example obtaining a passport, applying for benefits, etc.), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the information would be easily available?” “Likely” corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10, “neutral” to a response of 5 and “unlikely” to responses of 0-4; “don't know” was a separate answer choice. OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

StatLink  <https://stat.link/s78glc>

These results suggest people perceive a gap between Brazil's stated ambitions on government transparency and its results. One way Brazil could try to bridge this gap is by strengthening the legal framework. Like many other countries, Brazil provisionally suspended its law on access to information during the COVID-19 pandemic, making it harder for citizens to stay informed during the health crisis (OECD, 2020^[9]). The law on access to information could be more detailed and include fewer exceptions like those used for this suspension (RTI, 2023^[10]). Simplifying regulations and processes would reduce administrative burdens and harmonise implementation at the subnational level. Brazil could also discuss its implementation challenges with other countries that face or have faced similar issues. The OECD Network on Open and Innovative Government in LAC, which Brazil is currently co-leading with Colombia,² provides a key platform for exchanging information on policies and good practices of open government. For instance, Brazil could follow Mexico's example and invest further in open data and digitalisation. Mexico included open data as a priority in its National Digital Strategy to drive the digitalisation and capacity building of public sector institutions, as well as focusing on social inclusion in open government data (OECD, 2018^[11]). A similar focus on open government data would make an important contribution to Brazil's transparency agenda.

These formal adjustments could be complemented by a number of initiatives highlighted by the recent OECD Open Government Review of Brazil (OECD, 2022^[7]) to help reduce the implementation gap. Public communications could help inform people about Brazil's existing strong legal framework on the right to access public information. It could also develop a centralised web page combining all existing portals and panels where information is disclosed; adopt interactive guidelines or manuals for citizens and stakeholders on how and where to request government information; host seminars and discussion groups on the potential impact of access to information; and develop multi-channel mechanisms to counter the digital divide (OECD, 2022^[7]; Michener, Contreras and Niskier, 2018^[12]; Kawashita, Baptista and Soares, 2022^[13]). Inclusive communication is key; all groups in society should understand their right to access to information and they should be actively included in the work on transparency and open data. In New Zealand, for example, minority leaders manage data platforms themselves (Box 4.1). This may also help to tackle mis- and disinformation. During the pandemic, some minority community leaders in Brazil made active use of open government data to fight mis- and disinformation about vaccinations (Silva et al., 2021^[14]).

Box 4.1. Inclusive data governance in New Zealand

New Zealand Māori Data Governance. In New Zealand, data governance processes are co-designed with indigenous Māori communities (*Māori Data Governance*). This co-design process provides an opportunity for the New Zealand government to include vulnerable populations in the open government process and to keep abreast of their specific needs and challenges when designing policies addressing social inequalities. The co-design process also engages Māori communities in learning about their data rights and might enhance trust in data and data systems among population groups that have previously been left out. Visualisation tools specifically designed for use by Māori communities help people to actively engage with the data and make informed decisions.

Source: (New Zealand, 2023^[15]; New Zealand Government, 2023^[16])

4.1.2. Brazil could build on its history of participatory politics to strengthen meaningful engagement

Apart from its commitment to the transparency agenda, Brazil is well known for its use of innovative tools to promote political participation both at the federal and subnational levels. Brazil has a long tradition of local deliberation processes, such as participatory budgeting – first implemented in Porto Alegre in 1989 – and municipal policy councils. For example, in São Paulo, one of the largest cities in the world, deliberative governance mechanisms were successfully used to include socially vulnerable population groups in participatory budgeting.³ This illustrates the importance of promoting social inclusion and citizen participation in the urban policies of large cities, and which policy options can be used to do so (Hernández-Medina, 2010_[17]).

At the federal level, Brazil is known for its two types of deliberative bodies (*colegiados*, or collegial bodies): National Policy Councils and National Policy Conferences. National Policy Councils are permanent bodies, which discuss policy agendas and public policies and involve both governmental and non-governmental stakeholders. National Policy Conferences are an innovative mechanism to combine input from different levels of government, in which elected local delegates get together with government representatives to inform national policies at the states level. These conferences grew in importance during the 2000s, with civil society organisations playing an increasing role in the process (Pogrebinschi, 2022_[18]). The online platform *Participa Mais Brasil* is another well-known participatory tool, offering a centralised participatory portal (OECD, 2022_[7]).


However, recent research finds that Brazil's historical commitment to innovative tools for citizen and stakeholder participation has faltered in recent years (Pogrebinschi, 2021_[19]). Experts interviewed for this study stated that innovative participation, and political participation in general, was declining in the country. Such deliberative initiatives are difficult to manage in such a diverse and large country, and rarely include randomly selected citizens, which may be one of the barriers to ensuring inclusive engagement among the public (OECD, 2020_[20]). In 2019, during Jair Bolsonaro's presidency, Decree 9.759/2019 was enacted in an effort to rationalise the federal administration. This decree closed several National Policy Conferences and changed the mandate of others. It also revoked both the 2014 National Policy of Social Participation and the National System of Social Participation (OECD, 2022_[7]).

The experts' assessment of declining political participation is reflected in Brazilians' scepticism about how much they can meaningfully participate in political decision making. According to results from the OECD Trust Survey, in April 2022, most Brazilians did not consider they would have the opportunity to participate in political decision making. Less than one-third of respondents (27.2%) believe they would have the opportunity to voice their views on decisions made by local government, while only one in five (21.5%) believe the government would listen to opinions provided in a public consultation on reforming a major policy area (Figure 4.3). Only one in ten believe they have a say in what government does (Figure 4.10).

Figure 4.6). Perceptions about being able to influence local decisions are at similar levels in Colombia (28.5%), while for consultations on major national policy decisions, perceptions of influence are higher in Colombia (29.4%), Mexico (32%) and OECD countries overall (32.9%) than they are in Brazil (Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3. Perceptions of participatory engagement are low

Share of respondents who indicate different levels of perceived likelihood that a government would adopt opinions expressed in a public consultation in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and OECD average, 2021-2022



Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the questions 1) "If a decision affecting your community is to be made by the local government, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that you would have an opportunity to voice your views?" (left); and 2) "If you participate in a public consultation on reforming a major policy area (e.g. taxation, healthcare, environmental protection), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the government would adopt the opinions expressed in the public consultation?" (right). OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries. In Mexico, the question was formulated in a slightly different way.


Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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Perceptions of effective engagement are especially low among the most vulnerable. In general, women and people with lower levels of education feel less heard (Figure 4.4). For example, while only 21.5% of respondents with lower levels of education believe the government would adopt opinions expressed in public consultations, more educated respondents are more positive (26.7%). This suggests that Brazil needs to enhance its feedback mechanisms and communicate better to people how their views were considered, as is done in the United Kingdom and in *deliberaturas* in Colombia (Box 4.2). It also needs to ensure participatory engagement is inclusive. Existing participatory initiatives often lack representativeness and should be more inclusive of women, LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex) persons, youth and indigenous populations (OECD, 2022^[7]). For instance, research led by the *Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada* (IPEA) showed that on average, 63% of Council members in Brazil are men, 66% identify as white, and 58% are between 40 and 60 years old (IPEA, 2013^[21]). Similar concerns were highlighted during in-depth interviews with minority leaders carried out as part of this study.


Figure 4.4. Women and those with lower levels of education are less optimistic about the government listening to them

Share of respondents in Brazil who indicate they think it likely that a government would adopt opinions expressed in a public consultation, by age, education, gender, socio-economic status and region, 2022



Note: Figure presents the responses to the question “If you participate in a public consultation on reforming a major policy area (e.g. taxation, healthcare, environmental protection), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the government would adopt the opinions expressed in the public consultation?” “Likely” corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10. BRA mean presents the weighted average across all respondents in Brazil. High education is defined as ISCED 2011 levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as bachelor’s, master’s or doctorates, and low education refers to below upper secondary attainment. Socio-economic status (SES) is based on household purchasing power following the Brazil Economic Classification Criteria (Critério Brasil-ABEP), which assesses respondents’ households’ access to public utility services, education and possession of several amenities. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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Box 4.2. Strategies to provide feedback to citizens in Colombia and the United Kingdom

Updated public consultation principles in the United Kingdom

Government responses following public consultations are important for informing the public about their outcomes and making people feel their opinions mattered. In the United Kingdom, the government must publish a response within 12 weeks of the consultation taking place. Responses must be published in advance or at the same time if public consultations cover changes in the legislation.

The UK government adopted new public consultation principles in 2018 to engage more effectively with citizens and introduce a feedback circle into the public consultation process. The government aims to use digital public consultation methods in early stages of policy formulation to facilitate a broader involvement, following trends in other countries to introduce online consultations in the wake of the pandemic. Consultation documents should use clear and plain language, so they are easy for the public to understand.

Deliberatura: Council to the street in Colombia

In the city of Buenaventura, the local council and mayor meet with citizens to answer questions and concerns related to the city's budget. Community leaders identify and suggest discussion priorities and the meetings are held in public places in the city so that everyone can participate. Citizens are designated to follow up with politicians on the commitments discussed in the meetings, to be adopted in municipal agreements. The initiative started in 2021 and several meetings have been taken place since then. Colombia plans to replicate the practice piloted in Buenaventura in other cities to strengthen the policy co-creation process and provide innovative solutions for city development.

Source: (Chwalisz, 2021^[22]; OPSI, 2023^[23])

OECD countries face similar issues to Brazil with the under- or over-representation of certain groups in participatory processes but because of its extension, population size and administrative complexities Brazil may face additional challenges in scaling and streamlining local initiatives to the federal level. A good practice example of promoting political participation among vulnerable groups are the Finnish National dialogues, based on the experience of lockdown dialogues held by the government during the pandemic. These provide specific mechanisms to ensure that a representative group of people participated. Other more targeted initiatives, such as the Danish Senior Citizens' Council, help to strengthen participatory engagement among vulnerable groups (Box 4.3). Established Brazilian Councils, for example the National Council for the Rights of the Elderly, could look to this example for ways to increase representation in participatory engagement. In addition to measures that actively seek to recruit a more representative group of citizens to take part in participatory initiatives, diverse individuals may also be more likely to participate if they believe these initiatives will have an impact. One example of boosting the incentive to participate is the European Citizens Initiative, which offers EU citizens an avenue to directly propose legislation (Box 4.3).

Box 4.3. Signature initiatives to increase participation

Finnish National Dialogues

The Finnish National Dialogues are a social dialogue initiative aimed at increasing communication and exchanges between public institutions and civil society. The National Dialogues cover different themes, and a new form of dialogue on the topic of immigration is currently being piloted, to inform policy revisions. Everyone is encouraged to participate, and summaries of the dialogues are published online.

The initiative originally emerged as a mechanism to consult citizens during the COVID-19 lockdowns (Lockdown Dialogues). One of the original ideas behind these lockdown dialogues was to enhance trust in public institutions in times of crisis. During the pandemic, relevant non-governmental organisations (NGOs) reached out to vulnerable communities to inform them about the ongoing dialogues and to ensure that a representative group of citizens participated in the open discussions.

National Association of Senior Citizens' Councils (Danske Ældreråd)

The Senior Citizens' Councils in Denmark were first established as a local initiative, serving as a legislated function of local municipalities to increase political engagement and influence among the population aged 60 and older. Today, the National Association of Senior Citizens' Councils (*Danske Ældreråd*) has 1 000 members from across Denmark. Senior citizens can run as candidates to represent senior citizens' interests.

National guidance and legislation ensures further representativeness by gender and ethnicity in the Senior Citizens' Councils. For example, the inclusion of women is encouraged via expense allowances, and financing for the organisation of council activities.

European Citizens' Initiative


The European Union (EU) has developed several initiatives to promote civic society participation. These initiatives attempt to strengthen the link between policy outcomes and citizens' preferences, to strengthen democratic legitimacy. For example, the European Citizens' Initiative allows citizens to propose legislation to the Commission if they can show support from at least 1 million EU citizens. At least seven EU citizens living in seven different EU countries are required to team up to register an initiative. Once the initiative is accepted, the team needs to collect a million signatures of support within 12 months. The initiative must then be submitted to the Commission within three months, together with detailed information, signatures and funding received. There have been more than 100 registration requests, some of which have been successful.

Source: Ministry of the Interior, Finland (2022), "Immigration dialogues", <https://intermin.fi/en/immigration-dialogues>; <https://www.sitra.fi/app/uploads/2022/06/sitra-lockdown-dialogues.pdf>; <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12219>; <https://epd.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/case-study-latin-america.pdf>; (Falanga et al., 2020^[24]) (Davidson, 2017^[25])

According to results from the OECD Trust Survey, Brazilians participate in various forms of political engagement, with one in five reporting posting political content online and signing petitions (Figure 4.5). This reflects the country's traditionally high voter turnout, which has tended to be at around 80% for national elections (IDEA, 2023^[26]). Even so, 27.8% of respondents stated that they did not participate in any of these forms.

Figure 4.5. After voting, posting political content and signing petitions are the most common form of political participation in Brazil

Share of respondents mentioning different forms of political participation during the last 12 months in Brazil, 2022



Note: Figure presents the share of respondents that mentioned having participated in the following forms of political participation during the last 12 months (“Over the last 12 months, have you done any of the following activities? Please tick all that apply”).

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).


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Even though the majority of people in Brazil are rather sceptical about their opportunities for meaningful engagement, a significant share feel confident about their own ability to participate in politics (34.8%), similar to the average across OECD countries (41%) (Figure 4.10).

Figure 4.6). A majority of Brazilian respondents (61.4%) also think it likely that collective action in their neighbourhood would succeed, measured as their neighbourhood’s ability to collect signatures for a petition to fund the maintenance of their streets and pavements (Figure 4.7). These results could offer some grounds for optimism, especially as people’s perceptions of their ability to participate in politics is the main driver of trust in government and the civil service in Brazil (see Chapter 2). Belief in the success of collective action in the form of a neighbourhood petition is also strongly associated with trust (Figure 4.10).

Figure 4.6. Despite their scepticism over whether government will let them have a say, many Brazilians are confident in their own ability to participate in politics

Share of respondents reporting different levels of confidence that the political system lets them have a say in government decision making and their own ability to participate in politics in Brazil and OECD average, 2021-2022




Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the questions 1) “How confident are you in your own ability to participate in politics?” (left figure) and 2) “How much would you say the political system in your country allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?” (right figure). “Confident” corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10, “neutral” to a response of 5 and “not confident” to responses of 0-4; “don't know” was a separate answer choice. OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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Figure 4.7. A majority of Brazilians believe that collective action at the local level would be successful

Share of respondents reporting different levels of likelihood that enough signatures for a petition to be successful could be collected in their neighbourhood, 2022



Note: Figure presents the responses to the question “Many pavements and streets in the city are in bad condition. Imagine that the government will give funds for maintenance to neighbourhoods where residents get 500 signatures on a petition. How likely would it be that the moderators in your neighbourhood would be able to collect the 500 signatures?” “Likely” represents the aggregated responses of “very likely” and “likely”, and “unlikely” represents the aggregated responses of “very unlikely” and “unlikely”; “don't know” was a separate answer choice.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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These more positive results about the potential for successful collective action and people's own ability to participate in politics suggest there may be room to improve and shape representative deliberative processes, even if Brazilians have little trust in more traditional democratic institutions (Chapter 2). Box 4.4 gives an example of one such process in Ireland. Alongside initiatives to strengthen representative institutions such as political parties – for instance taking a proactive approach to enhance transparency and good governance, by ensuring accountability of leaders and democratic candidate selection procedures or promoting participative decision-making processes within organisations – investing in initiatives to provide Brazilians with more information on political processes and opportunities to influence policies could also generate significant trust gains. Implementing participatory programmes in schools, like the mock elections in Norwegian schools, could promote participatory engagement from an early age (Box 4.5). Brazil could tap into its existing Brazilian National Youth Conferences, shaping the political education of the youngest generation (Silveira Rocha and Gonçalves Brasil, 2021^[27]).

Box 4.4. Representative deliberative processes in Ireland

Deliberative processes are used to inform recommendations on policy questions, gather opinions on policy issues, collect evaluations before ballots and create permanent representative deliberative bodies. In representative deliberative processes, citizens are selected randomly to participate in face-to-face deliberation with public authorities. In Latin America, however, even though deliberative processes are widely used, countries often do not randomly select the citizens taking part.

The Irish Citizens' Assembly (2016-2018)

The Irish Citizens' Assembly involved 100 randomly selected citizens who discussed five legal and policy issues: the 8th amendment of the constitution on abortion, ageing populations, referendum processes, fixed-term parliaments and climate change. The Assembly's recommendations were submitted to parliament for further debate. Based on its recommendations, the government called a referendum on amending the 8th amendment and declared a climate emergency.

Source: (OECD, 2020^[20]); <https://www.citizensassembly.ie/enn>

Box 4.5. Mock elections in Norwegian schools

Norwegians show high levels of trust, with many people are confident in their own ability to participate in politics (OECD, 2022^[28]). Political education in school is one means to engage people in the democratic process from an early age. In Norway, schools conduct mock elections in the weeks leading up to local and parliamentary elections. Norway has been conducting mock elections now for over 70 years, the only country to do so.

The exercise includes debates and interaction with party members from youth organisations, held one week before local or parliamentary elections. These debates familiarise students with the political realm and train them to be active democratic citizens, by increasing democratic accountability. A study on the impact of political education at schools in Norway showed that mock elections had a positive effect on students' willingness to vote in parliamentary elections (Borge, 2016^[29]).

Source: (Borge, 2016^[29])

4.1.3. Opportunities for enhancing communication and engagement between government and population

This section summarises the main findings and presents potential policy avenues Brazil could consider to improve openness and strengthen public trust in Brazil.

- Brazil has long been a regional leader in mainstreaming transparency, yet only one-third of respondents (35%) – less than in other Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries – believe that information about administrative procedures would be easily available, which is a significant driver of trust in the civil service. To improve these perceptions Brazil could:
 - Adopting a comprehensive approach to transparency by proactively communicating the relevant information and data to people, and providing guidance on how to access public information.
 - Developing initiatives to strengthen inclusive communication.
- Voter turnout in Brazil is high (around 80% for national elections), and federal and subnational governments have established innovative tools to promote political participation. However, when asked in April 2022, most Brazilian respondents were sceptical about whether they could have an effective political voice and meaningful engagement. Only one in three believe they could influence community decisions and only one in five believe the government would adopt ideas provided in public consultations, both important drivers of trust in public institutions. Based on this analysis, Brazil could:
 - Developing and strengthening participatory initiatives that incentivise and support political engagement, in particular reaching out to the most vulnerable groups and ensuring their representation in participatory engagement.
 - Enhancing feedback and communication with people about how their views are considered in policy making, potentially offering considerable improvements in trust levels.
- One-third of people in Brazil (35%) are confident in their ability to participate in politics, similar to the OECD average, and 61% believe initiatives requiring collective action in their community would succeed. Yet, political parties, the institutions that ensure people's interests are represented in decision making, are the least trusted institutions. To improve participation, Brazil could:
 - Improving people's attitudes about their ability to participate proactively in politics by sharing more information about political processes and opportunities to influence policies.
 - Reinforcing political participation through measures such as participatory programmes in schools and strengthening political parties, for example by democratising candidate selection procedures or decision making.

4.2. Integrity

The OECD refers to public integrity as shared ethical values and principles and the continuous prioritisation of public over private interests in the public sector. Integrity laws and policies aim to promote public integrity by nurturing a change of culture in the public sector and the whole of society, while establishing a coherent and comprehensive framework of effective vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms (OECD, 2017^[30]; OECD, 2020^[31]; OECD, 2021^[32]). Positive perceptions of a country's public integrity are crucial for public trust (OECD, 2017^[3]; Murtin et al., 2018^[33]), and have also been found to increase policy support and compliance, for example with (costly) climate policies (Kitt et al., 2021^[34]). Similarly, public sector integrity is an important component of open government: initiatives and policies that promote transparency and accountability often also facilitate the reporting and detection of corruption and fraud and vice versa (Huberts, 2018^[35]). For instance, a study on the use of participatory health councils in Brazil shows that they are associated with a reduction in corruption in municipalities (Avelino, Barberia and Biderman, 2013^[36]).

The OECD Framework on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions considers integrity in relation to the government's mandate to use powers and public resources ethically, by upholding high standards of behaviour, committing to fight corruption and promoting accountability. The OECD Trust Survey includes three questions to measure integrity, addressing petty corruption of public employees, “revolving doors” for high-level political officials, and political influence and horizontal accountability between different branches of the government:

- *If a public employee were offered money by a citizen or a firm for speeding up access to a public service, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that they would refuse it?*
- *If a high-level political official was offered the prospect of a well-paid job in the private sector in exchange for a political favour, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that they would refuse it?*
- *If a court is about to make a decision that could negatively impact on the government's image, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the court would make the decision free from political influence?*

Given that in Brazil, as in many Latin American countries, “clientelist” relations are seen as widespread (Rocha, Souza and Araújo, 2019^[37]; Koster and Eiró, 2021^[38]), an additional question was piloted in the OECD Trust Survey in Brazil aiming to gauge the importance of knowing someone to access public goods and services:

- *Do you consider it important to know someone who would help you to access public goods and/or services, for example, to receive social benefits, to obtain a place in a public school or a medical appointment?*

4.2.1. Despite robust policies to improve government integrity, efforts still seem to fall short of citizens expectations and perceptions of corruption


Since its transition to democracy, Brazil has developed a comprehensive legal framework to promote public integrity and tackle corruption. Relevant integrity standards include the Code of Professional Ethics of the Public Servants of the Federal Executive Branch, Law 8112/1990 regulating the civil service regime; Law 12846/2013, known as the Anti-Corruption Law; and Law 12813/2013 on conflicts of interest for public officials of the Federal Executive Branch (OECD, 2021^[32]). In addition to this legal framework, in 2021 Brazil established the Public Integrity System of the Federal Executive Branch (*Sistema de Integridade Pública do Poder Executivo Federal*- SIPEF) and in May 2023 it created the Federal Public Administration's System of Integrity, Transparency and Access to Information (*Sistema de Integridade, Transparência e Acesso à Informação da Administração Pública Federal*- SITAI), intended to mainstream integrity policies within federal entities. This is of particular relevance considering that Brazil's integrity system at the federal level is steered by three main actors covering different branches of government: the Office of the Comptroller General of the Union (*Controladoria-Geral da União*, CGU), the Public Ethics Commission (*Comissão de Ética Pública*, CEP) and the Federal Court of Accounts (*Tribunal de Contas da União*, TCU) (OECD, 2021^[32]).

Despite this well-developed institutional and legal framework, challenges remain. The different agencies' responsibilities need to be streamlined (OECD, 2021^[32]) and expectations of public integrity in Brazil are low. Experts characterise political corruption in the country as pervasive (V-Dem, 2022);⁴ Brazil scores 0.55 on the Political Corruption Index (where 0 indicates the lowest corruption level and 1 the highest; Figure 4.8). Brazil also scores 38 out of 100 points on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (where 0 indicates a country is highly corrupt and 100 that it is very clean) (Transparency International, 2022). Several studies have found that corruption is among the top issues of concern for Brazilian people (Avis, Ferraz and Finan, 2018^[39]). Addressing corruption in the public sector and establishing coherent and clear public integrity frameworks has been a common challenge across the LAC

region (OECD, 2019^[40]), and comparable data from the Latinobarometer show a high and long-standing perception of corruption among public servants and politicians (Latinobarómetro, 2023^[41]).


Figure 4.8. Brazil is around the regional average on the Political Corruption Index

V-Dem Political Corruption Index in Brazil, LAC countries and average, 2022



Note: Figure presents the country scores of the V-Dem Political Corruption Index, which measures six different forms of corruption across the executive, legislative and judicial branches, and can be further disaggregated into the executive corruption index and the public sector corruption index. The index ranges from 0 (less corruption) to 1 (more corruption), in contrast to other V-Dem indices, which have higher democratic components on the upper end. LAC refers to the unweighted average across LAC countries.


Source: V-Dem, 2022.

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According to the OECD Trust Survey, a majority of respondents in Brazil (60.2%) believe that if public employees were offered money for speeding up access to a public service, they would be unlikely to refuse it, similar to perceptions in Colombia (60.1%) and Mexico (68.9%), and above the average across OECD countries (40.1%) (Figure 4.9).


Figure 4.9. Most of Brazilian respondents do not believe that a public employee would refuse a bribe

Share of respondents indicating different levels of likelihood that a public employee would refuse a bribe in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and the OECD average, 2021-2022



Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the question "If a public employee were offered money by a citizen or a firm for speeding up access to a public service, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that they would refuse it?". "Likely" corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10, "neutral" to a response of 5 and "unlikely" to responses of 0-4; "don't know" was a separate answer choice. OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries. In Mexico the question was asked in a slightly different way.


Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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Similarly, when Brazilian people were asked about the relevance of help in accessing public goods and services, 64.6% of respondents agreed that contacts are important (Chapter 3, Figure 3.9). Trust in the federal government is more than twice as high among respondents who attach less importance to such clientelist relations or who are confident about the success of collective actions than among those who are sceptical about these two aspects (Figure 4.10). This suggests that perceptions about petty corruption are linked with other informal practices, such as clientelism or nepotism, that are detrimental to public integrity (Nichter, 2018^[42]; Ansell, 2018^[43]), and are underscored as a key concern in the forthcoming OECD Public Integrity Review of Brazil.


Figure 4.10. People who believe contacts are not important for accessing public services or are confident in the success of collective actions have greater trust in government

Share of respondents who have high or moderately high trust in the federal government in Brazil, by their perception of the importance of clientelistic relationships and the likelihood that collective action will succeed, 2022



Note: Figure presents the responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust the national government?” “High or moderately high trust” corresponds to responses of 6-10. Trust responses are disaggregated by perceptions of the importance of clientelistic relations (“Do you consider it important to know someone who could help you access public goods and/or services, for example, receive social benefits, obtain a place in a public school or a form to attend a medical center?”) and the likelihood of success of collective action (“Many pavements and streets in the city are in bad condition. Imagine that the government will give funds for maintenance to neighbourhoods where residents get 500 signatures on a petition. How likely would it be that the moderators in your neighbourhood would be able to collect the 500 signatures?”).

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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In addition to petty corruption and clientelism, systemic corruption at higher levels of government is a particular challenge for Brazil. High-level corruption scandals contribute to increasing mistrust towards the political system and pose threats to the democratic process. Recent corruption scandals, such as the *Mensalão* and especially the large-scale *Lava Jato* (Car Wash) scandal⁵, seem to have had a big impact on people’s perception of government as well as trust in public institutions (Samuels and Zucco, 2018^[44]; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2023^[45]). Although it is difficult to estimate the effects of large corruption scandals on Brazilians’ attitudes toward politics, a study that collected data with an experimental survey in Brazil found that respondents who were primed to think about the scandal were more disengaged from politics (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2023^[45]).

To tackle widespread integrity issues, whether “everyday” petty corruption, or larger scandals, a systemic shift is needed. Such a shift cannot focus merely on tackling corruption but must go hand in hand with cultural changes placing trust as the core strategy for the public administration, and communicating integrity values and positive actions, even at the individual level. As the OECD’s Recommendation on Public Integrity highlights, management and integrity training to support ethical leadership and codes of conduct in the public sector workforce are important mechanisms for strengthening awareness about public integrity standards and creating a culture of integrity (OECD, 2017^[30]). Brazil has had limited and fragmented integrity programmes and training courses, not well advertised, yet its efforts have been

renewed through the SITAI. A good example of mainstreaming training across the whole country is the Flemish Public Service integrity training (Box 4.6).

Box 4.6. Public service integrity training in Flanders, Belgium

The **Flemish Agency for Government Employees** offers practical training to public officials that differs from traditional training methods.

Rather than providing public officials with recommendations and guidelines, officials are presented with practical scenarios that may arise in their daily work, which pose ethical dilemmas. These scenarios do not have clear solutions, and the facilitator encourages participants to engage in discussions about how to resolve them with integrity. The main focus is on the debate and exploration of different choices and behaviour, which allows participants to identify opposing values.

Source: (OECD, 2019^[46])

Brazil could also further improve its efforts to mainstream integrity policies throughout the public administration, for instance building on the new SITAI to clarify responsibilities with other programmes in place and create a more agile system that avoids overlaps (OECD, 2021^[32]).

Finally, as part of ongoing initiatives led by the main integrity actors in Brazil, one frequently cited area where anti-corruption regulations in Brazil fall short of international standards is the whistle-blowing regulation (Transparency International, 2019^[47]). Indeed, a World Bank study carried out in 2021 stated many civil servants reported that they witnessed some form of unethical behaviour while in office but most refrained from reporting it, citing a lack of protection of whistle-blowers as the main barrier to doing so (World Bank, 2021^[48]). Brazil could take the opportunity of the Anticorruption Plan20 by the Inter-ministerial Committee against Corruption (*Comitê Interministerial de Combate à Corrupção*, CCIC), which has already worked on implementing a whistle-blower regulation, to further strengthen the proposed framework.


4.2.2. There is a widespread perception that public policies may be captured by vested interests at the expense of the public interest

Beyond the visible and illegal forms of corruption, such as bribery, other more subtle activities may skew public decision making away from what is in the public interest. Brazil lacks provisions on pre- and post-public employment restrictions for public servants and for public officials in the Federal Executive Branch. Those at risk include those who have regular contact with the private sector including officials working in public procurement, regulatory policy, inspections, tax and customs. Brazil also lacks appropriate regulations on post-public employment for national representatives in the legislative branch, leaving the door open to undue or unfair influence over government decision making (OECD, forthcoming).

At the start of this decade, Latinobarometer found that 74.3% of Brazilians perceive the country to be governed by a few powerful groups in their own interest, with 15.8% thinking members of congress are corrupt (Figure 4.11). These findings are also reflected in results from the OECD Trust Survey: most Brazilian respondents identify issues with “revolving doors” between the public and private sector. Only two out of ten people say that a high-level political official would refuse a well-paid job in return for a political favour (19.7%), compared to around three out of ten respondents in Colombia (33%) and across OECD countries (30.4%) (Figure 4.12).

Figure 4.11. Almost 16% of respondents in Brazil believe that Congress representatives are involved in corruption

Share of respondents who report corruption among the following institutions in Brazil and LAC countries, 2020




Note: Figure presents the responses to the question: “How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?” It shows the share of respondents mentioning each of the following political actors: members of parliament, local government and civil servants. LAC refers to the unweighted average across LAC countries
Source: Latinobarometer, 2020.

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Figure 4.12. Perception of revolving doors practices is a challenge in Brazil

Share of respondents indicating different levels of likelihood that a high-level political official would refuse to grant a political favour in exchange for a private-sector job in Brazil, Colombia and the OECD average, 2021-2022



Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the question “If a high-level politician was offered the prospect of a well-paid job in the private sector in exchange for a political favour, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that they would refuse it?” “Likely” corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10, “neutral” to a response of 5 and “unlikely” to responses of 0-4; “don’t know” was a separate answer choice. OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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The scepticism among the Brazilian population might be linked to the absence of lobbying regulations and significant gaps in the regulation of political finance (Transparency International, 2019^[47]). For instance, academic research has found that specific sectors and companies have long benefitted from deals in exchange for financing political campaigns (Boas, Hidalgo and Richardson, 2014^[49]). Brazil could take the opportunity of ongoing discussions about lobbying practices and regulations to develop a comprehensive and dedicated law to ensure transparency of lobbying activities, using participatory initiatives to gather input from citizens. Brazil could use examples from other OECD countries as its inspiration to develop a lobbying regulation coherent with the existing integrity framework (Box 4.7) (OECD, forthcoming).

Box 4.7. Lobbying practices in Chile and Ireland

Chile

Chile enacted a Lobbying Regulation in 2014 (Lobbying Law 20.730/2014). It requires all lobbying activities, as covered by the regulation, to be disclosed in a public registry, for instance regular meetings. The regulation applies to paid lobbyists, but also unpaid individuals as well as political actors, civil servants and individuals from other public agencies. Lobbying information is publicly available at <https://www.infolobby.cl>. The online portal is managed and designed by the Transparency Council (*Consejo para la Transparencia*) and publishes information on lobbyists and about meetings, trips and donations disaggregated by public agency.

Ireland


The Irish regulations on lobbying were developed through a wide consultation process that gathered opinions on its design, structure and implementation. The 2015 Regulation of Lobbying Act is simple and comprehensive: any individual, company or NGO that seeks to directly or indirectly influence officials on a policy issue must list themselves on a public register and disclose any lobbying activity. The rules cover any meeting with high-level public officials, as well as letters, emails or tweets intended to influence policy. According to regulation, a lobbyist is anyone who employs more than 10 individuals, works for an advocacy body, is a professional paid by a client to communicate on someone else's behalf or is advocating about land development. In addition to the law, on 28 November 2018, the Standards in Public Office Commission launched its Code of Conduct for persons carrying out lobbying activities. It came into effect on 1 January 2019 and is meant to be reviewed every three years.

Source: Regulation of Lobbying Act and website <https://www.lobbying.ie>; Lobbying Law No. 20.730 of 2014; <http://www.infolobby.cl/>.

Weaknesses in the checks and balances between branches of government could be another source of the perception that the system works in the favour of particular interest groups. People in Brazil are quite sceptical about the independence of courts from political power (Figure 4.13). While on average in OECD countries, 42.2% feel that a court would make a decision free from political influence if the decision could negatively influence the government's image, in Brazil only 22.2% of respondents felt the same way. In turn, results from the Rule of Law Index show Brazil is in line with the regional average on governmental and non-governmental constraints (Figure 4.14). These results align with other surveys conducted on perceptions of public integrity in Brazil (World Bank, 2021^[48]). They are worrying as they suggest Brazilian people have little confidence in their system's checks and balances, which provide the horizontal accountability that should be at the core of democracy. Nevertheless, historical survey data show that the share of the population who believe the judiciary to be corrupt has fallen over time (Avis, Ferraz and Finan, 2018^[39]; Ferraz and Finan, 2011^[50]).

Figure 4.13. Few Brazilians expect the courts to act independently of political pressure

Share of respondents who indicate that courts are free from political pressure in Brazil, Colombia and the OECD average, 2021-2022




Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the question “If a court is about to make a decision that could negatively impact on the government’s image, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the court would make the decision free from political influence?” “Likely” corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10, “neutral” to a response of 5 and “unlikely” to responses of 0-4; “don’t know” was a separate answer choice. OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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Figure 4.14. Constraints on government powers in Brazil are in line with the regional average

Rule of Law sub-index score in Brazil and LAC countries, 2022



Note: Figure presents the country scores of the sub-dimension of the Rule of Law Index: constraints on government powers. The World Justice Project collects nationally representative samples in a mix of face-to-face/online surveys and local expert interviews in each country. All country scores are normalised to a range between 0 (weakest adherence to the rule of law) and 1 (strongest adherence to the rule of law) and component scores are aggregated using simple averages. LAC (31) refers to the unweighted average across 31 LAC countries.


Source: WJP (2022), Rule of Law Index.

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Perceptions of judicial independence are even lower among the most vulnerable population groups in Brazil (Figure 4.15). Among younger adults (18-29 year-olds), 20.4% believe in the independence of the courts, compared to 24.3% of people aged 30-49. Regional differences are also stark. People in the North (26%) are most optimistic about the free decision making of courts, whereas people living in the Centre-West are the least positive (19.3%). In contrast to other indicators of perceptions of government integrity, women are more likely to believe in the courts' independence from political influence: the gap between women and men stands at 4 percentage points.

Figure 4.15. Perceptions on the political independence of the courts vary by age, gender and region

Share of respondents in Brazil who indicate they think it likely that courts are free from political pressure by age, education, gender, socio-economic status and region, 2022



Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the question “If a court is about to make a decision that could negatively impact on the government’s image, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the court would make the decision free from political influence?” “Likely” corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a 0-10 scale. BRA mean presents the weighted average across all respondents in Brazil. High education is defined as ISCED 2011 levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as bachelor’s, master’s or doctorates, and low education refers to below upper secondary attainment. Socio-economic status (SES) is based on household purchasing power following the Brazil Economic Classification Criteria (Critério Brasil-ABEP), which assesses respondents’ households’ access to public utility services, education and possession of several amenities. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.
Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

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4.2.3. Opportunities for strengthening public integrity and improving perceptions of corruption

This section summarises the key results and presents potential policy avenues that Brazil could consider to improve integrity and strengthen public trust.

- Perceptions of public integrity in Brazil are lower than perceptions of responsiveness, reliability, fairness and openness. Most Brazilian respondents (60.2%) believe that public employees would accept a bribe for speeding up access to services, similar to the share in other Latin American countries. To increase perceptions of public integrity Brazil could:
 - Investing in providing integrity guidance for civil servants and training to support ethical leadership.
 - Strengthening co-ordination across agencies and levels of government to mainstream integrity policies.
 - Continuing to develop a whistle-blower regulation to lay the foundations for a regulatory framework.

4.3. Fairness

Fairness is an important value and the foundation of sound public governance. Fair governance processes are closely linked with openness and integrity: corrupt practices in the public sector can hinder the fair treatment of citizens, while open and inclusive citizen engagement enables fair processes. Perceptions of fair treatment are often used as a proxy for measuring people's feelings of inclusion/exclusion and status in society (OECD, 2017^[3]). Fair treatment by government institutions also matters for trust (Ciani, Fréget and Manfredi, 2021^[51]; Frey, 2004^[52]; Lind and Arndt, 2016^[53]). Indeed, fair processes in the design and implementation of services and interaction with institutions and officials are important prerequisites for people's feelings of loyalty, co-operation and government legitimacy (OECD, 2017^[3]). The perceived fairness and competence of government may also influence preferences for redistribution of income and wealth – thereby affecting income inequality outcomes (Ciani, Fréget and Manfredi, 2021^[51]).

Another important component of trust is the perception of fairness and equality in socio-economic outcomes, not just in political processes. Academic research finds people's perceptions of fair outcomes and inequality are related to their satisfaction with democracy (Saxton, 2021^[54]). On the other hand, perceptions of unfairness can be a catalyst for political engagement if people believe they can have any influence, and as such are closely related to key values such as openness (Reyes and Gasparini, 2022^[55]; Zmerli and Castillo, 2015^[56]).

Perceptions of fairness and equality in socio-economic outcomes are particularly relevant in a large and diverse country such as Brazil. Like many countries in Latin America, Brazil still has strikingly high levels of inequality and comparatively low levels of redistribution (Higgins and Pereira, 2013^[57]; OECD, 2023^[58]).

Brazil has succeeded in reducing poverty and income inequality over a long period by expanding social protection through programmes such as *Bolsa Família/Auxílio Brasil*. However, the current social transfer system is failing to provide an effective universal and accessible social safety net (OECD, 2020^[20]) and income inequality and poverty have started to rise again after a long decline during the 2000s. A study that analysed attitudes to politics and democracy among *Bolsa Família* beneficiaries from 2007 to 2014 found that, on average, support for specific political institutions, such as trust in local governments, is higher among those beneficiaries than among people without such support (Layton, 2017^[59]). Confirming the relationship between expectations of fair processes and outcomes and credibility of policies, results from the OECD Trust Survey find that perceptions of fairness have a significant and positive impact on trust in public institutions (see Chapter 2).

According to the OECD Framework on Drivers of Trust in Public institutions, fair treatment by public officials refers not just to the fairness of formal procedures, but also to the style of interactions with public officials and their behaviour during them (OECD, 2017^[3]). The OECD Trust Survey addresses fairness, covering people's perceptions of how public employees and the government interact and treat people, through three questions:


- *If a public employee has contact with the public in the area where you live, how likely or unlikely is it that they would treat both rich and poor people equally?*
- *If a government employee interacts with the public in your area, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that they would treat all people equally regardless of their gender, sexual identity, ethnicity or country of origin?*
- *If you or a member of your family would apply for a government benefit or service (e.g. unemployment benefits or other forms of income support), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that your application would be treated fairly?*

4.3.1. There is a widespread perception of unfairness in Brazil

Although it does not distinguish if referring to services at federal or subnational level, the OECD Trust Survey illustrates widespread dissatisfaction with the treatment of applications for government services in Brazil and finds that less than one in three people (33.1%) believe that their application for government benefits or services would be treated fairly. These results are slightly higher than in Colombia (28.8%), but lower than in Mexico, where more than four out of ten people (44.9%) expect fair treatment of their applications (Figure 4.16). These results confirm other findings on dissatisfaction with access to services (see Chapter 3) and scepticism over public employees' integrity (see Section 4.2).

Figure 4.16. Few Brazilians expect fair treatment of their government applications

Share of respondents reporting different levels of perceived likelihood that their application for government services or benefits would be treated fairly in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and the OECD average, 2021-2022




Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the question “If you or a member of your family would apply for a government benefit or service (e.g. unemployment benefits or other forms of income support), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that your application would be treated fairly?” “Likely” corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10, “neutral” to a response of 5 and “unlikely” to responses of 0-4; “don't know” was a separate answer choice. OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

People are similarly sceptical about public employees' ability to treat all people equally. When surveyed in April 2022, few people in Brazil reported that they thought public employees would treat people equally regardless of their economic status (19.1% of those responding); or regardless of their gender, ethnicity or sexual orientation (25.3%) (Figure 4.17). These inequalities are felt more strongly among the most vulnerable population groups. Women and people with a lower level of formal education are more likely to expect unfair treatment. The gap in perceptions of fair treatment of all people is 13 percentage points between those with below upper secondary education and those with tertiary or postgraduate attainment (Figure 4.18). Survey data suggest that structural discrimination is a challenge, and is widely accepted among the population as the reason for persistent inequalities in Brazil (Telles and Bailey, 2013^[60]). While feelings of being discriminated against are widespread across the LAC region, they are most prevalent in Brazil, where 39% of people reported that they felt discriminated against in 2020 (Latinobarómetro, 2020^[61]).

Figure 4.17. Perceptions of unfair treatment by public employees are widespread

Share of respondents indicating different levels of perceived likelihood that a public employee would treat people of different gender, ethnicity or sexual orientation equally in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and the OECD average, 2021-2022




Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the questions: 1) "If a public employee has contact with the public in the area where you live, how likely or unlikely is it that they would treat both rich and poor people equally?" (left); and 2) "If a government employee interacts with the public in your area, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that they would treat all people equally regardless of their gender, sexual identity, ethnicity or country of origin?" (right). "Likely" corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10, "neutral" to a response of 5 and "unlikely" to responses of 0-4; "don't know" was a separate answer choice. OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

Figure 4.18. Women and those with lower levels of education are more likely to expect public employees to treat people unequally

Share of respondents in Brazil who indicate they think it likely that a public employee would treat people of different gender, ethnicity or sexual orientation equally, by age, education, gender, socio-economic status and region, 2022



Note: Figure presents responses to the question “If a government employee interacts with the public in your area, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that they would treat all people equally regardless of their gender, sexual identity, ethnicity or country of origin?” “Likely” corresponds to responses of 6-10 on a scale of 0-10. BRA mean presents the weighted average across all respondents in Brazil. High education is defined as ISCED 2011 levels 5-8, i.e. university-level degrees such as bachelor’s, master’s or doctorates, and low education refers to below upper secondary attainment. Socio-economic status (SES) is based on household’s purchasing power following the Brazil Economic Classification Criteria (Critério Brasil-ABEP), which assesses respondents households’ access to public utility services, education and possession of several amenities. * means that differences in proportions are statistically significant at the 90% significance level; ** means that differences are statistically significant at the 95% level; *** means that differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. Reference group in light blue.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).


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Civil servants seem to carry inherent biases and have occasionally shown resistance to changes aimed at improving the fair and equal treatment of all people. Indeed, a study of civil servants in the Brazilian National Social Security Agency (*Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social, INSS*) found that the officials’ socio-economic background affects their judgment of deservingness of beneficiaries. These judgements may feed into unequal implementation of policies and unfair treatment of disadvantaged groups (de Andrade and Pekkola, 2022^[62]). Similarly, another study analysing the National Policy on Comprehensive Health of the Black Population (*Política Nacional em Saúde Integral da População Negra, PNSIPN*) found that its implementation faced challenges because agents did not agree with the proposal of offering differentiated attention to the black population and resisted the PNSIPN’s formal guidelines and rules (Silva et al., 2022^[63]).

These findings pair with concerns and policy demands in Brazil, as a large majority (74%) demand more government action on promoting equal opportunities (Figure 4.19). The promotion of equal opportunities by the federal government was mentioned more frequently than on average in OECD countries (62.9%). Of all the policies surveyed, it was the one that most respondents named when asked where the government should increase its efforts.

Figure 4.19. A large majority in Brazil wants the government to do more to promote equal opportunities for all

Share of respondents indicating different levels of priority for the government on the policy issue of providing equal opportunities for all in Brazil, Colombia and the OECD average, 2021-2022



Note: Figure presents the distributions of responses to the question “On the following issues, do you think the government should be prioritising them a lot less / less / about the same / more / a lot more?” in reference to the policy priorities of providing equal opportunities for all in Brazil?“. ‘More’ and ‘a lot more’, and ‘less’ and ‘a lot less’ are combined under labels ‘more’ and ‘less’, respectively. OECD (22) refers to the unweighted average across 22 OECD countries.

Source: OECD Trust Survey (<http://oe.cd/trust>).

StatLink  <https://stat.link/x6af4k>

The government should ensure vulnerable groups do not bear the cost of policy design failures, as they are often the most exposed to the complexity of the public administration. The implementation of public service delivery can serve to reinforce or reproduce inequalities, where the desired outcomes are mediated by civil servants’ powers of discretion, informed by their background, beliefs, behaviour and daily practices. Regularly collecting and publishing data on vulnerable groups in an open format may help to target policies, tackle inequalities and vulnerabilities, and understand how people of different backgrounds experience interactions with public institutions (Box 4.8).

Box 4.8. Addressing inequalities using government open data in Australia

Data visualisation is an important tool for governments to use to show inequalities across regions or vulnerable population groups and make it accessible and understandable to the public.

Government strategies on publishing disaggregated open data varies across OECD countries. **Australia**, for example, uses open data portals to publish granular data on several statistical indicators. Australian Government’s Open Data Agenda established the central online portal: <http://data.gov.au/>. Data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics is published to show differences across states and territories, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, migrants and ethnicity, age, disabilities and many other variables.


Source: (Ansari, Barati and Martin, 2022^[64]); <http://data.gov.au/>

4.3.2. Increasing the representativeness of the public administration and politicians strengthens inclusive processes

Brazil has introduced initiatives and binding laws to promote the representation of minorities in politics. These include gender quotas and requiring parties to distribute political finances equally among white⁶ and black candidates at the municipal level (IDEA, 2023^[65]). Brazil's legislation recognises the right of under-represented groups to participate in policy making, for example, the participation of indigenous communities through the National Council of Indigenous Policies and the National Council to Fight Discrimination against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Individuals. However, the political representation of women is still low in Brazil compared to other LAC countries (Figure 4.20). For other vulnerable population groups, the figures are even worse: while black people account for half of the population in the country, only one-quarter of representatives in Congress are black, as are only 3 of the 54 senators elected in 2022 (Folha de São Paulo, 2022^[66]). These shortcomings are relevant as equal representation of all population groups in formal political and deliberative processes increases people's feeling of having a say and their trust in public institutions (OECD, 2017^[3]). Brazil may therefore need to strengthen representativeness in its politics, and could use other countries' initiatives as an example (Box 4.9).

Figure 4.20. Brazil ranks last among many Latin American countries for the share of women in Congress

Share of women in parliament in Brazil, LAC countries, 2023



Note: Ranking and shares of women in parliament as of 1 January 2023.

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union Open Data.

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Box 4.9. Towards gender equality in politics in Latin America and the Caribbean

In 2015, all Latin American and Caribbean countries committed to a “Parity Democracy” Framework to promote gender equality in politics. The Framework provides policy targets for countries with a focus on changing political parties’ and organisational structures. One of the Framework’s targets states that countries should strive to monitor progress by collecting and publishing granular data and carrying out gender analysis.

Despite a legislated candidate gender quota (minimum 30% of each sex), Brazil is behind on women’s participation in public decision-making processes (IDEA, 2023^[67]). Similarly, other groups face difficulties in entering politics.

In other countries, several policies and initiatives have proven helpful to increase equal representation in politics and public decision making:

- **Political parties’ policies:** These include the adoption of measures and guidelines for the prevention of political discrimination and violence, as well as sanctioning measures. These should cover campaigning and political mandates. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) provides recommendations for party strategies to tackle racism and discrimination and two Colombian parties have adopted the framework to the Colombian context (National Democratic Institute, 2023^[68]).
- **Associations, training and mentoring:** Women’s caucuses have proven useful for promoting gender equality and gender policies, where female members of parliament from different parties engage in several activities. The Inter-Parliamentary Union’s 2013 guidelines provide further information and tools for politicians.
- **Public financing:** In Brazil, women’s campaigns are indirectly financed through free phone airtime. Additionally, current efforts to finance leadership training for women could be expanded and promoted more widely, looking at examples from Panama, Mexico or Costa Rica.

Source: (Jennifer M. Piscopo, 2020^[69]; IPU, 2023^[70]; IDEA, 2023^[71]; National Democratic Institute, 2023^[68])

Brazil also faces imbalances in representation in the public workforce. According to a 2018 study, the share of women in the Brazilian public sector stood at 44.8%. Moreover, approximately 64% of public servants identified as white, rising to around 75% in management, compared to 43% of the Brazilian population. A diverse public sector workforce is often said to increase innovation by bringing together different views and skills on policy design (Nolan-Flecha, 2019^[72]). Setting a diversity and inclusion strategy and identifying and collecting data on the diversity of the workforce as well as promoting coaching and diversity training, have been shown to be helpful in increasing diversity and inclusion in OECD countries (OECD, 2021^[73]). A cross-country survey administered by the OECD in 26 EU member states in 2015 provided an improved understanding of these countries’ approaches to managing diversity within their public administration. It suggests a multidimensional process to build and implement robust diversity management, which Brazil could draw on to improve its practices (Box 4.10). Further, diversity training offers an important tool to promote an inclusive public workforce. The Ethnic Communities Graduate Programme in New Zealand aims to promote the representation of minorities in the public sector and in leadership positions and could serve as a leading example (Box 4.11). Participants of the programme explained how their participation affected the views of their communities about the government by promoting diversity in the public service and being able to understand and react to people’s needs.

Box 4.10. Elements to build and implement robust diversity management

The OECD highlights the following elements to build robust diversity management, with the aim of contributing to innovation, performance and trust:

- collecting a wider range of diversity data;
- adopting clear diversity targets;
- building an action plan and implementing it;
- including diversity-related elements in leadership competency frameworks and development;
- providing flexible working arrangements and career patterns' to ensure employees' work-life balance and engagement across the life-cycle;
- assessing the efficiency of the diversity policies implemented: monitoring on a regular basis to adjust it if needed.

Source: OECD/EUPAN, 2015.

Box 4.11. Ethnic Communities Graduate Programme in New Zealand

The Ethnic Communities Graduate Programme in New Zealand, which started in 2021, promotes early career graduates from ethnic communities to get a first employment opportunity in the public service. Graduates work for 18 months in one of New Zealand's public agencies. The programme addresses the representation of ethnic minorities and their barriers to entering the public service. In the long run, New Zealand's Ministry for Ethnic Communities envisions broadening the public service's cultural competency by increasing its representativeness and reflecting the ethnically diverse communities of New Zealand. In the future, the programme hopes to change the public service in accordance with future societal changes.

Source: (Ministry for Ethnic Communities New Zealand, 2023^[74])

4.3.3. Opportunities for improvement for promoting fairness across public institutions

This section summarises key results and presents potential policy avenues Brazil could consider to improve fairness and strengthen public trust in the country.

Over a long period, Brazil succeeded in decreasing income inequality. Nevertheless, when consulted in April 2022, Brazilians reported high perceptions of unequal treatment and inequalities. According to the OECD Trust Survey, few people (19%) believe their application for government benefits would be treated fairly, and the perception of fair treatment of applications is a significant driver of trust in government. To improve these perceptions Brazil could:

Increasing efforts to tackle structural inequalities and ensuring fair social and economic treatment of all population groups in political processes and in the interaction with public officials, for example by providing inclusiveness training to public officials and publishing data and results on population subgroups for an open debate.

- Most people in Brazil are sceptical that public employees would treat all people equally, regardless of their economic status (62%) and their gender, ethnicity or sexual orientation (52%). At the same time, perceptions of fair treatment regardless of economic or demographic status are the most important drivers of trust in the civil service. Brazil could:
 - Investing in building a more diverse public workforce, aiming at greater representation of underrepresented groups. Extending this opportunity to all levels of government that are beyond the reach of federal agencies would be beneficial.

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Notes

¹ Transparency refers to stakeholder access to, and use of, public information and data concerning the entire public decision-making process, including policies, initiatives, salaries, meeting agendas and minutes, budget allocations and spending, etc. Information and data disclosed should serve a purpose and meet citizens’ needs (OECD, 2017^[5]).

² Network on Open and Innovative Government in Latin America and the Caribbean – OECD, www.oecd.org/gov/open-government-in-latin-america-and-caribbean.htm.

³ These vulnerable population groups include Afro-Brazilians, senior citizens, children and adolescents, youth, the LGBT community, women, indigenous groups, the homeless and people with disabilities. The inclusion of these population groups in the participatory budgeting has shown to increase redistribution and fight social exclusion. A review of the deliberative processes in Sao Paulo can be found in Hernández-Medina (2010^[75]).

⁴ The Corruption Index measures six distinct types of corruption covering different areas and levels of the polity realm, distinguishing between executive, legislative and judicial corruption. Within the executive realm, it also distinguishes between corruption mostly pertaining to bribery, and corruption due to embezzlement. Measures differ across government levels and the index measures corruption in the executive, cabinet and public sector.

⁵ Over the last years, large-scale corruption scandals have gained public attention in Brazil. The Mensalão (2005) was an illegal scheme of campaign contributions that supported a vote-buying arrangement within President Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva’s (Lula) congressional coalition. The Mensalão trial attracted impressive public interest and resulted in the conviction of 25 of Brazil’s leading political figures, and incarceration of 19 of them. The Lava Jato (Car Wash- 2014) case refers to a corruption scheme at the heart of the state-owned oil giant Petrobras, which involved 11 of the country’s largest companies. According to the investigation, Petrobras executives accepted bribes in exchange for contracts and used these resources to finance elections. Over six years, prosecutors and judges signed 278 leniency and plea bargain agreements with individuals and corporations, arrested at least 546 suspects, conducted 1 864 searches throughout the country, issued 195 indictments, imposed millions of dollars in fines, and convicted 219 defendants. The scandal implicated politicians from 28 different political parties. Yet, the debate over the integrity of the process, as well as private interests of actors involved remain a highly contentious issue in Brazil.

⁶ The *Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística* (IBGE) defines *População branca* as those who identify as descended from European immigrants, adapted from IBGE’s institutional definition.

Annex A. Methodological notes on the OECD Trust Survey implemented in Brazil

The OECD Trust Survey, carried out by the OECD Directorate for Public Governance, had around 2 000 respondents per country in the twenty-two participating OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In Brazil, the survey was implemented online with a final sample of 4 140 respondents.

The survey process and implementation were guided by an Advisory Group comprised of public officials from the *Controladoria-Geral da União* (CGU), representatives of National Statistical Offices from Brazil and Colombia, and international experts, including representatives from Latinobarometer, the Americas Barometer (LAPOP) and the Inter-American Development Bank.

The survey was conducted online by the survey company Netquest between 7 April and 6 May 2022, sourced by Netquest's and its partners panel in Brazil.

The Trust Survey questionnaire was prepared in English, translated into Portuguese and reviewed by CGU's public officials and public governance specialists that were also part of the Advisory Group established for the Trust Survey in Brazil.

The OECD Trust Survey uses an eleven-point scale for the response choices on questions about levels of trust and drivers of trust, following reviewed best practices (OECD, 2017^[1]) and applications in country studies in Korea, Finland, Norway, and New Zealand (OECD/KDI, 2018^[2]; OECD, 2021^[3]; OECD, 2022^[4]; OECD, 2023^[5]). A numerical 0-10 scale with verbal scale anchors is recommended and used here for survey questions on trust and drivers of trust, as it allows for variance in responses, increases overall data quality and complexity, and facilitates translatability across languages. This presents a more nuanced analysis, allowing respondents to provide a “neutral” response that other surveys do not allow.

The online survey uses a non-probability sampling approach, based on ex-ante country-level quotas representative of the Brazilian population by age, gender, level of education, socioeconomic category and region. The quotas were derived from national estimates of these population groups based on probabilistic surveys and census data. The non-probability sample construction was the most feasible option for the OECD Trust Survey given its simplicity, timeliness, and lower cost. The implementation in Brazil largely follows the same quota design as in other participating countries, with one exception. Instead of using income as a soft quota (bottom 20%, middle 60% and top 20%) (Nguyen et al., 2022^[6]), in Brazil socioeconomic categories were used following the Brazil Economic Classification Criteria (*Critério Brasil-ABEP*). The Brazil Economic Classification Criteria classifies households into five groups (A-E) based on their estimated purchasing power. It assesses access to public utility services, level of education and possession of several amenities (such as bathroom, dishwasher, freezer, etc.) (ABEP, 2021). The quotas were derived from national estimates of group prevalence based on probabilistic surveys and census data.

Responses were collected until the country-specific quotas were filled and post-stratification weights were calculated using the “random iterative method (RIM)” based on age, gender, education, region and socioeconomic status. The median interview duration was 19 minutes.

Table A A.1. Sample composition by age, gender, education, region and social class

		%	N
Age	18-24	20.7	858
	25-34	21.0	871
	35-44	19.6	815
	45-54	15.6	646
	55-64	11.9	491
	65+	11.2	459
Gender	Female	50.8	2104
	Male	49.2	2036
Education	No education or incomplete primary education (low)	20.2	837
	Completed primary or secondary school (low)	20.0	829
	Completed high school or incomplete university degree (medium)	41.3	1709
	Completed higher education (high)	18.5	765
Region	Norte	8.3	345
	Nordeste	27.7	1148
	Sudeste	42	1738
	Sul	14.3	592
	Centro- Oeste	7.7	317
Socioeconomic Category	A	3.2	131
	B1	5.2	215
	B2	16.7	692
	C1	21.8	901
	C2	25.2	1044
	D-E	27.9	1157

Note: The table shows the achieved quota by age, gender, education and socioeconomic status. This table deviates slightly from Table 2.1, which shows the weighted (and target) sample distribution.

Source: Netquest, 2022

Specification notes of the model on the drivers of trust in public institutions

The econometric results presented in Chapter 2 are based on three logistic regression analyses for establishing the main drivers of trust in the federal government, local government, and civil service in Brazil.

Based on the OECD Framework on the Drivers of Trust, respondents' perceptions of the responsiveness, reliability, openness, integrity and fairness of government and public institutions are expected to be the main drivers of trust in the three institutions (federal government, local government and the civil service). Trust in each of the institutions is recoded as a binary variable (low or no trust: 0-4 and high or moderately high trust: 6-10). Neutral responses (5) and "don't know" are excluded. The analysis operationalises government competencies and values through 15 variables, measured on a 0-10 response scale and standardised for the analysis. The model also includes six further variables: internal political efficacy, external political efficacy, satisfaction with administrative services, the perceived relevance of knowing a broker to access public services, willingness to formalise any new business and confidence in the country's ability to tackle environmental challenges.

Table A A.2. Additional variables

Indicator	Survey question
Internal political efficacy	How confident are you in your own ability to participate in politics?
External political efficacy	How much would you say the political system in [country] allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?
Satisfaction with administrative services	On a scale of 0 to 10, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the quality of administrative services (e.g. applying for an ID or a certificate of birth, death, marriage or divorce)?
Integrity: Relevance of clientelistic relations	Do you consider it important to know someone who would help you to access public goods and/or services, for example, to receive social benefits, to obtain a place in a public school or a medical appointment?
Reliability: Levels of economic informality	If you were to open a business today, would you apply for the Brazilian National Registry of Legal Entities (Cadastro Nacional de Pessoas Jurídicas – CNPJ)?
Reliability: Country's ability to tackle climate challenges	How confident are you that [country] will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the next 10 years?

The following explains the technical details about the econometric analysis.

- **Stepwise deletion:** All the drivers of trust are included in the three baseline regression models and those which are not statistically significant are deleted (stepwise deletion process). The results in this section show all the significant drivers of trust in the three institutions.
- **Model specification:** All models include survey weights and control variables for individuals' socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, education, social class and region of residence), interpersonal trust, perceptions of economic and physical insecurity, and whether the respondent voted for the parties in government. Missing data are excluded using listwise deletion.
- **Technical interpretation:** The statistically significant drivers are shown as average marginal means. The technical interpretation of the effect of government effectiveness to reduce greenhouse emissions on trust, for example, is that one standard deviation increase in the perceived likelihood that the government is effective is associated with a 10 percentage point increase in trust in the federal government. Or – taking into consideration all other variables in the model – all else being constant, moving from the typical citizen to one who is one-standard-deviation more satisfied, results in a 10 percentage point increase in trust in the federal government in Brazil.

Table A A.3. Drivers of institutional trust in Brazil

	Trust in federal government	Trust in local government	Trust in civil service
Drivers of Trust			
Fairness: Fair treatment of applications			
Fairness: Treat rich and poor equally			
Openness: Account for public consultation views			(+)
Openness: Voice views in community decisions			
Openness: Access to information on administrative procedures			
Reliability: Confidence in reducing CO ² emissions			
Reliability: Stable business conditions			
Reliability: Preparedness for a new contagious disease			
Reliability: Willingness to formalize business			
Responsiveness: Satisfaction with administrative services		(+)	
Responsiveness: Adopting innovative ideas			
Internal political efficacy: Confidence in ability to participate			(+)
Personal characteristics			
Age	(+)		
Education			
Security concerns			
Political alignment			
Interpersonal Trust			(+)

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Annex B. OECD Trust Survey Questionnaire in Portuguese for Brazil

The complete questionnaire in English can be found in the methodological background paper at <https://oe.cd/trust>

OECD TRUST SURVEY - QUESTIONÁRIO

[Introduction shown to respondents]

"Como parte de seu trabalho sobre a confiança das pessoas no governo, a Organização para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Econômico (OECD) encarregou a Netquest de conduzir esta pesquisa sobre uma variedade de tópicos relativos à sua experiência e avaliação do governo e das instituições públicas.

A pesquisa leva, em média, 10 a 12 minutos para ser concluída. Os dados desta pesquisa serão tratados de forma anônima e confidencial.

Por favor, clique na flecha abaixo para continuar".

1. NÍVEIS DE CONFIANÇA (2 perguntas)

P1. Para começar, uma pergunta geral sobre confiança. Em uma escala de 0 a 10, onde 0 é de maneira alguma e 10 é completamente, em geral, quanto você confia na maioria das pessoas?

- [De maneira alguma – Completamente - Não sei]
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

[Text shown to respondents]

"A próxima pergunta é sobre a confiança em algumas instituições brasileiras. Mesmo se você teve muito, pouco ou nenhum contato com essas instituições, por favor, baseie sua resposta em sua impressão geral".

P2. Em uma escala de 0 a 10, onde 0 é de maneira alguma e 10 é completamente, quanto você confia nos seguintes?

- Governo federal
- Governo estadual
- Governo municipal
- Congresso nacional
- Partidos políticos
- Polícia
- Servidores públicos (funcionários públicos do governo federal, estadual ou municipal não eleitos)
- Imprensa
- Poder judiciário
- Organizações internacionais

2. Determinantes de confiança nas instituições (17 perguntas)

[Text shown to respondents]

"Agora você vai ler a descrição de algumas situações que podem acontecer em qualquer país e será perguntado qual a probabilidade você acha que elas poderiam acontecer no Brasil. Por favor, responda em uma escala de 0 a 10, onde 0 significa muito improvável e 10 significa muito provável".

2.1. Integridade

P3. Se um político de alto nível recebe uma oferta de emprego bem remunerado no setor privado em troca de um favor político, você acha que ele recusaria a oferta de emprego?

- [Muito improvável que ele recuse a oferta de emprego - Muito provável que ele recuse a oferta de emprego - Não sei].
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

P4. Se um tribunal está prestes a tomar uma decisão, que pode afetar negativamente o governo, você acha que o tribunal tomaria a decisão livre de influência política?

- [Muito improvável que o tribunal tome a decisão livre de influência política - Muito provável que o tribunal tome a decisão livre de influência política - Não sei].
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

P5. Se um servidor público recebe uma oferta de dinheiro por parte de um cidadão ou de uma empresa para acelerar o acesso a um serviço público, você acha que ele recusaria a oferta?

- [Muito improvável que ele recuse a oferta de dinheiro - Muito provável que ele recuse a oferta de dinheiro - Não sei].
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

P6. Você considera importante conhecer alguém que te ajudasse a acessar bens e/ou serviços públicos, por exemplo, receber benefícios sociais, obter vaga em escola pública ou ficha para atendimento em posto médico?

- Muito importante
- Importante
- Pouco importante
- Nada importante
- Não sei
- Prefiro não dizer

2.2 Capacidade de resposta

P7. Se muitas pessoas reclamam de um serviço público que está funcionando mal, você acha que o serviço melhoraria?

- [Muito improvável que o serviço melhore- Muito provável que o serviço melhore - Não sei].
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

P8. No caso de existir uma ideia inovadora que pode melhorar um serviço público, você acha que ela seria adotada pelo responsável [órgão/ entidade públicos]?

- [Muito improvável que seja adotada - Muito provável que seja adotada - Não sei].
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

P9. Se mais da metade das pessoas expressam claramente uma opinião contra uma política nacional, você acha que essa política mudaria?

- [Muito improvável que ela mude- Muito provável que ela mude - Não sei].
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

2.3 Confiabilidade

P10. Se uma nova doença, contagiosa e grave se espalhar, você acha que as instituições públicas estariam preparadas para proteger a vida das pessoas?

- [Muito improvável que estejam preparadas - Muito provável que estejam preparadas - Não sei].
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

P11. Se você fosse compartilhar seus dados pessoais com um [órgão/entidade públicos], você acha que eles seriam usados exclusivamente para fins legítimos?

- [Muito improvável - Muito provável - Não sei].
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

P.12. Se você fosse abrir um negócio hoje, você faria a inscrição no CNPJ?

- [Muito improvável - Muito provável - Não sei].
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

P13. Você acha que as condições de negócios permanecerão estáveis e previsíveis nos próximos anos (excluindo elementos externos fora do controle do governo nacional, como uma crise econômica global, desastres naturais, etc.)?

- [Muito improvável - Muito provável - Não sei].
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

2.4 Abertura

P14. Se uma decisão que afeta sua comunidade for tomada pelo governo municipal, você acha que conseguiria expressar suas opiniões?

- [Muito improvável - Muito provável - Não sei].
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

P15. Se você precisar de informações sobre um serviço público (por exemplo: obtenção de passaporte, solicitação de benefícios, etc.), você acha que essas informações estariam facilmente disponíveis?

- [Muito improvável que elas estejam disponíveis- Muito provável que elas estejam disponíveis - Não sei].
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

P16. Se você participar de uma consulta pública sobre a reforma de uma área política importante (por exemplo: impostos, saúde, proteção ambiental), você acha que o governo adotaria as opiniões expressas na consulta pública?

- [Muito improvável - Muito provável - Não sei].
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

2.5. Equidade

P17. Se você tem contato com um servidor público, na região onde você mora, você acha que ele trataria as pessoas ricas e as pobres da mesma forma?

- [Muito improvável - Muito provável - Não sei].
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

P18. Se você interage com um servidor público de sua região, você acha que ele trataria todas as pessoas da mesma forma, independentemente de seu sexo, cor/raça ou país de origem?

- [Muito improvável - Muito provável - Não sei].
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

P19. Se você ou um membro de sua família solicitasse uma assistência ou serviço do governo (por exemplo: assistência de desemprego, auxílio Brasil ou outras formas de apoio à renda), você acha que sua solicitação seria tratada de forma justa?

- [Muito improvável - Muito provável - Não sei].
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

3. SATISFAÇÃO COM OS SERVIÇOS PÚBLICOS (5 perguntas)

P20. Em uma escala de 0 a 10, até que ponto você está satisfeito ou insatisfeito com a escola pública no Brasil?

- [Nada satisfeito - Completamente satisfeito - Não sei].
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

P21. Em uma escala de 0 a 10, até que ponto você está satisfeito ou insatisfeito com o SUS (sistema único de saúde) no Brasil?

- [Nada satisfeito - Completamente satisfeito - Não sei].
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

P22. Em uma escala de 0 a 10, até que ponto você está satisfeito ou insatisfeito com a qualidade dos serviços públicos no Brasil (por exemplo: solicitar um documento de identidade, passaporte ou uma certidão da receita federal)

- [Nada satisfeito - Completamente satisfeito - Não sei].
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

P23. Nos últimos 2 anos, você ou um de seus filhos esteve matriculado em uma escola pública no Brasil?

- Sim
- Não
- Não sei

P24. Nos últimos 12 meses, você ou alguém em sua casa utilizou o SUS (sistema único de saúde) no Brasil?

- Sim
- Não
- Não sei

4. Atitudes políticas e participação (6 perguntas)

[Text shown to respondents]

“Agora vamos fazer algumas perguntas sobre sua participação direta ou indireta na política”.

P25. Até que ponto você está confiante em sua própria capacidade de participar na política?

- Nada confiante - Muito confiante - Não sei].
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

P26. Na sua opinião, até que ponto o sistema político no Brasil permite que pessoas como você tenham voz em relação ao que o governo faz?

- [De modo algum - Muito - Não sei].
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

P27. Durante os últimos 12 meses, você realizou alguma das seguintes atividades? Por favor, assinale todas as que se aplicam

- Votou na última eleição municipal
- Entrou em contato com um político ou funcionário público municipal ou federal
- Participou de uma reunião de um sindicato, partido político ou grupo de ação política
- Participou de uma Assembleia Cidadã, de um Diálogo Cidadão ou de um Júri Cidadão
- Forneceu informações sobre ou avaliou uma política, lei ou documento do governo
- Usou ou exibiu algum material de campanha, como adesivo, broche, bandeira
- Participou de uma manifestação pública
- Assinou uma petição on-line
- Publicou, encaminhou ou compartilhou conteúdo político nas redes sociais
- Boicotou certos produtos por razões políticas
- Nenhum destes
- Prefiro não responder

P28. Muitas calçadas e ruas da cidade estão em mau estado. Imagine que o governo dará recursos para manutenção dos bairros onde os moradores conseguirem 500 assinaturas em uma petição. Quão provável seria que os moderadores do seu bairro conseguissem coletar as 500 assinaturas?

- Muito provável
- Algo provável
- Pouco provável
- Nada provável
- Não sei

P.29 Em política, as pessoas normalmente falam de "esquerda" e "direita". Numa escala em que 0 é esquerda e 10 é direita, onde colocaria o governo nacional?

- [Esquerda - Direita - Não sei].
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

P.30 Em política, as pessoas normalmente falam de "esquerda" e "direita". Numa escala em que 0 é esquerda e 10 é direita, onde se colocaria?

- [Esquerda - Direita - Não sei].
[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

5. AVALIAÇÃO DA AÇÃO DO GOVERNO EM POLÍTICAS DE LONGO PRAZO & DESAFIOS GLOBAIS (5 perguntas)

[Text shown to respondents]

“Vamos agora fazer-lhe algumas perguntas sobre os desafios enfrentados pela sociedade, hoje e no futuro. Estamos interessados em suas opiniões sobre as prioridades políticas no Brasil e na cooperação com outros países”.

P31. Sobre as seguintes questões, você acha que o governo deveria priorizá-las: mais, da mesma forma ou menos?

Proporcionar igualdade de oportunidade para todos no Brasil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Muito menos • Menos • Mais ou menos o mesmo • Mais • Muito mais • Não sei
Ajudar os trabalhadores a se adaptarem à automação e às novas tecnologias	
Reduzir a emissão de gases que causam a mudança climática	
Reduzir a dívida pública brasileira	
Criar condições para que as empresas prosperem no Brasil	

P32. Até que ponto você está confiante de que o Brasil conseguirá ter sucesso nas suas políticas para reduzir os efeitos negativos da mudança climática (tais como desmatamento, incêndios, enchentes, etc.) nos próximos 10 anos?

- Nenhuma confiança
- Pouquíssima confiança
- Um pouco confiante
- Muita confiança
- Não sei

P33. Em relação a cada um dos seguintes temas, indique se você acha que seria melhor para o Brasil agir sozinho ou em cooperação com outros países Latino-americanos? Por favor, escolha suas três questões principais para a cooperação global

- Combater a mudança climática
- Tributar as grandes empresas multinacionais, independentemente de onde estejam sediadas
- Proteção de dados pessoais e privacidade on-line
- Preparar para a próxima pandemia
- Gerenciando a migração
- Proteção a refugiados
- Reduzir a desigualdade e a discriminação
- Enfrentar notícias falsas e desinformação
- Combate ao crime internacional e ao terrorismo
- Nenhum destes
- Não sei

QUESTIONÁRIO DE BASE

"Você vai ler e responder a uma série de perguntas sobre sua vida e trabalho. Garantimos que todas as respostas serão tratadas de forma anônima e confidencial".

B1. Você é cidadão brasileiro?

- Sim
- Não
- Não sei
- Prefiro não dizer

B2. Você nasceu em outro país e se mudou para o Brasil, em algum momento de sua vida?

- Sim
- Não
- Não sei
- Prefiro não dizer

B3. Em geral, pensando no próximo ano, até que ponto você está preocupado com as finanças de sua casa e com o bem-estar social e econômico em geral?

- Nada preocupado
- Pouco preocupado
- Mais ou menos preocupado
- Muito preocupado
- Não sei
- Prefiro não dizer

B4. Se você imaginar um status na sociedade como uma escada, alguns grupos poderiam ser descritos como estando mais próximos do topo e outros mais próximos da base. Pensando em si mesmo, onde você se colocaria nesta escala?

- [Base - Topo - Não sei/ Prefiro não dizer].
[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

B5. A água utilizada na sua casa é proveniente de?

- Rede geral de distribuição
- Poço ou nascente
- Outro meio

B6. Considerando o trecho da rua no qual você mora, você diria que a rua é:

- Asfaltada/Pavimentada
- Terra/Cascalho

B7. Qual dos seguintes meios você utiliza para obter informações sobre política e assuntos atuais, pelo menos uma vez por semana:

- TV
- Rádio
- Jornais/revistas (inclusive on-line)
- Redes sociais on-line (por exemplo Facebook, Twitter ou Whatsapp)
- Outras fontes online
- Conversas com família/amigos
- Local de trabalho ou estudo

- Nenhum dos itens acima
- Prefiro não dizer

B8. Quando você lê, vê ou ouve uma notícia, quais são os três aspectos mais importantes para você decidir se a notícia é digna de confiança?

- A organização jornalística que publica a história
- A pessoa que compartilha a história
- A história tem muitos compartilhamentos, comentários ou likes nas redes sociais
- As fontes que são citadas na história
- O jornalista específico que relatou a história
- O meu instinto sobre a história

B9. Em qual cidade você costuma morar?

- [open text field]

B10. Qual é o CEP do lugar onde você costuma morar?

- [open text field]

B11. Falando do bairro onde você mora e pensando na possibilidade de ser agredido ou assaltado, você se sente muito seguro, um pouco seguro, um pouco inseguro ou muito inseguro?

- Muito seguro
- Um pouco seguro
- Um pouco inseguro
- Muito inseguro
- Não sei

B12. Como você se descreveria?

- Homem
- Mulher
- De outra forma

B.13 Você se considera branco, preto, pardo, amarelo ou indígena?

- Branco
- Preto
- Parda
- Amarela (para a pessoa de origem oriental: japonesa, chinesa, coreana, etc.)
- Indígena
- Não sei
- Prefiro não dizer

B14. Em que ano você nasceu?

- [open numerical field, 4 digits]

B15. Qual é o nível educacional mais alto que você atingiu? Por favor, assinale um

- Sem instrução ou fundamental incompleto
- Ensino fundamental completo ou médio incompleto
- Ensino médio completo ou superior incompleto
- Ensino superior completo
- Pós-graduação

B16. Qual é a sua religião?

- Católica
- Evangélica de Missão (luterana, presbiteriana, metodista, batista etc.)
- Evangélica de origem pentecostal (Assembleia de Deus, Congregação Cristã, Universal, Evangelho quadrangular etc.)
- Outra evangélica
- Espírita
- Umbanda e Candomblé
- Outras religiosidades
- Sem Religião
- Não sabe

B17. Informe o total da renda bruta mensal da sua casa em 2021

Nota: Por renda bruta mensal, entendemos antes de impostos e deduções, mas incluindo subsídios. Por casa, entendemos todas as pessoas que moram em sua casa, independentemente de serem ou não um membro de sua família.

[open numerical field] or [choice of bands based on deciles of national income distribution]

B18. Informe a renda total disponível (líquida) mensal da sua casa em 2021

Nota: Por renda mensal disponível, entendemos após impostos e outras deduções. Por casa, entendemos todas as pessoas que moram em sua casa, independentemente de serem ou não um membro de sua família.

[open numerical field] or [choice of bands based on deciles of national income distribution]

B19. Incluindo você mesmo, quantas pessoas, normalmente, moram em sua casa?

[open numerical field]

Building Trust in Public Institutions

Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions in Brazil

Brazil's public governance efforts have been seen as a model for other Latin American countries in areas such as civil service reform, open and digital government. However, in line with regional trends, trust in government and public institutions in Brazil has consistently declined in recent decades, hindering inclusive and sustainable growth, as well as social cohesion. The COVID-19 and other emerging crises have further exacerbated this trend and highlighted the need to strengthen the resilience of public institutions. Brazil is the first country in Latin America to undertake an OECD study on the main drivers of trust in public institutions, as part of a broader effort in building trustworthy relationships between the people and institutions. This report provides novel evidence on Brazilian people's expectations and evaluation of government's reliability, responsiveness, openness, integrity and fairness, based on the OECD Trust Survey. Based on this evidence, it identifies opportunities to further enhance trust, including improving the delivery and responsiveness of public services, enhancing foresight, planning, and preparedness to address long-term challenges, and promoting communication and engagement between the government and the people.



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